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John Roberts' Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Asbestos Legislation (2)
Box: 4
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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33 Box 4 - JGR/Asbestos Legislation (2) - Roberts, John G.: Files
SERIES I: Subject File
DATE
1946
MARIDUE
COMMISSION-
CONFIDENTIAL
PULICY DOCUMENTATION ]
THE NAVAL AND MARITIME SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS
Log No.
(Prepared by the Policy Analysis and Records Branch, Office of
the Executive Secretary, War Production Board, July 18, Class 1944)
No.
033, 3
shiphmal
Naval Program July 1940 to December 1941. The Naval construction
program started earlier than any other major phase of our defense effort.
From 1934 to 1940 almost 600,000 tons of combatant ships had been added
to the Navy. By July 1, 1940, the United States Navy had a total of
1,300,000 tons of major combatant ships in service. Making up this
total were 15 battleships, of which 3 were overage; 6 aircraft carriers;
18 heavy. cruisers; 19 light cruisers, of which 2 were overage; 225
destroyers; and 101 submarines. 151 destroyers and 68 submarines were
overage.
The combatant ships in service and the planned additions in the
spring of 1940 constituted a sizeable sea force. Had not the world
picture changed rapidly at that time, it would not, perhaps, have seemed
too inadequate for the task of safeguarding American interests. For
with a friendly British fleet protecting the Atlantic approaches to the
United States, a one-ocean Navy, largely concentrated in the Pacific,
appeared to be adequate for this nation's defensive purposes.
The isolation of Great Britain in 1940 by the Nazi invasion of
Norway, the Low Countries, and France, together with the simultaneous
Japanese aggression in the Pacific, foreshadowed the possibility of
simultaneous naval action in two or more oceans. The one-ocean Navy
which had seemed adequate a few years. before was now entirely inadequate.
As a result, in June 1940 the legislative basis for a two-ocean Navy was
laid. In less than two months Congress approved three separate additions
to the Navy. When completed, these planned additions of 2,172,000 tons
of major combat ships were to triple the size of the fleet as it existed
in the summer of 1940.
After Congress had acted, the Navy speedily contracted for the
new additions. By October 1, 1940, 336 major or combat ships totaling
2,172,000 tons were under construction or on order. In addition, con-
tracts for 17 auxiliary ships, 31 patrol vessels, and 132 district craft
had been let. 3/ As planned in 1940, this new addition to the fleet was
to be of a classical type, preponderantly strong in battleships and
WPB, "Defense Progress", No. 1, August 8, 1940.
WPB, "Defense Progress", No. 9, October 4, 1940; Memorandum, Rear
Admiral E. S. Land to W. S. Knudsen, July 16, 1940.
WPB, "Defense Progress", No. 9, October 4, 1940.
FURNIES
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 130022
BY ERC KLES; Bria 5-19-83
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2. -
cruisers, and relatively weak in aircraft carriers. It was to consist
of 17 battleships, 12 carriers, 6 large or battle cruisers, 8 heavy
cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 171 destroyers, and 82 submarines. The
following planned completion dates underscored the pre-eminent position
of battleships às against carriers:
Battleships
Carriers
Battleships
Carriers
1941
2
0
1944
3
4
1942
1
1
1945
5
3
1943
4
0
1946
2
4
The 1940 Naval program had one other striking characteristic. The pro-
gram concentrated heavily upon large combatant ships. Relatively little
emphasis was placed upon small escort and anti-submarine vessels.
Obviously, the history of the 1917-18 submarine warfare had either been
forgotten or disregarded.
Once established, the two-ocean Navy program remained largely
unchanged in quantity until Pearl Harbor. However, as the course of the
war in Europe and events in Asia became increasingly ominous for the
United States, accelerations of scheduled deliveries were made. In
December 1940, by authorization of the President, the goal for destroyers
was changed from 101 to 149 by the end of 1943. 5/ This acceleration was
undoubtedly prompted in part by our transfer of 50 overage destroyers to
Great Britain in return for bases in the near Atlantic. A second advance
in schedules was made in August 1941, at which time 116,000 tons were
added to the scheduled deliveries for 1942. 6/.
The two-ocean Navy program launched in the spring and summer of
1940 involved more than just the construction of ships. Because of the
size of the program, new shipyards had to be built, and new ways con-
structed. Thus, the December 1940 acceleration of destroyers had to be
preceded by the laying out of six new shipyards. Moreover, great
expansion of facilities for the production of critical components had
to be made before completion of the program was assured. Up until
December 31, 1941, the total funds appropriated for Naval ships amounted
to $9,605,000,000. of that amount, only about 50 percent was allocated
for actual construction. The rest of the sum was needed for facilities,
armor, armament, and equipment.
4/ Shipbuilding Division, WPB, "United States Naval Shipbuilding Program,
Combatant Vessels", August 1, 1941; WPB, "Defense Progress" No. 9,
October 4, 1940.
Letter, W. S. Knudsen to Rear Admiral S. M. Robinson, December 2, 1940.
WPB, "Defense Progress", No. 55, September 12, 1941.
7/ Letter, W. S. Knudsen to Rear Admiral S. M. Robinson, December 2, 1940.
8 NDAC Press Release 293, December 6, 1940; WPB, "Financial Analysis War
Program, United States", February 10, 1941 (WPB Document 17).
CONFIDENTIAL
CONT IDENTIAL
- 3 -
Merchant Shipbuilding Program, July 1940 to December 1941. -
When the war started in September 1939, the United States had the second
largest merchant fleet in the world. The United States merchant fleet
at that time amounted to about 1,150 ocean-going vessels of 3,000 dead-
weight tons or over in size, aggregating approximately 10,500,000 dead-
weight tons. Even so, this fleet was entirely inadequate to carry
essential seaborne commerce of this country. In 1940 a total of
26,000,000 long tons of dry carge was imported into the United States,
of which only 9,300,000 tons or 36.8 percent was carried by American
flagships. In 1941 it was estimated that if the United States fleet
were forced to carry by itself all the critical war and other essential
materials needed by this country there would be an estimated annual
shortage of 3,400,000 to 5,700,000 tons of shipping. 9/
There was also one other great deficiency in the-United States
merchant fleet as it existed in September 1939. That was in the
character of the individual ships making up the fleet. Most of them
had been built during or immediately after the World War. Consequently
the ships were, for a large part, overage, slow, and unsuited for many
purposes required by modern warfare.
Some concrete steps had been taken before the outbreak of the
war to improve the condition of the United States merchant marine. With
the passage of the Merchant Marine act of 1936, a ten year program of
construction had been started. This program called for the building of
about 50 high-speed standard merchant ships a year so that over a ten
year period most of the obsolete vessels would have been replaced. But
deliveries under this program had scarcely gotten started when the war
broke out and the need for far greater completions of merchant shipping
was apparent.
From September 1939 through November 1941 the size of the United
States merchant fleet was actually shrinking. This was due to our sale
or transfer of ships to Great Britain and Panama to aid the British and
to circumvent the law barring the use of United States flagships in
belligerent waters. By June 1941, one estimate placed the size of the
merchant fleet under the United States flag at 6,900,000 tons. 10/ In
July 1940, however, a greatly increased program for the construction of
standard merchant ships was scheduled. This program called for the con-
struction of 10,000,000 tons of standard cargo shipping by early in
1944. But as the course of the war increasingly threatened the security
of the United States, even this program appeared to be greatly inadequate
9/ WPB, "Defense Progress" No, 42, May 31, 1941.
10/ WPB, "Defense Progress" No. 49, July 25, 1941.
60MF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
to the assumed future needs. The hard fact was that enemy submarines
were sinking ships faster than the United States and Great Britain
could build ships during 1940 and 1941, From the start of the war
until the middle of 1941 submarine sinkings had averaged about 425,000
tons a month. American production of ocean-going ships reached
100,000 tons a month in July 1941 and the peak production of 450,000
tons a month was not scheduled under the new ship program until a year
later. 11/ Obviously what was nseded was a ship which could be mass-
produced in the shortest possible time, and the construction of which
would not interfere with the great naval construction program then
under way. The standard cargo ship then being constructed did not fit
that bill of particulars. It was expensive to construct in both man-
hours and materials, and its main propulsive engines were of the type
needed by the naval program.
In December of 1941 the Maritime Commission recommended to the
President that the so-called "Ugly Duckling" be mass-produced to answer
the need for a greatly increased ship production in the shortest possible
time. The design for the "Ugly Duckling", since called the Liberty ship,
was adapted from a British tramp-steamer type. The new Liberty ship was
of 8,600 or more cargo deadweight tons and had a speed of 11 knots. It
was powered by a reciprocating engine, the procurement of which would
not encroach on the turbine and diesel requirements for combat craft.
From the start it was understood that there were to be few changes made
on the Liberty ship, to facilitate the use of assembly-line methods and
the extensive prefabrication of parts. One other innovation in the con-
struction of the ship is noteworthy. It was to be largely electrically
welded instead of riveted. 12/
With the design for the new emergency ship approved, plans for
its construction were rapidly made. In December 1940 the President
allocated to the Maritime Commission $36,000,000 to start preliminary
work on a new shipbuilding program. On February 6, 1941, Congress, by
Joint Resolution, authorized the construction of the new emergency
type. 13/ Thereafter, additional increases were made to the emergency
ship program in April, July, October, and December. In the summer of
1941 this country was producing about 100,000 tons of merchant shipping
a month. By the December 1941 schedule, the construction of over
500,000 tons a month was planned for 1942. 14/
11/ WPB, "Defense Progress" No. 49, July 25, 1941.
12/ Memorandum, Rear Admiral E. S. Land to the President, December (?),
1940; Letter, W. S. Knudsen to the President, November 19, 1940;
United States Senate, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., Special Committee
Investigating the National Defense Program, Report No. 10, Pt. 18,
June 23, 1944.
13/ Memorandum, Harold D. Smith to William S. Knudsen, December 31,
1940; The President to Rear Admiral E. S. Land, April 14, 1941.
14/ Planning Committee, WPB, "Report on Maritime Shipbuilding Program",
July 20, 1943 (Planning Committee Document 133).
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
Facilities, Components, and Materials, Before a good start
could be made on either the Naval or Maritime construction programs
the shipyards and the new ways needed to build the ships had to be
planned and constructed. Since the increased Naval program had been
planned and under way many months before 1941, the problem of ways
did not seriously interfere with the construction of the larger com-
batant ships. But from its start, the Maritime program was limited
by the number of ways available. In 1936 there were only 10 ship-
yards and 46 ways in this country capable of producing ocean-going
vessels of 400 feet longer. A handful of new ways had been con-
structed between that time and 1940. But in 1941, seven new ship-
yards with 50 new ways had to be constructed before the delivery of
200 new merchant ships could be assured during the next two years.
17
6
Every increase to the merchant ship program after that date meant
additional shipyards and-new- ways. When the peak Maritime Program
96
300w
of 20,000,000 tons had been worked out for 1943 it was to require
the utilization of 81 shipyards and over 300 ways. 15/
Throughout the entire period previous to Pearl Harbor, the
Maritime Commission encountered especial difficulties in obtaining
the materials and components needed for the enlarged merchant ship
program. This was not only because of the greatly increased Mar1=
time need for these items but also because of the severe competi-
tion afforded by the Navy for many of these same items and the
facilities making them. And in the competition between the Navy and
the Maritime Commission the odds were all with the Navy. For one
thing, the expanded Navy program had started much earlier than the
merchant ship program and thus the Navy got the jump on the Maritime
Commission as far as selection of facilities were concerned. For a
second thing, combatant ships seemed more closely connected with the
defense effort than merchant ships, and manufacturers tended to react
more favorably to the appeals of the Navy. Seemingly, only in priori-
ties did the Maritime Commission fare as well as the Navy Department.
But this happy state of affairs lasted only until November 7, 1941.
When the Maritime Commission contacted manufacturing companies with
proposals to build reciprocating engines the Commission was told in
practically all cases that any promises to the Maritime Commission
would have to await until their commitments to the Navy had been
worked out in full. 16/ Substantially the same story was repeated
in the quest for turbines, valves, and gears. of the needed materials,
steel was by far the most important and by far the most critical.
15 Memorandum, Rear Admiral E. S. Land to Frank Knox et al.,
February 4, 1941; United States Senate, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program,
Report No. 10, Pt. 18, June 23, 1944.
16/ Letter, Rear Admiral E. S. Land to W. S. Knudsen, March 19, 1941.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 6 -
Throughout 1941, reports were made repeatedly of ships being held up
for the lack of steel. At one time, a Kaiser yard reported that all
work had been stopped on three vessels because of the need for
steel. 17/ However, both the Navy and the Maritime programs were in
need of steel. At the same time that the Maritime Commission was
reporting a shortage of steel, the starting of two destroyers was held
up at the Charleston Navy Yard for the want of steel. 18/
Production Progress to December 31, 1941. The time lapse
between the start of a ship program and the actual production of ships
is great, especially when yards and ways have to be constructed before
work can start. After facilities have been completed, the actual con-
struction time of larger ships amounts to many months and in case of
the larger combatant ships, years. Obviously then, much of the neces-
sary preparatory shipbuilding work done in 1940 and 1941 did not show
up in Naval and Maritime completions during that time. Still, the
deliveries during these years were not negligible. From July 1, 1941,
to December 31, 1941, 2,228 Navy ships of all classes were completed,
with a total tonnage of 1,354,000 tons. 49 of these were combatant
ships, a figure which included two 35,000 ton battleships, one 19,800
ton carrier, one 6,000 ton light cruiser, and sixteen submarines of
1,526 displacement tons. The rest of the Naval tonnage was made up
of landing craft, patrol vessels, and auriliaries. 19
Maritime deliveries for the period from July 1, 1940, to
December 31, 1941, amounted to 135 shipa of 1,551,000 tons, Making up
this total were 77 standard high-speed cargo vessels and 37 standard
tankers. The Liberty ship program, the design for which had been
selected in December 1940, produced seven ships during the last half
of 1941, a figure which well illustrates the length of time needed to
get a mass-production ship program under way. 20/
Naval Program, January 1942 to June 1943. Prior to Pearl Harbor
a good start had been made on the program to change the United States
Navy from a one- to a two-ocean Navy. With the entrance of this nation
into the global struggle and with the enormous damage done to our &fleet
on December 7, 1941, this two-ocean Navy program appeared to be entirely
inadequate to meet the existing situation. Within three months after
Pearl Harbor the funds appropriated for Navy ships had been increased
from $9,600,000,000 to $15,400,000,000. And by September 1942 complete
17/ Letter, Henry J. Kaiser to Benjamin F. Fairless, June 30, 1941.
18/ Memorandum, W. H. Harrison to J. D. Biggers, April 24, 1941.
19/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production of The United States", July 1,
1942, June 1, 1944.
20/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production of The United States", July 1,
1942, June 1, 1944.
IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7 -
plans had been made for a "Five Ocean Navy", which contemplated quad-
rupling the size of the existing fleet to bring the total combat
tonnage to about 8,000,000 tons. In addition to these great increases,
the entire Naval program was accelerated by months. Ships which were
previously scheduled for the late months of 1942 were now scheduled for
March and April of 1942. And many major units scheduled for completion
in 1943 were now brought into 1942 schedules. This "Five Ocean Navy"
program, with certain important alterations, has remained in its larger
outlines the basic Havy ship program until the present. Paralleling it,
of course, was another huge program for Naval facilities, including dry
docks and other facilities. 21/
Following the naval engagement in the Coral Sea and the one off
Midway Island in May and June of 1942 a major change was made in the
heavy combatant ship program. In those two sea battles, 23 ships were
sunk by naval air action without the opposing fleets getting in gun
range of each other. This fact, together with the experience at Pearl
Harbor, convinced the Navy of the tremendous striking power of the
carrier compared to that of the battleship. In June 1942, the construc-
tion of five battleships and four heavy battle cruisers was indefinitely
postponed to make way for the construction of more carriers. 22/
At the start of 1942 the United States Navy had seven carriers,
of which four were sunk during that year. Moreover, as of February
1942, only one regular carrier was scheduled for completion in 1942 and
twelve more in 1943, 1944, and 1945. After the battle of Midway this
lack of balance was hastily corrected. By September 1942 the Navy had
scheduled 30 regular carriers and 9 small carriers to be converted from
10,000 tom cruisers. During 1943, six 27,000 ton carriers and all nine
of the converted carriers were delivered, thus relieving a critical
deficiency in American seapower. 23/
of particular interest during 1942 and 1943 was the Navy's destroyer
escort and aircraft carrier escort programs. From the start of war until
December 1942, German submarines had sunk an average of about 450,000 tons
of Allied merchant shipping & month.- After Pearl Harbor this rate took a
decided upturn with the inception of total submarine warfare in the Nes-
tern Atlantic. During 1942, the United Nations lost an average of about
21/ WPB, "Financial Analysis War Program United States", February 10,
1942 (WPB Document 17); WPB, "War Progress", No. 108, October 9,
1942; Memorandum, W. H. Harrison to Donald Nelson, February 2, 1942.
22/ WPB, "War Munitions Progress Report", June 16, 1942 (WPB Document 96).
23/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production Of The United States", April 1,
1942, July 1944; Navy, Bureau of Ships, "Combatant Vessels Under Con-
struction", February 1, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 8 -
750,000 tons of shipping a month, and by September 1942 the total ton-
nage of merchant ships available to the United Nations was about
10,000,000 tons less than the total available in 1939. 24/ Obviously,
the United Nation's war effort was seriously curtailed if not imperiled
by this wholesale destruction of merchant shipping.
At the time of Pearl Harbor, and for months thereafter, this
nation had to rely almost entirely on the destroyer to protect its
merchant convoys. But the United States had entirely too few destroyers
for the task, and the destroyers available were often needed elsewhere.
As pointed out before, during 1940 and 1941 the Navy had concentrated on
large combat ships and had neglected smaller craft. During that period
anti-submarine type crafts had comprised only about six percent of the
total naval deliveries. In the face of steadily mounting losses, this
was raised to about 22 percent in 1942 and about 40 percent in 1943. 25/
Relying on British experience, the United States Navy started the
construction of two special types of vessels to control the submarine
menace. The first of these was the aircraft carrier escart, a converted
merchantman carrying planes, and the second, the destroyer escort. Two
more or less experimental carrier escorts were constructed in 1941, and
13 were delivered in 1943, 5 of which were sent to the British. During
1943, 50 carrier escorts were constructed, 31 by the Navy and 19 by the
Maritime Commission. 40 more escort carriers were scheduled for 1944.
As predicted by its advocates, the carrier escort has been signally
successful in combating the submarine. 26/
As its main anti-submarine craft, however, the Navy devised the
destroyer escort. This was a 1,500 ton craft, about two-thirds the size
of the large destroyer and twice the size of the largest submarine
chaser. The first destroyer-escort contracts were let in January 1942.
Their construction was hampered, however, by interference from the landing
craft program, and the first destroyer escort was not completed until
January 1943, thirteen months after the United States had entered the war.
Reflecting the spiralling rate of sinkings by submarines, the destroyer-
escort program was repeatedly raised during 1942 until 750 of them had
been scheduled for delivery before 1945. "Meanwhile, the Navy, because of
its lagging anti-submarine craft program, had to convert hundreds of
pleasure and commercial vessels into coast guard and escort work. 27/
24 WPB, "War Progress", No. 163, October 1943.
25/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 125, February 5, 1943.
26/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 119, December 25, 1943; WPB, "Official
Munitions Production Of The United States", June 1, 1944.
27/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 102, August 28, 1942; Progress Division,
WPB, "Report to the War Production Board", August 1942 (WPB Document
130).
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 9 -
The submarine war became so serious in 1942 and the production
of destroyer escorts lagged 80 badly that the destroyer-escort program
was raised at the end of the year to a position of the highest urgency
on the President's "Must Programs M 28 At the same time, the WPB made
available to the program its special expediting service that had been
BO successful in the first landing craft program. Rated as an AA-1 pro-
gram, the production of destroyer escorts first exceeded the current
schedule plus past deficits in October 1943. But for the year 1943,
306 such ships were produced as against a schedule of 260. The ultimate
result of these production figures was reflected in the sharply declin-
ing rate of ship sinkings. By September of 1943 the destroyer-escort
program was being cut back. 29/
of pre-eminent importance to strategical developments abroad was
the Navy's landing craft program. Measured by either tonnage or cost
figures, the landing craft program was the largest small vessel program
scheduled by the Navy. Starting with a few tank lighters of assorted
shapes and sizes in 1937, the landing craft program by 1944 included
thousands of vessels ranging in size from small rubber raiding boats of
a few pounds to ocean-going vessels of 4,500 tons and over. Among the
most important types of landing craft which have been developed for
amphibious warfare are the LVT's (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) which are
able to operate on both land and water and which, when armored, are
really seagoing tanks; the ISM's (Landing Ship, Medium) of 490 tons,
which are designed to carry men and equipment through very shallow waters;
the LST's (Landing Ship, Tank) ocean-going ships of 1,490 tons which carry
tanks and other heavy equipment items to a beach and disgorge them through
their open bow; and the ISD's (Landing Ship, Dock), which transport other
landing craft and which act as repair ships for other landing craft.
Landing craft schedules have naturally reflected future amphibious
operations. The first great landing craft program was started in April
1942 when the Navy was ordered to provide craft for the North African and
Pacific operations scheduled to start in the fall of that year. When the
final requirements for these indispensable vessels were totalled in
September 1942 the long-time program was tremendous in size. By that time
landing craft requirements totalled 9,598 vessels of varying size to be
1
delivered by the end of 1946. 30/
28 Letter, Rear Admiral E. S. Land to W. Francis Gibbs, January 21,
1943.
29 Progress Division, WPB, "Monthly Report to the War Production Board",
January 1944 (WPB Document 270).
30/ Progress Division, WPB, "Monthly Report to the War Production Board",
October 1942 (WPB Document 142).
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 10 -
Since most of the regular shipbuilding yards were busy with
other types of Navy vessels, landing craft orders had to be given to
small boat yards, bridge construction companies, and other manufac-
turing concerns. By June 30, 1942, contracts for landing craft had
been let to 5 Navy yards, 22 major private yards, 11 minor private
yards, 12 small boat yards, and 29 manufacturing companies, some of
which had never built ocean-going boats before. of the total number
of landing craft yards, 21 were located in the Mississippi River-
Great Lakes water sheds. 31/
Both of the great landing craft campaigns have been character-
ized by the extreme shortness of time between the date on which the
military planners ordered the craft and the date by which they were
to be completed. By August 1942, landing craft deliveries were 50
far behind the impossible schedules which had been set in April that
a special program to expedite them was organized. Landing craft were
put in the most urgent category of vessels wanted by the Navy and all
landing craft were given an AA-1 priority rating. Thereafter a spec-
ial WPB organisation was created to work with the Navy to expedite
the delivery of landing craft materials and components. With this
special aid, landing craft deliveries, which had been running 50 per-
cent or more behind schedules in September, met the schedule in full
by December 1942. And by February 1943, production was so great that
the program was leveled off thereafter to about half the rate of that
month's production. From July 1940 to December 1941 the Navy had pro-
duced 8,328 tons of landing craft; 230,000 tons were produced in 1942,
and 793,000 tons in 1943. 32/
The second great landing craft program was started after
strategic plans had been made for the invasion of Western Europe. To
make the second front possible, schedules for landing craft were in-
creased sharply in September, October and November 1943. 33/ As in
the first program, the time between the planning of the program and the
expected delivery dates was desperately short. It was not until
December 1, 1943, that a final decision was made on the exact amounts
of landing craft needed for the invasion of France. Between that date
and the deadline date of May 31, 1944, the schedules called for the
delivery of about 675,000 tons of landing craft. This figure repre-
sented the absolute maximum which the Navy thought it possible to produce.
31/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 117, December 11, 1942.
32/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production of The United States", July 1,
1944.
33/ Bureau of Ships, "Landing Craft Progress Report", September, October,
November, December 1943.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 11 -
On December 1, 1943, the delivery of these requirements looked like
an almost impossible task. And up until April 1944 deliveries for
each month lagged badly behind the published schedule. But in April
and May 1944 production shot up under the impetus of a great campaign.
By May 31 total deliveries for the six months came within 12,000 tons
of meeting the schedules. Undoubtedly this was one of the most suc-
cessful high-speed jobs of war production accomplished by this
nation. 34/
The WPB played an important part in this second landing craft
program. Three months before the final decisions were made on the
quantities of craft needed, the WPB was advocating increases on the
grounds that the existing schedules were inadequate to meet future
requirements. 35/ While on a trip to England in September, Donald
Nelson conferred with high military authorities there and found that
they considered the existing schedules for landing craft to be inade-
quate. He immediately cabled Gharles E. Wilson asking him to do every-
thing possible to increase the production of landing craft. 36/
Within two days after landing craft requirements were finally
set, an organization within the WPB was created to help expedite
materials and components for the program. Within the next five months
this organisation handled well over 2,000 requests from the Navy for
special priority assistance. In answer to these requests the WPB
granted over 2,200 directives on materials and components for landing
craft valued at $41,452,451.00. 37/ That the work of this WPB organi-
zation was effective was evident in the Navy statement that "sufficient
quantities of materials and components" were being supplied to assure
landing craft production on schedule. 38/
Total Navy Production, January 1, 1943 to May 31, 1944,-On June
30, 1940, the total tonnage of the United States Navy amounted to
1,875,000 tons; on December 31, 1941, the total tonnage was 2,636,000
tons; by May 31, 1944, that figure had been increased to 7,142,000 tons.
In other words, in two-and-a-half years approximately 4,500,000 tons of
ships had been added to the Navy. Included in that total tonnage were
7 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 19 light cruisers, 19 aircraft carriers,
34/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting LXXIIII, June 13, 1944.
35/ Progress Division, WPB, "Monthly Report to the War Production
Board", July 1943 (WPB Document 242).
36/ Cablegram (State Department paraphrase), Donald M. Nelson to
Charles E. Wilson, (Through Ambassador Winant and Secretary of
State) September 27, 1943.
37/ Special Rating Branch, WPB, "History of the Accelerated Landing
Craft Program", no date.
38/ Memorandum, "Statement of the Navy Department Before the War Pro-
duction Board on Landing Craft Production", April 4, 1944 (WPB
Document 291).
GONF IDENTIAL
CONE
- 12 -
191 destroyers, 121 submarines, 129 destroyer escorts, and 49 aircraft
escort carriers. 39/ In addition to these major combat ships, 34,850
landing craft of 1,600,000 total tons had been produced along with
hundreds of auxiliary vessels and other types of smaller craft. 40/
Maritime Shipbuilding Program January 1, 1942 to June 1944.-
After Pearl Harbor this nation's merchant shipbuilding program began
a fateful race with the German submarine. As submarine sinkings
skyrocketed during 1942, merchant shipbuilding schedules followed.
About 3,100,000 tons of United Nation's shipping had been destroyed
by submarines in 1940, and another 3,100,000 tons had been destroyed
in 1941. During 1942 the comparable figure was. 9,200,000 tons. This
great increase in sinkings resulted in part because the United States
Navy was not prepared to perform an adequate job of convoying. During
the first World War the ratio of escort vessels to merchantmen had
been about one to three. In 1942 that ratio, because of the lack of
escorts, varied between one to five and one to ten. Beyond the paucity
of escort vessels the submarine had the advantages in the second war of
more accessible bases, a far greater operational range, much greater
speed, and a significant increase in numbers. In January 1943 Germany
had about 400 submarines in service; the mumber during the First World
War was never greater than 140. 47/ These things added together meant
wholesale destruction of United Nations shipping and an herculean job
for the United States Maritime Commission. In the words of the WPB
Planning Committee, the Commission's really "impossible job" was to
build merchant ships faster than an "unmolested enemy" could sink
them. 42/
As sinkings rose during 1942, the shipbuilding schedules for
deliveries advanced rapidly. Four separate increases took place by
June 1942. At that time the schedules called for the construction of
8,300,000 tons of shipping in 1942 and 19,900,000 during 1943. 43/
This goal of about 27,000,000 tons of shipping in two years remained
with some downward alterations as the shipbuilding objective by
January 1, 1944.
There were many obstacles in the way of achieving this tremendous
merchant shipbuilding program. Much of the program had to wait on the
construction of new shipyards and new ways. Once built, the new yards
39/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 158, September 25, 1943.
40 WPB, "Official Munitions Production Of The United States", June 1,
1944.
47 WPB, "Merchant Ship Sinkings and the Submarine Mar" (WPB Document
188).
42/ Planning Committee, WPB, "Maritime Shipbuilding Program", Recommen-
dation No. 5, May 16, 1942.
43/ Planning Committee, WPB, "Report on Maritime Shipbuilding Program",
July 20, 1942 (Planning Committee Document 133).
CONT IDENTIAL
- 13 -
required time to learn the "know-how" of mass production shipbuilding.
Moreover, shipyards were constantly plagued with manpower and materials
problems. To some extent the wage stabilization plan for shipyards worked
out with WPB assistance prevented acute labor trouble, but at the end of
1942 it was estimated that the shipbuilding industry would need 900,000
additional workers to maintain peak production at all yards. 44 More
serious than the actual mumber of workers involved were the problems of
labor turnover and the need for training the available labor in the
particular skills wanted. In March 1942 the California Shipbuilding
Company had a total of 22,000 workers, but only 700 of those employees
had any previous shipbuilding experience. At that time training was being
given or had been given to 14,000 employees. 45/ The turnover of labor
continued to be a problem through 1943. In May 1943 the average turnover
of labor for all shipyards was 11.2 percent of the personnel. Only 2 per-
cent of this was attributable to selective service. After that date, how-
ever, the War Manpower Commission's restrictive orders proved to be of
substantial help in reducing labor turnover. 46/
Throughout 1942 and 1943 the merchant shipbuilding program was held
up from time to time by the shortage of gears, turbines, diesel engines,
valves, and steel. Of all these items, the most serious shortage was the
one existing in steel plates and shapes. At one time in 1942 the lack of
steel was reported to be holding up production in most of the Pacific
Coast Yards. 47/ During this period of the war the total supply of steel
was far below the total requirements and so all claimants suffered. But
the Maritime Commission, because of its unfavorable priority position as
compared to the Army and Navy, was hurt much more than either of these
Services. Throughout 1942 the Navy aggravated the Maritime Commission's
steel problems by diverting steel from the merchant ship program by means
of its higher priorities. 48/
Up until December 1941 the Army-Navy Munitions Board had granted
T
merchant vessels an equal priority with Naval construction. After December
17, 1941, however, this was no longer true and the merchant-ship program
thereafter was given an inferior priority rating. The Maritime Commission
received almost daily notifications of delays due to this priority disparity.
Appealing to the Army-Navy Munitions Board for equal status, Rear Admiral
Vickery estimated that it would delay the program by as much as five months
and would be particularly harmful to the production of tankers. 149/ But no
relief was given to the Commission despite the judgment of the Commander of
44/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting VI, February 24, 1942.
45/ WPB Press Release 442, March 6, 1942.
46/ WPB Press Release 3415, May 4, 1943.
47/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting XXII, June 30, 1942.
48/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting XXII, June 30, 1942.
49 Letter, Rear Admiral H. L. Vickery to Army-Navy Munitions Board,
January 22, 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 14 -
the United States Fleet that there was little use in producing all the
materials of war unless we could transport them abroad. 50/ Instead,
this unequal priority treatment was carried to the point where aircraft
escort carriers being constructed by the Maritime Commission carried a
lower priority than similar Navy construction. 51/
When the entire priority system was revised in May 1942, the
priority granted to the merchant-ship program by the Army-Navy Munitions
Board was still inferior to the priorities granted to the Naval program.
This was done in spite of the fact that the submarine campaign had
reached a peak of destructiveness and the entire war effort of the United
Nations was being threatened by the deficiency of shipping and the
tremendous loss of cargo on the high seas. Whereas an AA-1 priority was
granted at that time to all Navy vessels that could be completed before
March 31, 1943, a similar rating was given to only 50 percent of the
Maritime program that was to be completed before January 1, 1943. 52/
Even then there had been little conceded to the Maritime Commission for
a WPB analysis of the shipbuilding program revealed that 50 percent of
the 1942 program was to be completed by August 1942. Since the materials
for these ships had to be delivered in May 1942 to insure delivery by
August, the analysis concluded, "no materials are listed for the Maritime
Commission in the AA-1 category." 53/ But, despite protests by the WPB
Planning Committee, the inequality in priorities was continued. 54/
One of the chief reasons contributing to this inequality in
priorities was the lack of proper Maritime representation on the Army-
Navy Munitions Board. The Maritime Commission had representatives to this
Board that determined priorities for all munitions, but they were in a
subsidiary position, and on a numerical basis alone could be outvoted by
the representatives of the Army and Navy. Some of the inequalities resul-
ting from priorities might have been alleyiated had the WPB Shipbuilding
Division been more energetic in aiding the Maritime program. But appar-
ently this division lacked either the disposition or the energy to act
strongly in behalf of the Maritime program. In the summer of 1942 the
Navy, by means of its superior priorities, was placing orders in plants
booked solidly with Maritime orders, thus setting back the delivery of
needed components for merchant ships. Commenting on these delays, the
WPB Planning Committee observed that "with the exception of scheduling
main propulsion equipment, especially turbines and gears and electro-drive
mechanism, the Shipbuilding Branch of W.P.B. is paying little attention to
this problem. "55/
50/ Memorandum, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet to The Secretary of
the Navy, February 20, 1943 (WPB Document 32).
51/ Minutes, War Production Board, Meeting VI, February 24, 1942.
52/ Letter, Army and Navy Munitions Board to Donald M. Nelson, May 20,
1942.
53/ Memorandum, Bertram Fox to Stacy May, June 2, 1942.
54/ Planning Committee, WPB, "Report on Maritime Shipbuilding Program,
July 20, 1943 (Planning Committee Document 133).
55/ Planning Committee, WPB, "Report on Maritime Shipbuilding Pregram",
July 20, 1942 (Planning Committee Document 133).
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 15 -
Perhaps it is not out of place to observe here that both the
Maritime Commission and the WPB Shipbuilding Division were headed by
retired Navy personnel. Because of this fact it may have been that
the needs of the merchant shipbuilding program may not have been pre-
sented strongly enough when they ran counter to the needs of the Navy
program. At least it may be questioned whether, as a matter of good
administration, it is advisable to staff a vital wartime agency with
personnel attached in their loyalties in any way to another agency,
when those agencies are likely to be in competition for scarce
materials, components, and facilities.
Merchant Shipbuilding Production: January 1942 to May 1944.-
The first eight months of 1942 were a critical time in this nation's
merchant shipping program. For during this time deliveries were lag-
ging badly. On the other hand, the rate of sinkings by submarines was
ascending. In only one month out of the eight, July, did new construc-
tion in this country exceed in tonnage the amount of losses at sea.
Consequently, the size of the United States merchant fleet and that
of the United Nations was rapidly approaching the danger point. In
March 1942 it was noted that the shipbuilding program probably pre-
sented "the most serious aspect of the munitions program." 56/
From September 1942 on, however, the merchant shipping situation
rapidly grew better. For one thing, the mass production of merchant
ships began to result in mass deliveries. During the last quarter of
1942 the Maritime program delivered a total of 286 ships as compared
with 68 in the first quarter. 57/ In conjunction with that fact, sub-
marine sinkings began to decline slightly. Deliveries were so good
during the last quarter of 1942 that the President's goal of 8,000,000
tons for the year was exceeded by 9,000 tons. This rapidly accelerating
pace continued, with the construction during 1943 of 18,300,000 tons of
shipping. Moreover, in 1943 the submarine menace was gradually brought
6
under control. With construction outstripping sinkings in virtually
every month in 1943, the decline in the size of the United Nation's mer-
chant fleet was stopped, and relative increases made. By October 1943
the size of that fleet was back to what it had been in June 1940. From
that time on, submarine sinkings dropped steadily while monthly construc-
tion figures mounted. By May 1944 the United Nation's merchant fleet
rose to 67,000,000. deadweight tons as against the low point of 43,000,000
tons, and about 55,000,000 tons at the start of the war. In May 1944 new
construction in the United States totalled 1,600,000 tons; sinkings of all
United Nations vessels amounted to 35,000 tons. From July 1, 1940, to
May 31, 1944, Maritime yards had delivered about 36,000,000 deadweight
56/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 77, March 6, 1942, No. 102, August 28,
1942.
57/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production Of The United States", March
1943.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 16 -
tons of ships. American aptitude for construction had vanquished German
power of destruction. 58
In making the above deliveries the American shipyards participating
in the program broke all established shipbuilding records. In 1941 the
average time consumed in the construction of a Liberty ship from keel lay-
ing to delivery was 235 days. By the end of 1942 the average for all
yards had been reduced to 56 days. Particularly brilliant in 1942 was the
record set by the Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation in completing a ship in
14 days. 59/
The overall tonnage record set by the Maritime program would have
been impressive if it had included nothing but merchant shipping. But from
1942 on, the Maritime Commission built an increasing number of vessels for
critical Navy programs. Maritime yards constructed 19 military-type
vessels in 1942, 167 in 1943, and were scheduled for over 250 such vessels
in 1944. By types, these military vessels ranged from aircraft escort
vessels, landing ships, tanks, and corvettes to troop transports. In 1943,
for example, 31 of the 50 vessels converted to the escort carriers were
constructed by the Maritime Commission. 60/ In the same year, 60 IST's were
constructed in Maritime yards. After the German submarine had been appar-
ently brought under control, the Maritime Commission was asked by the Navy
to construct appreciable numbers of special troop transports and attack
transports. 229 transport-attack and cargo-attack vessels and 47 troop-
ships were scheduled for 1944. 61/ As each one of these types of military
vessels was of special design and required a large amount of special out-
fitting, they interrupted the cycle of production for merchant ships. For
every ton of special military vessels constructed, the Maritime Commission
lost an equivalent four or five tons of merchant shipping.
Another great change was made in the Maritime program when submarine
sinkings declined sharply. That was the gradual substitution of the Victory
6
ship for the Liberty ship. The Liberty ship, or the "Ugly Duckling" as it
had first been known, was strictly an emergency ship. It was a slow ship,
an ungraceful ship, and none too large as standard cargo vessels go. It
had been constructed because it had been capable of fast mass production
and because it used relatively few of the more critical components needed
in urgent combat vessels. However, these same features useful in an emer-
gency would militate against its usefulness in peacetime. In ordinary
58 WPB, "War Progress", No. 195, June 10, 1944; WPB, "Official Munitions
Production Of The United States", June 1, 1944.
59/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 94, July 3, 1942, No. 112, December 11, 1942.
60/ WPB, "War Progress", No. 172, January 1, 1944.
61 WPB, "War Progress", No. 179, February 19, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 17 -
times, it was feared, the competition of more powerful, larger, and
faster cargo vessels of foreign nations would drive it from the seas.
Proposals were therefore made in the middle of 1943 to substitute the
construction of a new ship, the so-called Victory ship for the Liberty
ship. The new Victory ship was to be longer and wider than the Liberty
ship, more elaborately fitted, and with considerable more power and
speed. Whereas the top speed of the Liberty type was 11 knots, the
speed of the new Victory ship was to be 15 knots. It was estimated
that the new Victory ship would cost $238 per ton as against $170 for
the Liberty and that it would require double the time to construct. 62/
Previous to 1943 there had been some support for constructing
faster merchant ships on the grounds that their greater speed would
better protect them from submarine attack. But each time the proposal
was made it was defeated on the score that a faster ship would take.
longer to construct and that it would require main propulsion units
that were critically needed for combat ships. Raising the same objec-
tions in 1943, Charles E. Wilson refused to authorize materials and
components for the new Victory ship until its construction had been
approved by the Combined Shipbuilding Committee and the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. 63/
The Combined Shipbuilding Committee had been created to standard-
ize the design of all ships in this nation's shipbuilding program. 64/
W. F. Gibbs, WPB Controller of Shipbuilding, was its chairman. Gibbs,
who had attempted without too much success to standardize Navy designs
had had better luck on the Maritime program. Acting as WPB Controller
of Shipbuilding and as Chairman of the Combined Shipbuilding Committee,
W. F. Gibbs had been instrumental in reducing the number of types of
geared turbines used by the Maritime program from 27 to 9, the number
of types of turbo-generator sets from 77 to 17, and the number of types
of tugs constructed from 23 to 7. 65/
62 Minutes, WPB, Meeting LVIX, May 25, 1943; WPB, "War Progress", No.
176, January 29, 1944.
63, Letter, c: E. Wilson to Ralph Cordiner, March 24, 1943.
64/ As one illustration, Gibbs had pointed out early in 1943 that the
Navy was constructing five different types of destroyer escorts and
corvettes and that each type had a different main propulsion unit.
His argument, however, that standardization would mean a great sav-
ing in manpower, materials, and time was overruled by the Navy on
the grounds that they were too far committed to the existing programs
to effect a change. Letter, W. F. Gibbs to J. V. Forrestal, January
19, 1943.
65/ WPB Press Release 4089, August 22, 1943.
COMP
- 18 -
The Combined Shipbuilding Committee approved the construction
of Victory ships after a simplified type of geared turbine had been
substituted for the Lenz engines in the original design. 66/ After
this decision the first few Victory ships were scheduled and the first
delivery was made in February 1944. 67/ In January 1944, when it was
obvious that the submarine menace was being substantially controlled,
sharp cuts were made in Liberty ships, and increased numbers of Victory
ships were added to the 1944 schedules. As of June 1, 1944, 741 Liberty
ships and 129 Victory ships were scheduled for production in 1944. For
1945, 104 Liberty ships and 278 Victory ships were scheduled. 68/
1
66, Memorandum, Charles E. Wilson to Ralph Cordiner, May 13, 1943.
67/ WPB, "Official Munitions Production Of The United States,"
June 1, 1944.
-
68 WPB, "Official Munitions Production Of The United States",
June 1, 1944.
CONFIDENTIAL
MARITIME COMMIS
July 1, 1940 t
Total Maritime
Standard Cargo
Deliveries
Vessels
CONFIDENTIAL
Biosissar Punishable Under Espissage 10
DWT
DWT
Tons
Tons
No. (000)
No.
(000)
1940 Second Half
31
357
18
185
1941 First Half
46
538
32
323
Second Half
58
628
27
242
1942 January
16
199
3
26
February
25
280
4
33
0
March
26
292
2
17
April
36
401
1
11
May
57
620
2
19
June
66
732
2
19
E
(
July
71
792
4
35
August
58
752
3
28
September
93
1,016
7
63
October
81
890
7
64
y
84
2
$
November
893
17
December
121
1,197
11
100
1
Total 1942
746
8,090
49
444
1943 January
102
1,008
4
39
February
130
1,236
14
139
March
145
1,513
19
181
April
154
1,603
15
140
May
173
1,785
12
121
June
161
1 677
18
172
SION DELIVERIES
0 May 31, 1944
Liberty
Victory
All
Ships
Ships
Tankers
DWT
DWT
DWT
Tons
Tons
Tons
No.
(000)
No.
(000)
No.
(000)
9
134
11
185
7
72
17
248
6
62
7
111
16
171
4
66
20
213
It
62
32
341
3
49
52
555
3
46
58
622
5
81
50
642
5
96
59
635
4
62
74
794
7
109
68
732
4
68
70
754
5
85
82
885
10
155
597
a
6,402 a
62
999
79
852
5
85
81
874
9
152
103
1,112
12
193
110
1,187
13
219
120
1,295
15
245
115
1.241
"
JRZ
August
172
1,706
15
140
110
1,187
15
272
September
165
1,662
7
81
106
1,144
22
320
October
167
1,681
7
61
98
1,058
35
474
November
169
1,698
12
120
89
961
36
507
December
219
2,059
17
170
118
1,274
35
513
Total 1943
1,949
19,296
156
1,519
1,238
13,361
214
3,410
44 January
131
1,211
9
89
73
788
15
223
February
148
1,382
18
178
78
842
1
11
19
312
March
163
1,549
16
156
83
896
4
43
22
356
April
161
1,600
20
192
79
853
10
109
18
338
May
162
1,545
14
138
67
724
16
174
23
390
a.
Revised
CONFIDENTIAL
Source:
WPB, "O
fficial
Munitions Production of The United States"
Disclasure Parisbable United Esplenage
Ad
.... NOT OCUTAIN
CONFINENTIAL COMPANY DATA
submitted
DECLASSIFIED
NNP CAS 740023
IC
NARS. Date 6-13-83
NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ss
C-FS/L9-3 (SAX)
EN28/A2-11
CONFIDENTIAL
1 February 1941
From:
Bureau of Ships.
To :
All Comman dants of Naval Districts less
Sixteenth Naval District.
All Supervisors of Shipbuilding, USN.
Subject:
Ship Conversion, Repair and Overhaul Work at
Private Shipyards.
References:
(a)
Naval District Manual - 1927.
(b)
Opnav ltr. Op-23M-VS (SC) A16/ND12 Serial 5898 of
Apr. 25, 1939, to Comdts. of all Naval Districts.
(c)
Contracts with private yards - alteration and
repair.
(d)
Buships ltr. FS/L9-3 (MA) of Aug. 26, 1940, to
Comatron, Comdesatron, Combasefor, Cominbatfor,
Comairscofor, Comsubron 2.
(e)
Opnav ltr. Op-23-MY (SC) A16/ND Serial 0104923 of
Nov. 28, 1940 to Comdts. of all Naval Districts
and Comdts. of all NYds.
(f)
Buships ltr. YY/L9-3 (MPC) of Oct. 8, 1940 to
Comdts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 N.D.,
Comdt. Guantanamo and Gov. Guam.
(g)
CNO ltr. Serial 140230 of July 1, 1940 to Comdts.
3,5,8,12 N. D., Info. Comdts. 1,4,6,7,9,11,13 N.D.
and Cincus.
(h)
Buships ltr. QS1-(9) (SAX) EN28/A?-11 of Dec. 21,
1940, to Comdts. 1,3,5,6,7,8,11,12,13,14,15,16
N.D. -
(1)
Buships ltr. LE (MA) of July 26, 1940 to Comdts. 1,
3,4,5,6,11,12 N. D.
(j)
Buships ltr. FS/L9-3 (MMM-MMH) EN28/A2-11 of Oct.
25, 1940 to Comdts. of all Naval Districts.
Enclosures:
(herewith - to Supervisors of Shipbuilding only)
(A)
Copy of reference (b).
(B)
Copy of reference (c).
Ss
FS/L9-3 (SAX)
EN28/A2-11
Enclosures:
(cont'd)
(G)
Copy of reference (d).
(D)
Copy of reference (e).
(E)
Copy of reference (g)
(F)
Copy of reference (h).
1.
The references outline the procedure to be
followed in handling matters pertaining to the accom-
plishment of repair, conversion and overhaul work by
Purpose
the Naval Districts. The Burcau desires to follow
during the present emergency the procedure which would
become effective during war, as far as practicable, in
the interest of developing an organization and per-
sonnel capable of performing these functions of the
Naval Districts during war.
2.
References (a), (b) and (c) recuire the
District Commandant to inspect, supervise and coordi-
nate the work of repair, conversion and overhaul within
his District. Reference (a) provides that the Comman-
dant shall work through the District Material Officer
to accomplish the above. Reference (b) provides for
the organization of the District Material Officer and
emphasizes that for vessels under cognizance of that
Summary of
officer "readiness on the date sct is the paramount
the
consideration. II This reference recuires inspectors
References
at private shipyards to supervise the execution of con-
version and repair work in accordance with work lists
prepared by the District Material Officer and to make
technical decisions on the spot in accordance with
policy laid down by the District Material Officer.
Reference (c) provides that the Naval Inspector dc-
termine the "cstimated fixed price" and perform other
duties of his office. Reference (j) authorizes Naval
Inspectors to approve job orders on the spot for over-
haul and repair work, regardless of amount, providing
the project allotment is not exceeded. Reference (d)
sets forth the procedure for overhaul work at private
yards and provides that the Commanding Officer of the
ship shall be the Naval Inspector for such overhaul
and repair work. For the purpose of decentralizing
authority for initiating and releasing assigned pro-
Jects, reference (e) gives the District Commandant
authority for:
(a) The assignment of ships to Navy Yards for
conversion or repair, subject to the approval and
designation of priority by the Chief of Naval Operation
FS/L9-3 (SAX)
Ss
EN28/A2-11
(b) The assignment of ships to private yards under
contract.
(c) The preparation and approval of detailed con-
version and repair specifications and conversion plans,
when required, for ships made available by himself.
(d) The inspection and follow up supervision to
insure prompt completion.
Summary
Reference (e) also gives the Office of Shore Establish-
of the
ments Division of the Navy Department authority to direct
Referen-
the transfer of civilian personnel between the Navy Yards
ces
(or other available sources) and the District Material
Offices, as needed, when recommended by the District Com-
mandant, and authorizes the Commandant to call upon any
Navy Yard within the District for cortain technical
assistance, such as, proparation of plans and specifica-
tions for conversion and repair work being done at private
yards. Reference (f) outlines the procedure for maintc-
nance of District Craft. Reference (g) announces the in-
tention of executing alteration and repair contracts with
commercial yards and enjoins the District Commandents to
develop District personnel for these activities, and
directs that the Bureau of Ships communicate the details
of arrangements for this work. Reference (i), also in
regard to conversion and repair, emphasizos the authority
of the District Commandant to authorize changes and out-
lines the Bureau's recuirements regarding completion data.
3.
Under present conditions the following covers
the procedure employed in accuiring merchant vessels and
Procedure in handling repair, overhaul and conversion work on mer-
chant vessels and existing Naval vesscls assigned to Naval
Districts for accomplishment:
Secretary
(a) The Sccretary of the Navy directs the Chief of
of the
Naval Operations to sclect by name a vessel suitable for
Navy
conversion to a specific type.
(b) The Chief of Naval Operations, after invostigat-
Chief
ing all matters relative to the types of vessels available,
of Naval selects the vessel by name, determines the principal con-
Opera-
version features to be embodied in the vessel to be con-
tions
verted and, whenever practicable, indicates a date on which
the completion of conversion work is desired.
FS/L9-3 (SAX)
EN28/A2-11
Ss
(c) The Burcau of Ships conducts negotiations,
with the assistance of the Maritime Commission, cither
directly or through the District Commandants, leading
up to the acquisition of the vessel selected. In any
case, the final negotiations and execution of the con-
Buships
tract must be completed by the Department upon the
Accuires
approval of the Sccretary of the Navy in accordance
Vessel
with the requirements of law. This legal requirement
does not permit execution of contracts by field
agencies although such agencies may conduct, upon
request of the Bureau, the necessary proliminary
negotiations and provide sufficient information to
enable the Department to complete the contracts with-
out the presence of the owners.
Buships
(d) The Bureau designates the Naval District
Designates
in which the delivery and conversion work will be
Naval Dist.
undertaken.
(c) After obtaining information as to the con-
Buships
version yard in which the District Commandent desires
Arranges
the conversion work to be accomplished, the Buroau
Delivery
arranges for delivery of the vessel nt that conversion
yard, or clsewhere as desired by the Commandant.
Buships
(f) The Burcau furnishes the District Commandant
Furnishes
or his designated representative with the general con-
Conversion
version directive, arrangement plans and other infor-
Directive
mation as are available.
Principles
4.
After acquisition and delivery of the
Now Apply
vesscl, in accordance with the procedure outlined
above, the following basic principles relative to the
accomplishment of repair, overhaul and conversion work
obtain:
Condt.
(a) The District Commmient is responsible for
Charged
all conversion, repair and overhaul work assigned to
with Con-
the District, subject to the limitations imposed by
version
paragraph 3(a) (1) of reference (c).
Comdt.
(b) The Commandant of the District effects the
Effects Work work of repair, overhaul and conversion.
(c) Where overhaul, repair or conversion work is
Supship
undertaken in any one private shipyard concurrently
Handles
with new construction, such overhaul, repair and con-
Conversions
version work at that plant should be handled, wherever
in Yards
practicable, by the Supervisor of Shipbuilding nt the
with New
plant. This procedure is considered to be in the
Construction
interest of coordination and simplification of rcla-
tionships with the Yard.
FS/L9-3 (SAX)
Ss
EN28/A2-11
Comdt. or his
(d) The Commandant or his designated repre-
Representative
sentative determines the items of work to be accom-
Determines
plished in accordance with the General Conversion
Work
Specifications, the plans and other specifications
furnished by the Bureau.
Commanding
(e) The Bureau expects that the services of
Officer Repre-
Commanding Officers, prospective Commanding
sentative of
Officers, and other ships' officers will be
Commandant
utilized in overhaul, repair and conversion work,
wherever practicable, for inspection purposes or
as otherwisc best suited to meet conditions.
(f) The Commandant or his designated repre-
sentative is authorized to depart from the General
Conversion Specifications, the plans and the con-
Comdt. or his
version directive at his discretion, having duc
Representative
regard for those items affecting time of final con-
Authorizes
version, stability, water tight integrity, the
Changes
military characteristics of the vesscl, and work
which would result in exceeding the funds made
available for the conversion work.
(g) The Burcau will designate the machinery
and other material to be furnished by the Burcaus,
The contractor will purchase all other material.
The Bureau may initiate investigations of sources
Buships
of supply and possible delivery dates of machinory
Investigates
and material to be purchased by the contractor, the
Procurement
procurement of which might dclay final conversion,
and in such instances will advise the Commandant
or his reprosentative.
(h) Request for changes in plans and speci-
Comdt. Decides
fications originating with prospective Commanding
Changes Rc-
Officers or others should be referred to the Com-
ouested by C.O.
mandant or his representative for the necessary
action.
(1) The Commandant or his designated repre-
sentative will, after investigation of the work
required in connection with the repair, overhaul
Comdt. Nofity
and conversion of vessels assigned to the District
Buships Re-
for accomplishment in accordance with the above,
garding Comple-
inform the Bureau at the carliest practicable date
tion
the estimated cost of the work and the estimated
time of completion of the conversion work. Where
a directive is issued indicating a date on which
the vessel is to bc completed, the District Com-
mandant will inform the Burcau if It is not
possible to complete all of the work covered by
the directive within that limiting date, and if not
the items which must be omitted to comnly with the
FS/L9-31 (SAX)
So
EN28/A2-11
assigned date for final conversion and what extension
of time is necessary to complete all of the work of
conversion.
5.
By special arrangement with the Maritime
Commission Marine Surveyors have been provided in
accordance with reference (1) for work in connection
with ships being recommissioned and ships undergoing
Marine
overhaul at private yards. Similrly Marine Surveyors
Surveyors
have been provided in some instances in connection
Report to
with conversion work at private yards. Reference (1)
DMO
indicates that the Marine Surveyors report to the
Commanding Officers for duty. The Bureau intends
that all Marine Surveyors report to the District
Material Officer for such duty as he may assign.
S. M. ROBINSON
Chief of Burcau
Copy to:
NYBOS
NYCHARL
NYMI
NYNYK
NYNOR
NYPEARL
NYPHIL
NYPORT
FEB 6 1941
NYPS
NYWASH
Bureau M. & S.
U.S. Maritime Commission
SECNAV (ICB)
File No. 19-3/A2-11/EN28
TVISNHUTANO-
JAG
OPNAV (9)
(416200)5c)
BUORD
BUNAV
BUSANDA
BUAER
BUMED
SOSED
MGC, USMC
DECLASSIFIED
Authority COMMERCE GUIDANCE 2/7/83
BY
LOT
NARA, Date 8/9/05
RAW MATERIALS DATA SHEET
Prepared for the
ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIVISION, OFFICE OF IMPORTS
BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
by the
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE.
IIA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMODITY
Unit:
Short ton
information
Indicated
by Asterish
*
Asbestos (Crude)
Conversion Factor:
Canadian and African Critical Grades
1. DESCRIPTION, GRADES:
Description: "Asbestos" is a commercial term applied to fibrous varieties of several minerals differ-
ing widely in composition, the fibre being diverse in strength, flexibility, and consequent usefulness. The
three varieties of asbestos in greatest use commercially are: (a) Chrysotile, a highly fibrous material en-
ployed in the manufacture of asbestos textiles, compressed sheet packings, asbestos-cement materials, and
other asbestos products; (b) Amosite, a coarse, long, resilient fibre used principally for insulations;
(o) Crocidolite (Blue), a fibre with high tensile strength used mainly in asbestos-cement pipe and also, be-
cause of its acid-resistant qualities, in certain packings. Chrysotile comprises the major portion of the
world production and consumption of both long and short fibres.
The United States produces only about 21 percent of its present required supplies of asbestos. Domes-
tic production is chiefly chrysotile, mined principally in Vermont and Arizona. The Vermont fibre is short
and is comparable to short Canadian fibres. Arizona production includes some long fibres. which can be sub-
stituted for low iron imported types. Canada accounted for about 85 percent of all asbestos imported in
1942. Importe from Canada are chrysotile and now average 8 percent crudes and spinning or textile fibres,
the remainder being shorter, nonspinnable fibres. The supplies of these short fibres are adequate. The ma-
jor source of imports other than Canada is South Africa, which produces blue, amosite, and the bulk of the
critical grudes of low iron chrysotile.
Critical Grades: African fibres (chrysotile Grades C & 01, 2, 3, and 41 amosite B-1, B-3, or D-3,
3/DM-1 and M-1; and blue asbestos) are essential for direct and indirect wilitary use and cannot be replaced
to any great extent by the spinning grades of Canadian fibre, the supply of which also is limited. African
chrysotile grades, chiefly from Rhodesia, have relatively low iron content and are required to meet Navy
specifications for essential types of electrical insulation. Amosite, found only in the Union of South
Africa, is essential for the manufacture of certain types of insulation for the Navy and the U. 8. Maritime
Commission. Blue asbestos is produced principally in the Union of South Africa, although some of inferior
quality is found in the Transvaal. The blue 1s used because of its high tensile strength in asbestos-cement
pipes and also, owing to its acid-resistant qualities, in packings, filter cloths, etc. Canadian spinning
fibres represent the three highest groups of Canadian chrysotile, and are used principally in the manufac-
ture of asbestos textiles.
2. BASIC STATISTICS:
1942 U. S. SITUATION*
CANADIAN AND AFRICAN PRODUCTION, 1942*
Consumption4
Supplies
& of
Country
Amount
total
Military
Stocks 1/1/42
23,475
Civilian
52,345
U. 8. prod
Nons
South Africa
31,000
25.4
Exports
Imports
54,038
Southern Rhodesia"
56,000
46.9
African
26,401
Canada"
Total req
52,345
35,000
28.7
Canadian
27,637
Total
122,000
100.0
Total sup
77,513
"Estimated.
Gov't stockpile:
Industry stocks:
Represents production of critical grades of crude of a
1/1/43
692
1/1/43
25,311
total production of 397,978 toss of crude of all grades.
Objective
None
a Military and Civilias requirements for crade asbestos are negligible. Require-
mests are for masufactured products for which a breakdows is not available.
Consumption of African grade vas 25,610; Casadian grade 26,725.
U. 8. IMPORTS*
U. S. EXPORTS, 1942*
1937-39
$ of
Source
1942
% of
average
total
total
Exports of Canadian and African grades
of aebestos are not shown separately.
Africa"
8,820
40.1
26,401
48.9
Canada
12,880
59.9
27,637
51.1
U. S. PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Total
21,500
100.0
54,038
100.0
1937-39
4 Schedule A Nos: 5500.0; 5500.1: 5501.0.
1941
1942'
average
Rhodesia and Usice of Soath Africa.
Production
None
None
None
Consumption
n.a.
n.a.
62,345
2-11161
(Continued on other side)
April 22, 1943
Asbestos (Crude), Canadian and African Critical Grades-Continued
3. USES, SUBSTITUTES, RESTRICTIONS:
Uses: The white, highly fibrous, chrysotile from Canada and Southern Rhodesia is used in the pro-
duction of textiles (including brake linings and clutch facings) and certain grades of building materials.
The brownish gray coarse fibred amosite from the Union of South Africa is used in the production of
fireproof board, high temperature insulation, pipe covering, blankets for insulating turbines on combat
ships.
The blue crocidolite from the Union of South Africa is used in the production of acid packings, fil
ter cloth, asbestos cement and pipe, because of its resistance to acids.
Substitutes: There is no generally acceptable substitute for asbestos in specific applications where
resistance to heat, electricity, acid erosion are prime considerations.
Mineral wool, glass wool and the shorter fibres have been utilized for insulation in some instances
in lieu of the critical grades. Asbestos is, however, being used in the war program as a substitute for
other materials, e. 8., asbestos pipe is being used in some applications in lieu of cast iron and steel
pipe. Short fibre in some instances is being used as a substitute for critical grades of long fibre.
Restrictions: Conservation Order M-79, as amended June 18, 1942, restricts the use of fibre from
South Africa to priority rated orders and confines certain grades and types to specific uses. Asbestos
from the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia was placed under General Imports Order M-63, January 13, 1942.
Conservation Order M-123, as amended December 14, 1942, prohibits the use or delivery of asbestos tex-
tiles for certain nonessential uses. Conservation Order N-283 provides for the allocation of asbestos
textiles.
4. PRICES AND STOWAGE:
Prices (March 18, 1943):
Canadian grades:
Crude No. 1
$650-$750
Crude No. 2 and sundry crudes.. $165-$385
Spinning fibres
$124-$233
Per ton, f.o.b. Quebec Mines, tax and bags included (Quotations in U. S. funds):
African grades:
Crocidolite crudes
$105-$138
Amoxite orudes
$100-$122
Rhodesian chrysotile
$ 75-$285
Per ton, f.o.b. African port:
Stowage: Crude asbestos is packed in cloth bags with no inner liner; gross weight 101 pounds, tare one
pound. Cubic measurement, 1.6 cubic feet; stowage factor 34. Some grades occupy 3.4 cubic feet per bag
of 99 pounds gross weight and have stowage factor of 78. Stowage factors for crude asbestos from Africa
vary from 78 to 90 depending upon the degree of fibre concentration from crude rock.
5. SPECIAL PROBLEMS:
Since only African varieties of asbestos satisfy certain critical military requirements, the essential
problem is that of maintaining uninterrupted imports from Rhodesia and Union of South Africa.
Further references: "Asbestos-Critical Grades" in "Commodity Chart Book." W.P.B. Statistics Division,
Materials Branch.
U. S. Tariff Commission has studies on Asbestos.
2-11181
POLICY DOCUMENTATION
COPT
February 25, 1941
04 NO.
3047
TO:
Mr. George M. Moffett
195. NO.
B
FROM:
C. K. Leith
SUBJECT:
General Review of Procurement of Strategic, Critical and Essential
Mineral Raw Materials as of February 1, 1941.
From time to time detailed and statistical reports have been made on the
progress of mineral procurement. The present review presents only the over-all
picture in general terms without detailed documentation.
As & result of the acute difficulties of the Great War, aditation for the
accumulation of Government stockpiles of strategic minerals began immediately at the
close of the war, and increased in tempo during the last decade. The Army and Navy
and many organizations and individuals interested in the subject participated in this
effort. Aside from a small expenditure by the Army and Navy from their own funds, it
resulted in nothing concrete until June 7, 1939, when a law became effective authoris-
ing the expenditure of $100,000,000 in four years. Small proportions of the funds
under this bill were made available in 1939, but the major part of the total of
$70,000,000 actually appropriated was not made available until the spring of 1940.
Additional funds were made available by RFC during the summer of 1940.
When the Defense Commission began its work about June 1, 1940, only a very
few purchases had been made. The mineral specialists of the Industrial Materials
Branch of the Defense Commission began a study of the materials needed by reviewing
a series of reports by seventeen subcommittees of the Mineral Advisory Committee to
the Army and Navy Munitions Board prepared during the preceding two years under the
general chairmanship of O. K. Leith. The subcommittees were made up of representatives
of the Munitions Board, the U. S. Geological Survey, the Bureau of Mines, and special-
ists from the industries. With this background, conferences were held by the Defense
Commission specialists with the trade to bring figures and conclusions up to date.
From time to time special recommendations for purchase were made during this period,
but it was not until October 18 that the full program was approved by the Defense
Commission and transmitted to the buying agencies; namely, the Procurement Division of
the Treasury, and the Metals Reserve Company, a subsidiary of the RFC. The delay was
due to the requirement that all such recommendations had to have the approval of the
Munitions Board before going forward to the Defense Commission itself. This approval
was long delayed and some of the items were not approved by the Munitions Board.
In spite of this lack of complete approval the program is now being substantially
followed by the purchasing agencies.
The recommendations of the Defense Commission of October 18, 1940, for the
purchase of strategic minerals are summarised in the following table:
Antimony
18,000 short tons
$ 5,040,000
Asbestos
20,000 M
M
3,000,000
Chromite
870,000 long tons
31,290,000
Graphite
2,000 short tons
160,000
Industrial diamonds
6,000,000
Manganese ore
1,600,000 long tons
60,453,000
Mercury
10,000 flasks
1,600,000
Mica
4,700 short tons
5,489,000
Quarts Crystals
106,900 pounds
730,000
Tin
159,400 long tons
178,775,000
Tungsten
13,000 short tons
14,3000000
$306,845,000
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND730022
&
(Table Continued)
Total
$306,845,000
Contingencies, administrations
storage, etc
24,283,000
$331,128,000
Costs are only estimates based either on past average acquisition costs
or current markets.
The totals are considerably higher than Munitions Board figures, partly
because of our higher estimates of requirements and partly because of the fact that
the Munitions Board figures were adjusted to limited funds available at the time
the estimates were made. Events have already shown that even our figures have been
in some cases too conservative,
The original program drawn up by the specialists of the Defense Commission,
like the original program of the Army and Navy Munitions Board itself, was based on
the assumption of a three-year emergency. This was out to two years to bring it into
accord with new plans of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. We still think that
supplies should be acquired for a three-year emergency, but this question is more or
less academic for the time being because we are so far short of meeting the two-year
program.
Later the Defense Commission recommended the purchase of 200,000 tons of
copper from Chile and of 6,000 diamond dies from the British Purchasing Commission.
It has been active also in efforts to increase sinc smelting capacity.
The statistical position of the stockpile procurement of each of the
minerals is susmarized in the accompanying diagram.
Present Status. As of February 1st the general averages of the percentages of the
various stockpiles then delivered was 17 percent.
Considering industry and Government stocks as a unit, there is no immediate shortage
of strategic minerals which cannot be adjusted by voluntary re-distribution within the
industries or by the application of priorities. On the other hand, deliveries on the
whole are not running much shead of consumption and in some cases, notably in tungsten,
are running behind. With the shipping situation getting steadily worse and industries'
requirements growing, it is clear that the stockpile program is not likely to be
realised before the emergency is upon us, and that for some minerals, like tungsten,
consumption will have made inroads on the limited supplies now at hand. The stockpile
program was started too late, for prompt realization, On the whole, the situation
requires continuously more pressure on imports, domestic developments, conservation,
and substitution.
A considerable part of the domestic mining developments in strategic minerals which
are now being encouraged will be unsconomic in normal times and will have to be written
off when the emergency is over. Also our very limited reserves of such minerals as
mersury and high-grade chromite will ha 8 been sadly depleted. On the other hand,
DECLASSIFIED
NND730022
these developments make it possible to test a considerable variety of new processes
of extraction, concentration, and use of minerals which may make it possible, even
in peace-time, to use certain of our off-grade supplies existing in large quantities,
This will be & permanent gain to the nation. The new tin melter now planned will
also probably be unsconomic in normal times but provision is being made in connection
with this melter for a thorough test of certain new processes which, if successful,
may make it possible to maintain a permanent tin smelting industry in the United
States.
Present status of procurement of each mineral is summarised below:
Antimony. The actual stockpile is about 34% of the amount required. An additional
18 percent is under order, including about 3,000 tons of domestic production which has been
purchased for delivery over one year. The domestic production is smelted from Mexican
ores. Additional large tonnages have been contracted for with the Chinese Government in
repayment of loans made to them.
The present possition is satisfactory with industry stocks well above normal, and
arrivals of ore from South America in good volume.
Asbestos. No purchases of asbestos have yet been made by the Government, but negotiations
are under way for the purchase of three special varieties from South Africa and Rhodesia.
The question of the need of this material has been recently reviewed with the industry
and the need confirmed,
Chromite. The actual stockpile is 11 percent of the amount required. Contracts have
been made for an additional 32 percent of the amount planned. This situation requires
maximum pressure both on domestic developments and on the securing of supplies from
abroad. Projects are under way for domestic developments which we hope will help
relieve the situation, although at best there will be a delay of a year or more before
substantial production begins.
Government and industry stockpiles together will supply industry at the present rate of
consumption for about 14.5 months.
Copper. The shortage of copper was not antiopated until the fall of 1940 when the magni-
tude of the defense program began to appear. Arrangements were then made to purchase
100,000 tons from Chile through Metals Reserve, and later the purchase of mother
100,000 tons was authorized by the same organisation. The shipments on the first
100,000 tons have begun to arrive in New York, but will not be completed until May or
June. In the meantime industry stocks are very low and shortages are being net by
individual producer assistance.
Diamond Dies. Industrial dismonds are bored to make diamond dies for the drawing of
wires. The dies of the small sizes have heretofore been manufactured exclusively in
occupied terristory of Belgium and Germany. Supplies are now very short in this country.
A small amount has been purchased from the British Purchasing Commission which will
be pro-rated in the industry by the Priorities Division. Also arrangements are being
made to encourage the manufacturing of such dies in the United States.
Graphite. The actual stockpile is 23 percent of the amount required. No additional
amounts have yet been ordared. The only source of graphite of the best grade needed
is Madagascar, which is now under British blockade. A recent review of the need of
this particular grade of graphite has been made in conference with the industry with
the result that the need has been confirmed. Accordingly we have asked the State
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND730022 7-2-83
F.R.C
&
rtment to re-open the question with the British of passing a cargo through the
kade, and we are informed that this request has now been made to the British by
State Department. In the meantime a mall amount of graphite is being purchased
rylon by the trade which can be used as a not-very-satisfactory substitute for
indagascar graphite.
masnt and industry stocks combined will last the industry at the present rate of
aption about 10 months.
trial Diamonds. As yet no industrial dismonds have been secured for Government
pile. Negotiations for purchase have been under way for many months. There has been
fartunate delay in setting up the machinery for purchase by the Procurement Division
. Treasury. Arrangements are now being rapidly perfected by which it is hoped
the purchase will be begun at an early date. An additional supply will be bought by
$ Reserve, but this purchase will not be started until the program handled by
rement Division 1a well under way.
stal amount of industrial diamonds hald by the industry and by brokers and by
is individuals is supposed to be large, but specialists report that it is impessible
: figures because so many of the stocks have been smuggled in.
Bearings. Jewel bearings for watches made of sapphire and synthetic corundum have
fore been made almost exclusively in Switzerland. The Defense Commission recommended
urchase of a Government stockpile of 50,000,000 jewal bearings, but it now appears
diectuation of this program may not be: feasible, and that efforts of the Government
I be concentrated in landing all possible assistance in assuring continued importa-
of bearings from Swd. tserland to industry. Arrangements are DOW being made to en-
B the manufacturing of such jewels in the United States.
ese, The actual stockpile is now 9 percent of the amount planned. Contracts have
ade for an additional 124 percent of the amount planned; in other words, for an
which would overrun our objective by about 600,000 tons. This over-buying has been
eliberately to allow for failure to realise all the domestic production contracted
sent and industry stockpiles will supply the industry at the present rate of consump-
or about 16 months, and probable domestic aproduction plus Cuban deliveries will
industry nearly through 1943, even if all imports other than Cuba are out off.
to The actual stockpile is about 10 percent of the amount required. An additional
rent is now contracted for. In response to exceedingly high prices obtaining during
it year, domestic output has risen to record amounts which have considerably sur-
needs for domestic consumption and exports. In recognition of the fact that relative.
ge supplies of Mexican mercury continue to go to Japan, plus the recent increase
thase in the United States by England, plus the fact that domestic reserves may
ly a few years at the present rate of consumption, recommendation has been made to
curement Division that the remainder of the stockpile be purchased from Mexican
The Procurement Division is now out of the market awaiting quieting down of
fferings as a result of an ill-advised press release from Maxico City concerning
ons of the United States government to buy supplies from Mexico.
ant and industry stocks combined will last industry about 7 months at the current
tion rate.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND730022 7-2-83
-5-
The actual stockpile is about 3 percent of the amount required. An additional
roant is now under order. Long negotiations with the British Government were at
t not productive of much mica but recently larger amounts have been offered.
ilian sources have Just been investigated by a representative of the Materials Branch,
it appears that a sisable percentage of block mica required night be obtained from
source. A smaller amount of Madagascar mica is also needed as soon as it can be
ped. Production of amber nica in Canada for use in airplane spark plugs has recently
investigated by Canadian authorities who report that 50 percent increases in output
be made in 1941.
asive investigations have been made by the Ocological Survey and the Bureau of
E of mica deposits in New England and North Carolina, and industry is conducting
riments on sizable samples taken from these areas for specific uses.
ment and industry stocks combined will last industry about 16 months, based on the
imption rate as of January 1, 1941.
11. An apparent shortage has recently appeared. Customer demand places thisshortage
out 4,000,000 pounds per month but the actual shortage is probably considerably less.
'igures are being checked. The International Nickel Company now controls the entire
I supply and for some weeks past has found it necessary to prorate supplies to the
1. The problem is now under intensive study by the Priorities and Production Divisions.
nt supplies of the industry are very low.
$ Crystal. The actual stockpile is 26 persent of the amount required. An additional
reant in now under order. The shipments BO far have shown a high proportion of off-
material which has been rejected. It will be nedessary eithor to purchase more or
ange specifications to allow of the use of the rejected material. This is now under
The actual- stockpile is 17 percent of the amount required. An additional 22 percent
- under order. Additional large tormages have recently been contracted for with
in partial payment of leans made to their Government. In preparation for the contin-
that sources in the Far East may be out off, 18,000 tons per year for 5 years of
ian tin (in form of concentrates) have been contracted for, but delivery has not
tarted. Plans for a tin smelter are still being considered by Metals Reserve. Pro-
on at best cannot begin for over a year and assuming that we will get, in emergency,
of the Bolivian output, it will meet only about one-half of our requirement. Recovery
a from scrap and substitutions are being studied but are not yet being put into
to
ament and industry stocks combined will last industry at the pres nt rate of
aption about 12 months.
ten. The actual stockpile is about 51 percent of the amount recommended. An
ional 151 percent is under order, large parts of which represent contracts with the
ISS Government for repayment of loans. Even larger tonnages have been contracted
ust recently with China also in repayment of loans over a period of a number of
1. The specific quantity involved in the Chinese loans is indeterminate because it
vary with the market price as of arrival. (an the basis of the present market, the
go amounts to about 45,000 short tons, 60% wo, basis).
DECLASSIFIED
NND730022
Authority
car
2-2-83
-6-
La a result of enormous defense requirements, the present position is very tight and
an order has been issued by the President authorising the release of are, as required
by defense, from stockpile. No release will be requested until such action becomes
imperative.
The domestic production is being increased to the point where it can easily take care of
peace-time needs but not emergency needs. Every effort 18 being made to bring out
additional supplies from China over the Burma Road (200 tons are now afloat from Rangoon)
and also additional supplies from Bolivia and other sources.
Zinc. Rapid enlargement of the defense program and increased British needs have developed
& shortage of sino smelting capacity, which is being largely remedied by current rehabil-
itation and expansion of existing plants. So far this expansion has been privately
financed, in several cases with income-tax relief through accelerated amortization,
but it is likely that further plant construction will require more direct Government
aid. Meanwhile the immediate shortages of slab zinc are being met by partial allocation
of the supply through the Priorities Division. The domostic supply of sinc concentrates
is not adequate to this enlarged smelting capacity, but can be sufficiently supplemented
from Canada, Newfoundland, Mexico and South American, though supplies from the last-
named source are dependant on bottoms at reasonable rates,
C. K. Leith
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND730022 2-2-83
ERC
WAR
MONDS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
STATES
527,27144
CLASS.
IN REPLY REFER TO:
June 20, 1044
C
IIC
MEMORANDUM
TC:
WPS Regional Directors and Froduction Urgency Committees
in Areas where Asbestos Textile Plants are located.
FROM:
Fred B. Sinclair, Chief
Sinclaly
Analysis, Reports, and Services Branch
Procurenent Policy Division
SUBJECT:
Manpower for Asbestos Textile Industry
We have been advised by the Cork, Asbestos & Fibrous Glass
Division, WPB, that the production of asbestos textiles has become a
critical bottleneck in direct military programs. Until recently, pro-
duction has been limited by the amount of asbestos spinning fibre available.
The limitation at present, however, is manpower. Facilities and fibre are
available for the production of from 200 to 300 tons more asbestos textiles
than manpower permits.
Asbestos textiles are a non-substitutable component in all combat
vessels from battleships to Army ducks, as well as in the 22-ton truck program,
the rubber program, the rayon program, and the plane program; in fact they
cut across the entire mechanized field, military and industrial. The largest
single claimant is the U. S. Navy. In the face of this production decline,
the Navy has entered requirements for a 20% increase in roving for Navy cable,
and an additional 100,000 yards of asbestos cloth. Planned expansion of the
copper wire program will be measured in terms of our ability to produce as-
bestos roving.
This critical condition in asbestos textiles has been recognized
by PEC and cooperation of the Army, Navy, and ARCO has been obtained through
regular channels for assistance ut local and Area levels in recruiting manpower.
Advice has gone out from these respective Services to the field requesting full
cooporation. In addition, a Program Determination has been granted to give
asbestos textile machinery a green light where such additional machinery will
aid production without increasing manpower.
In spitc of the importance of asbestos textiles as a component,
the Industry is not a large one. The firms involved and their locations are
as follows:
Asbestos Manufacturing Co.
Huntington, Indiana
Asbestos Textile Company
North Brookfield, Mass.
Asten-Hill Mfg. Company
Scott's Lane, Philadelphia, Pa.
DECLASSIFIED
NND130022 MARS. Date
B 647482
By
J. Franklin Burke & Co., Inc.
Northfield, Vermont-
Carolina Ashestos Co.
Davidson, North Carolina
Ferodo & Asbustos Co.
P. C. Box 111, New Brunswick, N. J.
Fibre & Metal Products Co.
206 Downoy Ave., Downey, Cal.
The Garlock Packing Co.
402 Main St., Palmyra, N. Y.
General Asbestos & Rubber Div.
North Charleston, South Carolina
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
Greene, Tweed & Co.
North Wales, Pennsylvania
Johns-Manville Corporation
Hanville, New Jersey
Keasbey & Muttison Co.
Ambler, Pennsylvania
Philadelphia Asbestos Co.
2010 N. 10th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
Rockbestos Products Corp.
New Haven, Connecticut
Southern Asbestos Company
Charlotte, North Carolina
Union Asbestos & Rubber Co.
Cicero, Illinois
U. S. Asbestos Division
Manheim, Pennsylvania
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
U. S. Rubber Company
Hogansville, Georgia
The Industry Division has requested that we make these facts known
to the Production Urgency Committees so their cooperation may be secured in
obtaining the necessary manpower through priority ratings for labor which
will reflect the importance of the asbestos textile program.
The shall be glad to furnish any additional information regarding
this matter.
asbectos 2 ethiles
B 647483
DECLASSIFIED
NND130022
NARS. Date
By
570
1
PROFIT
3718 NOTIVINEWS.COM
III A
801
OR No.
ass No.
February 18, 1943
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mr. Irving Swerdlow,
Acting Chief, Public Welfare & Facilities Division
FROM:
C. Henri Rush, Chief,
Building Materials Section
SUBJECT:
Meeting of Asbestos Industry Advisory Committee, Febru-
ary 16, 1943 in the Social Security Building
The object of the meeting was that of hearing a report by the
Metals Reserve Company - a government agency charged with buying
various types and amounts of asbestos products for the country -
on its recent mission to England.
Instead of leaving the purchase and importation of asbestos,
which is largely a foreign product, to private concerns, the govern-
ment has adopted the policy of buying and importing from England
asbestos fiber mined in South Africa and needed by the USA, and
selling it to the domestic processors as and when required by them.
The contracts entered into by the USA and Great Britain pro-
vide for the shipment by England of certain amounts of specific
types of asbestos fiber needed in this country after approval of
samples submitted to our processors by England. Base prices de-
manded by England at present are practically the same us those of
last year. The U.S. Government notifies the asbestos processors
of current shipments and upon their arrival sells the amounts -0-
manded by processors at or below cost, that is, after marel/ adding
to the base price the freight plus overhead charges, war risk in-
surance and handling costs. The OPA determines the final sale price
for both the raw and the finished products. Quantities contracted
for in excess of current and future requirements are intended to
offset expected sinking losses, and/or to provide for a future
stockpile. In case the goods happen to be damaged in transit, the
government 1s to be informed by the recipient companies. : c con-
tract contains a provision for future adjustments as to prices and
additional quantities that may be desired.
DECLASSIFIED
Anthorite NAME - =
- 2 -
The procedure adopted in the distribution of imported asbostos
fibers is the following. The government informs the Cork-Asbestos
Division of shipments under way. The latter agency in turn notifies
immediately the various companies interested of the same fact 80 that
the latter will be able to place their demand for specific types
and quantities desired at the time the goods arrive, and receive them
without delay. Surplus stocks are to be stored in available warehouses,
that is, either in those of the asbestos processors themselves or of
other companies. Asbestos is not yet allocated, but the Covernment
will offer processors as much as is available.
Payments for asbestos fibers sold to processors are to be inade
to the Government through the Commercial National 3ank by means of
sight drafts.
The Industry representatives were unanimous in their ap reciation
of the new method devised by the Government of securing and distri-
buting the country's asbestos requirements.
sheurer:irk
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND730022
SY. ERC STAT W.Dec. 2.82
FEDERAL REGISTER, Saturday, August 30, 10:1
IV B2.
$0.50
akum, $0.85; Young, $0.83; Za-
officers shall report to the Governor fcr
pata, $0.83; and Zavala, $0.80.
(b) "Defense Order" means
duty at State Headquerters.
Wisconsin: Adams, $0.08: Ashland,
b. In emergencies, State medical offi-
(1) Any contract or order for material
$1.09; Barron, $1.20; Bayfield, $1.10;
cers may either assist examining phy-
or equipment to be delivered to, or for the
Brown, $1.32; Buffalo, $1.33; Burnett,
sicians in conducting physical examina-
account of:
$1.09; Calumet, $1.42; Chippewa, $1.22;
tions of registrants or may themselves
(j) The Army or Navy of the United
Clark, $1.25; Columbia, $1.27; Crawford,
perform such examinations in place of
States, the United States Maritime Com-
$1.33; Dane, $1.37; Dodge, $1.50; Door,
the examining physicians; in the latter
mission, the Panama Canal, the Coast
$1.13; Douglas, $1.22; Dunn, $1.25; Eau
event, the State medical officers shall
and Geodetic Survey, the Coast Guard,
Claire, $1.26; Florence, $1.03; Fond Du
sign the Reports of Physical Examina-
the Civil Aeronautics Authority. the Na-
Lac, $1.42; Forest, $1.13; Grant, $1.41;
tion (Form 200).
tional Advisory Commission for Acronau-
Green. $1.40; Green Lake, $1.32; Iowa,
$1.36; Iron, $1.13; Jackson, $1.21; Jeffer-
LEWIS B. HERSHEY,
tics, the Office of Scientific Research and
son, $1.46; Juneau, $1.13; Kenosha, $1.41;
Director.
Development;
Kewaunce, $1.25; La Crosse. $1.30; La-
AUGUST 28, 1941.
(ii) The government of any of the fol-
fayette, $1.36; Langlade, $1.20; Lincoln,
lowing countries: The United Kingdom,
[F. R. Doc. 41-6491: Flled, August 28, 1941;
$1.14; Manitowoc, $1.43; Marathon,
Canada and other Dominions, Crown
4:17 p. m.)
$1.18; Marinette, $1.08; Marquette, $1.04;
Colonics and Protectorates of the British
Milwaukee, $1.46; Monroe, $1.31; Oconto,
Empire, Eelgium, China, Grecce, The
$1.14; Oneida, $1.05; Outagamic, $1.35;
Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway,
[No. 27]
Ozaukee, $1.45; Pepin, $1.30; Pierce,
Poland, Russia and Yugeslavia.
ORDER PRESCRIBING FORMS
$1.32; Polk, $1.23; Portage, $1.03; Price,
(2) Any contract or order placed by
$1.14; Racine, $1.48; Richland, $1.33;
By virtue of the Selective Training and
any agency of the United States Govern-
Rock, $1.36: Rusk, $1.24; St. Croix, $1.30;
Service Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 885) and the
ment for material or equipment to be
Sauk, $1.26; Sawyer, $1.11; Shawano,
authority vested in me by the rules and
delivered to, or for the account of, the
$1.25; Sheboygan. $1.44; Taylor, $1.23;
regulations prescribed by the President
government of any country listed above,
Trempealeau, $1.27; Vernon, $1.33; Vilas,
thereunder, and more particularly the
or any other country, including those in
$1.04: Walworth. $1.40; Washburn, $1.09;
provisions of Paragraph 163 and Appen-
the Western Hemisphere, pursuant to
Washington, $1.47; Waukesha, $1.43;
dix A to Volume One' of the Selective
the Act of March 11, 1941, entitled "An
Waupaca, $1.29; Waushara, $1.02; Win-
Service Regulations, I hereby prescribe
Act to Promote the Defense of the United
nebago, $1.38; and Wood, $1.15.
the following changes in DSS forms:
States," (Lend-Lease Act).
Wyoming: Campbell, $0.61; Converse,
Revision of DSS Form 21, entitled
(3) Any other contract or order to
$0.61; Crook, $0.77: Goshen. $0.74; John-
"Oath of Office," by combining it with
which the Director of Priorities assigns
son. $0.86; Laramie, $0.56; Niobara,
and eliminating DSS Form 257, entitled
a preference rating of A-10 or higher.
$0.55; Platte, $0.73; Sheridan, $0.93; and
"Waiver of Pay." effective fifteen (15)
(4) Any contract or order for material
Weston, $0.79.
days after the filing hereof with the DI-
or equipment required by the Person
placing the same to fulfill his contracts
Done at Washington, D. C., this 28th
vision of the Federal Register. The sup-
day of August. 1941. Witness my hand
ply of original DSS Form 21 and DES
or orders on hand, provided such mate-
and the seal of the Department of Ag-
Form 257 on hand will be used until
rial or equipment is to be physically in-
riculture.
exhausted.
corporated in material or equipment to
be delivered under contracts or orders
[SEAL]
CLAUDE R. WICHARD,
The foregoing revision shall, effective
included under (1), (2) or (3) above.
Sccretary of Agriculture.
fifteen (15) days after the filing hercof
with the Division of the Federal Register,
(c) "Material" means any commodity,
[F. R. Doc. 41-6514: Filed, August 29, 1041;
become a part of Appendix A to Volume
equipment, accessories, parts, assemblies
11:18 a. m.]
One, Selective Service Regulations.
or products of any kind."
LEWIS B. HERSHEY,
*$§ 944.1 to 044.21. inclusive, Issued under
the authority contained in O.P.M. Regulation
Director.
3. March 7. 1941. G F.R. 159G; E.O. 8620, Janu-
TITLE 32-NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUGUST 27, 1941.
ary 7. 1011, 0 F.R. 101; SCC. 2 (n). Public No.
G71. 76th Congress. Third Session. as ainended
CHAPTER VI-SELECTIVE SERVICE
(F. R. Doc. 41-6402: Filed, August 28, 1941;
by Public No. 80. 77th Congress, First Session:
SYSTEM
4:17 p. m.]
M'C. 9. Public No. 763, 76th Congress, Third
Session.
[Ainendment No. 109)
§ 944.2 Acceptance of defense orders.
AN AMENDMENT To AUTHORIZE STATE
CHAPTER IX-OFFICE OF PRODUC-
Defense Orders for any Material, whether
MEDICAL OFFICERS To CONDUCT PHYSI-
TION MANAGEMENT
or not accompanied by a Preference Rat-
CAL EXAMINATIONS IN EMERGENCIES
ing Certificate, must be accepted and
By virtue of the Selective Training and
SUBCHAPTER B-PRIORITIES DIVISION
fuifilled in preference to any other con-
Service Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 885) and
[Priorities Regulation No. 1]
tracts or purchase orders for such Ma-
the authority vested in me by the rules
terial, subject to the following provisions:
PART 944-REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO THE
and regulations prescribed by the Presi-
OPERATION OF THE PRIORITIES SYSTEM
(a) Defense Orders must be accepted
dent thereunder, I hereby amend, effcc-
Establishing Provisions and' Definitions
even if acceptance will render impossible,
tive fifteen (15) days after the filing
or result in deferment of:
hereof with the Division of. the Federal
Applicable to the Operation of the Pri-
Register. the Selective Service Regula-
orities System
(1) Deliveries under non-defense or-
tions. Volume One,' Section 1V, by strik-
ders previously accepted. or
The following Regulation Is issued by
ing out the present Paragraph 123 and
the Director of Priorities to promote the
(2) Deliveries under Defense Orders
substituting therefor the following:
defense of the United States and for the
previously accepted bearin lower prefer-
123. State medical officers. a. In each
purpose of Improving and facilitating the
ence ratings. unless rejection Is spc-
State. one or more medical officers of the
operation of the Priorities System.
cifically permitted by the Director of
Priorities;
Army, Navy. National Guard. Naval Rc-
$ 044.1 Definitions. (a) "Person"
serves, or Organized Reserves shall be
means any individual, partnership. asso-
(b) Defense Orders need not be
assigned by the President, upon recom-
claticn. corporation or other form of
accepted:
mendation of the Governor. Medical
enterprise.
(1) Delivery on schedule thereunder
would be imposible reason of the
15 F.R. 3770.
F.R. 3770.
requirements of Defense Orders previ-
Certificate
nas
been
15-
rating."
Horlties:
sucd. Deliveries bearing no preference'
944.12 Intra-co deliveries.
(2) If the Person seeking to place the
rating or lower preference ratings shall
When any Order of the Director of Pri-
De Order is unwilling or unable to
be deferred to the extent necessary to
oritics prohibits or restricts deliveries of
meet regularly established prices and
assure those deliveries bearing higher
any Material by any Person, such pro-
terms of sale or payment, but there shall
preference ratings. even though such de-
hibition or restriction shall, in the ab-
be
no discrimination against Defense
forment may cause defaults under other
sence of a contrary direction, apply not
Orders in establishing such prices or
contracts or purchase orders. Each Per-
only to deliveries to other Persons, in-
terms;
son who has Defense Orders on hand
cluding affiliates and subsidiaries, but also
(3) If the Material ordered is not of
must so schedule his production and de-
to deliveries from one branch, division or
the kind usually produced or capable of
liveries that deliveries under Defense Or-
section of a single enterprise to another
being produced by the Person to whom
ders will be made on the dates required,
branch, division or scction of the same or
the Defense Order is offered;
giving precedence, in case of unavoidable
any other enterprise owned or controlled
(4) If such Defense Orders specify
delay, to deliveries bearing the higher
by the same Person."
veries within fifteen days, and if com-
preference ratings.
$ 994.13 Effect of order: damages.
pliance with such delivery dates would
(b) The sequence of deliveries bearing
When any Order of the Director of Pri-
require the termination before comple-
the same preference rating shall be deter-
orities prohibits or restricts deliveries of
tion of a specific production schedule
mined by the delivery dates specified in
any Material, such prohibition or restric-
already commenced.*
their respective Preference Rating Cer-
tion shall, in the absence of a contrary
$ 944.3 Rejected orders. When a De-
tificates, or if the ratings were assigned
direction, apply to all deliveries made
fense Order for any Material has been
by Order or direction of the Director of
after the effective date of the Order, in-
rejected in violation of this Regulation,
Priorities, but no Certificates were issued,
cluding deliveries under contracts or
the Person seeking to place such Order
then by the dates specified in the con-
purchase orders accepted either prior or
may file with the Division of Priorities
tracts or purchase orders. In any case
subsequent to the effective date of the
a verified report in form to be prescribed,
where both preference ratings and deliv-
Order. No Person shall be held liable
setting forth the facts in connection with
ery dates are the same, and it is impossible
for damages or penalties for any default
the alleged rejection. When the facts
to make all deliveries on schedule, the
under any contract or purchase order
set forth justify such action, the Director
matter is to be referred to the Division of
which shall result directly or indirectly
of Priorities will thereupon direct the
Priorities for instructions as to scquence.*
from his compliance with any rule. regu-
Person against whom complaint is made
§ 944.8 Delivery schedules. No earlier
lation or Order issued by the Director of
to submit a sworn statement setting forth
delivery date shall be specified in any
Priorities.*
the circumstances concerning the alleged
Defense Order than required by the pro-
§ 944.14 Inventory restriction. Un-
rejection. Thereafter, such action will
duction or delivery schedules of the
less specifically authorized by the Direc-
be taken by the Director of Priorities as
Person placing the Defense Order. No
tor of Priorities, no Person shall. after
he deems appropriate.*
preference rating will be assigned to any
the effective date of this Regulation,
$ 944.4 Assignment of preference rat-
contract or purchase order specifying de-
knowingly make delivery of any Material
ings. Preference ratings may be as-
livery dates earlier than required by the
whatever, and no Person shall accept de-
signed to contracts, purchase orders or
production or delivery schedules of the
livery thereof, in an amount, quantity
deliveries by means of Preference Rating
Person placing the contract or purchase
or number which will increase for any
Certificates issued by authority of the
order.*
current month the inventory of such
Director of Priorities, or by regulations
944.9 Deferred deliveries. When
Material of the Person accepting deliv-
or Orders issued by the Director of Pri-
deliveries under Defense Orders have
ery, in the same or other forms. in ex-
orities assigning ratings to particular de-
been unreasonably or improperly de-
cess of the amount. quantity or number
liveries or to specified classes of deliveries.
ferred. the Person entitled to delivery
necessary to meet required deliveries of
Such ratings may be assigned to deliver-
may file with the Division of Priorities a
the products of the Person accepting de-
ics under accepted contracts or purchase
verified report in form to be prescribed,
livery, on the basis of his current method
orders. and also, in the case of Defense
setting forth the facts in connection with
and rate of operation. This provision
Orders. to purchase orders which have
the alleged deferment: When the facts
shall not prohibit or restrict:
not been placed or accepted at the time
set forth justify such action. the Director
the rating is applied for. The Director
of Priorities will thereupon direct the Par-
(a) Deliveries for direct export out of
of Priorities may also issue specific direc-
son against whom complaint is made to
the United States, provided that such ex-
tions as to particular deliveries, without
submit a sworn statement, setting forth
pcrts shall have been licensed by the
assigning ratings thereto.*
the circumstances concerning the al-
Administrator of Export Control;
leged deferment of deliveries. There-
(b) Deliveries of imported Material to
$ 944.5 Sequence of preference rat-
after, such action will be taken by the
any Person importing the same, either
ings. Preference Ratings, in order of
directly or through an agent.*
precedence, are: AA, A-1-a, A-1-b,
Director of Priorities as he deems appro-
etc.,
A-1-j: A-2, A-3, etc.,
priate."
§ 944.15 Records. All Persons affected
A-10: BB, B-1, B-2, etc.,
B-8, AA
$ 944.10 Allocations. When specific
by any Order of the Director of Priorities
being the highest rating presently as-
allocations of a Material are made by
shall keep and preserve for a period of
signed."
the Director of Prioritics, such allocations
not less than two years accurate and
$ 944.6 Doubt/ul cases. Whenever
may. in the discretion of the Director, be
complete records of their inventories of
there is doubt as to the preference rating
made without regard to any preference
the Material covered by such Order, and
applicable to any delivery, or as to
ratings which have been assigned to de-
of the details of all transactions in the
whether a-particular order is a Defense
liveries under particular contracts or
Material covered by such Order. Such
Order. the matter is to be referred lo the
purchase orders.*
records shall include the dates of all
Division of Priorities for determination,
944.11 Use of material obtained
contracts or purchase orders accepted,
with a statement of all pertinent facts."
under allocation 01' preference rating.
the delivery dates specified in such con-
§ 944.7 Sequence of deliveries. (a)
Any Person who obtains a delivery of
tracts or purchase orders, and in any
Every delivery under a Defense Order
any Material under an Order or specific
Herence Rating Certificates accom-
shall be made in preference to deliveries
direction of the Director of Priorities. or
perving them. the dates of actual deliv-
under all other contracts or orders when-
a delivery of Material bearing a profer-
CHCS thereunder. description of the
ever. and to the extent, necessary to ful-
ence rating. must use such Material. or
Material covered by such contracts or
fill the delivery schedule provided in the
an equivalent amount thereof. for the
purchase orders. description of deliveries
FEDERAL REGISTER, Saturday, August 30, 1911
4491
by classes, types. quantities. weights and
after regulate and govern all matters cin-
wholly from silk, nor shall anything
values, the partics involved in each trans-
braced herein, except where inconsistent
herein contained be construed to pre-
action, the preference ratings, if any,
with the specific provisions of any exist-
vent any producer of rayon yarn from
assigned to deliveries under such con-
Ing or future Order or direction of the
selling yarn not covered by this section
tracts or purchase orders, details of all
Director of Priorities. All existing Or-
to any manufacturer.
Defense Orders either accepted or offered
ders, directions and actions of the Direc-
and rejected, and other pertinent infor-
tor of Prioritics are hereby ratified and
Section 1337.2 is hereby amended by
confirmed and shall remain in full force
adding at the end thereof the following:
mation.*
$ 944.16 Audit and inspection. All
and effect until they expire by their
$ 1337.2 Disposal of yarn allocated
records required to be kcpt by this Regu-
terms or are specifically revoked or
but not purchased.
Provided,
lation or by any Order of the Director of
amended.*
however, That if on the last day of August
Priorities shall, upon request, be sub-
any of the amounts of rayon yarn re-
Issued August 27th, 1941, effective
mitted to audit and inspection by duly
immediately.
quired to bc set aside during the month
authorized representatives of the Office
of August have not been purchased by
of Production Management.*
E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.,
persons permitted to make purchases un-
944.17 Reports. All Persons af-
Director of Priorities.
der Section 1337.1, such yarn shall not be
fected by any Order of the Director of
Approved:
disposed of by the producer thereof but
Prioritics shall execute and file with the
WILLIAM S. KNUDSEN,
shall continue to be held by the producer
Office of Production Management such
Director General.
thereof for disposition in accordance
reports and questionnaires as said Office
SIDNEY HILLMAN,
with the terms of this program.
shall from time to time request. No re-
Associate Director General.
Issued this 28th day of August 1941.
ports or questionnaires are to be filed
[F. R. Doc. 41-6490; Filed, August 28, 1941;
LEON HENDERSON,
by any Person until forms therefor are
1:40 p. m.]
Administrator.
prescribed by the Office of Production
Management."
[F. R. Doc. 41-6512: Filed. August 29, 1941;
11:15 a. m.]
944.18 False staiements. Any Pcr-
son who wilfully falsifies any records
CHAPTER XI-OFFICE OF PRICE
which he is required to kecp by the Direc-
ADMINISTRATION AND CIVILIAN
SUPPLY
[Schedule No. 25]
tor of Priorities, or who otherwise wil-
fully furnishes false information to the
PART 1343-FATS AND OILS AND THEIR
PART 1337-RAYON'
Director of Priorities or to the Office of
PRODUCTS
Production Management, and any Person
AMENDMENT OF CIVILIAN ALLOCATION
ELIMINATION OF SPECULATIVE AND INFLA-
who obtains a delivery, an allocation of
PROGRAM FOR RAYON YARN
TIONARY PRICE PRACTICES WITH RESPECT
Material or a preference rating by means
It is hereby directed that the amend-
TO FATS AND OILS AND THEIR PRODUCTS
of a material and wilful misstatement,
ment to S 1337.1 which was issued August
The Office of Price Administration and
may be prohibited by the Director of Pri-
15, 1941, be amended by deleting the
orities from making or obtaining further
Civilian Supply is charged with the main-
expiration date "August 31, 1941", and
deliveries of Material under allocation
tenance of price stability and civilian sup-
substituting in lieu thereof the expiration
and may be deprived of further priorities
ply. Present stocks and production of
date "September 30, 1941."
assistance. The Director of Priorities
fats and oils and their products are
It is further directed that the amend-
may also take any other action deemed
ample. However, during the past few
ment to $ 1337.1 which was issued August
appropriate, including the making of a
months, speculation in and hoarding of
10, 1941, be amended by deleting the ex-
recommendation for prosccution under
fats and oils and their products has cre-
piration date "August 31, 1941", and sub-
section 35A of the Criminal Code (18
ated the impression of a shortage and has
stiluting in Heu thereof the expiration
U. S. C. 80).*
imposed an artificial influence upon
date "September 30, 1941", and IL is
9.14.19 Appeal. Any Person affected
prices detrimental to the public interest
further directed that such amendment
and national defense. The exhaustive
by any Regulation or Order of the Direc-
be amended by deleting the figure "95%"
tor of Priorities who considers that com-
investigation by this Office, and the in-
and substituting in lieu thereof the figure
formation and counsel furnished this Of-
pliance therewith would work an excep-
"100%.".
tional and unreasonable hardship upon
fice by the trade, have established the
him, may appeal to the Division of Pri-
Section 1337.1, as amended, Is also
necessity for, and the willingness of the
orities by addressing a letter to the Divi-
hereby further amended by adding at
trade to coopcrate in, the elimination of
sion of Priorities. Office of Production
the end thereof the following:
certain of these speculative and inflation-
Management. Social Security Building,
1337.1 Allocation of materials.
ary price practices.
Washington, D. C., setting forth the per-
Therefore, under the authority vested
Provided further, That the
tinent facts and the reasons such Person
rayon yarn expressly required by this
in me by Executive Order No. 8734, it is
considers that he is entitled to relief.
program to be made available to hosicry
hereby directed that:
The Director of Priorities may thereupon
manufacturers and to other former users
§ 1343.1 Elimination of speculative
take such action as he deems appropri-
of silk shall be used only to replace silk,
resales. No person shall buy or offer to
ate.*
and the amount thereof shall therefore
buy, and no person shall sell or offer to
$944.20 Notification of customers.
be computed apart from the quantities of
sell, fats or olls or their products for the
Any Person who is prohibited from, or
rayon yarn which will, in the reduced
purpose of reselling them at a profit
restricted in, making deliveries of any
amounts available by reason of this pro-
without either (a) further processing
Material by the provisions of any Order
grain. be supplied to persons who prior
them or (b) performing some other rec-
of the Director of Priorities shall, as soon
to August 1, 1041 were purchasers of
ognized function in the distribution or
ns practicable. notify each of his regular
rayon yarn, and Provided also, That
manufacture thereof.
customers of the requirements of such
nothing herein contained shall be taken
Any purchase or sale of a futures con-
Order. but the failure to give such notice
to be any representation on the part of
tract made on an erganized commodity
shall not excuse any customer from the
the Government as to the suitability of
exchange to hedge a position, or any pur-
obligation of complying with the terms
any process of manufacture of rayon yarn
chase or sale made to fill an order on
of such Order.*
for the manufacture of hosicry or other
hand. to avoid transportation expenses.
944.21 Effect of regulation; ratifi-
products formerly made largely or
cr to facilitate any other recognized
cation of prior acts. This regulation
shall take effect at once, and shall here-
F.I. 3922, 4115, 4214.
F.IL. 1917.
No. 170-2
979
requirement
CROSS /HEF.
1
proj
December 4, 1942
2
3
To:
sesistang Chief in Charge of Planning And **********
office of Programent and Material, Mary Department
From:
Staty Kay, Director
Statistics Division
Subject: Asbectos Requirements of Bureau of This and Turnan of
Turds and Decks
The Dark and Asbector Division of the WE has requested
this office to obtain the mest recent estimates of the Therents of
Ships sad the Durenz of Turds and Docks for ashests in terms of
the grean weight of artestos procusts rather than the net veight
of the asbestee restained in shone products as heretofore reported.
The acceptly for reporting gress instead of net weight afison free
the fact that bettlenesks exist is the facilities for fubricating
certain nebratos products, such as amosits insulating blocks, unite
syart from the searuity or abundance of the Fav asbestos contained
in those products.
The nabasies reducts to be covered should be the trme
as these shown on previous asbestos reports and include the fel-
leving Items:
Products using Chrysetile - Bureau of Thips:
855 Nagasais Pipe Gevering
$57 Magnesia Cansut
*9% Magnesia Blecks
High Temp. Asb. Pipe Cevering
High Temp. Asb. Commit
Assay Asbectos
Marine theathing
Asbestos Millboard
Restric Cable Filler
Asbectos Cloth - 80% Asb.
Fire Fighting Suits
"age, Twine Yara 30,
Asbector Filtens
High Ass. Seguental Bleaks
Facking
Molded Blocks
PY
Carropated abouts
Gersenl Aubestos Tape
Missellanesus
OKM-80
Dec. 4,1942
2a: Asst. thisf in Charge
+
November 25, 1942
of Flamming and Statistics
Products value Amesite - Bureau of Ships:
Pipe Govering
Veras Asbectes Falt
Eigh Temp. hab. Nagatal Blocks
Asbestos Helded Blecks
Corrugated Asbestes
Corssal Asbestee Tape
Burner of Lards and Deckgr
Corrugated thests
Asbestos Shingies
Asb. Insulating Board
89% Magnesia Pipe Covering
555 Engnesia Blocks
Amesite 10b. ripe Covering
Amoxite Asb. Wlecks
Verez Asbestes Falt
Nigh Tesp. sub. Pipe Cov. (Paperx)
High Temp. ask. Turbine Gevering (Bleck or Loose)
There Asbectos
Achestes Tape
Brake Linings
Gaskets
the period to be severed by the report is the calondar year
1943, w quarters.
Since a major parties of the requested information should
be readily available in the work sheets used by the Bureaus in prepar-
ing recent estimates of requirements for contained asbertos, it is
expected that you will be able to supply the with the needed data by
December 10, 1942. Year prompt cooperation will be appresisted.
13/ Story may
BF
Stacy May
RUSherman, Jr:fal
+)
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT AND MATERIAL
162240
21
5
CURRENT STATUS
OF
CRITICAL MATERIALS
(
DECLASSIFIED
>
Authority DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.3 3/21/83
VOLUME No. s
BY LIONES , NARA, Date 8/9/05
1 OCTOBER 1944
L
EXHIBIT NUMBER 101
COMPIDENTIAL
FOREWORD
This report presents the supply demand relationship of most of the materials important to Navy production programs
and Includes all these materials which were incorporated is Volume No. 1, dated 1 April 1964, in addition to these which have
been discussed in supplements Insued nines. Cartain materials are not regarded sufficiently critical to warrent a detailed
statement and are simply Nated for reference. h will be noted that since the publication of Volume No. & the Not of materials
no langer regurded as critical has expanded considerably. The general easing of mest materials appears Mholy to continue
and, when the termination of the European war results in substantial outbacks is military programs, the supply of meet
materials should be adequate for military programs necessary to presseute the war in the Pasific. M must be smphosized
that certain strategie and critical materials (mently imported, such as tim, miss, manila Sher, sincl, and natural crude rubber)
will reunnin critical after the defent of Germany. Certain chemicals and text Hes will also remain is this entagory.
Manpower is atill regarded as the most difficult factor indivencing the production of new materials, compenents and and
products. When Germany is defeated, however, the labor situation may be alleviated.
It will be noted that principal Navy - have been summarized at the beginning of the report on each material with
a Slow exceptions where the - are obviews. This practice is Intended primarily to assist Nevy fluid mangower repre-
mentatives in relating materials to and Items of munitions.
Attention in again invited to the necemity of obtaining recommendations conserning increased - of critical ma-
from the segnisant Divisions of this Office, the Materials Division, PM 230, and the Conservation Division, PM
mode. Instructions If I i
R to planned to issue frequent supplements to this report, as changes cosur in material situations.
a M. Recember
8
COMPINENTIAL
INDEX OF MATERIALS
1
1
Peal OIL (see Funis)
5
Asstone
3
Asstylene
7
Funis
=
Alsohol, Normal Butyl
,
Gas, manufactured (see Feels)
z
Alsohol, Allyl
=
Cas, natural (ass Funia)
%
Alsohol, Ethyl
7
Gassilne, Aviation (nee Fush)
=
Alsohole, Coconut off (estyl, normal deayl, lawryl,
7
Couphite-Amorphous Lamp
n
Graphite Electrodes (see Electrodus)
us
normal cetyl, steary!)
Alloy Steel (see Controlled Materials)
14
Hardwood (now Lumber)
=
Aluminum (see Centrolled Materials)
14
Heltum
1
Amyl Alcohol
H
Hisles, Cattle
20
Antimalarials
a
Mydroducrie Acid, Ankydrows
2
Antimony
3
Bridium (nee Platinem-group Metals)
$
8
Jowel Bearings-AN Types
20
Asbestos sad Asbestos TextSes
Atabrine (see Antimalerials)
8
Kapek
30
Aviation Gasoline, 160-Octane (ase Fush)
31
Lastrie Acid
Bales (see Lumber)
81
Lanolta (me Degree)
M
Beasaldshyde
9
Load (Including Antimental)
=
Bensol
9
Liquefied Petroleum Game (see Funis)
x
Beryllium
=
Lithham Compounds and Lithken
и
Directh
H
Lithium, Oree and Metal
z
Butane (see Fuels, Liquelled Petroloum Gases)
94
Lumber
=
Cadmium
10
Magnesham
X
Calcite, Optical
3
Mahogany (me Lumber)
=
Calefum Carbide
H
Malete Ankydride
1
Carbon Electrodes (see Electrodes)
3
Manganess
1
Carbon Tetrachloride
11
Manda The (abaca) (see Fibera)
18
Castor on
1
Maroury
s
Chrome Chemicals
18
Mothyl Amines, Mone and DI
=
Chromium
18
Methyl Promide
и
Coal (see Fuels)
=
Methyl Ethy! Kotone
z
Cobalt
3
Misa, Amber Blook
Columbium
14
Miss, Bookform Muscrite Spittings
=
Controlled Materials
14
Miss, Mussovite Block, all qualities and slees
a
Copper (see Controlled Materials)
14
Melybdonum
I
Corundum (Natural Primary Grain)
16
Monal
z
Cetton Textiles
17
Monosthanolamize
z
Cresol and Creaylie Acid (see Orreol, Meta Para)
17
Monomethylamine (ase Methyl Amines)
=
Cresol-Metz Para
17
Naphthenic Acid
2
Ouprous Oxide
17
Niskal
=
Degres
14.
Mylon
=
12
Diamonds, Industrial
H
Otticies ON
Dishiorodifiveromethane (see Freen-12)
20
Ownlum (see Platimum Group Metals)
$
18
Palindium
M
DDT
Dimothylamine (see Methyl Amines)
31
Paper and Paperheard (see Weedpulp)
18
Pare Phonyl Phone
84
Electrodes, Dipentene Carbon and Graphite
H
I
N
Bibyl Collulose (thermoplastic plastic)
H
Pentacrythettel (altration grade)
5
Ethylone Giysel Monobutyl (buty) collensive)
18
Penteerythritol (tocknical grade)
84
10
Fibres
Pupper
5
Fibrous Class Textiles
3
Purchiorothylene and Trichlorothyisms
04
Flr, Douglas (see Lumber)
=
Perchiscio Acid
и
Fluerspar-Asid Grade
91
Phonel-Formaldskyde Resine (thermontting plas- 84
and cornamic grades
z
tie)
Freen-12
20
Phospheres
34
5
CONFIDENTIAL
1
Phinelis Ankydride
Plas (me Lumber)
(Fibers)
Pine on
Biokromate (non Chrome Chemicals)
Platinum Group Metain
Bedium-Motalle
Ptywood (see Lumber)
Pulydishierestyvene (thermoplastic realn)
ON
(crude basin)
(thermaplactic realn)
(nos
Controlled Materials)
Polystyrene, Shrees or "PolyShes" (therms-
Organis Detengents
plastic reals)
Block
Polyviari Butyeel (see Benine)
Polyviayl Becime realns)
Load
Potenshum Purchiorate
Privicy Chieride (m Polyvingt Becime)
PolyvinyMens Chieride (see Priyving Reales)
Propare (see Funis, Liquified Petroloum Game)
Pyrothrum
ON
Orystals
(A) (Moh Inver oil)
Hydrochloride (see Antimalarials)
Valoanized
Fiber Tubing (plactic)
(see Antimalaria)
Miero Orystalline (specification grades)
Impressed ON
Baren (Stigh Tenacity)
Weel Grease ( Dagree)
Medium (see Platinum Group Motals)
Subber
Dust
Buthorism
Onlds, Lead-Proe
(Stab)
Gel
CONFIDENTIAL
1
ACETYLENE BLACK
Uses
Military Dry Batteries (Including dry cell batteries for Navy Communication and Ordnance Programs)
R. R. Lanters Batteries
Rubber Compounding
Acetylene black to produced by only one company which b located in Canada. Several attempts have been made
by companies in the United States to produce M acceptable grade of this material but none have been sommercially
successful. A pliot plant is new being built that seems premising. During the Gret quarter of 1048 the expacity of the
Canadian plant will be increased sufficiently to allow the importation of acetylene black in - of countial require-
meats. The Army and Navy have requested that a stockpile equivalent to a siz months demand be established for
security reasons. At the end of August the stock pile totalied 2,805,000 pounds including 1,886,000 pounds hald by
Defense Supplies Corporation.
(998 pounds)
let Our.
Qtr.
Otr.
One.
Total
Oir.
1944
1944
Not. 1944
20t. 1944
Inc. 1944
But. This
New Supply-Total
2,271
1,900
1,900
1,900
8,000
2,000
д,000
Imports
2,271
1,900
1,900
1,900
8,000
2,000
2,000
Demand-Total
1,348
1,807
$2,075
2,158
7,000
2,127
2,130
Indirect Military (Batteries)
1,170
1,000
1,300
1,875
6,387
1,875
1,578
Indirect Military (Rubber
Compounding)
ITS
197
BYS
200
988
NO
200
*Astual
ALCOHOL, NORMAL BUTYL
Uses
Butyl Asstate
Inseet Repollents
Dibutyl Phikalate (smokeless powder)
HydrauMs Fluid
Butyl Collossive
ON Additives
Laequer Selvents
New facilities for the production of butyrie sold from ethyl alcohol to be completed by the Best quarier of 1948
will decrease requirements for normal butyl alsohol by 2,800,000 lis. per quarter. It is estimated that this will being
supply and requirements into balance. Buty: alsohol is under allesation. On 1 October 1944 inventories equalied
1,800,000 pounds.
(1,000 No.)
Qtr.
our Our.
Our.
3
Not. 1944
Not. 1945
New Supply-Total
88,800
80,700
80,700
80,790
Prim. Production
87,200
88,000
88,000
88,000
Becond. & Berap
TOO
790
700
700
38,006
41,244
28,000
20,000
Direct Military.
I
2
1
3
Indirect Military & Resent. Civilian
88,790
34,000
$4,000
Import
6,886
8,804
8,004
8,000
ALCOHOL, BTHYL
Mass
Explaives, selvents, antifrees, ordnance (terpodees), synthetic rubber
AM military and consential civilian requirements are being met in full under present controls. The sverall supply
and demand is uncertain due to present requirements for butylenes for aviation gaseline. Dustriance are used in produc-
ties of butadiss. At present othy! alcohol b earrying the full lead of butadions production for agrathetic rubber. M
butylenes are returned to butadiens production the demand for sthyl alcohol will sase considerably.
ALCOHOLE. COCONUT ON. (HORMAL OCTTL, NORMAL BECTL. LAURYL, CUTTL. STRARTL)
You
Manufacture of Smid, foaming agents for to fighting, Mary antimaption, all additives; synthetic rubber
modifiers
These matorials continue to be in short supply because of Image requirements for rubber modifiers. One-half of the
geaduation of them alsohols b obtained through the redium reduction process, requiring the use of metalls sedium. At
present, due to the shortage of andium, very Name b being allowed the the manufacture of these faity aleahols. AN
military requirements and most assemital sivilina requirements are being met under present controls.
8
CONFIDENTIAL
ANTIMALARIALS
Blues
Quinine, Totaquine, and Quinacrine Hydrochloride (atabrine)
The government stockpile of quinine and quimine salts M of 1 September 1944 was 5,238,230 cancer, an increase of
445,713 custome over the actual steekpile of 4,863,546 - as of 1 January 1944. 530,000 cumees of quinime and quinine
make, which has been added to the stockpile from 1 January to 1 Suptember 1944, is material that has been realized from
processed sinehons bark. 104,375 cusess has been released from the government stockpile during the period of 1 January
to 1 Suptember 1944. The military requirements for quinine and quinine salts have been greatly reduced in favor of
Increased - of quinaerine hydrochloride (stabrine). Consequently, the Foreign Economic Administration has made
dractic out-backs in their South and Central American development and procurement plans. Only einchona bark -
taining over 3% total erystallizable alkaloids will be procured M compared to the procurements of all back in the past.
Under the present Foreign Economic Administration plans for the salendar year 1945, it is estimated that approximately
18,000,000 pounds of einshons bark will be imported. Through M agreement with the United States, Great Britch is
to receive approximately 3,080,000 pounds of einehone bark annually. It is anticipated that about 2,330,000 sumees of
quinine will be realised by the United States during the calender year 1945 from the einehone hark imported and
prosessed. At the present rate of consumption of quicine by the claimant agencies H is astimated that total requirements
of quinine and quinine salts for the calendar year 1945 will be approximately 1,280,600 curres.
The production of quinacrine hydrochloride (stabrine) is now is 020020 of requirements. Consequently, n b son-
templated that the allocation order controlling the distribution of this synthetic antimalarial will be reveked by 1 Jane-
ary 1945.
All imported einehons bark containing less than 3% total crystallizable alkaloids is being processed into totaquine.
The demand for this antimalarial, to date, has not been large. It is estimated that the inventory as of 1 Jenuary 1945
will be approximately 1,865,000 ouness.
AM of these materials are at present under complete aboeation.
ASSESTOS AND ASSESTOS TEXTILES
USES (see table below)
The requirements for the higher types of asbestos textiles (med for legging over plpe coverings and for Havy
eable, etc.) have not been met in full, for the industry has not had the manpower and facilities to provide them. The
use of Canadian Crude 1 and , and IF through ST, employed for these higher types, has been Menited by the Industry's
espacity to consume, but by means of a combination asbestos and abrous glass cloth, together with on expansion is pro-
duetive capacity of the industry which is now m process, it should be possible to meet the most Important requirements
from new on. The tight supply situation OR packing, gaskets, and oil seals, due to insufficient manufacturing facilities
continues.
Asbertos-Critical Grades (Shert Tena)
Actual Stocks
1944 Commung-
Grade and Source
9/1/44
1944 Supply
time
Chrysotile-Rhodesian
C & G/1
876
#1, *1,000
1,778
C & G/2
2,404
96,000 %
8,100
c & G/S
11,039 039
2 $2,446
4,706
Chrysotile-Canadian
Crude 1 and 1
BB2
1,911
1,379
SF
200
⑉
E
IX
565
2,814
2,386
IR
2,763
11,200
12, 12,118
ST
⑉
1,087
1,700
Dependent upon skipments to last quarter from South Africa.
C8G137
Phocksin or Arizona
CONFIDENTIAL
1
1944 Consumption of Asbectes by Red Use
+
(a) Asbertes Compressed Sheet Packing (Canadion $2, ST, and is)
Compressed asbestos sheet packing is used by the Navy, the Maritime Commission and for other direct and
certain indirect military requirements.
1
(b) Melded America Insulation
Used by the Mary, the Maritime Commission, and for direct and indirest military purposes.
+
(a) Worm America Fall Invidation
Used by the Mary and the Maritime Commission.
60 Firegrouf Marine Type Invulating Board (Amesite)
Used on Proproof divisional bulk'hoads on Meritime Commission versols.
(a) Sprayed Asberies Insulation (Amoolle and C & 6/8)
Used by the Navy and Maritime Commission for ship insulation.
+
6) u persond Magnesia and Other High Temperature Insulations (Amerite and Consdion as)
H persent of the as persont magnesia and other high temperature molded insulations are required in insulation
of Naval and Maritime versels; the remaining 45 persont to used for indirect military and amential sivilies purposes
for high temperature insulations.
(g) Asbecias Coment Pipe (0 & G/S, c s 0/4, and Blue)
Used as a substitute for each from and steel water plane. M persent will be employed for water supply to
military establishments; the balance will P for direct military sad emential civilles requirements.
+
(b) Missellaneous Date (Conodian ss)
B Asbertos Tuntiles
African 0 & G/1 and C & G/2 are principally senfined to Navy sable construction. Canadian Crudes and
Canadian Grades IF and SK are used only for the higher types of asbectos textiles.
INSALDENTE
Uses
Protective - claiment
Delousing spray
Benealdehyde became critical during September 1944 due to large military requirements for protective - sintment
and delousing spray. It is expected that by March 1045 requirements and supply will be brought into balance through
increased production and anticipated decreased requirements.
BENSOL
Does
Manufacture of sumone (aviation gasoline)
Manufacture of styrene (Buse 5)
Manufacture of nylon, phonol, aniline, etc.
Bensol continues to be critical due to large aviation gasoline and synthetic rubber requirements. AM excential
military and excential civilian requirements are being met under present controls. As of 1 September 1944 Government
stocks totalled 23,500,000 gallons. Industrial stocks are negligible,
(800 Gals.)
1st Qur."
2nd Qtr.°
3rd Ou.
4th Qtr.
Total Ext.
lot Qtr.
1944
1944
Est. 1944
Est. 1944
1944
list. 1065
New Supply-Total
88, 58,147
88,310
61,810
61,000 61,
244,207
61,800 a
Prim. Production
88,574
$8,500
$4,000
48,000
108,874
66,998
Becond. & Berap
18,278
21,810
81,810
18,000
80,400
18,000
Imports
0
8,800
6,000
2,600
12,000
2,990
Allocations-Toini
84,617
28,176
$56,838
61,000 61,
206,201
61,000
Direct Military
345
1,100
1,188
1,040
1,000
1,200
Indirect Military }
54,372
DT,000
57,000
88,500
200,300
68,313
Civilian