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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
3
20
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Haldeman
RE: effectively organizing and consolidating
the various individuals and groups necessary
for RN's re-election. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 5 pgs.
3
20
2/9/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Colson RE:
polling data on Wallace and an analysis of
his viability as a candidate in the 1972
election. Handwritten notes on original
added by unknown. 2 pgs.
3
20
11/29/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: a review of the
Democratic National Committee's analysis of
RN, and how to combat those strategies.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 7 pgs.
3
20
1/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: California
Assemblyman Bill Bagley's advice on state
politics, particularly with regard to Reagan. 1
pg.
Monday, October 04, 2010
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
3
20
1/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: California
Assemblyman Bill Bagley's advice on state
politics, particularly with regard to Reagan.
Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg.
3
20
8/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Hallett RE: RN and
Haldeman's approval of a strategy generated
by Hallett. 1 pg.
3
20
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: campaign
strategies for the closing months of the
campaign. 1 pg.
3
20
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: responding to
a previous memo and making RN visible
during the campaign. 5 pgs.
3
20
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's
campaigning in 1968, what can be learned
from that year, and current poll numbers. 5
pgs.
Monday, October 04, 2010
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
3
20
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: an analysis of
which issues RN seems to have favorable
national support, and areas where he could
use improvement. A brief analysis of
McGovern's campaign is also included. 4 pgs.
3
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: Buchanan's book
of tactics to use against McGovern. Hallett
suggests additional points which he believes
may prove useful in the campaign.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
3
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Colson RE:
Buchanan's book of tactics to use against
McGovern. Hallett suggests additional
points which he believes may prove useful in
the campaign. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 4 pgs.
3
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
Copy of a memo from Hallett to Colson RE:
Buchanan's book of tactics to use against
McGovern. Hallett suggests additional
points which he believes may prove useful in
the campaign. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 4 pgs.
3
20
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: Buchanan's book
of tactics to use against McGovern. Hallett
suggests additional points which he believes
may prove useful in the campaign. 2 pgs.
Monday, October 04, 2010
Page 3 of 3
10AM
Worthing
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Feder
July 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Doug GHAR Hallett COLSON
SUBJECT:
Larry Higby's Request of July 19.
The following is in response to Mr Higby's request that I update and
amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memo-
randum you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice
you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No,/ it's only half
a joke.)
The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may
recall, suggested that the period between the conventions was a good
opportunity to focus on domesticissues with some dramatic, colorful
Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.
My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier
memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a
local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt,
and feel, we should be aiming quarely at those peripheral urban ethnics
and upper-middle+class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West,
and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election -- and
that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive
positive approach. geared around reprivatization, getting government off
people' back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local,
regional, and interest-grouplleyel; in turn, I felt, and feel, we should
be; directing our negative issues = abortion, acid, homsexuality, our
more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare
reform, etc in tarefully-designed, well-rescarched, probably
printed and front group formats SO that we ourselves are not hurt by our
own efforts.
2.
To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being
contravened. In particular, our positive national material the pamphlets,
the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have scen is
the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968.
More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least SO
far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive
way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator
Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric "white flag budget" and under-
researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice
President's rhetoric "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about
Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating
posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol
Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are
all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's
extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They
undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency
while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation
to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we
know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward,
P rogressive and potentiall/even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.
On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem
satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be getting
Bill
irgorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's
views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues
Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national
let's
security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings,
particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense
budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not
get
know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending
a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we
Spingic hear
know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to
expand our constituency at least if the fact that there is not one
Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example,
that is true.
There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign SO
Now
far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going
after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary
how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use
the Democratic Convention that we were going to encourage division,
Daral from um healy valid
have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. how much was done?
we
3,
And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern
get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on
the particulars of his issues how much has been done?
In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization
and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is
going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will but
there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:
1.
Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there
may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do
the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive
duplication of effort, inter office rivalry, competition, holding back
of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting
the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
(a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's
1701 would get lead responsibility and it would also get Colson.
Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts -- dinners,
funding requests, etc. have already been accomplished. (If
they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving
organizational and political effort and that can only be done from
a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as ny people from
here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people,
etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would
have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
(b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with
authority to run all over the place. It needs it still.
(c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction
to provide such support activities as are needed agency contact,
White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming,
etc.
(d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and
God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief -
perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No
matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy
and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that
one guy.
4.
(e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and,
in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate
pretty well with the Shumway operation. P. R. - types like
Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P. R.
activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled
within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining
at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
(f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation
presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
(g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with
the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as
it is now as a separate Connally-Colson preserve it is
going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
(h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be
visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for
two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the
President. Starting now, the President should have a series of
afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at
least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't
believe how lax people are around here and mainly, I think,
because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal
identity with the President.
2.
Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to
remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only
Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so
response-oriented and SO quick to jump at every quiver in the
McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the
President should be locked in and something attached to the
President SO he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The
same goes for everybody else.
3.
Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our
constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of
awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything
else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign,
with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's
substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We
would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around
with a sense of humor.
5.
4.
Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know
anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available
for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been
around the President for more than one campaign.
I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.
CC: Charles W. Colson
can
had
THE WHITE HOUSE
in
WASHINGTON
a
February 9, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHARLES COLSON
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT:
George Wallace
Attached is all I could get from the Republican National Committee.
As you know, I don't have access to any polling we've done or have
private access to, but I am told that it is that material which is
more conclusive on this question. Nevertheless, on the basis of
what I can garner from the attached and my own reading/instincts,
here goes:
1.
Wallace has slipped steadily in the South since 1968. They are
sich ui inim. He's run too
They're
switching
to
1000
proletarian racism. In 1968, Wallace received 54 percent of
the vote in the Some Drop South - Now he is the choice of
only 30 percent of those voters. President Nixon has 36 percent
of the Southern vote and the Democrats 27 percent. Thus, it
appears we can win the South even with Wallace. While having
Wallace out of the race would probably assure us Alabama and
Mississippi, we have a better than even chance of taking every
other state and a fighting chance even there. And if our position
on busing becomes firmer, so would our support in the South.
2.
Wallace is below his peak '68 level everywhere, but is still
fairly firm in the North. There, he's still relatively new. His
Populism and identity with hard-hat hard-linism which no
other candidate, including President Nixon, has come close to
has definite appeal. Given President Nixon's usual campaign
style and an opponent like "zig-zag" Ed Muskie, Wallace stands
to do very well and, in doing so, he stands to take from the Demo-
crats. Outside the South, Wallace supporters would otherwise
go for Muskie over the President by about 5 to 3. Depending on
the strength of his overall support, these voters could well be the
difference between victory and defeat in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New
Jersey and Illinois.
2.
3.
There is a vast difference between 1968 and 1972. In 1968, it
is possible that Wallace robbed us of certain support both South
and North which we might have otherwise received. We were
both the out-party, the guys trying to overthrow the status quo.
Now we are the Establishment, Whatever appeal we had in 1968
as the change party (and I can't convince myself that it was much
among Northern blue-collar types) that appeal is gone, gone, gone.
Whatever happened in 1968, this time Wallace will draw certain
voters exclusively from the Democrats, the clear-cut out-party
of 1972. Wallace is not, fundamentally, a conservative. That is
partially why his support has faded in the South with the racial
issue. Wallace is a radical and he appeals to certain voters'
radical instincts. These are voters we're not going to get no
matter how many pics the President has taken with hard-hats.
These guys want to overthrow the Ford Foundation, reform the
tax structure, redistribute income and do all kinds of things they
know Chamber of Commerce-blessed Richard Nixon ain't going
to do. These guys are Demos. Wallace knows that, too. Except
for busing, he attacks us very rarely. This year, he's trying a
Northern strategy and it's aimed at his fellow Democrats.
On the basis of the foregoing, I would argue that it is better to have
Wallace
in
than
out.
With
With him out, we guarantee ourselves the South. With him in, we may
lose two or, at most, four (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia)
Southern states, but may make what could be decisive gains in such
Northern states as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Illinois. I
think the risk is worth taking.
Let me stress, however, that my recommendation is based on a lack
of concrete information unusual even for me. There have been only the
most superficial (like mine) analyses of his impact, I don't have access
to any of our private polls, and most of the above is just speculation.
Frankly, it seems to me a simple matter to program some polls in five
or six Northern states and find out exactly what Wallace's impact is.
Instead of relying on everybody's hunches, why don't we try that ?
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
flw
NARS, Date 8/26/80
CONEIDENTIAL
November 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON RSAA
DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT:
DNC Study of the President
Per request, I have reviewed the confidential DNC analysis of the
President. I, too, find it rather unimpressive. Nevertheless, I
will summarize its findings, the strategy it suggests, and what I
think we should be doing in opposition to that strategy.
I. Summary of Study
Data for the study was obtained from a national poll taken in September,
after the announcement of Phase I of the President's economic program.
Respondents were asked to volunteer what they liked/disliked about the
President. They were also asked to respond positively or negatively
to a number of statements about the President; i.e., He has kept most
of the promises he made in 1968. Conclusions were based on the per-
centages volunteering various feelings about the President and dispari-
ties between those agreeing and disagreeing with the various statements.
Interestingly, the outstanding positive attribute, volunteered by 25
percent of the respondents, is that President Nixon is doing the best he
can. The President's honesty (13 percent), his handling of Vietnam and
the economy (both 10 percent), his personality (9 percent), his decisive-
ness (8 percent), his way of gathering facts before making a decision
(6 percent), that he is a family man (6 percent), and his ability to
communicate with people (4 percent) followed.
The West -- half of which is California -- rated President Nixon's
honesty and intelligence more highly than the rest of the nation his
handling of Vietnam less highly. This might suggest -- contrary to
general assumptions about his media ability that the President is more
easily able to communicate his personal values and attributes to people
to whom he is exposed again and again than to those who have seen him
only occasionally.
2.
It is also interesting that more people in the 21-29 year old group were
attuned to the President's Vietnam and economic policies than in the
rest of the nation. On the other side, the group over fifty was much
more likely to say the President is honest and doing the best he can,
but less likely to approve of his handling of the war and very skeptical
of his conomic policies. The 18-20 year old group was in between
these two extremes.
The criticism most commonly volunteered is that the President has a
poor personality (11 percent). This is followed by failure to keep
promises (7 percent), cannot make decisions (7 percent), failure to end
war (6 percent), and bad economic policies (6 percent). Young people,
who were most likely to cite the President's war policy as an attribute,
were also most likely to cite it as a debit.
Respondents agreed that the President is not afraid to take decisive
action (74 percent) and that he is experienced and smart, especially in
foreign affairs (55 percent). On the other hand, 50 percent to 40 percent,
they agreed that the President does not inspire confidence or faith as a
President should. By 44 percent to 37 percent, they disagreed with the
statement that the President has kept his campaign promises.
Respondents divided evenly between agree and disagree on statements
that the President lacks personal warmth and color and that he is often
uncertain and wishy-washy in what he stands for. The contrast between
the sample's recognition of the President's decisiveness in particular
instances and its recognition of his overall decisiveness is interesting to
note.
The group breakdowns in response to the various statements are not
surprising. The South is most likely to respond positively to the President;
the East is least likely to do so. The older one is, the more likely it is
that his composite rating of the President is favorable. The cities are
most antagonistic; rural areas are least antagonistic. Here, however,
it is worth noting that rural areas cite President Nixon for breaking his
campaign promises more than the other two areas; this clearly reflects
upon the agricultural situation.
Education and income breakdowns do not appear to be determinants of
attitudes towards the President in this study. Among racial groups,
blacks are most antagonistic. Republicans respond much more favorably
to the President than any single group in the society.
3.
II. Strategy Suggested by Study
The authors of the study draw various and sometimes conflicting -
conclusions from their data. At one point, they conclude that the data
shows that the President "can duck the responsibility for errors in
judgment by pointing to the complexity of the situation he inherited. 11
At another point, they write: "As long as nothing visible is accomplished
by his Administration, his position will erode slowly; he is clearly
vulnerable in a personalit contest. 11
In general, however, they seem to feel that the data shows the President's
coalition is flimsy and tentative, buoyed mainly by the general feeling
that he is making the best of a bad situation. They recommend that the
Democratic Party attack President Nixon's "stance as an innocent victim
of circumstances" asking such questions as, "Is this the best we can do ?
Is Carswell/Haynsworth the best we can do? Is six percent unemployment
the best we can do?"
They also warn that the President will continue to use "major announce-
ments¹ to boost his position and that these announcements can be damaging
to the Democrats unless the Party begins now on a concerted effort to
challenge the assumption that these announcements are great breakthroughs
and departures from the generally bad situation left by the Democrats in
1968.
Some of these conclusions seem to me to be more along the lines of
assumptions. In my view, the only significant conclusions that can be
clearly drawn from the study are that President Nixon does have major
liabilities in the areas of inspiring confidence and overall decisiveness.
The Red China and economic announcements as we already know from
the popularity polls and trial heats did not overcome the general
impression that the President is unsure of himself and his goals.
There does seem to be a general feeling throughout the country and
among every group that the President's leadership whatever that
is - has been lacking; that he has not disclosed his philosophical values
and guidelines; that he has not provided the country with a sense of
direction and purpose; that he has not defined the nation's problems
in a coherent, thoughtful way.
And although this appears to be President Nixon's only major weakness,
it cannot be taken lightly. The President's major strength is only that he
is making the best of a bad situation; in other words, there is nothing
4.
inherent in the President's posture to counterbalance the majority
view that he does not provide the country with real leadership. Given
a mediocre economy or an unsatisfactory war situation and an attractive,
positive, forceful Democratic candidate, it seems quite possible that
the President's support could quickly evaporate.
III. Combating the Democratic Strategy
If, as presented, what the authors recommend is more of an approach
than a full strategy, it is one that warrants some consideration even in
its present form. I have never shared in the general optimism that
pervades this place about 1972, and I do not now. Nor, I think, should
you.
The results of the President's last three election campaigns lead to
the clear conclusion that he has a tendency to lose support as a campaign
progresses. While many people may support the Presidentnsuch
grounds as issues and experience when a campaign begins, many end
up supporting his opponent by the campaign's conclusion. If in the long
run he increases confidence in himself by exposure as the California
part of the Democratic poll suggests, in the short run he decreases it.
The more people see Mr. Nixon juxtaposed to a Democratic opponent,
the less they like him.
Why this is so is shown clearly in the Democratic study. People do
not have a clear view of Mr. Nixon personally or philosophically.
Campaigns tend to highlight this aspect of a politician. The Democrats
able by their posture to resort to more extravagent rhetoric fulfill
people's expectations for a sense of purpose and direction; unless the
nominee is Humphrey, they will be able to do so again in 1972. This
leaves Mr. Nixon on the short end of the comparison and causes him to
decline the more he campaigns. I think this clearly happened in 1960,
1962 and 1968.
Unfortunately, we seem to be on the brink of letting it happen again in
1972. In both 1962 and 1968, the President started 18 points ahead. He
won't have that kind of lead next year, yet few around here seem at
all concerned that the same kind of bland, hold-your-ground, middle-of-
the road, say-nothing campaign strategy the President normally chooses
will not be satisfactory.
5.
We have been doing better on the personal side since the 1970 campaign,
although I have noted something of a fall-off since last June, an unfor-
tunate over-reaction to the over-zealous self-exposure the President
went in for last March. We have done nothing on the philosophical
direction side. The President continues to mouth the same banalties
as always; nobody with the exception of you - - seems particularly
concerned about expanding our constituency; if in foreign affairs we
do go in for dramatic moves and visual events, in domestic affairs
we have done virtually nothing of political or media value except for
the economic policy.
This must end. We have got to come up with a coherent, consistent
and forceful rhetorical, philosophical and personal posture for Mr.
Nixon and carry it through from now until the election. When people
think of Mr. Nixon, they should think of something more substantial
than that he is the Avis of the political set. While there are clearly
disadvantages in defining the President better than we have so far, I
think these disadvantages are more than offset by the gains we would
make among those now turned off by the President's rather vapid public
image.
The following are the areas in which I think improvement is needed:
1.
The President's Rhetoric. Historians will record that nothing more
undermined the President's efforts to exert leadership than his
rhetoric. It is, to be perfectly frank, god-awful. This is not to
say that I could do better; I have tried, and cannot.
But better speeches could be given. Noel Koch is a thoughtful,
elegant and forceful writer the President should let Noel really
write write a full speech, not those silly sets and then give
what Noel writes in an undoctored form. John Andrews is also a
fine writer, although not a particularly original thinker.
The other writers, I think, are not very good. At best, they are good
for two pages - -and the President's rambling rhetoric reflects it.
Speeches have an important effect in setting the tone for the Administra-
tion, in giving clues to columnists, newsmen, scholars, etc. Intel-
lectuals it has been said correctly live by words alone; some-
times words are more important than substance. We have lost the
opportunity;we have to use our speeches to set a tone and supply a
direction.
6.
2.
The President's Travels. We have done magnificiently on the
foreign front and miserably in the domestic arena. The
President rarely does anything out of the ordinary or gutsy
aside from the AFL-CIO convention, I cannot think of one thing
he has done which has been directed towards expanding his con-
stituency and identifying himself with groups with whom he is not
normally identified.
The President spends too much time in airplanes, at hotels, and
on military reservations. He has spent too little, if any, time in
factories, on farms, with every-day people, on the streets it
would be great, for instance, if we could get him to drop in un-
announced in the Chicano section of Los Angeles.
We should be striving more for visual identification with problem
areas like it or not, that kind of identification is essential to
a public figure's leadership. I still like the idea of a two-day,
three-night trip to Indianapolis with an in-depth immersion in the
metropolitan region's problems. I'd like to see the President at
a juvenile detention center, at a drug treatment center, in a prison,
spending a night with a police officer on patrol, camping out in the
Rockies with Morton and Governor Love, at a local union meeting,
at a gutsy college campus, on an Indian reservation for a day and a
half these are all things I've suggested before, but they should be
done.
The trip to the Redskins camp was the best thing he's done in months
it was spontaneous and human ; it showed the President in a relaxed,
unstructured situation; it allowed people to see that he really is one of
them; that he has more to him than mechanistic good sense; that he is
not just a "professional President", as Sir Robert Thompson put it,
or a "GS-100", as Scammon and Wattenberg have written.
3.
The President's Use of Television. We made a good, if over-eager,
start in this area after the 1970 election presumably because we
immediately did not go up 30 points in the polls, we stopped as suddenly
as we started. This is unfortunate. Last January, we had a real
chance to develop a thought-out, consistent television strategy with
the use of regular conversations with various interest groups as I
suggested which could have provided a good vehicle for showing
the President as a thoughtful, philosophic, quick, analytically minded
leader. We have lost that opportunity, and now the best we can do is
slap together whatever we can as best we can.
7.
4.
The Use of Written Media. Here, agai n, there was a good beginning
last winter with the various interviews (the Sulzberger interview
is still the best thing he's ever done) and the articles in some of the
magazines. We seem to have dropped off a little bit, however, since
that time.
A Sports Illustrated interview-article with the President (if it was
not done as a World of Sports Illustrated TV show) talking on sports,
his interest in themwhat values he learned from them, etc. would be,
in my view, fantastic.
Other Administration figures should also write more often. If I were
President, I think, I would have six or seven good writers spending
their whole time writing articles big and small for newspapers,
mainline magazines, interest-group magazines, etc. We do some
of this and that is good but I don't think we do nearly enough.
As far as it concerns the President, use of magazines should be
thought out and planned so the appearance of the President in a
magazine is natural and normal. We do not want a whole spate of
substantive and human-interest stories appearing all at once we
want a gradual, steady procession.
Central to all of the above, I think, is the development of a viable, consistent
philosophic posture for the Administration. We need a way of explaining
ourselves so we don't shoot off in shallow directions like the "New
American Revolution" or "We're No. 1" and so we don't appear to be
wandering from "bold stroke" to "bold stroke" without any sense of
direction or purpose.
While the immediate pay-off in spending time trying to put together such
a posture may not be very clear, Ithink the long-run pay-off will be quite
real. At the least, we might avoid some of the phony sputtering we go in
for now in our P.R. I have already in my response to last year's
State of the Union and in some of the other things I've written made an
attempt admittedly an awkward one to accomplish this. I think
a more sophisticated effort should be made before the State of the Union so
that that document does not again become a cacaphony of worn-out slogans
instead of a serious statement about the condition of the nation.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
19 January 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM DOUG HALLETT
DAS
Do me a favor and show this one to the President - I talked to Bill
Ra gley. my state assemblyman in California and the state's best mind
in general on government/ political stuff, today. Bill is very concerned
that we are letting the campaign out there fall into the hands of the Reagan
Right. He's being circumspect and says he'll do headstands in Dubuque,
Iowa if the President's reelection depends on it, but thinks we're making
a terrible mistake in not broadening the base out there a little more.
Being one who recommended giving California to Reagan, Iagree. I
think we can and should exact something in return for it unless we
want to kill any Republican activity to the left of Lyn Nofziger. I think
1972 could be a disaster if we don't - and 1974, the way it's going now,
is going to make 1958 in California look like a picnic.
By the way, Bill is very interested in a job back here - probably
after the election. Anybody who knows anything about California can
assure you that he's qualified for something at the subcabinet level -
one of the ASsistant AG sibts would be perfect if something is still open.
There is nobody brighter in state government and Bill has put together
a legislative record that is, according to California political historians
I know, second to none in the state's history.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
19 January 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM DOUG HALLETT
ASS
Do me a favor and show this one to the President - I talked to Bill
Bagley, my state assemblyman in California and the state's best mind
in general on government/political stuff, today. Bill is very concerned
that we are letting the campaign out there fall into the hands of the Reagan
Right. He's being circumspect and says he'll do headstands in Dubuque,
Iowa if the President's reelection depends on it, but thinks we're making
a terrible mistake in not broadening the base out there a little more.
Being one who recommended giving California to Reagan, I agree. I
think we can and should exact something in return for it unless we
want to kill any Republican activity to the left of Lyn Nofziger. I think
1972 could be a disaster if we don't - and 1974, the way it's going now,
is going to make 1958 in California look like a picnic.
By the way, Bill is very interested in a job back here - probably
after the election. Anybody who knows anything about California can
SI
assure you that he's qualified for something at the subcabinet level -
one of the ASsistant AG stbts would be perfect if something is still open.
There is nobody brighter in state government and Bill has put together
a legislative record that is, according to California political historians
I know, second to none in the state's history.
August 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DOUG HALLETT
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
I know you feel your advice is never taken, but it may interest
you to know both Haldeman and the President have concurred
in the attached. This is precisely the strategy that we are
now employing.
21 July 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM DOUG HALLETT
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July
I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the
President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then
that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous
memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my
position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear
to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention.
From September 1 on there should be a mix of D.C. -based substantive
activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most
for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should
just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the
last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be
one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in
mid-October, and two during the last twooweeks -- and any rally appearance
should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day.
On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September,
three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be
at least theoretically government-related and he would appear talking
about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign
with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan
banalities the President can attract attention and dominate the airways
and the issues in other, more éffective and less destructive -- ways.
CC: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme -- which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pace should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc. ) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices;
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our Women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic i. c. Nixon and Jews and
negative i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On,the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help McGovern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc.
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget -- or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers:
-it would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing - - the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish.
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 27.
Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost
no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline
during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is
true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than
it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but
since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures
are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the
attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent
support his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to
47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the
campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz.
Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking
most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the
election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was
remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall.
What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the elec-
torate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote
declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas
in 1960 the President's actions, both effective the TV blitz and
ineffective the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the
electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base
of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.
In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the
convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing
with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appro-
priate and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention
period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-
media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as
2.
usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum
with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across
the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford
it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur
his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech
and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign
continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the
White House.
Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was
better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally,
approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates,
deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-
Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse
observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and
steel strike activies in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not
done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's
attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me)
and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented,
even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his
office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage
of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and
the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before
that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually
losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative
media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give
decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on con-
stant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would
have probably won.
Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The
tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance
of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate
is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of
rallies and the institution of thoughful speeches, etc. The failure in
1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which
the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out;
only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there
were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being
radio speeches and not visual events poorly designed to attract attention
from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly
3.
designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening
on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the
1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried
out, both by the President and the people around him.
What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz
the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led
to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that
he should remain above and beyond the battle remain Presidential is
the way Ray Price would put it as he did in 1968. The first approach
would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the cam-
paigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled
it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's
Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach,
in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public
attention -- it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could
manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate,
and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to
ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican
majority.
What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism
of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days,
with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's
incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should
be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices,
fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax
reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and
although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R.
wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace and he should be doing
all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve
some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking
should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the
media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential
appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political
rally appearances made should be few and far between and the rallied
should be SO massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not
just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed
suggestions and I will not repeat them here.
4.
I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is
beginning to get battle-hungry the sight of Geo rge McGovern galavanting
around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to
resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of
the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him
in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-
charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960
campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President,
we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving
the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't
done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our
domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with
business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few cor-
porations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the
environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed
out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at govern-
ment expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the
substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the
President now in the White House.
The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not and should not
be taken as - - doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and
I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can
lose it -- assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach the
only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take
advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense
of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off
those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who
can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the
President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good.
But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office,
not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive
against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad,
not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new
sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican
or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference,
and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of
what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our
advantage in the election campaign now facing us.
GALLUP POLL
1960
Nixon Kennedy Undecided
Early June
48
52
Late June
48
52
July (After Convention)
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November 6
48
49
3
GALLUP POLL
1968
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
June
35
40
16
9
July
40
38
16
6
August
45
29
18
8
September 3-7
43
31
19
7
September 20-22
43
28
21
8
September 27-30
44
29
20
7
October 3-12
43
31
20
6
October 17-21
44
36
15
5
November 1-2
42
40
14
4
August 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
RE:
Issues -- Positive and Negative
Positive
(1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign
policy strategist who has phased down the war, brought a new
relationship with China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union,
and, just as importantly if not more, needs four more years to
complete his structure of peace.
(2) Returning Power to People -- This is more a theme than an
issue, but it does embody a range of issues -- reveme-sharing,
welfare reform, goveramental decentralization, etc. -- where we
have done enough to get by and which reaches into the core of
McGovern's appeal. This, too, must involve some discussion of
what is to come as well as what has happened -- deregulation,
reprivatization, etc.
(3) Concern for the Workingman -- This, again, is more a theme
than an issue, but it is a theme which can and should be used to
unite our very commendable and very usknown record in this area --
occupational health and safety, pension guarantees, social security,
tax reform, unemployment compensation, and the other Rosow
Report issues. We should press hard with the idea (tacitly) that
the Kennedy-Johnson Administration concerned itself almost ex-
clusively with the exotic (and, if we want to get racist, with the
blacks) whereas the Nixoa Administration has reached out and in-
volved itself in lower-middle-iacome and middle-income issues.
(4) The Economy This should be pressed not because our record
is great (it is not), but because McGovers will be pressing it against
us and the best way to obscure our debits is to claim (which we can,
with some evidence) success in this area, The idea implicit in our
discussions should be that the President is the cool, tough, pragmatic
operator who can face the fact that his policy is not working, change
and adjust it, etc. not explicitly said like that, but implicit in what
we say.
(5) Resteration of Integrity to the System -- The President can travel
anywhere, the campuses and cities are quiet, the Supreme Court has
been turned around, our anti-crime efforts, etc. However, we must
be careful not to take an undynamic approach here -- order is not
good for its own sake and McGovera is right that people know it.
Negative
(1) McGovera is an inept, inexperienced, hyper-idealistic dreamer
who is more concerned with the problems of the exotic few than he
is with the problems of the majority of the American people. Our best
issue is McGovera himself. This has to be handled carefully. Being
heavy-handed refocuses attention on us -- and that we don't want, for
the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what a President
should be -- but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrate
like Connally and through mailiags, articles, etc. can get this across.
McGovern's ties with liberal elitists, his concern for amnesty,
abortion, homosexuals, etc. all get tied up with his inexperience,
lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to make him seem incredible
as President of the U.S.
(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovera's
weakness. We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but,
without the rhetoric, we can get the Idea across that McGovern has
no experience in and no knowledge of the realities of mid-twentieth
century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved -- perhaps
through an hour-long Walter Cronkite conversation or something --
would get across the real sophistication of our policy sad mailings,
etc. can be used to chip away at McGovera.
(3) McGovera is more of the same at a time when we need a new
direction in domestic policy -- At the same time we're attacking
McGovera as a light-weight idealist, we can also get him as just
another high-spending, bureaucratic-orieated New Deal problem-
solver -- behind the froth of "new politics" lies the same old stuff
we've gotten for the last thirty years more taxes for the workingmas,
ao problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be put on with
certain groups, but the fecus for the national strategy should be that
while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovera is just proposing
a blown-up version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a
perfect point of attack for this.
(4) Specific Voter-Bloc Issues -- Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-
speaking, labor, etc. etc all have their separate range of issues on
which McGovern's record can be attacked and compared with ours
unfavorably. These should not be made into national issues by and
large -- but should be pressed hard through front groups, Democratic
organizations, mailings, local speakers, local ads, etc.
From McGovera's point-of-view, all issues are necessarily
negative -- he's attacking us and his qualities are attributes only
insofar as they differentiate himself from us. He will stress:
(1) End the War New or If it's ended why not sooner -- McGovera
believes that the American people, deep in their hearts, know the
Vietaam war is a moral travesty and that only pride keeps us from
ending it now. Whatever happens, he will use this issue to point
out the frontier hubris which he sees at the core of America's lack
of maturity and its failure as an international power since World
War II.
(2) The Economy -- The domestic equivalent of Vietnam is our
handling of the economy. McGovern will say we favor the rich
against the poor, the powerful against the weak that the economy
is suffering from no temporary malady, but needs to be unchained
from corporate control through aati-monopoly laws and tax reform
to allow greater competition and growth. Jobs for everybody and
holding down of prices will be the immediate foci for his attack.
(3) Openess, Credibility and Candor of Government -- The President
lies and when he does not lie, he does not level with the American
people. The government is out of people's reach and beyond their
control. It lies to them about bembing abroad, unemployment
statistics at home, it bugs their telephones and collects massive
data files on them, it controls their lives without being under their
control.
(4) Nixon is a low-brow, not very thoughtful, low-quality mid-1930's
Depression-iafluenced, out-of-date man on the make. Anybody who
can keep Bebe Reboso, John Mitchell, Bob Haldeman, Chuck Colson,
Spiro Agnew, Billy Graham, Clement Haynsworth, and the other
people Nixon surrounds himself with is not fit to be President of the
United States in 1972. At a time when the country is searching for
new values and new directions, Nixon represents the past at its most
mediocre. Poor boy made good, he reflects all the worst aspects of
American conservatism a bigoted, reactionary, unfeeling, un-
humanistic make-it-or-else philosophy influenced far more by Horatic
Alger than Edmund Burke. A weeden figure ready to use people for
his own ends and then cast them off, Nixon cannot understand an
America which has no choice but to confront itself and what it is be-
coming if it does not want to fall victim to the machinery and the
psychology which has brought it to preeminence. Nixon's like a
Fourth of July speaker who doesn't believe himself what he's saying;
McGovera knows what's happening, baby. It's time to start speaking
up to people, not speaking down to them is the hyper-patriotic,
obscure-the-substance rhetoric Nixon uses.
(5) Corporate Bias The tax structure, ITT, the economic program,
etc. -- all reflect a blas towards reactionary corporate chiefs. Peter
Flamigan says the government is open to each and everyone, but, If
I called him, I couldn't get through -- why should James Roche?
(6) Redirect Priorities Whatever we have done, it's not enough.
The defense budget can be slashed and domestic spending must be
increased.
EC: Charles Colson
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
% August 19 72
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM DOUG HALLETT
RE: Issues -- Positive and Negative
Positive
(1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign policy
strategist who has pha sed down th e war, brought a new relationship with
China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union, and, j ust as importantly if
not more, n eed four more years to complete his structure of peace.
(2) Returning Power to People -- This is more a theme than an issue, but
it doe S embody a range of issues -- revenue-sharing, welfare reform,
governmental decentralization, etc. -- where we have done enough to get
by and which reach into the core of McGovern's appeal. This, too, must
involve some discussion of what is to come as well as what has happened --
deregulation, reprivatization, etc.
(3) Concernfor the Workingman -- This, again, is more atheme than an issue,
but it is a theme Which can and should be used to un ite our very commendable
and very unknown record in this area -- occupational h ealth and safety, pension
gunaratees, social security, unemployment compensation, and the other Rosow
Report issues. We should press hard with the idea (tacitly) that the Kennedy-
Johnson Administration concerned itself almost exclusively with the exotic (and,
if we want to get racist, with the blacks) whereas the Nixon Administration
has reached out and involved itself in lower-middle-income and middle-income
issues.
(4) The Economy This should be pressed not because our record is great (it
is not), but because McGovern will be pressing it against us and the bestt way
to bbsucre our debits is to claim (which we can, with some evidence) success in
this area. The idea implicit in our discussions should be that the President is
the cool, tough, pragmatic operator who can face the fadt that his policy is not
working, change and adjust it, etc. -- not explicitly said like that, but implicit
in what we say.
Negative
(1) McGovern is an inept, inexperienced, hyper-idealistic dreamer who is more
concerned with the problems of the exotic few than he is with the problems of
the majority of the American people. Our best issue is McGovern himself.
This has to be handled carefully. Being heavy-handed refocues attention on us --
and that we don't want, for the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what
a President should be --but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrats
like Connally and through mailings, articles, etc. can get this across. McGovern's
ties with liberal elitists, his concern fro amenesty, aborition, homosexuals, etc.
a 11 get tied up with his inexperience, lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to
make him eem incredible as President of the U.S.
(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovern's weakness.
We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but, without the rhetoric,
we can get the idea across that McGovern has no experience in and no knowledge
of the realities of mid-twentieth century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved
perhaps through an hour-long Walter C onkite conversation or something --
would get across the real sophistication of our policy and mailings, etc. can
be used to chip away at McGovern.
(3) McGovern is more of the same at a time when we need a new direction in
domestic policy -- At the same time we're attacking McGovern as a light-weight
i dealist, we can alosso get him as just another high-spending, bureaucratic-
oriented New Deal problem-solver -- behind the froth of "new politics" lies the
same old stuff we've gottenfor the last thirty years -- more taxes for the
wo kingman, no problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be
put on with certain groups, but the focus for the national strategy should be that
while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovern is just proposing a blown-up
version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a perfect point of attack for this
(4) Specific Voter-Babc Issues -- Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-speaking,
labor, etc., etc. all have their separate rangeof issues on which McGovern's
record can be attacked and compared with ours unfavorably. These should not
be made into national issues by and large -- but should be pressed hard through
front groups, Democratic organizations, mailings, local peakers, local ads, etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT:
McGovern Briefing Book
I have reviewed Pat Buchanan's McGovern briefing book and his
suggested assault tactics memorandum. While I would generally
concur with his recommendations, I would make the following
random recommendations:
1.
McGovern's labor record is not mentioned. There is the
14-b vote, and if there is that, there must be something else.
Somebody should thoroughly research McGovern's positions
on labor, and labor-related issues. I have a feeling he can
be made to look worse than us in this area.
5
convo
2.
McGovern's attendance record is not mentioned.
3.
When I worked on the Hill, McGovern had a reputation as a not
very effective legislator -- he hasn't got much legislation through,
Comect
he didn't work on his committees, he was a kind of dreamy, high-
spending and hyper-idealistic character. This, I think, can be
effectively used against him if we can get more facts on what kinds
of legislation he personally has sponsored, what it cost, what's
happened to it, etc.
4.
We should begin now undermining McGovern's Vietnam image --
right from the start. This, really, is the key to his image as a
good
credible, conscientious, non-political senator -- but to undermine
it will take hard work beginning now. For starters, I would suggest
a Hugh Scott or Gerry Ford op ed for the major dailies and an RNC
pamphlet. This stuff should be particularly useful with youthful types.
2.
5.
The Spanish-speaking sector, like the labor sector, is an area
where I suspect McGovern has done nothing. Again, we should
begin working now to undermine him there.
6.
McGovern talks a lot about including women in his government and
he has made pledges of certain appointments, but his campaign
organization is all male. It is also virtually completely WASP.
This point should be made to women and to blacks, Spanish-
speaking, etc.
FORGETT
George McGovern is unconvincing as a war hero. Has anybody gone
through Pentagon files to find out what he really did in the war?
8.
We need some work on McGovern's personal finances. He wears
$300 suits, $15 ties, has a $110, 000 home, vacations in the Carri-
bean, and pays to send his kids to school the son of a preacher
who has never made more than $42, 500 per year? Somebody's
got to be bank-rolling this guy and we ought to find out who and use
it to undermine his credibility image.
9.
We have to be more careful with the Chicago demonstrations, Ellsberg,
McGovern's friends, etc. material that Pat suggests, I think. A
national ad identifying Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin as future
White House dinner guests would be, in my view, disastrous. This
kind of material must be carefully targeted, used by non-national
speakers in particular communities, and distributed through mailings,
ethnic press advertising, etc.
10. On foreign policy, we should develop the idea that McGovern is a
radical in the American prairie isolationist tradition a tradition
Americans have accepted only at their peril. Somebody should do a
quality piece on McGovern as the successor to the isolationist
SXcellent
tradition Lindberg before World War II, the obstructionist
Republicans after Versailles, etc., and, of course, the nineteenth
century Populists. This will assist us on the domestic side, too.
Quoting McGovern and calling him a wild-eye radical nationally
will hurt as much as it helps, but thoughtfully, systematically
identifying him with an isolationist and radical strain in American
history -- a strain which has been destructive will allow us to get
at him, and get his positions out, without making ourselves the issue.
3.
Another quasi-historical idea that we should develop is that there
is an historical anomoly in prairie isolationist-populist McGovern's
acceptance among the Eastern Establishment elite which has
traditionally been our most internationally-oriented community.
Again, a thoughtful piece can be done on the decline of the eastern
elite its failure inVietnam, the degradation of its universities,
the collapse of the WASP churches, the failure of the elite to raise
decent kids, etc. and how in its decline, in its exhaustion, it has
accepted the viewpoint of its traditional opposition. Conversely,
The Republican Party of Richard Nixon is moving away from its
obstructionist role, is developing a new internationalism, is
incorporating the white, ethnic, Catholic middle-class working
population, is proposing energetic -- instead of tired retread--
solutions to domestic problems, and will produce the new elite
for the final third of the century. At your request, I did something
along these lines last summer, but nothing ever came of it it is
a theme we should now revive and get circulated.
The idea is that the Eastern Establishment has gotten soft and flabby.
It is unable and unwilling to see it through -- to find new ways to
solve domestic ills; to take the hard, tough steps necessary to
bring peace to the world. The Eastern Establishment has turned
to wishful thinking, to imagining that something can be accomplished
by wishing it. President Nixon, in contrast, is tough, hard and
realistic. He realizes that it takes time and patience and courage to
solve our international pr oblems. Similarly, he recognizes that
we have to remove the crutch of a patronizing government and free
peoples' individual wills if we are not to smother over our people and
their ability, their willingness, their courage to solve their own
problems here at home. Indeed, RN is even closer to the best
thinking among blacks, browns, etc. than is George.
11.
Presidential anger at some kind of business price-gouging is not
enough to shed the "in bed with business" image. In my view, it is
too bad we don't have a stronger anti-trust program with legislation
we did did
if necessary. But if we can't do that now at least until the second
term, I will bet, though I'm not yet a lawyer, that we could go after
5" 60mp>N
one or two major, publicly-identifiable corporations with existing
anti-trust laws - or with something. Business has no place else
to go - we ought to be on their asses.
auto Company the louk we
4.
12. It would be a mistake to leak polls showing us weaker than we are.
Our whole campaign must be based on the idea that McGovern is
an anomoly a Goldwater type -- something out of the ordinary
and something out of step with mid-twentieth century America.
Showing him to be stronger than he is can only give credence to his
view that America is ready for a change, etc. etc.
13. If McGovern is nominated, responsible foreign policy types like
George Ball might not be able to support him. These guys should
be lined up for us some kind of Foreign Policy Advisory Board
poot
to the Committee for the Re-election. If they don't line up with us
and try to sit it out, we should do an op ed or something on that fact,
blasting them for cowardice, etc. If they support McGovern, we
should blast them for selling out. Like it or not, these guys do have
a certain credibility and however we smoke them out can help us by
getting them on our side or showing them to be shams.
14. Somebody should do a piece on "McGovern Isn't a Politician? " citing
the change in his voting stance in election years, his weaving all over
good
the place this time, his compromises with Daley, his tenure as
executive secretary of the South Dakota Democratic Party, etc., etc.
15. Somebody should do a piece comparing RN's and George's foreign
policies. George, actually, has no foreign policy except for Vietnam
where he's been consistently wrong -- the rest is just a derivation
from his "reordering priorities" stuff. RN, in turn, has clearly
developed foreign policies for all sections of the world, great exper-
ience, etc. The thing could end with the question: "Could what
has been accomplished in the last four years been achieved with an
isolationist and inexperienced person like George in the White House? 11
and mass distributed.
16. A two-minute foreign policy spot could be developed, swinging from
trouble area to trouble area and showing how RN has improved
things, and ending with the question: "At this time when we are
moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation at
this time when we have a chance to achieve firm solutions to major
world problems in Asia, in the Middle East, etc. is this any time
to draw back on our responsibilities and to withdraw from the world?"
This could also be the theme for speeches, a pamphlet, and op ed, etc.
17.
Any blatantly racist suggestions -- like saying McGovern would be
delighted to run with a black, but not Wallace should be dropped.
The above are just preliminary thoughts and thoughts which I haven't
mentioned in the other memoranda I've done in recent days.
HRH
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT:
McGovern Briefing Book
I have reviewed Pat Buchanan's McGovern briefing book and his
suggested assault tactics memorandum. While I would generally
concur with his recommendations, I would make the following
random recommendations:
1.
McGovern's labor record is not mentioned. There is the
14-b vote, and if there is that, there must be something else.
Somebody should thoroughly research McGovern's positions
very
on labor, and labor-related issues. I have a feeling he can
be made to look worse than us in this area.
conus
2.
McGovern's attendance record is not mentioned.
3.
When I worked on the Hill, McGovern had a reputation as a not
very effective legislator he hasn't got much legislation through,
he didn't work on his committees, he was a kind of dreamy, high-
Come
spending and hyper-idealistic character. This, I think, can be
effectively used against him if we can get more facts on what kinds
of legislation he personally has sponsored, what it cost, what's
happened to it, etc.
4.
We should begin now undermining McGovern's Vietnam image --
right from the start. This, really, is the key to his image as a
good
credible, conscientious, non-political senator but to undermine
it will take hard work beginning now. For starters, I would suggest
a Hugh Scott or Gerry Ford op ed for the major dailies and an RNC
pamphlet. This stuff should be particularly useful with youthful types.
2.
5.
The Spanish-speaking sector, like the labor sector, is an area
where I suspect McGovern has done nothing. Again, we should
begin working now to undermine him there.
6.
McGovern talks a lot about including women in his government and
he has made pledges of certain appointments, but his campaign
organization is all male. It is also virtually completely WASP.
This point should be made to women -- and to blacks, Spanish-
speaking, etc.
George McGovern is unconvincing as a war hero. Has anybody gone
through Pentagon files to find out what he really did in the war?
8.
We need some work on McGovern's personal finances. He wears
$300 suits, $15 ties, has a $110, 000 home, vacations in the Carri-
bean, and pays to send his kids to school the son of a preacher
who has never made more than $42, 500 per year? Somebody's
got to be bank-rolling this guy and we ought to find out who and use
it to undermine his credibility image.
9.
We have to be more careful with the Chicago demonstrations, Ellsberg,
McGovern's friends, etc. material that Pat suggests, I think. A
national ad identifying Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin as future
White House dinner guests would be, in my view, disastrous. This
kind of material must be carefully targeted, used by non-national
speakers in particular communities, and distributed through mailings,
ethnic press advertising, etc.
10. On foreign policy, we should develop the idea that McGovern is a
radical in the American prairie isolationist tradition a tradition
Americans have accepted only at their peril. Somebody should do a
quality piece on McGovern as the successor to the isolationist
tradition - Lindberg before World War II, the obstructionist
Republicans after Versailles, etc., and, of course, the nineteenth
century Populists. This will assist us on the domestic side, too.
Quoting McGovern and calling him a wild-eye radical nationally
will hurt as much as it helps, but thoughtfully, systematically
identifying him with an isolationist and radical strain in American
history a strain which has been destructive will allow us to get
at him, and get his positions out, without making ourselves the issue.
/
3.
Another quasi-historical idea that we should develop is that there
is an historical anomoly in prairie isolationist-populist McGovern's
acceptance among the Eastern Establishment elite which has
traditionally been our most internationally-oriented community.
Again, a thoughtful piece can be done on the decline of the eastern
elite its failure inVietnam, the degradation of its universities,
the collapse of the WASP churches, the failure of the elite to raise
decent kids, etc. and how in its decline, in its exhaustion, it has
accepted the viewpoint of its traditional opposition. Conversely,
The Republican Party of Richard Nixon is moving away from its
obstructionist role, is developing a new internationalism, is
incorporating the white, ethnic, Catholic middle-class working
population, is proposing energetic -- instead of tired retread--
solutions to domestic problems, and will produce the new elite
for the final third of the century. At your request, I did something
along these lines last summer, but nothing ever came of it it is
a theme we should now revive and get circulated.
The idea is that the Eastern Establishment has gotten soft and flabby.
It is unable and unwilling to see it through -- to find new ways to
solve domestic ills; to take the hard, tough steps necessary to
bring peace to the world. The Eastern Establishment has turned
to wishful thinking, to imagining that something can be accomplished
by wishing it. President Nixon, in contrast, is tough, hard and
realistic. He realizes that it takes time and patience and courage to
solve our international pr oblems. Similarly, he recognizes that
we have to remove the crutch of a patronizing government and free
peoples' individual wills if we are not to smother over our people and
their ability, their willingness, their courage to solve their own
problems here at home. Indeed, RN is even closer to the best
thinking among blacks, browns, etc. than is George.
11. Presidential anger at some kind of business price-gouging is not
enough to shed the "in bed with business" image. In my view, it is
too bad we don't have a stronger anti-trust program with legislation
We & dids
if necessary. But if we can't do that now at least until the second
term, I will bet, though I'm not yet a lawyer, that we could go after
one or two major, publicly-identifiable corporations with existing
Networ
anti-trust laws - or with something. Business has no place else
to go we ought to be on their asses.
also 3 there lous
4.
12. It would be a mistake to leak polls showing us weaker than we are.
Our whole campaign must be based on the idea that McGovern is
an anomoly a Goldwater type something out of the ordinary
and something out of step with mid-twentieth century America.
Showing him to be stronger than he is can only give credence to his
w
view that America is ready for a change, etc. etc.
13. If McGovern is nominated, responsible foreign policy types like
George Ball might not be able to support him. These guys should
be lined up for us some kind of Foreign Policy Advisory Board
good
to the Committee for the Re-election. If they don't line up with us
and try to sit it out, we should do an op ed or something on that fact,
blasting them for cowardice, etc. If they support McGovern, we
should blast them for selling out. Like it or not, these guys do have
a certain credibility and however we smoke them out can help us by
getting them on our side or showing them to be shams.
14. Somebody should do a piece on "McGovern Isn't a Politician? citing
the change in his voting stance in election years, his weaving all over
the place this time, his compromises with Daley, his tenure as
executive secretary of the South Dakota Democratic Party, etc., etc.
15. Somebody should do a piece comparing RN's and George's foreign
policies. George, actually, has no foreign policy except for Vietnam
where he's been consistently wrong -- the rest is just a derivation
from his "reordering priorities" stuff. RN, in turn, has clearly
developed foreign policies for all sections of the world, great exper-
ience, etc. The thing could end with the question: "Could what
has been accomplished in the last four years been achieved with an
isolationist and inexperienced person like George in the White House? "
and mass distributed.
16. A two-minute foreign policy spot could be developed, swinging from
trouble area to trouble area and showing how RN has improved
things, and ending with the question: "At this time when we are
moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation at
this time when we have a chance to achieve firm solutions to major
world problems in Asia, in the Middle East, etc. is this any time
to draw back on our responsibilities and to withdraw from the world?"
This could also be the theme for speeches, a pamphlet, and op ed, etc.
17.
Any blatantly racist suggestions -- like saying McGovern would be
delighted to run with a black, but not Wallace should be dropped.
The above are just preliminary thoughts and thoughts which I haven't
mentioned in the other memoranda I've done in recent days.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
SUBJECT:
McGovern Briefing Book
I have reviewed Pat Buchanan's McGovern briefing book and his
suggested assault tactics memorandum. While I would generally
concur with his recommendations, I would make the following
random recommendations:
1.
McGovern's labor record is not mentioned. There is the
14-b vote, and if there is that, there must be something else.
Somebody should thoroughly research McGovern's positions
on labor, and labor-related issues. I have a feeling he can
be made to look worse than us in this area.
convo 2.
McGovern's attendance record is not mentioned.
3.
When I worked on the Hill, McGovern had a reputation as a not
very effective legislator -- he hasn't got much legislation through,
he didn't work on his committees, he was a kind of dreamy, high-
spending and hyper-idealistic character. This, I think, can be
effectively used against him if we can get more facts on what kinds
of legislation he personally has sponsored, what it cost, what's
happened to it, etc.
4.
We should begin now undermining McGovern's Vietnam image --
right from the start. This, really, is the key to his image as a
good
credible, conscientious, non-political senator but to undermine
it will take hard work beginning now. For starters, I would suggest
a Hugh Scott or Gerry Ford op ed for the major dailies and an RNC
pamphlet. This stuff should be particularly useful with youthful types.
2.
5.
The Spanish-speaking sector, like the labor sector, is an area
where I suspect McGovern has done nothing. Again, we should
begin working now to undermine him there.
6.
McGovern talks a lot about including women in his government and
he has made pledges of certain appointments, but his campaign
organization is all male. It is also virtually completely WASP.
This point should be made to women and to blacks, Spanish-
speaking, etc.
George McGovern is unconvincing as a war hero. Has anybody gone
through Pentagon files to find out what he really did in the war?
8.
We need some work on McGovern's personal finances. He wears
$300 suits, $15 ties, has a $110, 000 home, vacations in the Carri-
good
bean, and pays to send his kids to school the son of a preacher
who has never made more than $42, 500 per year? Somebody's
got to be bank-rolling this guy and we ought to find out who and use
it to undermine his credibility image.
9.
We have to be more careful with the Chicago demonstrations, Ellsberg,
McGovern's friends, etc. material that Pat suggests, I think. A
national ad identifying Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin as future
White House dinner guests would be, in my view, disastrous. This
kind of material must be carefully targeted, used by non-national
speakers in particular communities, and distributed through mailings,
ethnic press advertising, etc.
10. On foreign policy, we should develop the idea that McGovern is a
radical in the American prairie isolationist tradition a tradition
Americans have accepted only at their peril. Somebody should do a
quality piece on McGovern as the successor to the isolationist
tradition -- Lindberg before World War II, the obstructionist
Republicans after Versailles, etc., and, of course, the nineteenth
century Populists. This will assist us on the domestic side, too.
Quoting McGovern and calling him a wild-eye radical nationally
will hurt as much as it helps, but thoughtfully, systematically
identifying him with an isolationist and radical strain in American
history a strain which has been destructive will allow us to get
at him, and get his positions out, without making ourselves the issue.
3.
Another quasi-historical idea that we should develop is that there
is an historical anomoly in prairie isolationist-populist McGovern's
acceptance among the Eastern Establishment elite which has
traditionally been our most internationally-oriented community.
Again, a thoughtful piece can be done on the decline of the eastern
elite its failure inVietnam, the degradation of its universities,
the collapse of the WASP churches, the failure of the elite to raise
decent kids, etc. and how in its decline, in its exhaustion, it has
accepted the viewpoint of its traditional opposition. Conversely,
The Republican Party of Richard Nixon is moving away from its
obstructionist role, is developing a new internationalism, is
incorporating the white, ethnic, Catholic middle-class working
population, is proposing energetic -- instead of tired retread-
solutions to domestic problems, and will produce the new elite
for the final third of the century. At your request, I did something
along these lines last summer, but nothing ever came of it it is
a theme we should now revive and get circulated.
The idea is that the Eastern Establishment has gotten soft and flabby.
It is unable and unwilling to see it through -- to find new ways to
solve domestic ills; to take the hard, tough steps necessary to
bring peace to the world. The Eastern Establishment has turned
to wishful thinking, to imagining that something can be accomplished
by wishing it. President Nixon, in contrast, is tough, hard and
realistic. He realizes that it takes time and patience and courage to
solve our international pr oblems. Similarly, he recognizes that
we have to remove the crutch of a patronizing government and free
peoples' individual wills if we are not to smother over our people and
their ability, their willingness, their courage to solve their own
problems here at home. Indeed, RN is even closer to the best
thinking among blacks, browns, etc. than is George.
11.
Presidential anger at some kind of business price-gouging is not
enough to shed the "in bed with business" image. In my view, it is
too bad we don't have a stronger anti-trust program with legislation
if necessary. But if we can't do that now at least until the second
term, I will bet, though I'm not yet a lawyer, that we could go after
3 3
one or two major, publicly-identifiable corporations with existing
Networ
anti-trust laws or with something. Business has no place else
to go we ought to be on their asses.
Juee Lous augusto
4.
12. It would be a mistake to leak polls showing us weaker than we are.
Our whole campaign must be based on the idea that McGovern is
an anomoly a Goldwater type something out of the ordinary
and something out of step with mid-twentieth century America.
users
Showing him to be stronger than he is can only give credence to his
view that America is ready for a change, etc. etc.
13. If McGovern is nominated, responsible foreign policy types like
George Ball might not be able to support him. These guys should
be lined up for us some kind of Foreign Policy Advisory Board
good
to the Committee for the Re-election. If they don't line up with us
and try to sit it out, we should do an op ed or something on that fact,
blasting them for cowardice, etc. If they support McGovern, we
should blast them for selling out. Like it or not, these guys do have
a certain credibility and however we smoke them out can help us by
getting them on our side or showing them to be shams.
14. Somebody should do a piece on "McGovern Isn't a Politician?' citing
the change in his voting stance in election years, his weaving all over
the place this time, his compromises with Daley, his tenure as
executive secretary of the South Dakota Democratic Party, etc., etc.
15. Somebody should do a piece comparing RN's and George's foreign
policies. George, actually, has no foreign policy except for Vietnam
where he's been consistently wrong -- the rest is just a derivation
from his "reordering priorities" stuff. RN, in turn, has clearly
developed foreign policies for all sections of the world, great exper-
ience, etc. The thing could end with the question: "Could what
has been accomplished in the last four years been achieved with an
isolationist and inexperienced person like George in the White House?"
and mass distributed.
16. A two-minute foreign policy spot could be developed, swinging from
trouble area to trouble area and showing how RN has improved
things, and ending with the question: "At this time when we are
moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation -- at
this time when we have a chance to achieve firm solutions to major
world problems in Asia, in the Middle East, etc. -- is this any time
to draw back on our responsibilities and to withdraw from the world?"
This could also be the theme for speeches, a pamphlet, and op ed, etc.
17.
Any blatantly racist suggestions -- like saying McGovern would be
delighted to run with a black, but not Wallace should be dropped.
The above are just preliminary thoughts and thoughts which I haven't
mentioned in the other memoranda I've done in recent days.