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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Portal-to-Portal
(9 of 14)
Box: 37
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
ISSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
FICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Department of Justice
file
portal
portal
to
Mashington, B.C. 20530
DEC 5 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT J. LIPSHUTZ
Counsel to the President
Re: Letter from Senator Proxmire to Hugh Carter--
Home to Work Transportation of
White House Employees
This responds to your memorandum of November 9, 1978
on the above subject. Senator Proxmire's letter calls
Mr. Carter's attention to 31 U.S.C. § 638a(c) (2), which
prohibits, with certain exceptions, the use of Government
vehicles to provide employees with transportation between
their homes and offices. Your memorandum requests that
we prepare a draft response to questions (3) and (4) in
the letter, which are as follows:
3) If an official is driven to and from
home, in view of Title 31, Section 638a,
what is the specific legal justification
for the practice? Please cite the pre-
cise language of the law.
4) If any official not exempted by Title
31, Section 638a is driven to and from
home, how is the practice justified in
view of the energy shortage and the fact
that such a practice means four trips a
day instead of two trips a day?
We understand that Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski is the
only White House official driven between his home and his
office. He has been authorized to use a White House
limousine because he needs its communications facilities
to remain in contact with the White House and because the
military driver provides him with security.
The statute in question, 31 U.S.C. § 638a(c) (2),
provides in pertinent part:
Unless otherwise specifically provided, no
appropriation available for any department
shall be expended--
(2) for-the maintenance, operation, and
repair of any Government-owned passenger
motor vehicle or aircraft not used exclu-
sively for official purposes; and 'offi-
cial purposes' shall not include the
transportation of officers and employees
between their domiciles and places of
employment, except in cases of medical
officers on out-patient medical service
and except in cases of officers and em-
ployees engaged in field work the char-
acter of whose duties makes such trans-
portation necessary and then only as to
such latter cases when the same is
approved by the head of the department
concerned
The limitations of this
paragraph shall not apply to any motor
vehicles or aircraft for official use of
the President, the heads of the executive
departments enumerated in section 101 of
Title 5, ambassadors, ministers, charges
d'affairs, and other principal diplomatic
and consular officials.
As National Security Advisor to the President, Dr. Brzezinski
does not come within the exceptions enumerated in the
statute, and we are aware of no other statute that speci-
fically excepts employees in the Executive Office of the
President from § 638a(c) (2). 1/ However, the Comptroller
General has construed the statute to provide an implicit
exception, and it is our view that Dr. Brzezinski's case
is within the Comptroller General's exception.
1/ We note that 31 U.S.C. § 638a was enacted as § 16 of
the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 806.
Section 18 of the Act, 41 U.S.C. § 5a, defines a "depart-
ment" to include "independent establishments [and] other
agencies,' thus including the Executive Office of the
President.
2
In a recent opinion, the Comptroller General states
that 31 U.S.C. § 638a(c) (2) generally prohibits the use
of a government vehicle to transport an employee between
his home and office. "However, 11 the opinion continues,
54 Comp Gen. 1066, 1068 (1975) :
in construing this general prohibition to the
use of Government vehicles for home to work
transportation, this Office has recognized that
its primary purpose is to prevent the use of
Government vehicles for the personal conveni-
ence of the employee. We have long held that
use of a Government vehicle does not violate
the intent of the above statute where the use
of the vehicle is deemed to be in the best in-
terest of the Government. We have also held
that control over the use of a Government
vehicle is primarily a matter of administrative
discretion to be exercised by the agency con-
cerned within the framework of applicable laws.
Use of Government Vehicles, 54 Comp. Gen. 855
(1975) and 25 id. 844 (1946). 2/
Thus, the Comptroller General has permitted agencies to
provide home to office transportation for employees in
extraordinary circumstances where a government interest
which transcends considerations of personal convenience"
could reasonably be found by the agency to require it.
See, e.g., 54 Comp. Gen. 855, 857-58 (1975). As that
opinion notes, however, the broad scope of the prohibi-
tion in § 638a(c) (2) and the existence of specific
statutory exceptions to it suggest "that the exercise of
administrative discretion
should be reserved for
the most essential cases. 11 Id. at 858.
There are two reasons unrelated to Dr. Brzezinski's
personal convenience why the best interests of the
Government require that he be driven between his home and
office in an official car. As National Security Advisor
to the President and Chairman of the National Security
2/ This interpretation is consistent with the legislative
history of § 638a(c) (2), which states only that the stat-
ute would prohibit the operation of automobiles for the
personal use of employees, with certain exceptions. "
H.R. Rept. 2186, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 9 (1946)
S. Rept. 1636, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 9 (1946)
- 3 -
Council, he must be able to communicate with the Presi-
dent and the White House at all times. He cannot be
caught in traffic, out of contact, during an emergency,
and he has therefore been provided with a car equipped
with radio and radio-telephone facilities. Unfortu-
nately, his position also makes him an important potential
target for terrorists or disturbed persons. To protect
him against assault or abduction, he has been given a
military driver trained in defensive, counter-terrorist
driving techniques. It is our opinion that the Comptro1-
ler General would consider these to be sufficient
justification for providing Dr. Brzezinski with door-to-
door transportation, particularly since he is the only
White House official who receives this service.
We also believe that the above points respond to
Senator Proxmire's question concerning the energy shortage.
Mary C Sauton Mary C. Lawton
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
4
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
O: FICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Bepartment of Justice
Mashington, D.C. 20530
AUG 27 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT J. LIPSHUTZ
Counsel to the President
Re: Home-to-Work Transportation of Executive Branch
Officials.
This responds to Margaret McKenna's request of July 20, 1979.
Home-to-work transportation in government vehicles is governed
by 31 U.S.C. § 638a(c) (2) 1/ It prohibits generally the transporta-
tion of executive branch officials between their homes and places
of employment by Government-owned passenger motor vehicles. Ex-
ceptions are provided for the following: (1) medical officers on
out-patient medical service; (2) officers engaged in field work
where approved by the head of the department concerned; (3) official
use of the President and heads of executive departments, and (4)
ambassadors and other principal diplomatic and consular officials.
The statute covers independent establishments and other agencies,
wholly-owned Government corporations, and the government of the
17
The text of the statute is as follows:
(c) Unless otherwise specifically provided, no appro-
priation available for any department shall be expended -
*
*
(2) for the maintenance, operation, and
repair of any Government-owned passenger motor
vehicle or aircraft not used exclusively for
official purposes; and "official purposes"
shall not include the transportation of officers
and employees between their domiciles and
places of employment, except in cases of medical
officers on out-patient medical service and ex-
cept in cases of officers and employees engaged.
in field work the character of whose duties
makes such transportation necessary and then
District of Columbia, but not members of Congress and the Architect
of the Capitol.
We understand from conversations with your staff that our
opinion is wanted with respect to the following particularized
questions:
(1) The scope of the Comptroller General's implied exception
to § 638a (c) (2) permitting home-to-work travel "in the interest
of the government";
(2) Whether an appropriation for the purchase and operation of
passenger motor vehicles implicitly authorizes their use for home-
to-work transportation;
(3) Whether the statutory exception for "ambassadors
and
other principal diplomatic and consular officers" extends to
officials in the United States whose duties involve national
defense and foreign policy;
(4) The nature of "field work" in which home-to-work transporta-
tion may be allowed by an agency head;
(5) Whether it applies to independent regulatory agencies and,
if so, whether the President is empowered to promulgate regulations
implementing the statute for those agencies.
1/ (Cont.)
only as to such latter cases when the same is approved
by the head of the department concerned. Any officer
or employee of the Government who willfully uses or
authorizes the use of any Government-owned passenger
motor vehicle or aircraft leased by the Government,
for other than official purposes or otherwise violates
the provisions of this paragraph shall be suspended
from duty by the head of the department concerned, with-
out compensation, for not less than one month, and shall
be suspended for a longer period or summarily removed from
office if circumstances warrant. The limitations of this
paragraph shall not apply to any motor vehicles or aircraft
for official use of the President, the heads of the execu-
tive departments enumerated in section 101 of Title 5,
ambassadors, ministers, charges d'affaires, and other
principal diplomatic and consular officials.
2/ Section 638a (c) (2) was enacted as § 16 of the Administrative
Expenses Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 810. Section 18 of that Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 5a, defines "department as follows:
(Cont. on P. 3)
- 2 -
We will address these questions seriatim:
1. Your first question concerns the scope of the Comptroller
General's view that home-to-work transportation may be provided
when it is in the Government's interest and not merely for personal
convenience. In our opinion, the scope of that exception is very
narrow.
Section 638a (c) (2) has a sparse and unilluminating legislative
history. Between 1935 and 1946 it appeared sporadically in appro-
priation acts 3/ and was enacted into permanent law in 1946.
Neither the committee reports nor the debates discuss it. Its
enactment appears to have been prompted by a recommendation of the
Joint Committee on the Reduction of Unnecessary Federal Expenditure
stating that the use of government vehicles should be curtailed,
both to save money and to conserve fuel in wartime. The Joint
Committee expressed concern over both the private use of government
vehicles and the general level of use
The statute prohibits expenditure of funds for the operation
of any Government motor vehicle not used exclusively for "official
purposes. " It excludes from "official purposes" home-to-work
transportation for government employees, other than those speci-
fically excepted. Despite the plain language of the statute, the
Comptroller General in a series of three opinions holds that an
additional exception may be implied for situations in which an
agency decides that such transportation is "in the interest of
the Government. 7/
21
(Cont.)
The word "department" as used in this Act shall be
construed to include independent establishments,
other agencies, wholly owned Government corpora-
tions
and the government of the District of
Columbia, but shall not include the Senate, House
of Representatives, or office of the Architect
of the Capitol, or the officers or employees there-
of.
See also 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.202 (1978).
3/ See Act of March 15, 1934, ch. 70, § 3, 48 Stat. 450; Independent
Officer Appropriation Act, 1944, ch. 148, § 202(a), 57 Stat. 195.
4/
Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, ch. 744, $ 16, 60 Stat. 810.
5/ See H.R. Rep. No. 109, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. ; S. Rep. No. 247,
78th Cong., 1st Sess.
6/ See S. Doc. 5, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2-4; 89 Cong. Rec.
895-96 (1943) ; 88 Cong: Rec. 4225-26 (1942).
7/ 54 Comp. Gen. 1066 (19/8); 54 Comp. Gen. 854 (1975) 25 Comp.
Gen. 844. (1946).
- 3
He reasoned as follows;
In construing the specific restriction in this statute
against employee use of government-owned vehicles for
transportation between domicile and place of employment,
our Office has recognized that its primary purpose is
to prevent the use of Government vehicles for the personal
convenience of an employee. In this regard we have long
held that use of a Government vehicle does not violate
the intent of the cited statute where such use is claimed
to be in the interest of the Government. We have further
held that the control over the use of Government vehicles
is primarily a matter of administrative discretion, to be
exercised by an agency within the framework of applicable
laws. 25 Comp. Gen. 844 (1946).
But this sweeping language has been applied narrowly by both the
Comptroller General and this department.
The implicit exception theory first appeared in dictum at
25 Comp. Gen. 844, 846-47 (1946) That decision involved a claim
for cab fare from an employee's home to the place where he obtain-
ed a government car for official travel. The claim was disallowed
on the general principle that an employee must bear his own com-
muting expenses. In passing, the Comptroller General said that
§ 638a (c) (2) would not have prohibited the employee from "using
a Government automobile to drive to his residence when it is in
the interest of the Government that he start on official travel
from that point, rather than from his place of business Id.
at 847.
He applied this implicit exception in two cases in 1975. In
the first, he held it to be in the government interest to provide
home-to-work transportation for military employees abroad where
the Defense Department determined that there was a "clear and
present" danger of terrorism. But the decision cautioned that
it would be best for the Defense Department to obtain specific
statutory authority for this 9/ and concluded that it would be
an abuse of discretion to provide transportation in countries
where no clear and present threat existed. 54 Comp. Gen. 854, 857-58
9/ It appears that no such authority was obtained.
4
(1975) 10/ In the second case, the Comptroller General approved
the transportation of essential employees where a strike rendered
normal public transportation unavailable. To avoid personal benefit
to the employees, however, the decision states that transportation
must be limited to "temporary emergencies" and that employees must
pay the equivalent of commercial fares. 54 Comp. Gen. 1066, 1067-
68 (1975).
This Department has determined that home-to work transporta-
tion may be provided for the Director, FBI, the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant Attorney
General, Office for the Improvements in the Administration of
Justice. For the first two individuals, it was the judgment of
the responsible officers that a genuine threat to their personal
safety existed. In our opinion, travel for the Assistant Attorney
General was primarily in the interest of the government because
his personal services were unique and indispensable and a temporary
medical condition made it impracticable for him to use other trans-
portation. 11/
With respect to both the Director, FBI, and the Assistant
to the President, additional factors were cited. Both were said
to need communications equipment in the car to be able to respond
to crises. In addition; it was said that the government automobile
permitted the Director to protect official documents which he took
home. Standing by themselves, we doubt that these factors justify
home-to-work transportation They are common to large numbers of
senior officials with duties involving national defense, foreign
policy, or law enforcement. Rather than being the product of forces
beyond the control of the employing agency, they are inherent in
the position. If such common circumstances made home-to-work
transportation primarily for the government's convenience, the
statute's express prohibition would be a dead letter for a signi-
ficant number of senior officials. Nothing in its text, background,
or prior interpretation supports a reading so contrary to its plain
meaning.
10/ See OLC Memorandum of November 1978, to Robert J. Lipshutz,
"Home to Work Transportation of White House Employees"; Letter of
November 16, 1978, to Senator Proxmire from the Assistant Attorney
General for Administration. Copies of these are attached.
11/ Memorandum of August 29, 1977, "Automobile Transportation for
Assistant Attorney General Meador". A copy is attached. Transporta-
tion for Mr. Meador was originally approved for 60 days. It has
been subsequently extended indefinitely because his medical con-
dition proved permanent.
- 5 -
This is true a fortiori of another justification sometimes
given for home-to-work transportation, namely, that it conserves
the valuable time of senior officials by permitting them to work
while being transported. There is hardly a senior officer to
whom this rationale would not, in fact or fancy, apply. It would
also make the statute nearly a dead letter for any officer with
sufficient status to have a regularly assigned automobile. A
senior official may lengthen his or her working day, if necessary,
by coming earlier, leaving later, and living closer to the office.
Using government transportation instead is a matter of personal
convenience. 12/
We are aware of nothing that supports a broad application of
the exception implied by the Comptroller General. That exception
may be utilized only when there is no doubt that the transportation
is necessary to further an official purpose of the government. As
we view it, only two truly exceptional situations exist: (1) where
there is good cause to believe that the physical safety of the
official requires his protection, and (2) where the government
temporarily would be deprived of essential services unless official
transportation is provided to enable the officer to get to work.
Both categories must be confined to unusual factual circumstances.
2. The second question is whether an appropriation for the
purchase, operation, or hire of passenger motor vehicles implicitly
authorizes their use for home-to-work transportation. In our opinion
it does not.
Section 638a(a) provides that, "[u]nless specifically authorized
by the appropriation concerned or other law, no appropriation may
be used to hire or purchase passenger motor vehicles other than
those for the President and heads of the executive departments.
As part of the Administrative Expenses Act, this provision also
applies to all executive establishments. See footnote 2, supra.
Its purpose is to retain Congressional control over procurement
of passenger cars 13/ Accordingly, appropriations specifically
provide for the purchase or hire of passenger motor vehicles 14/
12/ Cf. 23 Comp. Gen 352, 357 (1943) 19 Comp. Gen. 836, 837
(1940)
13/ See generally 44 Comp. Gen. 117 (1964).
14/ See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-330, 90 Stat.
778; Military Construction Appropriation Act, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-202, § 105, 79 Stat. 837; Department of Justice Appropriation
Act, 1950, Pub. L. No. 179, 63 Stat. 460:
- 6 -
And § 638a (c) (2) similarly states that an appropriation must "speci-
fically" provide that it is available for home-to-work transporta-
tion. We are aware of only one instance in which Congress has done
SO. 15/ Since the exceptions to § 638a call for two separate
"specific" statements serving two separate purposes, an appropri-
ation for the procurement of passenger automobiles for official
use plainly does not imply authority to use them for home-to-work
transportation: Were this not so, any agency that could buy auto-
mobiles could use them without regard to § 638a (c) (2).
3. The third question is whether the "ambassadors, ministers,
charges d'affaires, and other principal diplomatic and consular
officers" excluded from the prohibition of § 638a (c) (2) include
officials in the United States whose duties involve national defense
or foreign relations. Our opinion is that they do not.
These terms are not defined in the statute or discussed in its
legislative history. They do, however, have a well-established
connotation of persons who represent a government abroad. They
have been construed as, respectively, the accredited representatives
of the United States abroad and of foreign states here. 16/ Their
technical meaning is that ambassadors, ministers, and charges
d'affaires are the chief officers of a diplomatic mission abroad. 17/
By familiar principles of statutory construction, Congress should
be understood as having used these terms in accord with their techni-
cal meaning as reinforced by prior legal usage. 18/ The named officials
refer to senior diplomatic officials representing this country abroad.
By the principle of ejusdem generis, the class of "other principal
diplomatic and consular officers" is limited to persons of the same
type; that is, senior officials who represent the United States abroad.
This interpretation confines the exclusion to a well-defined group
that Congress rationally could have set apart for reasons of protocol,
prestige, and usage, and thus it is not inconsistent with the general
purpose of § 638a (c) (2).
4. The next question is the nature of the limited exception
for "field work." This is also a technical term. For purposes
of pay and classification, the civil service laws distinguished
15/ See Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1979, 92 Stat. 786
(Shuttle Busses for Library of Congress employees)
16/ Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925) ; In se Baiz, 135
U.S. 403, 424-25, 432 (1890) 7. Op. Atty. Gen. 186, 190-92 (1855)
See also The Federalist, No. 81, at 510-11 (Harvard ed. 1961).
17/ See 7 Whiteman, Digest of International Law, §§ 2, 15; 4 Hackwort
Digest of International Law § 370 at. 394-96; id., § 371, at 398.
18/ See Bradley V. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) Standard
Oil Corp. V. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 51 (1911).
19/ See, e.g., Cleveland V. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18 (1946)
United States V. Stever, 222 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1911).
- 7 -
between the "departmental" service on the one hand and the "field"
service on the other. As explained in a decision by the Comptroller
of the Treasury, 21 Comp. Dec. 708, 711 (1915) :
The executive departments of Government execute the
laws which Congress enacts through the instrumentali-
ties sometimes designated "departmental" and "field"
establishments. What is known as the "field force"
is engaged, directly or indirectly, in locally executing
the laws, while the "departmental force" is engaged in
general supervisory and administrative direction and
control of the various field forces. 20/
Field employees are located, for the most part, out of Washington.
In many cases, such as inspectors, extension agents, or law en-
forcement personnel, their work involves visits to scattered loca-
tions away from their office. Departmental employees, on the other
hand, would be concentrated in Washington, and their routine duties
would be performed at their post.
As we have said above, Congress is usually understood to have
used a technical legal term in accordance with its legal meaning.
Thus, "field work" consists of the execution of statutory programs
by individuals below the policy level stationed away from the seat
of government. It often saves considerable. time for these individuals
to go directly from their homes to a work place away from their office,
and it reasonably can be viewed as within the government's interest
for them to do SO 21/ The "field work" exception therefore should
be viewed as an express recognition by Congress that it is in the
government's interest for official vehicles to be used in this way,
subject to the control of the agency head.
5. Your final question is whether. § 638a(c) (2) applies to
independent regulatory agencies and, if so, whether the President
has the power to promulgate regulations implementing the statute
for these agencies. We believe that the statute does apply to
independent regulatory agencies, and that the President does
have the power to promulgate implementing regulations for that
purpose.
20/ Accord, 19 Comp. Gen. 630, 631 (1940) 5 Comp. Gen. 272, 273-74
(1925)
21/ See 25 Comp. Gen. 844, 847 (1946).
- 8 -
Section 638a (c) (2) provides that no appropriation available
for any "department" shall be expended for the use of vehicles
for other than official purposes. We have pointed out above, 22/
that the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, provides that the
term "department" shall be construed to include "independent estab-
lishments, other agencies, wholly owned Government corporations
and the government of the District of Columbia
"
(Emphasis added)
The President may promulgate regulations to enforce. $ 638a
for both executive departments and independent establishments. The
President's authority has two sources. First, 5 U.S.C.. § 7301
empowers him "to prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees
in the executive branch." Under this authority, the President
and his delegates have promulgated regulations governing employee
conduct in agencies throughout the executive branch, including
the independent regulatory agencies. 23/ Authority under. § 7301
has been held to include regulations relating to the use of govern-
ment property 24/
The second source of authority is the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. This statute
applies to all of the executive agencies including independent
establishments 25/ Its general purpose is to provide an efficient
and economical system for the procurement, supply, and utilization
of government personal property. 26/ Under it, the Administrator
of General Services has the power to "procure and supply personal
property
for the use of executive agencies in the proper
discharge of their responsibilities" to the extent that he deter-
mines it advantageous in terms of economy and efficiency 27.1 The
President may prescribe policies and directives "not inconsistent"
with the provisions of the Act that he considers necessary and
these are binding on executive agencies generally 28/
22/ See PP. 1-2 and note 2 supra.
23/ See Exec. Order No. 11222 (1965) ; 5 C.F.R. § 735. 102 (a) (Civil
Service Commission); 16 C.F.R. § 5.2 (FTC) ; 29 C.F.R. Part 100 (NLRB) ;
29 C.F.R. § 1600.735-1 (EEOC) ; 47 C.F.R. § 19.735-107 (FCC) ; 49 C.F.R.
Part 1000 (ICC).
24/ See Kaplan V. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1976).
See generally Old Dominion Branch No. 496, AFL-CIO V. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 273 n. 5 (1974).
25/ 40 U.S.C. § 472 (a).
26/ 40 U.S.C.. § 471.
27/ 40 U.S.C. § 481 (a) (3).
28/ 40 U.S.C.. § 486 (a).
- 9 -
Subject to the President's authority the Administrator may issue
such regulations as he considers necessary to effectuate his
functions under the Act. 29/ At present, there is a specific GSA
regulation directing all executive agencies, which includes inde-
pendent establishments, 30/ to comply with § 638a (c) (2) 31/
Sanheman Leon Ulman
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
29/ 40 U.S.C. . § 486 (c)
30/ See P. 9 and note 25 infra.
31/ 41 C.F.R. § 101-38.1304 (c) (1978)
- 10 -
I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
9-18
TO:
FFF
FROM: John G. Roberts, Jr.
Associate Counsel
to the President
FYI
COMMENT
ACTION
HOROWITZ'S PROPOSED
TESTMONY ON
PORTAL- TO- - PORTAL
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. HOROWITZ
GENERAL COUNSEL
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
BEFORE THE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 19, 1985
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on a
proposal to authorize the provision of home-to-work
transportation for a narrowly defined group of senior officials
of the Federal government for security and other reasons.
I understand that this is an issue that has claimed a great
deal of attention of members of Congress and senior agency
officials in recent years. The question is whether, and under
what circumstances, senior government officials may lawfully be
provided portal-to-portal transportation in a government vehicle
on a regular basis. In the last few years, the issue has been
the subject of numerous opinions and reports by the Comptroller
General and several opinions issued by the Department of Justice.
Rather than clarifying the issue, however, this increasing volume
2
of opinions has raised more questions than it has solved.
The political sensitivity of the issue is obvious: all
persons in public life, whether in the legislative or executive
branches, know the public reaction to newspaper articles stating
that government officials are being chauffered around Washington
in limousines.
At the same time, it has long been recognized that in
certain instances, the interest of efficient management of the
government itself, and not the personal convenience of the
persons involved, justifies providing such transportation to a
very limited number of the most senior officials of the three
branches of government. These instances include, for example,
when there have been tangible threats to the personal safety of
these officials. Morever, the demands of the schedules of
certain senior officials and the nature of their official
responsibilities are such that it is of great utility to the
government that these persons be able to use vehicles as an
extension of their regular offices and maintain constant contact
with other senior officials during what otherwise would be time
not spent on official duties. Additionally, for those officials
having sensitive national security responsibilities,
portal-to-portal transportation carries with if increased
accessibility to the White house, the Situation Room, and the
Nation's defense installations primarily through sophisticated
communications systems including, where necessary, scrambler
3
phones. This crucial benefit would simply be unavailable were
these individuals required to spend substantial time each day
commuting in their own vehicles or in public transportation.
This proposal is intended to resolve the needless confusion
regarding who is, and who is not, entitled to portal-to-portal
transportation, while strictly limiting the number of persons who
are eligible for such transportation and confining its use to
travel that is directly related to official business.
At the outset, and so that there is no possible
misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that the proposal will not
authorize the government to procure "limousines" to convey
officials around Washington. We do not anticipate that the
proposal would require dedication of a specific vehicle and
driver for an official. Rather, we envision that the agencies
whose officials are covered would use the same vehicles they
already employ in order to drive officials to and from official
appointments in the course of the business day.
In the 1983 opinion that prompted the most recent round of
questions about this issue, the Comptroller General conceded that
part of the confusion was caused by its prior rulings and
recommended passage of legislation to resolve the problem once
and for all. The proposal was drafted after extensive
consultations with the General Accounting Office. I am confident
that with the joint efforts of the Administration, this Committee
4
and the Comptroller General, we can fairly, efficiently and
definitively resolve this issue.
In addition to the officials now expressly authorized to
receive portal-to-portal transportation, the proposal would
authorize transportation for the following officials:
-- the Vice President
-- deputy heads of Cabinet agencies;
2
-- other individuals deemed by the President to have
Cabinet-level status;
Z
-- certain persons in the Executive Branch holding Level II
positions in the Executive Schedule;
-- the Director of the FBI, the White House Chief of Staff,
the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the Commandants of the Coast Guard and the
Marine Corps;
-- Members and employees of Congress, as directed by each
House, and the Comptroller General;
- The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, as designated by the chief Justice; and
5
-- Persons afforded protection by the Secret Service under
18 U.S.C. 3506 (a).
In addition, the proposal would make explicit what GAO and
Justice have found implicit in current law - that
portal-to-portal transportation may be made available if the
President or an agency head determines that safety, security or
other operational reasons make such transportation essential for
the conduct of official business. I would point out, for
example, that only a few weeks after issuing its June 1983
opinion, GAO concluded that the State Department's Chief of
Protocol would be entitled to such transportation based on her
"unusual job" and the official function's required of that
position. GAO reach this conclusion notwithstanding its
government-wide declaration in June. This demonstrates the
difficulties which even GAO has found in dealing with this issue
and demonstrates the need for a comprehensive, definitive
legislative solution.
The proposal carefully defines the procedures under which a
determination to provide portal-to-portal transportation could be
made; the authority to make such decisions would be nondelegable,
and the decision would have to be reviewed every ninety days.
The bill would make permanent provision of portal-to-portal
transportation for three Executive branch officials who, without
question, should be covered under any conceivable formulation of
6
the personal safety or security provision. These are the
Director of the FBI; the White House Chief of Staff; and the
National Security Adviser. In this day and age, we simply cannot
ignore the security implications of these vital positions.
Some of the persons covered by the proposal, such as the Vice
President, already receive portal-to-portal transportation under
opinions of counsel, although they are not listed in the current
more
law. As the Committee is aware, many senior government officials
have received such transportation in past years. The proposal
actual
before you thus would sharply reduce the number of persons who
could be driven to and from work. The bill would provide the
agual wptn
clear direction to the agencies necessary in order to place
express limits on future transportation.
In drafting this proposal, the most difficult question was
where to draw the line as to which Executive officials should be
considered so senior that they should be deemed eligible for
coverage. In the final analysis, we determined to draw the line
at those persons holding Executive Level II positions, with the
exception of ambassadors at large. This proposal has several
major advantages:
-- It limits transportation to a small number of persons;
-- The persons selected undoubtedly are the most senior in
the actual operation of the government. Essentially,
7
these are Cabinet officials, deputy heads of the largest
Cabinet agencies, and heads of significant non-Cabinet
?
entities.
-- It ties eligibility to a seniority classification
determined by Congress.
Admittedly, any line of this nature could be said to be
arbitrary, and credible arguments could be made for drawing the
line in other places or including other, specific officials. But
after weighing various alternatives, we determined that the
Executive Level II criterion best fits the principles that
justify providing such transportation.
Furthermore, I would note that this determination is more
restrictive in scope and content than legislation adopted by
Congress last year which authorized such transportation for
various officials in the Department of Defense, including two
Level III Under Secretaries. In addition to demonstrating the
restrictive nature of the current proposal, the 1984 bill
demonstrates the pressing need for uniformity in this area.
Otherwise, authorizing committees may afford such transportation
on different and inconsistent bases for officials of similar rank
and responsibility. Failure to draw a consistent line, and
leaving the issue instead to authorizing committees on a
case-by-case basis, will serve only to make this issue a
continuing point of contention and to require continued
8
expenditure of time and resources on this issue by both Congress
and the Executive Branch. I urge Congress to adopt a uniform,
government-wide solution to the problem.
Finally, in order to ensure greater accountability, the
proposal in many instances would require an agency head to give
his or her personal approval before portal-to-portal
transportation could be authorized for subordinate officials,
even though the position would be expressly included in the
statute. Department and agency heads are being asked to make
certain that their organizations adhere strictly to the
provisions of whatever legislation is enacted. The President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency will help coordinate the work
of the Inspectors General to assist agency heads in ensuring
compliance.
OFFICE OF
SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE
WISCONSIN
TESTIMONY BEFORE HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE - Thursday, September 19th, 1985
Mr. Chairman: Why should an able-bodied public official require a chauffeured
limousine to take her or him to and from work? Why? Consider the case against such
extravagance. First: the inequity. At least 107 million of the 108 million women and
men who are employed in this country get to and from work without a chauffeur. And who
pays virtually all the taxes to this government that this government reeeives to provide
for the national security, to staff the Congress, the judiciary and to pay the hundreds
of thousands of people who enforce our laws? That same non-chauffeured taxpayer! That
tax burden, as all of us know, weighs heavily on the taxpayer, very heavily. And it may
get worse. Congress may have to increase that already heavy burden to bring our
colossal deficit under control. Now I ask you, how can we justify to the taxpayer in
Johnson Creek, Wisconsin or Dickinson, Texas where they have never seen a limousine except
on T.V. paying his hard earned money to hire chauffeurs and limousines to transport high
paid public officials to work and home. Remember practically none of the taxpayers have
chauffeurs. Isn't travelling to work just as much of a chore for that taxpayer as it is
for the public official? Of course, it is. What burden does the abuse of the privilege
impose on the taxpayer? Answer: about $35,000 per car, several million dollars in direct,
out-of-pocket costs and many times that in resentment.
Why do we permit it? Answer: there is nothing-but nothing-that a bureaucrat
treasures like having his own limousine and chauffeur. If you doubt that, think a
little about why public officials put such a high priority on the limo. Again and again
I have found Department heads willing to surrender multi-billion-dollar programs or lose
major parts of their jurisdiction. Ah, but, when it comes to saving their limousines,
they will fight to the death. Why? Because the limousine is the ultimate ego trip. The
supreme sign of success. It doesn't lend a subtle ambience of power. It shouts: "Hey
this guy is really and truly Mr. Big!". The neighborhood may not think very much of
Hobart Edgewater when he moves in, pro or con. But when they look out the window and
see Edgewater's brand-new, big Cadillac limousine, with a chauffeur - yet, waiting for
Hobart every morning and bringing Hobart home at night, how can they doubt that Hobart
Edgewater is one very big cheese, indeed. His wife, his children all take on that extra
glow of power and prestige. Even the neighbors bask in Edgewater's glory and let it be
known that they live near a very big, big shot. Of course, Edgewater doesn't tell a
Congressional Committee that. I'd like to hear just one official blurt right out:
"Chairman Brooks, don't take this limousine away from me. Without it, I'm Rodney
Dangerfield. With it, I'm really somebody". No, the public official will say something
MORE
- 2 -
like "My time is so important. I need to use that time constructively by working
at my desk in my limousine and not waste those precious minutes going to and from
work idly at the wheel. Of course this is nonsense as the Justice Department
declared in 1979, "There is hardly a senior officer to whom this rationale would
not, in fact or fancy, apply. It would also make the statute nearly a dead letter
for any officer with sufficient status to have a regularly assigned automobile. A
senior official may lengthen his or her working day, if necessary, by coming
earlier, leaving later, and living closer to the office. Using government transpor-
tation instead is a matter of personal convenience."
If Edgewater wants to be chauffeured to and from work so he can work instead
of steer his car, let him call a taxi or take the Metro. The latest gambit is being
trundled out by the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. We now provide
chauffeured transportation for the Chief Justice. But not to the Associate Justices.
The Associate Justices want to get their own individual chauffeur service. So what
do they plead? Another phoney. They plead safety. They have been threatened
by a phone call or a letter just as many of us in the Congress have been threatened.
How about that? Well, maybe some day some nut may kill a member of Congress or a
Justice. Would a chauffeured limousine prevent it? Who are we trying to kid? A
24-hour, 7 day a week, 52 weeks a year, round-the-clock secret service professional
detail might prevent such a tragedy. But a chauffeured limousine to trundle the
Justice to and from work? Any assassin would simply pick an occasion when the
Justice was not travelling to work. Incidentally, when was the last public official
in this country killed or attacked on his way to or from work?
If you drive safely and observe speed limits, you are usually safe when you're
driving your car. Think about it. You can lock the doors, roll up the windows
and no thug or mugger can touch you. Unless you insist on careening down the
street in some show-off fancy-super costly car, or in a limousine with a chauffeur
I
that shouts "hey, here comes a guy worth knocking off".
Mr. Chairman, the legislation before this subcommittee urgently needs to be
+ightened up. For years some of us in the Congress have been struggling to persuade
the Congress, the Judiciary and especially the executive branch to live within the
law. Today, the average cost of a chauffeur and limousine to trundle a public
official to and from work and breeze him about town at will is about $35,000 per
year. That is a lot of money. It comes to about half the salary of officials
MORE
-3-
being transported. The Congress has passed legislation providing reasonable limits
on the use of limousines and chauffeurs. But many agencies have found ways around this
legislative limitation. At the request of Chairman Brooks the GAO issued an opinion
on eligibility under the law for chauffeured limousines. On the basis of a survey
by my staff this Spring, 52 federal officials exercise the privilege of using limousine and
chauffeur service. That GAO opinion had a sharp salutory effect in limiting limousines.
As recently as three years ago as many as 190 officials had been using this service. The
Comptroller General decided to enforce the law last year and as of January 1st, he has
-
achieved commendable results. A number of powerful, influential public officials didn't
like it. They lost their limousine and their chauffeur. The taxpayer has been saved a
couple of million dollars. Far more important in a year when the American people are more
bitter and angry about the federal deficit than they are about any other issue, we have
made some real progress on spending money on limousines and chauffeurs- a relatively
small amount in a trillion dollar budget but probably the most ridiculous and arrogant
waste of money by the federal government.
So what happened to this success story in bringing waste under control? The
bureaucrats who have lost or may lose their limousine and with it the prime ego trip
in government have not taken this limitation lying down. They have fought back with a
proposal that superficially sounds good. But don't let it fool you. It's long on ex-
pressing its intent to limit chauffeured service to a few senior officials who absolutely
have to have it. But as you might expect, when you read the fine print you
find an escape clause through which a long Cadillac caravan can and surely will cruise.
Just listen to the language of Section 1344 (b) (2) (A) in providing the exception to
the limitation on chauffeur-limo service. The exceptions include the heads and deputy
heads of Executive Departments. AND ANY OTHER INDIVIDUALS DEEMED BY THE PRESIDENT
TO HAVE CABINET-LEVEL STATUS. And Section 1344 (b) (2) (B) also exempts "other persons
in the executive branch designated at level II of the executive schedule shall be
granted (chauffeured limousines) upon the determination of the executive department
that such transportation is appropriate."
I
How will these provisions be carried out? Will President Reagan take time away
from his overwhelming national and foreign policy responsibilities to decide whether
George Albatross or Vince Dinwiddie should have cabinet-level status for purposes of
having his own limousine? Of course not. Technically, the bill prohibits delegation.
But in fact what will happen? Of course, the President will have to assume full respon-
sibility. But his Chief of Staff will take over. The Chief of Staff is also a very busy
man. So he will in turn hand over the decision to someone else. And someone else
will be smothered by undersecretaries and deputy secretaries and a myriad of others who will
4 -
fight to the death for their limo and chauffeur. We have seen this happen before.
It will happen again. This kind of open ended provision in a bill that involved
such a predictable struggle for the number one perk will result in an explosion of
limos all over town.
So what do we do about it? One answer is to keep the law now on the books.
We can enforce it precisely the way the Comptroller General has insisted it be
enforced. We know that works. It has met the test or experience by sharply reducing
the number of chauffeur limousines. The cries of grief are loud and predictable.
But with a $200 billion deficit Congress should be able to withstand them.
A second answer is to accept this recommended bill but provide for a specific
cap on the number of limousines. How limited a cap? My own preference is 40. There
are too many now. We can easily pare twelve, starting with a 40% cut in limos
allocated to the Congress. If this is too steep we could settle for the fifty two
that are now officially permitted, but permit the three branches of government to
make the allocation within their present limits.
Certainly with the flexible language in the proposed bill, some cap is essential
if the number of taxpayer subsidized chauffeurs and limousines is not to explode out
of sight. We should not forget that we are dealing with the most preferred perk of
all. We are also dealing with some very influential, persuasive and powerful people
who will be seeking the limousines, the chauffeur and the ultimate ego trip.
One final note, Mr. Chairman, if your committee does decide to change the law,
and if you do decide not to include a cap on the number of limousines, then your
committee and the Committee on Ways and Means should consider the possibility of
taxing this benefit either fully or at a fixed percentage of its average cost. Why
not? The Administration has recommended that health benefits paid by employers on
behalf of employees be taxed. Are health benefits for a $15,000 per year factory
worker to be taxed while a $35,000 chauffeur and limousine service- for a $75,000
administration bureaucrat escapestaxation?
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548
FOR RELEASE AND DELIVERY
EXPECTED AT: 10:00 A.M. EDST
SEPTEMBER 19, 1985
STATEMENT OF
MILTON J. SOCOLAR
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for giving us an opportunity to comment on the
OMB-proposed "home-to-work" bill amending the provisions of
section 1344 of title 31, United States Code.
Section 1344 insists that all cars and aircraft main-
tained and operated with public funds be used at all times for
official purposes only. The statute does not explain what
official purposes are except to specify that transportation of
officers or employees of the Government between their domi-
ciles and places of employment is not an official purpose
unless the officer or employee fits one of a limited number of
exceptions.
This short section has generated considerable controversy
over the last four decades. The GAO has received many ques-
tions questions from various agencies and departments about
application of the home-to-work prohibition to their parti-
cular circumstances. Some of these questions concern the
statutory exemptions provided and the meaning of undefined
terms like "field work" or "principal diplomatic and consular
officials." The majority, however, deal with situations not
covered by exemptions, but with efforts to stretch the limits
of permissible conduct notwithstanding the statute's clearly
worded prohibition.
There is very little guidance to be found in the scanty
legislative history of section 1344. As early as 1914, the
Congress acted to control the purchase or acquisition of
passenger-carrying vehicles (Act of July 16, 1914, 38 Stat.
508). The first restrictions on the use of vehicles appeared
sporadically in various appropriation acts between 1935 and
1946. The current restriction was enacted into permanent
law--more or less in the form it appears today--as section 16
of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 810).
- 2 -
There are no committee reports or floor debates which discuss
the purpose of the restriction. A former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General once suggested that its enactment may have
been prompted by a recommendation of the Joint Committee on
the Reduction of Unnecessary Federal Expenditure that use of
Government vehicles should be curtailed, both to save money
and to conserve fuel in wartime.
Almost immediately after enactment of the 1946 law, the
GAO was besieged with questions about its interpretation. In
an early decision (25 Comp. Gen. 844 (1946), we denied a claim
for cab fare between an employee's home and the garage where a
Government car was stored, prior to beginning official trav-
el. We said that all employees, except those specifically
exempted by the new Act, must bear their own commuting expen-
ses. We added, as dictum, that if an agency were to find it
more appropriate for an employee to start travel from his home
instead of from a garage, we would consider this use to be an
"official purpose" within the meaning of the statute.
That decision and several others that followed over a
period of years implied that it is possible for agency heads
to exercise administrative discretion in appropriate circum-
stances to broaden the exceptions to the home-to-work prohi-
- 3 -
bition. The other circumstances we were talking about were
physical danger because of terrorist activities abroad
(54 Comp. Gen. 858 (1975)), or a general public transportation
strike (54 Comp. Gen. 1066 (1975). Even in those circum-
stances, we urged, in the case of the terrorist activities,
that specific legislative authority be sought, and in the case
of the transportation strike, that the employees be required
to pay back their normal commuting costs.
Our words implied more agency discretion than was
intended or than we subsequently allowed. As we have been
frank to admit, the imprecision of our language contributed to
a widely-held impression, until fairly recently, that the
appropriate use of Government cars and chauffeurs was for the
head of each agency to determine.
The Congress itself may share some of the blame for this
widely-held impression. Agencies have told us, when we
questioned some use of their cars, that they had explained to
their appropriation committees precisely what they intended
doing with the vehicles for which they sought funding, and no
objection was raised. They thus concluded that use of the
vehicles for the purposes explained to the committees, includ-
ing home-to-work transportation, was implicitly authorized.
- 4 -
We do not agree with that view, nor, for that matter, did the
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General who, in a memorandum
opinion for the Counsel to the President, August 27, 1979,
indicated that acceptance of this theory would make the statu-
tory prohibition a "dead letter."
Any legitimate doubts which may have existed about the
application of section 1344 should have been dissipated by
our definitive decision in 62 Comp. Gen. 438 (1983). That
decision was written in response to your specific request,
Mr. Chairman. After discussing all the previous misconcep-
tions, we held that the home-to-work transportation prohi-
bition in 31 U.S.C. § 1344 (a) constituted a "clear prohi-
bition which cannot be waived or modified by agency heads
through regulations or otherwise."
In spite of that- in my opinion--very clear message, the
statutory prohibition is still widely ignored or misinter-
preted today. The ink is hardly dry on a special report we
just completed for you, Mr. Chairman, entitled "Use of Govern-
ment Motor Vehicles for the Transportation of Government Offi-
cials and the Relatives of Government Officials," GAO/GGD-85-
76, September 16, 1985. We sent questionnaires to the 13
cabinet-level departments and their 178 subordinate compon-
- 5 -
ents, and to 60 independent executive branch agencies,
offices, boards, and commissions. All but the Executive
Office of the President responded. We asked how many offi-
cials and relatives of officials used Government cars to
travel between their homes and places of work regularly or
occasionally, and what authority they believed authorized this
use. There were 128 officials and 17 relatives who received
this service. Based on the justifications the agencies them-
selves presented on their behalf, 79 officials and 7 relatives
were not authorized to receive it, with another 5 relatives
sometimes using the cars legitimately and sometimes not.
This means that about 62 percent of the Government offi-
cials and 70 percent of the relatives apparently misunderstood
the criteria in existing law or chose to ignore it. I say
"apparently" because our conclusions were based only on the
agencies' own justifications for the usage. If given an
opportunity, it is possible that some of the individuals
involved could present further information that would persuade
us that, for example, they were in fact engaged in "field
work," as we construe that statutory exception, or that they
had legitimate reasons to fear for their physical safety had
not a Government car been provided.
- 6 -
When a public statute is so widely disregarded, one has
to wonder why. Our Government officials are, with tew excep-
tions, upright, law-abiding individuals. Either the statute
is inherently ambiguous or its terms are unrealistically
restrictive. In other cases, perhaps, the temptation is too
great for some to resist. I do not think that the statute is
ambiguous.
Mr. Chairman, over the years, the GAO has taken every
opportunity to suggest to the Congress that it consider modi-
fications of section 1344. We have done so in a series of
bill reports to both Houses on proposed legislation, even more
restrictive than section 1344, usually called the "Limousine
Limitation Act of 19_; or proposed as part of an appropri-
ation act for specific agencies. We have suggested to certain
agencies who asked whether we could modify our strict inter-
pretation of the law in deserving cases that they seek legis-
lative authority to expand the list of exceptions in section
1344 and they have done SO. For example, the Deputy Secre-
taries of State and Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among some others, are now all
specifically authorized home-to-work transportation by
statute.
- 7 -
In our letter to you transmitting the 1983 decision which
you requested (62 Comp. Gen. 438), we recommended enactment of
new language to clarify the extent of an agency head's discre-
tion to deviate from the restriction in true emergencies, or
when there is no other way to accomplish official Government
business because private or mass public transportation is
unavailable or impractical to use. We also recommended
expanding the list of exemptions to include the heads of all
non-cabinet agencies and the principal deputies of the depart-
ments. And, finally, we urged you to request a Government-
wide canvas of special needs before deciding whether to
broaden the exemptions in existing law. You immediately did
just that in a letter to OMB dated June 6, 1983. Now, albeit
two years later, OMB has completed its survey and proposed new
legislation.
While we regret that the proposed bill was not submitted
sooner, we hope that you will give it serious consideration.
The GAO was asked to comment on the various drafts prepared by
OMB--all but the final one, which we did not have an oppor-
tunity to review before it was submitted to you. We can
attest that each provision is the result of thoughtful,
responsible consideration, although we don't entirely agree
with everything in the OMB-proposed bill. Our specific
- 8 -
comments and suggestions are contained in a bill report to
your Committee.
To summarize our main recommendations briefly, we sug-
gested that:
(1) References in proposed subsection (a) (3) to specific
Presidential staff members by present title be deleted in
favor of more general Presidential authority to designate
up to three of his top staff members to receive routine
home-to-work transportation;
(2) The exemption from the prohibition on home-to-work
transportation in the original 1946 Act for members of
the Congress, the Architect of the Capitol, and their
respective officers and employees be reinstated in a new
subsection (b) (1), adding the additional exemption for
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court. Paragraphs (D) and (F) of subsection (b)(2) would
then be deleted as unnecessary;
(3) We would add the word "principal" before the word
"deputy" in subsection (b) (2) (A), to make it clear that
only the number two official in each cabinet-level
- 9 -
department was entitled to have home-to-work transpor-
tation;
(4) GAO recommends a specific exemption from the prohi-
bition for all non-cabinet agency heads, without refer-
ence to their placement in Level II of the Executive
Schedule; and
(5) That the President's open-ended authority in sub-
section (b) (2) (A) to confer cabinet-level status on "any
other individuals" be limited to such maximum number as
the Congress deems appropriate.
There are several other recommendations of a technical
nature as well. In addition, the bill report comments on the
added cost to the Government, should the OMB recommendations
become law. We project a range of costs, depending on which
of two operating assumptions are used, of $1,100 per car each
year at the low end to a high of about $9,465 per car
annually. This is explained more completely in the bill
report, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I should like to
have the entire bill report made part of the hearing record.
I will be happy to answer any additional questions you
may have.
- 10 -
Opening Statement of Chairman Jack Brooks
before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee
at the hearing on OMB's Proposed Legislation on Home-to-Office
Transportation
September 19, 1985
THE HEARING TODAY HAS BEEN CALLED TO REVIEW A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL RECENTLY
ADVANCED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO USE GOVERNMENT VEHICLES FOR HOME-TO-WORK
TRANSPORTATION. MEMBERS HAVE A COPY OF THE PROPOSAL IN THEIR FOLDERS.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE PROHIBITED FROM USING GOVERNMENT VEHICLES FOR
HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION UNLESS THEY ARE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO DO SO.
IN JANUARY 1983, I LEARNED OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE EXCESSIVE USE OF GOVERNMENT
VEHICLES FOR HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE. IN
JUST THOSE TWO DEPARTMENTS, NEARLY 70 GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE THEN RECEIVING
HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION ON EITHER A FULL-TIME OR INTERMITTENT BASIS. I ASKED THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL TO REVIEW THE MEMORANDA PREPARED BY STATE AND D.O.D., WHICH THE
DEPARTMENTS CLAIMED OUTLINED THE LEGAL BASES FOR ALLOWING THEIR OFFICIALS TO USE
GOVERNMENT VEHICLES FOR THIS PURPOSE.
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL RESPONDED WITH A DECISION THAT WENT BEYOND THE QUESTION
OF WHO IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE COULD BE LEGALLY PROVIDED HOME-TO-WORK
TRANSPORTATION. THE DECISION STATED THAT THE LAW AUTHORIZES SUCH TRANSPORTATION FOR
ONLY THE PRESIDENT, THE HEADS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, INCLUDING THE ARMY, NAVY
AND AIR FORCE, AND THE HEADS OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS. A FEW OTHER GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ARE AUTHORIZED
HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION IN SEPARATE STATUTES.
I SENT A COPY OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S DECISION TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SUGGESTING THAT HE MIGHT WANT TO REVIEW THE CURRENT
NEEDS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND, IF NECESSARY, RECOMMEND AN AMENDMENT TO THE LAW. THE
ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL WE ARE REVIEWING TODAY IS THE RESULT OF O.M.B.'S REVIEW.
I AM RELEASING TODAY A G.A.O. REPORT WHICH EXAMINES THE USE OF GOVERNMENT
VEHICLES FOR HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1985. THE REPORT
REVEALS THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE NOT BEEN IN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAW.
WE INTEND TO REVIEW THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL CAREFULLY, AND, IF NECESSARY,
AMEND THE LAW AUTHORIZING HOME-TO-WORK TRANSPORTATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. IT
MAY BE THAT IT IS IN THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST TO PROVIDE THIS SERVICE FOR SOME TOP
OFFICIALS WHO ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE CURRENT LAW. HOWEVER, IF WE AMEND THIS LAW, WE
MUST ASSURE THAT THE BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT OUTWEIGH THE POTENTIAL COSTS TO THE
TAXPAYERS.
WITNESSES THIS MORNING WILL BE SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE AND REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
SCHEDULE OF WITNESSES
10:00 a.m.
Honorable William Proxmire
United States Senator
State of Wisconsin
Mr. Michael J. Horowitz
Counsel to the Director and Chief Legal Officer
Office of Management and Budget
Mr Milton Socolar
Special Assistant to the Comptroller General
U. S. General Accounting Office