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This file contains:
From Howard to Strachan. RE: Abel's comments and their use with the labor movement. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Haldeman to Klein, Ziegler, and Colson. RE: Written Q&As. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Buchanan Assault Book on McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Higby to Strachan. RE: campaign song. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Safire to Haldeman. RE: songs. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/27/1972
From Ziegler to participants of the 8:15 staff meeting. RE: statement by McGregor. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Ehrlichman Political Meetings. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Key State Analysis. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Higby to Strachan. RE: MacGregor strategy meeting. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
Status Report on campaign by Wallace. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 7/19/1972
Author unknown. RE: top and low priority states. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Teeter to MacGregor. RE: second wave polling results. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/3/1972
From Finkelstein to Marik. RE: priority states. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/7/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Flanigan's statement of support. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Haldeman to Vice President. RE: afternoon notes. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gov. Whitcomb telephone call. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: individual state polls. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/18/1972
Author unknown. RE: talking paper for the president. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign direct mail. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1972
From High to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Materials, with edits. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/14/1972
From Haldeman to Higby. RE: campaign materials. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: meeting with MacGregor. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Wallace. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Ziegler Line to Press. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Colson to Haldeman. RE: RN's meeting with Connally. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: convention program. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: incident at Democratic Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: copies of letters between McGovern and Retail Grocers. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/8/1972
From MacGregor to RN. RE: Campaign Progress. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
Author unknown. RE: public appearances of RN and notes. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 7/6/1972
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Magruder's Press Contacts. 2 pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Mitchell. RE: timing of Godwin's support. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: talking paper. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign strategy session. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: publicly getting Democrats out in support of RN. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Conversation with Mitchell. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26146010
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WHSF: Contested, 34-10
core
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document
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pageCount
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id
26146010
sourceUrl
contentType
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title
WHSF: Contested, 34-10
description
This file contains:
From Howard to Strachan. RE: Abel's comments and their use with the labor movement. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Haldeman to Klein, Ziegler, and Colson. RE: Written Q&As. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Buchanan Assault Book on McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Higby to Strachan. RE: campaign song. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/25/1972
From Safire to Haldeman. RE: songs. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/27/1972
From Ziegler to participants of the 8:15 staff meeting. RE: statement by McGregor. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Ehrlichman Political Meetings. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Key State Analysis. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Higby to Strachan. RE: MacGregor strategy meeting. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
Status Report on campaign by Wallace. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 7/19/1972
Author unknown. RE: top and low priority states. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Teeter to MacGregor. RE: second wave polling results. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/3/1972
From Finkelstein to Marik. RE: priority states. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/7/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Flanigan's statement of support. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Haldeman to Vice President. RE: afternoon notes. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gov. Whitcomb telephone call. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: individual state polls. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/18/1972
Author unknown. RE: talking paper for the president. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign direct mail. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1972
From High to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Materials, with edits. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/14/1972
From Haldeman to Higby. RE: campaign materials. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: meeting with MacGregor. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Wallace. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Ziegler Line to Press. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Colson to Haldeman. RE: RN's meeting with Connally. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: convention program. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: incident at Democratic Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: copies of letters between McGovern and Retail Grocers. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/8/1972
From MacGregor to RN. RE: Campaign Progress. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
Author unknown. RE: public appearances of RN and notes. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 7/6/1972
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Magruder's Press Contacts. 2 pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Mitchell. RE: timing of Godwin's support. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: talking paper. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign strategy session. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: publicly getting Democrats out in support of RN. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Conversation with Mitchell. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Howard to Strachan. RE: Abel's
comments and their use with the labor
movement. 6 pgs.
34
10
7/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Klein, Ziegler, and
Colson. RE: Written Q&As. 1 pg.
34
10
7/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Buchanan
Assault Book on McGovern. 1 pg.
34
10
7/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Strachan. RE: campaign song.
1 pg.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 1 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
6/27/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman. RE: songs. 2 pgs.
34
10
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ziegler to participants of the 8:15 staff
meeting. RE: statement by McGregor. 2 pgs.
34
10
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Ehrlichman
Political Meetings. 1 pg.
34
10
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Key State
Analysis. 2 pgs.
34
10
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Strachan. RE: MacGregor
strategy meeting. 14 pgs.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 2 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/19/1972
Campaign
Report
"Status Report" on campaign by Wallace. 1
pg.
34
10
Campaign
Report
Author unknown. RE: top and low priority
states. 2 pgs.
34
10
7/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Teeter to MacGregor. RE: second
wave polling results. 4 pgs.
34
10
7/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Finkelstein to Marik. RE: priority
states. 5 pgs.
34
10
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Flanigan's
statement of support. 4 pgs.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 3 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Vice President. RE:
afternoon notes. 5 pgs.
34
10
7/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Gov.
Whitcomb telephone call. 1 pg.
34
10
7/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: individual
state polls. 4 pgs.
34
10
Campaign
Other Document
Author unknown. RE: talking paper for the
president. 4 pgs.
34
10
7/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign
direct mail. 3 pgs.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 4 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From High to Haldeman. RE: Campaign
Materials, with edits. 1 pg.
34
10
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Higby. RE: campaign
materials. 1 pg.
34
10
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: meeting
with MacGregor. 1 pg.
34
10
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Wallace. 1 pg.
34
10
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Ziegler Line
to Press. 1 pg.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 5 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Haldeman. RE: RN's
meeting with Connally. 6 pgs.
34
10
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: convention
program. 1 pg.
34
10
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: incident at
Democratic Convention. 3 pgs.
34
10
7/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: copies of
letters between McGovern and Retail
Grocers. 7 pgs.
34
10
7/5/1972
Campaign
Memo
From MacGregor to RN. RE: Campaign
Progress. 16 pgs.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 6 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
7/6/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Author unknown. RE: public appearances of
RN and notes. 4 pgs.
34
10
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby. RE: Magruder's
Press Contacts. 2 pgs
34
10
6/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Mitchell.
RE: timing of Godwin's support. 1 pg.
34
10
6/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: talking
paper. 1 pg.
34
10
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman. RE: campaign
strategy session. 3 pgs.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 7 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
34
10
6/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to unknown. RE: publicly
getting Democrats out in support of RN. 1 pg.
34
10
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Haldeman. RE: Conversation
with Mitchell. 1 pg.
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Page 8 of 8
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN
We are using I. W. Abel's comments extensively,
but very subtly, with the labor movement.
In answer to your second question, we do not and
will not have a Labor for the President organization
understanding
as such. The only way we can hope to get local
labor people to work for us and vote for us is if
we do perform a very subtle operation which is
what Don Rodgers is doing now through local labor
leaders. Any outward or formal Labor for Nixon
set up would only coalesce organized labor against
us and make our job much more difficult. Therefore,
it will be a very subtle and low played, but hopefully
quite effective, operation.
Dick
W. Richard Howard
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK HOWARD
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Abel Seconding Speech
Attached are Bill Safire's comments on the I. W. Abel
speech seconding the nomination of Henry Jackson.
His notes on the bottom should be of interest to you.
The question is whether they are underway and if the
individuals he suggests, former Under Secretary of Labor
in the Eisenhower cabinet is being used. Would you
let me know?
CC: Ken Khachigian
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BILL SAFIRE
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Abel Seconding Speech
Attached is a transcript of the I.W. Abel speech seconding
the nomination of Henry Jackson. You may have some suggestions
as to how we might use this. Please advise.
CC: Ken Khachigian
Do we he a "Laln for View"
Conntlee ? of nut, why not ?
Evalue (Iver calcut, will - he good to help seT up.)
6.1hmle, It undersecal Labe in
This shoul he the that then marlings.
And we are tired of the politicians who denounce "big labor"
and "labor bosses" on Monday, and then come to us on
Tuesday with their hands outstretched.
We have heard a lot about hypocrisy at this convention --
especially from those who called them advocates of a "new
politics. "
Well, let us end hypocrisy.
Let us end the hypocrisy of candidates who tell us they
are for the working people and then turn around and vote for
the right to work laws and against minimum wage programs.
Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for
the working people and then serve as a mouthpiece of the weak
lobbies.
Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for
young people and then vote against summer jobs for youth.
Let's end the hypocrisy of candidates who say they are for
the blacks and then seek to weaken the voting rights provision
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
And let's end the hypocrisy that says that democracy is
only for Americans -- and the hell with the rest of the world.
To those who say that building a democracy at home is the
road to peace in the world I say: Yes, but if democracy is
worth building at all it is worth defending in the world.
There are those among us who say that the way to win in
November is to reject the traditions and the values of our
party. And to them I say: Where were you when the chips
were down four years ago?
If some of these new politicians had worked this hard
to support our party as they subsequently worked to reform
our party, we would be meeting here tonight to renominate
and lay plans to re-elect President Hubert Humphrey.
This is the party of working people.
Give us a candidate with a unblemished labor record.
Give us a candidate with an outstanding civil rights
record.
Give us a candidate with a perfect record of pioneering
for a better environment.
Give us a candidate who believes in a strong America --
and who believes that the cause of freedom does not stop at
the water's base.
Give us a candidate who can put America back to work.
Give us a candidate who speaks for the vital progressive
center - where the people are. Give us a candidate working
people can support.
I give you such a candidate who can defeat Richard Nixon
in 1972. Fellow delegates, there is only one candidate whose
name is before you who meets these tests. I am proud to
second the nomination of the great Senator from Washington,
Senator Henry Jackson.
July 25, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HERB KLEIN
RON ZIEGLER
CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT:
Written Q&As
The President has agreed to provide written Q&As such as the
current request from SEVENTEEN and the inevitable forthcoming
one from AP. The stipulation here must be that there will be no
personal Presidential involvement and all questions will be sub-
mitted in writing and answered in writing. There will be no special
photographs made or anything of that sort. Also, we should be
selective in the determinations of which publications to get into.
ea: Ray Price
Dwight Chapin
HRH:LH:kb:KB:kb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Buchanan Assault Book
on McGovern
You received Buchanan's Assault Book on McGovern yesterday.
Copies were also given to the Vice President, RNC (Dole),
Connally, Harry Dent and 1701 (MacGregor).
However, a copy was not given to John Ehrlichman. Ken Cole
called urgently requesting a copy. I asked Buchanan if
he planned on giving a copy to Ehrlichman. He said no and
asked if I would check you.
RECOMMENDATION:
That a copy of Buchanan's McGovern Assault Book be given
to Ehrlichman (Ken Cole).
N
AGREE
DISAGREE
COMMENT
AS-0
Door
Budy abject.
CA7 coll
7/26
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 25, 19th
CRITY
HIGH PRIORITY
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
Bob would like you to look into the situation regarding the
campaign song. It should be ready for the convention at the
very latest. Please find out what is happening here and give
him a report. One approach he suggests would be to get some
of our country music people to work on some songs. A good
simple song to a country beat might be the best possibility for
us.
7/26 Dailey - Listened in nyt
CC to mac G whomes
to gue tep.
Red
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 27, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Songs
Appears that McGovern may adopt "Bridge Over Troubled Water"
as his theme song, the way that Bobby Kennedy used "This Land
Is Your Land."
Is there any way we can work "God Bless America" into the
convention proceedings or in any other rally-type occasion?
Would make a good contrast.
(The writer of "Bridge Over Troubled Water" is Paul Simon,
of Simon & Garfunckle, who also wrote "Mrs. Robinson" and
"Feelin' Groovy, 11 neither of which would be quite suitable for
us.)
ADMINISTRETIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PETER DAILEY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Song
As you probably know, McGovern may adopt "The Bridge
Over Troubled Waters" as his theme song in much the
same way Bobby Kennedy used "This Land is Your Land".
One suggestion that has been made is that we try to
work "God Bless America" into an appropriate song
as it would be an excellent contrast.
I know you have probably received several suggestions
about campaign songs, but would you advise me of the
status of the campaign song project - when the options
will be ready, possible recording artists, and any
problems?
GS/jb
FU - 7/7
H
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
JULY 24, 1972
TO:
PARTICIPANTS OF THE 8:15 A.M.
STAFF MEETING
FROM:
RON ZIEGLER
Clark asked me to send this to you for your
information.
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D. c. 20008
(202) 333.0920
STATEMENT BY CLARK MacGREGOR, July 22, 1972:
President Nixon's re-election campaign effort will carry
the issues to the American people in a variety of ways through
many spokesmen. The President will of course be participating-
personally this fall as the leader of this program.
The Nixon Administration's position on a broad range of?
key issues is clearly defined, Well understood, and broadly
supported by American citizens. The sharply divergent views of the
President's opponent have been spelled out in this year's primaries,
and have not found wide acceptance. The people know fully of the
great differences on issues between the candidates.
Senior Senators and Congressmen of both parties have 10mg
felt that it was unwise for an incumbent President to engage
in political debates.) Senator John O. Pastore? (Dem., R.I.) has been
a leading voice in this regard, and Senator McGovern in the past has
agreed with Pastore. On August 18, 1964, McGovern voted to kill a
bill which would have permitted debates botween Senator Goldwater and
former President Johnson.
President Nixon is now engaged in directing many vital and
highly sensitive negotiations for peace. Success in these negotiations
must not be jeopardized. Debates would not serve the nation l
# # #
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
1+FU
7/27
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Ehrlichman Political Meetings
A check with Jana Hruska in John Ehrlichman's office indicates
that John Mitchell did not attend the July 20 meeting in
Ehrlichman's office because he was not invited. He was invited
to the meeting this morning, according to Jana, but did not
attend because Mitchell's secretary did not put the item on
his schedule. In the future, John Mitchell will be invited
to the Ehrlichman political meetings.
TAS
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
wal Pore well
July 22, 1972
L
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Key State Analysis with
Wallace - Wave II Survey
Results
You reviewed the MacGregor Strategy Meeting determination
of Key States on July 12. This memorandum reviews the
Key States in light of the July 19 legal analysés of
Wallace's ballot position in various states. The poll
figures are from Wave II of the Campaign Surveys.
In the 10 Key States - California, New York, Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Ohio, Maryland
and Connecticut - the President's margin over McCovern
is cut by 1 to 6 if Wallace is in the race.
WAVE II
N
McG
Un
N
McG
w
Un
CALIF.
-3
48
42
11
42
39
11
8
N.Y.
Results will be available 7/28
PENNA.
-3
49
42
9
42
38
12
8
N.J.
-2
49
42
9
41
36
16
7
ILL.
-5
56
35
10
47
31
12
10
TEXAS
-6
54
35
11
42
29
22
7
MICH.
-3
45
45
100
33
36
23
8
OHIO
T
56
38
6
47
33
15
6
MD.
-1
52
42
6
44
35
16
4
CONN.
-2
53
37
10
47
33
10
10
- 2 -
The only state lost as a result of Wallace's entry is
Michigan. However, as the Wallace ballot position
chart indicates, George Wallace is precluded from being
on the ballot as a third party candidate because he ran
in the Democratic Primary.
In Maryland, where Wallace cuts the President's lead
from 10 to 9 points and in Pennsylvania, where Wallace
cuts the President's lead from 7 to 4 points, Wallace'
is precluded from appearing on the November ballot as
a third party candidate.
In New Jersey, where Wallace cuts the President's lead
from 7 to 5 points, Wallace is already qualified on
the general election ballot as a candidate of the
American Party.
In the remaining Key States, California, Connecticut,
Illinois, New York, Ohio and Texas, Wallace could
obtain ballot position by convention, certification
or petition. Each of these legal steps involves
varying degrees of difficulty. As the chart indicates,
Wallace could obtain nearly automatic ballot position
in California, Connecticut and Ohio. Illinois and
New York would be more difficult and Texas would be
quite hard for Wallace to get on the general election
ballot as a third party candidate.
GS:car
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
1
WASHINGTON
-
Date
TO: AS
FROM:
L. HIGBY
Do B of
Wallace.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
MacGregor Strategy
Meeting - July 11
Clark MacGregor met with the Campaign Strategy Group
(Teeter, Magruder, Malek, Dailey, Marik, Finkelstein,
and Miller) to discuss the Key States in light of Wave II
polling results.
MacGregor opened the meeting with two comments. He said
he planned on meeting with Mitchell, Connally, and possibly
Colson to determine how the Democrats for the President
would be arranged. Second, he advised the group that an
appropriate approach was being made to Mayor Daley and
that you had been informed.
MacGregor told the group that Governor Love and Secretary
Morton would be in Miami Beach to welcome disenchanted
Democrats. They will also push the line that McGovern
heads an extreme elitist machine that has replaced the
"party of the people". The Democrats cannot be allowed
to keep that label. Many liberal Democrats are calling
MacGregor to indicate their concern about McGovern.
MacGregor agreed with Teeter that the campaign should
concentrate on the great national issues and McGovern's
extreme positions It is Teeter's view that McGovern's
perception will be set in the minds of the American people
in the next 2-3 weeks. MacGregor said the campaign will
continue to hit McGovern through MacGregor's "Issues and
Answers" appearance this Sunday, the distribution of the
Wicker article, and the Pierre Rinfret discussions with
economists. When Malek pressed for a single person within
1701 to run this operation, MacGregor deferred.
- 2 -
The Key State discussion focused on the three attached
memoranda. There were two views expressed. Some thought
the results showed the President so far ahead in Illinois,
Texas and Ohio that the primary effort should be placed
in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, New
York and Michigan. All agreed Washington should be dropped.
Malek led the argument to work in the big states regardless
of what the polls indicate. MacGregor concluded that there
should be three states for maximum effort -- California,
New York and Pennsylvania. New Jersey and Cook County in
Illinois should also receive First Priority attention.
The Second Priority states would be Texas, Michigan, Ohio,
Maryland and Connecticut.
MacGregor also emphasized that the campaign would not shift
its attention to Senatorial or Congressional races because
if the President wins by 54-55%, Congressional races will be
helped naturally.
TALKING PAPER
In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group,
established three groups of priority states for the campaign:
Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of management
attention. "Must win" states.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
California
45
+0.2
+3
Illinois
26
-0.3
+3
Texas
26
-2
-1
Ohio
25
+6
+2
New Jersey
17
-1
+2
139
Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
New York
41
-6
-5
Pennsylvania
27
--2
-4
Maryland
10
-8
-2
Michigan
21
-2
-7
Connecticut
8
-8
-5
Washington
9
+3
-2
116
Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electorsl Votes
1960
1968
Missouri
12
-0.5
+1
Wisconsin
11
+4
+4
Oregon
6
+5
+6
West Virginia
6
-6
-9
35
- 2 -
The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic
nominee, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives
of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing
in the large population states.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether
the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors
to be considered include:
Z
1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic
efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.
How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral
votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large
states must we win in order to carry the election.
?
3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking--
How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 3, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL/TYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE CLARK MAC GREGOR
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Second Wave Polling Results
Attached are the sample ballot results from the second wave poll-
ing. The interviewing for this polling was all done between
June 14 and June 25. I have noted differences in the two Kixon/
Humphrey races from the first wave where applicable. We did not
neasure McGovern in the first wave which was done in December and
January.
I will have the results from the National poll later today or
toborrow morning, the New York data in about t.c.n days, and the
Indiana data in about three weeks. The New York and Indiana polls
were delayed to begin after the primary in New York and the State
Nominating Convention in Indians.
Cenerally these results are very optimistic and indicate that
the President has improved his position since January. I think
it is particularly significant that his committed vote is above
or very near 50% in the 11.0-way races against eGovern in the top
pricrity states. This, as ]. am sure you are aware, has been. a
problem in the past.
While our situation has improved, we still appear to have some
problems in Missouri, Oregon, Misconsin, and Washington.
Also I just got 21) advance report of a telephone poll taken by
Docker Research for the Diston Globe ir Mescachusetts which will
be publishe i FORDEROW. It shors MeGovern with 47%, Nixon with 44%,
and 9% underidad. This is obviously 2 most optinistic result.
We will have the complete data from this second wave polling by
July 15.
I will be heppy to discuss these figures and the first wave data
at your commenicnce.
Note: I will i.e giving these results to Gordon Strachan of Mr.
office 00 the telephone 21 5 o'elock, Pacific
Tire, this CV Time.
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
1
U.S.
BAMA
CALIFORNIA
CONNECTICUT
INDIANA
ILLINOIS
MARNING
1W
2W
+/-
IW
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/
-
1W
2W
+/-
G.W
2W
+/-
IW
20
+/-
IV
25
-
Nixon
54
47
65
+18
47
47
C
--
56
----
53
--
56
---
49
58
-i- 9
Humphrey
40
18
20
+ 2
40
40
0
-
32
---
38
-
34
---
45 26 - ?
Undecided
6
35
14
-21
13
13
0
--
12
---
9
--
11
---
5 6 +1
Nixon
48
29
34
+ 5
44
42
-
2
--
50
-----
47
45
48
+
3
L.4.
43
-4-4
Humphrey
35
14
15
+1
37
35
- 2
--
27
---
33
36
28
-
8
43
29
-14
,
Wallace
12
36
43
-i- 7
6
13
+7
--
13
---
11
7 15 +8
3 17
+ 9
Undecided
5
21
9
-
-12
13
11
- 2
---
11
---
S
12
10
I
2
:: or a
H
Nixon
63
16
T19
--
--
------
--
48
--
54
----
--
56
-
52
-
McGovern
-
--
23
--
--
42
-------------------------
-
37
--
--
35
--
----
42
----
Undecided
-
-
14
--
--
11
-
-
10
--
--
10
---
--
on
----
Nixon
--
-
35
--
42
----
--
47
---
47
----
------
44
--
McCovern
---
-
11
39
---
--
33
--
-
31
---
-----
05
---
Wallace
-
-
40 /
--
11
--
--
10
----
-
32
--
---
3.
---
Undecided
-
-
7
--
8
---
--
10
10
--
--
4
1 First wave figures from a survey for Winton Blount, June, 1971.
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%
MAPKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
1
MICHTGAN
MISSOURT
NSW JERSEY
NEW YORK
ONTO
ORIGON
PLANSYLV
IV
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
1W
2V
+/-
IV
2W
+/-
IW
2W
+/-
1W
2W
+/-
IV
217
+/-
Nixon
49
----
---
43
48
+ 5
54
52
-
2
50
53
58
+ 5
48
50
+ 2
49
46
(_)
Humphrey
--
39
------
45
42
-
3
36
38
÷ 2
40
40
37
-
3
30
31
-
7
43
41
Undecided
--
12
---
12
10
-
2
10
10
0
10
S
5
-
3
13
19
+
6
8
10
+
1 )
Nixon
---
36
------
37
37
0
43
44
- 5
47
48
50
:-
2
43
4.4
+1
44
40
-
:
Humphrey
--
30
---
40
35
-
5
33
30
- 3
39
33
30
-
(1)
30
24
-12
-
41
35
-
:-
Wallace
--
24
----
12
20
-:- 8
3
18
+10
in
8
15
+ 7
9
18
+ 9
(r)
10
+ I
Undecided
--
11
---
11
8
-
3
10
9
-
1
5
7
5
-
2
12
15
+ 3
3
$
:-
---
Nixon
--
45
---
-
44
--
49
--
56
--
42
15
-----
McGovern
--
45
---
--
46
---
---
42
--
38
--
45
42
Undecided
10
----
--
10
-----
--
9
-----
--
---
6
---
10
----
--
3
---
Nixon
--
33
---
--
35
---
---
41
--
--
47
37
---
12
McGovern
--
35
---
---
37
---
36
---
---
--
33
---
-
SS
--------
08
----
Wallace
--
23
---
--
20
---
16
I
--
--
15
---
----
15
---
32
Undecided
--
8
---
8
-----
---
8
---
-
5
10
--
(i)
1 First wave figures from & survey for Robert Griffin, February, 1972 with Muskie, not Hamphrey, 20
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%
MICHIGAN
IW
MICHIGAN
1V
Nixon
41
Nixon
3S
Muskie
42
Muskie
40
Undecided
17
Wallace
7
Undecided
15
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
BALLOT SUMMARY OF STATES
WASHINGTON
WISCONSIN
TEXAS
IW
2W
+/-
1W 2W +/-
1W
2W
+/-
Nixon
---
45
-----
46
56
+10
49
55
+ 6
Humphrey
--
39
---
46
35
-11
40
35
- 5
Undecided
--
16
---
7
9
+2
11
10
-
7-1
Nixon
--
38
-----
44
48
+ 4
4.2
43
+ 1
Humphrey
---
32
-----
42
31
- -11
36
23
--
8
Wallace
--
17
---
8
12
-- 4
12
22
+10
Undecided
--
13
---
7
9
+ 2
11
7
- 4
Nixon
--
41
-----
--
44
---
---
54
McCovern
--
45
----
--
52
---
--
35
Undecided
--
13
---
--
U
---
--
11
Nixon
--
34
-------
--
39
---
42
McCovern
--
39
i
--
47
---
--
29
Wallace
---
16
---
--
10
---
--
22
Undecided
--
12
-
4
---
-
7
NOTE: Due to rounding not all columns add to 100%.
Committee for the Re-election of the Presider.t
MEMORANDUM
July 7, 1972
TO:
Dr. Robert H. Marik
FROM:
Arthur J. Finkelstein
IF
SUBJECT:
Priority States
Please find attached several charts depicting my thinking
on the electoral vote situation that would exist in a
Nixon-McGovern contest. As you can tell the Nixon total
electoral vote surpasses by 16, the 270 votes needed for
election. Further, there is an additional 188 electoral
votes which realistically can still be considered
undecided. Due to recent information, states such as
Illinois, Maryland and Ohio have been added to the safe
Nixon total. Wisconsin, Oregon and Missouri have been
added to the McGovern total. Of the 188 undecided
electoral votes, on the basis of recent information and
past election analyses, it can be assumed that 104 are
leaning to Nixon. With New York State's 41 electoral
votes kept completely in the undecided column, the
President receives a stuming 390 electoral votes, the
making of a real electoral landslide.
Considering the possibility of an electoral landslide,
it would make great sense to solidify those states which
would clearly give us the margin of victory. Therefore,
our priority states should be those which are not sure
states but large electoral states now leaning slightly
to the President. California, Pennsylvania and New Jersey
fit this criteria. I would also add Connecticut, New York
and Michigan because of the very nature of the clossness
of this election.
You will note that I suggest dropping five presently
targeted states either because we have secured them or
because to win them would take more effort than frankly is
essential or necessary for this campaign. Three of those
five states dropped, Texas, Illinois and Ohio, account for
77 electoral votes which should be constantly kept track of.
I would suggest greater than normal emphasis upon the
states organizationally and the use of the telephone
operations.
- 2 -
Dr. Robert H. Marik
July 7, 1972
Finally I include a list of third priority states which are
chosen because of the strength of the President. None of
these ten states are target states. All of these ten
states will have senatorial contests in 1972, where
Republicans can either hold on to a seat (Kentucky), or
as in the case of the other nine, gain a seat. In each
of these states with the exception of Rhode Island, a
Nixon--Senatorial Candidate Campaign would be helpful
to the Republican Senatorial candidate's chances. Since
the Republicans only need to gain five or six seats in
the Senate to take control of that body, I would strongly
suggest that the campaign strategy develop which would
emphasize in these areas the ideal Republican ticket.
A. J. F.
AJF:kvf
Attachments
cc: J. Magruder
PRIORITY STATES
First Priority
1. California
-
45
A
2.
Penusylvania
-
27
3.
New Jersey
-
17
4.
Connecticut
-
8
B
5.
New York
-
41
6. Michigan
-
21
159
Second Priority
1. Texas
-
26
2. Illinois
-
26
3. Ohio
-
25
77
Third Priority
1. Alabama
-
9
2.
Georgia
--
12
* 3. Kentucky
-
9
4. Montana
-
4
5.
New Hampshire
-
4
6.
New Mexico
-
4
7.
North Carolina
-
13
8. Oklahoma
--
8
** 9.
Rhode Island
-
4
10. Virginia
-
12
TOTAL STATES
N
M
U
Alabama
9
Alaska
3
Arizona
6
Arkansas
6
California
45
Colorado
7
Connecticut
8
Delaware
3
D. C.
3
Florida
17
Georgia
12
Hawaii
4
Idaho
4
Illinois
26
Indiana
13
Iowa
8
Kansas
7
Kentucky
9
Louisiana
10
Maine
4
Maryland
10
Massachusetts
14
Michigan
21
Minnesota
10
Mississippi
7
Missouri
12
Montana
4
Nebraska
5
Nevada
3
New llampshire
4
New Jersey
17
New Mexico
4
New York
41
North Carolina
13
North Dakota
3
Ohio
25
Oklahoma
8
Oregon
6
Pennsylvania
27
Rhode Island
4
South Carolina
8
South Dakota
4
Tennessee
10
Texas
26
Utah
4
Vermont
3
Virginia
12
Washington
9
West Virginia
6
Wisconsin
11
Wyoming
3
286
64
188
UNDECIDED STATES
N
M
U
Alaska
3
California
45
Connecticut
8
Maine
4
Michigan
21
Nevada
3
New Jersey
17
New York
41
Pennsylvania
27
South Dakota
4
Washington
9
West Virginia
6
-
-
104
43
41
Safe
286
64
--
I
390
107
41
GEORGE C. WALLACE (GCW)
STATUS REPORT 7/19/72
CAN
AS
CAN
AS
GCW
CANDIDATE
ACTION
CCW
CANDIDATE
ACTION
STATE
RUN
OF
REQUIRED
DATE
STATE
RUN
OF
REQUIRED
DATE
Ala.
Yes
AIP
Convention
9/9 *
Mo.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
7/31**
Alas.
Yes
AIP
Request
8/10 *
Mont.
Yes
AP
Convention
9/23
*
Ariz.
Yes
AIP
Convention
#
Ncb.
No
All Applicable filing dates passed
Ark.
Yes
AIP
Convention
9/4-9/24 **-H
Nev.
No
No Petitions Filed
Cal.
Yes
AIP
Certifica-
9/6 A
tion
N.H.
Yes
AP
Certify
9/27
Colo.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
9/24 *
+
N.J.
Yes
AP
Already Qualified
300 sigs.
F.M.
Yes
AIP
Certify &
9/12 *
Conn.
Yes
George
Non.Papers
9/20 *
Petition:
Wallace
3% last vote
Party
N.Y.
Yes
Indep.
Petition:
8/28-31
Del.
Yes
AIP
Convention
7/22 *
20,000 sigs.
**-E
& Certify
9/1
N.C,
Yes
AP
National
*
D.C.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
8/15 **-H
Convention
13,000 sigs.
N.D.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
9/29**E
Fla.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
8/15 **-H
300 sigs.
1% last vote
Ohio
Yes
AIP
Convention
8/25 *
Ca.
No
No Tetitions Filed
Okla.
Yes
AP
Convention
8/10 *
Hawaii
No
No Petitions Filed
Ore,
No
Ran in primary and lost
Idaho
No
No Petitions Filed
Pa.
No (See Text) All applicable filing dates passed
111.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
7/31-8/7**-E
25,000 sigs.
R.I.
Yes
Indep.
Petition:
7/28**
500 sigs.
Ind.
See
New Party
Petition:
9/1
Text
8,500 sigs.
S.C.
Yes
AP
Certify
10/4 *
Iowa
Yes
AIP
Convention
8/4-9/3 *
S.D.
Yes
Indep.
Petition
9/2 **
2% last vote
Kans.
Yes
Conservative Already Nominated
Tenn.
Yes
AP
Convention
9/7 *
Kty.
Yes
AP
Already Qualified
Tex.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
9/1 **
La.
Yes
AP
Certify
9/18 *
22,300 sigs.
& Convention
9/19
Mc.
No
No Petitions Filed
Utah
Yes
AIP
Convention
7/31 *
Md.
No
No Certificate of Candidacy Filed
Vt.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
9/20**
Mass.
No
No Petitions Filed
1,535 si
Mich.
No (See Text) Ran in primary and lost
Va.
Yes
AIP
Petition
9/8 *
9.103 sigs.
Minn.
Yes
New Party
Petition:
7/5-9/12
2,000 sigs.
Wash.
**-E
Yes
New Party
Convention
9/19**
& Petition:
9/26
Miss.
Yes
Kew Party
Petition:
9/27
100 sigs.
1,000 sigs.
**-E
W.Va
No
All applicable filing dates passed
Wisc.
Yes
AP
Already Qualified
Wyo.
Yes
Indep.
Petition:
9/27**
5,815 sign.
*
where Wallace can obtain nearly automatic ballot position if nominated
by States the American Party National Convention in Louisville, Kentucky, August 3-5.
**
States where Wallace can obtain ballot position by petition; in seven it would
be hard (ii); in eleven it would be easy (E).
TALKING PAPER
In early May, Mr. Mitchell, in consultation with the Strategy Group,
established three groups of priority states for the campaign:
Top Priority (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of management
attention. "Must win" states.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
Wave
II
48-42-11/42-39-11
California
45
+0.2
+3
Illinois
26
-0.3
+35635-10/47-31-12-10
Texas
26
-2
-154435-11/47324-22-7
Ohio
25
+6
New Jersey
17
-1
+249242-9/41-36-16-8
139
Second Priority (High allocation of resources and management attention.)
Ninon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
New York
41
-6
Pennsylvania
27
-2
-449-42-9/42-38-12-8
Maryland
10
-8
-252-42-6144-35-16-4
Michigan
21
-2
-745-45-10/33-36-23-8
Connecticut
8
-8
Washington
9
13
116
Third Priority (Lower allocation of resources and management attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
Missouri
12
0.5
+1
Wisconsin
11
14
Oregon
6
+6
+642
West Virginia
6
-6
-9
35
- 2 -
The emergence of George McGovern as the probable Democratic
nominec, as well as the successful foreign policy initiatives
of the President, have substantially altered his relative standing
in the large population states.
The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the question of whether
the original priority grouping should now be changed. The factors
to be considered include:
1. What is meant by priority ranking, in terms of programmatic
efforts, in-state campaign organization and total resource allocation.
2. How the President stands in terms of the number of electoral
votes now leaning toward him. That is, how many of the large
states must we win in order to carry the election.
3. How much should the June/July polls influence our thinking--
How firm do we believe the positive or negative margins to be.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 17/21 7/21
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Jon Rose in Flanigan's office
advised us that Don Kendall
planned on putting this very
supportive statement in the
Pepsico quarterly report. Malek
and Magruder for MacGregor agree.
Dean obtained an opinion from
Justice that such a statement
would not violate any laws.
Flanigan will advise Kendall
to proceed.
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
July 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON C. STRACHAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
Per our discussion, attached is a copy of
Kendall's approved statement.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
Donald M. Kendall - Message to Stockholders
It was recently announced in Washington that Donald M. Kendall,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Pepsico, Inc., has been
selected to serve as Chairman of the Business and Industry Committee
for the Re-election of President Nixon.
Following a recent meeting with the President (see photos), Mr.
Kendall discussed some of his reasons for supporting Mr. Nixon's
candidacy:
"As a businessman, I've been very impressed by the soundness
and effectiveness of the Administration's actions in the economic
sphere. At the same time, I'm very concerned about the approaches
favored by his opponents.
"In sharp contrast to the present Administration's favorable
attitude towards the free enterprise system, the opposition's policies
seem to proceed out of distrust and even outright hostility toward the
legitimate objectives of American business enterprise.
"I refer specifically to the opposition's plans that involve con-
fiscatory taxation to support overly ambitious and ll-conceived social
goals, and to the formulation of such proposed legislation as the Burke-
Hartke Bill, with its isolationist quotas on imports, punitive tax levels
on overseas profits, and intolerable restrictions on foreign investments --
all based on the erroneous assumption that these repugnant measures
will alleviate domestic unemployment, though studies indicate that the
opposite is actually the case.
"For all American business, and especially for multinational
corporations such as Pepsico, I would regard the election of an
Administration and Congress bent on such policies as potentially dis-
astrous for this country and its role in international trade.
"Moreover, those who are workers and shareholders in American
business would, I believe, inevitably feel the direct impact of this anti-
business bias -- not only in the impediments placed on the potential of
their jobs, but also on the value of their investments.
"On the other hand, there are several positive achievements to
which I believe the current administration can point.
ADMINISTRA CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
"The President's forthright measures to check inflation, taken
without regard for the political criticism they were sure to provoke,
have done much to strengthen our nation's economy and protect the
purchasing power of the wage-earner's dollar. The short term un-
employment picture is improving, and the long term security of the
American worker will rest on firmer ground as a result of his actions.
"Mr. Nixon's bold initiatives in foreign relations, particularly
with China and the Soviet Union, have been a dramatic step beyond
the rigid sterility of cold-war dogma, and open the way to a new and
fruitful era of peaceful co-existence with our country's main potential
adversaries - - replacing tension and mistrust with the possibility for
scientific, commercial and cultural interchange in a world at peace.
At the same time, he has taken these steps without in any way dim-
inishing our essential defensive strength.
"Lastly, Mr. Nixon has responded to one of the most agonizing
challenges ever to face an American President by dealing with our
military involvement in Southeast Asia, which he found upon entering
office, in a manner compatible with our national honor, the credibility
of our international commitments, and the safety of our armed forces
and prisoners of war.
"For all these reasons, and because I believe the re-election
of President Nixon is vital for the future of our economy and our
nation, I urge all who share my concern to work earnestly in his
support during the current campaign."
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED -TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVA MARKING
July 21, 1972
E.U, 12085, Section 6-102
By-OP
NARS, Date 4-2-82
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
I thought it might be helpful to you to have a copy of my
rough notes from the meeting this afternoon, and am
attaching them herewith.
Attachment
EYES ONLY
NOTES FROM MEETING OF JULY 21, 1972
It was agreed that the basic point to make is that we believe
this is a time when issues are too important for partisan,
political treatment. We are not dividing the country, all are
welcome in support of our new coalition. The vocal raucous
minority that nominated McGovern will be answered by the great
silent majority that support our team.
Suggestions on how to handle some of the things that come up:
1. Never mention the Vice Presidential candidate.
Always take on McGovern directly - - totally ignore
Eagleton.
2. It's important not to make the Vice President the
issue. Don't give them the ammunition. Be hard-hitting
on the issues, but avoid becoming the subject of controversy.
3. Regarding the press -- Ignore their existence, let
others take them on. Possibly make a complete twist
and make the point specifically that the idea the Administration
is anti-press is wrong.
EYES ONLY
2
4. Regarding McGovern -- Avoid making a martyr
of him by characterizing him in any way.
5. Praise the President and his initiatives and kick
the opponent for his bad ideas, but stay with McGovern's
original positions. Don't take him on for changing his
views, don't let him off the hook of his extreme positions.
6. Develop a contrast with Eagleton who is basically a
smart aleck by a basic show of dignity, stability,
responsibility, avoiding any crownish appearance, but
using a little humor to kid yourself. Let the Democrats,
labor people, veterans, etc., cut up McGovern and
Eagleton personally, but don't do it ourselves. Stay
on what McGovern has said and why it's dangerous.
7. No discussion in any form regarding a candidacy in
'76. Make the point that the job at hand is to end in '72.
8. Make a positive point of talking to people while main-
taining dignity. Do some unscheduled drop-bys. Get
pictures at the fence in other situations with people.
Stay around after a rally or a dinner and shake hands
for a while so the media can't say that you are aloof.
EYES ONLY
3
Over-rule the Secret Service. Don't let them keep
you away from people because they have a different
goal than you do. Do some unexpected things that
will get played up in the media.
9. Go hard on the issues. Be tough, but avoid personalities.
Be outgoing with people, but retain dignity.
10. Work on the three areas in which the President
cannot work. First, concentrate on ethnics, labor
groups, and that sort of potential. Second, take up the
slack on party activities which the President cannot do.
Don't overload the schedule with this kind of thing, but do
the important events. Still take the nonpartisan line, even
at party activities regarding the open door. Third, get
Senate and House members in on a regular basis and just
talk to them. The President can't do this. Hear their beefs,
talk a little politics, ask about the issues.
11. The true Democrats today are homeless. They have
been driven out by the McGovernites. Make this point to the
Republicans, especially in the South that we've got to let
the Democrats in.
1
EYES ONLY
4
12. In all speeches, regardless of subject, spend
at least five minutes on foreign policy and hit this
point hard, because it's our best issue.
13. Never miss a chance to hit marijuana, amnesty,
and the other key bad positions of McGovern's.
14. Their major effort will be to get off the bad
points that they are on now. Our job is to make sure
they don't succeed in doing this.
HRH
July 21, 1972
HRH:kb
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
17FU7/28
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
dr
July 20, 1972
gerananies
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Governor Whitcomb Telephone Call
Governor Whitcomb called you this morning to ask for a meeting
with the President. He wants to discuss the request by several
Indianapolis people that he address the RNC Convention on behalf
of a Vice Presidential candidate other than Agnew. Yet Whitcomb
favors Agnew; he claims he is caught as the Chairman of the
Indiana delegation.
I told the Governor the President was not having any political
meetings, and so that a meeting with him would probably not be
possible. Whitcomb accepted that.
Whitcomb would not elaborate on this Vice Presidential challenge
which he referred to as the "Indianapolis Situation".
Recommendation:
n John mitchell
That Clark MacGregor be asked to call Governor Whitcomb to
obtain more of the facts and to prevent any further request
for a meeting with you.
H. Approve
Disapprove
Comments
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
July 18, 1972
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Although you don't usually see
individual state polls, you may
be interested in this Texas
poll from Finch which shows
McGovern ahead of the President.
You may want to discuss this
with Connally.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT FINCH
FYI
X
COMMENT
Belder is one of the
The
Consistatily Beat State
Texas
Pollsters
Poll
Report #834
THE
STATEWIDE
SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION
Release Monday, July 10, 1972
McGOVERN'S CHANCES AGAINST NIXON IN TEXAS BETTER THAN EVEN;
CONNALLY WOULD ADD LITTLE TO REPUBLICAN TICKET
By Joe Belden
Director, The Texas Poll
If the Democrats nominate Senator George McGovern for president at their convention
this week, his chances of carrying Texas in November against President Richard Nixon are
today slightly better than even.
And if Nixon should select the state's man of the hour, John Connally, as his vice
presidential running mate, little might be gained by the Republicans.
Those are the highlights from the latest Texas Poll, completed a few days ago across the
state, a study that reveals two paradoxes underlining the realities of party politics. First,
while McGovern displays the ability to sneak the state away from Nixon -- just the way
Hubert Humphrey did in 1968 -- the senator from South Dakota is far from being the most
popular nominee among Texans. Second, while the survey shows that Connaily would add
only insignificantly to the Nixon ticket, the former governor is Texans' top choice for vice
president.
Interviewers asked a representative cross section of adults 18 or older to select their
current choice from two hypothetical presidential and vice presidential tickets: Richard Nixon
and Spiro Agnew for the Republicans versus George McGovern and Edmund Muskie for the
Democrats. They were also asked to name a choice with the names the same except that
Agnew was replaced by John Connally as the Republican candidate for vice president.
These were the results on the first selection, among people who say they are voters:
Nixon-Agnew
44%
McGovern-Muskie
51
Neither
3
Undecided
2
(More)
Each Texas Poll report is based on face-to-face interviews made in all sections of the state by a permanent staff of 150 trained interviewers using a uniform questionnaire. From
1000 to 2000 persons are usually included in each fampling, never less than 500. The cross section of interviews is controlled so that correct proportions are included as to sex, age,
race, socia-economic level, region of the state, and place of residence: farms, ranches, villages, towns, and cities. The Texas Poll was established in 1940 and is supported by the
newspapers that publish its results.
CONDUCTED BY BELDEN ASSOCIATES, SOUTHLAND CENTER, DALLAS
The Texas Poll -- Page 2 -- Report #834
When Connally was substituted, these were the replies:
Nixon-Connally
45%
McGovern-Muskie
49
Neither
3
Undecided
3
A previously-reported Texas Poll finding has been that, given a free choice, only about
one Texan in ten selects McGovern for president, Nixon and George Wallace being far more
popular.
Interviewers also asked this open-choice question: "Whom would you like to see elected
vice president of the United States in the general election in November ?" with these results
among voters:
John Connally
22%
Edward Kennedy
15
Spiro Agnew
12
Hubert H. Humphrey
12
George Wallace
9
Edmund Muskie
8
George McGovern
6
Wilbur Mills
2
Others
1
Undecided
13
The battleground in Texas between the two major parties is primarily among those voters
who are traditional Democrats. A breakdown of these self-styled Democrats shows that currently
about seven out of ten would vote for a McGovern-Muskie ticket. The addition of Connally to
the Nixon camp would cause only about 2 percent to defect to the Republicans. But none of
this takes the coming campaign into account.
One of the sharpest divisions of opinion in Texas that the presidential race may bring out
is along racial lines. This is the current vote using Nixon-Agnew against McGovern-Muskie:
Rep.
Demo.
Anglo Americans
52%
42
Blacks
8%
88
Mexican Americans
23%
70
(The remainder from 100 percent in each line goes to "neither" and "undecided.")
An analysis by age, however, fails to show any great differences in support between the
two parties, the Democrats generally holding a lead among young and old alike.
This Texas Poll was conducted between June 21 and July 1, being based on 1,031 interviews
made in all parts of the state.
#
TALKING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT
MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
AND BOB HALDEMAN ON
POLITICAL STRATEGY
BACKGROUND
At your direction, Bob Haldeman has called the Vice President and
asked him to come over to discuss campaign strategy, particularly
in terms of issues, activities, and generally what the Vice President
should be doing between now and the Convention. Mr. Haldeman will
be the only person sitting in on this meeting, / and the Vice President
will have had no time to prepare. This meeting should give you the
opportunity to outline in specific as well as general terms how the
Vice President should operate over the next four months.
TALKING POINTS
1.
I have been discussing with Bob Haldeman my schedule as well
as the family schedule, and I told Bob that I want the same planning
to go into your schedule as goes into mine and my family's.
Obviously we want to dovetail events and activities in order to
realize the maximum benefit from every appearance of any one of us.
2.
I have been talking with some of the political operatives here
and at the Committee with regard to activities in which you and
I should be engaged between now and the Convention. Polls that
have been taken show that there are four crucial issues that are
of concern to the electorate:
(a)
The Administration's success in obtaining a
just peace in Vietnam.
(b)
Drug/crime.
(c)
Cost of Living (George Meany).
(d)
Busing (on a regional basis).
TALKING PAPER
Points TELEPHONE to THE VICE CONVERSA PRESIDENT TION WITH re Schedule.
cover with
BACKGROUND
In order to involve you right from the start when the President meets
with the Vice President to discuss the Vice President's posture between
now and the campaign, it is recommended that you make the initial
telephone call setting up the meeting. You would sit in on the meeting
and then have the opportunity to follow up and involve members of your
staff with the Vice President and his staff. As a result of that meeting,
another talking paper will be developed for your subsequent meeting
with the Vice President.
You will call the Vice President approximately 15 minutes before his
meeting with the President. The purpose of this short notice is SO that
the Vice President will come in to the meeting cold, without any staff
accompanying him, and be told what it is that the President expects
of him.
TALKING POINTS
1.
Mr. Vice President, the President would like you to come over
in 10 or 15 minutes to discuss some political items on which he
has been working. I'll be sitting in on the meeting, but the main
purpose is to have a closed session between you and the President
SO that there can be a free exchange of ideas.
2.
I am not sure precisely what the President wishes to discuss, but
it probably will touch on the coordinated program for Administration
speakers, including the President, First Family, and you, which is
currently under development.
- 2 -
2.
The strategy that I should be exercising should be to maintain
a non-political posture, speaking moderately about issues,
and carefully selecting the forums to which I speak. I plan on
engaging in no overt political activities between now and the
campaign.
3.
Thereare a lumber of groups throughout the country where you
have Particular rength and, although may be in the Democratic
corner
quarter now, WILL come over to our side next November were you to
approach them. noted with great interest the tremendous reception
you received with the police group in New York City. Other groups
to which you have a terrific appeal include blue collar workers,
certain Union groups, and members of ethnic groups. You are able
to relate to them and they, in turn, have a respect for you as a man
of candor.
4.
Certain polls indicate that much of the so-called "anti-establishment
vote" that Governor Wallace received in Florida and Wisconsin came
from this middle-America section I just described.
5.
Bob and some of the scheduling group have been working on a salendar
of events that integrates activities of all of us, including other Admin-
istration spokesmen. Some of the events that I would like you to take on
are putlined on this calendar (specific schedule suggestions attached).
The President her anhedto
6.
have told Bob to have one of our top people assigned to you to assist
in the planning and execution of your outside speaking engagements.
Meanwhile, they tell The understand that Boul good man working over in
intergovernmental relations section by the name of Jim Kolstad.
the present time he is setting up the Austria portion of my USSR
trip for me, but you should use him after he returns in late May.
7.
I feel that the moderate but firm approach you have been taking in
your recent speeches has been extremely good. I wonder how you
can reach more people and more groups without spending all of your
time making public appearances. I have found myself that it is a
waste of my time to sit through an entire dinner of three hours just
to give a 10-minute speech. Rather, I arrive during dessert, make
my remarks and leave after 10 minutes, thus saving & good deal of
time that can be put against other events.
- 3 -
I
8.
The Democrats will be tearing themselves apart for the next
few months as they approach their primary, but they will be
throwing some barbs at us. I feel that we should not respond
directly to such attacks by words, but by deeds, standing on the
successful record that we have. What are your thoughts on this?
9.
I wanted Bob Haldeman to be here at this meeting SO that he could
hear firsthand your views and thoughts. I would like to have Bob
work with you now on specific details for implementing some of the
ideas we have discussed today. Bob--I want you to make sure that
your staff is giving full attention to the Vice President's activities
and is lending full support to the Vice President and his staff.
Make sure that you give the Vice President more input on what
I and all the others are doing. Sit down with some of our people
and go over the highlights of what we have discussed today, come
up with a plan, and discuss this again with the Vice President in a
few days. We have made a good start, but I want to make sure that
we have good, effective follow through.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Campaign Direct Mail
Magruder is asking whether a direct mail letter over the President's
signature can be considered for the campaign, He claims be is under
severe time pressure or I wouldn't have forwarded this to you without
complete staffing.
I believe such a letter would be a mistake. If raises the President's
campaign profile too high. It demeans the Presidency. It cannot be
self-laudatory, harshly critical of McGovern's issue stands, or
"political" enough to accomplish the goal of getting the President's
voters to the polls.
Reisner 7/19
NO!
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 14, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDE
SUBJECT:
Direct Mail
In our planning for direct mail, several of our people have suggested
that a letter signed by the President would be more effective than
any other approach. Such a letter would be "Presidential" in tone,
and printed on official-type letterhead. The notation, "Not printed
at government expense" would be included at the bottom of the page.
These would be computer letters, with personalized inside address and
salutation. The first and last paragraphs would be standard, but
interval paragraphs might be varied to reflect specific issues of
interest to each voter segment.
It is now contemplated to send such letters to Democrats and Independ-
ents in priority precincts of the target states. The objective would
be to exert strong influence on potential ticket splitters early in
the campaign -- about mid-September. Although the mailings are several
weeks in the future, we must commit on paper very soon. The paper for
this mailing would be of a higher quality than that used for other
mailings. If it were procured now, but not used as proposed, it could
be sold back to the vendor, or applied to other mailings. Either
option would incur some moderate cost. At the appropriate time, the
proposed text of the letters and the areas to be mailed would be pre-
pared for review before the President's signature is obtained. A small
test mailing to one market will also be proposed, to measure any pos-
sible negative factors before the total mailing is committed.
GONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
The purpose of this memo is to solicit an indication that a
campaign mailing bearing the President's signature can be
considered, so that the long lead-time procurement can begin,
if appropriate.
Agree that the option of a mailing signed by the President
should remain open and that procurement should proceed on that
basis.
Agree
Disapprove
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
July 14, 1972
TO:
HRH
STRACHAN
H
FROM:
L.High PHIL JOANOU Florden St
SUBJECT:
Campaign Materials
Attached is a photostat of the campaign materials
catalog. This is the catalog that will be sent to
all state chairmen, and contains the materials that
will be available to them. There are some correc-
tions in the catalog, which & have made in red.
Also attached is a notebook containing photographs
of the promotional items. The cover will be done
in color, as will the first page showing a picture
of the President.
We are aware of earlier comments on the use of the
flag, and hope this treatment will be found acceptable
If it is at all possible, I would appreciate getting
this catalog back Monday evening in order to review
it with Clark MacGregor Tuesday morning.
CC: Pete Dailey
P.Janau
July 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
Get me a report on the Campaign materials situation,
particularly, bumper strips and buttons. We are to
drop the use of the "Re-Elect the President" immediately
and go with the little gold "N"s, the flage, the President
Nixon bumper strip and the Nixon now bumper strip.
We should concentrate on getting our new ones out quickly,
especially in the primarlestates where there are a lot of
McGovern bumper stickers out now. We need to do this to
counterast the McGovern bandwagon effect immediately.
HRH:kb
mac
ACTION MEMORANDUM
MacGregor should get all of the organization together and make
the point to them of the danger of our troops picking up enemy
quotes such as the idea of while McGovern can't win it that
Nixon can lose it. We must not play the enemy line. We must
be up-beat.
We've got to get away from our obsession of berating everything
we do. We should not get into any fights inside and within ourselves.
HRH
July 13, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Wallace
Gordon Strachan reports that MacGregor, Mitchell and
LaRue are working with Eastland -- and -- a couple of
Eastland's major contributors are going to act as
emissaries to Wallace. They are now in the process
today of trying to set up a meeting.
Gordon will keep us advised.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Ziegler Line to Press
Ron Ziegler asked that you discuss two questions with the
President regarding the line he will take this evening.
1. Did the President watch the acceptance
speech?
Ziegler suggests that we say that he did.
2. What is the President's reaction to the
selection of the Vice Presidential candidate
and the ticket in general?
Ziegler suggests that we say something to the
effect of, "The President followed the Convention
with interest, but had no specific comment. ".
NOTE: Ziegler indicated that you run the fine line between no
comment which suggests an uptightness and some brief, but
noncommittal, relaxed comment. He requested that you discuss
this with the President, or perhaps, the President would want to
call him and discuss it directly. Also, he said we may want to get
some of our people back East thinking about what the most appropriate
response would be.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Attached Two Memos
In talking with the President this morning, he told me he had
had a full report from you on the meeting with Connally yesterday.
He also indicated he had talked to Connally, but didn't tell me
any of the conversation, nor obviously did I ask. I did explain
to the President the "chicken and egg" dilemma the Connally
situation created. I also told the President I was preparing a
memo which might be helpful to him before his meeting with
Connally, which he said he would like to have; attached is an
indepth account of our meeting yesterday and also a memo that
briefly reports the current status of Democrats for Nixon. You
might wish to go over some of these points with the President be-
fore he meets with Connally. We do have a real problem in getting
this off the ground and in finding out exactly where Connally stands.
Clark and I both feel very strongly that we need a formal organiza-
tion announced as early as possible, preferably with Connally, but
if not with Connally, then without him. Until we have his answer,
however, we obviously are in limbo.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting with John Connally, Clark McGregor and
Charles Colson, July 11, 1972
Conclusions:
1.
Connally honestly wants and needs a rest.
2.
Despite whatever else he may say, he is keenly interested in
his own future and I do not believe he is ruling out any options.
He is very anxious to know what the President wants from him
in the way of future assignments, and in my opinion would jump
at the prospect of being on the ticket this year.
3.
Understands fully the dilemma of Democrats for Nixon, is
happy that we have not set up an organization, he does not
want to be handed a "fait accompli" but at the same time
realizes we need to get the organization set up and running
immediately and agrees completely with the strategy of
getting the Democratic endorsements now. In short, he
totally understands the difficult situation we are in, but he
is not ready to make his own decision.
4.
If he assumes the chairmanship of Democrats for Nixon, he
wants it to be a real campaign, well financed; he wants to play
a major role and wants to be damn sure he has complete control
in the areas for which he is responsible.
A more detailed summary of the meeting is attached.
LmDa
Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES ONLY
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting with John Connally, Clark MacGregor
and Charles Colson, July 11, 1972
MacGregor opened the session by explaining how he wants to take over
the campaign, the things the President had discussed with him, the steps
that he, MacGregor, was taking to reorganize the Committee to Re-Elect
the President, the general situation politically around the country. He
then discussed the importance of the Democ rats for Nixon effort. Mac
Gregor said he was very hopeful that John Connally would agree to be
the head of our national effort in this area. I then explained all of the
Democratic support we expected to get -- Teamsters, other major
labor leaders (Connally expressed some surprise over some of the
names), leading Jews, businessmen and politicians. Several times
during the conversation, Connally came back to this point wanting to
be sure we really had the people lined up that we said we did.
I explained the dilemma we were in, that we had good people ready to
go, in fact eager to, but we were reluctant to create any organizational
framework until we found out what interests Connally had in this area
and obviously if Connally was interested in this area, we would not
set up anything that didn't have his complete approval. He seemed
very appreciative of this point and also said he understood the dilemma
completely. He further said he felt it was important to move fast and
to get Democrats defecting while their passions were aroused as they
are now. In short, he felt we shouldn't wait, that we should move out
immediately but also expressed appreciation for our not moving until
he could be involved. I used the Paulucci example saying that we were
holding him at bay, not accepting his $1 million because we didn't know
if Connally would want Paulucci involved.
EYES ONLY
2.
We also discussed the difficulty of getting defections without having
a place for the defectors to go. In the case of labor there is no
problem. Unions can announce their own endorsements and their
leadership can announce their personal endorsements. The same
is true for politicians, like Rizzo. But someone not in a public office
has an entirely different problem. I used the illustration of John
Kenney, who was formerly Jackson's campaign treasurer, former
Democratic National Committeeman from Washington, D. C. and former
Under Secretary of the Navy. He wants to support Nixon but feels that
it would be highly presumptuous to call a press conference to do so,
that he, in effect, is just an ordinary citizen. If, however, he could
announce as a member of the Board of Directors of Democrats for
Nixon, there would be a plausible reason for a public statement. I
also pointed out that in a few weeks Kenney might be taken in by
McGovern, whereas today we have him. Hence the need to have an
organized plan, people in place and an operation functioning.
Clark talked about his conversation with Dwayne Andreas, the fact that
the Democrats operation was as important as anything we would have in
the campaign and that in his judgment, a view he was sure the President
shared, that Connally was the only man who could do this. At a number
of points in the conversation, Connally kept saying, "Are we sure there
isn't anyone else who could do this?". He several times expressed
concern over his need to begin making money again, his plans to go
back to the law firm, but to retain sufficient personal freedom to be
able to campaign, the need to maintain an apartment in Washington and,
as he put it a myriad of other mundane details. He also said that if he
were to take the operation over, he would want to run it himself; he
had not gotten where he is in life by allowing other people to make
mistakes for him. If mistakes are made, it would be becau se Connally
made it on his own behalf. He indicated that he would want to assume
full responsibility for the South and the Southwest, would want to handle
money, advertising and organization. He felt the effort would demand
at least $2 to $3 million and MacGregor assured him those funds would
be available.
At several points in the conversation, Connally asked what kind of campaign
the President wanted. MacGregor spent a considerable amount of
time explaining this, the gist of which was the President, in MacGregor's
view, would not start campaigning until Halloween, that he would concentrate
on being President, using the advantages of the office and letting
surrogates handle the heavy load of campaigning. Connally kept asking
EYES ONLY
3.
who would attack McGovern. I didn't make the point that Connally
would be the best man for fear of turning Connally off. I did make
the point that we would be hitting very hard on the issues, that we
would not be attacking McGovern personally, but cutting his positions
hard and all of our speakers would have to assume responsibility for
this.
At 3 or 4 times during the meeting, Connally said, "When I do this
"
or "The way I am going to run this is
"
At several points I thought
he was on the verge of saying yes. Needless to say, neither Clark
nor I put it to him that hard to force an answer. At the end of the
meeting, he said he never made decisions when he was tired and
that therefore he didn't feel he could make a decision until he had
had a little rest. He agreed, however, with the point that MacGregor
and I made that the best time for a press conference would be Friday
or Saturday, immediately following his meeting with the President.
I made the point at least twice that it was my idea to raise the issue
with Connally simply because I felt we were under enormous time
pressures, but I realized full well that the discussion should have
taken place exclusively between the President and Connally. Each
time I raised it, Connally demured and said he did not stand on
protocol and in some ways preferred it this way because he could
talk frankly and kick around the pros and cons. He also said he
was glad to have time to think it through. I told him that we were
frankly jumping the gun simply because we were getting SO many
urgent appeals from Democrats and we didn't want to accept support
until after it had been discussed with Connally, but at the same time
not lose it by delaying. He agreed with both points.
After MacGregor left, I deliberately stayed behind for a few minutes
and said to Connally that I personally had very warm feelings for
him, that I had no idea what his interests were in the future, but I
didn't think anything that Clark or I were suggesting would in any
way hurt Connally in the future; that in my opinion, a very historic political
re-alignment was taking place, that Nixon was building a new coalition.
The point I made was that whatever his interests are in the future, I felt
it would not be detrimental to be part of the effort to build a new political
EYES ONLY
4.
alliance, which I felt we had the opportunity to do this year. Connally
said he had no personal ambitions of any kind but that he agreed with
my analysis that we are on the verge of a massive change in political
allegiences around the country and that the President could very well
be the architect of a new majority in this country. He then asked me what
the President meant in his last press conference when he said that he
had another assignment for Connally in mind. I told him that I had
never discussed that question with the President and that I didn't know,
but that I knew for a fact that the President thought that Connally was
one of the very few people who would have the courage to do the things
that had to be done in the Government and I thought his remark that
Connally was able to do anything in Government was very significant
and reflected how highly the President regarded Connally. Connally
said he thought the remark was very important; he had read the
President's press conference very carefully, particularly the remarks
about the Vice Presidency. He then said that, "Of course the President
has no choice with respect to Agnew. I assume the reason he went
through the answers he did was to get back at Agnew because he was
still mad at the comment that Agnew made about a Democrat not running
on a Republican ticket. " I told Connally I had no idea, that this was one
subject I had never discussed with the President, that a President always
has all of his options open, especially this President, but that since the
subject had never come up when I was present, I really couldn't cast any
light on it. I simply said again how highly the President regards Connally
and that whatever the President said, I am sure he said with great
deliberatness. Several times Connally commented about the specific
language the President used in his last press conference with regard
to the Vice Presidency. Connally said he might like to talk to me again
today, but in any event he would be in touch before leaving the city and
that he would want to do anything that the President wanted him to do
to be of help in getting the President re-elected which he felt was the
most important thing he could do. I haven't the slightest doubt but that
Connally was fishing with respect to what I could tell him on his future
and in my opinion he is greatly interested personally in his own future,
specifically this year.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
7/12
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
This is one of two copies of
the Convention Program. 10,000
copies will be printed for
the Convention.
The text has been cleared by Price,
the Domestic Council (Harper)
and the NSC (Lehman).
Dick Moore has the final word on
all pictures used in the Campaign.
He has vetoed three in this book
which are marked.
Timmons is still trying to get
the cover changed to correspond
with your views on the flag.
7/24-H -ok AGO, togooat, instrut no
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
7/12
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
By not watching the Democratic
Convention until 3:20 a.m. PDT
you missed this scene.
UPI-244
(GAY)
MIAMI BEACH--THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION EARLY TODAY SHOUTED DOWN
A PROPOSAL TO ENDORSE HOMOSEXUALITY IN ITS PLATFORM BUT ONLY AFTER
GIVING THE GAY LIBERATION MOVEMENT ITS FIRST FULL HEARING AT A
NATIONAL CONVENTION.
THE PROPOSED ADDITION TO THE PLATFORM WAS REJECTED AFTER
CATHY WILCH, A MEMBER OF THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE FROM OHIO, SAID
ITS APPROVAL WOULD "INVITE THE RIDICULE OF THIS NATION."
BEFORE THE VOTE, TWO DELEGATES WHO ARE AVOWED HOMOSEXUALS
PLEADED FOR APPROVAL OF THE MEASURE.
"WE HAVE SUFFERED THE GAMUT OF REPRESSION FROM BEING TOTALLY
IGNORED AND RIDICULED TO HAVING OUR HEADS SMASHED AND OUR BLOOD
SPILLED IN THE STREETS," SAID MADELINE DAVIS OF BUFFALO WHO
DESCRIBED HERSELF AS "A WOMAN ... AND A LESBIAN."
JAMES FOSTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALLED ON THE "WHITE, AFFLUENT,
MALE, HETROSEXUAL POWER STRUCTURE" TO PERMIT HOMOSEXUALS TO
PURSUE THEIR OWN LIFESTYLES.
"THE 20 MILLION GAY MEN AND WOMEN ARE LOOKING FOR A POLITICAL
PARTY THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THEIR NEEDS," FOSTER SAID.
AFTER THE VOTE, GAY ACTIVISTS KISSED AND HUGGED EACH OTHER
IN THE CONVENTION'S SPECTATORS SECTION.
7-12--LZ527A
UPI-246
-$$ 1 GAY MIAMI BEACH
THE GAY LIBERATION, REPRESENTED BY A DOZEN PEOPLE IN BLEACHERS
IN ONE CORNER OF THE HALL, DEBATED NEARBY DELEGATES ON THE PLANK.
THE EXHCNAGE BECAME HEATED AT TIMES, AND THE GAYS CHANTED, "JUSTICE
NOW, JUSTICE NOW." ONE SPECTATOR WAS OVERCOME WITH EMOTION AND
TURNED AWAY. FINALLY, HE TURNED BACK TOWARD THE HALL AND
THE GROUP EXCHANGED KISSES AND HUGS.
7-12--LZ530A
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
7/8
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Shultz sent you copies of these
letters between McGovern and
the Retail Grocers. Buchanan
has copies for his McGovern
file. The interesting note is
the McGovern apology for the
letter and the retracting
telegram.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
CHUCK COLSON
VAN SHUMWAY
FROM:
RAY PRICE Rafy
I think you will find this exchange of letters to be most
interesting.
Attachments
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
RAY PRICE
FROM:
DAVE GERGEN
SUBJECT:
McGovern Gaffe
Someday when you think our staff work has hit its sloppiest
nadir, you might recall this exchange of letters between the
retail grocers and McGovern.
I talked this morning with Frank Register to confirm the
authenticity of the letters before circulating them. He informs
me that they were genuine and that he was SO taken aback that
he sent the McGovern letter to his board of directors and since
that time the letter has "caused an awful lot of comment in the
food industry. "
As a result, he continued, the McGovern office called him to
apologize and on June 23 he received a telegram from the
Senator saying that the letter was "unauthorized and ill advised"
and praising the independent food stores as "one of the last
bastions of free enterprise. 11 McGovern's office apparently
admitted they didn't know who Register represented; they also
did not disclaim the original nor its signature, but said that the
Senator didn't write it.
CC: Roland Elliott
TIFFANY & Co.
FIFTH AVENUE & 57TH STREET
NEW YORK 10022
WALTER HOVING
CHAIRMAN
June 29, 1972
Dear Mr. President:
I'm enclosing herewith
xeroxes of two letters. The
second letter signed by
George McGovern is a honey.
I never in my life
have read a letter that
showed more arrogance,
conceit and impertinence.
With all kind wishes,
Naltro
WORKING COPY
May 22, 1972
Senator George McGovern
United States Senator from South Dakota
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator McGovern:
In yesterday's news telecasts, you were shown endorsing
Caesar Chavez and the lettuce boycotts.
I would suggest that you consider this position carefully
from a number of standpoints. Under existing law, such
boycotts are clearly illegal. Secondly, the pattern
established in the grape boycotts was one of damage and
destruction to innocent third parties - -in this instance,
retailers who have no way of knowing who is right in a
labor dispute many miles away. Thirdly, such tactics, if
successful, result in increased costs which mean increased
prices, a subject which I know is of concern to you.
Sincerely,
Frank D. Register
Executive Director
FDR/cms
WORKING COPY
June 1, 1972
Dear Mr. Register:
Thank you very much for your recent letter.
You should know, Mr. Register, that I have competent
legal advice and you need not worry about me on that
score.
Your reference to innocent third parties was intriguing
to say the least. If you are suggesting that retail gro-
cers are under any definition of the term "innocent, 11 I
would be surprised. It may interest you to know that I
am fully aware of the monopoly meat and other commo-
dity pricing practices of the chain stores. I am also
aware of rate of return on your investment.
You may be sure, Mr. Register, that when I am Presi-
dent suits will no longer be brought by stockmen, egg
producers and others, but by the Attorney General of the
United States.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely,
George McGovern
Frank D. Register
Executive Director
National Association of Retail
Grocers of the U.S., Inc.
Suite 620
2000 Spring Road
Oak Brook, Illinois 60521
TIFFANY & Co.
NEW TOP.K -PM I
FIFTH AVENUE & 57TH STREET
UNITED
STATES
8°
UNITED
NEW YORK 10022
2n JUN
Br
1972
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
CLARK MacGREGOR
SUBJECT:
Campaign Progress
In your recent discussions with me you indicated concern and gave me
direction in several key areas. In my first days as Campaign Director, I
have reviewed your areas of concern along with other aspects of the cam-
paign, held discussions with John Mitchell, taken steps to deal with the
most serious problems, and developed a plan of action to guide further
efforts. This memo comments on the actions taken and outlines my future
plans.
FIELD OPERATIONS
You felt there was a decided lack of progress in the critical task of building
grass roots organizations in the States able to implement basic registration,
identification, and get-out-the-vote drives. You also indicated concern
about certain personnel in this area and felt there was a lack of overall
direction. My initial review confirmed that the situation was at least as
bad as you feared, and I have taken the following steps:
1. Appointed Fred Malek as Deputy Campaign Director with
overall responsibility for field operations and Citizens activities.
2. Made it clear to all concerned that basic field organization
efforts were my highest priority and that Fred had my full backing
in strengthening our State organizations and getting the voter con-
tact programs off the ground. This was done through a staff
meeting, individual conversations, and with the Press.
3. Asked Bob Mardian to confine his activities full time to the
DNC lawsuit, working with Fred LaRue. Bob is considering
doing this or resigning altogether, and my guess is that he will
leave.
4. Requested through Fred Malek that Harry Flemming leave the
Committee. Harry has agreed to this without acrimony, and his
resignation for personal reasons will be announced next week.
- 2 -
5. Called or wired all State Chairmen, emphasizing my ex-
pectations for intensified State activities and notifying them of
my new appointments.
6. Ordered a complete review of all State budgets with the aim
of finalizing them by July 15th. At present only 25 have been
approved, and the budgets do not cover the areas of highest
priority.
7. Arranged for closer relationships between RNC and 1701
field operations. In effect, Tom Evans has agreed that his
Deputy along with other RNC field personnel would work for
Fred on the Presidential campaign, and we would especially
ensure a closer tie-in at the State level.
8. Solidified a basic approach to field operations, developed a
plan of action for strengthening State operations, and identified
initial candidates for key field positions. This is covered in more
detail at Tab A and is worthy of your review. My future plans
here are also covered at Tab A.
WOMEN'S PROGRAM
You indicated concern over the scope of the women's program, particularly
whether we were effectively reaching the average homemakers across the
country. I spent two hours with Pat Hutar reviewing her program. My con-
clusions were that she is doing a fine job of recruiting women volunteers
for the State campaigns but an inadequate job of attracting top level, non-
partisan women to your support. To begin rectifying this, I have taken
the following steps:
1. Asked Pat Hutar to recruit past Presidents of leading women's
organizations (e.g., Soroptimists, Junior League, General Fed-
eration of Women's Clubs) plus other women leaders to a National
and State Advisory Committees for the Campaign. Her deadline
is to have identified and invited these women by July 15th, and
they will be used to get members of their organizations involved
in the campaign.
2. Proposed a program for getting my wife, Barbara, along with
wives of Cabinet Officers and senior White House staff to barn-
storm various States during the campaign. Basically, the concept
is that a trio of wives (representing the Cabinet, White House,
and campaign) would hedgehop across a State each week recruiting
- 3 -
volunteers and talking to large groups of women about their
families and their husbands' roles. I have asked Mrs. Hutar
for a comprehensive, fully costed program by July 20th.
3. Requested that Mrs. Hutar and Barbara Franklin submit
to me by July 22nd a comprehensive proposal for further
reaching the women voters by broadening our approach and
focusing on the average, non-partisan woman voter.
I am convinced that more yet needs to be done to attract the woman voter,
and Iintend to give continuing attention to this crucial area.
TAKING CONTROL AND TIGHTENING UP
In addition to the above, I have taken a number of other steps to assert my
control over the organization. At the same time I have rejected, at least for
now, several more dramatic moves (e.g., salary cuts) that could have a
counter-productive impact on morale at this time. The actions taken included:
1. Designated Jeb Magruder as a Deputy Campaign Director with
responsibility for his current activities (e.g., advertising, polling,
research, administration). Also redesignated Fred LaRue as
Special Assistant to the Campaign Director. These men have
performed well, and their appointments preserve continuity.
2. Held a staff meeting Monday to lift the spirits of the organi-
zation and assert my priority on field operations.
3. Had Malek, Magruder, and Colson review the Democrats
for Nixon program and intensify their efforts. A tentative
selection has been made of an Executive Director, and Ed Failor
has been assigned the responsibility of developing and imple-
menting a comprehensive, hard-hitting program.
4. Let it be known that I expected a general belt tightening,
especially around national headquarters. Included here is re-
ducing the number of State people coming in for planning meet-
ings (savings of $25, 000), suggesting longer hours for all
personnel, and the personnel moves already discussed. I am
considering further moves such as cutting the budget for Head-
quarters personnel by 10%.
- 4 -
PUBLIC ROLE
You asked me to spend more time as a spokesman. To this end, I have met
with several groups of reporters, had an NBC interview Monday, and held
a full press conference on Wednesday. I will be on the Today Show on
Friday and on Face the Nation on Sunday. Further appearances are being
developed, and I intend to maintain an active public schedule.
FUTURE PLANS
Our major efforts over the next month will be strengthening the field organi-
zation as outlined in the Tab A plan, further developing campaign strategy,
preparing for the convention, and following through in other priority areas
such as the women's program and Democrats for Nixon.
During the next week, I will spend a major amount of time with the State
Chairmen who will be in Washington for final planning sessions. I intend to
establish new relationships with them, emphasize the danger of complacency,
and push them hard on the basic voter contact programs.
*
*
*
*
Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to serve you in SO meaningful an
endeavor. The past few days have acquainted me with the enormity of the
task ahead, but I am confident we can build the Committee and wage the
strongest possible campaign.
Attachment
TAB A
REVITALIZING THE FIELD ORGANIZATION
The central assignment of the Field Organization at 1701 is to organize
the states so that they identify, register and turn out those voters favor-
able to you. You have expressed concern that the field organization is fall-
ing down on this assignment. Unfortunately, my discussions over the last
few days indicate that your concern is more than justified. In fact, the
situation is even worse than I expected it to be; and only fast, resolute, no
holds barred action will get us back on track. After briefly summarizing
the present situation, this memorandum outlines the action steps I feel are
necessary to get the field organization moving. While the details of some
of these steps may change as new facts come to light, I am sure the basic
approach is sound.
THE PRESENT SITUATION
A reasonable goal for the field organization is to cover 60 to 65% of the
precincts in the key states for voter identification, registration and turn out.
In the non key states, a goal of 50% coverage, with the expectation that actual
coverage will be nearer 40% is reasonable. Fortunately, core programs
designed to assist the states in identifying, registering, and turning out
favorable voters (e. g., telephone, direct mail, and vote canvassing programs)
have been developed both for the key states and the non key states. I have
reviewed these programs and am satisfied that if implemented by the states,
they will get the job done. Exhibit I is a more complete description of these
programs.
Given the present circumstances in the field division, however, we would be
fortunate to get these programs implemented in 10 to 20% of the precincts in the
key states and less than 10% in the non key states. There is no need to review
again how this came about, but I will summarize the specific problems caused
by this situation to provide a perspective for judging the action steps proposed
in the next section.
There are two basic problems which we must overcome:
1.
The 1701 field division is poorly organized and does not have the
resources necessary to implement the core programs in the states.
a.
There are too few coordinators to organize the states and
implement the core programs that have been developed and
inadequate support staff for functions such as training. Also,
- 2 -
the workloads are out of balance. For example, one coordinator
is responsible for handling five of the eleven key states.
b.
The 1701 budget procedures are in shambles. Only 25 of the 50
state budgets have been approved, and budgets do not include
expenses necessary to establish a sound grassroots voter
identification, registration and turn out effort.
c.
The states do not have campaign victory plans which set out
the program, action steps and time tables we expect them to
carry out.
2.
Most of the state organizations are developing so slowly that they will
not be able to begin implementing the core programs until mid-September,
if then. Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Michigan,
California and Washington are of particular concern.
ACTION STEPS
In order to correct the problems confronting us in the field organization
we intend to take these action steps:
1.
Establish a field organization advisory group. Our internal strength
will be operations and drive. To build in the political experience
needed and, to lend weight to our field directors, we will form this
advisory group. It would include seasoned political organizors such
as Cliff White, Harry Dent, Chuck Colson, Al Abrahams, Len Hall,
Ray Bliss, Steve Shattack, Steve Lampray, and Lee Nunn. This
group would be used for two purposes:
a.
To meet weekly at 1701 over a beer and sandwich supper to
review and guide field organization plans, problems, progress
and contemplated steps.
b.
To serve in an advisory capacity to the field coordinators on
specific problems in the states. Ideally each member of the
advisory group would be a "Godfather" to one of the field
coordinators, assisting him in working through problems,
and handling difficult personalities in the states. The group
will be formed and will begin meetings by August 1.
- 3 -
C.
Sell the Republican party and our volunteer force that the best
political minds in the country are being brought to bear on
their problems.
2.
Reorganize the 1701 field headquarters to better carry out the task of
setting up and giving guidance to the grassroots campaign in the states.
a.
Expand the field coordinator group from the present three to
nine or ten. Exhibit II shows the tentative state groupings we
expect to use. This expansion is necessary because the core
programs are relatively complex and because we must tele-
scope about four months work into the next thirty days if we
are to get these programs off the ground.
b.
Bring in the most able men we can find to staff these coordinator
jobs. I am using my recruiting group here at the White House, the
RNC, and selected people at 1701 to identify men capable of play-
ing this role. Exhibit III outlines the background of those men
identified to date. I expect to begin my interviews on Saturday
and the additional coordinators to be recruited and on board by
July 14.
C.
Establish a new approach for working with the states. The 1701
coordinators will spend most of their time in the field. They
will be in the office on Mondays to get general direction and
strategy from Clark MacGregor and to meet individually with
me on progress and problems within their states. They will
spend Tuesday through Saturday in their states, pushing pro-
grams through to completion.
d.
Establish new budgeting procedures to set up budgets in those 25
states where there are none and to revamp those budgets which
have been approved to date. The budget analysis has just begun,
and thus we cannot yet outline the specific procedures at this
time. It is already clear that we will need a full time budget
officer in the field division at 1701 and we will have to stream
line the present cumbersome system of budget guidelines and
budget reviews. I have had an initial discussion with Maurice
Stans on this problem, and we plan a wrap up budget review on
July 15.
- 4 -
e.
By July 31, take other necessary steps to:
1.
Establish a training capability at 1701.
2.
Cut short the state planning process.
3.
Develop the capability to monitor the progress of the
campaign efforts in the states.
3.
Strengthen the state organizations. As mentioned in the previous section,
the states are well behind in their efforts to develop effective grassroots
organizations. In order to correct this, I will take the following steps.
a.
Evaluate the status of each state. This evaluation will include
a look at the effectiveness of the state campaign management, the
extent to which the state organization is in place, the budget,
and any problems that need to be addressed in the state. I have
started each coordinator on this evaluation and we expect to begin
the review next Monday.
b.
Change state chairmen where necessary. Obviously, we want
to minimize the number of changes for it is very late to attempt
to build an organization from zero. But there are at least two
chairmen in key states where we must seriously consider making
a change - Tom Houser in Illinois and in Pennsylvania, where
Arlen Specter is the chairman.
c.
Slot young, aggressive executive directors into these key states
where our organization is lagging. Tentatively, we plan to put
executive directors in Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Washington.
We plan to change the executive director in Pennsylvania. Finally,
we are carefully reviewing California and Michigan to see if there
are steps that can be taken to bolster those two organizations.
Where possible, we would like the state chairmen to find and
hire the executive directors. However, as part of the search
effort for the additional field coordinators, I am also searching
for men who would make suitable executive directors. Thus,
if the states are not capable of finding suitable candidates, we
can provide them so that within the next three weeks these men
can be recruited, trained and put to work.
d.
Require each state to develop a headquarters staff to give
direction and technical assistance to their county and city
campaign managers in implementation of the grassroots programs.
- 5 -
e.
Instruct the state chairmen in the key states to hire fieldmen
who would be assigned a specific key county. These men would
be responsible for opening the storefront headquarters, for
setting up the telephone operations, and for seeing that all
operations county wide operate smoothly. Their assignment
for the next four months would be to stay in that county to make
the programs work there. Again, we would hope the state
chairmen could find these men and bring them on board. To
assure that this will happen, however, I have begun a search
to locate some 40 or 50 men capable of handling this job.
These men could be assigned as necessary to the states and
should be recruited and on board by August 15.
4.
Use every possible means to recruit the largest and most effective
volunteer force ever assembled for a Presidential campaign. This
will include pressing hard on all Voter Blocs and Citizens Groups
to attract large numbers of volunteers in each state from their
constituencies. All Voter Bloc and Citizens Directors will have
this as their top priority and plans are underway to intensify these
efforts. In addition, we will utilize national advertising to aid in
volunteer recruitment.
The above steps and tight time tables will require the field organization to
go on a war footing. I am sure, however, that they can be met and that we
can recover the ground we have lost.
EXHIBIT I
THE CORE PROGRAMS FOR
REGISTRATION, VOTER IDENTIFICATION AND VOTER TURN OUT
The purpose of our organizational activities in the field will be to:
1. Register all unregistered voters favorable to the President.
2. Identify favorable and undecided voters and record their
names.
3. Use direct mail, telephone, and other persuasive devices
to swing undecided voters to the President.
4. Make sure all favorable voters get to the polls on November 7th.
These programs should be carried out on a door to door basis
in the priority areas of all states - where the President received
30% or better in the 1968 election. Besides identifying the
favorables, the door to door volunteer will act as a sales force
for the President. They will demonstrate support and enthusiasm
for the Nixon Administration in every state.
In all eleven priority states, the state organization will be provided
extra support for registration, voter identification, and turn out
activities. Computer printouts of all registered voters will be
provided in both street walking and alphabetical order. In addition,
telephone banks will be established to supplement door to door
activity.
The key to the successful operation of these programs will be the
use of storefront headquarters in every priority county in America.
Some larger counties will be sub-divided even further and several
storefronts established. These headquarters should be opened after
the convention and be fully staffed until election day. They will
serve as the central coordinating point of all organizational activity.
As mentioned previously, priority states will be provided with
computer canvass lists of registered voters. Non priority states
will be given blank canvass sheets with a similar format that
will allow the volunteer to record whether the person canvassed
favors the President, is registered, will volunteer, etc. In addi-
tion, canvass kits with instructions will be provided to all states.
- 2 -
After establishing headquarters in priority centers or similar
areas, the county or storefront staff should prioritize all
precincts within its regions. Each precinct's canvass sheets
and instructions should be placed in a canvass kit and in turn
the canvass kit placed in an evelope with campaign materials.
A precinct map and the precinct number should be attached.
Volunteers will be used to do precinct work in the following
ways:
1. Assign a precinct canvass kit to a precinct captain who
will come into the storefront headquarters and pick up his
precinct kit and return the kit at a specified time.
2. Blitz have all volunteers come to the headquarters at
one specified time to receive instructions and kits. Have
these volunteers return the kits at a specified time together.
3. Have the volunteers come in on an individual basis, give
them brief instructions and ask them to return the kit at a
specified time.
Depending upon the number of volunteers available, the fol-
lowing alternatives should be considered for door to door
canvassing:
1. Canvass all households,
2. Canvass only registered voters.
3. Canvass only Democrats and Independents.
After the kits are returned to headquarters by the volunteers,
appropriate chairmen should check for volunteers, those
needing absentee ballots, and those who need to register. The
election day chairman should start compiling lists for poll
watching and get out the vote activities.
On or before election day, all favorable voters who have been
identified should be contacted and reminded to vote.
In states where poll watching is appropriate, runners should
return copies of poll watching lists to headquarters. Volunteers
- 3 -
then go door to door and telephone all favorables who
have not voted and urge them to go to the polls.
The entire registration, voter identification and voter
turn out program is based on the successful use of store-
front headquarters for control and accountability. In
addition, priority emphasis must be placed on recruiting
volunteers before September who will make this program
work.
Exhibit II
TENTATIVE STATE GROUPINGS FOR
FIELD COORDINATOR ASSIGNMENTS
1.
California, Arizona, Nevada,
7.
Texas and the Deep South
Utah, and Hawaii
Texas
Florida
2.
New York and New Jersey
Georgia
Alabama
3.
Pennsylvania and Delaware
Louisiana
Mississippi
4.
New England and Illinois
South Carolina
Illinois
Arkansas
Connecticut
New Hampshire
8.
Farm States
Vermont
Minnesota
Maine
Iowa
Rhode Island
Missouri
Massachusetts
Kansas
Oklahoma
5.
Midwest
North Dakota
Ohio
South Dakota
Michigan
Wisconsin
9.
Northwest and the
Indiana
Mountain States
Washington
6.
Border States
Oregon
Maryland
Idaho
Virginia
Montana
Kentucky
Colorado
North Carolina
Alaska
Tennessee
West Virginia
Exhibit 3
POTENTIAL FIELD COORDINATORS
Albert E. Abrahams - Assistant Director for Congressional and Public
Affairs, Cost of Living Council. Abrahams, age 48, has been actively in-
volved with politics since 1953 when he served as Press Assistant & Legis-
lative Assistant to the late U. S. Senator Robert C. Hendrickson. His past
positions include Legislative Assistant to Sen. Clifford P. Case; Director,
Washington office, Rockefeller for President Committee; Executive Director,
Republican Citizens Committee; Executive Director, National Draft Rocke-
feller Committee; assisted in political campaigns of various elected officials
and in 1967, formed his own campaign management firm. Abrahams is very
bright, an excellent strategist and an outstanding politician.
A. Lamar Alexander, Jr. - Lawyer, Nashville, Tennessee. Alexander
is in his early 30's and has had excellent political experience. He has served
as Legislative Assistant to Senator Baker of Tennessee and headed up Governor
Dunn's successful campaign for election in Tennessee. He is a real professional
and an extremely capable young man. He has served at the White House and
has excellent Republican credentials.
Robert E. Bradford - Administrative Assistant; Senator Bill Brock
Bradford, age 41, has worked in the political area since 1958 when he joined
Rep. Richard Poff as his A. A. He has since served as Executive Director,
Illinois Republican State Central Committee and on a volunteer basis has been
involved with the "Paul Revere Panels" (group of Republican Congressmen who
toured mainly Democratic districts helping party candidates); Regional Field
Director of Republican Congressional Committee that toured 18 states to help
organize party campaigns; Region III Director of the Young Republicans. He
is well respected on the Hill, is a good professional and would be willing to
serve.
Richard B. Cheney - Assistant Director for Operations Review; Cost of
Living Council. Cheney, age 31, has his Doctorate in Political Science and
has been involved in politics since college. He has worked in the Wyoming
State Legislature; in the Office of the Governor of Wisconsin; U. S. House of
Representatives under Rep. William A. Steiger; and in 1969 joined Don Rums-
feld at the Office of Economic Opportunity. He has been working with Rums-
feld since that time and has moved with him from OEO to the White House
and now to the Cost of Living Council.
Marvin Collins
Collins is a very heavy professional politician with tremendous experience.
He managed both the Bush and Holten campaigns and would be extremely use-
ful in Texas as he knows the state extremely well. He has excellent judgment
and is very innovative.
Benjamin W. Cotten - Partner; Brault, Graham, Scott & Brault, Wash,, D.
Cotten, age 35, has been an active Republican for many years and has held
several offices in the Young Republicans both on the local and national levels.
He has been involved in many campaign activities including speaking on various
occasions in the Metropolitan Wash., D. C. area on behalf of the party ticket;
Pre-convention - Field Representative & Assistant Director of Young Adults,
United Citizens for Nixon/Agnew; Post-convention - Assistant National Field
Director of United Citizens for Nixon/Agnew; Field operations director, Holton
for Governor campaign, Campaign Manager, Echols for Senate Campaign.
He is capable, bright and very knowledgeable in the political field.
Gordon Gooch - General Counsel; Federal Power Commission
Gooch, age 37, has outstanding political experience. Gooch has worked with
George Bush in both his Senate and House races; served as General Counsel
of the Harris County Republican Party and was responsible for the County
Convention, including its organization, logistics, security and program: helped
in organizing Senator Tower's campaign in 1966; headed County Ballot Security
for the Nixon Campaign in 1968 and worked with Peter D'Donnell on the State
Convention. Gordon has been asked to run for various public offices by party
officials and is extremely well regarded in Texas. He is tremendously com-
petent and would be willing to serve.
Ned Jennatta - Partner; William Blair & Company, Chicago, Illinois
Jennatta is a highly successful partner with William Blair & Co. in Chicago.
He has had extensive political campaign experience in Illinois and ran Don
Rumsfeld's first campaign for Congress. He is highly regarded by the Re-
publicans in Illinois and described as being a superb professional.
William T. Kendall - Administrative Assistant; Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen
Kendall, age 51, has been with Rep. Frelinghuysen for the past ten years.
He has run all of the Congressman's campaigns and has been extremely active
in New Jersey politics. He has a tremendous amount of campaign experience
and in addition has served as Rep. committeeman and precinct leader; Chair-
man of the Southeastern District, Morris County Republican Committee;
Special Assistant to Chairman, Republican Congressional Campaign Com-
mittee. He comes highly recommended.
Robert Monks - Lawyer and Entrepreneur, Boston, Massachusetts
Monks, who is in his late 30's, is the recently defeated Republican candidate
for the Senate seat in Maine. He established and maintained an excellent
precinct organization for his campaign and displayed very good political judg-
ment throughout his effort to unseat Senator Smith.
Richard D. Murray - Wisconsin District Director, SBA
Murray, age 34, was a Republican candidate for U. S. Representative, Second
District, Wisconsin in 1968. He has long been active in Republican politics
and has assisted in numerous political campaigns. He is highly regarded in
Wisconsin and at SBA where he has done an outstanding job.
Thomas Reed - Field Staff; Committee for the Re-election of the President
Reed was hired at the Committee by Bob Mardian. He is presently serving
as Field Man for Texas and is doing an outstanding job. Prior to joining the
Committee, he was a National Committeeman from California.
Richard Richards - Director, Political Division; RNC
Richards, age 40, has a very extensive background in politics. His past
record includes such political activities as Past Chairman of Utah State YRs;
Member, National Committee (1966-69); Chairman, Utah Delegation to National
Convention in Miami Beach, 1968; Field Man for Sen. Wallace F. Bennett:
Legislative Aide and Administrative Assistant to Cong. L. Burton of Utah:
and Republican State Chairman of Utah. He has keen political instinct, good
judgment and a sound knowledge of political campaigning.
Peter R. Sawers - Vice President; Robert H. Hayes & Associates, Inc.,
Chicago, Illinois. Sawers, age 38, has had excellent experience in political
campaigns. Since 1961 he has served as Precinct Captain in Evanston Repub-
lican Organization; he was 50th Ward Chairman of the Rumsield for Congress
Committee; Co-Chairman for Suburban Cook County in Percy's campaign
for Governor; Campaign Manager, Rumsfeld for Congress Committee III 1966;
Chairman for 6th, 10th and 13th Congressional Districts for both Primary and
General Elections under Citizens for Nixon. Sawers is an excellent man, a
superb politician and a tremendously effective individual.
Richard Thaxton - Director of Registration & Voter Turnout; RNC
Thaxton, age 30, has had extensive experience in political campaigns beginning
with his volunteer work in Dallas, Texas while employed by the University
Computing Company. He has served as Executive Secretary of the Colorado
State Party and has done an outstanding job in his present position at the RNC.
Webster B. Todd, Jr. - Director of Senior Citizens: Committee for the
Re-election of the President. Todd, age 34, is a very bright and competent
young man who has had good political experience. He has been active in New
Jersey politics serving as a member of the N. J. General Assembly in which
capacity he served as Chairman, Taxation Committee; Member, Appropria-
tions Committee; Member, Tax Exempt Study Commission; Chairman, Intro-
duction of Bills Committee. Todd managed Ray Bateman's campaign for
the N. J. State Senate and according to Bateman, ran the best organized county-
wide campaign in the history of the county with Bateman's margin of victory
being the largest ever in that county. He is an extremely effective organizer
and has good administrative abilities.
H,L, FM, C Mae G in car
7/6
Jm H re memo not asbad asappears
H but tone of memo - diafted by FM
Can't my "wolf"
H: Jm + H dept P hr/ Compaign
Avoid the attempt at close
H twoll Deen FM list of field word's
Fm must contain outward zeal
must treat people poli not
just air ass.
Contrary te press reports JM did not
have duect contact w/ P
during camp of -68 beef goal
of H+ Jm was to keep p out o/camp
I assume that a low visibility schedule policy is
generally in effect for the President; the purpose of this
memorandum is to question the validity of some of the under-
lying assumptions of that policy in the light of several
recent events. I think certain narrow exceptions to it are
now justified and necessary.
We begin with the obvious: The President has
unprecedented equity of China, USSR and the allied Summits.
The President's schedule must be designed, at
optimum, to build equity, but at least not to permit undue
loss. It is important to realize that loss not only occurs
as a result of what the President does or does not do but,
perhaps more importantly, because of what others do. He is
the victim of imputed liability for the acts of the Committee,
the Executive Branch, state organizations and even the wives
of some of those agents.
So the problem is not merely to hold what we have
by doing nothing. If we do nothing we lose, because collateral
events will cost us something.
How to cut the collateral costs (e.g. the Watergate
caper, Martha Mitchell, campaign funds disclosure and the
- 2 -
Ellsberg trial) is really a separate important subject.
Suffice it to say that every one of these examples is a
Mitchell subject and my confidence quotient in John is
lower than it has been in a long time.
How to rebuild equity by doing things within our
control is perhaps more important. We should analyze the
nature of the losses we are suffering and then do the kinds
of things which tend to counteract in the same generic area.
For example, both Watergate and funds disclosure
attacks take the lack-of-candor line. The President can
readily regain lost ground in this area in press conference
answers if we're alert to the problem.
We may want to consider an event which emphasizes
the family-man-President or church attendance going to the
reassertion of moral precepts. Given the generic class of
problems which are causing us losses just now - - essentially
in the category of crass politics, dirty tricks, secrecy and
non-disclosure, the schedule people should propose events in
the opposite vein and we should strongly urge the President to
do them.
That is why I thought the second flood story was a
good one. Aside from the appeal to the South in going to
- 3 -
Richmond, if he has to put in a day's work and compete
with Martha for news time on TV far better that it be on
a compassionate errand just now, rather than a meeting
with Republican Senators.
I won't labor the obvious. Simply: let's analyze
how we're losing equity and do things to regain it - Obviously
given the nature of our present problems this is not a call
for scheduling stump speeches, trips to conventions or drop-
bys to meetings of black educators.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
H
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Magruder's Press Contacts
The January 17th suggestion by Bob to John Mitchell that
Jeb should not be a press contact is not being followed.
Aside from the special assignments to talk with the press,
such as the shift of the Convention from San Diego to
Miami Beach, Magruder meets periodically with the press.
Most recently on Friday when I called his office told me
that he did not want to be interrupted as he was "with a
reporter". Whether Magruder continues to talk with the
press is, I suppose, Mitchell's decision, but you should
know that Bob's "personal view" is not being followed.
Compidentise Keyer Only
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O, 120 5, Section 6-102
January 17, 1972
By
EP
Date 4-2-82
,
MEMORANDUM FOR :
HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM :
H.R. HALDEMAN
In spite of the outstanding job that Jeb is obviously doing in many
phases of the organization of the campaign structure, it seems to
me that he is exactly the wrong guy to be used as a spokesman for
the campsign.
My personal view would be that Jeb should discontinue his present
practice of holding press interviews, TV interviews, etc., and
should become totally the man behind the scenes. Otherwise he's
going to destroy his usefulness.
HRH:pm
CC) Jeb Magruder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Last week or so, Mills Godwin, a respected former Governor of
Virginia, announced that he could not support McGovern & Co.,
and was going for Nixon in November. That was good news, but
terrible timing. Godwin got a nice little spread in the "metro"
section of the local paper. If we have lined up, or know of,
Democrats about to bolt to RN they should be called upon to
hold until after the Convention, when it becomes major political
news in terms of November, and then to do so, with Maximum
Fanfare in their State Capitals. Also, this is probably being done,
but we should orchestrate them, so that they fall sequentially, one
or two major figures a week - - and then on a regular basis, the
RNC or Re-Election Committee can send out a release listing major
national Democrats who cannot support the "extremism" of McGovern.
Muskie did most things badly, but one thing he did extraordinarily
well was to drop the endorsements he had lined up with the kind of
skill that made it appear opposition to him was hopeless. The fellow
looked like he was filling up a straight, with ease, only to turn over
nothing on the last card. But the buildup was impressive; and we
should orchestrate similarly.
Buchanan
TALKING PAPER - MITCHELL
The President believes very strongly in the old Chotiner rule
that a campaign team must be lean and that in their conduct
they must think of themselves as the candidate. They must
avoid ostentatious appearance of every kind such as fancy suites,
booze in the rooms, fancy restaurants, etc.
Any such appearances just give the opposition ammunition regarding
our being the party of the fat cats. Also, it's hard to justify to
our contributors and our volunteers.
This matter must be handled very toughly with all of the campaign
staff. We've got to tighten up the organization so it doesn't look
fat.
This was brought to the President's attention by a recent Jack Anderson
column saying that the Nixon people are travelling first class and
living high, and that people are beginning to say, "here's where
the $1 0 million is going".
HRH
6/21/72
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/20/72 7/15
TO:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
You mentioned yesterday morning
that there would be no campaign
strategy session. Do you never-
theless want to put this in
follow up for 2 weeks?
No make itport
convention
L.
POLITICAL STRATEGY PAPER
We should probably have a strategy meeting, or retreat, going for
a couple of days to get down to some basic decisions, both from the
standpoint of therapy and ideas.
There should be a bigger advisory group putting in some thinking time
such as the Committee of 100 and the Committee of 9, who thought they
were running the Campaign, and were actually helpful for ideas and in
enlisting loyalty.
We may be missing some smart people, such as some key Senators and
Congressmen, or some Governors.
We are overlooking some of the old hands on our staff such as Price,
Garment, Safire, Finch, Dent, Buchanan, Chotiner, Rumsfeld and
Weinberger.
The great danger is for two or three people to think that they are the
foun of all wisdom. Of course, the other side of this coin is also worse,
which is to try and run a campaign with a dozen or a hundred people. We
need to get better organized on the process of touching bases, however.
We must avoid getting too ingrown in terms of political strategy decisions.
2
We should follow the pattern at the retreat of the August 15 Camp David
meeting with sub-groups working on specific areas and then reporting
to a small executive group of two or three.
HRH
6/12/72
ACTION MEMORANDUM
There should be a major effort now to get name Democrats
to come out for the President on a periodic basis.
All present and former Democratic Governors, Senators, and
Congressmen should be carefully reviewed to see which would
be potential Nixon supporters, and then a program of contact
of all of them should be initiated immediately.
Harlow would be one to carry on some of this contact effort.
HRH
June 19, 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM :
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT :
Your conversation with John Mitchell
Re: Malek et al
I've given some more thought to the idea you mentioned to me earlier
today of approaching Mitchell on moving Malek more into the operational
aspects at 1701 in the manager role. I agree that the basic approach is
good and your suggestion on how to broach the subject with Mitchell,
very good. Below I've jotted some additional thoughts that might be
helpful. In addition you should review the attached. + think you'll see
that Mitchell is already moving somewhat in the direction of toughening
up at 1701.
-Fred is not the perfect man to move into the job but
is the best of what is available. You should make it
clear to Mitchell that the areas to move Malek in are
the priority areas where we have specific programs
already laid out and it' merely a matter of getting
something accomplished in those areas. Also, don't
be too hard on Magruder, he's done a good job of
putting this situation together and now it's a question
of making it run.
-Your approach to Mitchell is just right, i.e. the part
about two people who have worked for Haldeman. I
would put greater emphasis, however, on the Colson
thing.
-This should be done with no announcement other than
the fact that Fred is leaving the White House staff to join
the campaign operation fulltime. It would be good to
get into some discussion with John as to exactly what
the priorities are. We're doing a great job of planning,
figuring out advertising, etc. What we need is organiza-
tion, particularly field organization. This is where the
thing needs to be tightened up and Malek should become
a force to be reckoned with. Also mention that Magruder
needs to take a new "get tough" attitude. It will be help-
ful for him to have this. attenticle as well Malch