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Iran/Arms Transaction: Jay Stephens Files: Notes (2)
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Iran/Arms Transaction: Jay Stephens Files: Notes (2)
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Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: Jay Stephens
Files: Notes (2)
Box: CFOA 1132
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
/
12-22-86
Bruy 7 PJW/JBS by Bumi me Mahm - SSCI
dropt NSDD
Fall 1984 Study Directori - Iran - NSC New intelligance estimate
(Terachn Fortuie
JAN 85 Gober.fnr - relationships and key Siama "modiate"
Burranciary responsis to Study Duestine
politing inport
back
Negative - no deshing al Imm - State of
Dobanifor - convince U.S. GN. to participate
- (agent f Viama you. )
- was stay 6 "modiate" x
?
gov. a concretion ~ generine opening
- Jarasli - effort to bring as into
Air fn. policy.
- possible Insuran sting agent u.s. to
get U.J. arms.
Drive by Jean - appealed to us sense
of dispair - hope m hostogen
Skepting by us.
Who JP /on reglared Mc (Liden - personable
dure the process.
undertaking once started required u.d. to continue
to stand good farth to avoid danger to hostoge
Issuer
Role 7 NSC in brunger us political
support to this initiative
Jan 85 - - take my issue -
Furmark - who gole to Kashoggi
Spary 85
The 6 + K meet sevent pm -2 Kostagi paper
K cument paper to heade 7 G
2
Spen 85
G mute w/ Jeden - purtu same them
This theory become put f Drahan -Fuller Inted eat.
Jeden meet- of Kimche - Same they
Kowile for met of 6. segarately ( berauce
G had been meet, w/ Namrodi ).
June
NSC had study Du + new intel est unts, but
85/
no suggest from Shite Dy. - NSOD deapt dis
Con by Irania
- wo / NO pnt- IC issues
- ams +- fortagen - look like strange Im deal
- y/out by Iron to get arms from purchase
- my the us got is fortage
The Iseachis brought in duity to NSC (MF)
Deteen hostils shiptual f CIR - feder close to
Jedeen's intent - intelligence what I contacts could
tall us. can get intell few madlen - (Grb.).
Nimrodi - effort to get grown out 7 am (impany
his bma fulls by getty us into n. helped his y/ot /
also as levely weapon needed us come
July3 Kimste meets w/ Me F. (high personal repect
(yer Sedeen - Peus told him that Incard was
not alling arms to Iran before the unitiate
Kimche also indicated no period Israli am sub.
3
Q - did us have intelligen to induate Issael
coar allowing wragn to from - MeF denied
know. USC box info that sales likely
July 85
Kimche - me F — opportunts us should your
Thing - Sconion modustry too nervous to
deal durly m/us - better to had then send
Gob. playged to modustry - per Kinde - rishe
your f moduater - Smarti types -
Then Gobanja his contacts The TWA high
please were alcose - pressorally Then
( Care CCA- still muting w/ new diami go-between)
North - has action are straight anne - Lostage veg.
Me F- program stould have been stopped - no
hap-land channel. Wpus for hologes.
July-
Me F meeta w/ Shultz or Weinburge -
met cable to shulty - lays out issues
Nud to check audibility of go-between
Shullz - be canful of Go-between
- be sens he are not victaged by
MeF- asked JP to check out go-behmen.
July 16 Shultz - Cubanifer was a fabruator
4
July
Jedeen / Kinche muting -
Jeden adviser on how US6 react to this
Jedeen gon to Iseal to mut up Peres - claims he
is a WH
us Amb (Teme) to Israil complain about Inden
Shullz art me F
McF says Jeden an his own Look.
In July mly al Kimks, MeF provide bone fides
for Julian to timeke
Jedeen thinks be is the action officer that
MeF has anthonid him to deal and Inst Met denies
July - 2nd Me F- Kimske mtg:
13 July me F you u hospital (Regan part/
RR approver institute per me F
DTR - RR shoptual m intremedian
They of urganing - "moduation" need some bon/ish
after my w/FR, not calle Kimske
July30
Kinche comes back to M.F - sense 7 urgery incurred
"Moduation" - extremines - what about
us allhing arms - moduater need to
estableth born fuck w/ mulity grand
Use limited dy wpus- M.F claims The is
do fencter w/o dyfine - of ferson - define copins
5
( Chemborgy - NN 17 dogt by ON
The mp provided has w/ his comment (Novid)
the NN 20 dropt but me the stall
aug 6. RR. me F, Case, Shully, Regar
Only MeF industrin RR made decision m
sale of weapons to Iran - oil other say
no RK decision
NN 85- Met Shulty Tel. call- Hawk
shipmt- - (ON activity emolved : should
Ant industrial RR approved
Early on - The F to Sonda to about It
arms shipment - terminate contact
Between Du 10 - garb
Jeden brought Me F to Wash.
Inden - 3 mtge - work - CIA -
North memo Aptimal - wall die
Jeden puber my that $ problem for
U.S.
Jeden trues to change maye Z
Grbanya - Dr. 22
(McF. claims engh he knew he ted
(Pandyler has yound new that us turanded
that Hawke be benght back became they did so w/o
our sumission)
6
Du 85. Gobanija - town
CIP want Gobanya prlyguphd. - fails
But Gobamym story : puture
Nin intell comes to town to persuade
us partingt -
CIA anglas and - NN. shipment
think we need a family - that we are
- count action.
after
aug 4 my.
me F terms dear to Kamite
sight
I
Juleen mut Kinche bym about (606m/mala)
Jeden Kinke Gobinja ( bay 20)
and
mut again anythm weapne shyment. - Sept 4
Canglane bad engine tember an return try)
Jedeen - Komele - sent code -
lot aug.
North aluted - JSOC to senit area
(1st time work come to spective)
(me F claims he read Non its person - NN-16).
MF baught Non = to do logistic m Howk
shount - after Rabin call to me - /
Re shipment
Roban -7 mit a -> me
problems.
(No illuser about oil dulty) )
Minotor - says send asked for CIA plane -
(Nnk my have brought fund in Z do forit)
Jisbne - CIR chinf knew of fligh - ashed
PM C help clear flupta that Hawhs
7
Hawh - registed - way kind / Serant maching
:: no Loctogen given out. ( intercepts twith a durted C. and
So us ruch to send Tows - 1000
Jan -
Nir alows up
Komche ~ Nimodi tokn nt 7 paiters
Jan 2. -
Odum chuh m/ the sevent times m NSA
entercept to North allen - me F don't remand
art Muro - Asst t Chen , JCS ( did
16-17
Mil.Now. - wint to due Dy.
Weeking calle JP - JP says only myt wh.
Jan 3
my at Cosing bruse -
Sportin, comp, JP, Nonk
where to go band m Nii-JP mtg.
Nnth -Sprhi write finding - draft
(worth forwards funds to JP )
CIA can provide proferent help to etrangthe
out actual
(after MeF pronoun program dead, North
Leden gir up yrogne w/ CIA in and to
same
8
Jan 7 my - Wanty shully Know thy had
but nt
lost the Laz. Know an in found fundy some 1
Jan 16 my - Casey etal m new fording
spek, mine, Wentingh
-Notipy Carge
- nuse - behaved it
was 30-60 by younger
1000 Tow)/ part 7 4000 Tours - Sign -
Jan
17. RK signid
my bond for Hawker
our borefides
event - plane to Im Cooded at
weapons - idea surfored - late Jan. High-Carl
delegation to Tehan - fortage released -
Then get m w/ desloges - planed -- Jan.
with called
MeF - read into program by JP - avone claim
JP said Sucky fee H. fully a
(-- fact just the Numbe)
McF claims be did it for country; one last chance
constit leave to .
Was read fending an phone =
ON advid MEF m return f Tab about
deverser - claim le though it were you
wpns
NW 85 18 Howlls (Inal)
86
Feb- 1000 Tow
May 86- 508 town (mplember C should aug 85)
Oct86- 500 Town
S
I
(Gay st maghane
9
Financial TX
aug 85 TOWS - Issul
4 m Kastrygi ramed
"Im orn &
5 an departed is Imails Leven Act.
as m "2m Daral (cover cost f wpas )
"3 m left act
508 TOWS to Iran
Iron pd ok m g/m Tour
'um from Iseasli Act (Sean deposit)
for I Sumi and
"6m Gobinjar
Gob owed '6 m to Korboggi
Transfund to Knobaygis out.
:: 'Im spht between / Orimb Inventor
( Jawn Rowe - Co that is print inventor been)
Nos 85 Hanks
'5 m up. by inventors
unclean
6 m (amme) Iran pd.
& expect - got their may back
may not have ten payt
Same trype 7 Tx3 as aug.
10
Formal the cm /
Feb
86 TX
Kartryzi- 10 m raised from pust must of
(mo )
'10 m
Isanli hum Dect.
1000 TOWS
North to Tweeten (CEA/-) puri from DOD
from Insule ant '3.7m put into CIA out.
North asked for Corum cost from DOD - Russo
3.7 m CZR Ant DOD ant
Wpre sent to CIA
send brongs - SAT to put up 1000 Tows
To Isamli 6a.
Samule use own p lane, but send crew
fly then to Im
"5.7 7 cash pl p L 4 In in Enge
"5.7 depended -- Insule ant
/
(un cont them let about
"5. 7 t remarh _ out = 12.m
"12 m N behanja
( Israli ant empty)
Gobanja ner 712 m - chuke
an depart.
'10 m to prints amt
/ m antend to P. crunch
/ m Kartyn
(No propet 606. al tas at /
11
& March 7 Gobingin - suggests muchaging
I d directy fundsh to afgster
or FDN - Telle George Came who
cables back
Early april - ON plan written (Smok gun now)
Imaton put up mong
Serali ant to pay us
Shy W pro.
Change cont maching
(for Densine ) "12 m + cost (2" for TOWS stupd sand
make Im pay the "2m
HAWK
"I m. 7x cost
mussell
PARTS
2 m fn tows d by Ismit
3 m for invetos paynt
4.5 m (actual wpn cost )
22.5 million
Kortong -
"5m- aroh
puts dealtiph
'10 - 2 carach
Before
%5
small act
Shyment
Isral want its my 7/ too
*2 m (Tw rembers
4.5 m Hank
6.5
CIA
out.
Jeans "8.5 - act -
(Mand to his own ant:)
Second (go FDN )
US6
Sand
508 Tons + HAWK Parts
us.
"6.5m
Doral
12
186 Hawk partn palaths put m Mr F plane
Insnian balk - Not 22.5 fn 1/6 f copins.
!
Irams ague to pay over 5 months
total 6 "8 m for all Howk spans
Oscarle ant
6.60m/m out
out
5 m
arab inventor
3m intent to and t Canch
( diport of "10 m to Cand )
Phase IV ( 606 mya tohn out)
500 Town Oct 86
Iraning sput my ... dealy "4 m
Ant
milly
Sevent u.s , 037
("2m unaccounted for )
us - 500 Tows to Terml
bag Sept 86 Inali indunts it
will ship wpon to FDN - Peres mtg.
aug 86 - Clkott abrome you to Julta 7 5um
to get "10m. human
all
abram
CIA (Fines) how to set my
act. FDN open ant - Panama
abrom get bank ant #.
abrome you to Non as sam public - Non
give Clhott his Suise acct, Suctor "10 m
Sevented
13
Oct 86 - abrom asked North whilener
happened to "10m - ON - new showed
up yet Oct - reprated NN.
Due / Sulton say many went a august
to Swiss 10 m
(No akrom asurans that may for
humand and only )
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO:
FROM: JAY B. STEPHENS
Deputy Counsel to the President
FYI:
COMMENT:
ACTION:
1 any WH /NSC guidance
after phosoge 8 solard around
2 In contection cable
12-18-86 DTR Testiming HPSCI -
Opening Statement
July 85 let hand of prosibility of arme sale to In -
Hospital - M.F - OIR - RR
McF- Invel- I asun contact - RR.OK
aug
85 mtg -
Irachs wanted to sell arms
Oroo-Cone discussed of Inali only
DTR - RR relectant
- Didn't know
- Didnt approve- what They to they do
sept 85 930
Israntis had actually and 508 tow: - to get there
hostory out. Discussion Di mothing about it. But
let Issuly no us didnt condone & upset MeF to ulon
Demen NN 85 - at General burh in N/Ly
Movement in arm hostoye
later harned this envolved 18 Hawt missils form In to &
(2 Feb. us insisted these be returned
Dec. 7 (residence ) what to do about arm salue
concluded: Me F tell contacts -no more actualty
Early you 84- - Seracti internet
12-18-84 bTR
1.2
you 6- 9ʳᵈ but me Findy
JP wanted Fundy cv mtg
Jet RR know L advance
jun
7 NSP6 mtg-
Difference of views -
Evedence of sincerely m both parties
RR approved
DTR hairt sun finding - loan draft)
JP kept original in his safe
Fundy: Token amount f day ann
but from In - demand T; In Ing wa;
efforta to release Lostoyers
Feb. 86- Sale of row, (1000) by us to Im
us paid.
Jibya come onto seen -
uperted Im connect to be but
—
Carly May- - rans industed they wanted hugher cantact
Descussion whether to send smeone
Decided on Me F -
May -Sed wk.
mg w/ RR pun to his digartment -
RR JP. MF- DTR - Repub NS&
General change to MeF
Me F reported to RR - - United caean
Hatzy came out - July (Inhs)
(Replemishind 508 tow. to 20ml -(May June as part
f MiF trip )
p.3
DTR 12-18-86
Out 86 fale f 500 Trus
Before sale - uu contact w/ relative 7 In paint
probsem release
Channel still not broker H.
Nov. 24 AC revelation 7 skiming f mony for contras
NN. 2/- - AG - smith was w/ Casey testay -
met w/ RR - ( Once set by DOD - intropte
suggesty Sprin much higher )
Nov. 24- AG advises RR
Money - puice racid - Swine out -
Done by Nnh - JP should have Know
1st think ever heard about the
Stokes
Dole he think mistakes made
- mistaker 7 judgment an policy - history will feel
— Implementat - diversion 7 fund - more
than a mistake - may han been and - mola large
authority to Nork Brindster-
DIR Describer NSC / CgS relationing
Doesn't know Northi area 7 required
NSA- condent of NS issue - large anthing
Tower Common — note; count m; everyit;
P.4 OTR - 12-18-86
Incland:
Im - only rpunk NJC has un - DDR
who should do guat -
Opening f channel - tarml NSC (Me Failm)
Not new contact. (1981-83)
: MiF asked to follow up
1985 TX. were Deraila
( April - May 84- Hawk batteries remember
Me Curdy
WH procedure for access to
WH at off - Regan - In + SR.Ast.
-2 way nb
NSA V due Shat from duest areas
NSC - doesn't meet on regular base
Casey - - you them DTR
Su Dy- luky ml,
North - met w/ RR 19 time - never / m /
never just JP/N w/ Pren alone
Dennis Thomas- Asst to our - reporter then Rega
NSC my give Never drewssed - DTR. punde
denera of funds
Not NSC - discussion about enhety Lely of 3rd
countries
JP met w/ RR alone on reason
p.s.
DTR 12-18-86
JP seem discommed durn 7 frush / RR in OTR'S pend
Cheney Deusen Not to mating Conguise
This only time admin fuiled to noth Congues
m cont action
Not much time spent m this
- CIA cound had June you that current
metain not neue
at progress time would
be Cong nature
- AG some openion
(RR mode dear - probut him 7 muhe )
RR- VP- DTR didn't how 7 deven - would have
notful lazy ASAP - did
Kastenmer -
No invocation of Expire
930 buty - DTR - JP - Kull the Danil
attende most-
(Deputy NSA usually for pad pen )
- Should be daily buify agende
- plus may be some notes
NSC - y OTR in trom attends -95% %
NSA responsible for notes record f mly
Jengston
No knowledge f disport f many f
pale 7 am to I
p.G. DTR 12-18-86
Daniel
MeF resigned 1985 Du.
good Transit to JP
DTR
should report duity to Que
No covert actual - But of RR wants to
develop a purats channel - OK for NSC
But not handle an repent
Relations
Houseny /budyet - adm purpose
Speecher - NSC arguts dropt
spud wash
Pren can - NSC brung - subsher -
NSA attend may staff my
McF - OTR - Hejact ushman to OTR - emban
Mative Daral -
Establish pt 7 contact - gews - Im-; Indian
war; Jebonse termin ; There then factor
-
How to get stop out immunt —
DTR - manatine drought of Comm. jugget
WH wid declarary - get story out.
Roe
NSC - what was my f advice
state Dy know of contacts ul Jean -
CIA /NSA/ oir an favor
Turned to JP to congret - work w/ CIA
P.7. 12 118'84 OTR
Roe cont
Spendyter to cangout
Regorter back to R.R.
RR would give guidane
Img intelligm - CIA deasin -
-Prempals agreed to the poling antelly
Brown - N VJP mistake judget /zeal
raised issue I Cardn immunity
Nork should take bloom y he served up,
DTR- anone f effetz to suice Junt many
whith "agpeng."- DTR would the to fort
Mithigh — Who AG advid RR m deverser
Nrth admitted to A6 m devera f funds
JP aware, but don't want to do anything
why weren't N dp called ?-
agus w/ descript of M.F me relationship
of NSA-lys - Same w/ JP -
C, 5 not envolved is implinht centers leg.
Deveger -
who - Pm.
what if poly went bad -
- pubhi irregact
Pricing never demand w/ DTR RR
RR told to MeF to get Hunt Mind bach
p.8 DJR 12 -18.86
Paniltr
DTR agreed to make downt available to Come
Deveropment 7 funds - werry - don't know if elleged
Speculate are to how derea received
skimm went m
clandictive op - sking not unemam
May have prtin of divin to Control
Tegal up. f AG/CIA -
Homelton want arcept new that Brea can
withhold wis from Corry. - Emphanges view
that can't accept enn AG oping about
withoutdy ap
Stoker Immunity - w/RR
Pardon discussed - reluded- -
use amount better because at doesn't interpory
wl Ind Counsel. of cise immunity, can stall pen.
muse present - -upted idea 7 and Cound so that
not effected - advan
R.R has muled out Spandon -
Re Cosey Testing m Nov. 21
Pondyh- Carry mtg (AG notice
$101 emanter didnt fike my intropk /
A6 intermine - NO assent of Count my th by v + p
Dolant know if enigh if to persent - still
pursing ment.
p.9. 12-18.86 DTR
Me Curdy
Statement ne next 2 years
Impressed by OTRU candon
adver orr to seek out spent
w/ Congress
Suspiur between OCT - Cman
DTR response -
expreson enternet - coop & bigatershy
Chemag: any gendence to WH staff after passon
check
of Brand amendment - partually
any graden for JP/ N
RR V DTR never met m/ outside people
Not Segnion a sund (
No Knonggi contacts
Second RR- only my - larger group 7
Control supporters at WH.
Q
Du 4-7 '85 and Jan 7 1985 what happened
How was this Spragram resumented
Internent by Israilis - further chocom
withoutile - JP need find; - arme on customs.
Jumpton
Would DJR give his advice anymen >
R-mo mre arms to Im.
Would not sell N Kour am -y paing contact.
P.10 DTR 12-18-86
McCurdy -
argued for consultation w/ Congua to build
consinsus-
DTR — Trumar - ream been
- after declara mode, DTR docent reall
ag further discussion about maty Conguas,
collection decision -
Damet
OTR Best testing Cram has had.
agun w/ mative 7 In instante -
r
Roe
Issue 7 but 76 intent:
Thought they would break contact agtn some
wants ) Not broken.
entre stud there
Devisering 8 funds into pol. ?
DTR - no me in Rep Sparty confums the
No truth to this story.
Communial did run- -- but fundy
dant come from Sign am sale.
Brown - AG anterview of North- why not mne nife
Me Hugh- - See 7 State mantains he dedn't know there was a
fundy - the Dy- unaware f transfer 7
-fo-
CIR agreed to provide Intel to dray before bir
come
towl COTR not aware we are provide
withhough to Iran)
9.11. DTR 12-18-86
Was december mode to cut out the 7 It - Ry
CIA / NSA / Sho lay have and mee a week
up should have been should
Shulty knew 8 policy
Amb Killy - packchaml - disignd to oh
Jorkson out
Dugar - Casey - R.R. -how for -
occasement - 2x /month
New said talk to Pun about Jimm am deal
[ Comm genig DTR cable on Iranning antillym
shaming - want letter back respondy
to cable ]
Hamilt-
— we get cable
— document - wont as Coum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 23, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE
FROM:
PETER J. WALLISON
JAY B. STEPHENS
SUBJECT:
Chronology of Iranian Events (Based upon
December 22, 1986, Briefing of PJW and JBS
by Bernard McMahon of the SSCI)
Set forth below is a chronology of events based upon hearings
conducted during December on the Iranian arms transactions by
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Parenthetical
material indicates analytical theories, hypotheses, or
additional explanatory or contradictory information.
Fall 1984
In the fall of 1984 the NSC issues a Study Directive on Iran in
an effort to stimulate new strategic thinking regarding U.S.
policy toward Iran. It appears that Fortier and Teicher are
the principal architects of this directive which is circulated
to the national security bureaucracy for reflection and
comment. This Study Directive eventually leads to a draft NSDD
which is circulated in the spring of 1985; a new intelligence
estimate regarding the Iranian situation provided support for
an Iran initiative. USG reaction to the NSC Study Directive
is basically negative, especially from the State and Defense
Departments.
Winter 1985
Ghorbanifar, who is believed to be an Iranian intelligence
agent as well as a self-styled entrepreneur, launches an effort
to convince the United States political bureaucracy of a
scenario justifying a new initiative toward Iran. Ghorbanifar
spreads the story that "moderates" in the Iranian government
are interested in opening a dialogue with the United States and
that the United States needs to prepare for the post-Khomeini
period. In conjunction with this, Ghorbanifar also promotes
the idea of Iran's impending economic crisis as well as its
military crisis vis-a-vis the Iraqi war. One of the
individuals to whom Ghorbanifar provides his information is
Furmark who then approaches Khashoggi.
Spring 1985
In the spring of 1985 Ghorbanifar and Khashoggi meet several
times; these meetings give rise to the Khashoggi paper which
Khashoggi circulates to the heads of a number of Middle Eastern
countries. Ghorbanifar also meets with Michael Ledeen to push
the same theory regarding the moderate faction in Iran. Ledeen
during this period of time meets with Kimche, an Israeli
intelligence agent, and Kimche also meets with Ghorbanifar.
During this same period, Ghorbanifar also meets with Nimrodi,
who is also a Mossad agent. Ghorbanifar's effort to convince
the United States Government to participate in an Iranian
initiative which presumably would entail shipment of arms to
Iran ultimately stimulates a new CIA intelligence estimate.
This Graham-Fuller intelligence estimate provides some
intellectual underpinnings for the NSC Study Directive and
supports the draft NSDD which is circulated in the spring of
1985.
(McMahon hypothesizes that Ghorbanifar was the instigator of an
Iranian sting against the United States in order to get U.S.
arms sales to Iran. He also hypothesizes that the Israelis
became either a witting or unwitting partner in this
Ghorbanifar sting because it was important to Israeli policy to
bring the United States into the Israeli-Iranian relationship.
The Israelis believed they needed to maintain an opening to
Iran in order to obtain the return of Jews living in Iran and
that arms sales probably were an integral part of their foreign
policy scheme. Because the Israelis could not be seen as
selling arms to Iran in violation of U.S. policy, it was in
their interest to coopt the United States by having the U.S.
join in the arms sale scheme. U. S. participation would
provide necessary cover for Israeli action as well as preclude
U.S. hostile reaction to Israeli arms sale policy. It would
also permit Israel to upgrade the quality of weapons it could
ship to Iran. According to McMahon, this whole scheme was
driven by an Iran-Israel linkage which appealed to the U.S.
sense of despair regarding the hostages. The original
McFarlane/Ledeen exploration of a possible Iranian opening was
later replaced by a Poindexter/North front which independently
began to drive the process because of concern for the hostages.
Once the United States began to participate in the process of
showing our "bona fides", the U.S. had to continue to show its
good faith in order to avoid perceived likely danger to the
hostages if the U.S. dropped out of the process.)
June 1985
The NSC now has in place a new intelligence estimate to support
its Iran Study Directive, but the national security/foreign
policy bureaucracy does not support the draft NSDD which has
been circulated to redefine U.S.-Iranian policy. At this point
it appears that the proposed NSDD dies a natural death.
However, in June, Michael Ledeen makes a direct contact with
McFarlane. Ledeen views the CIA with skepticism and has very
close ties to Israeli intelligence. Ledeen also has met with
Ghorbanifar in the spring of 1985 and builds a relationship
with him based upon a perceived mutual distrust of the CIA. In
meetings with the NSC, (McFarlane) Ledeen articulates the view
that the U.S. can obtain valuable information and intelligence
by dealing with the Iranian contacts, and he encourages the NSC
to deal with the Iranian middlemen, namely Ghorbanifar.
(Ledeen may have been expressing the interests of the Israeli
government in an effort to bring the U.S. into this initiative.
In addition to the reasons for the approach discussed supra,
Nimrodi, who had been spearheading the effort to get Jews out
of Iran, could improve his bona fides with the Iranians by
getting the U.S. to assist in the overall arms policy
approach.)
July 1985
On July 3 David Kimche, an Israeli intelligence agent, meets
with McFarlane to discuss the opportunity for an Iranian
opening as well to shore up the credibility of the middlemen.
McFarlane knows Kimche, and has substantial respect for him.
Kimche indicated to McFarlane that there had been no prior
Israeli arms sales to Iran. (Michael Ledeen indicated that
Peres had told him and had stated publicly that Israel had not
been selling arms to Iran before this initiative. Query: did
the United States have information or intelligence which
indicated that Israel had been selling arms to Iran
previously?) In his meeting with McFarlane, Kimche emphasizes
that this is an opportunity for the United States and Israel to
explore together, and he indicates that the initial approach
should be through Israel because the Iranians do not trust the
United States. He notes that the moderates in Iran would have
to expose themselves to establish this channel, and that
Ghorbanifar is plugged into the moderates in Iran. He
indicates that this information was confirmed through tapes to
which he had access. He also underscores the credibility of
Ghorbanifar by noting that the hostages from the TWA hijacking
had been released through the personal intercession of
Rafsanjani because of the influence of Ghorbanifar.
(According to McMahon, at the policy-making level U.S. policy
during the next year appears to be predicated on the hope that
one arms transaction would result in the release of the
hostages, and that this would be a one-time event; the real
interest of U.S. policy is opening a dialogue with Iran. At
the operational level the U.S. approach seems to be primarily
an arms for hostages swap. The Iranians, according to this
theory, were really interested only in arms; consequently, they
did not want to give up the hostages since they would then lose
their bargaining leverage to obtain the arms they needed so
badly.) (Apparently as recently as last week, George Cave of
the CIA was told by an Iranian go-between that North had
promised harpoons and the release of the Kuwaiti prisoners in
an effort to obtain the release of U.S. hostages. Also, when
McFarlane arrived in Tehran in May 1986, the Iranians did not
know who he was. It was a remarkable coup for Ghorbanifar to
bring direct U.S. arms shipments to Iran.)
In July McFarlane discusses the entreaty from Kimche with
Shultz and Weinberger. McFarlane sends a cable to Shultz in
which he lays out all the issues regarding an opening to Iran,
and indicates that we needed to check the credibility of the
go-betweens. Shultz responds to the McFarlane cable by
emphasizing the need to be very careful of the go-betweens and
to be sure that the U.S. is not victimized by the Israelis in
pursuit of their own policy objectives. McFarlane indicates
that he has asked John Poindexter to check out the credibility
of the middlemen. On July 16 Shultz indicates that in his view
Ghorbanifar is a complete fabricator. At this point in time
the CIA claims it is not asked to check out the credibility of
Ghorbanifar. (McFarlane may have indicated that he had not
heard of Ghorbanifar by name until as late as December 1985.)
Also in July, Ledeen meets with Kimche to advise Kimche on how
the USG was reacting to the proposed Iranian intiative. Ledeen
goes to Israel and also meets with Peres and claims he is a
White House emissary on this issue. U.S. Ambassador Lewis
becomes aware of this and complains to Shultz about Ledeen's
representations; Shultz then asks McFarlane to explain what
Ledeen was up to; McFarlane advises Shultz that Ledeen is
acting on his own initiative, and that he does not represent
USG interests. (However, in his July meeting with Kimche,
McFarlane does provide Kimche with Ledeen's bona fides.
According to Ledeen, he perceives of himself as the action
officer on this venture and believes that McFarlane has
authorized him to deal with Israel (McFarlane denies)
July 13, 1985
McFarlane goes to the hospital where the President is
recovering from surgery and presents the proposal for exploring
an initiative with Iran. The President, according to
McFarlane, approves the exploration of this initiative (Regan
is present); following this meeting McFarlane advises Kimche
that the U.S. is willing to explore an opening to Iran.
July 30, 1985
Kimche comes back to discuss with McFarlane a new sense of
urgency regarding the Iran situation. Apparently, the
"moderates" are in a very difficult situation and need some
demonstration of results to avoid a deterioration of the
situation. Particularly, the moderates need to establish their
bona fides with the revolutionary guards, and Kimche indicates
that limited defensive weapons would provide the kind of
evidence necessary to support them. According to McFarlane, he
believes, and indicated to Kimche, that the distinction between
an offensive and defensive weapons proposal is one of a
distinction without a difference.
August 6, 1985
McFarlane raises the issue of arms to Iran in a meeting with
the President; participating in the meeting were the President,
McFarlane, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan. Of the
participants, only McFarlane concludes that the President made
a decision supporting the sale of weapons to Iran; all other
participants believe there was no Presidential decision on this
matter.
Following the August 6 meeting, McFarlane transmits to Kimche
approval for the Israeli shipment of arms to Iran. Before the
shipment is made, Ledeen meets with Kimche, and he also meets
with Ghorbanifar (August 20).
August 30, 1985
504 TOWS (508) are shipped from Israel to Iran; the airplane
which delivered the weapons develops an engine fire on the
return flight and is forced to make an emergency landing. (In
late August, North is alerted to an impending hostage release
and, apparently on his own initiative, activates JSOC to the
Beirut area; this appears to be North's first entry into the
picture. (McFarlane claims that he did not read North into the
program until November 16 when he brought North in to resolve
some logistical problems with respect to the Hawk shipment;
this was only after Rabin had called McFarlane to get
assistance.)
September 4, 1985
Ledeen meets with Kimche and, through a secret code, advises
him of the impending hostage release.
September 15, 1985
Hostage Weir is released; this is a disappointment because all
the hostages were expected to be freed. Following this period,
there appears to be a discussion of the sale of Hawk missiles
to Iran because Iran said it needed more weapons before
additional hostages could be released. North then advises
Ledeen that he is out of the picture as an operational officer
and that North is taking over. North also requests General
Odom at NSA to provide all the intercept traffic directly to
North and to Charles Allen at the CIA; he claims that McFarlane
is aware of this tasking.
November 16, 1985
McFarlane calls North from Geneva; McFarlane had just received
a call from Rabin who noted the Israelis were having trouble
with an aircraft scheduled to deliver materials to Iran. This
is the first time that North is officially brought into the
operation by McFarlane when McFarlane called him to seek his
help in resolving the logistical problems. McFarlane also
advises Shultz of the Hawk missile shipment and indicates that
the President had approved it. On November 16 or 17 Secretary
Weinberger receives an intercept which indicates the impending
missile shipment. Weinberger calls Poindexter raising concern
about this matter; Poindexter indicates that they will plan to
meet the following week to review the whole issue. (McFarlane
claims that everything he knew about this program he told
Poindexter. Poindexter has expressed the view that the US
demanded the return of the Hawk missiles because they were
shipped without our permission. A CIA airplane was used in the
November Hawk shipment; McMahon of the CIA believes that a
Finding is necessary since we appear to be involved in a covert
action.)
November 18-21, 1985
There are several phone calls between North and others to deal
with logistical matters regarding the Hawk shipment; Secord is
brought into the operation by North to go to Lisbon; he tells
the Portugese that he represents the United States and needs
clearance for a planeload of arms. In Lisbon the CIA station
chief is aware of the proposed flight to Iran and asks the
Portugese Prime Minister to help clear the flight; he is aware
that the flight invclves the shipment of Hawk missiles to Iran.
He also apparently also knows it is a hostage release
operation.
November 24, 1985
The Hawk missile shipment arrives in Tehran; the Iranians
reject the missiles because they are the wrong type for their
operational demands; the missiles have Israeli markings on
them; and no hostages are released. From intercepts North
apparently finds out that the Iranians have rejected the Hawk
missile shipment; he knows that we do not have to demand their
return. (The chronology which North prepared is in error in
claiming that we did not find out about the rejection of the
Hawks until January, 1986.)
December 7, 1985
Meeting at the White House residence attended by most
principals to review the Iranian program. McFarlane goes to
London following this meeting to review the situation with the
middlemen. He determines that the program is over and that
Ghorbanifar is a totally unreliable individual.
December 10, 1985
North writes a somewhat hysterical memo claiming that the
hostages will die unless the United States continues this
operation; this memo is prepared after McFarlane returns from
London and after he advises North that the program is dead.
Mid-December 1985
Ledeen brings Ghorbanifar to Washington in an effort to
rehabilitate Ghorbanifar and to renew US interest in the
program. Through his contacts, Ledeen has picked up that
Ghorbanifar appears to be the problem with respect to the US,
and he sets up several meetings between Ghorbanifar and the CIA
in an effort to rehabilitate him. In early January, the CIA
polygraphs Ghorbanifar, and he fails the polygraph completely.
January 2, 1986
Nir appears in Washington as Peres' representative replacing
Nimrodi. Nimrodi was one of the initial Israeli middlemen, and
this appears to be an effort to restructure the program by
bringing in new intermediaries. Nir talks with Poindexter. At
this point Kimche and Nimrodi are then taken out of the
picture.
January 3, 1986
There is a meeting at Casey's home including Casey, Sporkin,
Poindexter, and North to discuss where the program should go
based on the Nir-Poindexter meeting of the previous day. North
and Sporkin engage in writing a Finding -- apparently, Sporkin
did a couple drafts of a Finding on January 2 and 3. The
theory of the draft Finding is that the CIA can provide
professional help to straighten out the situation, but that
they need a Finding to come into the situation officially. (It
appears that after McFarlane pronounced the program dead in
mid-December, North and Ledeen ginned up the program with the
CIA in order to save the hostages.)
January 4, 1986
North sends Poindexter a memo indicating Sporkin and Casey
support the program and forwarding a draft Finding for the
President's signature.
January 7, 1986
The NSPG meets to review the proposed Finding. Shultz and
Weinberger realize they have lost their argument and that the
President intends to go forward with the program.
January 16, 1986
Casey, Sporkin, Poindexter, Weinberger, and Meese meet to
review the Finding. At this meeting the issue of Congressional
notification is discussed. Meese provides a legal opinion that
the President has authority to carry on this intelligence
operation without advising Congress immediately; apparently,
Meese is under the impression that this is a 30-60 day program
and that, upon completion, appropriate notification would be
made. Also, at this meeting additional arms shipments to Iran,
including a shipment of 4,000 TOWS, is discussed. Initially,
an installment of 1,000 TOWS would be exchanged for the
rejected Hawk missiles; this arms transaction is viewed as
reestablishing our bona fides; it is also understood that a
high-level delegation would go to Tehran to move the initiative
forward.
January 17, 1986
The President signs the Finding.
January-March 1986
In late January the idea of sending a high-level delegation to
Iran develops further. An arms shipment which would facilitate
the release of all the hostages is planned. After the release
of the hostages, a high-level delegation would establish the
contacts necessary to develop a policy-level dialogue with the
Iranians. (The structure of the program had not changed
substantially from the beginning. At the working level, the
operational people viewed this as a straight trade of arms for
hostages; at the policy level the players believed this was a
one-time arms shipment which would facilitate the release of
all the hostages and then the initiative could move forward to
high-level government contacts.) Initially, the meeting in
Tehran is scheduled for April, but it is delayed because of the
Libyan bombing raid in early April. McFarlane claims he is
opposed to going to Tehran, but believes this was one last
chance to save the initiative. Poindexter advises McFarlane
(contrary to fact) that Shultz and Weinberger are fully aware
of the proposed trip to Tehran. McFarlane is concerned that
this venture could not be left to the bureaucracy; he is read
the Finding over the telephone.
February 1986
1,000 TOWS from US stockpiles are shipped to Iran.
May 1986
504 TOWS are shipped to Israel to replenish the Israeli stock
which had been used for the previous August 30, 1985 shipment.
McFarlane goes on mission to Tehran.
August 1986
Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams goes to the Sultan
of Brunei to solicit $10 million in humanitarian aid for the
Contras. The Sultan indicates he is willing to contribute to
this cause. Abrams goes to Allan Fires at the CIA to request
assistance in setting up an account for the Sultan's
contribution. The FDN opens an account in Panama to receive
the funds, and Abrams is given the bank account number. At the
same time, it appears that Abrams goes to North with the same
problem regarding establishing a bank account. North gives
Abrams North's Swiss bank account number, and it appears that
the Sultan's $10 million contribution is to be sent to the
Swiss account. In October and again in November Abrams
apparently asks North whatever happened to the $10 million
Sultan's contribution; North advises Abrams that it has not yet
appeared in the Swiss bank account as late as November. On
December 1 a State Department approach to the Sultan of Brunei
confirms that the Sultan had indeed sent the $10 million
payment to the Swiss account in August. (It appears that
Abrams sought no assurances that the Sultan's payment would be
used only for humanitarian purposes.)
October 1986
The US ships an additional 500 TOWS to Iran.
Financial Transactions for Iranian Arms Sales
Set out below is a preliminary description of the possible
financial transactions surrounding the Iranian arms sales.
August 1985 Israeli TOW Shipment
It appears that Khashoggi raised $5 million, $4 million from
investors and $1 million of his own funds, and deposited the $5
million in an Israeli Swiss bank account. From this account,
$2 million was withdrawn to pay Israel for the cost of the TOW
weapons; this left $3 million in the Israeli account. The 504
TOWS were shipped to Iran; Iran paid $6 million for this
shipment. $6 million was transferred to the Israeli Swiss
account from an Iranian Swiss account. From the Israeli
account, $6 million was withdrawn to pay Ghorbanifar who owed
$6 million to Khashoggi on the advance of this sale; the $6
million was transferred to a Khashoggi account. (Therefore, it
appears that $1 million in profit or interest was split between
Khashoggi, his private investors, and possibly Ghorbanifar.)
November 1985 Hawk Missile Shipment
Fewer details are available regarding this shipment, although
it appears to have followed the same transactional lines as the
August 1985 TOW shipment. It appears that $5 million was put
up by private investors, and that the Iranians paid at least $6
million for the Hawk missiles. It appears that Khashoggi and
private investors got their money back on their advance,
although there may not have been any profit. (Since the Hawk
missiles were rejected, it may be that no funds were
transferred from Iran and that the financial advance was
returned to the investors.)
February 1986 TOW Shipment
Khashoggi raised $10 million from private investors which was
deposited in an Israeli Swiss account. North, working with
Tweeten (CIA), negotiated a fair market value price for 1,000
TOWS from DOD; North apparently asked General Russo for a lower
cost figure on the TOWS. A cost figure of $3.7 million was
finally arrived at for the 1,000 TOWS. From the Israeli
account, $3.7 million was withdrawn which was transferred to a
CIA Swiss account to cover the cost of the TOWS; this amount
was then transferred to DOD to pay for the TOWS. The weapons
were then sent to the CIA. Secord appears to have brought in
Southern Air Transport to pick up the 1,000 TOWS for delivery
to the Israeli government. When the shipment arrived in
Israel, Israel used its own plane to fly the arms to Iran, but
the same crew from the Secord leg of the flight was used to fly
the arms into Iran.
It appears that Iran paid $5.7 million for this shipment of
1,000 TOWS; $5.7 million was deposited in the Israeli Swiss
account. This $5.7 million plus the remainder in the Israeli
account from the $10 million advance (approximately $6.3
million) meant there was approximately $12 million in the
Israeli Swiss account. This $12 million was transferred to
Ghorbanifar who owed $12 million to Khashoggi who had advanced
the financing on the sale. Out of this transaction, it appears
that $10 million went to the private investors who had put up
$10 million in advance; $1 million went to the private
investors as interest on their advance; and $1 million went to
Khashoggi for his promotional efforts. It appears that
Ghorbanifar obtained no direct profit from this particular
sale. (Note: This may differ from some of the North memoranda
which suggest that Ghorbanifar may have gotten a cut out of
each TOW missile which was sold.)
(On March 7, Ghorbanifar apparently suggested the possibility
of overcharging the Iranians for arms being shipped to them and
then diverting funds from these arms sales either to Afghan
rebels or the FDN. Ghorbanifar made this suggestion to George
Cave of the CIA who cabled it back to headquarters.)
May Hawk Missile Parts Delivery (Possible Thesis)
Consistent with the early April planning memorandum drafted by
North which suggested a $12 million diversion to the Contras,
those planning Iranian arms sales determined that they would
pass along to the Iranians this $12 million proposed funding.
In addition, the scheme involved charging the Iranians $2
million to cover the cost of the TOWS previously shipped by
Israel in August of 1985; the US was obligated to replenish the
TOW stock, and it was believed that this $2 million could be
charged against the Iranians. In addition, included in the
calculus was included $1 million in transaction costs, $3
million for investor profits, and approximately $4.5 million
for the actual cost of the weapons parts. The sum total of
these costs came to approximately $22.5 million.
Khashoggi then put together a deal to raise a $15 million
advance for the sale of these weapons; $5 million was raised
from an Arab investor and $10 million was raised from two
Canadians. This $15 million was then deposited in the Israeli
Swiss account. Israel wanted its payment for this shipment off
the top. This payment included $4.5 million for Hawk missile
parts and $2 million to cover the cost of the previously-
shipped 504 TOWS (although the US had agreed to replenish this
stock apparently without cost to the Israelis -- it appears the
Israelis intended to collect twice on this first shipment).
With the payment of $6.5 million to the Israelis, there
remained $8.5 million in the Israeli Swiss account. This $8.5
million apparently was moved to North's own Swiss account, and
subsequently, may have been drawn down by Secord.
When McFarlane delivered the weapons parts to Iran in May in
conjunction with his trip, only about one-sixth of the proposed
Hawk parts were actually taken into Iran. The Iranians
balked at paying $22.5 million for one-sixth of the proposed
shipment. As a result of negotiations, the Iranians agreed to
pay a total of $8 million for the Hawk spare parts over the
course of three months. This $8 million was transferred to the
Israeli Swiss account; it was then moved to Ghorbanifar's
account, then to Khashoggi's account. Of this $8 million, $5
million was used to repay the Arab investor, and $3 million in
interest was paid to the Arab and to the two Canadians. As a
result of this transaction, there was a $10 million deficit
still owed to the Canadian investors. (It is this $10 million
apparently owed to the Canadian investors which gave rise to
Furmark's being alerted to the problem of possible litigation
over this issue, as well as to the probable disclosure of the
whole transaction unless the Canadians were paid.)
October 1986 TOW Shipment
This transaction appeared to eliminate the middlemen. The
Iranians in this case were willing to put up the money
directly, and deposited $4 million in the Israeli Swiss account
to cover their payment for the 500 TOWS. Israel paid to the US
$2.037 million which was to cover the cost of the TOWS to the
USG. The 500 TOWS were shipped to Israel, and then
transshipped to Iran. This transaction left $2 million
unaccounted for in the Israeli account. (In conjunction with
Peres' September 15, 1986, meeting with the President, Israel
indicated it was planning to ship weapons to the FDN; one
hypothesis suggests that the $2 million in the Israeli account
might have been used to cover the cost of the arms apparently
shipped by Israel to the FDN.)
1-6-86
Bruf of a I
WHC
open - NOW
.PJW
Abobut
JBS
OML
- Charology
AR
-
PA
avoid water to ther
Spenks
-
Handle m info (CIA)
C.A
Ball
-
accord all Cong
whith
Tamer
-
Ex Brank condint " common monthing apten.
NSC
Peason
-
That of issues / bread by issues
Rugar.
abobece
Sunty
Me broth -
#2 server. multing.
Conguasional requests -
- - SSCI
- requesentation / remburnment issue
- documentation request
- reveny report for
-HPSCI
- downments
-
-
Chimology 7 events
- -multiple accounts - inemsistences
arm to documents by forms staff. /JP/ON
Crea. Intell. Overapt Bd.
(AR) FBI / DOJ
Revin of documents for release
Removal of dowments by FBC
(non relevant resolution gooding)
approv. 3000 -
Tower Commin -
Receipt of documents ( same an your to IBI)
No claim of Ex. Priviligo ( advice to Pun - Insted mp/
Jany Speaker
Dut to better 7 the - Yes. act time
No operations - chailess only arbid facts
Release of 58CI report
Intent - abshur role
Press problem -
- was at good spoling
- aims for hostager
- decreasemathy percess
- Presidented knowledge 7th issue
- Signature of events
- Legal aspert - Brland /am upat /fands have
Purblems:
- denied pergram
strewall-early period - RK put rut m limb
Contradutions - role
Info - dutio drobe
Will Will ball Ball
Notes to Congues m hostage releases
Phase I- NOV. 4 NN. 23 -
Jan 17 Finding - issue f notice to Comg.
am for hostoger -
Brefry 7 bodnetip by JP. - fond
Phase II
R.R. injormed 4-partm boduchy re
direction i Then publec amooment.
Phase III. committee hearings -
failure: North/Prinderter 5m
Jr whith
yourklens ay dreamte to Comm.
Corcern about Casey testing
there Gov. Ope -
Brooker - purty for CAO
- resitance to 640 involvet
For. affairs Com - GAO role - denned
generally veni their role as closed
- shully /muse prouble that
-turn-wer to Select Comm.
Sebet Committees : balanced
Scope - brand
- covent open generally
- private assist to contras
- This arms Transfer / funds
- Jay returns -
- NSC / E. O.P. operational actiony
Tength - Oct 30 likely
select Come
Procedure - watness appearance
- dysitime by staff
Problems me Spectation 7 documents
cleanty Sprocedum
Timing:
Introduce resolutions today - House -
Samate shorty - The week
Hearing - late Jan
Stoffig 7 Comm -
anulla ag. activities nature by the Comm u/ junistict
HFA / Intilligm Comm. /
am transfer
(mayonts of bith Salect Come supported Eartron Daniel supm)
NSC (Dearson)
Decesion mady Sprouns (enter agent organing
Dec 6 Radio address + Uni One spuch
Data base about complete now- anthority integuty
Coordinate f FOIA requests
C. Dean McGrath, Jr. Activities
Meeting with David Abshire January 6, 1987
I.
Congressional Inquiries with Jay Stephens
SSCI -
Represented several witnesses (Coy & McDaniel)
at Committee hearings
-
Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to
Committee request
-
Reviewed the SSCI Report for declassification
review
-
Worked on the problems associated with the
testimony of Lt. Col. Earle and Howard Teicher
HPSI -
Accompanied an NSC staff member (Florence Gantt)
to an interview by HPSI staff
-
Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to
Committee request
HFAC -
Reviewed and provided documents pursuant to
Committee request
II.
Chronology of Events
Reviewed documents for incorporation into a detailed
chronology of events
Prepared an abbreviated chronology for use in briefing
the President
III. Requests for Representation by Earle and Teicher
Requests for reimbursement of their attorneys
Requests for documents
IV.
Coordination with CIA, Defense, Justice and State
Attend weekly meetings
Attempt to assure security of documents released
V.
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
Requests for documents
Meeting With David Abshire
Roosevelt Room
6 January 1987
I. FBI Document Requests
A. FBI Impounded Contents of OEOB Room 302 (North et al.)
B. Copies of Documents Provided to Raul for Relevancy
Determination
C. Raul Provides List of Relevant/Non-Relevant Documents
to Brenda Reger at. NSC
1. FBI removes originals of documents Raul determines
are relevant
2. FBI/Independent Counsel will at future time resolve
non-relevant documents
D. Raul Has Now Reviewed All Documents Provided by FBI
II. Search of WH Central Files
A. Copies of All Relevant Documents Provided to FBI
III. Search of WH Staff Desk Files
A. Copies of All Files Provided to FBI
IV. Tower Commission
A. Copies of All FBI-Relevant Documents Provided to
Tower via NSC
B. Additional Documents Provided to Krieg/Tower Where
Documents Relevant to Tower Case Studies but not FBI
V. HPSCI
A. Raul Attended Staff Interviews of Paul Thompson
and Wilma Hall