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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (14 of 17)
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[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (14 of 17)
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
John Roberts' Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: [JGR/Carter Briefing Book for
Presidential Debate] (14 of 17)
Box: 7
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Cruise missiles -- already changing military thinking -- are
in their infancy and affer revolutionary potential. Future
characteristics such as "zero CEP" accuracy at large stand-
off ranges and supersonic dash, at relatively low cost, will
fundamentally change land, sea, and air warfare.
High energy lasers.
New forms of undersea submarine detection.
New capabilities in space, including satellites used for
targeting, missile guidance and surveillance.
Applications of the Space Shuttle.
a
Aircraf with Tow observables to make them virtually
undetectable and with V/STOL capabilities
New forms of defense against ballistic missiles.
All of these and others will dominate future thinking and our
future programs. A vigorous technology base must be created now.
NATO STANDARDIZATION
There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving
efficiencies and improved effectiveness through standard and interopera
ble systems in NATO.
I feel the US should take the lead in bringing this about through
a policy of international cooperation with our Allies which will encom
pass joint industrial programs, licensing both ways, and co-production
We have been pursuing this goal vigorously. We have made a gr
deal of progress despite the complexities of national interests, inter
national economic factors, and industrial pressure groups here and abr
But we still have a long way to go. The Culver-Nunn legislation has b
very supportive of this effort.
1-14
Mr. President, as the controversy over the stealth program
continues, let me address a few of what I consider to be the
essential points.
First, despite the recent flurry of charges from past, current
and would-be public officials, there is simply no evidence of
planned, high-level Administration leaks about stealth. In fact,
not only has the current Administration increased spending on
stealth one-hundred fold, but three years ago it, for the first time
ever, classified the very existence of the program, and since has
kept knowledge of it restricted to a named list of individuals.
Second, going back at least as far as 1976, there have been
published reports of attempts to reduce radar detectability, to
make aircraft "invisible," as it were. It is inconceivable to
me that Soviet analysts missed these various references, so we can
assume they have been aware for some time that the U.S. was engaged
in such efforts.
Third, as the stealth program continued to become larger and
more expensive, its existence would have had to be made public in
the near future anyway. The existence of a program of this size,
with hundreds of contractor personnel and government officials
involved, could not be kept secret much longer--under any
circumstances.
Fourth, a rash of press reports of stealth occurred last month
leaving the Pentagon no practical recourse but to acknowledge the
existence of the program--admittedly slightly earlier than they
wanted to or would have had to, in the absence of such press reports
I do not see how, in August 1980, the Soviets, who already knew from
open literature about such work, could have been tricked into
believing that there really was no such program. They are not naive
men in the Kremlin, although some in this country apparently would
have us believe they are.
Lastly, the Pentagon has now drawn a clear line between what
little has been declassified regarding stealth and everything else
about the program. It behooves all of us to honor that line and to
do all we can to see that others do as well.
Let me also make two observations in passing. One is that I
cannot help but be struck by what one distinguished journalist
has called the "selective indignation" on the part of some of those
who are most loudly and fervently decrying alleged leaks about steal
One wonders why all of these same voices were not raised in indignat
when earlier leaks occurred about U.S. negotiating positions during
SALT or about various Soviet strategic programs. One merely wonders
one doesn't know why.
2
The second observation involves current allegations that
the incumbent Secretary of Defense has broken tradition and engaged
in what are described as unusual, if not unprecedented activities,
such as replying to charges made by political candidates about
defense policy. I have not researched this matter closely and my
memory is far from perfect, but I do seem to recall other Secretarie
of Defense in both Republican and Democratic Administrations--
addressing party platform committees, correcting inaccurate allega-
tions about defense matters, at times even using very strong languag
while replying.
It is not unusual for national security matters to become
issues in a campaign. It is not unusual for challengers to make
criticisms, and it is not unusual for incumbents to make replies.
Lest we get diverted into partisan exchanges that obscure
the real issues, let me offer my opinion that the most important
question to be answered after the stealth dust settles is: in a
democratic society, yet one which has real adversaries around
the world, how do we protect our most vital secrets while not losing
the freedoms which define our system and our way of life? The
answers are not obvious or easy. They involve questions of policy,
of law, of ethics, of freedom of the press, of justice. These are
the matters to which this body must return.
Mr. Speaker, the overriding concern in the matter of the
stealth program is whether the Soviets have benefitted from recent
publicity of the program. A secondary, but nonetheless very importan
concern is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated leaks of
classified information about the program for political gain--and
thereby giving the Soviets a head start in countering stealth
technology.
I don't know about the infrared signature of stealth aircraft,
but I do know that, so far, this controversy has generated far more
heat than light.
Let me try to shed some light on this matter, in part by putting
it in a broader context and by laying out a fuller chronology of
events. From much of the current controversy, even the moderately
attentive observer would get the impression that the whole affair
began with a meeting on August 18, 1980, between Dr. William Perry,
Under Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benjamin Schemmer of the Armed
Forces Journal. In fact, there is much more history to be reckoned
with.
Virtually since the invention of radar, scientists have been
working to develop ways to offset it--to blind radars, to fool
radars, to make objects less detectable by radar. As in many areas
of high technology, the United States has been in the vanguard of
this work. The professional journals and the trade press have
published articles about such research over the years.
Contrary to the impression recently left by former President
Ford and Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. effort in this area was not highly
classified until 1977. In the \toring spring of that year, after recognizing
the true potential of stealth, the Carter Administration turned it
into a major development and production program, compartmentalized
it, and classified even the existence of this new, intensified
program. This is the first important landmark in the chronology of
stealth.
The second is in June 1978, when Ben Schemmer of the Armed
Forces Journal came to Dr. Perry with an article about stealth an
article 98 percent of which, Mr. Schemmer testified, came from
unclassified sources, yet which contained so much sensitive infor-
mation that Dr. Perry, invoking our national security interest,
asked Mr. Schemmer not to print it. To his credit, Mr. Schemmer
agreed but let me emphasize that Mr. Schemmer did not initiate the
notion of restraint; Dr. Perry did.
And the secret held for over two years, despite a dramatic
expansion of the scope and size of the program, and therefore the
number of people who had to--and did know about it.
The third landmark is a series of stories this summer,
beginning with a June 28 Washington Post article describing a
new bomber that "could be made invisible to enemy radar through
highly secret gadgetry."
Then in the second week of August, three stories in rapid
succession:
-- August 11 -- Aviation Week and Space
Technology refers to "the advanced
technology 'stealth' bomber. If Two
sentences in the article are worth
highlighting in our search for who
leaked what to whom and when:
"Several in the Senate contend
Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering William
J. Perry oversold the 'stealth'
aircraft in order to stop a Senate
amendment for a new but more
conventional bomber. Perry's
stealth bomber, one senator
complained, is too small, will
cost $14-15 bilion for 50 air-
craft and cannot be ready by
1987, the date requested by
Congress."
-- August 14 -- the Washington Post
publishes the article that Gen
Ellis of SAC has said "brought the
The key point is that, while there had been occasional
public references to such work over the years, the summer of 1980
brought a rapid-fire series of such stories- this at a time when
more and more people- members of the House and Senate, their staffs,
Defense Department and other executive branch. officials, and
contractors- were being brought in on the Stealth program as it
continued to grow in size and intensity and cost.
As members of this House know well, there is a world of
difference between rare and scattered references to an issue and a
flurry of stories about one.
After this flurry of articles, a period of intense activity
began at the Pentagon- and, again, the chronology is important.
-- August 14 -- the date of the last two
stories - Dr. Perry sends Secretary Brown
new security guidelines for stealth,
declassifying the existence of the
program, but drawing a tight circle
around sensitive technical and
operational details.
-- August 16 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry,
and Air Force Secretary Mark meet and give
final approval to the new guidelines,
order additional Congressional briefings,
and decide on an August 22 press con-
ference to announce the existence of
the stealth program.
-- August 18 -- With Brown's approval, Perry
meets with Schemmer, tells him of the August 22
press conference and indicates what has been
declassified. Perry offers to let Schemmer
print the story of what has been declas-
sified, one day in advance of the press
conference- because Schemmer has honored
Perry's 1978 request to hold AFJ's earlier
stealth story.
-- August 19 -- Schemmer shows Perry his new
article, and--at Perry's request agrees to
delete about a dozen items, several of
which Perry felt were particularly important
from a security point of view.
-- August 20 -- Perry gives SECRET stealth
briefings to four Congressional committees,
specifying what has been declassified and
what remains classified at SECRET level, and
states that all other stealth information
remains compartimented at the highest
security level.
-- August 21 -- Schemmer article appears.
-- August 22 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry,
and Gen Kelly Burke hold a press conference.
They confirm: 1.) that a stealth program
exists, 2.) that tests have been conducted,
3.) that stealth does not involve a single
technical approach, and 4.) that stealth
technology could be applied to many military
vehicles. Following the new guidelines, they
emphasize that operational and technical
details will be protected at the highest
security level.
Now, Mr. Speaker, we come back to the key question- did the
Soviets benefit from DoD's public acknowledgement of stealth's
existence?
The answer, I believe, clearly is no. You don't have to be a
Washington veteran or an intelligence expert to know that the
Soviets read Aviation Week, Aerospace Daily, the Washington Post,
and other important journals and newspapers. They watch American
television news as well. So, they had seen, over the years, a
number of reports in respected and authoritative publications about
a U.S. program that had real consequences for Soviet defense. Well
before Brown's August 22 press conference, Soviet scientists and
engineers--and, no doubt, Soviet intelligence agents--were hard at
work on stealth and possible countermeasures.
They weren't tipped off by Harold Brown on August 22, or
by the Schemmer article on August 21. And nothing Harold Brown
could have said on August 22 could have turned them off. Given the
public reports over the years, and given the importance of U.S.
stealth capabilties to the Soviets, does anyone seriously believe
that, had Harold Brown said "no comment," "neither confirm nor deny,
or "stories about Stealth are a bunch of baloney," the Kremlin would
have breathed a sigh of relief and told the scientists, engineers,
and KGB agents working on stealth to go back to other projects?
The second question, Mr. Speaker, is whether the Carter
Administration orchestrated stealth leaks for political gain?
Unlike Mr. Schemmer in his sworn testimony before a Committee of
this House, I will not engage in speculation about other people's
motives.
As to leaks this summer, Aviaton Week cites "several in the
Senate," not administration sources. The Washington Post says its
June 28 article was based on interviews "with defense specialists
8
in Congress and the Carter Administation. It does not say only
with DoD officials.
As for the Armed Forces Journal, in 1978 it was Schemmer who
came to Perry with the story--not the other way around. It was
Perry who asked Schemmer not to go public--not the other way
around. In August of this year, Perry--who as a contractor and as a
defense official has been working with classified material for
years--says he gave Schemmer no classified information in 1978 or in
1980. Schemmer, whose publication regularly--one is tempted to say
routinely--prints classified information, says his sources for the
1978 article included people in Congress, in the White House, and at
the Pentagon. Contrary to what some may believe, the Armed Forces
Journal was not a virgin as far as classified information is concerne
In conclusion, let me summarize: Secretary Brown's August 22
press conference did not tip off the Soviets. Earlier press accounts
had. In August 1980, no other response could have turned the
Soviets off.
Until three years ago, the existence of Stealth was not
classified. For the past three years it has been, even to the point
that you yourself, Mr. Speaker, have indicated you were not aware
of it.
An investigation is underway to find the source of the earlier
leaks. A tight security circle has been drawn around operational
and technical details of the program.
The August 21 Schemmer article was not the excuse or the
occasion or the trigger for the August 22 press conference.
Earlier press reports led to that course.
Who leaked what to whom, when, how, and why is a matter
for the investigators. As testimony before a Committee of this
House has revealed, there are real and serious problems in maintaini
security and investigating breaches of it. By and large, these
problems are not a function of executive policy, but rather a
function of the law. Legislation is written in this building, not
in the Pentagon. And ait is to legislation regarding secrecy and
security that those of us in this building should turn our attention
There is much important and difficult work to be done, and I say
full speed ahead.
10
MILITARY MANPOWER/REGISTRATION/DRAFT
Reagan
Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate
draft registration and any peacetime draft.
"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration.
Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980
He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.
"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease
our military preparedness, by making people think we have
solved our defense problem
"
Quoted by Senator Hatfiel
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980
Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan
calls for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors
the same buildup as an alternative to registration.)
"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a
reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained in
them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force) to
deteriorate very badly. It is must too small, it is not
equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the training.
National Journal
March 8, 1980
To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay
incentives.
Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve
strictly on a volunteer basis?
Reagan: yes.
Q: How, with pay incentives?
Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.
National Journal
March 8, 1980
Bush
"I also support draft registration for both men and women,
and I would like to see an immediate investigation of the readi-
ness of our military troops. If the facts demand it, we should no
hesitate to increase financial inventives for those in uniform or
even to return to the draft. I am confident that our young people
will rally to the flag as the need is there."
The Candidates 1980
Amerian Enterprise Insti
Received May 20,1980
Bush
"I think that we have to have draft registration
I
don't know whether we need a draft now. But when we do need it,
I'm going to say SO. A fair draft with not a lot of exemptions
that would prevent people from serving, letting rich kids to
ahead and get a Phd, while some poor ghetto kid gives his life
in the service of his country
It'll be men and women.
That doesn't mean that women will fight, go on the line or in
the trenches. But I believe in women's rights and opportunities
and I belive that women should have to serve their country."
Birmingham, Al, Post-Her
October 5, 1979
Bush
"It would be an equitable draft if we need it. It would be
a non-sexist draft if we need it
But that main thing is that it
would be a fair draft. "
Champaign, IL, Daily Ill
January 31, 1980
Bush
"I favor registration
I'm not convinced we need the draft,
but if we ever should, it ought to be men and women, exemption
proof and with a limited period of exposure."
Political Profiles
page 6
1979
Bush
"I voted for the volunteer Army. (But) we might have to go to
a draft, and if we do it's going to be a fair-play draft. Not
any exemption for a rich kid to get his PhD, and the poor kid
gets the rifle."
Christian Science Monito
January 24, 1980
Carter
"At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with
great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for
peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize
quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both
friend and foe alike.
It should be clear to everyone who studies national
security or defense that our work to keep American the strongest
nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on
which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There
are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've
resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense
preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves
with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of
today and the world of tomorrow.
"
Address to American Legion
Convention
August, 1980
Defense Manpower- - Overview
President Carter has been explicit in his opposition to
a peacetime draft; he has submitted legislation for a fair
benefits package to improve military pay and benefits; he
has cut military attrition, and (measured against the years
of the prior administration) improved military reenlistment
rates. In addition he has corrected major weaknesses that
arose during the prior administration with respect to our
pool of mobilization manpower.
Specifically:
First term attrition (the drop-out rate of those who
sign up for military service but do not complete their
terms) has fallen from 37% in 1976 to 50% in 1978.
Conversely, reenlistment rates for DoD as a whole
are up from 50% in 1976 to 53% now. (The reenlistment rates
of first termers are up, particularly in the Army. Career
reenlistment rates are down. The net effect is a modest
plus.)
As a general matter DoD has been within 1.5% of its
active force manpower pools in every Carter year--a better
record than in the prior two administrations.
Virtually all of the particular items recommended by
critics of this Administration's military pay and benefits
policy (right down to the nitty gritty item of increasing
the allowance for mobile homes) were first publicly recom-
mended by this Administration.
Beyond that, the Administration has been vocal in
support of many important benefits that go beyond those
endorsed by its critics. Among these are improvements in
the military medical insurance program (CHAMPUS) under which
the President has proposed the creation of dental and other
benefits. The Administration also supports a variable
housing allowance. It introduced- and supports- legislation
that would permit larger pay raises for the military than
for civilian government employees.
This Administration has not proposed reducing any in-
service benefits, * and, as noted, has proposed numerous
additions. An Administration proposal with respect to
Note, it may be argued that the President's paid
parking operation is such a diminution, but it more or
less incidentally affects only a small fraction of
military personnel.
2
military retirement (first advanced by an independent
commission on the subject: would add $7 billion to military
pay and benefits over the next 20 years, while saving tens
of billions of dollars over the longer term.
It should be noted that selected reserves (i.e.,
reserves in units) strength declined dramatically every year
during the last administration, while it has increased
during the last two Carter years; that individual reserve
strength declined even more dramatically during the last
administration, but has been reversed by Carter programs;
and that in reinstituting peacetime registration this
Administration has restored an important standby mobili-
zation capacity that the previous administration had aban- -
doned for budgetary reasons.
Defense Manpower Policies
The 1970's: Requirements
As the 1970's ended, the U.S. fielded its leanest
active and reserve armed force since the 1950's: slightly
over two million active duty members; a little over one
million reservists (attached table 1). This leanness resulted
from a number of things, but it was in no small measure the
product of some important doctrinal changes concerning force
structure that were made in the first half of the seventies.
Four of these are noteworthy.
Worldwide manpower requirements were adjusted
downward by President Nixon, from a program objective to be
prepared for 2 1/2 wars simultaneously to a less demanding
scenario that envisaged a major European war and a smaller
contingency elsewhere.
At the same time, a concept of global "total force
planning" was embraced, which placed greater reliance than
in the past on the armed forces of allies and regional
powers to supply initial forces and the first line of defense
for many warfare possibilities.
Within U.S. manpower assets, in 1973 a concept of
"total force planning" was also adopted, one which placed
less heavy reliance on the active forces and much more on
the activation and emergency mobilization of reserves, and
which worked some shifts of wartime functions and assets
from the active to the reserve structure; and
The all-volunteer (or "zero" draft) force replaced
the partial conscript manning scheme that had existed from
1948 to 1972.
Two other factors were at work in the early seventies
as well: the Vietnam conflict ended, and with it came a
drawdown of the strength increases that had begun in 1964;
and the increasing sophistication of modern weaponry, plus
the need for forward deployments and rapid responses (made
vivid in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) were inexorably forcing
shifts to smaller but more experienced forces that had been
the case in the first two post-war decades.
For the remainder of the decade, defense manpower
strategy consisted of:
*
In part for budgetary reasons, in part to reflect the
changing role of China in U.S. strategic concerns about
Asia and the Pacific.
:- To be augmented in the first instance in an
emergency by a call-up of reserves;
-- To be augmented additionally by call-ups of
pretrained individuals subject to call-up and by a
resumption of conscription in the context of a mobilization.
The Administration refined, but did not make fundamental
changes, in these manpower policies.
The 1970's: Resources
The Defense manning performance in the remainder of the
decade was mixed. Despite some periodic shortfalls in
enlistments, the active forces were generally successful in
meeting recruiting goals (Table 2); and since 1974, had
never been more than one-and-one-half percent below authorized
strength (Table 3). First term reenlistments remained
strong. At the same time, reserve strengths lagged notably
behind the active forces (Table 2), and the Services experienced
a significant--almost chronic--slippage in retention of more
experienced enlisted members. (The problem is particularly
serious in the Navy, where second term reenlistment rates
have fallen 15 points over the last five years.)
This mixed yield took place in a context that circum-
stantially favored military manning needs in a couple of
ways, but which otherwise was not very sustaining. The
Services benefitted for most of the decade from two things
in combination.
The demographics- the baby boom legacy- worked to
our advantage. By the time it peaked in 1978, the prime re-
cruiting pool (males, 17-21) topped ten million.
We met a smaller manpower requirement in the post-
Vietnam seventies than we had at any time since 1950.
But other factors were not favorable, and more than
offset these cushions.
The relative value of military compensation eroded
notably beginning in 1973;
There was a similar erosion in the uniqueness of
the advantages that military service had long offered youth.
No longer was the military the major source of initial jobs
and training, nor the principal stepping stone to higher
education. A bounty of federal programs in place by mid-
decade (basic educational opportunity grants, CETA, the Job
Corps, Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Opportunity
Acts, and various counter-cyclical programs) now compete for
young people.
The G.I. Bill was replaced in 1977 by an educational
package for service personnel that is seen by many young
people as much less attractice (and, as a matter of benefits,
is in fact less attractive) ;
The U.S. embraced all-volunteer manning with a
compensation and incentive structure that is long on tradition
but short on flexibility. The military retirement system
(which the Administration studied and has proposed sweeping
changes in) is a notable example- a structure built on per-
verse incentives, such that a person has little inducement
to stay after 20 years, and no incentives to say for less.
We have no rewards to offer the youth who would give 10 or
15, but not 20, years of service to country.
In embracing the AVF in 1973, the nation's policy
changed faster than its structures; its philosophy outpaced
its budgets and programs in some key respects.
Administration Policy
There are two cornerstones:
In the absence of an exigent international circum-
stance, the nation's military manpower requirements are best
met on an all-volunteer basis. Current military manning
problems seem most capable of solution in an AVF context. A
return to a peacetime draft is neither necessary not desirable
at this time. So long as our recruiting needs continue to
be met, and so long as the demands on the armed forces can
be met with present force levels, a return to the draft is
neither prudent nor required.
The nation's ability to augment its forces in a..
emergency had eroded in mid-decade, however, and requires a
reinvigoration. The reinstitution this summer of peacetime
registration has been taken as a precautionary step to save
crucial time in the event the nation had to mobilize in an
emergency. (It was always intended that the AVF be augmented
by conscription in such emergency circumstances.)
With the baby boom legacy receding (the prime recruiting
pool in 1992 will be 20 percent smaller than its 1978 level)
and with tougher competition for recruits, DoD has embraced
two general strategies.
First, we can reduce demand by managing the force
in ways that permit us to need fewer recruits from the
marketplace. DoD is already firmly embarked on such a
course in three respects: reversing the trend of the 1970's
toward high attrition (i.e., wash-outs) of first term personnel,
pruning manpower requirements in weapons systems acquisition
and design, and improving our long term retention of those
who do join up.
Second, we can expand supply, by embracing policies
that would make more people eligible for military service,
and would make service more attractive to those who are
eligible. DoD is doing the first of these by increasing the
enlistment of women for non-combat positions. It is also
studying whether some of its physical entrance standards-
many of these adopted in the draft era when supply was
virtually unlimited- bear a sound relationship to required
performance. The yield from this measure will be finite,
however, to do the second--increase the attractiveness of
service- require some hard decisions. There has been a
serious downward slide in the comparative value of military
pay and benefits for junior personnel. Other federal programs
that require no service obligations offer highly valued
lures to youth. In educational assistance, we now have the
G.I. Bill without the G.I.
We have made considerable headway, but certainly not
enough, in both strategies since 1977. And there is nothing
to suggest that the strategies themselves are not inherently
appropriate.
Are the Services enlisting the "right kinds of people?"
"The right quality?" The short answer is that there is no
sure test to tell. True military readiness is difficult to
measure and appraise; on-job performance can be graded, but
its relationship to the testable characteristics of candidates
for service remains a vague and imperfectly documented one.
Historically, the caliber of incoming recruits has been
described using two surrogate measures: graduation from
high school and entrance test scores.
By the first of these, high school graduation a good
predictor of a candidate's staying power and adaptability to
discipline but not of his on-job performance the Services
have experienced a decline since mid-decade. At the same
time, however, the staying power of both graduates and non-
graduates (measured by attrition rates) has been improved in
recent years, largely through better management of recruits
after they join.
As for the second, we have recently found that in
entrance tests--used to predict "trainability". we have
inadvertently inflated the scores of lower-scoring personnel
in recent years, such that the Services have been mislabeling
large numbers of recruits as having higher "aptitude" levels.
The significance of these mischaracterizations may not,
however, be very profound. DoD has now undertaken a special
analysis of the relationship between these scores and the
job performance of those whose scores were inflated. The
first (but still tentative) findings suggest that most of
the low scoring people have successfully completed training
and are performing adequately.
The relationship of these predictors to "quality - - and
the relationship of what a recruit brings to the military
and what military service itself produces in the way of
eventual "quality" are imprecise at best approximate,
ultimate unsure. Neither the AVF's critics nor its supporters
have an indisputable formula for measuring such things.
DEFENSE FORCE READINESSS
Bush
"I am clearly in favor and continue to be of a three-ocean
Navy, and that means we should commence work on a nuclear
carrier. The first year of this, a lot of this spending, this
extra spending would be to catch up in conventional types of
categories where we've gotten behind, and inventory. We've
gotten behind in maintenance. We've gotten behind in a lot
of just plain replacing of obsolete items."
Wall Street Journal
February 19, 1980
Mondale
"It is not wrong to ask whether we are strong enough to
provide for this nation's defenses: that is how we keep the
peace. But it is utterly wrong to assume we are behind. The
truth is that today there is no American General or Admiral who
would propose to trade our defense forces with those of any
other nation--now, or in the forseeable future."
Commonwealth Club
Address, September 5, 19
Carter
"Yes. The answer is yes. I don't want to go into
detail now because the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary
of Defense today are answering an article that was published in
the New York Times this morning on the front page saying that
some of our Army divisions were not prepared for combat, did
not enjoy combat readiness."
"We've added, including a bill I signed yesterday to
increase the pay and benefits of military personnel, we've
added about $4 billion since I've been in office to improve the
quality of military persons, to improve the retention rate among
vital trained petty officers primarily and also to help with
recruitment."
"We've had remarkable success that we did not anticipate
really with the registration for the draft with about 93 percent
of the young people who were eligible registering for the
draft. About 15 percent of those who registered expressed a
desire to know more about career opportunities in the military
forces. There was a place on the form that they could check
there, which I think will help us with recruitment in the future. "
"The spirit within the military is very good. They've
had some onerous assignments that I've given them, for instance,
the longterm stationing of aircraft carriers and the support
ships in the north Indian Ocean. They've performed superbly
in that respect. I visited a lot of the military bases. I
happen to be a professional military man by training and I've
found them to be well trained. SO I would guess that our
military forces are in good condition."
New Jersey Editors Weekl;
September 9, 1980
STATUS OF U.S. DIVISIONS
The New York Times article of September 9 on Army
readiness was factual and accurate, but fell short of a reasonable
explanation of the situation. Forward deployed divisions, the
combat force of that 45% of the Army which is overseas, are
maintained at highest status.
State-side divisions have the mission to deploy
overseas where needed, to reinforce forward deployed units, or
to go to areas where required. The status of state-side
divisions is forecast to improve significantly over the next
several months for several reasons:
-- Recruiting for the past year has fully met objections
and those soldiers are now beginning to arrive in units
-- NCO shortages will be improved, as the Chief of Staff of
the Army announced the other day, as balancing of forces
by reduction of overstrengths in forward deployed forces
takes effect.
These actions take about six months to work, and we can expect
to see reasonable improvements in the status of state-side units
within the next six months.
The situation is not as dreary as it might appear on the surface.
The Army's Units Status Report classifies divisions as
"fully ready" to "not ready" according to personnel, equipment,
and training conditions. A division rated low is one of these re-
source areas is capable of operating with two of its three
brigades if required to deploy immediately. In addition, assets
could be quickly shifted from one division to improve the readi-
ness of another division. Even though personnel challenges pre-
vail, the Army could cross level resources in the United States
to respond to a crisis. This would provide earlier deploying forc
full combat capability. In any event, the Unit Status Report is
an indicator of a division's resource picture and the time re-
quired to bring it to full capability -- excellent for flagging
divisons rather than a measure of combat readiness.
It is common practice among all armed forces to man
units in peacetime at lower levels than would be required in
wartime.
It is also important to recognize that the Soviets keep the
majority of their divisions at less than full combat readiness.
Force Readiness
a
Aircraft Readiness (including spares parts)
1.
Over the past several years the Defense budget has
generally provided enough spare parts to support the peace-
time flying hour program fully. However, we are continuing
to build war reserve inventories of spare parts and it will
be several years before those inventories will be adequate
to support all of our combat air forces at wartime sortie
rates in a major conflict for the full combat durations for
which we plan.
The claim that our hardware and spares posture is
such that "only half the planes can fly" is inaccurate.
This assertion seems to be based on a misinterpretation of
the so-called aircraft "mission-cable (MC) rate. MC rates
are not a measure of wartime readiness. They are an index
of the peacetime performance of our logistics support
system--not a measure of our ability to fly sorties in war-
time.
We should not expect MC rates to even approach 100%,
for two reasons--first, even under the best of conditions,
significant maintenance downtime (much of it scheduled
preventative maintenance and inspections) must be expected
as an unavoidable cost of doing business; second, we cannot
predict with certainty which aircraft components will fail
when, where, or how often. It is not practical or wise to
buy enough spare components to protect completely against
the uncertainty involved, and we typically stock to about
85% spares availability.
If we were to make a transition to war from our
normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would selectively
defer nonurgent periodic inspections and preventive main-
tenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited access to
our war reserve spares and would, as necessary, cannibalize
serviceable components from out-of-commission aircraft to
maximize our wartime sortie capability.
b. Navy Ship Aviation/Readiness
Today, the Navy's inventory of active deployable
ships stands at 455. One hundred two of our ships are
deployed. Two hundred eighty-nine (648) are reporting
combat ready. 85 ships are in programmed maintenance, a
category which includes overhaul, selected restricted
availability, and post shakedown availability. Seventeen
ships are not combat ready* because of elective maintenance
"Not Combat Ready" means that the unit has insufficient
resources to meet warfighting demands in a projected
combat environment. However, units being deployed in
this category can execute planned operations in a
peacetime environment.
(this is work that is done during scheduled upkeep periods),
and fifteen others are in a corrective maintonance category,
having sustained casualties to combat essential equipment.
The remaining 49 are deficient principally in areas of
personnel, training and supply.
Of 157 deployable active Navy squadrons, 36 report
their primary degraded area as personnel and 15 report not
combat ready for the remaining resource areas.
Recognizing the inevitability under existing require-
ments that units reporting not combat ready may be required
to forward deploy, the Navy has recently initiated an assess-
ment procedure which is required thirty days prior to deploy-
ment for all units reporting not combat ready in personnel.
This assessment either offers a final opportunity for
improvement measures or furnishes the basis for operational
limitations in the interests of safety. In the past the
Navy has augmented ships with personnel from other duty
stations to meet critical skill shortages. The fleet
commanders administer this level manning policy in order to
spread manpower shortages throughout the fleet. Use of this
practice has been infrequent. However, there will probably
be some necessary increases in this practice for ships on
station in the Indian Ocean.
C.
Divisions
Our forward deployed Army divisions are well-
equipped, well-trained, and at a high state of readiness.
Within the United States, the 82nd Airborne Division is
maintained at a high state of readiness. Many of the
remaining divisions in the United States have serious
personnel problems, primarily due to shortages of combat
arms NCOs.
We are taking numerous steps to improve our divi-
sion readiness by alleviating personnel shortages. In
recruiting, we are expanding bonus programs that are keyed
toward critical skills. We are also supporting legislation
now in Congress to improve educational benefits, including
provisions that would pass on unused educational benefits to
dependents. To alleviate the shortage of middle-grade NCOs,
we are working to expand bonus programs to include mid-range
NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry, armor, field artil-
lery, and other selected skills.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEADERSHIP
Bush
"The Carter Administration, despite its sudden
recognition of the American people's concern over our nation's
ability to defend itself, has shown no understanding of the
lessons of modern history."
"Under a Reagan presidency, however, the reversal of
those ominous trends will serve as a keystone of a foreign
policy based on just such an understanding: a foreign policy
that proceeds from strength not simply military strength, but
the strength of our alliances and the reinforcement of those
alliances by America's being true to its word in our dealings
with other nations. "
World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh, September 5,
Bush
"We don't have the luxury of dealing with one problem while
the others languish
They are interrelated, and so must our
handling of them be.
"The message will be loud and clear around the world: The
United States means to maintain her security and to retain the
ability to stand by her friends. "
Boston Globe
September 8, 1979
Mondale
"We will also stake the contest on the paramount issue
the Republicans tried to raise in Detroit-- the question of
antional strength. We gladly accept that challenge."
"The President of the United States has an enormous
job. He's charged with the most powerful responsibility
to be found in the world--the burden of nuclear power. He is the
leader of the civilized world. He must defend its freedom. He
must grasp the complexities of our difficult world. He must
protect our security by freeing our dependence on foreign oil."
"And to do all of that, we must have a strong President.
Yet last month Ronald Reagan spent two days on national tele-
vision drawing up a plan to divide the Presidency and weaken
its powers. Anyone who seeks the Presidency--and in his first
serious act convenes a Constitutional Convention in his hotel room
to weaken the office he's seeking--does not understand the
Constitution, the Presidency, or what national security is all
about."
D.N.C. Acceptance Speech
August 1980
NAVAL BALANCE VIS-a-VIS USSR
Reagan
Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slash-
ing Navy programs.
"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval
Operations, told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be
attained by 1980. By the end of this fiscal year only 5 or 6
weeks away, our conventional Navy will consist of only 415
active ships. Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program
in half, and has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-
a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement."
Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980
Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.
"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our
naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with the
equipment and spare parts they need."
Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980
The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft
carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships:
"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling
of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to
600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by Presi-
dent Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and
amphibious ships. We will restore naval and Marines aircraft
procurement to economical rates enabling rapid modernization of
the current forces, and expansion to meet the requirements of
additional carriers.
1980 Republican Platform
Bush
"A stronger Navy for us, a three-ocean Navy, is essential." "
Political Profiles
page 9
1979
Carter
Naval Forces
"Seapower is indispensable to our global position -- - in
peace and also in war. OUr shipbuilding program will sustain
a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the
most capable ships afloat.
"The program I have proposed will assure the ability
of our Navy to operate in the high threat areas, to maintain
control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication-
both military and economic--and to provide the strong maritime
component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for
operations in remote areas of the world, where we can not predict
far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition
equipment on land."
State of the Union Addre
January 1980
Mondale
"It has been said that our Navy is inferior to the Soviet
Navy, because they have more ships. But the number of ships alone
is a false measure. It assumes that one of their coastal patrol
ships is the equal of one of our aircraft carriers, and that one
of their diesels is as capable as one of our modern Trident
nuclear submarines. The truth is that the technology of our
carriers, of our submarines, and our new surface ships is far
more advanced than theirs. Moreover, from frigates on up, we
have a two-to-one advantage over the Soviets in Surface combat
tonnage. All of these factors must be weighed for any serious
and realistic assessment of the strength of our Navy -- a strength
that is unsurpassed on the high seas.
Commonwealth Club
September 5, 1980
0
Naval Balance Vis-a-Vis Soviet Union
The CNO stated earlier this year that the U.S. Navy is the
best in the world and has improved in capability relative to a year ago.
The Navy believes that, in conjunction with our allies, we currently
possess a slim margin of superiority over the maritime forces of the
Soviets.
Current estimates indicate that the Soviets are continuing to
emphasize qualitative improvements and that the trend toward construction
of larger surface combatants and auxiliaries will result in a moderate
decrease in overall Soviet Navy force levels over the next decade. For
example, the total of Soviet principal surface combatants (carriers,
cruisers, destroyers and frigates) and general purpose submarines is
projected to decline by 5-10% over the next decade.
Conversely, our naval forces are projected to grow from current
levels (about 540 total ships) to about 590 ships by the mid-1980s and
remain at this level through the late 1980s, based on Navy force pro-
jections that reflect a shipbuilding program generally consistent with
the 5-year plan submitted to Congress last January (roughly 19-20 new
construction ships per year). Projections beyond the late 1980s are
more difficult to make due to the uncertainties associated with future
shipbuilding plans, ship designs and costs, and the retirement schedules
of existing ships. Furthermore, our threat projections become increas-
ingly uncertain beyond the late 1980s thus making detailed capability
assessments extremely speculative.
In addition to the projected growth in the number of ships in
our Navy -- in terms of both major combatants and support ships -- our
naval force structure will undergo major qualitative improvements
through the 1980s. Such qualitative improvements are not reflected in
numbers comparisons but are taken into account in capability assessments.
Some examples:
--
Our 12 deployable carrier battle groups will be maintained
and strengthened by the addition of two CVNs, AAW improvements with new
CG-47 Aegis cruisers and upgrades to other guided missile ships, and ASW
improvements such as towed tactical array sonars and new LAMPS MK III
ASW helicopters. 12 deployable aircraft carrier battle groups represent
the minimum offensive capability required to meet peacetime needs and
wartime demands in the face of Soviet opposition.
-- We will continue to modernize and increase the size of
our nuclear attack submarine force with both continued SSN-688 procure-
ment and introduction of a more affordable yet fully adequate follow-on
submarine (FA-SSN).
-- Our overall ASW capabilities will be further strengthened
by continued modernization of our highly effective land-based P-3
maritime patrol aircraft forces. Substantial improvements will also be
made in our undersea surveillance capabilities with improved SOSUS and
introduction of at least 12 SURTASS mobile surveillance systems (TAGOS
ships).
Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan
The current five-year shipbuilding plan proposes to
build 97 new ships and modernize 5 older ships. This
shipbuilding plan incorporates both a shift toward the high
end of the mix of combatant ships, and the construction of
new maritime prepositioning ships (MPS/TAKX) to support the
rapid deployment force.
The five-year shipbuilding program was derived on the
basis of the Navy being prepared to conduct prompt and
sustained combat operations at sea in support of our national
interests. Using information from the Navy's study program,
we have reviewed carefully over the past year the roles that
can be played by the Navy in a NATO war, non-NATO contingen-
cies, intervention and crisis control, and in promoting
strategic deterrence and world wide stability.
The first priority of our naval forces in a NATO war is
to ensure the timely delivery of military shipping to Europe
with acceptably low losses. Intervention and crisis control,
where the chance of direct U.S./USSR conflict is small,
generate a need for offensive operations by our carrier and
amphibious forces. We are continuing to explore the impli-
cations of basing naval forces program planning on forward
deployments and intervention outside NATO, rather than
exclusively planning scenarios that emphasize the Navy as
primarily a sea control force designed to secure the North
Atlantic sea lines of communication against Soviet sub-
marines and long range bombers in a NATO war.
It has been estimated that to maintain the fleet at its
present level of about 533 ships (active force, naval
reserve force, and naval fleet auxiliary force) will require
an average of about $7B (FY 81 $) in the shipbuilding
account annually. The program that is proposed provides for
an 11% average real growth over the five-year period. In a
war with the Soviets and with the help of our allies, this
force would be capable of performing sea control operations
in the Atlantic; sea control and projection operations in
the Mediterranean; and austere sea control operations in the
Pacific.
We need not only realistic estimates of force levels
and capability, but also stability in the shipbuilding
program to provide a firm industrial base.
The shipbuilding plan supports the Navy's requirements
for strategic deterrence and forces to fight a NATO war by:
Enhancing the capability of our strategic forces by
adding 6 Trident submarines.
September 4, 1980
NAVAL POSTURE IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOVIET CARRIER MINSK
Q: What is our naval posture in the Indian Ocean region?
A: We have maintained a strengthened presence in the Indian Ocean since late last
year and we have made arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used
by our forces in the region of Northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.
- The size of our permanent presence in the region, the Middle East Force,
was increased to five ships last fall. We currently have 36 ships in the Indian
Ocean including two carrier task groups, headed by the carriers DWIGHT D.
EISENHOWER and MIDWAY. The 36 ships include 21 combatants and 15 support ships
(including the 7 maritime near term prepositioning ships).
The Soviets currently have 27 ships in the Indian Ocean including 11
combatants and 16 support ships.
The 40,000 ton Soviet carrier MINSK departed the Vladivostok area last
week and is currently operating in the South China Sea (4 Sept). So far, its
movements have not indicated a move toward the Indian Ocean.
FYI ONLY: MINSK arrived at Vladivostok on July 3, 1979, after earlier sailing
from the Mediterranean, around Africa and across the Indian Ocean. Until MINSK's
move last week, the ship had remained at or near Vladivostok.
Source: President's State of the Union address
DoD Press Guidance
CINCPAC
NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Bush
"Suddenly, after long years of administration silence
on the subject, the White House, with the help of the defense
secretary, is busy orchestrating a massive public relations
program to bolster President Carter's image as a Commander-in
-Chief who recognizes the Soviet military threat.
"Suddenly, we hear of a presidential directive-- - PD 59--
which we're told restructures American nuclear strategy in light
of a fresh look at Soviet objectives."
World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980
Carter
"Recently, there's been a great deal of press and public
attention paid to a Presidential directive that I have issued,
known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsi-
bilities for the defense of this Nation, I decided that our Nation
must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack
--in responding to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very
early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and
Defense and with my own national security advisers we have
been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently
revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolu-
tionary improvement in our Nation's defense capability and will
contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.
"No potential enemy of the United States should antici-
pate for one moment a successful use of military power against
our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition
and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to
ensure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have
a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an
integrated plan for their use."
American Legion Address
August 21, 1980
NATO ALLIES
Reagan
Reagan's primary concern is that if the United States
does not appear a strong and dependable ally, the nations
of Europe will seek an accomodation with the USSR.
"I think there is every indication that some of
our European friends are beginning to wonder if they
shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with--
the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are
dependable or not."
Time
June 30, 1980
To prevent such action, Reagan proposes to consult
with the allies and reassure them of our interest in preserving
the alliance.
"I think the Reagan Administration, first of all, would
do it by action, by consulting with them, making it evident
to them that we do value that alliance and want to preserve
it."
Time
June 30, 1980
Reagan has stated he would not be adverse to intervening
in the affairs of our NATO allies, however.
"To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975,
Reagan said the United States should have acted 'in any way
to prevent or discourage' the Communists, adding "It was
clearly interest to do so.' But he refused to be more
specific.'
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Reagan has also suggested that the United States push
for an extension of NATO's defensive perimeter into the Middle
East.
"There would be nothing wrong with us
appealing
to
our NATO allies and saying, 'Look, fellows, let's just make this
an extension of the NATO Line and you contribute some forces in
here too.
National Journal
March 8, 1980
Carter
"At the outset of this Administration I emphasized
the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national
security agenda. We have made important progress toward making
the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security
environment.
"We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of
important ways:
"First, there is a recognition among our allies that
mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are
each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3%
per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening
NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the
Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this
objective.
"Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic
step in Alliance security policies with with the decision to
improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The
theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes t.
deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of
ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous
support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet
SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential.
TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory
option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot
wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory
will remain unscathed."
State of the Union Addres
January 1980
Mondale
"Mr. Secretary General, Members of the Council:
In behalf of President Carter, I have come today to NATO
Headquarters as a matter of the first priority. I have come to COI
vey to you and the member governments of the North Atlantic
Alliance:
The President's most sincere greetings;
His commitment- and the full commitment of the
United States to the North Atlantic Alliance as a
vital part of our deep and enduring relations with
Canada and Western Europe; and
His dedication to improving cooperation and consultations
with our oldest friends, SO as to safeguard our peoples
and to promote our common efforts and concerns.
The President's conviction concerning NATO's central
role in deep-rooted and firm. As he stated in his message to
the NATO ministers last month: "Our NATO alliance lies at
the heart oftthecpartnership between North America and Western
Europe. NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our
collective security. The American commitment to maintaining
the NATO Alliance shall be sustained and strengthened under my
administration."
Address to North Atlantic
Council
Brussel, Belgium
January 24, 1977
DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL
Reagan
Regardless of political affiliation, almost all
public leaders support efforts aimed at reducing conflicts
through negotiation. But Ronald Reagan has had doubts about
negotiating peace.
"The President wants to end the cold war era of con-
flict and to substitute an era of negotiations,, peaceful
settlements of disputes before they flare into war. I am
sure every American shares that goal. But are we also aware that
every nation in history which has sought peace and freedom
solely through negotiation has been crushed by conquerors bent
on conquest and aggression."
Speech to World Affairs
Council
October 11, 1972
Mondale
"National strength requires more than just military might:
It requires the commitment of the President to arms control.
"If there is one thing that bothers me more than anything
else and I think bothers you, it is the fear that someday, some-
how, for reasons that don't matter, the world will resort to the
final madness of a nuclear holocaust. Reason, common sense, and
a decent respect for humanity demand that we stall this nuclear
arms race before it bankrupts and destroys us all.
"Without arms control, everythin is out of control.
Without the SALT treaty we would be forced to waste billions on
weapons that buy us nothing.
"And even though it took seven years to negotiate this
treaty; and even though our President, an our Secretary of
Defense and all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every NATO ally
wants this treaty ratified, Mr. Reagan for the life of him
cannot understand why.
Well, let me say Mr Reagan: We must have arms control
for the life of all of us, and we need a President Jimmy Carter
who believes in controlling the madness of nuclear arms.'
DNC Acceptance Speech
August 1980
0
NON-PROLIFERATION
Reagan
A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with
pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:
"I just don't think it's (non-prôliferation) any of our
business. "
Washington Post
January 31, 1980
Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:
"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation,
but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are
the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result
is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government
would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium
Monterey, Peninsula Heral
February 3, 1980
Mondale
"Our relationship with Western Europe and our NATO
allies can be severely damaged by the defeat of this SALT II
treaty. They strongly support it. They've been involved in
it all the way. Their interests have been carefully taken into
account. Around the world, as you know, there are several
so-called threshhold nations that are within a short distance of
having their own nuclear weaponry. And we have been pleading
with them, don't do it. Please don't resort to nuclear weaponry
yourself. And the only basis for persuasion that we have
is that, despite the fact that we are the holder of the most
sophisticated pool of nuclear weaponry in the world we have
handled that responsibly and with restraint, and therefore with
moral authority we can ask them to refrain from resorting
to their own nuclear weaponry.
"All of these things and more will be affected by
the outcome of this agreement. I am convinced it is in
our interest. I'm convinced it's in our national security
interest. And I'm convinced that with the support of the
American people, the ratification of this treaty will take the
most important step that we can take together for our children.
And that is to reduce the possibilities of the final madness,
a nuclear war."
L.A. World Affairs Cound
July 1979
Mondale
"Third, as we limit and reduce the weapons of existing
nuclear states, we must work in concert to insure that no
additional nuclear-weapon states emerge over the next decade
and beyond.
"The spread of nuclear weapons to an ever-increasing
number of countries and regions is a chilling prospect. It
brings ever closer the probability of their use. Such pro-
liferation would seriously heighten regional and global tensions.
It would impede peaceful commerce in the field of nuclear
energy. And it would make the achievement of nuclear disarmamemt
vastly more difficult."
Address to the U.N.
Special Session of
Disarmament
May 1978
FOREIGN POLICY
Reagan
"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally un-
impressed with all this talk about our problems being too
complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and
action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making
hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally of ration-
alizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American
foreign policy."
Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968
Reagan has chosen to ignore the progress that both
Democratic and Republican administrations have made toward
a secure peace.
His 1976 attacks on President Ford were at least as harsh
as those he makes on President Carter in 1980. Throughout,
he provides simple answers to the delicate complexities of
foreign affairs -- answers which reflect his lack of under-
standing of the consequences of his remarks.
I. Military Involvement
Reagan frequently rejects a tempered response to inter-
national problems, preferring instead to flex America's
military might at the slightest provocation. Over the last
12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American
military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador,
Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal,
Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home)
and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.
Angola
In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan
civil war Reagan said the U.S. should have told the
Russians:
"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting
or you're going to have to deal with us."
New York Times
January 6, 1976
Cuba
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Reagan said:
"One option might well be that we surround the island
of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."
New York Times
January 29, 1980
Cyprus
Reagan has said that, in a manner similiar to Eisenhower's
deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would
have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to
Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.
New York Times
June 4, 1976
Ecuador
In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna
boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:
" (T) he U.S. government next winter should send along
a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say 13 miles off the
shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's
dictum to 'talk softly, but carry a big stick.
San Diego Union
Marcy 7, 1975
Lebanon
"In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops
to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would
have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war. 19
New York Times
June 4, 1976
Middle East
Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should
establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the
Soviets, Reagan said:
"I think this might be a very, very good time for
the United States to show a presence in the Middle East.
I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it
looks like anyone bullying
"
Boston Globe
January 13, 1980
North Korea
In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. .
Pueblo, Reagan said:
"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone
in the United States government, particularly the President,
has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor
in 24 hours or we are coming in after it.
Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968
To demonstrate United States resolve and willingness
to stand by defense treaties, Reagan said we should let
it be known that, "B-52's should make a moonscape out of
North Korea if South Korea is attacked."
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Pakistan
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan
advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.
"I think the most logical thing is that they
(the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty
with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there,
with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason
and right to be."
St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980
Reagan also proposed sending "a squadron of planes" to
Pakistan to counter the Soviets' move in Afghanistan.
Washington Star
January 31, 1980
Portugal
To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975,
Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any
way to prevent of discourage" the Communists, adding "It
was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to
be more specific.
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Rhodesia
To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a
minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:
"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show
of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or
whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not
I don't know."
New York Times
June 4, 1976
North Vietnam
The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to
the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United
States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in
South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.
Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975
Panama Canal
Reagan has long been a principal opponent of the
Panama Canal Treaty, and has promised that:
"If there is any possibility of keeping the
Panama Canal, believe me I would do it
"
Atlanta Constitution
January 18, 1980
United Nations
In the past, Reagan has found excuses to question United
States' participation in the United Nations. The first
occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China
to the United Nations was being discussed.
"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that
it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international
organization
I don't know whether to withdraw totally
from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the
service organizations surrounding it are doing good work. "
Press Conference
October 26, 1971
In 1975 when the United Nations condemned Zionism as
racism, Reagan suggested, that if the U.N. continues its
present conduct, the United States should serve notice
"we're going to go home and sit a while."
Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975
Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United
Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO,
Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave
his reply.
"
UNESCO -- the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization
May actually be a base for
communist espionage."
Jefferson City Missouri
Post
December 15, 1977
Foreign Aid
Reagan has attacked the foreign aid program.
"We've bought dress suits for Greek undertakers, extra
wives for Kenya Government officials."
New York Times
January 23, 1965
Vietnam
Reagan has consistently defended the Vietnam war.
In a recent speech before the Veteran's of Foreign Wars
Convention, Reagan once again asserted the war was a "noble
cause. "
August 18, 1980
Reagan has also claimed that "The Vietnam war was
not an action of moral poverty; it was a collective action
of moral courage
"
Layfayette Journal
and Courier
April 23, 1980
Reagan feels that despite the best efforts of our
soldiers to win the war, they were hamstrung by the poli-
ticians and some segments of the public.
"There is a lesson
in Vietnam. If we are forced to
fight, we must have the means and the determination to
prevail, or we will not have what it takes to secure
the peace we will never again ask young men to fight
and possibly die in a war our government is afraid to win. "
Speech to Veterans
of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980
In a 1967 Newsweek article, Reagan called upon President
Johnson to escalate the Vietnam War using nuclear threats
"
no one would cheerfully want to use atomic
weapons
But
the last person in the world who should
know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go
to bed every night being afraid that we might."
Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967
Richard J. Whalen, one of Reagan's advisors, shares
his outlook. He believes the United States should have
bombed the dikes of North Vietnam, then "with 90% of the
country under water" negotiated a peace.
Los Angeles Times
June 26, 1980
Bush
"Certainly there are going to be situations where an
American President might have to contemplate the use of
force. One of Carter's great problems is that nobody
thinks under any circumstances that he would use force.
It's the post-Vietnman syndrome. But, going back to Reagan,
I do not favor blockading Cuba because I think that's irrelevant.
You'd lose all support of moderates in this hemisphere on
that."
National Journal
March 15, 1980
Bush
"I don't favor permanent bases (in the Middle East). That's
where I differ with some of the other Republican candidates.
And the reason I don't is not that I don't want to--don't
recognize that you need at some point to project power or
show force, but I see a permanent base in the Middle East as an
invitation to the Soviets to do the one thing that the
Sudanese and the Egyptians kept them from doing: getting
a foothold in the Middle East again.
Bill Moyers' Journal
WNET/Thirteen
March 6, 1980
Bush
"I am convinced that Carter has been an abnormally weak
and vacillating president in foreign affairs."
"He sees the world as he wishes it were, not as
it is."
"We don't seem to be realistic enough, tough enough,
strong enough. We have projected a failure to keep commit-
ments, a weakness and vacillation."
Madison WI, State
Journal
November 8, 1979
Bush
"I don't believe in bullying one's allies. Or pushing
some guy around because he's smaller. I believe in leading
him and I know that at times, you have to say, 'This
is how it's going to be. "
Concord, NH,
Monitor & Patriot
October 12, 1979
Bush
Asked recently where he would drawn the line and commit
American troops, Bush said,
"Look, I'm not going to answer a hypothetical question
about where you draw the line and put troops. That's one way
to get into foreign policy trouble, and it's a sure way to
get into political trouble."
Wall Street Journal
February 26, 1980
file #1-19-1 (R)
Bush
"I don't think you need an overall change in diplomacy,
but I do think we need to be able to protect conventional:
force power selectively. I don't favor stationing of U.S.
forces in the Middle East which, in my view, would draw
Soviets back into the Middle East. But I don't think it's
a question of redesigning something in the sense of a new
machinery to deal with foreign policy, I think it's a pro-
jection of commitment and will."
New York Times
January 5, 1980
Bush
"Mine is a moderate approach. We don't need radical
solutions. We need to figure out what works and what
doesn't work. We need to find a balance."
Philadelphia, PA
Inquirer
October 22, 1979
file # 2-3-7
0
Carter
"There are two obvious preconditions for an effective
American foreign policy: a strong national economy and
a strong national defense.
"That's why I placed the highest priority on the
development of a national energy policy which our
country has never had. That's why we must win the struggle
against inflation, and I've been very pleased lately at
the trend in interest rates and the good news we had this
morning on the Producer Price Index (Applause). The Congress
and I are moving resolutely toward this goal. In fact,
every single American is involved. This common effort
to deal with the worldwide economic challenge does require
some sacrifice and I am determined that the sacrifice will
be fairly shared. The response of our democracy to economic
challenges will determine whether we will be able to manage
the challenge of other global responsibilities in the 1980s
and beyond. If we cannot meet these international economic
problems successfully, then our ability to meet military and
political and diplomatic challenges will be doubtful indeed.
Although it will not be easy, the innate advantages of our
nation's natural bounty which God has given us and the
common commitment of a free people who
compromise
American society give us the assurance of success.
"We must also be militarily strong. The fact is that
for 15 years the Soviet Union has been expanding its
military capabilities far out of proportion to its needs
for defense -- a 4 or 5 percent real growth above the
inflation rate compounded annually for 15 years has
caused us some concern. For much of this same period,
our spending for defense had been going down. If these
adverse trends had continued, we would have found ourselves
facing a severe military imbalance, an imbalance all the more
threatening because of mounting global turbulence. That's
why I have launched a broad modernization of our strategic
and conventional forces and worked to strengthen our
alliances. We and our allies have pledged ourselves to
sustained real annual increases in our defense spending.
"Our task is to build together a truly cooperative
global community, to compose a kind of global mosaic which
embraces the wealth and diversity of the Earth's people,
cultures and religions. This will not be an easy task. The
philosophical basis of such a community must be respect for
human rights as well as respect for the independence of nations.
"In promoting that prospect for a future of peace, we
will stay on the steady course to which we have been
committed now for the last three and a half years.
"We pursue five major objectives:
"First, to enhance not only economic but also political
solidarity among the industrialized democracies.
"Second, to establish a genuinely cooperative relationship
with the nations of the Third World.
"Third, to persevere in our efforts for peace in the
Middle East and other troubled areas of the world.
"Fourth, to defend our strategic interests, especially
those which are now threatended in Southwest Asia.
"And fifth, to advance arms control, especially through
agreed strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union,
and to maintain along with this a firm and a balanced re-
lationship with the Soviets.
"Our first objective, solidarity with our Allies, is the
touchstone of our foreign policy.. Without such solidarity,
the world economy and international politics may well
degenerate into disorder.
"This is why we have led the North Atlantic Alliance
in its program to upgrade its convention forces. And last
winter, in an historic decision, NATO agreed to strengthen
its nuclear missiles in Europe in order to respond to a
very disturbing Soviet missile buildup there.
"Next month, the seven leading industrial democracies will
hold a summit meeting in Venice. I look forward to being
there with the other six leaders of our most important
Allies. It's our collective intention not only to make
the summit another milestone for global economic cooperation,
but also to advance our political and our strategic solidarity."
World Affairs Counci
Philadelphia
May 1980
Administration Record in Foreign Policy
We have a strong and good record:
peace in the
Middle East -- the most crucial area -- which provides
us with a basis for dealing with an outrageous situation in
Afghanistan. Nothing puts us in a better position for deal-
ing' with this problem than the Camp David Accords. Beyond
that, we are improving America's strength and resolve --
in the post-Vietnam era -- both at home and abroad; relations
with our key Allies have rarely been better; we have made
decisive progress in peacemaking; both in the Middle East
and (with the British) in southern Africa; and we have
demonstrated to the world -- following Vietnam -- that we
are a country that stands for its values, and are the major
country others look up to.
Afghanistan is the product of fundamental Soviet
miscalcualtion about the reaction of the entire world.
It has revealed the Soviets for what they are -- not the
partisans of independence and non-alignment and the whole
world has brought them to account.
-- Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is the
result of a disastrous failure of Soviet policy. That is
the way it is perceived by virtually every nation in the
world, and I am sure that is how it will come to be seen
in the Kremlin in time.
I have drawn the line in the region and the
response of other countries has been very gratifying, in-
cluding those who are prepared to provide necessary facil-
ities.
-- In defense, I reversed a decade's decline in
real defense spending, and we are now making steady increases
in the face of 15 years of major Soviet defense increases. We
created the NATO Long-Term Defense Program, a major
achievement; and we now also agree to deploy long-range
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
-- External factors -- the growth of Soviet
power and arrogance, spreading turmoil in parts of the
developing world -- have complicated this task, but we
have been putting together the essential building blocks
for the future. Specifically: 5% real growth in defense
spending; NATO Long-Term Defense Program; negotiating SALT II
normalization with China; Camp David; southern Africa peace-
making; Panama Canal Treaties; Multilateral Trade Agreement;
Seven-nation Summits; Common Fund.
-- There is much left to be done. Most
important is realizing as a nation the critical importance
to us of the Persian Gulf/southwest Asia area, and the need
to convince the Soviet Union of its mistake in believing that
we are too preoccupied with our domestic problems to resist
the further expansion of its powers abroad.
I have heard and read recently a lot about a strong
America. We are strong, and I intend to see that
we stay that way. But words are cheap.
It does no good to talk about a strong America
and oppose a strong defense.
You can't attack inflation with brave words
while you vote for larger deficits.
Anyone can be in favor of a "firm response," SO
long as the response in not controversial, and we certainly
will never end our addiction to OPEC oil by promising the
American people cheap, plentiful energy in the years
ahead.
SALT
Reagan's Early Position -- Objections
Reagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was
negotiated by both the Ford and Carter administrations.
His objections, even before the details of the Treaty were
known, were on the grounds that it would allow the Soviets
to achieve nuclear parity.
"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength than
we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to enter
a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried about
a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge technological
lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise missile
The
best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement is to negoti-
ate from a firmly established position. We should not be SO
eager for an agreement that we make unnecessary concessions,
for to grant such concessions is to whet the Soviet appetite
for more. "
New York Times
February 11, 1976
Reagan then changed his objections. He no longer
objected to Soviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets
would become superior to the United States.
"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress
are negotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well
make this nation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in
defense and offense capability."
Ronald Reagan Letter
February, 1979
Reagan did not change this latter objection and used
it as a standard campaign line.
"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is
strategic arms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum
of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory
"
New York Times
September 16, 1979
Reagan's Current Position -- Proposals
In late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals
to his criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected
to the Soviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began
to advocate a new policy.
"
(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately
reduces nuclear armaments to the point that neither country
represents a threat to the other. "
San Jose Mercury
September 16, 1979
By early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard
criticism of SALT II with his proposal of first achieving
military superiority, and then negotiating a nuclear arms
reduction treaty.
"We also should have learned the lesson that we
cannot negotiate arms control agreements that will slow
down the Soviet military buildup, as long as we let the
Soviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments.
Once we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that
we are determined to compete, arms control negotiations
will again have a chance. On such a basis, I would be
prepared to negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions
in armaments, since only on such a basis could reductions
be equitable.'
Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980
Bush
"And my conviction is this--amend the Treaty; send
it back, and I think this administration is wrong when
they're saying (sic) there's a new arms race. Why?
Because the Soviet Union is already in an arms race.
They're spending 40 percent more than we are. "
CBS Face the Nation
page 6
October 7, 1979
Bush
"And it's the intent of the Soviets that concerns me;
and I believe that those who, in the Senate, who want to
see it amended are on the right track. And I want a SALT
Treaty. I prepared the national intelligence estimates
for this country; I don't like what I see in this arms
race. Frankly, my presidency would be aimed as much as
possible at the reduction- SALT III. Not easy to do,
but strength of commitment, I think, could get us there."
CBS Face the Nation
Page 7
October 7, 1979
Bush
"Can we catch the Soviets if they try to cheat? The
answer is ominous for the United States. The fact is that
under this treaty we are virtually unable to monitor whether
the Soviets comply with its terms
When it comes to
verification of SALT II, Jimmy Carter will ask us to trust
the Soviets as he once asked us to trust him. But I say
that a treaty that cannot be verified tomorrow shouldn't
be ratified today,"
Wall Street Journal
July 6, 1979
Bush
"What we need is an actual reduction, not limitation
in nuclear weapons.'
Birmingham, AL, News
October 3, 1979
Bush
"I oppose the SALT agreement as put forward. I would
amend the treaty. After a period of time, I believe the
Soviets would indeed negotiate.'
Vancouver, WA, Columbian
July 18, 1979
Bush
"It is not a good treaty as drafted. Our ability
to verify Soviet compliance is severely diminished by the loss
of (observation) stations in Iran.
"There are things the Soviets can do to make the
treaty verifiable. Why aren't they willing to do them? I
want to see that tested."
Columbus, OH, Citizen
Journal
October 17, 1979
Bush
"Somehow every negotiation should push the Soviets for
far more meaningful reductions
I'd be prepared as
president to go a long way toward real reductions and real
verifiable limits
A SALT III treaty is really a lot
more important and meaningful than SALT II. So don't get
caught in a bad deal now. Push harder for better SALT II
terms."
Political Profiles, page 9
1979
Bush
"We should have SALT III, a meaningful, verifiable
reduction in nuclear arms. You don't get there through
a bad SALT II treaty, however."
Illinois interviews and
speeches
Champaign, Illinois
News-Gazette
February 3, 1980
Bush
"I don't like the SALT Treaty. I don't think it's
a good agreement. I think the Senate should amend it or
reject it. I think the Soviets would renegotiate (the
treaty) locks in inequality and can't be verified.
"
Carroll, IA, Daily Times-
Herald
July 2, 1979
Bush
"The Soviet economy is less than half as strong as
ours, and yet they're spending 40 percent more on military
matters. I don't think rejecting the treaties would mean
an arms race. Their economy is already over-burdened."
Claremont, NH, Eagle-Times
August 10, 1979
Carter
"
we remain deeply committed to the process of
mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the
effort to prevent the spread and further development of
nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon
our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty
reflects our firm conviction that the United States has
a profound national security interest in the constraints
on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide. "
State of the Union Address
January 1980
a