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Iran/Arms Transaction: Geoffrey Kemp
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118565370
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Iran/Arms Transaction: Geoffrey Kemp
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
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1988-12-31
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1987
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: Geoffrey Kemp
Box: CFOA 1129
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
2/18/2014
File Folder
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: GEOFFREY KEMP
FOIA
S643
Box Number
CFOA 1129
SYSTEMATIC
18
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
164209
PAPER
ADDEDUM TO MEMO RE: KEMP
3
ND
B1
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
2/2/2019
WASHINGTON
Unclass: fied with
TOP SECRET Attachment
May 6, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
FROM:
PETER D. KEISLER
POK
SUBJECT:
Interview of Geoffrey Kemp
On April 20, 1987, Geoffrey Kemp was interviewed by Bud Hall
(House Select Committee), Dennis Teti (House Select Committee),
and Victoria Nourse (Senate Select Committee). Dean McGrath and
I attended the interview. The interview began at 4:30 p.m. and
ended at approximately 6:00 p.m.
Kemp said that he is currently employed as a Senior Associate at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where his job is
to write and think about international affairs. Kemp said that
he has been employed there for nine months, and prior to assuming
that position had been employed by Georgetown University for
eighteen months. Kemp said that he left the White House staff in
January of 1985, but noted that he had "physically left" right
after the November elections; he had accumulated several weeks of
leave, and January 1985 is simply when he received his last
paycheck.
Kemp said that he worked at the NSC staff from February of 1981
through December of 1984. He said that he served as Director for
Near East and South Asia, and in 1983 was promoted to Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He
noted that this promotion did not result in any change in his
responsibilities.
Kemp was asked who his "employees" were, and named Howard Teicher.
Kemp was asked whether he had done any work relating to the draft
NSDD on Iran. Kemp said that he had not, and that the NSDD had
been drafted after his time. Kemp said that the draft NSDD did
not seem to have reflected any of his ideas or recommendations,
but explained that he has never actually seen the draft, and
therefore does not know whether there might be some portions with
which he would agree, or some portions which might in fact have
drawn upon his thinking. Kemp said that he would not have
approved or concurred in the draft NSDD as it has been described.
Kemp said that he had worked while he was at the NSC to try to
establish better relations with groups trying to "make life
difficult for the Ayatollah.' Kemp said that any discussions
concerning arms shipments to Iran during his tenure were in one
- 2 -
of two contexts: either in the context of proposals to ship arms
to exile or dissident groups, or in the context of efforts to
stop the flow of arms to the Iranian government. Kemp said that
his reaction to what he read about the draft NSDD was "amaze-
ment." Kemp was asked whether he has spoken to Teicher since
news of the arms shipments became public. Kemp said that he
talked by telephone with Teicher in November of 1986, and has run
into him a couple of times since. Kemp said that they have never
discussed the draft NSDD. Kemp said that he initiated the
November 1986 phone call prior to appearing on the McNeil-Lehrer
show. Kemp said that he spoke to Teicher to see whether Teicher
could tell him anything that he might need or wish to know for
his television appearance. Kemp said that Teicher declined to
talk about the Iranian situation. Kemp said that this telephone
conversation occurred at the time when the story of the arms
shipments was just starting to break in the Middle East.
Kemp said that the last time he spoke with Teicher was in February
of 1987. Kemp said he asked Teicher what Teicher was doing, and
Teicher told Kemp that he was looking for a job. Kemp said that
Teicher has also called him to ask about job opportunities.
Kemp was asked to speculate on how the policy towards Iran could
have changed so drastically and so quickly. Kemp reiterated that
he has not read the draft NSDD, and therefore was not entirely
sure what it said. Kemp said that there were certain components
of that draft NSDD with which he agreed. Kemp said that all of
them at the NSC were concerned about the possibility that the
Soviet Union might have an entree into Iran if things went awry.
Kemp said that his amazement arose from the fact that this
concern was linked to changing our policy on supplying arms.
Kemp said that he did not understand how that change could have
happened, and said that it was totally contrary to what we had
been doing previously. Kemp said that the fact that the Iranians
were so desperate for advanced weapons was a ringing endorsement
of what we had already done.
Kemp was asked whether he had had any conversations with McFarlane
concerning the arms shipments to Iran. Kemp said that he had had
one such conversation during a party held just after Christmas.
Kemp said he had asked McFarlane about Secretary Shultz's posi-
tion on the disclosures, and about why Shultz was not "saying
more." Kemp said that McFarlane responded by saying "You know
Shultz, what else do you expect?" Kemp said that McFarlane
seemed depressed and lonely, and appeared to feel somewhat
betrayed by Shultz.
Kemp said that he first met North in the summer of 1981. Kemp
said that North had come over to the NSC right after the decision
was made to place Richard Allen in charge of the effort to lobby
Congress on the AWACs sale. Kemp said that North came over with
two others from the Pentagon to help with the AWACs campaign, and
stayed on after it was over. Kemp said that North served for a
year as the liaison between the Office of Political-Military
- 3 -
Affairs, and Teicher and himself, on matters relating to arms
sales in the Middle East. Kemp said that they worked closely
together on such matters until the summer or fall of 1982, at
which point Philip Durr came to the NSC and assumed the role that
North had been filling. Kemp said that North then moved on to
other things, and that from that point on, he and North did not
work together very much. Kemp added that, given North's ubiqui-
tous mandate, which was counter-terrorism, North could move in
and out of every regional office with perfect legitimacy. Kemp
said that he knew North was tasked with Central America, but he
did not talk with North on Central American matters. Kemp said
that Roger Fontaine and Constantine Menges did most of the
talking at staff meetings regarding Central America. Kemp said
that North did not attend many staff meetings himself, and that
when he did, he was very quiet. Kemp said that he did not
connect North in his mind with Iran, but that he did work with
North on Lebanon in 1982. Kemp said that to his knowledge North
did not know anything about Iran.
Kemp said that he did connect North with hostage issues. Kemp
said that it was known that North was the NSC point man on
matters relating to terrorism, counter-terrorism, and hostages.
Kemp said that "beyond that, it was all a little vague." Kemp
said that once the policy decision was made to ship arms, North
was an obvious choice to be involved, since North handled hostage
issues and terrorism. Kemp said that, in addition, North was an
"operational whiz." Kemp said that North knew how to make phone
calls and move planes around. Kemp said that when he worked with
North in the summer of 1982 on Lebanon, North was "terrific."
Kemp said that North could keep secrets, and was willing to get
on the telephone and do the "scut work." Kemp said that the last
time he and North talked was in or around the spring of 1985.
Kemp said that he had called North's office because he had been
asked by a friend to pass on information concerning a threat to
an American diplomat in the south of France. Kemp said that he
could not get through to North, and therefore talked with Fawn
Hall, and told her that he would bring over a memorandum for
North, which he did. Kemp said that Hall later told him that she
had received the memorandum. Kemp said that he does not believe
he had any direct contact with North on that occasion.
Kemp said that he first heard stories of the arms sale initiative
in November of 1986. Kemp said that he had not heard anything
before that that he would have taken seriously. Kemp noted that
there had been a Jack Anderson column on the subject as well as
some pieces by John Wallop. Kemp said that he does not know if
he read them at the time, and Kemp said that if he had he prob-
ably would not have taken them seriously.
Kemp said that he has no idea why there was a policy change.
Kemp was asked to speculate. Kemp said that, in his judgment,
had the original team of Baker, Meese, and Deaver been in the
White House when this initiative was discussed, the proposal
would have been killed. Kemp said that Baker, Meese, and Deaver
- 4 -
would have "twisted Shultz's and Weinberger's arms" and gotten
them to go to the President and talk him out of it.
Kemp said that he had not met Poindexter until he joined the
staff in 1981. Kemp said that Poindexter's first job at the NSC
was as a military assistant to Richard Allen. Kemp said that
Poindexter then became the number three man when Judge Clark was
NSC Adviser, and that the "pecking order" was Clark, McFarlane,
Poindexter. Kemp said that Poindexter then became the Deputy.
Kemp said he saw Poindexter "all the time." Kemp said that
Poindexter was "the guy who got things done -- a terrific paper
pusher."
Kemp said that the last time he talked with Poindexter was in
late spring, 1985. Kemp said that when Poindexter became NSC
Adviser in 1986, Kemp had an appointment with him, but the
appointment was postponed and the two of them never had a chance
to have a meeting.
Kemp was asked who he thought was behind the arms initiative.
Kemp responded that he believes that the decision to explore
relations with Iran through the Israelis was probably McFarlane's
idea, because McFarlane was the one with the closest ties to
Ledeen. Kemp said that he did not know what role Teicher or
Fortier played in the matter. Kemp reiterated that he had no
first-hand knowledge of this, except for the fact that he knew
that Ledeen and McFarlane were close.
Kemp said that he had no idea what Ledeen's job was. Kemp said
that he is certain that there was a period when Ledeen served as
a consultant to the NSC. Kemp said that he sometimes saw Ledeen
at the White House, and that he assumed that Ledeen talked to
McFarlane about an array of subjects, one being the Middle East.
Kemp said that he believes that the decision to sell arms would
ultimately have been McFarlane's decision. Kemp said that he was
basing this speculation on what he had read in the press.
Kemp said that he has had no discussions with the principals
concerning any diversion of funds to the Contras, and had no
direct knowledge of it.
Kemp was asked whom he believed to have been the NSC point man on
the Contras. Kemp responded that he did not know for certain.
Kemp said that he knew that Constantine Menges was the regional
expert who took the greatest interest in Central America, and he
knew that North had visited Central America. Kemp said that,
beyond that, he had no clear knowledge of what they did.
Kemp was asked to elaborate on North's involvement with the AWACs
sale. Kemp explained that the National Security Council was
assigned the responsibility of coordinating several interagency
task forces which were lobbying the Hill on the AWACs sale. Kemp
said these were divided up into several teams, with each team
- 5 -
containing representatives from the State Department and the
White House. Kemp said that North worked with those teams.
[Kemp was shown various classified memoranda, and a summary of
the discussion pertaining to those memoranda is appended to this
report as a classified addendum.]
Kemp was asked, based on his past experience, how he imagines
that North became directly involved in an "operational mode.'
Kemp responded that the subject matters in which North was
engaged were very sensitive ones. Kemp stated that he did not
see anything wrong with senior NSC officials becoming involved in
operational matters on sensitive issues so long as no laws were
broken. Kemp said that he would endorse what was said in the
Tower Commission Report, that we should not create a series of
reporting requirements with respect to the NSC, because future
Presidents may need operational tasks carried out from time to
time. Kemp was asked whether he thought it would have been
characteristic of Poindexter not to let the President know that
something was going on. Kemp said that Poindexter was one of the
most efficient and organized officers he had ever met. Kemp said
that Poindexter kept very precise notes on meetings, and was "up
on factual matters." Kemp said that he always found Poindexter
very pleasant, decent, and open about what was going on in any
area on which he felt that the person he was talking to had a
right to be informed. Kemp said that anything that he would say
about what Poindexter did after Poindexter became National
Security Adviser would be pure speculation, and "I wouldn't want
to speculate."
CC: Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Jay B. Stephens
William B. Lytton III
C. Dean McGrath
Alan C. Raul
Paul Schott Stevens
Paul L. Colby
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B. FILES
DLB 2/18/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: GEOFFREY KEMP
S643
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1129
18
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164209 PAPER
3
ND
B1
ADDEDUM TO MEMO RE: KEMP
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.