Ask the Scholar
Page 25 of 94
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
TP-6
SECRET/EXDIS
February 19, 1969
THE MIDDLE EAST
The Points We Want to Leave in Europe
1. We are seriously concerned about dangerous tensions in the
Near East, but we are not panicked.
2. We will do our part to reduce them, but no one should expect the
US alone to produce a settlement. An Arab-Israeli settlement may be
beyond our capacity. If so, then we will seek other ways to limit great-
power involvement.
3. If there is to be a settlement, everyone will have to pay a price
for it Arabs, Israelis, Russians, Americans, French and British.
Cooperation is a two-way street not just something one side does when
it suits his interests.
4. We are willing to work in any forum as long as it is not stacked
against us. For instance, four-power talks are all right, provided the
other countries make a constructive contribution. If our allies line up
with the Soviet Union, we would do better to talk unilaterally with the USSR.
The Pitfalls to Avoid
1. The British and French are more ready than we to press for terms
of a Near East settlement some of them seemingly quite reasonable --
that Israel just will not buy. Since everyone will look to us to deliver
Israel, we must stick to a fairly hard line in talking about the terms of
a settlement and how to reach one. The major principles spelled out in
the talking points go as far as Israel could go -- maybe even a bit farther.
2. The British and French may each be more eager to promote their
own separate interests than to pay any price for a serious Near East
settlement. It would be helpful to probe for the real motive behind their
interest in a settlement not to take their professions of interest at
face value.
3. Much that is said in Europe will get back to the Israelis. We
must be in a position at the end of the trip to say to them convincingly
(a) that the talks were' exploratory and we committed ourselves to nothing
that would jeopardize Israel's security, and (b) that we pressed our belief
that the parties to the Arab-Israeli war must participate in working out
the terms of a settlement.
SECRET/EXDIS
Page data
- Page
- 25
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 44f9c689033cfef3
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 559236010
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "559236010",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"imageCount": 94,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "559236010",
"label": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "559236010",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "President Nixon's Trip to Europe - WHITE HOUSE ITALY February-March 1969",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"collections": [
"National Security Files (Nixon Administration)",
"Central Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_01.jpg",
"imageCount": 94,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/559236010",
"naId": 559236010,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 25,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/nixon/rn-nsf/572248/Batch0007/559236010_Page_25.jpg",
"mediaId": "44f9c689033cfef3",
"ocrText": "TP-6\nSECRET/EXDIS\nFebruary 19, 1969\nTHE MIDDLE EAST\nThe Points We Want to Leave in Europe\n1. We are seriously concerned about dangerous tensions in the\nNear East, but we are not panicked.\n2. We will do our part to reduce them, but no one should expect the\nUS alone to produce a settlement. An Arab-Israeli settlement may be\nbeyond our capacity. If so, then we will seek other ways to limit great-\npower involvement.\n3. If there is to be a settlement, everyone will have to pay a price\nfor it Arabs, Israelis, Russians, Americans, French and British.\nCooperation is a two-way street not just something one side does when\nit suits his interests.\n4. We are willing to work in any forum as long as it is not stacked\nagainst us. For instance, four-power talks are all right, provided the\nother countries make a constructive contribution. If our allies line up\nwith the Soviet Union, we would do better to talk unilaterally with the USSR.\nThe Pitfalls to Avoid\n1. The British and French are more ready than we to press for terms\nof a Near East settlement some of them seemingly quite reasonable --\nthat Israel just will not buy. Since everyone will look to us to deliver\nIsrael, we must stick to a fairly hard line in talking about the terms of\na settlement and how to reach one. The major principles spelled out in\nthe talking points go as far as Israel could go -- maybe even a bit farther.\n2. The British and French may each be more eager to promote their\nown separate interests than to pay any price for a serious Near East\nsettlement. It would be helpful to probe for the real motive behind their\ninterest in a settlement not to take their professions of interest at\nface value.\n3. Much that is said in Europe will get back to the Israelis. We\nmust be in a position at the end of the trip to say to them convincingly\n(a) that the talks were' exploratory and we committed ourselves to nothing\nthat would jeopardize Israel's security, and (b) that we pressed our belief\nthat the parties to the Arab-Israeli war must participate in working out\nthe terms of a settlement.\nSECRET/EXDIS"
}