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THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS WASHINGTON CONFIDENTIAL May 17, 1971 THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: The Recent International Monetary Disturbances and Some Suggestions The economic Policy Committee of the OECD met in Paris last week, and I had agreed to be in Brussels one day also. I found myself, therefore, in a position at first hand to observe reactions to the international monetary turbulence. In various discussions I tried to make certain basic points. 1. The D-mark and Dutch guilder have been allowed to "float" to a small premium, and the Swiss franc and the Austrian schilling were appreciated moderately. To call this a devaluation of the dollar is to use language loosely. One could just as well allude to a devaluation of the French franc, the pound, or the Japanese yen. Moreover, the four countries who changed their exchange rates account for roughly 11 percent of the developed world's GNP. To say that the currencies of those who account for the other 89 percent were devalued is to suggest that the tail wags the dog. 2. The heavy flow of funds was originally induced by differences in interest rates here and in Germany. Germany, with an overheated economy, was pursuing tight monetary policies, and the U.S., with domestic economic slack, was pursuing more expansionist policies. Interest-sensitive funds began to move into Germany. This calmed down in down in April, but comments by Giscard d'Estaing of France and Karl Schiller of Germany seemed to set a tidal wave going in early May. Was the original movement the "fault" of the U.S. or Germany? This is a frequently asked question, but it is the wrong one. The real question is: "What is the problem?" After all when two people are not in step, who is out of step? DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6 MR NLM 96-7 By WID NARA, Date 9/3/96