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    "ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files\nFolder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: 12/07/1985,\nMeeting (3)\nBox: CFOA 1131\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET\nRonald Reagan Library\nCollection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B. FILES\nWithdrawer\nDLB\n4/1/2014\nFile Folder\nIRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DECEMBER 7, 1985\nFOIA\nMEETING (3 OF 3)\nS643\nBox Number\nCFOA 1131\nSYSTEMATIC\n118\nID\nDoc Type\nDocument Description\nNo of\nDoc Date\nRestrictions\nPages\n164661\nPAPER\nTOWER BOARD INTERVIEW OF\n4 12/18/1986 B1\nRICHARD ARMITAGE P. 5-7\nThe above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing\nFreedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]\nB-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]\nB-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]\nB-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]\nB-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]\nB-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]\nB-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]\nB-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]\nB-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]\nC. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.\n12\n2\nSTENOGRAPHIC MINUTES\nUnrevised and Unedited\nNot for Quotation or\nDuplication\nJOINT HEARINGS ON THE\nIRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION\nTestimony of John M. Poindexter\nWednesday, July 15, 1987\nHouse Select Committee to Investigate\nCovert Arms Transactions with Iran\nand\nSenate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance\nto Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition\nWashington, D.C.\nJoint Hearings\nof the\nSelect Committee to\nSelect Committee on\nInvestigate Covert Arms\nSecret Military Assistance\nTransactions with Iran\nto Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition\nU.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nUNITED STATES SENATE\nOFFICE OF THE CLERK\nOffice of Official Reporters\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 57\n1304\nMr. LIMAN. Let's go to the on December 7, 1985, after\n1305\nfinding had been signed by the President, there was a\n1306\nmeeting, was there not, between the principals of the\n1307\nNational Security Council?\n1308\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes, there was.\n1309\nMr. LIMAN. And do you recall Mr. Weinberger was there an\n1310\nSecretary Shultz was there, Don Regan was there, Mr. McMahon\n1311\nof the CIA was there; do you recall that?\n1312\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do.\n1313\nMr. LIMAN. There has been testimony about this. The only\n1314\nreason I am going to ask you about this is because there\n1315\nwere certain perceptions in the Tower Report as to whether\n1316\nthe Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense really\n1317\nexpressed their views forcefully.\n1318\nWould you tell us, Admiral, will the--at that meeting,\n1319\nthere was a discussion again or there was a discussion of\n1320\nthe Iran initiative, is that so? You have to say yes or no.\n1321\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes, there was.\n1322\nThis December 7th meeting was the first opportunity that I\n1323\ncan recall that I had to hear the President personally, the\n1324\nSecretary of State, the Secretary of Defense talk about\n1325\ntheir feelings about this initiative that had been proposed\n1326\nby the Israelis.\n1327\nMr. LIMAN. And the subject on the table was an Israeli\n1328\ninitiative under which the Israelis would ship arms to the\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 58\n1329\nIranians and we would replenish the arms, hopefully there\n1330\nwould be better relations with Iran, and as a token of good\n1331\nfaith, the American hostages would be released; is that a\n1332\nfair summary?\n1333\nMr. POINDEXTER. Well, I think it is a partial summary.\n1334\nMr. LIMAN. Why don't you complete it.\n1335\n[Counse] conferring with witness. ]\n1336\nMr. POINDEXTER. We had been concerned in the National\n1337\nSecurity Council for some period of time with the situation\n1338\nin Iran. Unfortunately, we have very poor intelligence on\n1339\nwhat is happening in Iran.\n1340\nThe National Security Council staff had prepared a draft\n1341\nfinding earlier in '85 to try to get the government focused\n1342\non what we saw as a very significant, looming problem in\n1343\nIran as Ayatollah Khomeini eventually passed from the scene\n1344\nand it was some sort of succession. We didn't want a repeat\n1345\nof the '70s when things were happening in Iran that we\n1346\nweren't aware of, and eventually went out of our control and\n1347\nout of the control of the government there. We wanted to\n1348\npreclude the possibility in the future, and we felt that we\n1349\nneeded to take an initiative to get closer to people in the\n1350\nIranian government so that we could find out what is\n1351\nhappening and hopefully have some influence in the future,\n1352\nor at least have information on which to base the United\n1353\nStates policy.\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 59\n1354\nMr. LIMAN. Admiral, see if this part is correct, that\n1355\ncurrency for trying to get that influence that was being\n1356\ndemanded, as reported by the Israelis, involved arms?\n1357\nMr. POINDEXTER. That is often the currency of any sort of\n1358\nbusiness in the Middle East.\n1359\nMr. LIMAN. And in this case, that was the currency being\n1360\ndemanded?\n1361\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is correct.\n1362\nMr. LIMAN. And it is also true that we did not want to\n1363\nauthorize arms shipments to the Iranians unless we were\n1364\nassured of getting our hostages back; is that so?\n1365\n[Counsel conferring with witness. ]\n1366\nMr. POINDEXTER. As I was trying to lay out a moment ago,\n1367\nwhat our concerns were, what our major objective was, the\n1368\nPresident was clearly also concerned about the hostages.\n1369\nThe President is a very sensitive person, and he is\n1370\nconcerned about individuals when they are in difficulty.\n1371\nAnd 50 he, just as a human being, was concerned about the\n1372\nhostages.\n1373\nI don't think that the President was overly concerned\n1374\nabout them, but he recognized that we did have an\n1375\nopportunity here to try to get the hostages back, and there\n1376\nwas no way that we could carry on discussions with Iranian\n1377\nofficials about broader objectives until we got over the\n1378\nfirst obstacle and the first obstacle was to get the\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 60\n1379\nhostages back. And the President felt that that it was\n1380\nworth taking some risk here.\n1381\nMr. LIMAN. Did the Secretary of State and the Secretary\n1382\nof Defense express objections?\n1383\nMr. POINDEXTER. They expressed, as opposed to some\n1384\nreports, very strong, vociferous objection, and clearly laid\n1385\nout for the President the other side of the issue.\n1386\nMr. LIMAN. And without going into undue detail, could you\n1387\njust tick off the points they made?\n1388\nMr. POINDEXTER. Well, they are the obvious points that\n1389\nhave been made since this all has become public. Secretary\n1390\nShultz was concerned about our operation to staunch the flow\n1391\nof arms into Iran, which is one of the methods that we are\n1392\nusing to try to stop the war between Iran and Iraq.\n1393\nAfter all, our policy objective there is to stop the war.\n1394\nThe policy objective is not to have an arms embargo. You\n1395\ndon't just go out and have an arms embargo for nothing. The\n1396\nreason we have an arms embargo against Iran is because we\n1397\nwant to try to influence the end of the war, but in its\n1398\nsimplest terms, what was being proposed here was not in\n1399\naccordance with that particular method that we were using.\n1400\nHe was concerned that if the European countries found out\n1401\nabout it, that it would lessen their willingness to\n1402\ncooperate. In reality, though, in my opinion, we have never\n1403\nhad good cooperation from anybody on Operation Staunch. The\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 61\n1404\nEuropean countries continued to send military equipment and\n1405\nsupplies into Iran. Iran has been able to carry on a war\n1406\nfor six, going on seven years now, I guess.\n1407\nOther objections were that it was contrary to the Arms\n1408\nExport Control Aot. Secretary Weinberger had slightly\n1409\ndifferent reasons, but they are generally along the same\n1410\nlines.\n1411\nMr. LIMAN. And there is no doubt in your mind that the\n1412\nPresident listened to and understood those objections?\n1413\nMr. POINDEXTER. I have a very vivid recollection of that\n1414\nmeeting, and it was in the residence. The President pulled\n1415\na footstool up to the coffee table and sat there very\n1416\nquietly, as is his nature, listening to all of the\n1417\ndiscussion up to that point, listening to Secretary Shultz,\n1418\nto Secretary Weinberger, Mr. McFarlane. I had very little\n1419\ncomment. And I don't recall the Chief of Staff saying very\n1420\nmuch.\n1421\nMr. McMahon was there and commented a little bit about\n1422\nsome of the technical aspects of the initiative. I had\n1423\nspoken to Director Casey about the meeting before it took\n1424\nplace, and knew at that point that Director Casey was in\n1425\nfavor of the idea.\n1426\nAnd the President listened to all this very carefully, and\n1427\nat the end of the discussion, at least the first round, he\n1428\nsat back and he said something to the effect-and this is not\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 62\n1429\na direct quote, but it was something to the effect that \"I\n1430\ndon't feel we can leave any stone unturned in trying to get\n1431\nthe hostages back. We clearly have a situation here where\n1432\nthere are larger strategic interests, but it is also an\n1433\nopportunity to get the hostages back, and I think that we\n1434\nought to at least take the next step. \"\n1435\nChairman HAMILTON. Counsel, is this an appropriate time\n1436\nfor recess?\n1437\nMr. LIMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.\n1438\nChairman HAMILTON. The joint committees will stand in\n1439\nrecess.\n1440\n[Recess. ]\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 63\n1441\nDCMN MILTON\n1442\n1443\nChairman HAMILTON. The select committees will resume\n1444\nsitting.\n1445\nMr. Liman, you may proceed.\n1446\nMr. LIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.\n1447\nAdmiral, at the December 7th meeting, was there any\n1448\ndiscussion of the November Hawk shipment?\n1449\nMr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I can't recall that. I would\n1450\nbe surprised if there weren't, but frankly I'm not sure.\n1451\nMr. LIMAN. Is the same thing true with respect to the TOW\n1452\nshipment that took place in September by the Israelis?\n1453\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I'm reasonably sure in hindsight\n1454\nthat it was probably covered, but my recollection of Mr.\n1455\nMcFarlane's introduction to the issue was that he probably\n1456\nprovided a review of what had happened up to that point.\n1457\nBut frankly I can't remember that review very well.\n1458\nMr. LIMAN. As I understand your testimony, the bottom\n1459\nline of the December 7th meeting was that the President\n1460\nlistened to the objections, listened to the arguments for\n1461\nthis, recognized the risk, said he was prepared to take that\n1462\nrisk, and made a decision that at the very least Mr.\n1463\nMcFarlane should go to London. Fair?\n1464\nMr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is fair.\n1465\n[Counsel conferring with witness. ]\nNAME: HIR196000\nPAGE 04\n1466\nMr. POINDEXTER. And I don't want to leave the impression\n1467\nthat this was a stilted meeting. In other words, it wasn't\n1468\na situation where, as you probably have seen from some of\n1469\nthe agenda for NSC or NSPG meetings, where each Cabinet\n1470\nofficer had so much time and Mr. McFarlane provided a\n1471\nsummary. This was a very free-wheeling discussion, and\n1472\nfrankly my experience is that if you want to have a\n1473\ndiscussion like that, which was what you wanted, you have it\n1474\nat the residence in a less formal setting where everybody\n1475\ncould be comfortable. You only have principals in\n1476\nattendance, not a lot of staff around, and everybody feels\n1477\nfree to express their view without it being published in the\n1478\nWashington Post the following day.\n1479\nSo this was a very free-wheeling discussion. Everybody\n1480\nspoke very frankly. Secretary Shultz and Secretary\n1481\nWeinberger spoke more than once. There was a lot of give\n1482\nand take in the discussion.\n1483\nBut in the end, the President decided that Mr. McFarlane\n1484\nshould make the trip to London to check out this Israeli\n1485\nchannel so that we could, the President could take a\n1486\ndecision based on firsthand information.\n13\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET\nRonald Reagan Library\nCollection Name\nWithdrawer\nCULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR .:FILES\nDLB 4/1/2014\nFile Folder\nFOIA\nIRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DECEMBER 7, 1985 MEETING\nS643\n(3 OF 3)\nSYSTEMATIC\nBox Number\nCFOA 1131\n118\nID\nDocument Type\nNo of Doc Date Restric-\nDocument Description\npages\ntions\n164661 PAPER\n4 12/18/1986 B1\nTOWER BOARD INTERVIEW OF RICHARD\nARMITAGE P. 5-7\nThe above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing\nFreedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]\nB-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]\nB-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]\nB-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]\nB-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]\nB-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]\nB-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]\nB-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]\nB-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]\nC. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.\n14\nSRB report\nNext Steps: The Iranians, the Israelis, and\nthe longer range goals. Additional meet-\nour U.S. businessman plan to meet in\nings with the Iranians would be arranged\nLondon on Saturday, December 6 to dis-\nto further our objectives without requiring\ncuss whether or not to proceed with the\nsuch large scale sales/deliveries by the Is-\nsale of the TOWs and HAWKs. The Israeli\nraelis.\ngovernment has informally told us that if\nthey can be assured of \"prompt\" resupply,\nApproval is now required for us to take the\nthey will sell the quantities requested from\nnext steps on Saturday. After carefully con-\ntheir prepositioned war reserve. 3,300\nsidering the liabilities inherent in this plan,\nTOWs represents [sic] [a significant pro-\nit would appear that we must make one\nportion] their available supplies.\nlast try or we will risk condemning some or\nall of the hostages to death and undergo-\nThe U.S. businessman has arranged for the\ning a renewed wave of Islamic Jihad terror-\ncharter of two non-U.S. registered aircraft\nism. While the risks of proceeding are sig-\nfor use in the deliveries. The total delivery\nnificant, the risks of not trying are even\nwould be conducted in 5 flights from Tel\ngreater.\nAviv to Tabriz, Iran via interim airfields in\nEurope.\nEach delivery is to result in\n([North], \"Special Project Re Iran,\" 12/5/85)\nthe release of a specified number of hos-\nThe President met his principal national se-\ntages. Arrangements for the interim air-\ncurity advisors on December 7 in his residence.\nfields, overflight rights, and flight plans\nThe President, Secretaries of State and De-\nhave been made, some with the help of the\nfense, Deputy Director of the CIA, McFarlane,\nCIA. A communications code to preserve\nPoindexter, and the President's Chief of Staff\noperational security is available for use by\nattended. (Ellen M. Jones, Presidential Diarist,\nall parties. All aircraft would be inspected\nto Jay M. Stephens, 1/24/87 (information from\nby an Iranian at one of the transient loca-\nthe Presidential Calender, which apparently is\ntions between Tel Aviv and Tabriz. The\ncalled a Diary))\nentire evolution is designed to be complet-\nRecollections of the meeting vary. In his\ned in a 24 hour period. It can be stopped\nmeeting with the Board on January 26, 1987,\nat any point if the Iranians fail to deliver.\nthe President said he recalled discussing a com-\nThe greatest operational security concern\nplex Iranian proposal for weapons delivered by\nis that of replenishing Israeli stocks. The\nthe Israelis in installments prior to the release\nIsraelis have identified a means of transfer-\nof the hostages. The President said that Secre-\nring the Iranian provided funds to an Is-\ntary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger objected\nraeli Defense Force (IDF) account, which\nto the plan, and that this was the first time he\nwill be used for purchasing items not nec-\n\"noted down\" their opposition. The President\nessarily covered by FMS. They will have to\nsaid that the discussion at the meeting pro-\npurchase the replenishment items from the\nduced a stalemate.\nU.S. in FMS transaction from U.S. stocks.\nThe Attorney General remembered attend-\n[sic] Both the number of weapons and the\ning; he did not think McFarlane was present,\nsize of the cash transfer could draw atten-\nand thought that Fortier probably attended.\ntion. If a single transaction is more than\n(Meese 4) The subject of the meeting-the Iran\n$14.9 M, we would normally have to notify\ntransactions-was announced in advance, and\nCongress. The Israelis are prepared to jus-\nthe principals had time to prepare. (Shultz,\ntify the large quantity and urgency based\nSRB, 31; Armitage, 5) According to the Secre-\non damage caused to the equipment in\ntary of State,\nstorage.\nPoindexter suggested that Mr. McFarlane\ncould contact the Iranians in London to\nIf this process achieves the release of the\nask them to release the hostages without\nhostages and proves the credibility of the\ngetting equipment. If they would do so,\nIranian contacts in Europe, Bud McFarlane\nwe, then, would be prepared for a better\nwould then step in to supervise achieving\nrelationship with them.\n-42\nI fully supported this proposal.\nnians involved, I think Ghorbanifar or\nVice Admiral Poindexter suggested that\nsome such name, but a more formal pres-\nMr. McFarlane should be authorized to ask\nentation was now made by McFarlane\nthe British to sell arms to Israel [?Iran] if\nabout what could be accomplished with\nthe Iranians rejected his first proposal. I\nthis and points with respect to getting a\nopposed this idea. I said it was still U.S.\nbetter relationship with Iran as well as\narms, that it was a more complicated deal\nhopes that they might have a favorable\nthat would make us even more vulnerable.\neffect on the release of the hostages.\nOther views were expressed.\nAgain, I opposed it very strongly and said\nNo decision was made, however, at that\nI thought really it was a terrible idea and\nmeeting, as far as I could see.\nthat the transfer of arms which was part of\nOn December 7, Vice Admiral Poindexter\nthe plan which was to be done to establish\ntold me privately that the project had\nthe good faith of the negotiators-I think I\nmade some comment about what about the\nfallen apart during Thanksgiving week.\nThat is thinking back to that period. He\ngood faith of the Iranian negotiators, and\nsaid he had recommended to the President\nwhy-went through a whole catalogue of\nthat we disengage, but that the President\nthings which didn't require any gift of\ndid not want to.\nprophecy as to what would happen if this\nbecame public.\n[T]he advice I gave in\nI felt in the meeting that there were views\nthis case was as firm as I could do it, obvi-\nopposed, some in favor, and the President\nously not persuasive enough but as persua-\ndidn't really take a position, but he seemed\nsive as I could do it, that all kinds of very\nto, he was in favor of this project somehow\nunfortunate effects would result if this took\nor other. And, of course, by now he has\nplace, that we were pleading with a large\nsaid publicly that he was in favor of work-\nnumber of countries not to do this, that\ning at the Iranian operation and being will-\nJordan and Egypt regarded Iran as at least\ning to sell arms as a signal, as he has now\nas much of a great Satan as they regarded\nput it.\nus, and that it would be a very bad thing in\n(Shultz, SRB, 31-32)\nevery way to do, and that it wouldn't ac-\nWhen the Secretary of State returned to his\ncomplish anything, and that they would un-\noffice, he told his staff that Secretary Wein-\ndoubtedly continue to milk us.\nberger and Regan also strongly opposed the\nAt this time again, the Israeli connection\ninitiative. The Secretary of Defense spoke for\nor the Israeli support of such a transaction\nthirty minutes. The Secretary told his staff he\nI guess is the better way to put it, was ad-\nfelt that he perhaps should have barged in ear-\nvanced by McFarlane. And I said that an-\nlier and confronted the President. The prob-\nother of the problems that I thought with\nlem, he felt, was that McFarland did not tell\nit was that doing anything of this kind and\nhim the whole story.\nattempting to keep it on a clandestine basis\nThe Secretary of Defense had a different\nwould leave us open to blackmail of the\nrecollection of the meeting, which he remem-\nvery most elementary kind by the people\nbered as taking place in the Oval Office.\nwho knew about it, that is, the Israelis and\n[T]here was a quite specific, more detailed\nalso Iranians, and that any time they\nproposal that there had indeed been nego-\nweren't getting what they wanted, they\ntiations and discussions between somebody\ncould in one way or another, in Mideast\nrepresenting McFarlane's office and some\nfashion, go public with it and cause all\nIranians who were reported to be moder-\nkinds of problems with it, that there was\nates. I think at that meeting John McMa-\nno way that I ever felt I could talk with\nhon was there. I'm not sure. Bill Casey\n[moderate Arab States] again if we were\nmay have been, or they both may have\nsupplying arms to [a] bitter enemy when\nbeen. But there were some adverse com-\nwe wouldn't supply arms to him et cetera,\nments passed about the veracity of the Ira-\net cetera, just a whole series of arguments.\nB-4\nGeorge Shultz made some very strong ar-\nthrough how things had gone, and they\nguments along the same line\nA very\nhadn't gone very well.\nstrong, very persuasive argument. And\nagain, my impression pretty clearly was\nThe idea originally of us getting in direct\ncommunication with Iranian officials hadn't\nthat the President agreed that this couldn't\nbe done, that it might be a good thing to\nhappened, and instead this imperfect dem-\nachieve these objectives but it wouldn't\nonstration of bona fides had been imper-\nwork, and that this was not a good way to\nfect, rather dramatically, and had become\ndo it.\ntheir priority, with a very clear lack of good\nfaith, I thought. And I said to the Presi-\n(Weinberger 9-12) Armitage remembered the\ndent after thinking about it, and I went\nSecretary of Defense saying that he and Secre-\ndown to Santa Barbara and we talked, both\ntary Shultz \"thought they had 'strangled the\nabout my resignation but then about the\nbaby in the cradle' (Armitage 6)\nresults of this program. And I believe it oc-\nIn his first interview with the Board, McFar-\ncurred in the Century Plaza Hotel on a\nlane recalled suggesting to the President on\nmorning.\nDecember 1 that the negotiations with the Ira-\nAnd I said that it seems to me that we\nnians \"seemed to be getting skewed towards\narms going that way and hostages coming this\nought to try to reorient it to its original\nway.\nI thought we ought to seek a meet-\npurpose. Mr. President, and that is for us\ning directly with the Iranians and discontinue\nto avoid dealing through intermediaries\nany kind of sponsorship of arms transfers.\"\nand to talk to Iranians directly, and he\n(McFarlane (1) 25) In this interview, McFarlane\nagreed with that. And he said convene the\nremembered the President's suggesting an NSC\nNSC-the Secretary of State and Defense-\nmeeting to consider it. (Id.) At the meeting.\nand let's talk it over when we get back. So\nthat is what led me to then do two things-\nwe went through the record of what had\nconvene a meeting and tentatively ask Ad-\noccurred since August in terms of Israeli\nmiral Poindexter, I believe, to have a meet-\ntransfers and the absence of meetings, and\ning with the Iranian intermediary set up in\nat consensus, the unanimous view of all of\nLondon.\nhis advisors, the President decided: All\nright, you go to London, McFarlane, and\nSo with that prelude a meeting was con-\nyou meet with the Iranians and make clear\nvened on December 7 of the NSC, and I\nthat we remain open to the political dis-\nwould, I believe, have presided because I\ncourse, and here it is. And there were\nwas still sitting in the chair. What I am\nabout four generic areas that we wanted to\nsaying now is based upon routine and not\ntalk to Iran about, our disagreements and\nnotes from it. But I always started off by\nso forth.\nbriefing the issue. Here we are today con-\nvened to talk about the Iranian program.\nAnd the second point is that we will not\ntransfer nor encourage any other govern-\nHere is what has happened since the be-\nment to transfer weapons to them.\nginning and here is the return, the benefits\nand the liabilities of it, and the decision is\n(Id. at 26)\nwhat should we do or what should we do\nMcFarlane gave the Board a fuller account in\nhenceforth-continue as we have, change,\nhis second interview.\nor something else.\n[R]ight after the summit, after I got back\nAnd then invite the comments of every-\nfrom debriefing the Holy Father and Mit-\nbody around the table, usually start with\nterand and Prime Minister Thatcher, we\nthe Secretary of State, then the Secretary\nhad some time to look at other things, and\nof Defense, and around the table, and that\nI didn't even come to the office. I went di-\nwould have led to the Director of the CIA,\nrectly from London to Washington to Cali-\nand any one of the other ad hoc members\nfornia but had two days before the Presi-\nthat happened to be present. Usually it was\ndent got there to just kind of think\nMr. Regan.\nB-44\nAnd it was unanimous in the meeting that\nSo I am not certain, but I think I probably\nthis really had gone badly off course and\nalso reflect for the most part the Presi-\nthat we should yes, still be open to talking\ndent's view on that.\nto Iranian officials, authorities, and have a\nconcrete political agenda to describe. And\n(Regan 14-15)\nwe talked a little bit about that-our view\nJohn McMahon, who represented the CIA,\nof our interests in the area, how they were\nrecalled that [t]here was no decision. We didn't\nthreatened by Iran, disagreements we had\nwalk away with any marching orders or any de-\nwith them over terrorism and fundamental-\ncision at that moment.\" The President asked\nists' crusade in the Middle East, and ulti-\nquestions about strengthening moderates in\nmately perhaps even some common inter-\nIran by selling weapons. McMahon \"pointed\nest-Afghanistan and elsewhere.\nout that we had no knowledge of any moder-\nates in Iran, that most of the moderates had\nBut because of how things had gone up\nuntil then we ought to also tell them that\nbeen slaughtered when Khomeini took over.\"\nwe were not going to transfer U.S. weap-\n(J. McMahon 11-12) He noted that any weap-\nons, sell U.S. weapons. We were not going\nons sold \"would end up in the front, and that\nto allow or encourage anybody else to do\nwould be to the detriment of the Iran-Iraq bal-\nance.\" (Id. at 12) He did not know that McFar-\nso. And I don't recall anybody disagreeing\nwith that at all.\nlane was about to leave for London. (Id.)\nAfter the meeting, McFarlane went to\nThe President wasn't terribly-didn't inter-\nLondon, where he joined North. North had\nvene in the meeting, as I recall, very much\ntraveled on December 6 to meet Kimche,\non one side or the other, but at the end\nSecord, and Schwimmer \"LO review all the ar-\nsaid well, okay. That's what you should\nrangements\" in connection with the plan North\nsay. And I left that evening and was in\nset forth in his note to Poindexter of December\nLondon the next morning, and we took off\n4. (North PROF note to Poindexter, 12/4/85,\nfrom there.\n02:02:55) On December 8, before meeting with\n(McFarlane (2) 45-47)\nGhorbanifar, and Nimrodi, McFarlane privately\nreported his instructions to Kimche. Kimche\nRegan's recollection is somewhat different.\nHe recalled that, although McMahan, for exam-\nwas upset and he said: I think you're miss-\nple, was informally dressed,\ning a big opportunity; that you have to\nhave some patience; that these movements\nthe December meeting got to be more\ntake time to consolidate; and these people\nformal because McMahon, among others,\nare delivering to us important items, infor-\nraised the question of, you know, what the\nmation basically; and that we see signs\nhell are we doing here. Arms are being\nfrom our intelligence that they're making\nsent. Where is the formal authority? You\nheadway and beginning to lock up and\nknow, what are we doing here? Is this\narrest radical elements and put their own\ngoing to be policy?\npeople in more responsible positions, and\nAnd as a result of that meeting and people\nthe gradual evidence of their growing in-\nexpressing views which now are commonly\nfluence and ability to act.\nknown, such as State Department and De-\nAnd I said: Well, we don't see that; and\nfense opposed to this. CIA was in favor.\nfurther, we think it is being skewed off in\nNSC was in favor. And I must say that I fa-\nthe wrong direction. So he said: Well, we\nvored it. I won't deny that I favored keep-\ndisagree.\ning the channel open, if necessary selling a\nmodest amount of arms, in order to make\nAnd we went ahead and met with this Mr.\ncertain that we were having contacts with\nGhorbanifar, and in the course of about\nIran and at the same time, if as a result of\nthree hours I covered my instructions. And\nthis they could influence the Hizballah, as\nhe said: Well, I understand the political\nthey had in the case of Benjamin Weir,\ndialogue, and our people in Iran are very\nwhy not.\nmuch open to that; and so, the point is\nB-4!\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 20, 1987\nMEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.\nCHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nWILLIAM B. LYTTON III\nDEPUTY SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT:\nBriefing of the President Concerning\nthe December 7, 1985, Meeting\nI. Background\nMeeting: December 7, 1985\nResidence\n10:00 a.m. - 11:58 a.m.\nPresent: President (in pajamas and a bathrobe)\nSecretary Shultz\nSecretary Weinberger\nDDCI John McMahon\nRobert McFarlane\nJohn Poindexter\nDonald Regan\nSubject: Status of strategic opening to Iran;\nFocus was on U.S. supplying arms to Iran,\neither directly or through Israel, to\nobtain the release of the hostages.\nDiscussion: Strong opposition by Secretary Shultz,\nSecretary Weinberger and Don Regan to\nthe transfer of U.S. weapons to Iran;\nMcFarlane, Poindexter and President\nfavored the arms transfers.\nLegal Issue: Either Secretary Shultz or Secretary\nWeinberger raised the legal issue that the\ntransfer of U.S. arms by Israel to Iran\nviolated the Arms Export Control Act.\nResolution: The President directed McFarlane to go\nto London to meet with Ghorbanifar.\nThe President noted in his Diary for\nthat day that there was disagreement\namong the group and that no decisions\nwere made; they were at \"stalemate.\"\nThe diary entry does not discuss the\nlegal issue.\nII. The Charles Hill Notes\nWhile no contemporaneous notes were taken, to our\nknowledge, at this meeting, Secretary Shultz followed\nhis usual pattern of \"backbriefing\" his close aide,\nCharles Hill, who in turn made copious notes. In\naddition, Secretary Weinberger discussed the meeting\nwith Richard Armitage, who passed along Weinberger's\nrecollection to a State Department aide, and these\nrecollections also were the subject of a note.\nA. Charles Hill's notes reflect that Shultz,\nWeinberger and Don Regan strongly opposed\nthe arms transfers, followed by the note,\n\"Against the law. McFarlane, Poindexter,\nand the President are listed as \"in favor.\nThere is a further note: \"no decision yet.\"\nThere is then a discussion of McFarlane\ngoing to London, followed by, \"[the\nPresident] said American people won't\nunderstand if 4 hostages died because I did\nnot break the law.\"\nB.\nChris Ross' notes reflect Arnie Rafel's\ndiscussion with Armitage of Weinberger's\nrecollection:\nOn the legal issue, the President has said\nthat the American people would understand if\nhe broke the law to get the hostages back;\nthey would not understand it if four hostages\ndied because he refused to break the law.\nThe President said, \"they\" could impeach him\nif they wanted; visiting hours in prison were\non Thursdays. Weinberger pointed out that,\nin such a case, the President would not be\nalone.\nIII. Context of Discussions\nA.\nThis was an intensely candid and private exchange\nof views by and among the President's closest\nadvisors.\nB.\nIn this nearly two-hour conversation, positions\nwere stated very forcefully, and obviously\nwith hyperbole.\nC.\nEveryone knew that the lives of hostages were at\nstake.\nD.\nNo useful purpose was served by writing down the\nrhetorical flourishes of the participants in such a\ncandid discussion.\nIV. Potential Impact\nA.\nPartisans will try to take this comment out of\ncontext -- ignoring the fact that no decision on\nthe arms transfers was made that day and that\nthereafter the Attorney General's advice was\nsought and the arms sales were carried out in\naccordance with the law.\nB.\nThe political impact could focus on a tone\nallegedly set at that meeting.\nC.\nIf the President and his advisers cannot speak\nabsolutely candidly in these types of meetings,\nwithout the fear of selective words and phrases\nbeing publicly disclosed months or years later,\nthen the quality of that type of debate will\ndeteriorate to merely posturing. The result will\nbe a dimunition in the value of the advice the\nPresident receives. Both the substance and the\nstyle in which it is given will be affected out\nof a concern as to how it will be portrayed at\na later date.\nD.\nA lesson learned is that notes of candid con-\nversations with the President, if made at all,\nshould not be passed around to subordinates\nand should not be turned over to Congressional\nCommittees.\nE.\nBecause of the potential impact, both the\nPresident and the First Lady need to be\nalerted to the full context of this matter\nand its possible impact."
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