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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RES RICTION
DOCUMENT
A
/
Report
Review of U.S. Naval Forces -Summary of
9/1969
A
Part / (41pp)
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 10-H-57/1
SANITIZED
per RAC review 3-18-2009
RD/FR
2
Review of u.s. Naval Forces - Appendix A
9/1969
A
Report
+
3
Review of u.s. Naval Forces - Appendix B (144pp) 142
9/1969
A
Report
MANDATORY REVIEW REQUEST NLN 10-57/2
SANITIZED
per
Hr. 11-14-2013
3.3(b)(1)(5)(6)
FILE LOCATION
NSC H-Files Box H-148 Folder 2
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
NA 14029 (1-98)
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SECRET
131
VOLUME 1
National
Security
Study.
Memorandum
Number 50
A REVIEW OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES (U)
Summary of Part I
September 1969
NAVY review(s) completed
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
4-12-2016 R)
"This document contains information effecting
the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title 18,
GROUP-1
U.S.C., Section 793 and 794. The transmission
or the revelation of its contents in any manner
Excluded from automatic
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by
downgrading and declassification
law."
NSSM-50 STUDY GROUP
CERRET
SECRET
See Dof Cont Nr.
5063
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SECRET
!
A REVIEW OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES (U)
PART I
SUMMARY OF PART I COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF U.S./NATO
AND SOVIET/WARSAW PACT SINCE
1961 (U)
i
SECRET
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the DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20350
SEGRET
AMOUNT MIIN
NSSM-50/EXEC
17 September 1969
SECRET (Downgraded to Confidential upon removal of attachments)
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST
Subj: National Security Study Memorandum Number 50 -
"A Review of U.S. Naval Forces," forwarding of
Forwarded herewith is Volume 1 of 8 volumes comprising
the NSSM-50 Study, "A Review of U.S. Naval Forces".
Volumes 1 through 3 contain the final, revised edition
of Part I of NSSM-50. Volumes 4 through 8 contain Part II
and its Annexes. Volume 6 was forwarded separately on
September 5, 1969.
ROBERT A. FROSCH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Attachments
DISTRIBUTION LIST:
(See next page)
5-3034
iii
SECR
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Distribution to
I. Streeing Committee Principals
No of Copy
SECNAV
1
CNO
1
CMC
1
OASD (DDR&E) (Dr. G.L. Tucker)
1
OSD (ISA) (Hon G. Warren Nutter)
1
OASD (SA) (Mr. C.O. Rossotti)
1
STATE (Mr. Leon Sloss)
1
BUBUD (Dr. J.R. Schlesinger)
1
CIA (Mr. Jack Smith)
1
COMMERCE (Mr. Andrew Gibson, Maritime
Administrator)
1
JCS (BGEN John E. Elder, Jr., USA)
1
II. Points of Contact
WHITE HOUSE (Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.)
1
BUBUD (Mr. William A. Morrill)
2
Asst. Dir. for Air Force
STATE (Mr. Leslie H. Brown)
2
Staff Associate
OEP (Mr. Haakon Lindjord)
2
Spec Asst. for Planning
CIA (Mr. Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.)
2
Dir of Strategic Research
OSD (DDR&E) (Mr. David R. Heebner)
2
OASD (I&L) (MGEN A.T. Stanwix-hay, USA)
2
Dep ASD (Material)
OASD (M&RA) (Mr. Gus C. Lee)
2
Dir Util & Mgmt Tech
OASD (ISA) (RADM William E. Lemos, USN)
2
Dir Policy Plng & Arms Control
OASD (SA) (Dr. Arthur C. Herrington)
2
Directorate of Nav Forces Prog
OSD (COMPT) (Mr. John F. Cove)
2
Off of Directorate for Proc
ARMY (COL J.O. Shoemaker) Chief, War Plan
Div
3;
AIR FORCE (BGEN Charles W. Lenfest)
3
Dep Director for Force Dev
CMC (GEN Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC)
2
25X1
2
iv
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III. Other
UNSECNAV
1
ASN (R&D)
1
OPA
1
ASN (I&L)
1
ASN (FM)
1
ASN (M&RA)
1
I
JCS (JSTAFF)
5
CNM
2
CNA
2
OP 01
2
OP 03
2
OP 04
2
OP 05
2
OP 06
2
OP 07
2
OP 09
2
OP 090
2
OP 092
2
OP 093
2
OP 094
2
OP 095
2
OP 96
4
OP 097
2
NSSM 54
4
!
V
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SECRET
A REVIEW OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES
(PART I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
1
GEOPOLITICAL, POLITICO-MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
ASYMMETRIES
1
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. NAVAL MISSIONS
3
STRATEGIC FORCES
4
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
9
MANPOWER/PERSONNEL STATUS
23
MERCHANT MARINE FLEETS
23
COMPARISON OF THE GROSS CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. &
26
USSR NAVIES
vii
SECRET
CEODIT
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SECRET
The NSSM-50 report consists of 8 volumes:
PART I:
Volume 1 Summary of Part I
Comparative Analysis of the Naval Forces
of U.S./NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Since 1961
Volume 2 Appendix A: Strategic Forces
Volume 3 Appendix B: General-Purpose Forces
PART II:
Volume 4 Summary of Part II
Analysis of U.S. Requirements for Naval
Forces in the 1970's
Volume 5 Appendix 1: Naval Strategic Forces
Volume 6 Annex A: Naval Strategic Forces
Volume 7 Annex B: Regional Analyses
Annex C: Soviet Forward Posture Potentials
Annex D: Comparison of U.S./USSR Naval
Procurement Trends
Annex E: U.S. Bases Overseas
Annex F: Allied Defense Expenditures and
Military Forces
Annex G: Amounts and Costs of Airlift/
Sealift in 1974 Scenario
Annex H: Comparative Costs of Land-based/
Sea-based Tactical Air
Volume 8 Annex I: Northeast Asia Case
Annex J: General-Purpose Naval Force
Levels
Annex K: Navy Budget Implications
Annex L: Survivability of Naval Surface
Ships
Annex M: Technical Implications
Annex N: Amphibious Warfare Forces
Annex 0: Sizing of Ships
Annex P: Attack Submarines
ix
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SECRET
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SECRET
LIST OF TABLES
Number
Title
Page
1
Relative allocation of general purpose
4
forces to naval missions
2
U.S. and Soviet naval order of battle
11
all fleets - Mid-1969
3
NATO/PACT force levels (less US/USSR)
21
4
Percentage naval units reporting
24
readiness deficiencies in personnel
5
Total naval manpower (thousands)
24
SECRET
xi
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LIST OF FIGURES
Number
Title
Page
1
Total ballistic missile submarines
6
2
Deployable submarine ballistic missile
6
launch tubes
3
Naval strategic capability
9
4
Total number of ships
10
5
Total tonnage
10
6
Age distribution of major combatants
13
and submarines
7
U.S. cruiser-destroyer force useful
ship life remaining
14
8
Established annual expenditure for
15
general purpose naval forces (U.S.:
FYDP Program II; USSR: Program II
Equivalent)
9
Total (1962-69) expenditures for
16
general purpose naval forces (U.S.:
FYDP Program II; USSR: Program II
Equivalent)
10
Shipbuilding and conversion annual
16
expenditures: general purpose naval
forces
11
Major naval combatant cumulative
17
deliveries
12
Major naval combatant new construction
17
tonnage
13
Total USN aircraft inventory
14
Average age of all USN aircraft
19
15
?
Average age of USN fighter/attack
19
aircraft
16
Soviet operations in the Mediterranean
20
E
xiii
SECRET
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SECRET
LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)
Number
Title
Page
17
NATO/PACT force levels (including U.S.
22
and USSR)
i
18 & 19
Inventory and tonnage U.S. and Soviet
25
flag merchant fleets
SECRET
xiv
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
SECRET
April 26, 1969
National Security Study Memorandum 50
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: A Review of U.S. Naval Forces
The President has directed that a study be undertaken of
U.S. Naval Forces. The study should be conducted in two
parts:
Part I will be a comparative analysis of U.S., Soviet,
other NATO, and other Warsaw Pact naval forces from 1961
to the present. This analysis should include a comparison,
to the extent possible, of numbers, types, capabilities, ages,
unit costs (For those built since 1961 in U.S. dollars), and
deployments of naval forces by major mission, including
strategic forces. Projections of this information into the
foreseeable future should be made to the extent possible:
Part I should be completed and forwarded to the President
by June 1, 1969.
Part II will consist of an analysis of U.S. requirements for
naval forces in the 1970s, including the overseas bases necessary
to support them. This analysis should be related to the extent
appropriate to the results of the U.S. military posture review
being conducted under NSSM 3 and should reflect decisions that
may result from NSC discussion of the NSSM 3 study. Part II
should be completed and forwarded to the President by
October 1, 1969.
NSC discussion of the results of the overall study effort
will be scheduled at a later date.
SECRET
XV
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SECRET
This studyswill be conducted under the direction of the
Secretary of Defense. He will be assisted as appropriate by
the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and other agencies
whose assistance he may need. Close liaison should be
maintained in all phases of the study with the office of the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Henry A. Kissinger
CC: The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
xvi
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DATA SOURCES
THE INTELLIGENCE DATA AND PROJECTIONS CONTAINED IN THIS
DOCUMENT AND ITS APPENDICIES WERE BASED UPON THE MOST
CURRENT CY-69 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROJECTIONS FOR
PLANNING (NIPP-69) AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF WRITING. CIA,
DIA, AND ONI PUBLICATIONS WERE UTILIZED WHENEVER REQUIRED
DATA COULD NOT BE EXTRACTED FROM NIPP-69. IN THOSE IN-
STANCES WHERE NEEDED DATA COULD NOT BE OBTAINED FROM
EXISTING SOURCES THE STUDY GROUP DEVELOPED "BEST ESTIMATES",
IF A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF RELIABLE BACKGROUND MATERIAL WAS
AVAILABLE. THESE ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN FOOTNOTED AS SUCH.
ALL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES COMMONLY EXPRESSED IN TERMS
OF A HIGH/LOW RANGE HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO A SINGLE NUMBERED
ESTIMATE TO FACILITATE COLLATION AND DISPLAY, AND SHOULD NOT
BE EXTRACTED OR QUOTED WITHOUT A CLARIFYING STATEMENT.
xvii
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SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 50
REVIEW OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES - PART I
INTRODUCTION
This Part I study, comprising the initial review of
U.S. naval forces and other nations' navies, provides a
factual background for the further investigation of require-
ments in the Part II study. While the most pertinent data
on naval forces as we now see it is presented in this study,
the Part II analysis will undoubtedly highlight additional
areas appropriate for the comparative analysis of navies.
Thus, as we learn more during the course of the analysis of
requirements, the relative significance of the data presented
herein may be reordered and, in effect, the Part II study
will provide an expansion of this Part I effort.
The review and analysis of U.S. Naval Forces, and any
comparison with another nation's naval forces must necessarily
examine at the outset the mission of the U.S. naval forces and
the mission of other naval forces. In any such examination a
unique feature of the U.S. Navy's missions stands out - it is
and has been since the decline of the British fleet the only
navy in the world which has as a basic portion of its mission
the projection of military power overseas.
It should be emphasized that, while the basic mission of
Soviet naval forces is referred to in this study as being
strategically "defensive" in nature, they currently possess
the capability to conduct tactically offensive operations in
far reaching areas, and particularly against third countries.
If they so desired, the Soviets could make it extremely diffi-
cult for the free world to operate surface forces in large
ocean areas of the world. The Soviet Union has been, and is now.
embarked on the development of a modern, far-ranging, first-rate
maritime force, which is being used to political and commercial
advantage around the world. Their awareness of the importance
of sea power is clearly evident.
GEOPOLITICAL, POLITICO-MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASYMMETRIES
A comparison of the U.S./NATO and USSR/Warsaw Pact naval
powers leads one to consider the asymmetry of geography,
political goals, and economic factors.
The Warsaw Pact is basically a continental alliance.
That alliance is almost self-sufficient economically and not
dependent upon use of the seas for alliance support. On the
other hand, as a maritime power, the U.S. is critically
dependent upon free use of the seas to sustain its own
economic well-being at home and to support its alliances
abroad. This is illustrated by the following summary of
SECRET
1
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international seaborne trade, indicating the general magnitude
of relative dependence on sea lines of communication.
SEABORNE TRADE (MILLION LONG TONS)
1958
1965
U.S.
274
395
USSR
26
90
The major Soviet political objective has been expansion
of Soviet control and influence into strategically important
areas of the world, primarily through the use of the communist
political apparatus of their merchant marine supported by the
Soviet Navy. The U.S. objective has been the containment of
this expansion in areas where the expansion does not represent
the free choice of the people concerned. In consonance with
this objective the U.S. has bilateral and multilateral defense
agreements with 42 free world nations. Among these, the NATO
alliance, with 12 of the 15 signatory nations comprising the
western boundary of the Warsaw Pact nations, presents the most
immediate obstacle to Communist aggression in Europe.
The politico-military alliance asymmetries between the
U.S. and USSR are highlighted by the following summary
representing U.S. defense agreements and what appear to be
analogous Soviet alliances.
ALLIANCE SUMMARY 1/
With Contiguous Nations
With Non-Contiguous Nations
U.S.
2
43
USSR
7
4
The lines of communications between the various members
of the Pact are internal and not subject to interdiction at
sea. In this context, there is little that the U.S./NATO
alliance can accomplish by denying free use of the seas to the
Soviet/Warsaw Pact. In contrast, in peacetime the European
members of NATO are dependent upon the sea lanes for importing
POL, food and other raw materials; in wartime, with increased
POL and material requirements and decreased manpower, the need
would be greater.
1/ The summary includes only formal collective defense treaties
for the U.S. Soviet alliances shown are estimates only, and
include appropriate Warsaw Pact nations plus China, Mongolia,
and North Korea in the contiguous category and East Germany,
Bulgaria, Cuba, and North Vietnam in the non-contiguous category.
The chart is intended only to show the order of magnitude
differences between the U.S. and USSR.
2
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U.S. AND USSR NAVY MISSIONS
The U.S. Navy missions stem from those requirements
assigned to the Department of Defense by Congress in support
of U.S. national security objectives encompassing multilateral
and bilateral foreign policy commitments worldwide. Both U.S.
and USSR naval missions are summarized here.
Basically, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps missions are:
(1) Utilize the seas to contribute, in concert with
the other armed forces, to the preservation of the U.S. and its
territories by deterring attack, and to retaliate if deter-
rance fails.
(2) Protect sea lines of communication essential to
U.S. interests at home and abroad, and, if necessary, deny
enemy sea lines of communication.
(3) Project military power overseas through the use
of strike forces including air strike and amphibious assault
forces.
The Soviet Navy has missions similar to (1) above, as
evidenced by their defensive forces and their growing ballistic
missile submarine force. However, Soviet naval missions for
what we would term general purpose forces have been principally
oriented toward interdicting U.S./Allied sea lines of communi-
cation and countering the effective projection of U.S. military
power overseas.
Somewhat in contrast with the strictly military mission
context above, it is evident, in the total maritime context,
that the Soviet Union's rapidly expanding use of the seas in
the politico-military and economic arena indicates a commit-
ment to project power overseas in one fashion or another.
Historically, navies have been used for denying the sea
to the enemy and for insuring freedom to use the seas, in
essence controlling the seas. Advancing technology has now
permitted use of the seas as a far greater base for strategic
and tactical offensive operations against an enemy and for the
support of ground forces. The most important areas of the
world's land masses are accessible to sea based weapons systems.
Development of sea based air and strategic missile forces re-
presents recognition of this fact. The structure of U.S. sea
based general purpose forces also reflects this fact and high-
lights the basic dissimilarity between the navies of the U.S.
and the USSR. In recognition of the most likely areas of
conflict, and the vital dependence of various alliance partners
on sea lines of communications, the U.S. has designed its naval
general purpose forces primarily to control the seas and to
3
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exploit this control in the conduct of land action overseas.
The difference in allocation of general purpose naval forces
to the basic missions of denying, controlling, and exploiting
control of the seas is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
RELATIVE ALLOCATION OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES TO NAVAL MISSIONS
Deny Use of
Control Sea
Exploit Control of
Sea to Enemy
For Own Use
Sea/Support Land Ops
U.S.
Low
Medium
USSR
High
High
Medium
Low
STRATEGIC FORCES
The assessment of U.S. Naval strategic force posture
of respective force potentials for achieving respective
versus that of the Soviet Union is best made by the comparison
national objectives. A direct comparison including only the
number of ships in the forces, their weapons, etc., would be
incomplete since the forces do not interact, their missions
may be different, and neither the U.S. nor the Soviet naval
of land-based missile or strategic bomber forces.
strategic forces are employed alone, that is, independently
The following geographic and demographic comparisons
apply specifically to naval strategic systems.
USSR
U.S.
a. Land Area Ratio
2.5
1
b.
Population Density Ratio
1
2
C. Location of Population
Upwind
Center with respect to
Downwind
Land-based Strategic
Missile Complex
d. Sea Access
Limited
Open
e. Location of urban/
Extensive land
industrial centers with
Many U/I cen-
buffer areas in
respect to sea coasts
ters directly
all directions
on sea coast
forces for the Soviet Union.
These comparisons lend relative value to land-based strategic
insure the security of the United States, its possessions and
The overriding purpose of U.S. strategic posture is to insure
4
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areas vital to its interests, and to prevent other countries
from imposing their will on the United States or its Allies.
We want to prevent others from credibly threatening to use
strategic nuclear weapons and even from creating the presump-
tion that such threats would be successful. We want to insure
that a potential aggressor knows that nuclear attack, nuclear
blackmail, and acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear
war involve unacceptable risks.
In military terms, the primary purposes of our strategic
forces are:
- to reduce the likelihood of nuclear attack on the U.S.
and its Allies,
- to protect ourselves and our Allies from the destruc-
and tive consequences of nuclear wars, insofar as we can,
- to be capable of controlling strategic nuclear conflicts
so that the possible outcome leaves the United States
and its Allies in a relatively advantageous position.
The specific action objective for the U.S. Fleet Ballistic
Missile Force, which constitutes the Navy's basic strategic
force, is to be ready under all circumstances and with high
reliability to commence the launch of an accurate Polaris
missile strike against the USSR within 15 minutes of the
receipt of a valid order. Our attack aircraft carriers
(CVA's) also have a role in support of our strategic plans.
In this role, we now have alert and non-alert aircraft
scheduled on four CVA's in the Pacific, two in the Atlantic
and two in the Mediterranean. The CVA force is capable of
generating additional alert aircraft and carriers on short
notice. Since the primary function of the CVA force is
in support of the general purpose force mission, it will
be described and compared with Soviet forces under that
category.
Of the total FBM force of 41 submarines, about 50
percent is on alert patrol continuously within missile range.
of their assigned targets. Another 25 is are in refit,
between patrols, at advance sites and are ready for deploy-
ment to patrol areas on short notice. The Soviet sea-based
strategic force is not now kept in a similar posture of
readiness. Soviet submarines do not routinely make patrols
within missile range of the U.S., although some patrols are
made to mid-ocean locations. However, in a surge deployment
Soviet submarines would be highly survivable and, given a
period for transit into missile range, could become an alert
force. As the 16 tube Yankee class submarine enters inventory
in some numbers, the Soviets are expected to establish a
continuous on-station alert pattern for their strategic
submarine force, probably within range of CONUS.
5
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There are many ways to compare U.S. and Soviet strategic
forces. One method is to compare the number of ships. As
seen in Figure 1, the 41 Polaris nuclear submarines were all
delivered in the 60's. They all have the capability to launch
16 ballistic missiles while submerged. The Soviets have
produced two classes of diesel and two classes of nuclear
ballistic missile submarines. The numbers of ballistic
missile submarines each country has built is about equal today
and all these submarines are relatively new. However, a more
significant comparison is the total number of deployable
(i.e., not in overhaul) sea-based ballistic missiles for each
country (Figure 2).
The U.S. has a total of 512 deployable missiles at this
time while the USSR has an estimated 164. The Soviets are
continuing to build their Yankee class ballistic missile
submarines which will carry 16 ballistic missiles per sub-
marine. The Soviets will achieve the same number of deploy-
able ballistic missiles we have between 1971 and 1976 if the
Soviets build at the projected rates.
Another comparison of strategic capability is the number
of strategic warheads available. Today the U.S. is able to
deploy 512 warheads while the Soviets have the capability to
deploy less than 200. By 1976 when the Poseidon conversion
program is completed, the U.S. will be able to deploy about
3800 warheads, most of which will be of low yield. If the
FIGURE 1: TOTAL BALLISTIC
FIGURE 2: DEPLOYABLE SUBMARINE
MISSILE
BALLISTIC MISSILE
SUBMARINES
LAUNCH TUBES
90
NIPP-NATIONAL
HiNIPP
900
INTELLIGENCE
HiNIPP
PROJECTION
NUMBER OF SSB/SSBN
60
FOR PLANNING
FYDP
600
USSR
LoNIPP
US
PROJ
FYDP PROJ
30
300
US
NUMBER OF TUBES
FYDP - FIVE YEAR
LoNIPP
DEFENSE
USSR
PLAN
0
60
65
70
0
75
60
65
70
75
CALENDAR YEAR
CALENDAR YEAR
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Soviets do not deploy MIRV in their SLBM's, they would have
between 526 and 750 deployable warheads by 1976, but these
would be of larger yield than U.S. warheads. However, the
Soviet testing program is not incompatible with achieving a
MIRV capability.
The trend indicates that the Soviets are making major
efforts to build up their sea-based strategic forces. It is
believed that the Soviets are building toward a ballistic
missile submarine force that will confront the continental
U.S. with a threat roughly comparable to that which the
Polaris force presents to the USSR.
An extensive ABM system and a large ASW effort are the
only known methods for countering sea-based systems. Poseidon
with MIRV, now in development, will counter Soviet ABM improve-
ments. MIRV will increase manyfold the number of warheads
against which the ABM would have to operate. With respect to
the ASW threat, geography, experience and weight of effort,
have given the U.S. a lead in ASW capability and there is
little likelihood that the Soviets could achieve a near term
superiority or technological surprise in this field. As a
result of the U.S. technological lead in strategic missile
submarines and ASW development, it is concluded that our
submerged ballistic missile submarines are secure until at
least the late 1970's. This date is not set by any specific
projection of a known threat, but rather by the general un-
certainties in intelligence projections. Furthermore, there
is no evidence that the Soviets now have the technical capa-
bility to trail U.S. ballistic missile submarines, or that
they will achieve such capability in the foreseeable future.
Through U.S. tactical exercises, it has been found that U.S.
SSBN's are secure from detection and trailing by nuclear
attack submarines of the U.S. 594/637 class, our latest and
best SSN's. Intelligence estimates indicate that the newest
classes of Soviet SSN's are no better than the U.S. 585 class
SSN's. The U.S. 585 class SSN's are markedly inferior to the
594/637 class SSN's in the capabilities required for detecting
and trailing SSBN's. The first of a new, follow-on class of
Soviet submarines is not expected until 1972 or 1973. We do
not project that this Soviet class will be able to successfully
challenge our SSBN's. Based upon the possibility that a threat
to the presently configured SSBN's may develop by the 1980's,
the U.S. has in advanced development an improved follow-on
SSBN: the Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS).
U.S. ASW forces have a limited capability to detect and
trail Soviet ballistic missile submarines. As these sub-
marines transit at medium to high speeds, they can be detected
and trailed by U.S. units using a combination of SOSUS, air-
craft, and nuclear attack submarines. The U.S. does not
presently have the technical capability to continuously and
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covertly trail Soviet ballistic submarines which are conducting
quiet, slow speed patrols.
The U.S. and Soviet forces are compared in Figure 3 with
respect to their capability for accomplishing an assured
destruction mission. At the present time, the U.S. sea-based
strategic forces alone can inflict fatalities on the USSR of
30 percent of their population. In comparison, the Soviets
sea-based strategic forces can presently inflict fatalities
amounting to approximately 10 percent of the U.S. population.
The Soviet sea-based force is expected to attain an assured
destruction capability of 30 percent between 1971 and 1975.
Based on projected USSR ABM levels, the U.S. strategic bal-
listic submarine force with Poseidon will maintain a capa-
bility of 30 percent or higher through 1976. The decline in
U.S. capability after 1973 is the result of projected Soviet
ABM levels. Since the U.S. does not have a programmed ABM
system to protect urban/industrial centers from ballistic
missile attack, there is no similar decline for Soviet capa-
bilities.
The Soviet sea-based strategic force capabilities are
growing rapidly and it is not known how large they will become.
The U.S. sea-based strategic force capability is growing at a
rate which is considered adequate to maintain its present
assured destruction capability but not adequate to either
increase that capability or to assume additional strategic
missions. At the present time, neither the U.S. nor Soviet
navies have an effective defensive capability against the other's
strategic sea-based force. The rapid growth of Soviet stra-
tegic capability focuses attention on the need to further
develop the technological capability to effectively counter
the increasing Soviet threat and thereby protect both the U.S.
population centers and vital CONUS based military systems from
sea-based nuclear attack.
More detailed information on the strategic naval forces
of the U.S. and USSR is contained in Appendix A.
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FIGURE 3: NAVAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITY
40
HiNIPP
USSR Fatalities
from U.S. Bal-
30
listic Missile
Submarines
PERCENT FATALITIES
LoNIPP
20
U.S. Fatalities
10
from USSR Bal-
listic Missile
Submarines
0
60
64
68
72
76
78
CALENDAR YEAR
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
The comparison between General Purpose Forces of the U.S.
and Soviet navies must also take into account the asymmetries
of their respective missions. As noted previously, these
mission differences stem from basic geographic, economic, and
politico-military considerations
In view of this wide disparity between the requirements
of the U.S. and the USSR for naval forces, it is not surprising
that the structures of the two navies are dissimilar and that
the size and costs are not an accurate reflection of compara-
tive strength and effectiveness. Appendix B hereto presents
data on the general purpose forces of the two navies. While
various graphs of numbers, ages, costs, etc. of the two navies
can and have been drawn up, it must be noted that the purpose
of such graphs is primarily to present trends and to provide
indices of progress of the U.S. Navy as measured against its
mission and progress of the Soviet Navy against its different
mission. An analysis of the adequacy of forces indicated by
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such trends for the U.S. Navy in support of its mission and
for the Soviet Navy in support of its distinctly different
mission is not attempted in Part I. Such an analysis would
involve a close examination of the concepts for employment of
forces to support a strategic concept and the projected
threat environment which would exist. It is anticipated that
the requirements analysis to be included with Part II of this
review will contain such an examination.
A summary of the significant aspects of the data presented
in Appendix B follows:
(1) Soviet naval forces are larger in number, but
lighter in tonnage relative to U.S. forces. They appear well
suited for their historically defensive mission, and have been
increasing in both numbers and tonnage over the past decade.
U.S. general purpose naval forces are smaller in numbers
and heavier in tonnage than Soviet naval forces. U.S. naval
forces have been decreasing in numbers and slightly increasing
in tonnage over the past decade. Increases in tonnage relate
directly to a mission requiring extended deployments in over-
seas areas. Figures 4 and 5 indicate these trends graphi-
cally and indicate future projections. Table 2 outlines the
U.S. and USSR order of battle for 1969, and includes strategic
forces for comparison purposes.
FIGURE 4: TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPS
FIGURE 5: TOTAL TONNAGES
2400
9
INTELL. PROJ
USSR
FYDP PROJ
U.S.
1600
6
NUMBER OF SHIPS
MILLIONS OF TONS
INTELL. PROJ
800
U.S.
3
FYDP PROJ
USSR
61
65
69
73
77
61
65
69
73
77
CALENDAR YEAR
CALENDAR YEAR
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TABLE 2
U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE
ALL FLEETS - MID-1969
ACTIVE SHIPS
#U.S.
#USSR
Major Combatants
Attack Carriers (CVA/CVAN)
15
0
ASW Carriers (CVS)/Helicopter Ships (CHG)
7
2
Missile Cruisers (CLG/CLGM/CG)
9
11
Cruisers (CA/CC/CL/OCA)
6
8
Missile Destroyers (DLG/DDG/DDGS)
55
34
Destroyers (DD/DL)
169
47
Other Major Escorts (DE/PCE)
45
102
306
204
Submarines
Nuclear, Ballistic Missile (SSBN)
41
14
Diesel, Ballistic Missile (SSB)
0
28
Nuclear, Cruise (SSM) Missile (SSGN)
0
33
Diesel, Cruise Missile (SSG)
0
28
Nuclear, Torpedo Attack (SSN)
40
22
Diesel, Torpedo Attack (SS)
62
247
143
372
Patrol
Submarine Chasers (PC/SC/PTC)
0
320
Missile Boats (PTG/PTFG)
0
160
Other Major Patrol (PG)
14
0
14
480
Mine Warfare
Ocean Minesweepers (MSO/MCS/MSM/MSF)
65
252
Inshore Minesweepers (MSC/MHC/MMF/MSI)
9
69
74
321
Amphibious
Command Ships (LCC)
5
0
Helicopter Carriers (LPH)
9
0
Assault Ships (LKA/LPA/LPD/LSD/LPR/LSM/LSV)
143
109
Fire Support Ships (BB/LFR)
5
0
162
109
1/ Excluding riverine assault craft, harbor service craft, and
minor torpedo-gun boats.
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TABLE 2
ACTIVE SHIPS
#U.S.
#USSR
Auxiliary
Repair Ships (AD/AR/ARL/AS)
37
32
Fleet Oilers (AO/AOE/AOR/AOG/AOL)
48
52
Ammunition Ships (AE/AEM)
22
6
Stores Ships (ASL/AF/AFS/AK/AKL)
18
97
Salvage & Rescue Ships ARS/ASR/ATF/ATA/
ARSD/ATR)
55
175
Research & Survey Ships (AGF/AG/AGS/AGSS)
18
199
Other Support Types (AH/AGMR/AVB/ARC/ADG/
ANL/ARG/AVM/AOS/APB/AN/APC/AW/EAG)
13
97
211
658
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(2) The average age of the major combatant forces of
the USSR has increased from 6 years old in 1961 to 10 years
old in 1969, with intelligence projections indicating a
slightly increasing average age. Major. combatant forces of
the U.S. have increased in age over the past decade to average
15.4 years old in 1969, with FYDP projections indicating a
decrease in average age by 1977. The age distribution of U.S.
and Soviet submarines and major combatant ships as of the
present time (1969) is shown graphically in Figure 6. Given
an arbitrary ship life of 30 years, the diagonal (dotted)
line would represent a uniform distribution of ships in each
age category. It can be noted on this graph that 90% of the
Soviet ships in this category are less than 15 years old and
only 35% of the U.S. ships are less than 15 years old. Just
as chronological age is one factor in assessing overall capa-
bilities of naval forces, so also are such factors as tech-
nological ages, the tempo of operations to which ships have
been subjected and, in turn, the material condition of the
ships. Most of the U.S. naval forces in the over-20-years-
old category have participated. in the Korean and/or Vietnam
FIGURE 6: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR COMBATANTS
AND SUBMARINES
100
75
% SHIPS LESS THAN X YEARS AGE
NEWER
50
USSR
25
OLDER
U.S.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
CUMULATIVE YEARS
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wars and in one or more of those numerous lesser contingencies
(e.g. Lebanon, Suez, Cuban, Dominican Republic) which have
occurred during the past two decades. The three-fold increase
in the ship maintenance requirements for WestPac repair
facilities (from 468,000 man days/year in 1965 to 1,475,000
man days/year in 1967) for an approximately equal number of
ships in the Western Pacific in each of those years is
indicative of the effect of the tempo of operations on
material readiness.
(3) The average age of a force can be decreased by
replacing older ships with new construction ships or by just
retiring older ships. The average age of U.S. submarines and
combatants is projected by the FYDP to decrease from the 15.4
average in 1969 to a 13.2 average in 1977. This is based on
new construction of a number of ships, retirement of older
ships, and a reduction in the total number of ships in inven-
tory. However, projections may be somewhat misleading in that
FYDP projections have seldom, if ever, been matched by the
actual U.S. ship construction program. Figure 7 shows an
example, for U.S. cruiser-destroyer forces, of how FYDP
projections have been optimistic in the past. The graph shows
actual useful ship life remaining (based again on an arbitrary
30 year life span) from year to year as opposed to past FYDP
projections.
FIGURE 7: U.S. CRUISER-DESTROYER FORCE USEFUL
SHIP LIFE REMAINING
6
FL 63 STATE
USEFUL LIFE REMAINING
(SHIP-YEARS IN THOUSANDS)
4
THEREOF
11 6 IN
FRIDE
HISTORY
CURRENT TREND
2
61
65
69
73
77
CALENDAR YEAR
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(4) Figures 8 and 9 present two comparisons of total
direct expenditures in support of Naval General Purpose
Forces. / The projected rise in U.S. expenditures shown in
Figure 8 is based on FYDP programs, and is subject to the
uncertainties of actual funding noted in paragraph (3) above.
Figure 9 indicates that portion of the total expenditures
considered ship related, which can be summarized as follows
for the 8 year period 1962 - 69.
TOTAL
SHIP RELATED
U.S.
$80B
$41B
USSR
$41B
$36B
FIGURE 8: ESTABLISHED ANNUAL EXPENDITURES FOR
GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
(U.S. : FYDP Program II; USSR: Program
II Equivalent)
15
FYDP PROJ-
SEE FIG 7
U.S. (Less FMF)
$ BILLIONS
(1966 $)
7.5
LESS SEASIA
USSR
INTELL
PROJ
0
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
CALENDAR YEAR
1/ Intelligence estimates of Soviet defense costs are deli-
berately structured to be comparable with the U.S. FYDP Program
breakdown. For this reason, U.S. General Purpose Force costs
above are only those contained in FYDP Program II, so as to be
most nearly comparable to Soviet GPF costs. Soviet costs are
presented in dollars so as to have meaning to U.S. users and
to provide a common base for comparisons with U.S. costs. The
Soviet costs are the estimated cost of procuring, maintaining
and operating the Soviet force in the U.S. at U.S. prices. This
methodology is considered reasonably valid for comparisons of
U.S. and USSR military expenditures in totality, and for such
categories as ship procurement, general purpose forces, etc.
The controlled Soviet economy, and the very different price
relationships which apply in the U.S. and USSR, make any com-
parisons involving the two economies tenuous at best and there
is no consensus among economists as to the ideal method of
making such comparisons.
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FIGURE 9: TOTAL (1962-69) EXPENDITURES
FOR GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
(U.S. : FYDP Program II; USSR:
Program II Equivalent)
AMPHIB/
SHIPS
FMF
OTHER
TOTAL GPF EXPENDITURES
20
CVA/TACAIR
FY 62-69
($ BILLION-1966 $)
CVS/ASW AIR
CRU-DD
10
SERVICE
OTHER
SUBS
MAJOR SURF
MINOR SURF
NAVAL AIR (LAND-BASED)
SUPPORT
SUBS
0
U.S.
USSR
(5) Annual expenditures on shipbuilding and major
conversions for General Purpose Forces are shown in Figure
10. U.S. projection is based on FYDP programs. Again,
Soviet dollar costs are based on estimates of the cost of
prices. constructing the Soviet ship in the United States, at U.S.
FIGURE 10: SHIPBUILDING & CONVERSION
ANNUAL EXPENDITURES: GENERAL
PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
3.0
FYDP PROJ
$ BILLIONS
(1966$)
2.0
USSR
SEE FIG. 7
1.0
U.S.
INTELL. PROJ
62
64
66
68
70
72
74
CALENDAR YEAR
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(6) Figures 11 and 12, depicting major combatant
(DE/SS and larger) shipbuilding deliveries since 1957, shows
the Soviets as having averaged 19 ships per year. Their
cumulative displacement tonnage over this period was 958,000
tons. U.S. combatant shipbuilding over. this same period has
averaged 13 ships per year with a cumulative tonnage of
1,550,000 tons. U.S. CVAs account for 44% of this tonnage
total. Less CVAs, construction of U.S. combatants was slightly
less than 90% of that of the Soviet Union based on comparative
tonnages and much less based on numbers of individual units.
FIGURE 11: MAJOR NAVAL
FIGURE 12: MAJOR NAVAL
COMBATANT
COMBATANT
CUMULATIVE DELIVERIES
NEW CONSTRUCTION
TONNAGE
(General Purpose Force Ships)
(General Purpose Force Ships)
450
1.5
NUMBER OF SHIPS
300
150
CUMULATIVE TONNAGE (Million Tons)
1.0
0.5
57
62
67
72
57
62
67
72
CALENDAR YEARS
CALENDAR YEARS
Combatant ship deliveries and projected deliveries during the
1957-1973 period are subdivided by types as shown below.
Type
U.S.
USSR
Submarines
73
192-202
(less strategic)
ASW
82
116
ASW/AAW
61
49-55
CVA/CVAN/CHG
8
2-3
Total
224
359-376
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(7) The total U.S. Navy aircraft inventory, including
helicopters and USMC aircraft, is displayed in Figure 13. The
increasing average age of U.S. Navy aircraft is summarized in
Figure 14. By 1972, the average aircraft age will be over 9
years, almost double the 1959 average. The most economical
age, based on service life, rework times/costs and operational
loss rates is considered to be 4.35 years. In the case of
fighter and attack aircraft, technological obsolescence also
is a factor and is becoming an increasing problem as
shown by Figure 15. The effectiveness of these aircraft
is quite sensitive to age; it can be seen that their 1972
average age is also double the 1959 average.
FIGURE 13: TOTAL USN AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
14
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT
12
(000)
10
8
FYDP
PROJECTION
55
60
65
70
73
75
END FISCAL YEAR
During World War II Soviet Naval Aviation was dominated
by fighter aircraft. Today it is primarily a medium bomber
force. Approximately 60 percent of these 500 bombers
are equipped to carry air-to-surface anti-shipping missiles--
most, the AS-2, and some, the new AS-5. The latter weapon,
which includes a greater range among its advances, will prolong
the service life of its carrier, the BADGER B, which already
is more than twelve years old. A number of faster BLINDER
18
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FIGURE 14: AVERAGE AGE OF ALL FIGURE 15: AVERAGE AGE OF USN
USN AIRCRAFT
FIGHTER/ATTACK
AIRCRAFT
10
10
8
8
AVERAGE AGE (YRS)
6
6
FYDP
PROJECTION
4
4
AVERAGE AGE (YRS)
FYDP
PROJECTION
2
2
61
65
69
72
61
65
69
72
CALENDAR YEAR
bombers have entered service, but not yet as missile carriers--
although this appears to be in the offing. The force's
principal mission is the location and countering of Western
strike carriers in conjunction with the cruise missile sub-
marines. Soviet naval air is completely land based and
relatively small in numbers as compared with the U.S. inven-
tory. However, it poses a very significant threat to those
forces which approach within the radius of their land bases.
The Soviet tactical air inventory has almost doubled since
1961 with intelligence projections indicating a slight
decrease in the future due primarily to the phasing out of the
few remaining light bombers.
(8) During the first half of the 1960's, sustained
deployments of U.S. general purpose naval forces remained
fairly constant, with an average of 53 ships continuously
deployed with the U.S. SIXTHFLEET in the Mediterranean and
an average of 120 ships with the U.S. SEVENTHFLEET in the
Western Pacific. From 1965 to the present, U.S. deployments
have decreased slightly in the Mediterranean to a 46 ship
average and, as expected due to the Vietnam war, increased
considerably in the Western Pacific to average some 195 ships.
On the other hand, Soviet out-of-homeport-area deployments
have increased steadily during this decade. From 1964 to
1968 there was a 123% increase in Soviet submarine deploy-
ments and a 380% increase in surface ship deployments. The
most striking and publicized increase has been that in the
Mediterranean as shown below in Figure 16.
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FIGURE 16: SOVIET OPERATIONS IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN
12000
COMULATIVE DAYS
8000
4000
0
64
65
66
67
68
CALENDAR YEAR
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(9) Table 3 shows the inventories of NATO and PACT
(non-U.S., , non-USSR) navies. The numerical superiority of
the NATO forces is obvious and expected in view of these
nations' proximity to and historical dependence upon the
seas. With the exception of the U.S., UK, Canada and
possibly France in the NATO alliance, whose force structures
reflect a mission to protect sea lines of communication, the
naval missions of other NATO nations and all of the non-USSR
PACT nations center on coastal defense. Historical and
projected trends indicate increasing PACT naval assets and
decreasing NATO naval forces. The superiority shown in
numbers of NATO ships must be viewed in the light of the fact
that these forces are concentrated mainly in European waters,
that they are generally less effective than U.S. counterparts,
and that they can be counted on for assistance only in
situations in which their governments' interests and actions
coincide with those of the U.S. (e.g. Norwegian naval parti-
cipation in an Arab-Israeli environment?). NATO and PACT naval
forces are addressed in more detail in Appendix B.
TABLE 3 - NATO/PACT FORCE LEVELS (LESS US/USSR)
NATO
CVA
CVS
DD
SS
AMPHIB
MINE PATROL
AUX
TOTAL
1961
3
7
277
114
94
737
360
302
1894
1965
3
7
245
114
58
635
311
416
1789
1969
2
6
250
128
42
527
284
409
1648
1973
0
4
222
124
45
494
307
428
1624
1977
0
1
234
130
46
472
331
418
1632
PACT
CVA
CVS
DD
SS
AMPHIB
MINE
PATROL
AUX
TOTAL
1961
N
N
12
13
0
138
248
(99)
*
510
1965
0
0
9
9
14
142
242
(99)
*
515
1969
N
N
8
9
30
158
298
99
602
1973
E
E
11
10
(30) *
159
327
(99)
*
636
1977
3
12
(30) *
155
346
(99) * 645
*Estimates
Total NATO (including U.S.) and total Warsaw Pact
(including USSR) force levels present a somewhat different
picture, when compared, than do the totals shown in Table
3. These totals, for selected years 1961-77, are shown in
Figure 17 which depicts both the total number of naval ships
for each alliance and the proportion of each total classified
as major combatants and submarines.
21
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FIGURE 17: NATO/PACT FORCE LEVELS
(INCLUDING U. S. & USSR)
MAJOR COMBATANT & SS
ALL OTHER NATO
3000
NATO
ALL OTHER PACT
PACT
22
NUMBER OF SHIPS
2000
1000
0
61
65
69
73
77
CALENDAR YEAR
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MANPOWER/PERSONNEL STATUS
Manpower utilization in the U.S. Navy has put emphasis
on proportionately large numbers of highly skilled personnel
who require a high degree of mental ability and long technical
training. Generally, the Navy has requirements for skilled
petty officers (E4 to E9) on the order of about 60% of the
total enlisted force. All officers are desired to be either
college graduates or highly trained technicians. This emphasis
puts a premium on the capability to attract and retain high
quality people. Rapidly increasing requirements for skilled
personnel, which are not available within existing resources
without dilution of experience level, and low retention rates
among both officer and enlisted personnel have reduced the
Navy's capability to man its ships and to operate sophisticated
equipment to its designed level. Degradations in fleet opera-
tional capability can be directly inferred from percentages of
ships and squadrons reporting either marginally or not ready as
a consequence of personnel deficiencies (Table 4) and inability
to meet needs in many highly technical skills. These problems,
along with retention and manpower summaries, are elaborated on
in Tab M to Appendix B.
MERCHANT MARINE FLEETS
Any assessment of naval forces must take into account the
strength and flexibility derived from an active Merchant Marine
Fleet. Whereas the U.S. is heavily dependent upon a capable
Merchant Marine for the import of resources during peacetime
and export of materials in support of allies during wartime,
the USSR is practically self-sufficient and only requires the
limited assistance of her continental allies to sustain
herself. While the total active U.S. Fleet has declined in
numbers and increased in age over the past decade, the Soviet
Merchant Marine has enjoyed an unparalled period of expansion
and modernization. The USSR Merchant Fleet is now the seventh
largest in the world in terms of dead weight tonnage (DWT),
with over 80% of its units less than ten years old. Centra-
lized control over merchantile operations gives the Soviets
the potential to execute national policies as they wish by
utilizing their shipping in direct competition with Free
World Nations. Moreover, the Soviet Merchant Fleet possesses
an inherent capability to support military operations for
which an estimated 650 cargo, tanker, and passenger ships are
physically well-suited. A summary of active inventories
and tonnages of the U.S. and USSR Merchant Fleets is contained
in Figures 18 and 19.
23
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TABLE 4 : PERCENTAGE NAVAL UNITS REPORTING READINESS
DEFICIENCIES 1/ IN PERSONNEL
AVERAGE %
CURRENT %
1st HALF
2nd HALF
1st HALF
2nd HALF
FY68
FY68
FY69
FY69
3/69
Active Ships
21
LANT
59
62
65
56
57
PAC
39
41
40
41
38
Active
Squadrons
LANI
83
82
75
72
PAC
48
53
47
43
1/ Marginally Ready" or NOL Ready for reasons of per sonnel deficiencies.
i21 Excludes ships in overhaul.
Rough comparisons can be made between Soviet and U.S. naval manpower
on a basis of total numbers (Table 5). Expanded comparisons and additional
Soviet data areincluded in Appendix B, Tab M
TABLE 5: TOTAL NAVAL MANPOWER (Thousands)
1965
1969
1973
SOVIET
450
474
UNK
(DIA dara)
U.S.
6:71
7591/
683
(FYDP)
1/ Includes SEA Augment.
24
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FIGURES 18 AND 19: INVENTORY AND TONNAGE U.S. AND
SOVIET FLAG MERCHANT FLEETS
(SHIPS OVER 1000 G.R.T.)
2000
18
NUMBER OF SHIPS
INTELL PROJ
U.S.
1500
INTELL IPROJ
12
U.S.
SIS PROJ 1
1000
6
SIS PROJ1
TONNAGE (MILLIONS)
USSR
USSR
500
0
54
61
68
75 54
61
68
75
CALENDAR YEAR
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attack without warning. In this case the issue would be
in doubt. The primary threat against our CVA's remains the
submarine-launched or air-launched missile.
The Soviet Navy has no capability which corresponds to
that of U.S. attack carriers in providing tactical aircraft
to support U.S. or Allied sea, ground and air forces overseas
(e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Lebanon, etc.).
The relatively small Soviet amphibious force (about 3
battalion (U.S. equiv.) Soviet lift vs 15 battalion U.S. lift)
can conduct assault landing operations within radius of their
own or friendly land based fighter aircraft, or where there is
no opposing air power. Its small size restricts its use to
assaults against small powers, or as a tactical maneuver
element of their Army. Since our amphibious force can be pro-
tected and supported by carrier based aircraft wherever it can
go, it is useable on almost any coastline.
The Soviet Navy now has 153 fast patrol craft equipped
with 2 to 4 short range (15-20 miles) surface-to-surface
missiles. They are deployed in four different areas:
(Northern Fleet (Murmansk Area) 16, Baltic 53, Black Sea 24,
Sea of Japan (Vladivostok Area) 60. In these coastal waters
and protected inland seas they are a threat to U.S. and Allied
navies particularly if they are permitted the first shot.
They are highly vulnerable, however, to aircraft attack, and
should consequently be capable of being tactically contained.
The Soviets have provided small numbers of these missile-
equipped patrol craft to certain foreign countries, among
which are: Cuba, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, North Korea, Chicoms
and Indonesia. Against neighboring small nations' navies,
these are a major threat. Because of their limited open sea
operating capability, relatively short surface-to-surface
missile range, and vulnerability to aircraft, they present a
limited threat to U.S. Navy task forces which have air cover
if we have strategic or tactical warning. The Soviets have
also provided their shore-launched, short-range (45NM) anti-
ship missile to various countries.
27
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COMPARISON OF THE GROSS CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. AND USSR NAVIES
The growing Soviet SLBM force presents us with the
most difficult problem of any of their naval forces. The
reverse is probably also true. Since the ballistic missile
submarine's only mission prior to hostilities is to avoid
detection and its post hostilities' mission can be completed
in a few minutes, it presents the most difficult ASW problem.
Since its missiles are launched from an unpredictable direction
and have a relatively short time of flight, it also presents
the most difficult ABM problem.
The Soviet attack submarine force armed with anti-ship
missiles as well as torpedoes has a formidable capability to
inflict damage on any navy and to probably overwhelm any but
that of the United States. It also gives the Soviets the caps-
bility to greatly reduce the capacity of any sea line of
supply. In the case of the U.S., there is no assurance at
present, that the outcome of an anti-submarine campaign
against the Soviets could quickly be resolved in our favor.
Against any other nation, the Soviet Submarine force could
probably achieve virtually complete interdiction of their sea
lines of communication. The anti-ship missile is the most
formidable weapon our ships will have to face, especially when
and if a submerged launch capability is attained.
The Soviet naval air arm utilizes anti-ship missiles as
its primary weapon. Most overflights of our transitting
forces appear to be rehearsals of coordinated missile attacks.
In addition, as the Soviet strategic bombers are replaced by
ICBM's and SLBN's, it is to be expected that at least some of
these aircraft will be provided to increase the Navy air arm's
tactical missile striking ability. One fifth of the 100 Soviet
cruisers and destroyers are equipped with long range (100-plus
miles) surface-to-surface missiles. When our cruisers and/or
destroyers (which are not so equipped) face such ships and are
out of range of either friendly carrier based or land based
air, the U.S. force is in a difficult situation. This poton-
tial occurred in the Indian Ocean this spring. Our two des-
troyers of the Middle East Force (which operate from the
Persian Gulf) were faced with a Seviet squadron of one surface-
to-surface missile cruiser plus three comparably equipped
destroyers. Neither side had air support.
Soviet naval surface forces can out-match any naval force
in the world other than the U.S. Navy. This gives their
presence in any area of the world significant political
implications without any overt conflict.
Because of superior firepower and striking range, a 2 GVA
Task Force (i.e., any one of our 4. numbered fleets) can
probably manage the threat presented by any possible Soviet
assemblage of surface forces unless the Soviet forces
26
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131
VOLUME 3
National
Security
Study
Memorandum
Number 50: PARTI
A REVIEW OF U. S. NAVAL FORCES (U)
Appendix B: General-Purpose Forces (u)
September 1969
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
By R MIH NARA, Date 4-12-2016
NLN10-H-19/22671 [0.10f144] [e
See Def Cont Nr. X- 5063
"This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18,
GROUP-1
U.S.C., Section 793 and 794. The transmission
Excluded from automatic
or the revelation of its contents in any menner
downgrading and declassification
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law."
NSSM-50 STUDY GROUP
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A REVIEW OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES (U)
APPENDIX B
GENERAL - PURPOSE FORCES (U)
i
(REVERSE BLANK)
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DEPARTMENT E of 17
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350
SECRET
THE
NSSM-50/EXEC
17 September 1969
SECRET (Downgraded to Confidential upon removal of attachments)
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST
Subj: National Security Study Memorandum Number 50 -
"A Review of U.S. Naval Forces," forwarding of
Forwarded herewith is Volume 3 of 8 volumes comprising
the NSSM-50 Study, "A Review of U.S. Naval Forces".
Volumes 1 through 3 contain the final, revised edition
of Part I of NSSM-50. Volumes 4 through 8 contain Part II
and its Annexes. Volume 6 was forwarded separately on
September 5, 1969.
John ROBERT A. BROSCH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Attachments
DISTRIBUTION LIST:
(See next page)
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declassification
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ASN(R&D) Control No. S-3038
iii
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I. Streeing Committee Principals
No of Copy
SECNAV
1
CNO
1
CMC
1
OASD (DDR&E) (Dr. G.L. Tucker)
1
OSD (ISA) (Hon G. Warren Nutter)
1
OASD (SA) (Mr. C.O. Rossotti)
1
i
STATE (Mr. Leon Sloss)
1
BUBUD (Dr. J.R. Schlesinger)
1
CIA (Mr. Jack Smith)
1
COMMERCE (Mr. Andrew Gibson, Maritime
Administrator)
1
JCS (BGEN John E. Elder, Jr., USA)
1
II. Points of Contact
WHITE HOUSE (Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.)
1
BUBUD (Mr. William A. Morrill)
2
Asst. Dir. for Air Force
STATE (Mr. Leslie H. Brown)
2
Staff Associate
OEP (Mr. Haakon Lindjord)
2
Spec Asst. for Planning
CIA (Mr. Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.)
2
Dir of Strategic Research
OSD (DDR&E) (Mr. David R. Heebner)
2
OASD (I&L) (MGEN A.T. Stanwix-hay, USA)
2
Dep ASD (Material)
OASD (M&RA) (Mr. Gus C. Lee)
2
Dir Util & Mgmt Tech
OASD (ISA) (RADM William E. Lemos, USN)
2
Dir Policy Plng & Arms Control
OASD (SA) (Dr. Arthur C. Herrington)
2
Directorate of Nav Forces Prog
OSD (COMPT) (Mr. John F. Cove)
2
Off of Directorate for Proc
ARMY (COL J.O. Shoemaker) Chief, War Plan
Div
3
AIR FORCE (BGEN Charles W. Lenfest)
3
Dep Director for Force Dev
CMC (GEN Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., USMC)
2
DIA (CAPT V. Jennings, USN)
2
iv
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III. Other
UNSECNAV
1
ASN (R&D)
1
OPA
1
ASN (I&L)
1
ASN (FM)
1
ASN (M&RA)
1
JCS (JSTAFF)
5
CNM
2
CNA
2
OP-01
2
OP - 03
2
OP - 04
2
OP-05
2
OP-06
2
OP-07
2
OP - 09
2
OP-090
2
OP-092
2
OP-093
2
OP-094
2
OP-095
2
OP-96
4
OP-097
2
NSSM-54
4
V
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NUW10-H-19/2267/[0.50F14] 10-H-19/22671
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REVIEW OF NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
APPENDIX B
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SITUATION
B-1
PROJECTION OF MILITARY POWER OVERSEAS
B-1
SUMMARY
B-3
TABS:
A. U.S. Navy Ship Characteristics
B-A-1
B. USSR Naval Ship Characteristics
B-B-1
C. U.S. Navy Aircraft Characteristics
B-C-1
D. USSR Naval Aircraft Characteristics
B-D-1
E. U.S. Navy Order of Battle
B-E-1
F. USSR Naval Order of Battle
B-F-1
G. Non-U.S. NATO Naval Order of Battle
B-G-1
H. Non-USSR Warsaw Pact Naval Order
B-H-1
I. Age, Tonnage, and Shipbuilding Trends
B-I-1
J. Cost Data
B-J-1
K. Soviet Navy Deployment Trends
B-K-1
L. Other Maritime Forces
B-L-1
M. U.S. and USSR Navy Personnel
B-M-1
N. U.S. and USSR Active Fleet Reserve
B-N-1
vii
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The NSSM-50 report consists of 8 volumes:
PART I:
Volume 1 Summary of Part I
Comparative Analysis of the Naval Forces
of U.S./NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Since 1961
Volume 2 Appendix A: Strategic Forces
Volume 3 Appendix B: General-Purpose Forces
PART II:
Volume 4 Summary of Part II
Analysis of U. S. Requirements for Naval
Forces in the 1970's
Volume 5 Appendix 1: Naval Strategic Forces
Volume 6 Annex A: Naval Strategic Forces
Volume 7 Annex B: Regional Analyses
Annex C: Soviet Forward Posture Potentials
Annex D: Comparison of U.S./USSR Naval
Procurement Trends
Annex E: U.S. Bases Overseas
Annex F: Allied Defense Expenditures and
Military Forces
Annex G: Amounts and Costs of Airlift/
Sealift in 1974 Scenario
Annex H: Comparative Costs of Land-based/
Sea-based Tactical Air
Volume 8 Annex I: Northeast Asia Case
Annex J: General-Purpose Naval Force
Levels
Annex K: Navy Budget Implications
Annex L: Survivability of Naval Surface
Ships
Annex M: Technical Implications
Annex N: Amphibious Warfare Forces
Annex O: Sizing of Ships
Annex P: Attack Submarines
ix
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
April 26, 1969
National Security Study Memorandum 50
the
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: A Review of U.S. Naval Forces
The President has directed that a study be undertaken of
U.S. Naval Forces. The study should be conducted in two
parts:
Part I will be a comparative analysis of U.S., Soviet,
other NATO, and other Warsaw Pact naval forces from 1961
to the present. This analysis should include a comparison,
to the extent possible, of numbers, types, capabilities, ages,
unit costs (for those built since 1961 in U.S. dollars), and
deployments of naval forces by major mission, including
strategic forces. Projections of this information into the
foreseeable future should be made to the extent possible.
Part I should be completed and forwarded to the President
by June 1, 1969.
Part II will consist of an analysis of U.S. requirements for
naval forces in the 1970s, including the overseas bases necessary
to support them. This analysis should be related to the extent
appropriate to the results of the U.S. military posture review
being conducted under NSSM 3 and should reflect decisions that
may result from NSC discussion of the NSSM 3 study. Part II
should be completed and forwarded to the President by
October 1, 1969.
NSC discussion of the results of the overall study effort
will be scheduled at a later date.
X
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This study will be conducted under the direction of the
Secretary of Defense. He will be assisted as appropriate by
the Secretary of State, the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and other agencies
whose assistance he may need. Close liaison should be
maintained in all phases of the study with the office of the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
xi
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APPENDIX B
REVIEW OF NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
SITUATION
A comparison of U.S. (and other NATO) and Soviet (and
other Pact) naval forces necessarily requires consideration
of the assymetry of the geography and the different goals of
the two powers. The USSR and her Pact allies are a continental
power that is almost a self sufficient unit. On the other
hand, the U.S. and its allies are critically dependent upon
sea lines of communication. This basic difference, and the
resulting assessment of the requirements for naval forces,
leads to navies that are very different - different in numbers,
types of ships, and costs.
Part II of the Review of Naval Forces will include
analyses of the requirements for naval forces in the 1970s.
Part I is not intended to prejudge the results of these
analyses; rather Part I presents data on past, present and
projected structures, order of battle, ship characteristics,
trends and costs which are the logical starting point for
analyses of naval force capabilities and requirements. In
assessing this data, it is important to do so in the context
of questions such as:
- Why are the structures as they are?
- Are the missions of the opposing navies properly in
conflict, i.e., does our defense counter their
offensive and vice versa?
- How do geography and broader National Policy and
Purpose influence the structure of the opposing navies?
- To what extent does a stable equilibrium not exist?
SANITIZED 3.3(b)(5)
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SANITIZED
3.3(6)(5)(6)
It is difficult to determine whether there is a stable
to predict or measure the outcome of a hypothetical con-
frontation. Indeed, it is difficult to predict the nature
of the confrontation. A behaviorist might say that there is
equilibrium, and that it is stable, because through the
Korean War, Berlin Blockade, Cuba Crisis, Southeast Aisa War,
there has been no major naval combat between the U.S. and
the Soviets despite extensive use of the sea by the U.S.
However, there are some destabilizing factors at work. The
age of U.S. ships is increasing, while the Soviets are
building and converting ships that increasingly threaten our
use of the sea. Both sides are improving the unit capability
of their combatant forces, new escort types are being built
or are contemplated by both sides, the U.S. is developing
a new sea based ASW aircraft, the VFX, etc.
Because the Soviets do not have a counterpart to our
military and civilian transport, amphibious assault and
attack carrier forces (e.g., they do not have forces with
them. We have, however, developed and employed forces to
interdict the local coastal and inland waterway traffic in
South Vietnam. There is an element of instability in this
regard. The Soviet fishing and merchant fleets are growing
SUMMARY
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SANITIZED
3.3(b)(5)(6)
TABS
The differing structure of U.S. /NATO and USSR/PACT naval
forces is shown in the various TABS to this Appendix, which
contain data on orders of battle, ship characteristics,
fleet age and tonnage, shipbuilding trends, and costs. These
TABS are:
A. U.S. Navy Ship Characteristics
B. USSR Naval Ship Characteristics
C. U.S. Navy Aircraft Characteristics
D. USSR Naval Aircraft Characteristics
E. U.S. Navy Order of Battle
F. USSR Naval Order of Battle
G. NATO (non U.S.) Navies Order of Battle
H. Warsaw Pact (non USSR) Navies Order of Battle
I. Age, Tonnage, and Shipbuilding Trends
J. Cost Data
K. Soviet Navy Deployment Trends
L. Other Maritime Forces
M. U.S. and USSR Navy Personnel
N. U.S. and USSR Active Fleet Reserve
B-4
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TAB A TO APPENDIX B
U.S. NAVY SHIP CHARACTERISTICS
The following tables highlight the basic characteristics
of U.S. Naval ships. Excluded are riverine assault craft,
harbor service craft, and minor torpedo gun boats.
=
B-A-1
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TAB A TO APPENDIX B
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. MAJOR COMBATANTS
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
Type Class
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASROC
Torp
D.C.
U.S.
ATTACH
CARRIERS
20/
CVAN
65
1
89,600
8
8
8:
32.2
350000
20/
CVA
67
1
87,000
1
1
1
31
12000
X
31.3/
12/
CVA
63
3
80,800
4
8
6
3800
10000
31.2/
12/
CVA
59
5
78,000
10
14
12
3800
12200
X
X
30/
20/
CVA
41
3
64,000
22
24
23
4500
8000
X
X
28.9/
12/
CVA
19
4
44,700
19
25
23
4600
10000
X
X
U.S. S. ASW
CARRIERS
28.2/
13.7/
CVS
11
2
42,000
26
26
26
3400
11200
X
X
30.2/
13.4/
CVS
10
4
40,600
23
26
25
4600
14000
X
B-A-2
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
IULN10-H-19/22671 [p15 of14.4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. MAJOR COMBATANTS
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
Type Class
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASROC
Torp
D.C.
U.S. CRUISERS
30/
20/
CGN
9
1
16,247
8
8
8
90000
325000
X
X
X
X
30.4/
12/
CG
10
3
18,950
23
24
23
2400
7100
X
X
30.6/
9.5/
CLG
3/6
5
15,200
23
25
24
2940
9850
X
31/
12/
CA
68
1
17,350
24
24
24
2820
9160
X
32/
13/
CA
69
2
17,820.
26
26
26
2300
8500
X
32/
12/
CA
139
1
20,950
20
20
20
2785
11290
X
BB
62
1
57,950
27
27
27
X
32/
12/
CC
1
1
17,204
16
16
16
2700
10200
X
X
30.8/
14/
CC
2
1
19,570
22
22
22
3480
9000
U.S.
ESCORTS/PAIROL
B-A-3
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
NLN10-H-19/22671/P [ppi 16 of 14.4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. MAJOR COMBATANTS
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
Type Class
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg,
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASROC
Torp
D.C.
20/
DLGN
25/35
2
9,000
2
7
4.5
29
450000
X
X
X
X
X
33/
20/
5,800 =
7
9
8
1200
4100
X
X
X
X
X
DLG
9
8
32.5/
20/
DLG
16/26
16
7,850
2
7
4
2100
7500
X
X
X
X
X
4150/
31/
15/
DDG
31/35
6
5155
10
14
12
1800
3052
X
X
X
X
X
30/
12/
DDG
2
23
4,500
5
16
8
1880
5500
X
X
X
X
X
30.6/
12/
X
X
DD
Fram I
79
3,500
23
24
23
1400
5800
X
X
30/
11.5/
DD
Fram II
52
3,500
23
27
25
1221
4348
X
X
X
X
931/
32/
15/
DD
945
14
4,050
10
14
12
1212
3052
X
X
x
X
Non-
31/
11/
DD
21
3,234
23
27
25
1240
5930
X
X
X
Fram
31.5/
14/
DL
1/4
3
5,500
15
16
15
1900
3500
X
X
X
X
1006/
26.5/
12/
DE
1021
12
1,900
11
15
13
1600
4500
X
X
X
X
22/
13/
DE
1033
4
1,750
9
10
10
3434
7957
X
X
X
X
1/6 Dash equipped
B-A-4
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SANITIZED COPY
NLN10-H-19/22671 [p170f14.4]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
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SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS. - U.S. MAJOR COMBATANTS
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
Class
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASROC
Torp
D.C.
1037/
20/
DE
1040
10
3,400
2
7
4
27.5
4000
X
X
X
x 1/
20/
DE
1052
1
4,100
1
1
1
27
4500
X
X
X
X 1/
20/
DEG
1
6
3,400
1
3
2
27.2
4000
X
X
X
X
X 1/
19/
10.5/
DER
386
12
1,745
25
26
26
4643
8435
X
X
X
U.S. PATROL CRAFT
37.5/
10/
PG
84
14
245
0
3
1
490
3090
X
X
1/ Dash equipped
B-A-5
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
NL1010-H-19/22671 [p.18 of 14.4]
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C03228059
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SANITIZED COPY
SANITIZED
3. .3(b)(1)(5)(6)
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
NLN 10-A-19/22671 p.19 of 14)
C03228059
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SANITIZED
3.3(b) (1)(5)(6)
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
NLN
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AMPHIBIOUS
Endurance
Gun
Lift Capacity
AGE (YRS)
Max,
Econ.
Systems
Helo
Landing
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Troop
Cargo( ft2)
Platform
Craft 1/
14.6/
12/
LCC
15
2
12560
24
24
24
21000
25600
X
X
150
600
1
0
15/
11/
LCC
7
3
12667
26
26
26
21602
31656
X
X
150
600
0
o
12.5/
6/
LFR
4
1280
14
26
21
3500
7000
X
X
0
0
0
0
20/
13/
LKA
113
2
20700
1
1
1
10000
17000
X
X
220
4500
1
9
22/
10.5/
LKA
112
I
16818
13
13
13
12800
22600
X
X
100
17000
1
9
15/
10/
LKA
103
6
10664
25
25
25
13770
16219
X
X
100
17000
0
7
15.5/
12.5/
LKA
88/94
4
13500
24
25
25
12000
15000
X
X
100
17000
0
8
14/
12/
LKA
53/54/56
4
13000
25
25
25
14000
16000
X
X
100
17000
0
8
22/
13/
LPA
249/248
2
16838
15
16
15
10500
16700
X
X
1300
7000
1
7
17/
12/
LPA
117
8
10679
24
25
25
6000
10150
X
1300
7000
o
2
16.6/
10.5/
LPA
33
3
13267
26
27
26
7768
9887
X
X
1450
7000
0
4
Number of LCM(6)
B-A-8
SECRET
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NIN10-H-19/2267/Fp.210FM4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AMPHIBIOUS
Endurance
Gun
Lift Capacity
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Helo
Landing
YPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Troop
Cargo( ft2)
Platform
Craft 31
20/
LPD
4.
8
16900*
1
4
2
8640
X
900
13000
2
9
20/
10/
LPD
1
3
15400
5
7
6
8891
9550
X
X
900
11900
2
9
32/
13/
LPH
4
3
38000
23
24
24
5100
18000
X
X
1800
1/
5800
12
0
23/
15/
LPH
2
6
18000
1
8
4
12000
19000
X
X
1800
5000
7 2/
0
23/
12/
LPR
87/101
5
2130
24
26
25
1862
4434
X
X
121
0
0
0
13.8/
8.5/ 3/
LPSS
315/574
2
1659
25
25
25
7700
4.2
72
o
0
o
22.5/
16/
LSD
28
8
11525
13
15
14
5655
10460
X
X
320
8300
1
18
15/
12/
LSD
16/22
13
9078
24
25
24
7000
11000
X
180
7700
1
18
14.5/
9/
LSD
1/5
5
9300
26
27
26
8000
9500
X
180
7700
1
18
1/ Number of LCM(6)
2/ Normal Stowage 24 CR-46's
3/ Normal Stowage 20 CH-46's
B-A-9
SECRET
4/ ENDURANCE AT MAX. SPEED SUBMERGED
SANITIZED COPY
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C03228059
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SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AMPILIBIOUS
Endurance
Gun
Lift Capacity
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ,
Systems
Helo
Landing
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Troop
Cargo ft2)
Platform
Craft 1/
20/
LST
1179
2
8400
1
1
1
6000
X
430
16000
1
16.5/
107
LST
1173
7
7804
12
13
12
8250
16000
X
X
540
14500
1
20 51
13.5/
11/
LST
1156
15
5777
16
17
16
10000
17300
X
360
11000
1
17 5/
13/
10/
LST
1153
1
6000
22
22
22
5900
7800
X
173
8640
1
15 5/
10/
7/
5/
LST
542
36
4080
25
11250
20000
X
125
8300
1
15
10/
71
LST
1/491
5
3640
25
19850
24850
X
125
8300
1
15
5/
1/ Number of LCM (6)
5/ Number of LVT's
B-A-10
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C03228059
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-SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S MINE WARFARE
Endurance
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Weapons Systems
Countermeasures
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
Mines
Torp/DC
Moored
Acoustic
Mag
Tlunt
1
15/
MCS
1
2
9000
25
25
25
19
8000
X
X
12/
6/
MSC
190
2
362
16
16
16
3041
4472
X
X
X
12.8/
6.8/
MSC
200/289
7
412
5
14
10
1300
2650
X
10/
MSO
519
3
934
10
10
10
15
3200
X
X
14.9/
10/
:1SO
508
4
750
11
13
12
1400
3300
X
X
10/
MSO
422/428
56
775
13
17
15
14
2500
X
1/ Transport and Operate 20 MSL and 2 MCM Helos
B-A-11
SECRET
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NLN
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AUXILIARY
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg,
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft)
POL(bbls)
Boom(T)
18.2/
10.7/
AD
14
5
18000
26
30
28
8540
14800
X
x
317,000
o
20
16/23/
17/
11/
AD
26
8
15300
23
26
24
10000
1500
X
X
211,000
0
3C
18/
12/
AD
37
2
20700
1
2
1
7300
9400
X
X
7,900
0
30
167
10/
ADG
383
1
1178
25
25
25
5100
9100
o
o
Degaussing Ship
18.8/
13/
AE
21/23
5
15623
10
13
11
10300
15700
X
X
788,600
0
10
15/
9/
AE
12
7
14400
24
25
24
15170
22000
X
X
231,000
0
10
13/
91
AE
3
7
13876
26
29
27
17098
21711
M
X
818,000
0
10
20/
AE
26
3
18530
0
1
1
10000
-
X
x
-
-
-
18.5/
10/
AF
58
2
15500
14
14
14
11400
16650
X
X
X
344,250
0
10
AF
16/
12/
56
2
11948
15
15
15
12800
14078
x
x
X
222,000
0
10
15/
8,5/
AF
55
1
12891
24
24
24
12900
16200
x
X
200,000
10
Dead Weight Tons
B-A-12
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AUXILIARY
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk (ft³)
POL(bb)s)
Boom(T)
15,5/
12.8/
AF
48
5
14190
23
24
23
13400
16000
X
X
X
263,000
0
10
20/
18.5/
AFS
1
6
16500
2
6
4
6500
10000
X
X
X
625,000
37000
10
20/
AGDE
1
1
3575
4
4
4
27
40000
Escort
Research
(ASROC, DASH, TORP)
17/
10/
AGF
1
1
2800
23
23
23
4000
9300
X
30,000
0
10
19/
12/
AGMR
1
1
23850
24
24
24
10750
15450
X
X
Commu
nications Re
lay Ship
325/
14/
AGMR
21
1
19800
24
24
24
2770
11700
X
x
Commu
nications
Relay Ship
2A
18/
12/
AGS
15-30
5
2720
24
27
24
7490
14800
Hyd:
tographic Survey
Ship
2
318/
AGSS
555/559
12
1850
4
28
21
-
-
Auxi
liary
Submarine
Research Ship
18.3/
13.5/
AH
12
2
15100
24
24
24
10600
12350
Hosp ital Ship
10/
10/
AK
258
1
12100
25
25
25
17800
31000
X
394,000
0
10
11.5/
10/
ANL
6
1
760
28
28
28
5440
11340
x
(Net Layer)
2/ Average for Class
B-A-13
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
CERRET
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AUXILIARY
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk
POL(bbls)
Room!?
19/
12/
AO
143
6
40171
14
16
15
14350
34000
X
X
X
0
155,000
10
16/
11/
AO
105
5
34350
23
24
24
10470
17200
X
X
X
0
149,000
16/
8/
AO
41
3
22447
27
28
27
8233
11238
X
M
0
106,000
15.5/
12/
AO
36
2
21500
28
29
29
4600
5600
X
X
0
102,000
18/
13/
AO
22
20
25500
24
30
26
10100
14200
X
X
0
112,000
17/
3/
AOE
1
3
52200
1
5
2
26
10000
x
x
X
3377
174,000
20
14/
11/
AOG
1
8
4570
23
25
24
5000
8200
x
X
21,000
1,500
3
20/
3/
AOR
1
1
38100
1
1
1
6500
X
x
x
745
150,000
10
15.4/
12/
AR
5
4
16330
26
29
28
19800
21900
X
X
200,000
0
20
16/
12/
AR
9
1
13690
28
28
28
14500
18500
x
X
150,000
o
20
AR
13/23
3
14490
24
29
26
15.5/
11.5/
x
x
119,000
o
30
L2960
13950
3/ Dead Weight Tons
B-A-14
SECRET
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AUXILIARY
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Snd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft3)
POL(bbls)
Boom(T)
4/
15/
11/
ARC
2/3
3
7200
23
23
23
8750
10650
CABLE REPAIR
SHIP
10
11.5/
9/
ARG
2
1
9620
25
25
25
27000
29000
X
X
70000
23
10.6/
7.31
ARL
1
2
3640
24
24
24
10600
11200
X
40000
25
14.3/
10/
ARS
6
6
1970
26
27
26
8500
13000
X
SALVAGE
SHIP
14/
11/
ARS
38
6
2040
24
25
24
7656
11600
X
SALVAGE
SHIP
12/
AS
33
2
21000
4
5
4.5
18
10000
X
X
X
12/
AS
31
2
16500
6
7
6
18
10000
X
X
X
12/
AS
19
1
18500
27
27
27
16
10000
X
X
17/
14/
AS
11
6.
16050
24
29
26
23000
28000
X
X
X
187000
20
14/
10/
ASR
12
2
1740
23
26
24
12900
14450
SUBM ARINE RESQUE
10
ASR
7
14/
10/
8
2290
23
26
24
9100
14000
SUBMARINE RESCUE
12,5
4/ Average For Class
B-A-15
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C03228059
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SANITIZED COPY
TABLE OF SHIPS - U.S. AUXILIARY
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Nax.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft³)
POL(bbls)
Boom (T)
12.5/
8/
ATA
174
2
860
24
24
24.
4500
12300
5
15/
10/
ATF
148
29
1640
23
26
25
7350
15570
X
X
10
16/
13/
ATS
1
1
2950
0
0
0
6000
10000
M
-
-
13.2/
12,5/
AVB
2
1.
5400
20
20
20
5700
8000
X
x
3000
30
17.3/
11.5/
AVM
1
1
15170
24
24
24
22300
28900
Missile Test Ship
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B-A-16
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TAB B TO APPENDIX B
USSR NAVY SHIP CHARACTERISTICS
The following tables highlight the basic characteristics
of Soviet Naval Ships. Excluded are riverine assault craft,
harbor service craft, and minor torpedo gun boats.
B-B-1
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-
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TAB B TO APPENDIX B
TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR MAJOR COMBATANTS - 1969
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
TYPE
No.
Tonnage
Newest
01dest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp
Guns
SAN
ASWROC
Torp
D.C.
USSR HELICOPTER SHIPS
L
32/
15/
CHG
2
17,500
0
1
4800
11000
UNK
X
X
X
X
X
USSR CRUISERS
32/
18/
CLG
SVERDLOV
2
17,200
13
17
15
2470
8700
X
X
X
34/
15/
CLGM
KRESTA
6
6,700
0
4
3.5
1700
8000
X
X
X
X
X
X
34/
14.5/
CLGM
KYNDA
4
5,600
4
7
5
2050
7000
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
32/
18/
CL
SVERDLOV
6
17,200
--
18
15
2470
8700
X
X
X
32/
15/
CL
CHAPAYHV
1
15,000
20
20
20
1000
5000
X
X
X
35/
18/
CA
KIROV
1
9,060
27
27
27
850
3000
X
X
X
SSR ESCORTS
35/
10/
DLG
KASHLN
16
4,450
0
6
3
1240
7000
X
X
X
X
X
X
1/ Characteristics estimated
B-B-2
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR MAJOR COMBATANTS - 1969
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
TYPE
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASWROC
Torp
D.C.
35/
15/
DDGs
KRUPNYY
6
4,500
--
10
8
1400
4700
X
X
X
X
X
34/
11/
DDGs
KILDIN
4
3,500
--
11
9
1050
4700
X
X
X
X
X
1
35/
15/
DDG
KANIN
2
4,500
0 1/
1 1/
1
1400
4700
X
X
X
X
2
34/
11/
DDG
KOTLIN
6
3,500
0
7
--
1050
4700
X
X
X
X
X
X
34/
11/
DD
KOTLIN
20
3,500
12
15
13
1050
4700
X
X
X
X
33.5/
14/
DD
SKORYY
26
3,050
--
20
--
1050
3500
X
X
X
X
28/
9/
DE
RIGA
35
1,320
--
17
--
700
2450
X
X
X
X
30/
12/
DE
KOLA
6
1,500
--
19
--
950
3500
X
X
X
X
34/
10/
PCE
PETYA
II
19
1,100
0
2
1
450
4900
X
X
X
X
34/
10/
PCE
PETYA I
24
1,100
3
9
6
450
4900
X
X
DD
TALLINN
1
4300
--
X
X
X
X
X
1/ KRUPNYY conversion. Age represents years since conversion.
2/ SAM conversion of general purpose KOTLIN (DD)
B-B-3
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR MAJOR COMBATANTS - 1969
Endurance
Major Weapons
AGE (YRS)
Max
Econ
Anti-Surface
Anti-Air
Anti-Sub
TYPE
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
SSM
Torp.
Guns
SAM
ASROC
Torp
D.C.
34/
10/
PCE
MIRKA
18
1,150
2
6
4
450
6100
X
X
X
X
X
40/
.5/
PTC
MO-VI
40
66.5
--
13
--
505
590
X
35/
UNK/
PC
POTI
84
580
0
8
4
UNK
UNK
X
X
X
X
X
KRONSH
18.5/
12/
PC
TADT
80
380
13
21
--
1350
3100
X
X
X
X
34/
14/
SC
STENKA
17
205
0
2
--
1100
3000
X
X
X
X
29/
7.5/
SC
S.0.1
98
200
3
13
--
570
1920
X
X
X
X
34/
14/
PTFG
OSA
110
205
0
10
5
1100
3000
X
X
36/
22/
PTG
KOMAR
50
81.5
4
9
--
445
610
X
X
B-B-4
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TABLE OF SHIPS-USSR GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES - 1969
SECRET
Avg. Submerged
Weapons
Tonnage
Age (yrs)
Depth (ft)
Max Speed
Patrol Endurance
Systems
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Surf.
Subm.
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Oper.
Collapse
Surf
Subm.
NM6/
Days
Torp 3/
Missil
SSN
N
12-15
4000
4800
5
11
8
1000
1500
16
28
NUC
60
32
SSN
C
3
4400
5200
0
1
0.5
1300
2000
16
30
NUC
60
18
1/
SSN
V
3-4
4300
5100
0
1
0.5
1300
2000
16
30
NUC
60
32
If Diesel:
22/if nuo-
2/
SS
B
3-4
2400
2900
0
1
0.5
1300
2000
UNK
lear:30
UNK
UNK
18
45
2100
2500
2
11
7
900
1400
18
17.5
7200
60
22
SS
F
SS
2
20
2100
2500
14
17
15
750
1100
18
15
7200
60
22
SS
R
14
1100
1400
7
11
9
900
1400
18
15.5
4800
40
18
SS
W
150
1055
1355
12
19
15
656
984
18
13.5
4500
40
12
450
725
55
Q
15
420
510
12
15
13
16
8
41
4/
8
SSGN
E-1
5
4000
5000
7
9
8
1000
1500
20
24
NUC
60
22
6
SSGN
E-11
28
4200
5200
2
/
5
1300
2000
20
23
NUC
60
22
8
1/ The C Class appears to be equipped with an unidentified weapon system , possibly a short-ranged, submerged-launch
cruise missile or perhaps a parallel to the SUBROC concept.
3/ Torpedo Capabilities are maximum. A combination of torpedoes and mines could be carried.
2/ The B Class propulsion system is undetermined.
The Q Class is considered to be for coastal or inland B-B-5 sea deployment.
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NUN10-H-19/2267/10346f141
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TABLE OF SHIPS. USSR GENERAL PURPOSE SUBMARINES - 1969
SECRET
Avg. Submerged
Weapons
Tunnage
Age (yrs)
Depth (ft)
Max Speed
Patrol Endurance
Systems
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Surf.
Subm.
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Oper.
Collapse
Surf
Subm.
NM
Days
Torp 3/
Miss
SSG
J
16
2700
3500
o
8
4
1300
2000
16
14
7200
60
22
4
Long
SSG
W Bin
7
1200
1500
12
19
1551
656
984
18
12
4800
40
10
4
Twin
SSG
W CYL
5
1100
1400
12
L9
155/
656
984
18
12
4800
40
12
2
5/ W Class conversions were accomplished between 1960 and 1963.
6/ Total distance of which the class is capable on a patrol of the duration indicated under "days".
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B-B-6
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NUN10-H-19/[email protected]]
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TABLE OF SHIPS - ÜSSR AMPHIBIOUS
Endurance
Gun
LILL Capacity
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ
Systems
Ik:10
bane!
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonunge
Newest
Oldest
Avg
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Troop
Carge(fL2)
Platform
Cre
12/
LSIL
MP-2
10
750
10
14
12
5400
X
210
5
10.5/
LSV
MP-4
20
760
--
13
:
5100
X
270
7
12/
LSV
MP-6
8
:2,100
9
10
10
7300
:
480
14
12.5/
LSM
MP-8
18
1,000
--
10
--
9200
--
X
380
9
19/
15/
LSM
POLNOCNY
46
772
0
6
--
UNK
1500
X
X
:
9
16/
12/
LST
ALLIGATOR 7
4,000
0
3
1-2
6400
9100
X
42
1/ Number of medium landing tanks
B-B-7
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR MINE WARFARE
Endurance
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Weapons Systems
Countermensures
TYPE
CI.ASS
No.
Tennage
Nevest
01dest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Guns
Mines
Torp/DC
Moored
Acoustic
Mag
18/
MHC
VANYA
61
244
0
--
--
UNK
--
X
X
X
X
X
16/
15/
MF
ALESHA
2
3,500
0
2
1
5000
7500
X
X
18/
MSF
YURKA
46
460
0
7
3-4
UNK
--
X
X
1/
20/
14.5/
MSF
T-58
20
900
--
10
--
2200
3400
X
X
1/
14/
10/
MSF
T-43
120
560
11
20
--
2000
3200
X
X
X
X
X
1/
MSM
T-301
40
170
12
22
17
17/UNK
:
1/
MSM
SASHA
26
300.
:
--
18/UNK
--
--
New
NSI
Class
6
--
:
:
1/ Steel hulled
B-B-8
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR AUXILIARY-1969
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft³)
POL(bbls)
Boom(1)
AD
35
3000
Tender
AEM
6
7000
Missile Support
AG
51
1000
Misc
ellaneous
AGCL
19
800
Small Communication
AGB
2
9500
Icebreaker
AGI
40
900
Intel ligence
Collection
AGS
30
5700
Survey
AGOR
13
5700
Ocean Research
AGL
5
400
Buoy Tender
AGM
6
5300
Missile Range Instrumentation
B-B-9.
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR AUXILIARY-1969
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No,
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft)
POL(bbls)
Boom(1)
AGSC
33
1200
Coastal Survey
AK
13
3500
Cargo
AKL
67
1500
Light Cargo
AO
17
4500
Oiler
AOL
35.
1700
Small Oiler
AN
2
700
Netlayer
AOS
7
1000
Special Liquid Carrier
APB
3
500
Barracks Ship
APC
5
800
Small Coastal Transport
AP
1
1800
Transport
B-B-10
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NLN10-H-M/22671[E39-[43]]
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR AUXILIARY-1969
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg.
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rq
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk(ft3)
POL(bbls)
Boom(T)
AR
20
4500
Repair
ARC
11
700
Cable Layer
ARS
11
2000
Salvage
ARSD
25
3000
Salvage Lifting
AS
17
6700
Submarine Tender
I
ASL
12
4800
Small Submarine Tender
ASR
17
2000
Submarine Rescue
ATA
23
800
Auxiliary Tug
ATR
41
800
Research Ocean Tug
AW
69
200
Distilling
B-B-11
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NUN10-H-19/22671 [ 40of144]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
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TABLE OF SHIPS - USSR AUXILIARY-1969
Endurance
Gun
AGE (YRS)
Max.
Econ.
Systems
Cargo Capacity
TYPE
CLASS
No.
Tonnage
Newest
Oldest
Avg,
Spd/Rq
Spd/Rg
Surf
Air
Vertrep
Bulk (ft³)
POL(bbls)
Boom(T)
EAG
16.
1500
Experimental Auxiliary
B-B-12
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NAVAL SHIP TYPE CLASSIFICATION USED
PRINCIPAL COMBATANT
PATROL (Cont'd)
CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier
PGM Motor Gunboat
#CVH
Helicopter Carrier
#PGMG Guided Missile Motor Gunboat
CVHE
Escort Helicopter
PR
River Gunboat
Aircraft Carrier
PT
Motor Torpedo Boat
CVL
Small Aircraft Carrier
PTC Motor Boat Submarine Chaser
CVS
ASW Support Aircraft
PTF
Fast Patrol Boat
Carrier
#PTFG
Large Guided Missile Patrol Boat
#CHG
Guided Missile Helicopter
Carrier
#FTC
Small Quided Missile Patrol Boat
CA
Heavy Cruiser
FY
Yacht
CL
Light Cruiser
PYC
Coastal Yacht
CLAA Antiaircraft Light Cruiser
SC
Submarine Chaser
CLG
Guided Missile Light Cruiser
#CLGM Guided Missile Light Cruiser
MINE WARFARE
(mixed SAM and SSM systems)
DL
Frigate
DM
Destroyer Minelayer
DLG
Guided Missile Frigate
DMS
Destroyer Minesweeper
#DLGM
Guided Missile Frigate
MCS Mine Countermeasures
(mixed SAM and SSM systems)
Support Ship
DD
Destroyer
#MCSL Small Mine Countermeasures
DDG
Guided Missile Destroyer
Support
#DDGS Guided Missile Destroyer
MHC Coastal Minehunter
(SSM only)
MMA
Auxiliary Minelayer
DDR
Radar Picket Destroyer
MHC
Coastal Minelayer
DE
Destroyer Escort
#MMR
River Minelayer
DHG Guided Missile Destroyer
MMF
Fleet Minelayer
Escort
MSA Auxiliary Minesweeper
DER Radar Picket Destroyer
MSB Minesweeping Boat
Escort
MSC
Coastal Minesweeper
SS
Submarine
(nonmagnetic)
SSB
Fleet Ballistic Missile
MSCO Old Coastal Minesweeper
Submarine
MSF
Fleet Minesweeper
SSBN Nuclear Power Fleet Ballistic
(steel hulled)
Missile Submarine
MSI
Inshore Minesweeper
SSG Guided Missile Submarine
MSL Minesweeping Launch
SSGN Nuclear Power Guided Missile
#MSM
Medium Minesweeper
Submarine
(steel hulled)
SSK Antisubmarine Submarine
MSO
Ocean Minesweeper (non-
SSN Nuclear Power Submarine
magnetic)
SSR Radar Picket Submarine
#MSR
River Minesweeper
AGSS Auxiliary Submarine
MSS
Special Minesweeper
X
Submersible Craft
YMP
Mine Planter
PATROL
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS
BM
Monitor
AGC
Amphibious Force Flagship
#BMR
River Monitor
AKA
Attack Cargo Ship
#BMRL
Small River Monitor
APA
Attack Transport
PC
Large Submarine Chaser
APD
High Speed Transport
PCH
Hydrofoil Submarine Chaser
IFS
Inshore Fire Support
PCE
Escort
Ship
PCER Rescue Escort
LPD
Amphibious Transport Dock
PCS
Submarine Chaser Sweeper*
PF
Patrol Escort
PFR
Radar Picket Patrol Escort
PGH
Hydrofoil Gunboat
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NAVAL SHIP TYPE CLASSIFICATION USED
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS (Cont'd)
AUXILIARY (Cont'd)
LPH
Amphibious Assault Ship
#AGRL Small Radar Picket Ship
LSD
Dock Landing Ship
AGS Surveying Ship
LSIL Large Infantry Landing
AGSC Coastal Surveying Ship
Ship
AGSL Satellite Launching Ship
LSM Medium Landing Ship
#AGT Target Service Ship
#LSMH Medium Landing Ship
AH
Hospital Ship
Hospital
AK
Cargo Ship
LSMR Rocket Medium Landing
AKL
Light Cargo Ship
Ship
AKN
Net Cargo Ship
LSS Support Landing Ship
AKS
Stores Issue Ship
LSSL Large Support Landing
#AKSL Small Stores Issue Ship
Ship
AKV Cargo Ship and Aircraft
t
LST Tank Landing Ship
Ferry
LSV
Vehicle Landing Ship
AN
Netlaying Ship
AO
Oiler
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE CRAFT
AGE Fast Combat Support Ship
AOG
Gasoline Tanker
LCC Control Landing Craft
#AOL
Small Oiler
LCM Mechanized Landing Craft
AOR Replenishment Fleet Tanker
#LCMM Mechanized Landing Craft
#AORL Small Replenishment Fleet
Minesweeper
Tanker
LCP Personnel Landing Craft
#AOS
Special Liquid Carrier
LCPL Personnel Landing Craft
#AOSR Radiological Líquid Carrier
(Large)
AP
Transport
LCPR Personnel Landing Craft
APB
Self-propelled Barracks Ship
(Ramped)
APC
Small Coastal Transport
LCS Support Landing Craft
APH
Wounded Evacuation Transport
LCU
Utility Landing Craft
AR
Repair Ship
LCVP Vehicle, Personnel Landing
ARB Battle Damage Repair Ship
Craft
ARC Cable Repairing or Laying Ship
ARH
Heavy Hull Repair Ship
AUXILIARY
ARL Landing Craft Repair Ship
ARS
Salvage Ship
AC
Collier
ARSD Salvage Lifting Ship
AD
Destroyer Tender
ARST Salvage Craft Tender
ADG
Degaussing Ship
AS
Submarine Tender
AE
Ammunition Ship
#ASL
Small Submarine Tender
#AEL
Small Ammunition Ship
ASR
Submarine Rescue Ship
#AEM Missile Support Ship
AT
Tug
AF
Store Ship
ATA
Auxiliary Ocean Tug
#AFL
Small Store Ship
ATF
Fleet Ocean Tug
AG
Miscellaneous Auxiliary
ATO
Old Ocean Tug
AGB Icebreaker
ATR
Rescue Ocean Tug
#AGBL Small Icebreaker
ATS
Salvage Tug
#AGBN Nuclear Power Icebreaker
AV
Seaplane Tender
#AGCL Small Communication Ship
AVB
Advanced Aviation Base Ship
AGEH Hydrofoil Research Ship
AVM
Guided Missile Ship
AGF Flagship
AVP
Small Seaplane Tender
#AGI Intelligence Collector
AVR
Aircraft Rescue Vessel
AGL
Buoy Tender
AVS
Aviation Supply Ship
AGM Missile Range Instrumentation
AW
Distilling Ship
Ship
AWK
Water Carrier
AGOR Oceanographic Research Ship
#EAG
Experimental Auxiliary
AGP
Mator Torpedo Boat Tender
(vice AGX)
AGR
Radar Picket Ship
IX
Unclassified Miscellaneous
(Sail Training Ships; Relics)
# Type designation devised to cover foreign ship categories which
have no counterpart in the U.S. Navy.
* Include trawlers armed for ASW.
Single letter prefixes "E" and "0" to any type of designator signify:
E - Exparimental; 0 - Overage (of reduced effectiveness due to age).
SECRET
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TAB C TO APPENDIX B
U.S. NAVY AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
The following tables reflect the characteristics of
U.S. Navy aircraft together with age and cost estimates.
B-C-1
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Table of Naval Aircraft (July 1968) I/
Combat
Number
Age (yrs)
Radius
Weapons
Unit Cost (Millions)
Type
Tactically
Total
Assigned
2/
Inventory
3/
Newest
Oldest
Average
Anti-
Anti-
Anti-
Investment
41
Operating
5 /
Surface
Air
Sub
(Annual)
Carrier-based
Attack
A-4
392
744
1
12
6.9
320
2 Walleye
.70
.390
A-6
90
141
1
6
2.5
480
18-500#
4.62
1.117
A-7
182
270
1
3
1.4
750
2 Walleye
1.61
.581
TA-4
66
1
3
1.7
320
2 Walleye
.97
.395
A-3
13
11
15
11.7
1100
3-2000#
2.55
1.018
Fighter
F-4
228
373
1
8
3.5
350
10-500#
4 Sparrow
2.95
.776
F-8
120
360
4
12
8.4
350
2-1000#
4 Sidewinder
1.14
.427
Other
RA-3
18
23
9
10
9.3
1100
2.43
1.018
RA-5
44
62
4
10
6.1
1100
6.22
1.370
RF-8
23
38
9
12
9.7
640
1.46
.388
E-1
20
23
7
11
8.4
2.02
.658
E-2
40
55
2
7
4.1
11.8
1.337
EA-1
18
24
13
15
14.0
.54
.427
EKA-3
27
31
8
12
9.3
1100
3.55
1.236
KA-3
31
48
10
12
11.3
1100
2.52
1.064
ASW
SH-3A
128
183
3
9
5.8
2-MK46
1.43
.523
S-2
160
299
1
9
4.8
400
2-MK46
1.07
.434
Land-based ASW
P-3
180
246
1
8
3.9
1400
2 Bullpup
8-MK46
4.48
1.143
P-2
120
284
10
12
11.3
1050
4-MK46
2.19
.800
B-C-2
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#
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1/ 1969 Draft Presidential Memorandums on Tactical Air Forces and ASW Forces with associated back-up tables.
2/ Unit equipment
3 / Includes pipeline and training aircraft
41 Aircraft investment costs are average flyaway costs adjusted to 1968 dollars through use of the BLS Wholesale Price Index
(Machinery and Equipment). Flyaway costs do not include spares or special support equipment.
51 Navy Program Factors, OPNAV-90P-02 (Revised 1 March 1969)
B-C-3
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U.S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE1/
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973
Fighter/Attack Recce
4478
3475
2827
3013
ASW Land Based
739
667
594
632
ASW Carrier Based
643
458
354
263
Helicopters
1032
1285
1506
1286
Training Aircraft
2710
2305
2487
2099
Other Aircraft
900
998
1199
1117
TOTAL
10502
9188
8967
8410
1/ Includes both USN and USMC inventories
B-C-4
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CONFIDENTIAL
AGE OF NAVY PROGRAM AIRCRAFT
AGE (YEARS)
VA/VF CLASS
7
6
5
4
B-C-5
3
2
1
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
END FISCAL YEAR
CONFIDENTIAL
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10-H-19/22671 144]
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CONFIDENTIAL
AGE OF NAVY PROGRAM AIRCRAFT
TOTAL INVENTORY
10
9
8
7
TOTAL INVENTORY
48 cut
6
B-C-6
AGE (YEARS)
5
4
3
2
1
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
END FISCAL YEAR
CONFIDENTIAL
If
is
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SECRET
TAB D TO APPENDIX B
USSR NAVY AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
The following tables highlight the basic characteristics
and order of battle of Soviet Naval aircraft.
B-D-1
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Soviet Naval Aviation
During World War II Soviet Naval Aviation was
dominated by fighter aircraft. Today it is primarily
a medium bomber force. Some 60 percent of these
500 bombers are equipped to carry air-to-surface anti-
shipping missiles--most, the AS-2, and some, the newer
AS-5. The latter weapon, which includes a greater
range among its advances, will prolong the service
life of its carrier, the BADGER B, which already is
more than twelve years old. A number of faster BLINDER
bombers have entered service, but not yet as missile
carriers--although this appears to be in the offing.
The force's principal mission is the location and
countering of Western strike carriers in conjunction
with the cruise missile submarines.
Naval Aviation has gained new capabilities with
the advent of the helicopter carriers. Progression
in this area could result in greater use of the helicopter
throughout the Soviet Navy in much the same manner
as it is employed by the U. S. Navy. The Soviets
probably could develop and deploy VTOL aircraft on the
helicopter carriers, despite design limitations of the
present flight deck, but by their very nature these
planes will continue to be limited in range and weapon
loads. The possible Soviet introduction of aircraft
carriers would add the new dimension of seaborne strike
and interceptor aircraft. Despite the revolutionary
aspects of Soviet Naval Aviation's future, it is ex-
pected to retain its anti-carrier mission, and
consequently, will continue to include large numbers
of long-range ASM-equipped aircraft.
B-D-2
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INVENTORY AND AVERAGE AGE OF
SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT
MID YEAR 1969
TYPE
NUMBER
AVERAGE AGE
Heavy Reconnaissance
Bear D
40-50
2
Medium Bombers
Badger A
175- 195
13
Badger B
75-95
13
Badger C
190- 210
13
Blinder A
30-40
5
Blinder B
30-40
5
Light Bombers
Beagle
40-60
16
Patrol/ASW Aircraft
Madge
25-40
15
Mail
40-60
2
May
10-15
1/2
Helicopters
Hook
10-20
4
Hound
125-150
8
Hormone
50-70
1
B-D-3
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SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION 1/
Combat
Type
Number
Radius
Weapons
Badger A
175-195
1550
10,000 LB
Badger B
75-95
1300
2 AS-5
Badger C
190-210
1450
1 AS-2
Blinder A
30-40
1700
10,000 LB
Blinder B
30-40
1500
1 AS-4
Bear D (Recon)
40-50
4600
Beagle
40-60
550
6,600 LB
Patrol
Madge
25-40
1150
8,800 LB
Mail
40-60
1150
10,000 LB
May
10-15
1210
18,000 LB
Helicopters
Hook (Heavy)
10-20
210
9700 LB
Hound (Medium)
125-150
140
1000 LB
Hormone (Medium)
50-70
200
2900 LB
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION 1/
Combat
Type
Number
Radius
Weapons
Badger A
275-210
1550
10,000 LB
Badger B
200-300
1300
2 AS-5
Blinder A
100-110
1700
10,000 LB
Blinder B
75-90
1500
1 AS-4
Bear A
40-35
4150/4500
25,000/10,000 LB
Bear B/C
70-80
3950
1 AS-3
Bison
35
2800
25,000 LB
1/ NIPP-69
B-D-4
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SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION
A/C
TYPE
1961
AA²¹
1963 AA
1965 AA
1967 AA
1969 AA
1971 AA
1973 AA
BEAR D
Heavy
0
N/A
0 N/A
5-10 1/2
25-35 1
40-50 2
40-50 4
40-50 6
Recon
BADGER A
MED
BMR
55-65
5
75-90 7
145-165 9
180-200 11
175-195 13
155-175 15
135-155 17
B
"
"(ASM)
100-120 5
95-100 7
60-70 9
60- 70 11
75-95 13
75 - 100 15
75-100 17
C
"
"(ASM)
145-165
5
150-185
7
190-210 9
190-215 11
190-210 13
170-195 15
150-175 17
BLINDER
"
"
o
N/A
10-20
1
45-55 2
50-60
3
30-40 5
30-65 7
30-65
9
B
"
"(ASM)
0
N/A
o
N/A
o
N/A
0
N/A
30-40 5
30-60 7
30-60
9
BEAGLE
LT BMR
35-70
8
70-120
10
100-115
12
50-75
14
40-60 16
20-40 18
0-20
20
MADGLE
Patrol/ASW
70-80
7
70-80
9
55-65
11
50-60
13
25-40 15
10-15 17
0
N/A
MALLOW
"
"
5-25
1
5-25
2
5-25
4
o
N/A
0
N/A
0
N/A
o
N/A
MAIL
"
"
o
N/A
0
N/A
o
N/A
10-25
1
40-60 2
80-100 3
80-100
5
MAY
"
:
o
N/A
0
N/A
o
N/A
o
N/A
10-15
1/2
30-45
2
40-60
4
HOOK
HELO (Heavy)
0-5
1/2
0-5
1
5-10
2
10-15
3
10-20 4
10-20
5
10-20
7
HOUND
"
(Med.)
90-110
3
90-110
4
100-120 6
115-140
7
125-150 8
125-150 10
125-150
12
HORMONE
"
(Med.)
o
N/A
0
N/A
o
N/A
0-10
1/2
50-70 1
70-120 2
90-150
4
MEAN TOTAL AIRCRAFT AND
500-640
5.0
565-735
6.9
710-845 8.3
740-905
9.5
840-1045 9.7
845-1135 10.2
805-1105 11.3
AVERAGE AGE
(570)
(651)
(778)
(821)
(942)
(991)
(954)
1/ BLINDER B Included in A totals until 1969
2/ AVERAGE AGE (YEARS)
B-D-5
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NUW10-H-19/23671[0540FMA]
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TAB E TO APPENDIX B
U.S. NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE
The following tables catalog the U.S. Navy active ships
by type. Included in these tables are the pertinent age data
used in the Main Body assessment of age of the U.S. fleet.
All ages are calculated to the nearest month (i.e., they are
actual ages.) Detailed information on ships by individual
class is contained in Tab A.
B-E-1
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TABLE 1: U.S. NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1961
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
3-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30+
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
ATTACK CARRIER
5
2
2
8
17/10.8
ASW CARRIER
9
9/17.6
CRUISER
1
1
1
11
14/15.0
DESTROYER TYPES
29
12
4
192
3
240/14.8
ESCORT
8
9
53
70/14.6
SUBMARINE
19
8
8
75
110/13.2
AMPHIBIOUS
8
26
1
96
1
132/14.5
MINE
10
72
2
84/6.8
AUXILIARY
3
12
1
175
26
217/16.9
PATROL
TOTAL
83
142
17
621
30
893/14.3
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TABLE 2: U.S. NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1965
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
304
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
ATTACK CARRIER
4
3
1
3
4
15/12.2
ASW CARRIER
1
8
9/12.2
CRUISER
1
1
4
10
16/18.3
DESTROYER TYPES
41
20
5
70
98
234/16.0
ESCORT
6
14
3
13
36/12.5
SUBMARINE
13
15
8
16
53
105/15.8
AMPHIBIOUS
10
12
21
6
86
135/16.6
MINE
2
16
64
2
84/10.0
AUXILIARY
8
4
11
30
153
10
216/21.0
PATROL
TOTAL
85
84
114
130
427
10
850/14.9
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TABLE 3: U.S. NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1969
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30+
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
ATTACK CARRIER
2
3
4
1
2
3
15/14.3
ASW CARRIER
1
6
7/25.4
CRUISER
1
1
7
2
11/21.7
DESTROYER TYPES
9
39
15
5
103
53
224/19.3
ESCORT
17
4
10
2
12
45/11.2
SUBMARINE
20
13
12
8
27
22
102/15.4
AMPHIBIOUS
17
6
16
19
51
53
162/19.1
MINE
2
37
33
2
74/14.8
AUXILIARY
16
6
12
3
71
102
1
211/22.0
PATROL
14
14/ .5
TOTAL
95
74
106
72
262
255
1
865/18.3
1/
Includes 4 CA which are listed under major combatants in Table
to allow more direct comparison
with Soviet order of battle.
B-E-4
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TABLE 4: U.S. NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1973
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
304
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
ATTACK CARRIER
1
2
4
3
1
4
15/16.3
ASW CARRIER
4
2
6/29.5
CRUISER
1
8
10/25.1
DESTROYER TYPES
4
16
39
15
7
86
167/20.8
ESCORT
46
16
6
9
77/5.2
SUBMAR INE
26
18
15
8
9
28
1
105/14.7
AMPHIB IOUS
42
11
6
18
7
17
3
104/12.3
MINE
4
57
6
2
69/17.4
AUXILIARY
26
14
6
10
3
97
25
181/22.0
PATROL
14
7
21/3.3
TOTAL
163
84
77
120
34
246
31
755/16.8
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TABLE 5: U.S. NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1977
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30+
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
ATTACK CARRIER
2
2
1
4
3
3
15/16.4
ASW CARRIER
1
5
6/32.1
CRUISER
1
1
1
3/23.4
DESTROYER TYPES
58
26
35
15
26
160/13.2
ESCORT
50
14
4
9
77/9.7
SUBMARINE
19
27
14
15
5
11
14
105/14.3
AMPHIB IOUS
24
41
10
4
11
1
6
97/10.5
MINE
18
6
57
2
83/18.1
AUXILIARY
54
30
10
4
11
2
58
169/16.2
PATROL
8
13
4
25/6.0
TOTAL
183
163
79
73
112
15
115
740/13.4
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TAB F TO APPENDIX B
USSR NAVY ORDER OF BATTLE
The following tables catalog the USSR Navy active ships
by type. Included in these tables are the pertinent age
data used in the Main Body assessment of age of the USSR
fleet. Detailed information on ships by individual class
is contained in Tab B.
B-F-1
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SANITIZED COPY
TABLE 1: USSR NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1961
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
HELO CARRIER
CRUISER
4
5
4
2
2
17/7
DESTROYER TYPES
49
40
12
101/6
ESCORT
20
37
10
67/7
SUBMARINE
76
219
45
340/7
AMPHIBIOUS
72/-
MINE
320/-
AUXILIARY
591/-
PATROL
380/-
PATROL (SSM)
66/-
TOTAL
1954/7
SECRET
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TABLE 2: USSR NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1965
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPE
HELO CARRIER
CRUISER
4
5
3
1
1
2
16/5
DESTROYER TYPES
13
22
47
6
88/9
ESCORT
27
24
34
2
87/8
SUBMARINE
87
191
53
331/
AMPHIBIOUS
94/-
MINE
311/-
AUXILIARY
700/-
PATROL
360/-
PATROL (SSM)
128/-
TOTAL
2125
SECRET
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CENDET
TABLE 3: USSR NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1969
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPES
HELO CARRIER
2
2/1
CRUISER
8
2
4
4
1
1
20/10
DESTROYER TYPES
12
13
31
23
2
81/11
ESCORT
39
22
20
21
102/8
SUBMARINE
49
87
195
331/10
AMPHIBIOUS
109/-
MINE
321/-
AUXILIARY
658/-
PATROL
320/-
PATROL (SSM)
160/-
2104
TOTAL
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TABLE 4: USSR NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1973
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPES
HELO CARRIER
1
1
2/5
CRUISER
12
6
2
4
3
27/8
DESTROYER TYPES
31
11
17
13
1
73/12
ESCORT
30
35
20
19
4
108/8
SUBMARINE
34
59
67
148
308/13
AMPHIBIOUS
119/-
MINE
292/-
AUXILIARY
658/-
PATROL
300/-
PATROL (SSM)
180/-
TOTAL
2067
SECRET
B-F-5
Reproduced at the Library and Museum.
SANITIZED COPY
C03228059
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
TABLE 5 : USSR NAVY ACTIVE INVENTORY AND AGES
1977
AGE BY YEARS
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
TOTAL/AVG.
SHIP TYPES
HELO CARR IER
2
1
I
4/6
CRUISER
10
11
5
1
4
3
34/7
DESTROYER TYPES
22
32
12
9
4
79/11
ESCORT
30
32
33
14
109/7
SUBMARINE
46
36
65
52
82
281/14
AMPHIBIOUS
129/-
MINE
270/-
AUXILIARY
658/-
PATROL
315/-
PATROL (SSM)
180/-
TOTAL
2059
B-F-6
SECRET
NLN10-H-19/22671 [p66 of 144
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
"C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
TAB G TO APPENDIX B
NATO (NON-U.S.) NAVIES
SANITIZED
3.3 (b) (5)(6)
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom
West Germany
B-G-1
SECRET
NLN10-H-19/22671 E67 19/22671 of 14.4
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
15 May 1969
*Estimates
BELGIUM
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973 *
1977 *
Patrol
1
o
2
0
o
AMPH Craft
o
0
o
0
o
AMPH Ships
o
o
o
0
o
Mine Warfare
52
52
49
29
20
Auxiliary
1
3
1
2
2
A
B-G-2
SECRET
NLW10-H-19/2671[6808]444]
Reproduced at the Library and Museum.
SANITIZED COPY
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - CANADA
* Estimates
FISCAL YEARS
*
*
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
ASW Support
1
1
1
1
o
Aircraft
Carrier
Destroyer
o
o
0
o
o
Destroyer
25
24
22
24
24
Escort
Submarines
1
2
5
4
4
Patrol
23
20
3
3
3
Amphib Ships
0
o
o
0
o
Amphib Craft
o
o
o
0
o
Mine Warfare
10
10
6
6
6
Auxiliaries
16
30
27
30
30
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - CANADA
RCN Air Arm (Pre-Ur ification)
Maritime Command (Post
Unification)
ALL WX FTR
F2H-3 Banshee
29
-
-
I
-
ASW Carrier
CS2F-1 Tracker
35
18
13
$
I
CS2F-2 Tracker
49
53
28
6
-
CS2F-3 - Tracker
-
I
28
45
41
ASW LD/SEA
P-2H Neptune
-
-
24
-
-
CP-107 Argus
-
-
32
22
1
P-3 Type Follow-on'
I
I
1
16
30
ASW HEL
H04S-3
10
7
7
-
-
CHSS-2 Sea King
-
12
36
41
35
B-G-3
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
*Estimates
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - DENMARK
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973 *
1977*
Coastal
&
Destroyers
2
2
-
I
-
Destroyer
Escorts
-
-
2
2
2
Submarines
3
4
4
6
6
Patrol Types
30
32
33
35
39
Patrol
30
32
33
35
39
Mine Warfare
28
22
20
20
20
AMPH Ships
o
0
o
0
o
AMPH Craft
o
10
o
0
o
Auxiliaries
7
13
6
6
6
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - DENMARK
ASW Aircraft
o
o
o
o
0
B-G-4
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
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SECRET
5 May 1969
*Estimates
NAVAL ORDER OF
BATTLE - FRANCE
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
ASW Support
1
2
2
2
1
Aircraft
Carrier
Small Aircraft Carrier
2
1
1
1
-
Helicopter Carrier
-
1
1
1
1
Destroyer Types
18
18
19
20
16
Cruisers
2
2
2
2
2
Submarines
20
21
19
22
24
Destroyer Escorts
29
28
28
28
34
15 May
1969
Patrol
43
27
15
15
20
Minesweeps
124
102
101
104
90
AMPH Ships
10
9
8
8
8
AMPH Craft
11
9
12
13
10
Auxiliaries
34
45
63
65
50
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - FRANCE
5 May
1969
Fighters
Aquilon
54
28
-
,
1
F4U-7
106
I
-
1
-
F-8
I
13
39
35
,
Mirage G
-
-
-
-
10
Fighter Bomber
Etendard IV-M
6
55
51
35
-
Jaguar
I
-
I
10
48
Lt Bomber
Lancaster
35
-
-
-
-
Recon
Etendard IV-P
-
16
20
17
-
Jaguar
-
-
-
-
15
ASW
Brequet Atlantic
-
-
33
38
37
B-G-5
I
SECRET
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - FRANCE
*Estimates
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
4
ASW (con't)
TBM
72
15
-
-
-
P-2V 6/7
52
58
29
21
-
P5M-2
10
-
-
-
-
=
HSS-1
45
52
51
-
-
Brequet Alize
47
73
67
50
40
Super Frelon
-
-
8
17
14
e
B-G-6
SECRET
NUN10-4.19/2267/[E720/14]
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
-C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
*Estimates
GREECE
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
DD
6
8
8
8
8
DE
4
4
4
o
o
SS
2
3
2
5
5
15 May
1969
Patrol
15
9
19
19
19
Mine Warfare
18
28
26
19
15
AMPHIB Ships
21
19
16
16
16
AMPHIB Craft
39
44
44
44
44
Auxiliaries
13
17
15
15
15
B-G-7
SECRET
NLN-10-H-19/22671
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
a
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
*Estimates
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE -
TTABY
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
Guided Missile Lt Cruiser
1
1
1
1
1
Light Cruiser
2
o
o
o
o
Guided Missile Frigate
o
2
3
3
3
Guided Missile Destroyer
0
2
2
2
4
Frigate
2
2
2
2
2
Destroyer
6
4
4
4
4
Destroyer Escort
7
11
13
13
13
Submarine
6
5
6
6
7
Anti Submarine Submarine
o
o
4
4
6
Patrol
46
45
39
40
43
AMPH Craft
46
42
49
49
49
AMPH Ships
6
8
9
9
10
Mine Warfare
96
94
61
61
61
Auxiliary
41
53
48
48
48
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - ITALY
5 May
1969
ASW
S-2A
19
43
39
36
25
Atlantique
o
-
-
18
36
B-G-8
SECRET
Reproduced and Museum.
SANITIZED.COPY,
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE = NETHERLANDS
*Estimates
FISCAL YEARS
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973 *
1977*
ASW Support Aircraft Carrier
1
1
o
o
0
Cruisers
2
2
2
1
1
Destroyers
15
12
12
14
14
Submarines
6
5
6
6
6
Destroyer Escorts
6
6
6
6
6
Patrol Types
12
12
11
11
11
15 May
1969
Patrol
14
12
11
11
11
AMPH Ships
1
o
o
o
o
AMPH Craft
44
14
13
13
13
Mine Warfare
59
68
63
63
63
Auxiliaries
17
15
14
14
14
AIR: ORDER OF BATTLE - NETHERLANDS
5 May
1969
Fighters
Ftr-bmr-Sea Hawk MK-4
19
-
-
-
-
ASW
Carrier-type
Firefly AS6
13
-
-
-
-
TBM-3W2 (3E)
8
-
-
-
-
S-2A
43
39
42
-
-
Land-Based P-2H
5
13
16
-
-
Brequet Atlantiques
-
-
-
9
9
B-G-9
SECRET
NUW10-H-19/22671[=75.6144
Reproduced and Museum.
SANITIZED.COPY
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - NORWAY
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
Destroyers
3
2
o
o
o
&
Destroyer Escorts
5
2
5
5
5
Submarines
8
7
15
15
15
$
Patrol Types
21
34
48
48
48
15 May 1969
Patrol
21
34
48
48
48
Mine Warfare
18
14
15
17
18
AMPH Ships
o
o
o
0
o
AMPH Craft
o
1
3
3
3
Auxiliaries
5
4
7
8
9
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - NORWAY
5 May 1969
HU-16B
1/9
2/18
2/18
-
-
Orions
-
-
1/5
1/5
1/5
B-G-10
SECRET
NUN10-H-19/22671 [p76 of 144
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at Library and Museum.
-C03228059
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SECRET
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - PORTUGAL
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
Destroyers
3
2
-
-
-
Submarines
3
3
4
4
4
Destroyer Escorts
3
3
7
8
8
15 May
1969
Patrol
21
31
29
40
40
Minesweeps
16
16
16
15
14
AMPH Ships
0
o
o
o
o
AMPH Craft
o
26
36
40
40
Auxiliaries
9
10
8
9
10
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - PORTUGAL
5 May 1969.
Aircraft (Fixed Wing)
P2V-5
1/7
1/12
1/12
1/8
1/8
B-G-11
SECRET
Reproduced at the Museum.
SANITIZED.COPY
C03228059
a
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
TURKEY
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
2
DD
9
9
9
7
7
DE
o
o
o
2
2
SS
10
10
10
9
5
15 May
1969
Patrol
18
19
32
30
30
Mine Warfare
35
23
20
20
20
AMPH Ships
o
0
0
0
0
AMPH Craft
0
10
70
74
72
Aukiliaries
32
34
40
39
39
B-G-12
SECRET
NUN10-H-19/22671/P78.f149
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - UNITED KINGDOM
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977*
Attack Aircraft Carriers
3
3
2
0
o
CVS Support Aircraft Carriers
2
2
2
0
o
Cruisers
10
4
4
3
3
Destroyers
47
24
17
9
13
Submarimes
52
43
40
27
30
Destroyer Escorts
65
62
65
42
45
Amphibious Assault Ships
2
2
2
3
3
15 May
1969
Patrol
77
22
6
11
18
AMPHIB Ships 1/
50
16
5
8
8
AMPHIB Craft
o
o
o
0
o
Mine Warfare
221
139
73
60
50
Auxiliaries
110
137
131
135
135
AIR ORDER
OF BATTLE - U.K. (ROYAL NAVY FLEET AIR ARM) 5 May 1969
All WX ftr
Sea Venom F (AW)21
21
-
-
-
-
Sea Venom F (AW)22
100
47
40
-
-
Sea Vixen F(AW)1
83
79
14
-
-
Sea Vixen F(AW)2
-
38
85
-
-
F-4K Phantom II
-
-
13
-
-
Day Ftrs
Scimitar F-1
61
46
23
-
-
Attack
Sea Fury FB-11
8
1
-
-
-
Sea Hawk FB-5
36
-
-
-
-
Sea Hawk F(GA)6
126
56
8
-
-
Hunter GA-11
8
38
36
-
-
1/ The Royal Navy's 2 LPH were included in inventory of ships previously submitted.
B-G-13
SECRET
NLIN10-H-19/22671-79 of 144]
Reproduced at the RichardNx Presidential ibrary and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
AIR ORDER OF BATTLE - U.K. (ROYAL NAVY FLEET AIR ARM)
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
Attack (Con't)
Buccaneer S-1
-
34
26
-
-
Buccaneer S-2
-
24
72
-
-
ASW Carrier
$
-
Avenger AS-6
1
-
-
-
-
Gannet AS-1
1
-
-
-
-
Gannet AS-4
30
5
1
-
-
Gannet AS-6
8
5
3
-
-
ASW Hel
Whirlwind HAS-7
89
69
48
5
-
Whirlwind HAS-22
5
5
4
-
-
Wessex HAS-1
16
87
58
33
-
Wessex HAS-3
-
-
36
40
35
Wasp HAS-1
-
55
84
77
55
SH-3D Sea King
-
1
16
60
60
$
B-G-14
SECRET
INCN10-H-19/2671/80 +1441
Reproduced and Museum.
SANITIZED COPY
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
5 May 1969
NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE - WEST GERMANY
*Estimates
TYPE
FISCAL YEARS
1961
1965
1969
1973*
1977*
Destroyers
6
8
9
12
11
Submarines
3
11
12
16
18
Destroyer Escorts
1
6
6
6
10
15 May 1969
Patrol
51
60
47
55
60
Minesweeps
60
67
77
80
95
AMPH Ships
6
6
4
4
4
AMPH Craft
N.A.
9
17
25
30
Auxiliaries
17
55
49
57
60
AIR ORDER OF
BATTLE - WEST GERMANY
5 May 1969
Fighter-bomber
Seahawk
62
51
-
-
1
F-104G
-
45
68
75
-**
Recon
RF-104G
-
-
27
25
-**
ASW
Gannet
16
15
I
-
-
Atlantic
-
-
19
21
20
** Plans for Naval Air not known for post-1975 either will be absorbed by Air Force or
F-104G will be replaced by new type such as MRCA-75 or F-4.
B-G-15
SECRET
NLN10-H-19/22671/E810F144
Reproducer\thelFichardixn COPY
Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
AVERAGE AGE (IN 1969) OF MAJOR
COMBATANT SHIPS
NATO NAVIES (NON U.S.)
CANADA
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
CVS
BONAVENTURE (1)
12
DE
ST. LAURENT (7)
13
RESTIGOUCHE (7)
10
MACKENZIE (4)
6
ANNAPOLIS (2)
5
ALGONQUIN (2)
25
SS
FLEET SNORKEL (2)
26
OBERON (3)
2
DENMARK
Type
Class
DE
PEDER SKRAM (2)
3
SS
DELFINEN (4)
4
s
B-G-16
SECRET
Reproduce COPY
Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
FRANCE
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
CVS
CLEMENCEAU (2)
7
CVL
Br. COLOSSUS (1)
25
CVH
JEANNE D'ARC (1)
4
CLAA
COLBERT
10
CL
DE GRASSE
15
DLG
SUFFREN (2)
(New/building)
DDG
SURCOUF (4)
13
DL
SURCOUF (3)
13
DDR
DUPERRE (SURCOUF) (5)
11
DD
SURCOUF (5)
13
LA GALISSONNIERE (1)
9
DE
ACOMIT (1)
(Building)
"C67" (2)
(Building)
CDT. RIVIERE (9)
6
LE NORMAND (14)
12
LE CORSE (4)
14
US. "DET" (1)
26
SSBN (3)
(Building)
ESSB
GYMNOTE (1)
3
B-G-17
SECRET
NLN10-H-19/22671/E83 of 144]
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
FRANCE (Cont'd)
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
SS
i
NARVAL (6)
12
SSK
DAPHNE (8)
5 (2 others
building)
ARGONAUTE (4)
10
GREECE
Type
Class
DD
FLETCHER (6)
27
GLEAVES (2)
29
DE
DET (4)
26
SS
FLEET SNORKEL (2)
27
ITALY
Type
Class
CLGM
GARIBALDI
32
DLG
DORIA (3)
4
DDG
MOD INDOMITO (2)
6
DL
SAN GIORGIO (2)
20
DD
INDOMITO (2)
11
U.S. BENSON-LIVERMORE
28
SECRET
B-G-18
NLN10-A-19/22671/6846/144
Reproduced at and Museum.
SANITIZED.COPY
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
ITALY (Cont'd)
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
DE
MOD CIRCE (ALPINO) (2)
1
GIGNO (4)
12
BERGAMINI (4)
7
U.S. "DET" (3)
27
SS
U.S. BALAO (3)
25
U.S. "GUPPY 1B" (2)
28
FLUTTO (1)
20
SSK
TOTI (4)
(new)
NETHERLANDS
Type
Class
CLG 080
DE ZEVEN PROVINCIEN (1)
12
CL 192
HOLLAND (4)
16
FRIESLAND (8)
12
DE 220
British LEANDER (6)
3
SS 265, 282
U.S. BALAO (GUPPY 1B) (2)
24
DOLFIJN
8
POTVIS (1)
3
NORWAY
Type
Class
DE
DEALEY (5)
3
SS
German KOBBEN Class (15)
4
CEODIT
B-G-19
SECRET
NLN10-H-19/22671/6856149
SANITIZED COPY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.
C03228059
SANITIZED COPY
SECRET
PORTUGAL
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
DE
FR. CDT. RIVIERE (3)
1
U.S. DEALEY (3)
1
Inj
PERO ESCOBAR (1)
12
SS
FR. DAPHNE (3)
1 (1 Building)
U.K. "S" (1)
24
TURKEY
Type
Class
DD
GLEAVES (4)
27
MILNE (4)
27
FLETCHER (1)
25
SS
FLEET SNORKEL (10)
26
UNITED KINGDOM
Type
Class
CVA
EAGLE (1)
17
ARK ROYAL (1)
14
CVS
"Modernized HERMES" (1)
10
HERMES (1)
16
CL
TIGER (3)
10
"Improved SOUTHAMPTON" (1)
30
DLG
"Country" (6)
6
DD
DARING (6)
16
EMERGENCY (4)
25
DDR
"Battle" (1)
22
B-G-20
SECRET
NLW
Reproduced at the Library and Museum.
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UNITED KINGDOM (Cont'd)
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
DE
LEANDER (17)
6
ROTHESAY (9)
9
WHITBY (5)
12
DE
"Tribal" (7)
7
LEOPARD (4)
12
BLACKWOOD (11)
12
ROCKET (8)
26
DER
SALISBURY (4)
11
SSBN
RESOLUTION (3)
1
SSN
DREADNOUGHT (1)
6
VALIANT (2)
3
SS
OBERON (13)
7
PORPOISE (8)
11
"A" (11)
22
"T - Conversion" (2)
25
LPH
HERMES (2)
15
WEST GERMANY
Type
Class
DDG
U.S. CHAS. F. ADAMS (3)
(Building)
DD
HAMBURG (4)
4
U.S. FLETCHER (5)
27
DEG
"Frigate 70"
(Building)
B-G-21
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WEST GERMANY (Cont'd)
Type
Class
Average Age (Years)
DE
KOELIN (6)
7
SS
U-13
(Building)
U-4 (10)
4
SST
"Type XX1" (1)
25
B-G-22
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TAB H TO APPENDIX B
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WARSAW PACT (NON-USSR) NAVIES
3.3(b)(5)(6)
The tables that follow show the numbers of ships,
by type (1961-77) and the average age (in 1969) of the
navies of:
Bulgaria
East Germany
Poland
Rumania
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BULGARIAN NAVAL SHIPS
(OPERATIONAL NUMBERS AT MID-YEAR)
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
Destroyers
=
-
-
-
i
-
Destroyer Escorts
2
2
2
2
2
Submarines
3
2
A
2
2
2
Fast Patrol Boats
20
8
8
8
8
Guided Missile FPBs
-
-
-
4
6
Coastal Escorts
4
8
8
6
6
Fleet Minesweepers
2
2
2
2
2
Small Minesweepers
22
18
18
18
18
Amphibious Types
11
11
11
16
20
EAST GERMAN NAVAL SHIPS
OPERATIONAL NUMBERS AT MID-YEAR)
Destroyers
-
-
I
-
I
Destroyer Escorts
4
4
3
4
4
Submarines
-
-
-
-
t
Fast Patrol Boats
31
50
67
75
85
Guided Missile FPBs
-
6
12
12
12
Coastal Escorts
66
69
85
95
85
Fleet Minesweepers
16
20
19
18
14
Small Minesweepers
37
36
28
30
30
Amphibious Types
-
18
18
22
30
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POLISH NAVAL SHIPS
(OPERATIONAL NUMBERS AT MID-YEAR)
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
Destroyers
3
3
3
2
3
Destroyer Escorts
-
-
-
3
4
Submarines
7
7
7
8
10
Fast Patrol Boats
33
19
28
36
44
Guided Missile FPBs
-
5
12
15
21
Coastal Escorts 1/
62
62
54
56
60
Fleet Minesweepers
12
17
24
24
24
Small Minesweepers
19
19
35
35
35
Amphibious Types
18
22
48
48
54
1/ Includes Coast Guard coastal cutters now being used to augment navel strength
RUMANIAN NAVAL SHIPS
(OPERATIONAL NUMBERS AT MID-YEAR)
Destroyers
3
-
-
-
-
Destroyer Escorts
-
-
-
-
-
Submarines
3
-
-
-
-
Fast Patrol Boats
18
8
13
11
10
Guided Missile FPBs
-
-
5
6
6
Coastal Escorts
14
7
6
3
3
Fleet Minesweepers
4
4
4
4
4
Small Minesweepers
26
26
28
28
28
Amphibious Types
8
8
8
8
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NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT NAVAL AVIATION
POLISH NAVAL AIR FORCES
(OPERATIONAL NUMBERS BY TYPE AT MID-YEAR)
TYPE
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
BEAGLE
o
10
10
1
t
FAGOT/FRESCO
20
72
36
30
25
FLASHLIGHT
-
-
I
-
-
MANGROVE
-
4
-
-
-
FITTER
-
-
-
,
5
FISHBED D/F
-
-
-
5
10
NOTES:
1. While it is unknown if any helicopters are actually assigned to the Polish
Naval Air Force, some 18-22 HARE/HOUND helicopters are believed to be operating
under the Polish Maritime Frontier Guard.
2. The Bulgarian and East German Navies have a limited number of helicopters assigned
which probably function in an air-sea rescue role as well as ASW.
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AVERAGE AGE (IN 1969) OF NON-SOVIET
WARSAW PACT NAVAL SHIPS BY CLASS
BULGARIA
Type/Class
Average Age (Years)
Destroyer Escorts
DE RIGA (2)
16
Submarines
SS W (2)
19
Fast Patrol Boats
PT P-4 (8)
17
Coastal Escorts
PC KRONSHTADT (2)
21
SC S.0.1 (6)
13
Fleet Minesweepers
MSF T-43 (2)
20
Small Minesweepers
MSM T-301 (4)
26
MSB PO-2 (14)
11
Amphibious Types
LCU MFP (11)
15
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EAST GERMANY
Type/Class
Average Age (Years)
Destroyer Escorts
DE RIGA (3)
17
Fast Patrol Boats
PT P-6 (18)
PT ILTIS (48)
16
4
PTF SHERSHEN (1)
3
Guided Missile FPBs
PTFG OSA (12)
6
Coastal Escorts
SC S.0.1 (12)
PGM KS-1 (6)
10
18
PGM DELPHIN (11)
PGM FORELLE (3)
16
PGM TUEMMLER (11)
9
SC/PGM KS-2 (20)
14
16
PGM SCHWALBE II (8)
14
PC HAI (14)
4
Fleet Minesweepers
MSF HABICHT I (3)
16
MSF HABICHT II (6)
14
MSF KRAKE (10)
12
Small Minesweepers
MSM SCHWALBE II (26)
12
MSM KONDOR (2)
1
Amphibious Types
LSM ROBBE (6)
LCU LABO-100 (12)
5
7
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POLAND
Type/Class
Average Age (Years)
Destroyers
DD GROM (1)
32
DD SKORYY (2)
20
Submarines
OSS ORZEL (1)
30
OSS MV (2)
23
SS W (4)
19
Fast Patrol Boats
PT MO-V (8)
23
PT P-6 (19)
18
PT WISLA (1)
3
Guided Missile FPBs
PTFG OSA (12)
9
Coastal Escorts
PC KRONSHTADT (8)
13
SC GDANSK (9)
9
SC OKSYWIE (4)
11
SC OBLUZE (5)
2
PGM K-8. (28)
12
Fleet Minesweepers
MSF T-43 (12)
11
MSF KROGULEC (12)
4
Small Minesweepers
MSB K-8 (28)
11
MSB TR-40 (7)
13
Amphibious Types
LSM POLNOONY (24)
5
LCP EICHSTADEN (24)
5
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RUMANIA
Type/Class
Average Age (Years)
Fast Patrol Boats
PT P-4 (13)
18
Guided Missile FPBs
PTFG OSA (5)
10
Coastal Escorts
PC KRONSHTADT (3)
14
BMR BUCOVINA (1)
54
BMR ARDEAL (1)
65
BMR BASARABIA (1)
54
Fleet Minesweepers
MSF M-40 (4)
18
Small Minesweepers
MSM T-301 (18)
23
MSB TR-40 (8)
12
Amphibious Types
LCM BRAILA (8)
4
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TAB I TO APPENDIX B
U.S. AND USSR NAVY AGE AND SHIPBUILDING TRENDS
The following tables, figures and descriptions concern
U.S. and USSR Navy trends with respect to numbers, tonnages,
ages, and rate of replacement of U.S. and Soviet ships.
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Numbers and Tonnage. Table 1 shows a comparison
of the number of active fleet units (less strategic forces)
in the U.S. and Soviet fleets from 1961 to 1969 and a
projection to 1977. The chart is arranged cumulatively
so that it shows that in 1961, for example, the U.S.
had about 960 of all class of general purpose force ships--
made up of CVA/CVS's, major escerts, submarines, amphibious
and patrol, mine warfare and auxiliary. The USSR at
the same time had about 2000 ships of all types. From
1961 to 1969 the U.S. fleet has decreased to about 850
while the Soviet fleet has increased slightly. Current
FYDP and intelligence projections indicate that the U.S.
fleet will decline to fewer than 800 while the Soviet
fleet remains about the same. (The basic characteristics
of U.S. and USSR general purpose naval forces are outlined
respectively in Tabs A and B.)
Table 2 shows the total tonnage of the two navies
for the same time period as shown in Table 1. This chart
illustrates the fact that the two navies are configured
very differently. The U.S. has a navy structured primarily
to keep sea lines of communication open worldwide and
to project power overseas while the USSR has a navy
structured primarily to prevent our successful execution
of these missions. The former is made up of large ships
with great endurance while the latter smaller ships with
less endurance. Note that the total tonnage of USSR
ships is projected to increase after 1969 while U.S.
tonnage will decline.
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TABLE 1
ACTIVE NUMBER OF SHIPS!!
U.S.
61
65
69
73
77
CVA
17
15
15
15
15
CVS
9
9
7
6
6
CRUISE
14
16
11
10
3
DES
310
270
269
244
247
SUBS
110
105
102
105
105
PATROL
0
0
14
21
25
AMPHIBS
132
135
162
104
97
MINE
84
84
74
69
83
AUX
217
216
204
181
169
893
850
858
755
750
USSR
CHG
0
0
2
2
4
CRUISE
17
16
20
27
34
DES
168
175
183
181
188
SUBS
340
331
331
308
281
PATROL
446
488
480
480
495
AMPHIBS
72
94
109
119
129
MINE
320
311
321
292
270
AUX
591
700
658
6582/
6582
1954
2115
2104
2067
2059
1/ Excludes strategic forces (SSBN, SSB) and landing craft (LCU), minor
patrol (PT, SWIFT), minesweep boats (MSB), harbor service craft (YO),
riverine gun-ships, and misc auxiliaries under 100 tons.
2/ No projection past CY 69 available.
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TABLE 2
ACTIVE SHIP TONNAGE
(thousands)
U.S.
61
69
77
CVA
935.0
1019.8
1475.2
CVS
360.0
243.6
243.6
CRU-DES
1120.9
1299.7
1227.0
SUBS
257.6
279.3
325.5
AMPHIB & PAT
1301.1
1403.9
1093.0
MINE
71.0
67.1
107.2
AUX
2869.1
2940.5
2613.2
6914.7
7253.9
7084.7
USSR
CHG
o
48.0
96.0
CRU-DES
530.4
648.6
737.7
SUBS
356.5
644.4
748.8
PATROL
234.0
190.0
185.7
AMPHIB
90.0
122.0
162.0
MINE
140.0
148.0
99.3
AUX2/
1300.2
1439.3
1439.3
2651.1
3240.3
3468.8
1/ Excludes strategic forces (SSBN, SSB) and landing craft (LCU), minor
patrol (PT, SWIFT), minesweep boats (MSB), harbor craft (YO), riverine
gun ships and misc auxiliaries under 100 tons.
2/ Averaged estimate.
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Shipbuilding Trends. The previous two tables, showing
total inventory and tonnages, do not, of themselves,
adequately portray trends of the two navies over the
past years. Figures 3 through 6 give some insight into
these trends. Figure 1 indicates the number of major
naval combatant ships delivered per year during the past
decade and a half. Figure 2 shows these same ships in
cumulative numbers of ships delivered during this same
period--U.S. construction of major naval combatants has
averaged about 13 ships per year as compared to the Soviet
average of about 19 per year. Here again the tonnage
comparison is significant. Figure 3 indicates the annual
tonnage delivered by the U.S. and USSR over this period
and Figure 4 indicates the cumulative tonnage- the U.S.
delivered some 1,550,000 tons of major naval combatants
and the USSR delivered 958,000 tons. Whereas the Soviets
constructed a greater number of major combatants during
this period, their delivery tonnage totals only 62% of
that of the U.S. Of the total U.S. tonnage, however,
it will be noticed that approximately 44% was for U.S.
carrier forces--that portion of the construction inventory
which permits the U.S. the capability to project its
power overseas with integral air support. When the CVA's
are omitted, construction of U.S. surface combatants
and attack submarines (that portion of the U.S. naval
ship inventory which, inter alia, protects U.S. strike
forces and LOC against the Soviet attack forces) was
less than 90% of that of the Soviet Union based on
comparative tonnage much less based on numbers of individual
units.
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FIGURE 1
COMPARISON OF MAJOR COMBATANT
SHIP CONSTRUCTION - USSR VS. U.S.
50
USSR
40
U.S.
B-I-6
NUMBER SHIP DELIVERIES
30
20
10
0
1957
59
61
63
65
67
69
71
73
FISCAI
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FIGURE 2
COMPARISON OF MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT
SHIP CONSTRUCTION - USSR VS. U.S.
360
300
CUMULATIVE NEW CONSTRUCTION (SHIPS)
240
B-I-7
USSR
180
U.S.
120
60
0
1957
59
61
63
65
69
71
73
FISCAL YEAR
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FIGURE 3
COMPARISON OF MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT
SHIP CONSTRUCTION - USSR VS. U.S.
300
369
USSR
U.S. w/o CVAs
250
U.S. CVAs
200
B-I-8
DELIVERY TONNAGE (000)
150
100
50
0
1957-58
59-60
61-62
63-64
65-66
67-68
69-70
71-72
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FIGURE 4
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT CONSTRUCTION
1500
1200
CUMULATIVE TONNAGE DELIVERED (000)
U.S. WITH CVAs
6-I-9
900
600
USSR
U.S. LESS CVAs
300
0
1957-58
59-60
61-62
63-64
65-66
67-68
69-70
71-72
FISCAL YEAR
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Age Trends. It has been pointed out that a type-by-
type comparison of U.S. versus USSR ships may not be
particularly meaningful in assessing the relative capa-
bilities of both navies due to the dissimilarity in missions.
For instance, there is nothing in the Soviet force that
compares with those U.S. forces which make it possible
to project power overseas, i.e., U.S. carrier strike
and amphibious assault forces. Perhaps one appropriate com-
parison would be Soviet ships designed to prevent our
strike forces from carrying out their mission versus U.S.
forces designed to protect our strike forces and thus permit
them to carry out their mission. In this manner one might
compare the Soviet submarine force versus some U.S. ASW
forces--surface combatants and attack submarines. One
method for looking at this comparison in graphic form, con-
sidering both the inventory and ages of these ships, is
to compute "useful life remaining" (hereinafter abbreviated
ULR) as a function of time. The attached tables have been
so constructed based on an arbitrary 30 year useful life
for naval ships. Figure 5 then indicates the percentage
of ULR for the total U.S. attack submarine and surface
combatant forces and the percentage for the total attack
submarine and surface combatant forces of the USSR. It can
be seen that in 1961 the U.S. surface combatant and submarine
force averaged 56% ULR. At the same time Soviet submarines
averaged 77% ULR. By 1965 U.S. ULR had dropped to 49% and
Soviet ULR to 74%. By 1969 U.S. useful life remaining
continued to decrease to 40% and the Soviet force (mainly
due to submarines) to 67%. The slope of the U.S. and Soviet
lines indicates that U.S. ULR decreased over this period
at a slightly faster rate than did the Soviets. Projections
beyond this current year are based on the 5 Year Defense
Plan for the U.S. and intellignece estimates for the Soviets.
It can now be seen that, based on these projections, U.S.
useful life remaining begins to climb, indicating a trend
which would bring U.S. ULR back up over 50% by the late
1970's. However, it should be noted that a large portion
of the percent gain in ULR is accomplished by retiring a
large number of over age ships and not replacing them. For
instance, in 1961, percentage useful life remaining is
figured on a base of some 530 ships--in 1977, the same per-
centage applies to only 360 ships. At the same time, Soviet
useful life remaining shows a continuing slight decline
which would reach the 50% line in the 1980's. The pro-
jections for U.S. forces may be somewhat misleading in that
FYDP projections in the past have never been matched by
the actual U.S. ship construction program.
1/The selection of 30 years as the basis for "useful ship
life" has no significance in this comparison except as
a common reference point. The 30-year span includes al-
most all the ships apparently considered useful (at any
rate, they are active ships) by either Navy. Selection
of another common reference point would not significantly
affect the comparison.
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FIGURE 5
U.S. VS. SOVIET NAVIES
(SHIP-YEARS REMAINING)
77%
12
FYDP/INTELL.
74%
PROJECTIONS
67%
10
64%
62%
SOVIET TOTAL
B-1-11
SHIP-YEARS REMAINING (000)
8
56%
SOVIET SUBMARINES
6
56%
49%
U.S. TOTAL
49%
40%
4
SOVIET SURFACE
COMBATANTS
U.S. SURFACE
COMBATANTS
2
U.S. SUBMARINES
0
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
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The next graph, Figure 6, indicates the effect of
various annual ship construction levels over the next two
decades. It indicates in round numbers what 1 billion,
2 billion, 3 billion, and 4 billion dollar annual ship
construction programs would accomplish for the U.S. fleet.
Essentially, both $1 billion and $2 billion annual programs
would continue the downward trend in the U.S. useful life
remaining assuming a constant number of ships in the
inventory. The $3 billion annual program would probably
permit a sustaining or slow rise in useful life remaining
for U.S. forces. The $4 billion annual program would
permit a faster buildup in useful life remaining.
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FIGURE 6
EFFECT OF VARIOUS ANNUAL SCN PROGRAMS
BEGINNING IN FY-70
1000
ASSUMPTIONS:
COMPLETION OF
TOTAL ACTIVE FLEET
1. GOAL IS A BALANCED FLEET OF
DETAILED PROGRAM
900
ABOUT 850 ACTIVE SHIPS WITH
NOMINAL SHIP RETIREMENT AT
30 YEARS
SHIPS 30 YEARS
800
OF AGE OR OVER
2. AFTER FY 69 4 YEARS INTERVAL
$4.0B
BETWEEN AUTHORIZATION AND
(REVERSE BLANK)
ACTIVE SHIPS UNDER 30 YEARS
ENTRY INTO THE ACTIVE FLEET
B-I-13
700
$3.08
3. FY 66-68 AUTHORIZED SHIPS THAT
SUSTAINING RATE $2.68
HAVE BEEN CANCELLED WILL NOT
BE BUILT. ALL SHIPS IN FY 69 AS
600
ADJUSTED AND THE RIVERS BILL
$2.0B
FOR FY 70 WILL BE BUILT
500
4. FLEET MAY BE MAINTAINED AT
$1.08
THE FY 80 ATTAINED AGE BY
DELIVERY
YEARS
CONTINUED EXPENDITURE AT
400
SUSTAINING RATE FROM
PROCUREMENT
FY 76 ON
YEARS
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
END OF FISCAL YEARS
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TAB J TO APPENDIX B
COST DATA
CONTENTS
Cost data, for both the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy,
is presented in a form intended to allow at least limited
comparisons between programs of the two navies. This TAB
contains the following tables.
1. U.S. Navy Expenditures, FY 1962-74
2. Soviet Naval Expenditures, 1961-74
3. General Purpose Force Expenditure Totals,
1962-69
4. U.S. Navy Expenditures, Shipbuilding and
Conversion, FY 1962-74
5. Soviet Naval Expenditures, Shipbuilding
1961-74
6. General Purpose Force Shipbuilding
Expenditure Totals 1962-69
7. Summary Comparison Table, 1962-74
U.S. NAVY COSTS
U.S. costs, in all cases, are estimates of actual (or
projected) expenditures for any given year and not the Total
Obligational Authority (TOA) figure. Expenditures, rather
than TOA, are used so as to most nearly correspond to intelli-
gence estimates of Soviet costs (expenditures). FY 1962-68
actual total expenditures, for total USN and for shipbuilding
(SCN), were statistically distributed to the individual
programs or program elements, based on the known pattern
of expenditures for any appropriation category. For
projected FY 1969-74 expenditures, the same methodology was
used based on the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). All U.S.
Navy expenditure estimates are presented in 1966 dollars so
as costs. to be comparable with the base used in estimating Soviet
SOVIET NAVY COSTS
Estimated Soviet expenditures are expressed in 1966 U.S.
dollars. These estimates are the estimated cost if the
force/program in question had been purchased, maintained and
operated in the U.S. at U.S. prices. For example:
-Ship procurement (SCN) costs are estimated by analogy
with the cost of constructing a U.S. ship with similar
characteristics. Using the characteristics of a Soviet
ship, a U.S. ship having the most similar characteristics is
determined. The known cost of that U.S. ship provides the
base for estimating the cost of the Soviet ship. Deductions
or additions are then made to this figure to account for
known differences in the characteristics of the two ships.
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-Personnel costs are estimated by multiplying the
estimated number of Soviet military (naval) personnel by
the dollar cost of personnel at U.S. pay scales.
The resulting "dollar equivalent" costs are considered
reasonably valid for use in order-of-magnitude comparisons
of the level of effort for such categories as ship procure-
ment, strategic attack forces, general purpose forces and
the like, provided it is recognized that the estimates
reflect U.S. terms of reference.
SUITABILITY FOR COMPARISONS
As noted above, Soviet dollar equivalent expenditure
estimates are considered appropriate for comparison with
U.S. expenditures for similar forces/programs. Soviet
costs are presented in dollars so as to have meaning to
U.S. users and to provide a common base for comparison
with U.S. costs. Dollar costs for Soviet programs could
also be computed by conversion to dollars from estimated
ruble costs. This method, however, could compound the
margin for error already present when attempting ruble
estimates 1/, since no one ruble-dollar conversion factor
meaningfully applies.
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY
While appropriate for comparisons of the relative
level of effort in the two countries, Soviet dollar costs,
based on U.S. prices, have little or no relationship to the
actual impact on the controlled Soviet economy and, thus,
do not reflect real resources allocation in the USSR. If
the desired comparison is of major end uses of Gross
National Product (GNP) in the two countries, there is the
problem of valuing two very different assortments of output
in a common set of prices. The international currency ex-
change rate cannot be used for the U.S. and USSR because
the exchange rate is set arbitrarily, foreign trade is a
tightly controlled monopoly in the USSR, and the exchange
rate only reflects (imperfectly) the prices of goods and
services that are traded internationally.
To illustrate, U.S. defense expenditures are about
10% of U.S. GNP. Measured in dollar equivalents, Soviet
defense expenditures (1967) are about 11.5% of the Soviet
GNP; measured in rubles, Soviet defense expenditures are
only about 7.5% of GNP. (Soviet expenditures on naval
forces, strategic and general purpose, are 10-15% of the
defense total.)
1/In some cases, particularly procurement of advanced
weapons systems, ruble cost estimates are made by
estimating the dollar cost at U.S. prices and then
applying a dollar-ruble conversion factor.
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COSTS NOT INCLUDED
Intelligence estimates of total defense costs are
deliberately structured to be comparable with U.S. FYDP
Programs. Thus, estimates of Soviet Navy Strategic
Force (SSN/SSBN) costs are comparable to U.S. Navy
Program I expenditures; Soviet Navy General Purpose
Force costs are comparable to U.S. Navy Program II costs.
The total of the two programs is, of course, not the
total Department of the Navy budget in the U.S. case.
Similarly, the total of the two Soviet programs is not,
conceptually, comparable to the total U.S. Navy budget.
Excluded in both cases, are costs included in FYDP
Programs 0 and III-IX. These programs are:
0 Support of Other Nations
III Intelligence and Command
IV Airlift and Sealift
V Guard and Reserve Forces
VI Research and Development
VII Central Supply and Maintenance
VIII Training, Medical and Other General Personnel
Activities
IX Administration and Associated Activities
Estimates of total Seviet Defense expenditures
treat the above categories as defense establishment-
wide expenses; they are not broken out by service. For
example, RDT&E is estimated as a single total for all
services, as is a category "Command and General Support."
Thus, for comparison purposes, it is necessary to limit
attention to U.S. Programs I and II and their Soviet
equivalents.
&
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TABLE 1
U.S. NAVY EXPENDITURES
($ Billions - 1966 $)
FY 62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
2/
STRATEGIC FORCES
2.3
1.9
1.7
0.8
0.6
1.0
1.5
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.4
1.2
1.3
GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES 3/
8.7
8.9
9.1
8.7
10.3
11.9
11.3
11.2
11.4
12.4
12.6
11.8
9.9
Attack Air
1.7
1.9
1.6
1.5
1.8
2.7
2.1
2.4
2.3
2.6
2.4
2.1
1.6
ASW Air
1.4
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.5
1.6
2.0
2.1
2.0
1.8
Submarines
0.5
1.0
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.9
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.1
Cruiser-Destroyer
1.9
1.4
1.7
1.4
1.4
1.8
1.4
1.4
1.6
2.3
2.3
2.0
1.5
Amphibious
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.5
Mine
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
Service
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.5
0.9
1.0
1.0
FMF
1.5
1.4
1.6
1.5
2.5
2.4
2.7
2.5
2.3
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.4
Other
0.6
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.8
ALL OTHER PROGRAMS
3.9
4.6
4.6
4.3
5.1
6.0
6.8
7.1
7.7
7.0
7.5
7.3
7.6
TOTAL NAVY & MC
14.9
15.4
15.4
13.8
16.0
18.9
19.6
20.0
20.7
21.2
21.5
20.3
18.8
1/ Expenditure Estimates: Total Actual (FY 62-68) and FYDP (FY 69-74); statistically distributed to Programs
and Program Elements
2/ FYDP Program I
3/ FYDP Program II
4/ FYDP Programs 0, III-IX
NOTE: Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
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SOVIET NAVAL EXPENDITURES
(Billion 1966 Dollars) 1/
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
STRATEGIC FORCES
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
1.0
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
4.7
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.1
5.3
5.5
5.4
5.2
5.1
5.1
5.0
4.9
4.8
Submarines
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.5
Major Surface
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.0
Minor Surface
0.9
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.7
Naval Air
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.4
Joint Support
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
TOTAL SOVIET NAVY
5.2
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.3
5.5
6.0
6.3
6.5
6.3
6.3
6.2
6.1
6.0
1/ Dollar values reflect the general size of the Soviet forces as if they had been purchased and
maintained in the U.S.
Note: Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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TABLE 3
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
TOTAL DIRECT EXPENDITURES
1962-69 (8, Years)
($Billions-1966 $)
U.S.
USSR
Attack Air Total
15.7
5.51/
(CVA/CVAN Only)
(3.2)
---
5
ASW Air
11.8
---
(CVS Only)
(1.0)
---
Submarines
5.8
10.3
Cruiser-Destroyer
12.4
9.12/
Amphibious + FMF
21.2
(Amphibious Ships Only)
7.53/
(5.1)
Mine
1.0
Service
5.4
9.1
Other
6.8
Total
80.1
41.5
1/ Almost all land based.
2/ Major Surface category.
3/ Minor Surface category.
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TABLE 4
U.S. NAVY EXPENDITURES
SHIPBUILDING & CONVERSION (SCN)
($ Billions - 1966 $)
FY 62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
STRATEGIC FORCES
0.7
1.0
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.1
2/
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.7
GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES
1.3
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.1
1.4
1.1
1.6
2.4
2.9
2.5
Carriers (CVA/CVAN)
2/
0.3
--
2/
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
---
---
---
Submarines
0.2
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.6
1.0
Cruiser-Destroyer
0.8
0.4
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.6
1.0
1.1
0.7
Amphibious
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
2/
0.4
0.2.
0.2
0.3
0.4
---
Service
2/
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
---
---
2/
0.4
0.6
0.7
Other
2/
2/
0.1
2/
2/
2/
0.1
0.2
2/
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
OTHER PROGRAMS
0.1
0.1
2/
0.1
2/
2/
0.2
0.1
2/
2/
2/
2/
0.1
TOTAL NAVY
2.1
2.7
2.2
1.8
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.5
1.5
2.0
3.0
3.5
3.3
1/ Total Expenditure Estimates: Total SCN FY 62-68 and FYDP FY 69-74, statistically distributed to Programs
and Program Elements.
2/ Less than $50 Million.
Note: Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
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TABLE 5
SOVIET NAVAL EXPENDITURES
SHIPBUILDING
(Billion 1966 Dollars) 1/
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
STRATEGIC FORCES
0.3
0.2
2/
2/
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1.5
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.3
Submarines
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.7
Major Surface
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
Minor Surface
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
Joint Support
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
TOTAL SOVIET NAVY
1.8
1.9
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.6
2.0
2.2
2.3
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.9
1.9
1/ Dollar values reflect the general size of the Soviet forces as if they had been purchased in the U.S.
2/ Less than 50 million
Note: Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
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TABLE 6
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
TOTAL SHIPBUILDING EXPENDITURES
1962-69 (8 Years)
($Billions-1966$)
U.S.
USSR
Attack Air
1.0
---
Submarines
2.8
5.5
Cruiser-Destroyer
3.5
2.7 1/
Amphibious
1.6
1.5 2/
Service
1.0
2.7
Other
0.4
---
Total
10.3
12.4
1/ Major Surface category.
2/ Minor Surface category.
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TABLE 7
SUMMARY COMPARISON TABLE
(Costs in $ Billion - 1966 $)
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
U.S.
Strategic (Prog. I)
2.3
1.9
1.7
0.8
0.6
1.0
1.5
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.4
1.2
1.3
General Purp (Prog. II)
8,7
8.9
9.1
8.7
10.3
11,9
11.3
11,2
11.4
12.4
12.6
11.8
9.9
Total Prog. I/Prog. II
11.0
10.8
10.8
9.5
10.9
12.9
12.8
12.9
13.0
14.1
14.0
13.0
11.2
GPF % of Total
79
82
84
92
94
92
88
87
88
88
90
91
88
Shipbldg. % of Total
19
25
20
19
14
11
10
12
12
14
21
27
29
USSR
Strategic
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
1.0
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.2
General Purpose
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.1
5.3
5.5
5.4
5.2
5.1
5.1
5.0
4.9
4.8
Total
5.4
5.2
5.2
5.3
5.5
6.0
6.4
6.5
6.3
6.3
6.2
6.1
6.0
GPF % of Total
93
96
96
96
96
92
84
80
81
81
81
80
80
Shipbldg. % of Total
35
33
31
30
29
33
34
35
33
33
34
31
32
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SOVIET DEPLOYMENT TRENDS
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Soviet Operations and Deployment. An illustration of
the degree of maturity being acquired by the Soviet Navy can
be seen in the comparison of two major Soviet Fleet exercises
separated by but six years in time.
The Soviet naval exercise conducted in the North Atlantic
and Norwegian Sea in July 1962 included but four surface war-
ships (none missile configured), approximately 20 submarines
of the WHISKEY, ROMEO, ZULU, and FOXTROT diesel classes, and
a number of BEAR and BADGER aircraft. The scenario simulated
Allied strike forces running the gauntlet of submarine home-
land. The exercise -- large for its time -- was nevertheless
limited in both number of forces, scope, and versatility.
In contract to that unsophisticated operation, the Soviet
fleet exercise in the summer of 1968, nicknamed "SEVER" or
"NORTH", involved the participation of naval headquarters,
ships, aircraft and naval infantry. Joint Warsaw Treaty
Organization participation -- specifically the Soviet Union,
Poland and the German Democratic Republic -- was highly
publicized, with emphasis on the overall direction by the
Soviet Navy's Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet
Union Gorshkov. A separete joint amphibious and air defense
exercise was carried out in the Baltic, while a major exercise
simultaneously unfolded from the North Atlantic up into the
Barents Sea. In addition to the traditional anti-surface
strike force scenario, the exercise incorporated an amphi-
bious warfare operation on the Murman Coast in the northern
area. In general terms of numbers of ships and aircraft
sorties involved, "SEVER" was the largest out-of-area
operation in the annals of Soviet high seas naval exercises.
At a minimum, there were 82 surface ships, at least 160
individual aircraft sorties, and possibly as many as 25 sub-
marines, including both diesel and nuclear units. Of the 28
prinicpal surface combatant ships, 7 were missile configured,
10 were amphibious warfare ships, the remainder auxiliaries
and minor surface combatants. Soviet air activity involved
both Naval Air Force and Long Range Aviation BEARs and
BADGERs employed in such roles as long and short range mari-
time reconnaissance, coordinated air/surface search, simulated
tactical air-to-surface missile and bomb strikes, video data
link coordination with surface-to-surface missile-equipped
ships, and active and passive electronic countermeasures.
Compared to the 1962 operation, "SEVER" demonstrated a
significant rise in both inherent capability and exhibited
expertise.
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FIGURE 1
SOVIET SUBMARINE OUT-OF-AREA DEPLOYMENTS, 1963-8
UNITS DEPLOYED
140
120
100
80
B-K-4
60
40
20
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
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FIGURE 2
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN MEDITERRANEAN 1964-1968
CUMULATIVE DAYS
12,546
4759
SUBMARINES
8663
4175
DAYS
AGIs
2703
3309
2891
2000
SUPPORT UNITS
4314
4207
1924
1800
COMBATANTS
1771
1600
1377
B-K-5
1400
1321
1200
1000
1000
1889
900
800
778
758
716
727
721
678
600
544
400
400
200
167
0
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
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FIGURE 3
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN INDIAN OCEAN (CUMULATIVE DAYS)
1000
TOTAL
TOTAL
800
B-K-6
CUMULATIVE DAYS
600
SUPPORT UNITS
COMBATANTS
SUPPORT UNITS
COMBATANTS
400
200
SUBMARINES
SUBMARINES
1966
1967
1968
1969
(1 JAN-30 APR)
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CONFIDENTIAL
The table below indicates the average number of ships annually deploying
to the Mediterranean (6th Fleet) and Western Pacific (7th Fleet).
TABLE 1
NUMBER UNITS
YEAR
6th Fleet
7th Fleet
1961
54
113
1962
54
121
1963
54
112
1964
56
125
1965
48
156
1966
49
198
1967
47
202
1968
45
203
1969*
43
186
*through April 1969
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TAB L TO APPENDIX B
OTHER MARITIME FORCES
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ELEMENTS OF SEAPOWER OTHER THAN COMBATANT NAVAL FORCES
The USSR is steadily and impressively burgeoning
in every aspect of seapower other than its strategic and
general purpose naval forces, discussed elsewhere.
As we briefly look at their on-going efforts in
growth, development and sophistication of a merchant
marine, fishing fleet, intelligence and oceanographic
research vessels, plus their specially configured space
and missile support ships, it can be readily ascertained
that they fully understand the role of all elements of
seapower in expanding Soviet power and influence through-
out the world in furtherance of their national objectives.
Unlike the U.S., centralized control and planning over
their merchant, fishing and naval forces enable the
Soviets to closely coordinate all elements of seapower
in pursuance of these national objectives. The Minister
of Shipbuilding, for example, centrally controls R&D,
design, and production of all ships, equipments, and
sensors for both the Merchant Marine and the Soviet
Navy.
MERCHANT FLEET. In contrast to the role of the
U.S. merchant fleet, elements of the Soviet merchant
marine are used in direct support of world-wide Soviet
naval operations. Subsidized, and frequently operating
at an economic loss, it furthers Soviet influence by
transporting Soviet goods and aid to the ports of some
100 nations of the world - 65% of which are those of
developing nations. Of major interest is the fact that
some 300 ships of the merchant fleet are particularly
well-suited for supporting administrative sealift
operations. These are large units of post-war con-
struction having heavy lift booms and capable of speeds
in excess of 14 knots. Of these, about 130 are large
hatch ships having at least one hold 50 ft. in length,
plus 60 ton booms. It is estimated that these some
300 ships are capable of transporting the weapons and
equipment for 13 motorized rifle divisions or 14 medium
tank divisions.
The growth of the Soviet merchant fleet over the
past 20 years has been truly remarkable. It has in-
creased by 8 1/2 million DWT and about 900 units
(1000 gross register tons and over) since 1948. The
U.S. merchant fleet on the other hand, has remained
about the same size in total tonnage and has decreased
by about 400 units (1000 gross register tons and over).
In numbers, with over 1,400 units (1000 GRT and over),
the Soviets have moved up to fourth position among the
merchant fleets of the world. In tonnage, with almost
11 mil DWT, they now rank seventh. The U.S., on the
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other hand, with its 1,135 (1000 GRT and over) ships
of U.S. registry, has moved down from second to sixth in
number of units (1000 GRT and over) and from second to
fifth in tonnage with its current 17 mil DWT. By 1980,
the Soviet merchant fleet is estimated to grow to some
2,500 units totaling 20-25 mil DWT. Where the U.S.
flag merchant fleet, e.g., ships of U.S. registry, now
has declined from 23.5% in 1955 to the present 5.5% of
the total U.S. ocean commerce carried, 50% of all Soviet
seaborne commerce is carried in Soviet bottoms. By 1980,
they plan to increase this to 75%. In terms of ships
ages, the Soviet merchant fleet is a much more modern
fleet. Of its more than 1400 ships, 80% are less than
10 years old. The U.S. merchant fleet, on the other hand,
has only 17% which are less than 10 years old.
FISHING FLEET. The Soviets possess the world's largest
and most modern fishing fleet. On any given day of the
year there are an average of 1500 Soviet fishing vessels
deployed throughout the world. They now have 3,583
vessels (100 GRT and over) of 4 1/2 mil GRT - 75% of
which are less than 10 years old. By 1980 the fleet
is estimated to comprise about 4,500 units totaling 10
mil GRT. In addition, they have modern fishing research
ships which precede the fishing fleet into various areas
of the world to seek out the most productive fishing
grounds.
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3.3(b) (1)
The U.S., on the other hand, has
only 7 units specifically configured for intelligence
collection (AGER's).
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH SHIPS. The USSR has a large
modern and thus the most impressive scientific research
fleet in the world. Of their 131 units, 65% (52 Navy,
33 civilian) are 10 years old or less. The U.S. has
142 research ships, some 30 of which belong to the Navy.
Of the total U.S. fleet, 40% are less than 10 years of
age.
Wartime employment of the Soviet research ships
would be limited as would those of the fishing and AGI
fleets. The Soviet scientific research ship threat is
therefore confined to a massive peacetime effort to obtain
a worldwide oceanographic data base, all of which has
application to undersea warfare.
SPACE AND MISSILE RELATED SHIPS. Soviet seapower
also includes some 22 modern space and missile related
ships. Of the 22, 6 are missile instrumentation ships
which serve as extensions of mainland tracking facilities.
Space event support vessels, of which there are 8, deploy
as water-borne tracking stations. And finally, 8 other
units are specially configured for space vehicle recovery.
up
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ACTIVE MERCHANT FLEET INVENTORY1/
CARGO SHIPS
1955
1960
1964
1967
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
U.S.
2/
817
5,755
732
5,803
692
6,041
879
7,641
Other NATO
5,407
28,454
6,094
36,127
5,962
39,427
5,855
43,357
Total NATO
6,224
34,209
6,826
41,930
6,654
45,468
6,734
50,998
USSR
595
1,850
720
2,600
942
4,008
994
4,700
Other Pact
91
361
189
932
312
1,528
464
2,760
Total Pact
686
2,211
909
3,532
1,254
5,536
1,458
7,460
TANKERS
1955
1960
1964
1967
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
Number
Thou GRT
u.s.²/
365
3,788
341
4,269
298
4,200
280
4,215
Other NATO
1,486
14,137
1,714
21,076
1,603
25,356
1,570
29,403
Total NATO
1,851
17,925
2,055
25,345
1,901
29,556
1,850
33,618
USSR
70
340
121
790
205
1,925
268
2,800
Other PACT
3
21
12
103
25
242
35
353
Total Pact
73
361
133
893
230
2,167
303
3,163
1/ Active ships of 1,000 Gross Register Tons (GRT) or more
2/ U.S. figures do not include National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) ships
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TAB M TO APPENDIX B
U.S. AND USSR NAVY PERSONNEL
U.S.
The impact of petty officer deficiencies can most
easily be seen in fleet readiness reports. Table I shows
the number and percentage of Navy units reporting C1
(fully ready) and C2 (substantially ready). In addition,
the number and percentage units reporting Personnel
readiness of C3 (Marginally ready) and C4 (not ready)
is shown. As can be seen, 46% of all Navy ships available,
and 55% of all Navy aircraft squadrons reported (as of
25 March 1969) that they had personnel deficiencies,
serious enough to warrant a status of marginally ready
or worse.
Table 2 shows the same data, in a slightly different
and more condensed format, showing the percentage of
ships and aircraft which were able to report: C1 (fully
ready) and C2 (substantially ready) in personnel readiness.
In the last two years (FY 68 and FY 69) the following
were the highest percentages obtained: Active Ships
(Excl. Ovh1/OD); LANT, 44%; PAC 62%: Active Navy Squadrons;
LANT, 28%, PAC, 57%.
Table 3 indicates, as of June 1969, those enlisted
ratings in which petty officer (E4-E9) shortages will
continue to exist. Except for the period Apr-Jun 1968,
and 1969, the Navy has had from 10 to 29 ratings (out
of 67 total) with petty officer inventories less than
85% of requirements (top limit of category C3). Among
the ten most understaffed ratings (exclusive of Aviation
ASW Operator, a new rating), staffing in June 1969 is
expected to be as low as 60.8% of requirements for Boiler
Repairmen, to 84% of requirements for Shipfitter.
In addition, the percentage of Leader (E5-E9) Petty
Officers on board is an even more significant indication
of the difficulties encountered in meeting Navy skill
requirements. As of June 1969, the Navy expects to have
on board about 97% of the required petty officer leaders
(E5-E9). This overall percentage obscures such extreme
percentages as Aviation Fire Control Technician, 76%
of requirements, and Shipfitter, 78% of requirements.
Table 4 indicates the Navy Manpower End Strength
Requirements from FY 61 and projected through FY 74.
Figures 1 and 2 show the reenlistment rates for both
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officers and enlisted personnel from FY 66 projected
through the end of FY 69.
Since personnel readiness posture is a controlling
factor in fleet readiness, personnel retention has become
one of the Navy's most serious problems. Of particular
concern is the low retention rate among those skills
requiring a high degree of technical training. This
includes submarine officers trained in nuclear power
and pilots in the officer ranks and enlisted personnel
skills. in ratings associated with electronic and engineering
As shown in Figure 1, Navy pilot's retention rate
has been dropping over the past several years. Also,
an acute retention problem exists at present in the
submarine officer category.
Using NIPP estimates, rough comparisons can be made
between the utilization of Soviet naval and US naval
manpower in, as nearly as possible, comparable programs
as shown in Table 5.
U.S. versus USSR
It should be noted that head counts of personnel
should be interpreted with extreme caution. In order
to approach a valid comparison, it would be necessary
to account for at least the following factors on a
comparable basis: level of training, average lengths
of service in Navy, ratio of careerists to noncareerists,
motivation, draft/volunteer source, maintenance philosophy,
support policies, and labor/ equipment intensiveness.
Little is known of Soviet Navy manpower/personnel practices
from which such parameters could be inferred.
of forces based on DIA estimates. It should be noted
Table 6 shows manpower allocation to various types
that Table 5 includes only US Programs while Table 6 shows
total Soviet navy military manpower categorized by the
Soviet practice. Comparisons can most validly be made
using Table 5.
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TABLE 1
SHIPS AND SQUADRONS WITH PERSONNEL RESOURCE PROBLEMS (MARCH 1969)
TOTAL
C1 & C2
C3 & C4 FOR PERSONNEL
?
UNITS
TOTAL
AVAIL
NO. %
NO. %
NAVY SHIPS
TOTAL
876
793
235
30
368
46
BB
1
1
1
100
0
0
CVA/CVAN
16
14
5
36
6
43
CVS
7
5
o
o
4
80
CRUISERS
16
14
3
21
9
64
DD
175
158
44
28
74
47
DDG
28
26
8
31
7
27
DLG/DLGN
27
26
8
31
9
35
OTHER DESTROYERS
4
2
1
50
1
50
DE
29
27
3
11
18
67
DEG
6
6
0
o
1
17
OTHER PATROL
20
20
5
25
8
40
SS
69
56
27
48
10
18
SSN
39
33
8
24
5
15
SSBN
41
34
30
88
0
0
MINE
76
64
27
42
7
11
AMPHIBIOUS
150
143
9
6
122
85
AUXILIARY
172
164
56
34
87
53
NAVY SQUADRONS
TOTAL
208
57
27
115
55
TACTICAL
122
45
37
49
40
HELO
15
2
13
9
60
PATROL
31
o
0
31
100
ASW
16
4
25
10
62
ALL OTHER
24
6
25
16
67
NOTE:
The
total
of
columns
B
and
4
do
not
add
up
to
the column 2 totals
because units reporting C3 and 04 for reasons
other than personnel
are not included in cblumn 4.
Column 2 includes statistics
reporting total unit
readiness,
including
categories for Personnel,
Supply, Equipment and Training.
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TABLE 2
% UNITS C1 & C2 IN PERSONNEL
AVERAGE %
CURRENT %
1st HALF
2nd HALF
1st HALF
2nd HALF
FY68
FY68
FY69
FY69
3/69
ACTIVE SHIPS
1/
LANT
41
38
35
44
43
PAC
61
59
60
59
62
ACTIVE SQUADRONS
LANT
17
18
25
28
PAC
52
47
53
57
1/
Excludes Ships in Overhaul
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TABLE 3
ENLISTED SKILLS SUMMARY
PAY GRADES E-4 THRU E-9
NUMBER OF UNSATISFACTORY RATINGS:
(Inventory less than 85% of
requirements)
SEP 1967
DEC 1967
APR 1968
JUN 1968
NOV 1968
APR 1969
JUN 1969
29
19
4*
4
18
4*
3
* The apparent major improvement is due to the large number of April
promotions from the February exams. Time in grade criteria for advance-
ments to pay grades E-4 and E-5 have been reduced to help meet the
Petty Officer authorized strengths.
TEN MOST UNDERSTAFFED RATINGS:
% of Requirements
RATING
SEP 67
DEC 67
APR 68
JUN 68
NOV 68
APR 69
JUN 69
AVI ASW Opera-
(Rating newly established -
39.0
44.2
44.4
tor (AW)
1 Sep 68)
Boiler Repair-
69.9
69.4
68.0
70.0
68.1
62.3
60.8
man (BR)
Opticalman (OM)
80.7
85.6
91.2
90.2
73.4
86.4
87.3
Shipfitter (SF)
80.9
79.5
91.7
90.0
78.0
83.7
84.2
Avi Fire Control
61.7
64.1
77.6
73.9
79.5
94.0
88.9
Tech (AQ)
Boilerman (BT)
78.4
83.7
89.7
88.4
84.6
89.4
88.8
Data Systems
77.5
78.5
81.3
84.2
90.5
92.1
89.2
Technician (DS)
Fire Control
94.3
93.9
104.0
101.3
86.8
90.2
88.1
Technician (FT)
Instrumentman
96.6
92.1
79.2
81.4
81.8
84.0
87.0
(IM)
Radioman (RM)
81.3
86.4
91.4
86.7
82.4
88.2
87.5
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TABLE 4
Navy Manpower Summary End Strength
Data as of January 10, 1969
(in Units)
FY 61
FY 62
FY 63
FY 64
FY 65
FY 66
FY 67
Navy Military - Officers
69,981
75,302
75,549
76,400
77,866
79,580
81,677
Enlisted
553,128
586,287
584,346
586,327
588,792
660,518
665,226
ACAD MID/AVN CADETS
3,980
4,839
4,752
4,869
4,936
4,882
4,491
Total Military*
627,089
666,428
664,647
667,596
671,594
744,980
751,394
FY 68
FY 69
FY 70
FY 71
FY 72
FY 73
FY 74
Navy Military - Officers
85,200
84,860
86,419
79,475
79,242
79,480
79,495
Enlisted
675,441
681,697
680,838
601,317
593,136
592,659
595,281
ACAD MID/AVN CADETS
4,591
4,243
4,243
4,243
4,243
4,243
4,243
Total Military*
765,232
770.800
771,500
685,035
676,621
676,382
679,019
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FIGURE 1
NAVY OFFICER RETENTION ACTUAL/PROJECTED
MINIMUM SERVICE REQUIREMENT PLUS 2 YEARS
100
80
SUBMARINE
60
B-M-7
PERCENT RETENTION
55
GOAL
PILOT
40
25
GOAL
20
SURFACE
65
66
67
68
69
70
FISCAL YEAR
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FIGURE 2
NAVY ENLISTED
REENLISTMENT RATE
100
OTHER TERM
GOAL
80
GOAL
2nd TERM
PERCENT REENLISTMENT
60
B-M-8
40
GOAL
20
1st TERM
0
65
66
67
68
69(1)
69(2)
69(3)
FISCAL YEAR (QUARTER)
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TABLE 5
SOVIET MILITARY NAVAL MANPOWER (Thousands)
FY65
FY69
FY73
FY77
Navy Strategic Attacks (SLBM)
6-8
6-9
9-13
12-20
su
Navy GP Forces
300-400
300-420
290-410
270-390
Total
310-410
310-430
300-420
280-410
US MILITARY NAVAL MANPOWER (Thousands)
FY65
FY69
FY73
FY77
Navy Prog I (FYDP)
23
22
25
--
Navy Prog 2 (FYDP)
399
479
395
--
Total
422
501
420
--
1/
The NIPP convention of rounding to two significant digits is used here.
110
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TABLE 6
TOTAL SOVIET MILITARY NAVAL MANPOWER (Thousands)
By Categories of Utilization
FY65
FY69
AFLOAT
Subs
25
25
SurfCombat
63
53
Patrol
22
27
Mine
19
17
Amphib
7
8
Auxiliary
37
45
TOTAL
173
175
ASHORE SUPPORT
173
175
NAVAIR
30
40
COAST DEFENSE
30
22
INFANTRY
4
12
TRAINING
40
50
TOTAL
450
474
1/
The changes seen in this categories may be due to functional transfer of
units or may actually represent changing force emphasis.
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TAB N TO APPENDIX B
U.S. AND USSR ACTIVE FLEET RESERVE
The following Table summarizes the reserve fleets
$
of the U.S. and USSR by ship types. Totals are shown
for selected fiscal years from 1961 to 1977.
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U.S. AND USSR ACTIVE RESERVE SHIPS
U.S.
Type
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
P
DD/DER
13
14
26
36
36
DE
27
25
9
1
1
MSC/MSCO
11
12
14
22
22
PC/PCER
14
9
7
7
7
SS/AGSS
23
23
21
21
21
AH
--
--
--
1
1
Total
88
83
77
88
88
USSR
Type
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
CL
NOT
6
7
7
7
DD
AVAIL
8
18
15
10
DE
3
13
15
15
Total
17
38
37
32
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