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To: The President From: Bryce Harlow RE: Brief comments on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's November 7 memorandum. 8pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE: "Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/16/1970
To: The President From: Bill Safire RE: "Approaches to 1972." 12pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/11/1970
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman RE: "The Election and the Near Future." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
To: The President From: Lyn Nofziger RE: "In Response to Request from H.R. Haldeman." 5pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
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WHSF: Contested, 45-29
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This file contains:
To: The President From: Bryce Harlow RE: Brief comments on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's November 7 memorandum. 8pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE: "Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/16/1970
To: The President From: Bill Safire RE: "Approaches to 1972." 12pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/11/1970
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman RE: "The Election and the Near Future." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
To: The President From: Lyn Nofziger RE: "In Response to Request from H.R. Haldeman." 5pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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45
29
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Bryce Harlow RE:
Brief comments on the points raised in Bob
Haldeman's November 7 memorandum. 8pgs
45
29
11/16/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE:
"Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs
45
29
11/11/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Bill Safire RE:
"Approaches to 1972." 12pgs
45
29
11/18/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman
RE: "The Election and the Near Future." 6pgs
45
29
11/10/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Lyn Nofziger RE:
"In Response to Request from H.R.
Haldeman." 5pgs
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
Halow
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Date 6-4-80
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
You have already received, I am sure, far better assessments
of the elections and the rest than I can furnish, in part
because I was preoccupied with the Vice President's campaign
and therefore didn't share in your effort or watch it as
closely as I otherwise would have. So I will make my comments
as brief as I can on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's
November 7 memorandum.
1. Your election efforts:
a. To all the VP's crew, it appeared that your
campaigning did very excellently what the VP wasn't supposed
to do and couldn't do -- stir up the general public and pre-
empt both the national and local media. Assuming that the
main objects of campaigning, aside from fund-raising, are to
remind and stimulate, I believe the timing, execution and
placement of your efforts are not challengeable even in
hindsight.
b. I fear we may have been guilty of overkill in
such places as Texas (perhaps the only place) ; the heavy
involvement of both the President and Vice President may
have flushed out more opposition votes than supporters, and
I believe it was agreed from the beginning that a small vote
was desirable in Texas. Nonetheless, the Bush people have
no basis for complaint; you and the VP did precisely as his
campaign crowd asked.
C. I feel a bit lame in making this point, since I
was not in Washington to share in the decision-making and
suspect there are considerations I am unaware of -- but I have
the uncomfortable feeling that the Vice President had already
driven home, powerfully and effectively, the law and order
theme by the time you hit the trail and that he had already
2
peaked with that message to the country. So by mid-October
all of us might have been better advised to swing away at
least partially from this issue we may have already won
(even the most radical Democrats had joined us on law and
order by that time) and clobber the economic issue, plus
bragging on Administration achievements. That is a gut
feeling -- sheer smoke-shoveling -- but by the time you took
to the road we were already in worried conferences in the
VP's group on what to do about newly adverse developments in
the economy and farm areas (the announcement of low parity
in the closing days of the campaign was a disaster!). In
other words, I vaguely sense even now (as the VP did in the
last two weeks of the campaign) that we were overstressing an
issue we had already won and on which the Democrats had
covered themselves, and we failed then to modify course to
take on escalating troubles in agriculture and the economy.
Bob Haldeman may recall my distraught telephone call ten days
or SO before election about the economic problem --- which gave
rise to Bill Safire's excellent statement for our candidates
to use (and which we did use at Hartford and Tuscon) - but I
rather suspect we might well have charged on these other issues
in the closing days, or at least given them greater emphasis,
instead of sticking overlong to law and order.
d. Even if we had done what (c) above suggests, I
must concede that local candidates would have raised plu-
perfect hell on the ground that you were campaigning too
blandly; certainly everyplace the VP went, the local lust was
for raw meat. Moreover, the press was hovering about with
pencils poised, eager to charge that the campaign had been
SO nasty, so bitchy, that you and the VP had to confess
wrong-doing and turn tail and run. So even if the country
had drifted away from law and order in the closing days, had
you and the VP changed subjects or muted the attack, there's
no telling what the national reaction might have been. It
could have been a disaster for you or the VP or both. There's
no way to tell.
e. The bottom fell out in the Midwest and West.
If that area had held up as I, at least, anticipated, we
would have done excellently -- the 5 to 8 seat gain I
personally expected in the Senate. The only constants in
3
that region that can explain this collapse, best I can
figure, are: unemployment (spotty), high interest rates
(epidemic and very basic), inflation (general), farmer
surliness (a sleeper; never once even mentioned to us by
any campaign manager or candidate in the entire area), and
maybe a regional disinterest in law and order, inasmuch as
both Democrats and Republicans are law abiding and square
in that part of the country. It is easy to particularize
on the races out there and conclude that oddities in each
state account for the poor showing, but I can't buy that.
I believe that, while state peculiarities obviously in-
fluenced every race in the western reaches, so also did they
in the rest of the country where we fared far better -- so
there are bound to be special troubles out west which did us
in. I can't help but wonder what might have happened in
North Dakota if our thrust had been not law and order, where
Burdick was immune, but on the arrogance and cynicism of the
Democrats' refusal to pass the farm law. But even there, as
you know, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union oppose
this legislation, so that, too, might have been a loser.
That tends to force me back to the desirability of the economy
argument - that you had wound down both inflation and war
while avoiding recession, and the Democrats are plainly
incompetent on both counts. It is conceivable that we might
have salvaged a race or two in the mountains and plains if
we had done that.
f. The fact remains, whatever happened, that the
whole campaign was directed toward one goal - unshackling
you in the Senate. You did precisely that -- a far better showing
than the pillar of political gold, Eisenhower, made in 1954 and
1958 - indeed, the best off-year showing of any Republican
Administration in memory. So liberal pundits notwithstanding,
your object was achieved, and the proof will be seen in 1971
and 1972 in the performance of the Senate. That is all that
matters; the rest is only hostile rationalization and yearning.
g. Finally, I reject as inane the argument that
your campaigning demeaned the Presidency and will plague you
through 1972. Never has this been SO before, and unless the
media take it upon themselves to make it so (even that won't
4
work, in my opinion) the whole orgy of 1970 will be dead
and gone except for (1) the wholesome Senate results and
(2) the gubernatorial disadvantages, by the time you deliver
your State of the Union Message. It is true, of course, that
the Phoenix film was a well-rounded disaster, but everybody
knows that, and it too is an isolated episode that soon
will pass.
2. Presidential posture for the future:
Posture
I don't think the election of 1970 influences your
future posture in any significant aspect other than (1) you
can now move more surely in national security affairs; (2) law
and order are now politically neutralized unless you wish to
test the Democratic commitment to their sudden campaign turn-
about; and (3) Party regularity is enhanced a bit by the
Goodell shafting. Otherwise, your posture, I believe, should
be just what it would otherwise have been anyway - that of a
deeply concerned President earnestly devising sensible solutions
for overriding national problems, and that will automatically
come to be as public and press attention turn to issues in the
rump session of Congress and your programs for 1971 and 1972.
For the future, I anticipate that your removal of
American ground forces from combat will be a vast political
plus in 1972 -- that a healthy economic situation will be
critical for success, for it will likely be the centerpiece
of the 1972 campaign -- and that matters of the environment,
race and the cities will be peripheral, though crucial in key
spots around the country. I needn't add, I know, that the
Policy
farm situation requires almost as much attention as the general
economy, because so much of your strength resides there, and
I would hope for tremendous emphasis on rural development plus
a greater sensitivity to farm needs (such as continuation of
the ACP, now scheduled for the axe) My hope remains that
you will "come clean" with Congress on the economy and the
fiscal situation and will brace them with the same hard
alternatives that you have had to wrestle with, making them
shoulder responsibility right along with you for inflation,
5
deficit financing, full employment troubles and high interest
rates -- all versus sharply higher taxes plus a withered
federal establishment. I feel the country is incredibly mixed
up over all this -- insistent upon vastly costly new programs
but adamantly against the high cost of government. If next
year you can hit just two or three of the sexiest domestic
programs with all your might and main and slough off the rest,
and assure adequate financing, 1972 ought to take care of itself.
3. Changed relations with media:
Media
a. I urge only that you handle them, as you have
sought to do, cooly, fairly and at arm's length, excepting
your obvious friends who are entitled to special care and
feeding. I would foreswear severe retaliatory attempts
against journalistic malefactors, because I think this in-
evitably backfires, and anyway reporters declared off-limits
are seen by your Administration people despite the ban. I
do press for more frequent press conferences (once a month,
on average), and far less daily concentration on this or that
critical column or article or, even, leak. I have long had a
feeling that we overreact to daily drivel and in the process
not only consume energies and time that could be fruitfully
used in other ways, but also in this way we tend to spotlight
the very problems we try to smother. Said differently, I feel
we ascribe too much importance to a columnist or commentator -
that we only flatter them and hurt ourselves when we spend
time countering their writings and broadcasts.
I do hope your regional backgrounders with the press
out in the countryside are carried forward. These, I have
felt, are the most rewarding innovation with the media that
you have hit upon since taking office.
4. Use of Vice President and Cabinet:
a. I have suggested to the Vice President that
(a) he work really diligently with minority groups, devoting
not less than two-thirds of his time on this (not only the
blacks, but also the Indians, Mexicans, etc.) ; (b) he spend
half his remaining time on youth (which ties in with the
minorities) ; and (c) he use such time as he has left for
6
intergovernmental relations, serving as your political
(not operational) nexus with Republican governors and
your political counter-weight against the strengthened
Democratic governors. On this point, I have told him it
is important to avoid operational responsibilities because
the problems of governors range across the entire government
and require far too elaborate a staff and too much time for
him to oversee it.
None of the foregoing has his approval, and he may
reject all of it. I have urged that whatever he concludes
must have, first, your very clear-cut personal blessing -
plus, second, hard notice to the Executive Branch and White
House staff that whatever areas you agree upon are definitely
made the exclusive responsibility of the Vice President.
b. I feel the Cabinet has been insufficiently used as
such and that the Cabinet members feel isolated from you
by layers of staff. The all-important "personal relationship
with The Boss" has gone out of it. I urge at least one
convention: Cabinet meeting a month (with an Administration-
wide agenda, not a technical, specialized topic or program),
plus one or two hours set aside weekly for Cabinet officers
to visit personally and privately with you on matters of their
own choosing whether official or personal. I believe the
team-spirit values of the foregoing would well justify this
investment of your precious time.
5. Relations with Congress:
a. I suggest that a hard decision is overdue here:
either use Bill Timmons in keeping with his offial status, or
take on someone who will be SO used. I have sensed a
reluctance to use Timmons directly with you, in connection with
the most important issues and members of Congress. He is often
left out of meetings and breakfasts, etc., on Congressional
matters in favor of others not charged with Congress -- and
contacts with Congress by the White House staff increasingly
bypass Timmons instead of going through him.
7
No Congressional man can be worth his salt if the
Hill feels he is ineffectual with the President or lacks easy
access to the President. Therefore, I urge that Bill be so
used, but if this can't be, a more acceptable person should
be installed in his place. Success in this area requires not
only Bill's open and frequent identification with you, but
also acceptance as a prime mover by your Staff -- for example,
his inclusion in Bob's eight o'clock staff meeting on the
same basis as Ehrlichman, Shultz et. al.
The Congressional function is so immensely important
to you. If it is kicked around, ignored, or handled as a
subordinate White House activity, the cost is excessive.
b. Some means needs also to be found to involve
the Congressional group more effectively in program formulation,
instead of being often used as clerks to cart bad news to the
Hill. A great deal of needless trouble can be avoided by the
early imput of Congressional people. While this is attempted
now, I feel it is inadequately done and intensifies your Hill
troubles. Involved here also is the instinctive reaction in
every Executive Branch activity (it is chronic in every depart-
ment as well as in the White House) that the Congressional
side of things is a confounded nuisance, therefore in time it
gets pushed into a corner. In my opinion, it should have at
least the same attention and emphasis as the press in all
areas of the White House.
6. Presidential Travel:
Trankl
a. I have no competency in this area, other than to
state the obvious -- that where you will need the greatest
strength in 1972, you should manifest the greatest personal
involvement. This would include special identification with
agricultural regions over the next two years, adequate attention
(with the Vice President also) to the South, continued appeal
to blue collar people by open identification with them at var-
ious places in the country, an improved relationship with the
business community (speeches to business organizations here
and there in the country), and some overt actions making very
8
clear your concern for the little folk and disadvantaged
in the society. Trips abroad should be, I believe. very
widely spaced, because we are entering a season in which
national concerns will probably rivet more on domestic
problems than on foreign troubles.
All in all, I believe you are entering a period in
which you will wish to keep on winding down the war as you
wind up the economy, get both shipshape not later than
August 1972 (earlier if at all possible), and devote your
other efforts to proving to the country that you are President
of all the people, whether they are for or against you and
your Administration. If the country believes you are doing
well with the war and the economy and are seeking selflessly
for sensible progress in just a few other areas of particular
concern, you will, I believe, win going away in 1972.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 16, 1970
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Ron Ziegler
Rz
-
RE:
Election and the next two years
These are my thoughts following the 1970 elections
THE ELECTION
The objective and honest assessment of the 1970 elections must be:
1. The President is better off in the Senate -- he has
gained in both party strength and ideological strength.
2. The President is no worse off in the House than
before -- the fact that Republicans lost no more
than nine seats can be considered significant
when compared with past off-year elections --
but basically there is no change in the House.
3. The Gubernatorial and State Legislature races
were determined primarily on local issues and
should have little effect on 1972.
4. Incumbency seemed to fall out in two opposite
directions in the 1970 elections.
The executive (Governor) incumbent
seemed to be at a clear disadvantage
while the legislative incumbent seemed
to have a clear advantage.
-2-
Only 13 incumbent Congressmen
were defeated (10 Republicans; 3
Democrats) out of 392 who sought
re-election.
However, of the 24 incumbent Governors,
seven were unseated (all Republicans). The
fact is that the executive had to make decisions
that were often unpopular -- i.e. tax increases.
This issue defeated Tiemann, Bartlett, it
almost defeated Curtis in Maine and helped
elect Meskill in Connecticut and probably hurt
Broderick in Pennsylvania.
5. Poor candidates hurt us in some areas -- in my
view we could have done better than Roudebush,
Spaulding, Romney, Gross, Carter, and Burton.
We lost Illinois the day Ogilvie selected Smith.
NOTE: This raises the question of matter of
Karl Mundt. While there is talk about the
Senator resigning before the Governor-elect
is sworn in, there should also be careful
consideration givento who will replace him.
Whoever is chosen must be electable in 1972
or we will be giving away another Senate seat.
The Administration has said enough about the 1970 elections.
We have analyzed them -- sold our point of view some critics
say oversold it. We should now move on to other things.
The President's efforts in 1970 were necessary and clearly within the
campaigning precedent set by former Presidents in off-year election
years. Had the effort ended in San Jose or before, the assessment
which follows would perhaps be different.
THE ISSUES
The San Jose incident and the events that followed it have tended to
give fuel to our critics -- and they will exploit what they feel is the
"Leadership issue" to the fullest. We must develop a strategy to
deal with this.
-3-
It seems to me there are two categories of issues; the first
contains the issues of the economy, social unrest and foreign
policy (Vietnam, defense expenditures, European troop reduction,
approach to East-West relations.)
The second category that our critics will attempt to build and exploit
in an effort to over-ride the Administration handling of the first
category contains (1) The Vice President and his so-called devisive
rhetoric, (2) Moral leadership in the context of uniting the country,
(3) The development of the issue that the Administration is more
concerned with political exploitation and interest than about the
National interest.
As false as these impressions are, our critics' attempts to build
and exploit these points will be assisted by columnist and commentators
many of whom are philosophically sympathetic to this point of view.
Also, they will see this as a way to strike back at what they feel
have been unjust attacks on them by the Vice President. The critics
can be expected to base many of their charges on interpretations of
Vice Presidential speeches over the past two years and this of
course provides good copy.
Finally, one of the results of the events following San Jose is that
our critics are claiming and will continue to claim with some credi-
bility that the Vice President is not an independent spokesman but an
echo of the President's view
From now on when the Vice President
makes a controversial attack we must expect it to be tied directly to
the President.
THE STRATEGY
I suggest we develop a strategy that outflanks our critics -- by that I
mean proceed in a way that is totally opposite from what the bias of
our critics would lead them to think we would do.
While the Scammon-Wattenberg thesis may apply to some of the issues
listed in the first category, it is my view that the attitude and direction
the President set forth in his Inaugural Address should lay the basis
for our strategy to deal with the second category issues.
-4-
All the staff would be well advised to re-read the President's
Inaugural Address and to reflect on how the President has
conducted himself in dealing with the many complicated foreign
and domestic problems that he has faced over the last two years.
From this the strategy and "posture the President should maintain
for the period to the end of this year and in 1971" should be self
evident.
The President has approached every major problem of the past
two years with confidence, calmness, grace and a certain amount
of mystique -- his decisions have been courageous, and forthright.
This posture and attitude should permiate the entire White House
staff and everything we do should be geared to maintain this posture
in an atmosphere of dignity.
The above elements and the President's competence in dealing with
foreign policy and his ability to analyze and calmly solve problems
facing the country should become the dominate posture of the Presi-
dency and the White House.
The dignity of these qualities has far more depth and appeal than the
shallow charismatic appeal that some will work to project over the
next two years.
As DeGaulle has said:
"The great leaders have always stage-managed their
effects -- the statesman must concentrate all his efforts
on captivating man's minds. He must know when to
dissemble, when to be frank.
"He must serve as the servant of the public in order to be its
master -- he must outbid his rivals in self confidence. 11
It has also been said that often times what is said and how it is said
is more effective than what is done.
A fitting bridge for our approach to the next two years I think can be
found in these words from the President's Inaugural Address:
-5-
"Standing in this same place a third of a century ago,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed a nation ravaged
by depression and gripped in fear. He could say in
surveying the nation's troubles: "They concern, thank
God, only material things. 11
Our crisis today is in reverse.
We have found ourselves rich in goods, but ragged in
spirit; reaching with magnificent precision for the moon,
but falling into raucous discord on earth.
We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by
division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives,
wanting fulfillment. We see tasks that need doing, waiting
for hands to do them.
To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of the spirit.
And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves.
When we listen to "the better angels of our nature, 11 we
find that they celebrate the simple things, the basic
things -- such as goodness, decency, love, kindness.
Greatness comes in simple trappings.
The simple things are the ones most needed today if we
are to surmount what divides us, and cement what unites us.
To lower our voices would be a simple thing.
In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever
of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it
can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into
hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of
persuading.
We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting
at one another -- until we speak quietly enough so that our
words can be heard as well as our voices.
-6-
For its part, government will listen. We will strive to
listen in new ways to the voices of quiet anguish, the
voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart --
to the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that
have despaired of being heard.
Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.
Those left behind, we will help to catch up.
For all of our people, we will set as our goal the decent
order that makes progress possible and our lives secure. 11
The same elements in our society that motivated the above exist in
our society today -- perhaps to a lesser degree -- perhaps not.
NEW DECADE OF PROGRESS (Suggestion)
The President also said in his Inaugural "As we reach toward our
hopes our task is to build on what has gone before not turning from
the old, but turning toward the new. "
We perhaps should use this as the underlying theme for presenting
the Administration programs over the next two years -- a series of
programs that will lead to the decade of progress in reform, world
peace, domestic unity and accomplishment.
The Decade of Progress is a phrase that is positive, evocative, far-
seeing. It is broad enough to encompass the President's entire foreign
and domestic program. Certainly there are other phrases or concepts
that might do just as well, but the essential thing is to begin at once
with some theme that will build a sense of movement and direction in
the national consciousness. Whoever is said to have "won" the
election, there is no denying that considerable bitterness has ensued.
The Administration has taken on something of a negative look in many
people's minds admittedly much of this is the doing of our adversaries
and the media, but we have to deal with it nevertheless. The President
-7-
came in facing some dirty and totally uninspiring jobs -- end the
war, end inflation, end the crime wave. With a solid start now made
of all these fronts, the time is right to emphasize a spirit of beginning
and building, to talk in a more positive and long-range context.
The new theme can be introduced in such a way that no shifting of
gears will be apparent. We do not say, "Let us have a new decade
of progress, 11 but rather "America has begun a new decade of progress, 11
and then we tick off the areas in which beginnings have already been
made. This can be done quite naturally in the context of a mid-term
progress report to the American people. The "new decade" idea has
a mainly domestic thrust, but it also complements perfectly the
"generation of peace" note that the President sounded so effectively
in Europe, and it fits with the foreign aid reform, State of the World
message, and other foreign policy initiatives.
Specifics
I would make the following specific suggestions:
Short Run -- November, December
The President should not move abruptly.
1.
Press Conference
The President should have one press conference
before the end of the year. This should be held
after Thanksgiving, perhaps the first week of
December (December 2nd.)
2.
Major Addresses
The President should give one major address
wherein he outlines his goals for the future of
the country. The address should be compatable
with the State of the Union but not as specific.
It could be philosophical. The National Association
of Manufacturers would be the perfect forum.
-8-
3. Lame-Duck Session
The President should be only indirectly involved
in the Lame-Duck session, addressing himself
to general concepts of such things as welfare
reform. We should allow the leadership,
Cabinet members and White House staff (Finch,
Ehrlichman, Shultz) to deal with the detailed
legislative debate.
The blatant partisan changes that are likely to
come should be ignored by the White House.
We should hold our fire and not get into a
rhetorical debate with our Senate critics.
This should include the Vice President. Our
critics will be trying to draw us in and we
should stay aloof from them.
The President should devote his time to
solidifying his support in the Senate in
meetings with the convervative and moderate
and liberal factions of the Senate.
4. Travel
The President should not travel before the
first of the year except of course to Florida
for the post Thanksgiving period and to
California for the post Christmas period.
The trip to New York for the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers dinner should be the
only other exception.
Long Range
1.
Media Relations
We should follow basically the same strategy, i.e.
the President should remain somewhat aloof and
avoid frequent and personal contacts with the press.
-9-
I do suggest the following:
A. Press conference
The President should hold one East Room
televised press conference a month and one
in-office press conference on three week
intervals.
The advantages of this are many -- the
President sets the line and the tone for the
Administration. Administration spokesmen
can then bridge off his words.
The President's proven ability to handle these
sessions and the tremendous effect they have
bodes well for following this pattern.
The TV sessions allow the country to see the
President in charge.
The in-office press conference serves our
purpose in two ways: It gets the President's
line out but it also lets the press in a little
closer to the President -- but not too close.
It must be remembered the President can and
does control these sessions, despite what
some say to the contrary.
B. Media contacts
Television
We should cease immediately the Colson type
contact. Klein and myself should increase
our sessions with the network heads and
commentators. More can be accomplished
through "friendly persuasion" based on
mutual trust than can be accomplished by
intimidation of the networks.
-10-
As a part of this effort it would be most
worthwhile for the President to meet with
the network heads periodically after the
first of the year for general discussion
and acquaintance session.
We have a lot to overcome to stabilize our
relations with the networks -- today they do not
trust us. They resent us and emotionally
react against us.
No Administration ever gets what they consider a
fair break from the news media. We perhaps suffer
from this more than most. It is my feeling, however,
that the way to deal with this adversary is not to
confront him head on -- this only gives excuse to
their sometimes bias -- but to outsmart him. One
never outsmarts the enemy by running at him head-on.
The White House staff should meet more freely and
openly with White House regulars. For example,
instead of just sitting back and decrying a negative
report, let's feed him information that he will have
to use.
HRH can be very effective at this.
2. Use of Cabinet and Vice President
Cabinet
The Cabinet should be revitalized, built and used.
Today it is nothing more than a ceremonial body.
I would suggest that the Cabinet not only meet more
regularly but that they talk programs and substance
and after the meeting on occasion -- the Cabinet
officers be put before the press to sell and lobby for
his programs.
Individual meetings should be set up more often with
Cabinet members and the President and then let them
go before the press.
-11-
Example:
Cabinet meeting could be held this week --
discuss status of appropriations, FAP, etc.
Richardson, Schultz and perhaps Finch
could go before press -- this would be a
good news story
shows President involved
but also Cabinet in there fighting for our programs.
Vice President
I would not attempt to evaluate the effect of the Vice
President's activities and statements over the past
year and a half
it is my opinion, however, that
he has built a base of support which is constant and
will not expand even if he continues to follow the
same pattern.
Therefore the Vice President's role should be shifted
from that of an outspoken, controversial critic of
our society to a hard-working builder of our society,
one who takes up the legislative oar and speaks to
and works for thoseprograms that will build The Decade
of Progress.
3. Relations with Congress
We should be aloof to their criticism and statesmanlike
and conciliatory to them personally.
We understand the Legislative process and two party
system. They can do the screening and we will do the
building.
4. Travel
The President should continue to go to the country.
However the staff should take on the responsibility of only
presenting him in a dignified Presidential setting. This
does not mean elimination of motorcades and crowds.
It's the handling of the situation we should address ourselves to.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Safire
WASHINGTON
November 11, 1970.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
From: Bill Safire
Re
: Approaches to 1972
Postine
I. President's Posture Thru '71
All that can be heard among friends and foes alike is how the
President must soften his image, return to being President and
not candidate, lower his voice. stop shaking his fist. etc., as
if windup off-year campaign activity were planned year-round.
We would do well to dismiss the straw man of stridency and
examine how best to protray the President as what he is:
He'is not now, and never likely to become, a beloved figure of
benignity, and it would be a mistake to attempt to strike such
a pose.
He is not a man who believes that national unity is a prerequisite
to progress; instead, he has pointed out that progress comes
first, and then will lead to a form of unity, or at least a reduction
in the level of bitterness.
Thus, his posture should be that of a man willing to fight for the
kind of progress for which the time is ripe, The representative
of "all the people" must not play it so cool as to refuse to do
battle for their interests, and those interests are controversial.
The posture for '71 cannot be unitarian, apolitical, ameliorating,
lofty - - the posture of a Chairman of the Board.
-2-
The posture should be firm, calm, decisive, certain of where
he wants to take the country and willing to damn the torpedoes
to get there the posture of a President.
I agree with the conventional wisdom that the President must
appear "Presidential, " but I do not define that word to mean
soothing and not-boat-rocking, as some do I think it means
surefooted and certain about goals, reserving final judgment
to history.
Needed for this now is an Order of Battle: a clearly under-
stood line of priorities in both legislation and administration.
Iday
We should begin twisting arms and publicly fighting for the
Family Assistance package. The controversy on the right will
position us firmly in the center, and we will have something
to crow about that is epochal.
We should have a tough-minded state of the union that lays out
the great choices that cannot be avoided next year (cut inflation
or have full employment at once, spend more on education or
insist on reform, take chances on defense with big cuts or push
the Nixon Doctrine of peace through strength) and makes the
decisions and sells them persuasively. Recognize the controversy
and address it soberly and rationally rather than obfuscate it.
We should have a fresh, new high-priority program for next
year. Health will be the issue; the Domestic Council is now
working on a big health proposal; this should be given the major
push for 1971.
Above all, we should not try to produce a "new image;" the
general impression of the first two years is a good one to build
on. We should press our strengths: Surefootedness in foreign
affairs (driving home its meaning to Ame ricans at home in terms
of no more war and no more draft) and placing the public interest
ahead of the special interests (where there is much more work to
be done showing how we are bringing about a genuine prosperity).
-3-
Every posture to be effective must have a single underlying
Have
theme into which all others are fitted. In RN's case it is this:
He is the single indispensable force toward bringing about a
full generation of peace.
II. One Possible Picture in the Summer of 1972
a. All the troops home from Southeast Asia; draft ended;
non-Communist regime of some type still in Saigon.
b. Middle East still troublesome, but new truce in effect.
C. SALT talks moderately successful, but defense spending
on rise again because of Soviet conventional buildup and Chinese
nuclear buildup.
d. Crime rate in US stabilized, but still rising.
e. Continued extremist bombings and acts of terror, in-
cluding kidnappings.
f. Inflation rate between four and five per cent.
g. Unemployment rate around five per cent.
h. Real GNP growth rate about four per cent.
i. Interest rates below 7%, housing booming.
j. Budget 15 billion in deficit, President urging spending
restraint.
k. Environment still an issue, but losing appeal.
1. Presidential approval rating about 50%, having dipped
under but recovered strongly after Summit meeting.
m. Wallace a factor again, stronger on Huey Long populism
this time.
-4-
n. Lindsay-Gardner fourth party effort negative, now behind
Democrats.
O. Dems to nominate a centrist like Muskie or Kennedy, with
a Southerner for Vice President. Gallup Poll shows President
slightly ahead, Harris substantially behind.
p. Family Assistance Plan checks beginning to go out
nationally with big Demo push for increases.
III. If the foregoing is 70% accurate, the Democratic campaign
themes will be:
a. End violence by "bringing us together" -- without divisive
President.
b. End inflation with some form of controls.
C. "Get the country moving again" -- faster growth, full
employment.
d. Divert defense dollars to meet human needs at home.
e. Massive health and education aid.
f. Time for a change.
IV. Our likely Appeals:
a. Peace without Surrender.
b. Prosperity without War.
c. Confidence in the President as President.
V. The Weakness in our Appeals:
a. Peace without Surrender. Biggest weakness here is "What
have you done for me lately?" Churchill did a fine job in World
War II, but then it was time for Labour. Peace is a powerful
promise in time of war or in threat of war (Wilson in 1916: He
-5-
Kept Us Out of War) but it loses potency in time of peace.
Ironically, the achievement of peace is a wasting political
asset: The more secure the peace, the less gratitude goes to
thos who bring it about. Besides, gratitude for past success
is the thinnest reed to lean on in politics.
b. Prosperity Without War. ("Oh, there he goes about the
war again. Took him three years to get out, and there are
still millions unemployed. ") Inflation is always an attacker's
issue, and a turn in the rate of increase is a purely intellectual
defense -- bread costs more, and that's what counts. People
will still remember the boomtime of the Sixties and forget the
war causes and hope for the kind of soaring markets and full
employment of those days.
C. Thus, we will be playing Republican basic strength (keep
out of war) at a time when that issue will be losing its gut appeal,
while the Democrats will be playing their strength (good times
with the party of the people) at a time when their issue will be
gaining in appeal.
d. Meanwhile, the social issue -- personal security, resent-
ment at redistribution of wealth and power by Washington fiat --
will be somewhat blunted by our incumbency. The aginners are
agin the Ins. On the whole, we will continue to benefit from our
concern with the Forgotten American, but not to the extent of
slicing deeply into the labor vote, or in decimating Wallace.
e. Confidence in the President as President -- the power of
the incumbency -- will continue to be an asset. Undecideds will
tend to play it safe with the President they know. But the news
f ocus in 1972 will all be on the selection of the Democratic
nominee; his campaign organization will be blooded and freshly
tested; and he will go into the campaign with the momentum of a
convention victory and the mantle of new solutions to all our problems.
How, then, should we plan now to make our own appeals unbeatable?
-6-
VI. The Peace Theme
a. The President has already sounded the tocsin for "a full
generation of peace 11 This cannot be allowed to be dropped as
only a 70 campaign phrase -- it is a phrase central to his Ad-
ministration, and must be repeated and reprised by all
Administration spokesmen. It should be the title of a USIA
documentary; of a book of Nixon foreign policy speeches; of a
Kissinger article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly; of Rogers speeches
and a Reader's Diget byliner. The Full Generation of Peace should
be worked into the Bicentennial planning, it should be the theme
of the Christmas Tree lighting and of Christmas sermons across
the country; it should also be the new theme of the White House
Conference on Children and Youth, because they are the ones who
will enjoy it indeed, they will be the "generation of peace" as
we succeed.
This phrase has in it what the Silent Majority, the Forgotten
American, the New Federalism and Forward Together never had
a specific, realizable promise of hope. When we in the Administration
are completely tired of it, we will know that we have just begun to
get it across, and we should then redouble our efforts. This is our
own "war to end wars" and we must not let it go.
b. Punctuating the Peace. We cannot permit peace to limp
in unheralded, causing people to wonder retrospectively, "When
did the war end?" Absent a break in negotiations and a formal
truce-signing, we must create a war's ending of our own. One
time for this would be when the last combat troops left in Vietnam
come home next spring -- there should be a national parade, in
six cities, with veterans of the war marching alongside the last
detachment of troops coming home. Then the following year, when
the last of the remaining troops come home, we should declare
"Homecoming Day" with appropriate festivities.
C. Arms Control. The average American has only the vaguest
idea of what the SALT talks are. Any form of success there, which
we would consider of the greatest significance, would be greeted by
a pleased yawn by the general public.
-7-
It may be that we have not played up their significance because
of the possibility of stalemate; if, however, there develops a
likelihood of even partial success, we should dramatize it with a
Presidential visit to Vienna and formal signing of Stage I with
Soviet leaders.
Such a ceremony would at once be contrasted with the Kennedy-
Khrushchev debacle in the same city, and the summit meeting would
be limited to one subject with success foreordained, A subsequent
full-range summit would be possible at a later date.
The political tail cannot be made to wag the diplomatic dog,
but if progress is forthcoming, we should recognize the fact that
the meaning of SALT has not yet begun to permeate the public
consciousness, and plan for a much wider understanding of what
it means for defense spending and the likelihood of peace.
d. The President as Peacemaker. There was a sign in
Illinois that Ollie Atkins got a picture of: "Welcome, Mr. Peace. "
This is the sign that must appear everywhere in 1972, without
our inducement; the President should become known next year as
"Mr. Peace. " At a commencement speech next June he should
be introduced as such, not by a university president but by a
student. This, of course, can never be officially sponsored or
used by Administration officials, but it should be welcome d when
used by supporters. In this way, the President will be the
personification of lasting peace. (The use of the term "Mister"
can be highly effective: RN used it in his nomination of Goldwater
in taking him from "Mr. Conservative" to "Mr. Republican" to
"Mr. President". ) Mr. Peace. of course leaves all other Misters
behind. It is a sobriquet that will ring true as he actually brings
the world closer to peace and specifically ends our involvement in
a war.
e. The President as Peacekeeper. The preservation of peace,
in these times, requires a strong defense. "Only a Strong America
can Keep the Peace" should be the theme with which we confront
those who would slash the defense budget; "penny-wise and lives
foolish" is what we call those who invite war through US weakness.
Evocations of Wilson, FDR and Truman on preparedness necessary.
-8-
We must bridge the gap between making the peace and keeping
the peace to overcome the "what have you done for me lately"
syndrome. The threat of war will be real after Vietnam; we
cannot allow a complacency to settle in, or an attitude to develop
that says "You did just fine at what you are best at (ending a war),
now let's give the Democrats a chance to do what they re best
at (ending unemployment). "
Despite summits, despite possible detentes, we must continually
point out the continuing dnager to the peace that requires a
vigilant, strong President to counter. There is nothing phony
about this: The threat will exist, and it is proper national policy
to make sure the public knows it. The temptation to say "we've
made peace" should be resisted, and replaced with "we've taken
the first step -- now the next steps are all-important. 11
VII. Prosperity Without War
If we do pretty well in slowing inflation and pretty well in reducing
unemployment, we could still lose on this issue because (a) it is
always attackable as "not enough" and (b) the Democrats have
greater public confidence as the party of boom.
Therefore, we merchandise all we do here not only as precedent-
shattering (nobody really cares about how tough it was for us to
do) but in terms of how much better off the average man is and in
what danger he would be in if the reckless types go t in again.
To the workingman, our sell should be "You never got a real
raise in the Sixties, but you did get a real raise in the Seventies
and even bigger real raises are in store. 11
On unemployment, much as this distresses the purists, we must
break away from the old way of figuring unemployment. Total
unemployment is a phony figure, since "full" employment starts
just under 4% -- but 4% unemployed sounds too much like a lot of
people out of work involuntarily, and is too easy a political
target. The only unemployment figure that counts is breadwinner
unemployment -- married men -- and that is a figure that must be
-9-
established as "priority unemployment" and that is the figure
we can expect to see heading downward in '71 and '72. There
will be screams of rage, but let us change the basis for com-
parison we have a good case to make, economists know it,
and it is about time we began judging our efforts in terms of
"real" unemployment and setting aside part-timers, teenagers,
voluntarily unemployed job-hunters and the rest.
Another aspect of unemployment we must remember is this: It
is not so much the number of unemployed that gets the news play,
it is the direction of the trend. It is better politically for a 5.5
rate to drop to 5.0 in 1972 than for a 4. 0 rate to rise to 4. 5.
Thus, it is not only economically right for us to take our lumps
early next year, but it is politically right as well.
The stock market is important politically. It would be far
better for it to sit for a while and then begin a long climb
starting toward the end of next year. It will go up when money
is easier to borrow and investors are convinced that you are
determined to see good times in '72, with a sound basis laid
for a genuine prosperity in '73. For that reason we should not
seek to change the game plan now it would appear to be a
panic result of the '72 elections. We suffered this year for
doing the right thing, now let'sget the nourishment out of it in '72.
One selling theme in '71 should be "at last you can make plans
for the future. 11 We have a relatively stable dollar, and we're
chipping away at breadwinner unemployment this spells real
security at last. Another theme should be "prosperity for all
the people" reminding the fixed-income people how they
suffered in Democratic "prosperity. 11
To get this across, the President should do some fireside chats
in 1971 -- FDR's fireside chats were almost always on the
subject of the economy, and they gave people the impression he
was getting something good done against great obstades. The
speeches were not simplistic: he flattered the public by talking a
little over their heads on economic affairs. The important thing
is not to thoroughly educate, but to instill confidence that we're
moving right along and things are steadily getting better.
-10-
This area, I think, is where the Vice President and the Cabinet
should spend a lot of time. Not right away - the message will
not sustain two years of banging away, no message will. But
as soon as a turn becomes more evident in 1971, we should begin
to hit hard on how right we were, and how wrong were those who
would have turned the nation toward rationing and black markets.
(Note: We should never talk about "controls" which are popular;
the results of controls are not, and we should concentrate on
them. )
VIII. Use of the Vice President
The VP doesn't need selling to his supporters, for he can do no
wrong in their eyes; nor can he be forgiven by committed
partisan Democrats he tagged with "radical liberal. 11
To widen his support in the middle, we must overcome the
sloughing-off of him as a joke by some. The attack on him that
would sway many people is not so much that he is a divider (the
other side of that coin is that he is a scrapper and a fighter for
his beliefs, which will gain him affection) but that he is ludicrous.
So: no more big words, no more alliterative flourishes, and no
more jokes about him by other members of the Administration,
even about golf.
He is an "homme serieux" and should undertake a series of
speeches and articles probing social concerns at great length and
with profound seriousness. In this way, he would not be backing
off his image of the stern pointer-outer of defects in the body
politic, but he would be much harder to attack as inconsequential
or frivolous. His views would have to be countered by long and
sobersided tracts, and we should seek out print "debates" on the
counterculture, on apathy, on elitism, on the real meaning of
intellectualism, on the future of federalism and the like.
It may get a little boring, and it will not make the front pages as
much, and it will require the hiring of a good, deep thinker-writer
to help out, but it will fit philosophically and it will let some wounds
heal over time. By '72, he will be stronger than ever for a
political campaign.
"Lying low" would be a mistake; digging deep would be the most
productive course.
-11-
IX. The White House Glow
Image
1971 should be a year of expanded social, cultural and educational
activity in the White House itself. It should be the center of news-
worthy activity and a frequent dateline, especially with TV film
coverage of innovative events.
We already have a plan ready to go on a series of White House
lectures by eminent historians and political scientists to an
Administration audience every third week in the East Room.
This will take a minimum of Presidential time (perhaps two
welcomes in the entire series) and be a source of continuing
stories.
We should have at least one Duke-Ellington-type night a month.
For each Irving Berlin salute, there should be a Burt Bacharach
salute; for each Bob Hope or Jackie Gleason, there should be
more modern comics to poke fun at ourselves; for each "1776"
there should be a non-musical dramatic presentation, from both
on and off Broadway.
The guests at these functions should no longer be limited to fat
cats or Administration staff or old friends; they should include
TV news editors, society columnists from Detroit and Los
Angeles who have never been to a White House function, sports
reporters and columnists at functions honoring sports greats, etc.
One of our troubles is that we try something new, it works, and
then we drop it before it has a cumulative impact. Case in point:
The astronauts dinner in Los Angeles. We should do at least
four major state dinners in cities around the nation next year,
bringing the full panoply of pomp and circumstance into action
in different regions. It will have ten times the impact it gets in
Washington and locations and invitations can be picked for the
greatest mileage.
Our goal is not recapture Camelot, or to exude a chi-chi image;
our aim should be to reflect the excitement of a spectrum of
American life and make sure that reflection is adequately disseminated.
The war is ending. Let's turn on the lights.
-12-
X. Focus for Hope and Idealism
The Bicentennial Commission, after a year of horsing around, is
beginning to come to grips with a plan for the years leading up to
1976.
The President should identify himself as interested in this project
and be the center of two events as yet unplanned: Thomas
Jefferson's birthday on April 13 and the Fourth of July 1971. A
speech about the full generation of peace from the steps of the
Jefferson Memorial, and an event on the Fourth of July in
Philadelphia should bring into focus the President's ideas about
what he wants for the nation and what he thinks the American
spirit is all about.
We have posed all kinds of questions in our "national goals"
report; the President should begin answering them next year.
In addition, at least one of the President's daughters should be-
come closely associated withthe Commission's activities as
they begin to generate interest.
The White House Conference on Children and Youth can also be a
springboard for our concern with idealism and the American future.
The President should give a formal speech here and then make
some surprise visits to smaller seminars to listen as well as
speak. Out of this conference should grow a National Youth Service,
a project RN promised in the '68 campaign, and one which can
channel some energies into worthwhile projects based on voluntarism.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Ehelichna
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
RE
THE ELECTION AND THE NEAR FUTURE
I.
Analysis of the President's election efforts
We have a ball which must be played from where it lies. Or,
rather, from where the media has ma de it appear to be.
The weekend TV and press and last week's newsmagazines
establish a common theme: The Vice President's efforts were
fruitless and, in fact, turned off many undecided voters.
The President discovered from polls that Republicans were in
danger of serious defeat and decided to campaign all-out. The
Senate victories were the President's. Lack of further victory
was, say the media, because the line adopted by the Republicans
was negative, founded on fear, divisive, etc.
Many contrasts between your Phoenix speech and Muskie's rebuttal
are being featured.
The comparison puts you on the political path and Muskie on
statesman street.
The net result: A gain in the Senate for two years and a short-run
p.r. loss for the Administration. The concerned media criticism
probably won't be very sustained. The election is not the public's
favorite subject at this point.
-2-
II.
Posture the President should maintain
postue
A.
November and December 1970
During the next 60 days everyting possible should be done to
ce-establish the public attitude toward the President and
counter the media's negative barrage.
We should pre-empt the statesman's high road image from
Muskie, et al.
For instance, such devices as a Thanksgiving service at the
White House, a visit to West Point for a Saturday parade, a
visit with HHH and wife to welcome them back (builds him,
shows magnanimity, appeals to the independent), a TV special
on a state visit, allowing film of the whole thing, the schedule
should be constructed to hit this theme.
A press conference is past due, will permit you to occupy the
high ground on questions of interest and has maximum visibility.
You can dispel the false media image, direct to the people
(Political)
The image being developed for the Democrats as being "resurgent"
should be demolished, For example, they owe $9 million. We
should cause them to be sued by dozens of creditors. Byrd should
be encouraged indirectly to oppose EMK for Whip.
B. Year 1971 Tactics
1.
Fireside chats
1972 will be a political year. 1971 is, therefore, the most credible
time for a series of talks, low key, on issues of the day. The
expressed purpose will be to help people understand better the
Nation's defense requirements, the problems of the economy,
tax and budget problems, etc.
There is, I feel, a strong national demand for this kind of
"leadership" by the President. A poll on this question might
be a good idea.
-3-
2.
Speeches on the issues
Accept invitations providing a forum for speeches which are
actually position papers on central domestic issues.
3.
Take government to the people
Hold Cabinet or Council meetings around the country but permit
them to be televised live. This will require some extraordinary
preparation but should pay real dividends.
4.
The National Parks tou
1971 is the right year for this.
5.
An image of probity, open-mindedness, interest
in people and their individual problems (e.g., we are concerned
change
about the man and his family who are out of work VS. "the problem
of unemployment"), the foreign policy and defense expert, the
statesman, the family man, the man who has brought down crime
in the District of Columbia; interpreter of the issues, expert
in management of government.
But, primarily, The President in all aspects. Never the
individual, the party leader or any other narrow role. Never
an action, an event or a comment that is non-Presidential. Yet,
at the same time, Presidential by presumption, indirection
and inference, never by self-serving statement or action.
To be avoided are first-party references to the power of the
Presidency. These are widely misinterpreted as self-serving,
regardless of context.
media
III.
Relationship to the Media
It should be merely correct. Continue to never let them use you;
never let them create a useful issue needlessly.
Force their coverage to be favorable by careful planning.
Be subtle in rewarding friends and cutting enemies among the press.
Be Presidential about it, never petty or partisan.
Do press conferences about once a month. It's your very best
platform. It's highly Presidential.
-4-
IV.
Use of the Vice President and Cabinet
The Vice President is "used merchandise" just now and needs
a few victories in agreeable areas. Some might be:
Veterans' health care
Reading
Water pollution
Mexican-Americans and Indians
Customs and immigration procedures
Labor
Relations with Canada
National Parks
Better use of Federal land
Signs along highways
Cancer/Heart research
He tells me his strong suit is politics, not the issues. I strongly
disagree. If he sticks to the merely partisan he will quickly
lose all credibility and will end up with a narrow, vocal following
of small influence.
eab.
The Cabinet should continue to be treated as "the family" and
as a speaker's bureau.
As said above, a televised Cabinet meeting or two, out of town,
where an issue is thoroughly discussed live and in color would
be effective and would focus on Presidential leadership.
V.
Relationship with Congress
Long
Presidential, Constitutional, as non-political as is possible.
Your effective power over Congress is your ability to unleash
public opinion. You have this power because you are everyone's
President, and for only that reason.
Thus, to be effective, you must build that particular capacity.
You should "go to the people" as frequently as there are key
Congressional issues on which you must act.
-5-
Generally, either sign or veto (not let a bill become law
without signature).
Consider the use of a sign-board tally of Congressional over-
spending.
Entertain Congressional families rather than just the Members.
It precludes much business talk and makes a most lasting
favorable impression on the Congressman.
Organize task forces of the younger Congressmen to give them
intensive schooling on some key issues:
- taxation
-- revenue sharing
-- wage and price controls
-- environment
so they can speak, write and fight for our position in these areas.
George Shultz and I will give you a schedule of our dinners we
are going to have with Senators and Representatives this Fall.
You might pick an early one to drop-by (here in the West Wing).
This word will get around and give them greater significance
without your actually being at any others.
SUMMARY
For the entire two years (November 1970 - November 1972), you
must always be the President, never a politician, never a
candidate, never anything else.
It is the high ground, and we must never let anyone else get
close to it.
All of your instincts and predispositions will impel you to
become a candidate or, at least, a manager of the campaign.
I think that would be dangerous, indeed fatal. It would move
you from a position of strength and broad appeal to one of
relative weakness.
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When Nixon organizations in the states are formed and
are discovered by the press you should never comment on
them or have personal contact with them. Others may do
these political things but you are President of everyone --
especially the non-political, non-partisan citizen (who is
more inclined to vote for a man than a party or political
organization).
Only at the 11th hour in 1972 will you move to partisan campaigning
and then as President, asking for a personal mandate in re-election.
****
THE WHITE HOUSE
Notagica
WASHINGTON
November 10, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Lyn Nofziger
R
In Response to Request from H. R. Haldeman
1. The President's Election Efforts. I believe his decision to help
was 100 percent correct. I believe the average American appreciates
a fighter and a man who is loyal to those under him. Too often, loyalty
is thought of as a one-way thing from the troops to the leader.
The President has made loyalty a two-way street; it will pay-off in the
long run.
I think there is some merit to some of the second-guessing. First,
instead of making Vietnam pretty much of a nonissue, it is possible
we could have made it more our issue, although, in Tennessee where
Brock did it, he didn't win SO big. Secondly, everyone I have talked to
says Muskie won the Monday night TV presentations. The criticism of
our presentation has been that our production was poor technically and
that Muskie came off as the reasonable man.
Overall, however, I believe the President's campaigning was a tremendous
plus. I believe the question to be asked of the critics is: Would you
have had him do less? The fact is, if he had done less and if the Democrats
had won more, they would have been kicking him around for not having
done enough.
The image of the President now is of a fighter. That is not a bad image;
it is one that breeds respect. If we equivocate, we lose that respect.
2. The President's Posture. It has to be one of continue to fight for
Pot
the things and principles in which he believes. I do not think he needs
any change in his modus operandi. However, a sterner public stance
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toward inflationary actions by both business and labor might be helpful,
for the fact remains that most employed persons are not members of
unions.
Cong
His posture with Congress should be one of wanting to work with Congress,
but at the same time absolutely refusing to surrender to it. I believe
it is better to fight and lose than not to fight because win or lose the
buck always winds up on his desk.
3. Relations With The Media. My feeling is that the President should
have more televised press conferences.
meda
1. He handles them well. Each one to date has been a plus.
2. The media is going to beat him over the head with this
issue, saying he is afraid to face them and/or that he is
denying the public the right to know.
3. He will eventually reach the point where, when he has a
press conference, the media will say that he knuckled
under to pressure.
4. All told, the scarcity of press conferences is creating
an anti-Nixon issue which we don't need.
5. I don't think we need one every week, but certainly once
every 4-6 weeks is not unreasonable from our point of
view. It is infrequent enough to keep the press unhappy
but frequent enough so they don't have an issue.
I like the idea of meeting with small groups of friendly columnists from
time to time. I think it should be extended to small groups of friendly
reporters who write for individual papers. For instance, Jack Jarrell
from the Omaha World Herald; Ray McHugh from Copley, Lou Hiner
from Pulliam, George Embrey from the Columbus Dispatch, and others.
I do not believe in rewarding the President's enemies in the media; it
does not make friends of them.
4. Use Of The Vice President And The Cabinet.
VP
The Vice President. The Vice President, I think, has functioned
effectively. However, recognizing always that he and we are up against
a hostile media, his effectiveness can be nullified if he is used solely
as a "hatchetman" because he will be labeled as such. Obviously, we
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need a hatchetman, but he should not be exposed as the only one. The
National Chairman should carry a much larger share of this burden in
the future. At the same time, the Vice President should be given some
positive assignments during the next year to year and a half, so that
he will be more effective when he takes the stump in 1972. Considera-
tion might be given to making him the major day-to-day spokesman on
domestic affairs, thus taking some of this burden from the President.
The Cabinet. From p.r. and political standpoints, the Cabinet is a
weak one. For instance, not one has aroused enough excitement to be
considered in the press today as a possible successor to the Vice
President or a possible Presidential nominee, The only one who has
built any kind of a political name is Hickle, who did it in opposition to
the President. It is obvious that they cannot all run around getting
headlines, but we might consider arbitrarily picking two or three of
them, and set out to build their political images so they can be used
effectively in 1972 and thereafter. I do not believe we should leave
the building of strong party spokesmen to chance. The President can
build two or three Cabinet officers and half a dozen members of the
Congress, but it must be a deliberately planned and executed effort.
It must be a continuing thing.
Regardless, I believe all members of the Cabinet should continue to
be utilized on a programmed basis, and be provided with political
speaking engagements and political input. We need not only to sell
the President, but also to sell the Administration. If we minimize
the issues for the Democrats we minimize their chances, regardless
of who their candidate is.
5. Relationships With Congress. Relationships with the Congress have
gotten better as this Administration has become more familiar with the
attitudes of Congressmen of both Houses. A never-ending effort is
needed, however, to keep relations good. I believe the President al-
ready is accessible to members to about the maximum. However, we
should assure that senior staff members and Cabinet and subcabinet
should also be accessible and cooperative, especially where Republicans
are involved. I cannot see any reason to do anything drastically dif-
ferent, but I believe our people must be kept continually aware of the
need to be accessible and courteous. even if we can't do anything for
the individual Congressman at the time.
Dave
6. Presidential Travel. I believe there should be as much as possible
without it appearing that the President is neglecting his duties.
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1. It takes the government to the people and this should be
the approach.
2. It counters the "isolation" charge which may be phony
but which must be countered.
3. It builds confidence in the people when they see that the
President can move about with impunity. It is good for
the country, and if the President is doing something that is
good for the country it is good for him.
7. The New York Election. It is apparent that the Buckley victory was
a Republican victory; not a Conservative victory. The Conservative
Party was poorly structured, and there was much internal bickering.
As a result the Buckley campaign was staffed, organized and run largely
by Republicans. The Conservative vote in New York is largely a dis-
sident Republican vote. I would suggest wrapping Jim Buckley close
to this Administration, in the hopes that we can use him to build a
strong middle-of-the-road base for the New York Republican Party,
with which we can wrest the Party from the liberals four years from
now. I think we can do better by bringing the Conservatives back into
a middle-of-the-road Republican Party then we can by creating a
permanent three-party situation there.
8. The Negative Aspects Of The Next Two Years. I believe, still, that
more people vote against than vote for. I believe we must, therefore,
begin actively to collect and disseminate information that will give
people reasons to vote against Muskie, Kennedy or whoever the Democratic
nominee for President may be. I believe we must do the same thing in
the key Senatorial races.
Our perennial weaknesses have been:
1. poor research
2. poor use of research
3. failure to attack on a continuing basis; people forget easily
We must say again and again and again that Muskie is a polluter, that
he is already running for President, that he has no standing in the
Senate, etc. We must never let the public forget Chappaquidick, or that
there is insanity in Tunney's family, or that Stevenson, McGovern and
Ramsey Clark are cop-haters. We must magnify and repeat the stories
of their every mistake and misstep.
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This will take: 1) good research; 2) a few spokesmen who are willing
to attack regardless of the cries of outrage; 3) a continuing dissemination
of this stuff to the media and through the media. We must begin now
in all areas.