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1969 Wiretaps
By mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive
foreign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam,
achieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and
establishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved
highly secret diplomacy. They were closely interrelated. Leaks of
secret information about any one could endanger all.
Exactly that happened. News accounts appeared in 1969, which were
obviously based on leaks -- some of them extensive and detailed -- by
people having access to the most highly classified security materials.
WIRETARS
There was no way to carry forward these diplomatic initiatives
unless further leaks could be prevented. This required finding the
source of the leaks.
In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in
mid-1969 and terminated in February, 1971. Fewer than 20 taps, of
varying duration, were involved. They produced important leads that
made it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials.
I authorized this entire program. Each individual tap was undertaken
in accordance with procedures legal at the time and in accord with
long-standing precedent.
The persons who were subject to these wiretaps were determined
through coordination among the Director of the FBI, my Assistant
for National Security Affairs, and the Attorney General. Those
wiretapped were selected on the basis of access to the information
leaked, material in security files, and evidence that developed as
the inquiry proceeded.
Information thus obtained was made available to senior officials
responsible for national security matters in order to curtail further
leaks.
The 1970 Intelligence Plan
In the spring and summer of 1970, another security problem reached
critical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions
struck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats in
one.24-hour period in New York City. Rioting and violence on college
campuses reached a new peak after the Cambodian operation and the
tragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The 1969-70 school year
brought nearly 1800 campus demonstrations, and nearly 250 cases of
arson on campus. Many colleges closed. Gun battles between guerrilla-
style groups and police were taking place. Some of the disruptive
activities were receiving foreign support.
Complicating the task of maintaining security was the fact that, in 1966,
certain types of undercover FBI operations that had been conducted for
many years had been suspended. This also had substantially impaired
our ability to collect foreign intelligence information. At the same time,
the relationships between the FBI and other intelligence agencies had been
deteriorating. By May, 1970, FBI Director Hoover shut off his agency's
liaison with the CIA altogether.
On June 5, 1970, I met with the Director of the FBI (Mr. Hoover), the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Mr. Richard Helms), the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (General Donald V. Bennett)
and the Director of the National Security Agency (Admiral Noel Gayler).
We discussed the urgent need for better intelligence operations. I
appointed Director Hoover as chairman of an interagency committee to
prepare recommendations.
(MORE)
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"ocrText": "-2-\n1969 Wiretaps\nBy mid-1969, my Administration had begun a number of highly sensitive\nforeign policy initiatives. They were aimed at ending the war in Vietnam,\nachieving a settlement in the Middle East, limiting nuclear arms, and\nestablishing new relationships among the great powers. These involved\nhighly secret diplomacy. They were closely interrelated. Leaks of\nsecret information about any one could endanger all.\nExactly that happened. News accounts appeared in 1969, which were\nobviously based on leaks -- some of them extensive and detailed -- by\npeople having access to the most highly classified security materials.\nWIRETARS\nThere was no way to carry forward these diplomatic initiatives\nunless further leaks could be prevented. This required finding the\nsource of the leaks.\nIn order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in\nmid-1969 and terminated in February, 1971. Fewer than 20 taps, of\nvarying duration, were involved. They produced important leads that\nmade it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials.\nI authorized this entire program. Each individual tap was undertaken\nin accordance with procedures legal at the time and in accord with\nlong-standing precedent.\nThe persons who were subject to these wiretaps were determined\nthrough coordination among the Director of the FBI, my Assistant\nfor National Security Affairs, and the Attorney General. Those\nwiretapped were selected on the basis of access to the information\nleaked, material in security files, and evidence that developed as\nthe inquiry proceeded.\nInformation thus obtained was made available to senior officials\nresponsible for national security matters in order to curtail further\nleaks.\nThe 1970 Intelligence Plan\nIn the spring and summer of 1970, another security problem reached\ncritical proportions. In March a wave of bombings and explosions\nstruck college campuses and cities. There were 400 bomb threats in\none.24-hour period in New York City. Rioting and violence on college\ncampuses reached a new peak after the Cambodian operation and the\ntragedies at Kent State and Jackson State. The 1969-70 school year\nbrought nearly 1800 campus demonstrations, and nearly 250 cases of\narson on campus. Many colleges closed. Gun battles between guerrilla-\nstyle groups and police were taking place. Some of the disruptive\nactivities were receiving foreign support.\nComplicating the task of maintaining security was the fact that, in 1966,\ncertain types of undercover FBI operations that had been conducted for\nmany years had been suspended. This also had substantially impaired\nour ability to collect foreign intelligence information. At the same time,\nthe relationships between the FBI and other intelligence agencies had been\ndeteriorating. By May, 1970, FBI Director Hoover shut off his agency's\nliaison with the CIA altogether.\nOn June 5, 1970, I met with the Director of the FBI (Mr. Hoover), the\nDirector of the Central Intelligence Agency (Mr. Richard Helms), the\nDirector of the Defense Intelligence Agency (General Donald V. Bennett)\nand the Director of the National Security Agency (Admiral Noel Gayler).\nWe discussed the urgent need for better intelligence operations. I\nappointed Director Hoover as chairman of an interagency committee to\nprepare recommendations.\n(MORE)"
}