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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files Folder Title: Specter, Senator (2 of 2) Box: 51 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ MAR / / No and to to Dog we for time at MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 11, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD A. HAUSER FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS OBR SUBJECT: Senator Specter's "White Paper" on a National Program to Cut Violent Crime You have asked for my comments on the above-referenced White Paper, which was sent to you by Paul R. Michel of Senator Specter's staff. The paper details a series of criminal justice proposals costing $8 billion per year over a 5-10 year period which allegedly will reduce violent crime by 50 percent. Mr. Michel indicates that they are considering introducing legislation to implement this program early in the 98th Congress. The proposals in the White Paper would increase Federal law enforcement expenditures by $2 billion, primarily by increas- ing resources available to DEA, FBI, USMS, and the U.S. Attorneys. Training, laboratory, and research resources would be doubled; the Bureau of Prisons would receive $500 million for new construction. State and local law enforcement would receive an additional $6 billion. The biggest ticket items comprising the $6 billion include $1 billion for state prisons, $700 million for juvenile delinquent programs, and $500 million each for special detective squads, compensation for victims and witnesses, school police and counselors, neighborhood crime prevention programs, commercial crime prevention programs, and drug treatment programs. At a time when a very modest increase in narcotics law enforcement resources requires an all-out effort by the Department of Justice and the Attorney General, it is unlikely that the major increases called for by this White Paper will receive any serious consideration. The proposals are the epitome of the "throw money at the problem" approach repeatedly rejected by Administration spokesmen. I have talked with Marshall Cain, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legislative Affairs, who did not recall a copy of the package being delivered to Justice. Cain advised that Michel often tries to obtain White House -2- approval of legislative proposals rather than dealing with Justice, and recommended that the package be forwarded to Justice for appropriate handling. I have prepared a letter to Michel for your signature, thanking him for the package and advising that you have transmitted it to Justice for appropriate consideration. A transmittal memorandum to Stan Morris is also attached. Attachments THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 11, 1983 Dear Paul: Thank you for providing me with a copy of your draft "white paper" on a national program to cut violent crime. Please be assured that the package will be reviewed with interest. I have also taken the liberty of forwarding a copy to the Department of Justice for appropriate consideration. As you know, that Department is responsible for preparing Administra- tion legislative proposals in this area, and for developing Administration responses to other legislative proposals. Thank you for advising us concerning your efforts. Sincerely, Richard A. Hauser Deputy Counsel to the President Mr. Paul R. Michel c/o The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 11, 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR STANLEY E. MORRIS ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL FROM: RICHARD A. HAUSER RAA DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Senator Specter's "White Paper" on a National Program to Cut Violent Crime Attached for whatever consideration and handling you deem appropriate is a "white paper" describing a legislative proposal prepared by Paul R. Michel of Senator Specter's staff. Attachment THE WHITE HOUSE VHBFINGTON March 11, 1983 Dear Paul: Thank you for providing me with a copy of your draft "white paper" on a national program to cut violent crime. Please be assured that the package will be reviewed with interest. I have also taken the liberty of forwarding a copy to the Department of Justice for appropriate consideration. As you know, that Department is responsible for preparing Administra- tion legislative proposals in this area, and for developing Administration responses to other legislative proposals. Thank you for advising us concerning your efforts. Sincerely, Richard A. Hauser Deputy Counsel to the President Mr. Paul R. Michel c/o The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 RAH: JGR:aw 3/11/83 CC: RAHauser JGRoberts Subj. Chron 2/8/83 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TO: John Roberts FROM: Richard Á. Hauser Deputy Counsel to the President FYI: COMMENT: ACTION: FEB 7 1932 COMMITTEES: ARLEN SPECTER JUDICIARY PENNSYLVANIA APPROPRIATIONS VETERANS' AFFAIRS United States Senate WASHINGTON. January 25, 1983 The Honorable Richard A. Hauser Deputy Counsel to the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. Hauser: Enclosed is a draft "white paper" outlining a major new Federal law enforcement effort aimed at substantially reducing violent crime and drug trafficking. The paper proposes a comprehensive program based on Senator Specter's experience as District Attorney of Philadelphia, Judiciary Committee hearings of the past two years, the Report of the Attorney General's Violent Crime Task Force, and the conclusion of the 1973 National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals on which Senator Specter served. With such a comprehensive program, we believe violent crime could be reduced by 50%. The program will cost money, but there is no other way to end the crime epidemic. We believe the American people will support the program as essen- tial "domestic defense". We are suggesting an additional 1% of the federal budget be directed to this effort for a period of 5-10 years. The annual cost would be about $8 billion. In our view, this expenditure will save many times that amount. We are confident the program will succeed and be cost- effective, because, as the paper explains in great detail, the money would be applied to very specific and critical needs of the American criminal justice system. This program is, there- fore, very different from LEAA or other prior efforts. We are considering introducing legislation to implement such a program early in the 98th Congress. We would appre- ciate receiving your reaction and any suggestions you or your staff may have. Please send your comments to me at 342 Russell Senate Office Building or call me at 224-9017. Thank you. Sincerely, Paul Paul R. Michel PRM: wmw Enclosure: DRAFT Paul R.Michd Executive Summary: National Program to Cut Violent Crime 1/19/83 The United States now suffers four times more violent crime than in your youth and 20 to 100 times more than other industrial democracies. Random violence afflicts 1 in 10 American households every year, serious crime, 1 in every 3. The total loss to our society reaches $100 billion a year. Domestic criminals have succeeded where foreign armies failed: They have terrorized not only the millions victimized, but all Americans, denying our Constitutional rights and our inalienable birthright to the pursuit of happiness. According to repeated polls of public opinion, Americans worry more about crime than anything other than economic distress. Not even the Soviet threat is viewed as more serious. Most violent felonies are premeditated crimes for profit, committed, without passion or provocation, against strangers by repeat offenders whose chosen livelihood is to prey on persons who appear vulnerable. Although an arrest is made in only 1 felony in 5, most of these "career criminals" are ultimately arrested repeatedly, even if for only a tiny fraction of the scores or hundreds of crimes they commit. Once taken into our criminal justice system, however, they often evade justice as effectively as they did arrest in other cases. Dismissals, delays, plea bargains, judge- shopping, unrealistic bail, lenient sentencing, early parole, crowded prisons, lack of job training, idleness and many other problems all help nullify laws, blunt deterrence and undermine public safety. Usually, the career criminals are back on the street soon, if not immediately. Even career robbers who are sent to prison serve, on the average, less than four years. Many serve only a few months. In short, as the President has said, the problem is a "breakdown" in the system. The solution is simply to reorient it; treat serious defendants seriously. Since career criminals, though comprising less than 10% of all arrested commit more than 70% of all offenses, they warrant our greatest efforts. From investigation to release, violent career criminals should be singled out for highly concentrated attention and: rapid, realistic disposition by all concerned. That is not improper "selective prosecution", just common sense, if uncommon practice. -2- Violent crime for profit truly can be cut in half in five years as proposed in 1973 by the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. What is required is a crash effort to focus far greater resources far more narrowly on correcting the specific deficiencies in the system that prevent it from incapacitating the truly dangerous. The program proposes spending 1% of the federal budget on strengthening "domestic defense" against violent crime by increasing federal manpower and improving state criminal justice systems which would still handle 90% of the violent crime caseload. The budget allocation for criminal justice would rise from $5 to $13 billion (out of 800). The $13 billion comprises a small fraction of the projected Pentagon budget of $300 billion for the same years. Indeed, an increase of $8 billion over a period of years compares with the addition in 1982 alone of $50 billion for defense. Cutting serious crime in half would cut the annual cost of crime in half, saving $50 billion. Adding a few billion per year would not only save $50 billion per year, but would also make the other 99% of the federal budget buy billions more value. In short, the program, which requires modest investment "up front", would more than pay for itself within a few years. The most serious difficulty is not whether our country can find and afford the funds, but whether we now know enough about preventing violent career crime to pinpoint the new expenditures like laser beams rather than, as in the past, disperse them like a light bulb and whether doing so would, in fact, produce so large a reduction. The answer, in a word, is "yes". The attached chart shows in a page how this goal can be accomplished. Really, the country cannot afford not to undertake this program. The full cost of crime is incalculable. Property damage just from reported robberies and burglaries amounts to $5 billion annually. The unreported losses may well equal that figure. Applying the legal concept of pain and suffering and psychological distress, which are measurable and compensable damages under U. S. law, crime victims probably sustain an additional $100 billion. -3- The full psychological impact, however, cannot be quantified; because it is suffered not by actual victims, but by potential victims -- all of us: What dollar amount can be attributed to the fright Americans experience when they hear an unexpected noise at 3:00 a.m. wondering if a burglar is in the house? What dollar amount can be attributed to the fear women experience as they walk home at night and a sudden movement toward them suggests a rape or assault or worse? What losses are sustained when business oppor- tunities are ignored because of the risk of crime? What dollar amount can be attributed to cancella- tions and reschedulings to avoid events which conclude after dark? Conservatively, the economically measurable cost of crime in this country approximates $100 billion *and the total cost, including the psychological effect on the entire population, reaches $500 billion. Adding to the anguish above the estimated dollar loss, crime is an intentional act unlike damages resulting from accidents or natural disasters beyond man's control. Com- pounding the agony, much crime is preventable -- if only the murderer had not been paroled, the robber had not been placed on probation, the burglar had not been acquitted because the policeman erroneously filled out a search warrant, or the rapist had not been on bail for 6 months, without being tried! Government at all levels -- Federal, state and local -- now spends $25 billion on crime control covering police, prosecutors, defenders, courts, prison and parole. This program proposes an increased expenditure of $8 billion per year, constituting 1% of the Federal budget with the realistic prospect of reducing violent crime by 50%. / The figure $100 billion is based on calculations by Dr. Mark Cannon, Administrative Aide to the Chief Justice of the United States. Based on figures supplied by the National Institute of Justice, this total has been used by Dr. Cannon in various speeches and articles. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION INCREASE USE RESULT (Thousands) millions $8,000 National attack on violent Reduce violent crime crime. by 50% in five years. FEDERAL 200 Fugitive programs. Triple arrest rate. 300 Federal robbery prosecutions. Triple arrests. 500 Drug enforcement. Triple the number of major arrests, seizures and forfeitures. 250 Training and support services Expand training and to states. speed up support. 250 Research and development. E.g., weapons detectors and computerization. 200 Construction of federal Accommodate increased prisons. federal population. 300 Temporary detention facilities End state overcrowding. for state inmate "overflow" and permanent prisons for state habitual offenders sen- tenced to life. $2,000 STATE 500 Special detective squads. Double arrest rate to 40%. 100 Case screening and diversion. Cut minor and non-violent trials in half. 100 Career criminal units. End plea bargains. 300 Diagnosis classification, and Cut adult crime cycle. correctional programming. 1,000 Prison construction. End overcrowding that causes short sentences. 300 Job and literacy training. Make convicts employable. 700 Juvenile delinquent inter- Cut off escalating crime vention. cycle. 300 Housing for Runaways. Keep them out of prisons. 500 Victim/Witness assistance. Compensation. 500 Crime prevention -- schools. Cut violence and drugs in hal: 500 Crime " -- neighborhoods. Cut burglaries in half. 500 Crime " -- commercial. Cut robberies in half. 500 Drug treatment. End addiction. 200 Calendar control. End delays. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION CREASE HOUSANDS) USE AGENCY RESULT Ilions Reduce violent crime .000 National attack on Violent Crime - "SAVE" - Safety Against Violent Events by 50% in five years deral Fugitive programs USMS : 80; FBI: 60; Increase arrests from 200 DEA:40; others 20 40% to 90% of 80,000 Quadruple resources. warrants per year for federal and state vio- lent and drug offenders 300 New Federal prosecutions for violent FBI 250 (4,000 Increase federal arrests crimes, such as bank and commer- slots) and US from 3 to 13,000 per year, cial robbery Attorneys 50 (500 for robberies, especially prosecutors). armed career robbers. 500 Drug Enforcement 200 to double DEA Triple the number of (1900) investigators major arrests, seizures 100 for accountants, and forfeitures. Focus (1,000 CPA Corps) action on financing as 100 for FBI, 50 for much as on commodities Customs, 50 for to take profit away. Im- additional 500 Assi- mobilize major organiza- stant US Attorneys tions. (20% increase). S 250 Training, lab, identification, and FBI, Treasury, DEA, Expand training and speed other support services and tech- NIC, DOJ, NIJ up support to respond to nical assistance to states by Double resources. all state requests in Federal agencies timely fashion. 250 Research and Development. Design BJS, NIJ, FBI Urgent violent crime pro- means to end plea-bargaining and LEAA, others jects, including weapons cut trial delays in half. Double resources. detectors and computeri- zation of fingerprints, modi operandi weapons, prior records, stolen property, co-conspirators, and case management and court calendars. 200 Construction of correctional facilities BOP starts 4 new Build new prisons for in- for federal inmates and operating prisons and 4 new creased federal population costs. camps each year. to prevent crowding and decreased security. 300 Temporary detention facilities for BOP starts 8 camps Build new prison camps state inmate "overflow" and perma- and 2 prisons per and maximum security nent prisons for confinement of all year. penitentiaries to end all state habitùal offenders sentenced to state overcrowding. life. -2- CREASE TOUSANDS) USE AGENCY RESULT tate millions 500 Improve investigations with special Local police depart- Double violent crime ments - 100 cities arrest rate to 40% detective squads per year. Improve case screening and diversion Local prosecution, Cut minor and non- 00 courts, and probation violent trials in half and agencies in 100 metro- increase violent crime politan jurisdictions trials so plea bargains per year. can be reduced, then eliminated Improve violent crime prosecutions Police, prosecution, End plea bargains 100 by forming career criminal units court administration 100 cities per year. Improve convict diagnosis, classifica- State prison systems; Cut adult crime cycle, 300 tion, and correctional programming all states isolate hardened offenders Prison and other construction State prison systems; End short sentences and 000 all states with over- other problems resulting crowding-about 40. from overcrowding Job training/prison industry/functional All state prison End pressure of economic 300 literacy training systems. need as a cause of recidivism for unhardened convicts Juvenile delinquent intervention State and local Cut off escalating crime 700 authorities. cycle State authorities. Create homes so these 300 Runaways and missing children youth are not mingled with juvenile offenders or placed in prison-like facilities Victim/witness State authorities. Aid and Compensation, 500 where none other is available, for medical costs and lost wages 500 School police and Cut violence and drug Crime prevention - Schools counselors. sales by or to students in half Crime prevention - Neighborhoods Volunteer observers. Cut burglaries in half 500 500 Crime prevention - Commercial Security devices. Cut robberies in half Drug treatment Local courts. End addiction whenever 500 possible 200 Calendar control applying Research Local courts. End delays and judge and Development results to specific shopping localities 6,000 A REALISTIC PROGRAM TO REDUCE VIOLENT CRIME BY 50% I. Introduction Nearly ten years ago, after a decade of increasing crime and violence, the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended steps for reducing violent crime in America by 50%. Unfortunately, many of its key recommendations, such as abolition of plea-bargaining, were never implemented. Now, after another decade of escalating street crime, Americans are still waiting for the "crime control" and "safe streets" promised by Congress in a 1968 statute. In fact, the streets have gotten even more dangerous and crime more out of control. Instead of being decreased 50%, as the Commission urged in 1973, violent crime increased 100%. Just since 1978, the violent crime rate has increased 30%. America's serious crime rate has risen 200% since 1960 and 400% since World War II. Year in and year out, increases in the crime rate exceeded increases in inflation. And, crime costs citizens even more than inflation and hurts them even worse. Not only has crime continually increased for decades, but it is vastly worse in America than in any comparable country. The United States suffers much more crime per person than other industrial democracies -- 20 times more than England and 100 times more than Japan. -2- Our crime wave has grown so powerful that now it is destroying whole neighborhoods, bankrupting businesses, shrinking tax revenues, subverting schools and terrorizing senior citizens. The only bigger problem in America today is unemployment. Unemployment has numerous causes as many people realize, but few realize that crime is one of them. In fact, crime is cited by businesses at the most common cause for closings -- not taxes, not government regulation, not foreign competition, but crime. Nor is violent crime a disaster limited, like a tornado, to some narrow swath. Once the scourge mainly of inner city slums, it now reaches everywhere -- cities, suburbs, towns and rural areas; its devastating impact hurts people at all economic levels; it condemns all Americans to living in fear. One in every three American households suffers from crime each year. No epidemic disease or natural disaster has ever ravaged so many Americans. Nor, in the past decade, has war. More Ameri- cans are killed each year by criminals than by enemy soldiers. As one witness wryly noted in a hearing before a Judiciary Subcommittee, the "score is: Americans killed by Russians -- 0; Americans killed by criminals -- 23,000 every year. " The psychological harm from our crime epidemic is immeasur- able; the economic harm is not. More economic loss results from crime than from all natural disasters and disease epidemics -3- put together. Each year, crime costs Americans an astonishing 125 billion dollars. Property stolen just in burglaries accounts for $4 billion. The total price of crime, however, is paid not just by the hapless victims, but by all of us -- in the form of higher prices, higher insurance rates and higher taxes. Our national tolerance for the intolerable dismays America's allies and convinces critics that we are a stupid, suicidal, "sick" society. Tolerating crime breeds disrespect for law. Allowing so many to become actual victims and everyone else to become potential victims threatens to sabotage the social compact. When the law abiding see the lawless getting away with it, and sometimes getting rich, too, what happens to their own willingness to serve in the military, support their community, assist their schools, and pay their taxes? Crime threatens not only the safety of individuals, but the security of society. Yet, we still have not resolved to reduce it! Eliminating crime must await utopia, but reducing violent crime cannot wait any longer. Strangely, we rarely even talk anymore about "reducing" crime. We talk, sometimes, about "crime control". That merely means stopping further increases! That) concedes defeat! We talk, often, about the "causes of crime", as a mystery which, once understood, would magically -4- end our national nightmare of random, anonymous criminal violence -- the muggings and murders, the rapes and robberies, the break-ins and burglaries. We are, I suspect, resigned to this much crime because we have come to believe that we have no alternative. This conclu- sion has been corroborated each year by relentlessly rising crime rates. Some social commentators argue that we cannot begin reducing crime until we finish eliminating poverty. Others urge minor adjustments in the criminal process as if it were an end in itself. They imply that further refinements in what is already by far the most complex, costly and cumbersome justice system in the world will somehow reduce crime. Still others minimize the role of the judicial process, arguing that decreasing the number of offenses requires increasing the number of policemen. Almost no one anymore believes that hardened criminals can be rehabilitated at will by correctional programs. For humanitarian reasons, prison reform is still championed by concerned persons. But, few believe that reducing prison overcrowding will reduce recidivism. Our criminal justice system exists primarily to secure safety for citizens -- in our streets, schools and homes. It must be fair, but also effective. Judged by its results, our system is failing. As President Reagan said, our criminal -5- justice system has suffered a "breakdown". Actually, the breakdown is in the state courts, which have been overwhelmed by the volume of cases. State enforcement efforts need federal help. Combatting violent crime has traditionally been, and I believe should remain, primarily a local responsibility. Primarily, but not exclusively. Indeed, the Constitution of the United States makes clear that crime control is also a federal responsibility. It obligates our national government to secure "the general welfare", and the Executive "to see that the laws are faithfully executed." In taking their oaths of office, federal officials swear to defend the Constitution and the country from "all enemies, foreign and domestic." And violent criminals are our most harmful domestic enemies. More protection from crime means more resources. Our Chief Justice asserts that "domestic defense" is no less urgent than national defense. I believe the Justice Department needs sufficient resources as much as the Pentagon. Yet, we spent more than 35% of our federal budget on national defense, and less than 1/2 of 1% on domestic defense. Recently, we have -- I think properly -- increased the defense budget sharply, even after accounting for inflation, to compensate for years of neglect. But, we have neglected to raise our Justice budget enough to offset inflation. Few Americans realize that since 1975, while the number of soldiers increased, the number of FBI agents decreased. -6- Other ironies abound in this comparison. For years, we heard of the "missile gap", but not of the "sentencing gap". Legislatures make robbery a crime punishable by 10 to 20 years imprisonment, but many courts regularly give first time robbers probation or short jail sentences; even repeaters, on the average, serve less than four years. We worry, properly, about foreign adversaries having "a definite margin of superiority" in strategic arms. What about the "inferiority" of the law abiding citizen to the career criminal? The criminal goes about freely; the citizen changes his lifestyle. Or the "inferiority" of the manpower and equipment -- planes, boats, radios -- of the drug enforcers, compared to the drug traffickers. We are concerned, correctly, that imbalance in military forces has opened a "window of vulnerability." With three million burglaries a year in our country, one for every 14 American households, another "window of vulnerability" we need to be concerned about is every window in our homes. We believe instinctively in deterrence against the Soviets. We take it on faith that potential adversaries are deterred by the threat of retaliation. Yet, we lack faith that criminals too can be deterred. Instead, some scholars demand massive empirical proof of this obvious fact. Some then declare the evidence unreliable and the results inconclusive. Always, however, they recommend further research. More studies are not needed, more action is. -7- In the past 15 years, we have created five national commissions to make recommendations on combatting crime and violence, and spent more than $7 billion on federal financial assistance. The money, by and large, was not wisely spent. The recommendations, were, by and large, ignored. Now we are doing it once again. The report of the most recent commission, the Attorney General's Violent Crime Task Force, was presented well over a year ago -- on August 17, 1981. It contained 64 principal recommendations and scores of subsidiary ones on actions the federal government should take. Most would entail increased expenditures; nearly all of these have been silently shunned. While, indiscriminate spending would produce as little progress as in the past, these recommendations are practical, proven and cost-effective. Their vigorous implementation is needed desperately. The required actions are affordable. In fact, what we cannot afford is inaction. The total cost of implementing these and other necessary steps would be $8 billion a year. If our country can afford to increase defense spending by more than $50 billion this year alone, we can certainly afford 1/6 of that increase to reduce violent crime. I spent fifteen years in law enforcement, served two terms as District Attorney of Philadelphia and was a member of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and -8- Goals. From my personal experience, I am convinced that a practical program for this price can, in fact, cut violent crime in this country in half in five years. The basic outlines of the program can be found in the reports of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: eliminate plea bargaining, concentrate on career criminals, make punishment swift, sure and sufficient, assure speedy trials and appeals, teach short-term prisoners marketable job skills, incarcerate unrehabilitatable repeat violent felons for lengthy periods. On specifics, some of the necessary actions were set forth in the Violent Crime Task Force Report -- reform bail laws for dangerous offenders, eliminate early release on parole, and, most importantly, increase federal law enforcement, prosecutive, and correctional personnel and facilities, and provide the states with the financial assistance they need to curtail crime. The rest of the actions needed are set forth in my Program for Violent Crime. In truth, we have as much know-how for crime curtailment as for national defense or space exploration. We can find the funds. We lack only the will. II. The Program It is a program, not just a set of goals and guidelines. In essence, it targets specific "program activities" in the federal budget for increases that will reduce crime. -9- 1. Fugitives There were more than 40,000 violent crime fugitives whom the federal government was responsible for locating and appre- hending as of 1981. In all, there were 180,000 fugitives being sought, a very large portion of the non-violent offenders being drug traffickers. The vast majority have fled from local authorities. They are a federal resonsibility because they are thought to have fled across state lines. Federal warrants have been issued for their arrest. Federal agents must find them. The Marshals Service is the principal federal agency responsible for finding them. It is a most difficult investi- gative task since by definition fugitives are specifically trying to avoid being found and therefore avoid former homes, work places and friends. They often have many months "head start" on the Marshals who seldom receive productive investiga- tive leads when they receive the warrants. Despite these difficulties, because of other essential duties and insufficient manpower, the Marshals Service is able to devote only 400 employees to criminal fugitive warrants in the entire country. Nor are all of them Deputy Marshals. Some are cierks and other support personnel. As a result, only a small fraction of these violent and drug fugitive cases can be actively investigated on an on-going -10- basis. In most cases, the warrant is merely kept on file should the person be arrested again. Paradoxically, if they are later arrested for a serious crime, execution of the warrant will be both too late -- since the further offense will already have been committed -- and unnecessary -- since the new offense itself will probably lead to incarceration. The Marshals' fugitive manpower should be at least doubled over the next two and a half years and redoubled by the end of five years. The cost of increasing the warrant manpower from 400 to 1600 would be about $80 million per year. The result would be to prevent tens of thousands of violent felonies. The program would result in far faster apprehensions as well as apprehensions of many fugitives who otherwise would never be found at all. Most of these offenders are recidivists who fled precisely because they feared long jail sentences. Many are true "career criminals" --- offenders who commit scores or even hundreds of offenses each year. Some average a felony a day. Apprehending just one such vio- lent fugitive a year earlier, would thus prevent more than 300 serious crimes, save 300 people from being victims, avoid many thousands or tens of thousands of dollars in losses. Each such arrest would measurably reduce violent crime. At present, the Marshals receive twice as many warrants as they can serve each year and now have a backlog of about -11- 40,000 warrants. They receive 63,000 warrants of t he total of about 77,000 issued each year. They serve about 40%. The warrant program consumes about $18 million per year. Raising the investment to $80 million would double and redouble the manpower and increase the clearance rate from 40% to 90%, eliminate the backlog, allow the Marshals to stay current and enable them to catch more major fugitives. Proportional increases in the fugitive personnel of: the FBI; (2) DEA; and (3) all the other agencies would also be required, costing $120 million a year. These increases are important too, for often the agency that originally investigated the fugitive from federal court will be best equipped to find him. Thus, when a federal drug defendant jumps bail before trial, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is the respons- ible agency, is best prepared to succeed. (The Marshals are responsible after trial, regardless of offense.) The same reasoning applies to the FBI for bank robbers, terrorists and organized crime goons and other agencies for other offenders. The FBI currently devotes about 300 positions and $14 million to fugitive work and has primary responsibility for about 2500 federal violent crime warrants. The clearance rate is 40%. Therefore, $60 million would be added to its fugitive program, allowing a doubling of manpower in 2 1/2 years and a redoubling in 5 years. DEA would receive $40 million. The balance of $20 million would be divided among ATF, Customs, IRS, Secret Service, et al. -12- 2. The FBI Bank Robbery Program Another manpower increase which would surely be cost- effective against violent offenders would be in the FBI Personal Crimes Program. The major offense in this program is bank robbery. While every bank robbery is a federal felony and nearly all bank robberies were once investigated entirely by the FBI, today the majority of these cases are turned over to local police and prosecutors shortly after an initial FBI response team rushes to the scene of the robbery. Many of these transfers are justified. For example, where a sole, unarmed robber is caught in the bank or trying to escape, the nationwide capabilities and expertise of the FBI are hardly needed. However, insufficient manpower in the FBI requires transfer of many cases in which apprehension by FBI would be more likely and faster. Moreover, federal prosecutions are far faster and federal sentences far longer than in most urban state courts. Federal robbery trials are nearly always held within two months of indictment, whereas in many state courts such cases remain untried 6-9-12 months after indictment. State robbery sentences (all types) actually served averaged less than four years, even for offenders with prior convictions. Federal sentences imposed on bank robbers average more than 12 years. There- fore, federal handling vastly reduces the chances for the bank robber to escape arrest or to continue to commit violent felonies -13- before trial or upon early release from prison. Nor do bank robberies constitute an unmanageable burden since there are about 9000 per year in the entire country. They represent a small, stable and clearly defined sub category of all robberies, comprising well under 2%. At present, the FBI handles less than 4,000, making arrests in about 2,000 cases. The FBI manpower allocated to the Personal Crimes (bank robbery) Program has been greatly reduced in recent years and now stands at about 1000 and $45 million. Meanwhile, bank robberies rose 70% since 1977. Thus, FBI now handles a smaller percentage of the cases that need FBI handling. In order to handle all the bank robberies that can be better handled at the federal level, the FBI's allocation to this program should be doubled and redoubled over the next five years. The cost would be about $200 million per year. The FBI could then handle 6-7,000 cases. 3. The Commercial Robbery Program Under the Hobbs Act, any robbery that "interferes with" or "in any degree affects interstate commerce" is a federal felony. The policy of the Justice Department, however, has been not to prosecute such robberies, except in rare cases involving "wide-ranging schemes" or "organized crime" groups. The statute itself contains no such restrictions. Nor does it require that a firearm was used, that the perpetrators abused -14- the instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the mails or that they travelled in interstate commerce in connection with the robbery. In fact, court opinions on the coverage of the Hobbs Act have made plain that the Act applies even to "local" robberies where the effect on interstate commerce is "indirect" and "minimal". Indirect effects have been found whenever the taking depleted the inventory or assets of a business which buys goods in interstate commerce. There is little doubt therefore, that the Hobbs Act applies to vir- tually every robbery of a store, business office, factory, restaurant, hotel or other place of public accommodation. Despite this broad statute that potentially could result in many thousands of federal robbery prosecutions (in addition to those for bank robbery), in fact fewer than 50 cases a year are brought for these "commercial robberies" in the entire country. The lack of resources and the declination policy have virtually nullified this Congressional enactment. The justification has been that commercial robberies are adequately handled in the state system. Yet, it is indi- sputable that in many cities, the backlogs in state court combined with plea-bargaining result in short "misdemeanor" sentences, if not probation, for these serious felonies. Rob- bery, after all, is one of the five violent felonies historically regarded as so serious as to warrant application of the "felony -15- murder rule" whereby a killing in the course of such a felony is automatically first degree murder, even where the felon(s) originally had no plan or intent to kill. Although recent Congresses have considered bills to make it a federal offense to rob a pharmacy, no efforts have been made to compel, encourage or enable the Attorney General to enforce the Hobbs Act and use it in such cases. Two strong arguments in favor of the pharmacy bill were that very often the perpetrators are narcotics addicts and carry firearms. Thus, pharmacy robberies tend to be rather aggravated and dangerous and to involve serious offenders with narcotics habits and long criminal records. Pharmacy robberies thus share some of the characteristics of bank robberies that helped make the latter appropriate for federal action. Many robberies of business offices, hotels and restaurants also share these characteristics. Federal resources currently allocated to these "commer- cial robberies" are negligible. To be capable of handling all commercial robberies that are highly complicated or conspiratorial, plainly interstate, or in which guns are discharged, the FBI would have to be expanded by about 1000 persons over a five year period. The cost would be about $50 million. Estimates are that 10,000 robberies per year fit one or more of these three criteria. With 1,000 persons, the FBI could handle at least half these cases. -16- Corresponding increases in prosecutors would be necessary. For $50 million, 500 prosecutors could be added to the existing corps of nearly 2,000 and could handle the additional bank robbery and commercial robbery cases. 4. DEA and the Drug Enforcement Program Interstate drug trafficking, unlike bank robbery or commer- cial robbery, is primarily, if not exclusively, a federal enforcement responsibility. Yet, DEA has only about 1500 investigative agents to cover all the cities that serve as distribution points in the trafficking networks. There are at least twenty cities that are major hubs and dozens more that are minor hubs. In addition, DEA has regulatory, training, overseas and intelligence responsibilities that are critical and divert personnel. Thus, only about 1500 agents of a total of 1900 actually investigate in U.S. cities. Therefore, there are fewer than 100 agents on the average to cover each major hub city. In the other hubs, DEA offices typically have fewer than a dozen agents. That is not even enough manpower to staff even one wiretap! Clearly, two to four times as many agents are needed. DEA's annual budget is about $227 million. To double its manpower would cost $200 million a year. Since a high percentage of robberies and violent crimes are committed by narcotics ad- dicts and since addicts commit offenses six times more frequently -17- when taking drugs than in periods of abstinence, reducing the availability of narcotics will help reduce violent crime. According to testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice by Dr. John Ball and other experts, these addict/criminals each commit multiple crimes nearly everyday of the year. They are thus the very worst of the career criminals who as a group comprise less than 10% of all persons arrested but are responsible for more than 70% of all violent offenses committed. In addition, DEA should hire, train and integrate with its investigators, financial analysts with CPA credentials. A corps of 500 such accountants should be gradually built up over a five year period. They must be supported by "accounting assistants" on a one-for-one basis, as well as, secretaries and clerks. The total cost would be about $100 million per year. It should soon result in additional forfeitures of many times that amount. Until the vast profits are taken out of drug trafficking, there will always be ample replacements for those imprisoned. Adequate deterrence against drug traffickers requires that the government capture the profits too. Corresponding increases in FBI and prosecution manpower devoted to drug enforcement would be required. To pay for the 2,000 FBI personnel would cost $100 million per year. Another $50 million would be needed for 500 additional prosecutors. The U. S. Customs Service would get $50 million for 1,000 additional personnel to improve enforcement at the borders and the country's air and sea ports. -18- With these additional resources, we could triple the 9,000 drug arrests and the major seizures and forfeitures per year. 5. The Emergency Corrections Program The federal manpower increases called for above will, of course, produce more federal prison inmates. Adding investi- gators will produce predictable increases in arrests, prosecu- tions and convictions in each of four categories: fugitives, bank robbers, commercial robbers and drug traffickers. Once convicted, nearly all of these felons will be sentenced to prison, most of them for substantial terms. Indeed, the bulk of the present federal prison population consists of bank robbers and drug traffickers. Consequently, substantial increases will be needed in federal prison capacity to accom- modate these additional convicts. The state prison systems certainly cannot help, for most of them are severely overcrowded already. a. Start New Federal Prisons The solutions are, first, to build new permanent federal facilities, for federal inmates, starting four medium or maximum security institutions (capacity 500) per year for the next five years and four prison camps. The cost to build and operate them will be about $200-230 million per year. -19- The camps could be opened in about one year of the start and the prisons in about four years of the start of site acquisition. In the meanwhile, increases in the medium to maximum security population could and would be absorbed by existing institutions. b. Open Temporary Prison Camps For State Convicts Second, in the meanwhile, extensive use should be made, on a temporary basis, of military barracks on abandoned military bases or unused portions of bases, for state inmates. Existing buildings can be renovated within 6-18 months at modest cost. Since there is no need for the military to charge rent for the buildings and grounds, most of the cost will be for renovation, upkeep and staff. For 200 million dollars per year, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, within 1-2 years, could open 8 minimum security prison camps per year that could house some 4 thousand inmates for up to three years. These facilities would be used primarily to relieve state overcrowding pending completion of permanent state prison buildings. They could also handle any federal "overflow" of minimum security inmates. This temporary program is essential since it takes nearly five years to build a prison--from the initial decision to the entry of inmates. Thus, the states cannot eliminate their overcrowding fast enough to meet court orders (usually federal) to release inmates, even those who have not served their sentences or are unready for release, in order for the remaining inmates -20- to "fit" in the prison buildings under constitutionally per- mitted circumstances. More than half the states presently face such a situation. So that the federal government is assured that necessary state prison space will be made avail- able as soon as possible, it could pre-condition a state's eligibility for the federal emergency program for state inmates on the state's beginning construction of prisons for the same number of inmates the federal government is being asked to house temporarily. Although such temporary "barracks style" facilities would be unsuitable for robbers and for some of the drug traffickers, the Federal Prison System's three next largest population sub- groups are immigration violators, theft defendants and fraud convicts, most of whom could safely be placed there. Among state prison populations, about 1/3 are "property offenders", most of whom probably are suitable for such facilities. Changing prosecution policies and increasing manpower for offenses like "commercial robbery" will itself relieve state prison overcrowding, as will using temporary federal prison camps to house state "property" inmates. Nevertheless, more than 95% of violent criminals are now in the state systems and these changes will not alter the division by about more than 10%. Therefore, the long range needs of public safety cannot -21- be met in any other way than by expanding the capacity of the jails in nearly every major city and the prisons in nearly every populous state. This step, strongly advocated by the Attorney General's Task Force, will require large and continu- ing expenditures. Billions of dollars must be spent over a five to ten year period to build more state prisons. There is no way to avoid it and still reduce violent and major crime. However, an additional way the Federal Government could help relieve overcrowding in state prisons would be to house state inmates sentenced to life imprisonment under the habitual criminal statutes in force in some 45 states. These inmates are unusually costly to house both because of the high level of security required and the length of their incarceration. Often they are confined in the most severely overcrowded facility in the state. At present, the habitual criminal statutes are rarely used to impose life sentences even for convicts with four, six or eight prior felony convictions. One of the main deterrents is the overcrowding. Another may be the cost. With current knowledge about the realities of recidivism and rehabilitation for this limited group of repeat offenders, the logical policy is incapacitation by imprisonment for life or an equivalent term. While for less hardened offenders, greatly increased efforts at rehabilitation are justified, for this group they are not. -22- Therefore, to encourage state authorities, in appropriate cases in accordance with existing state law, to impose life sentences on career criminals it is proposed that the Federal Government offer to house such inmates on behalf of the states. Each year, two maximum security federal prisons would be started for this purpose, costing $70 million per year to build and operate. Their capacity when completed would be 4-5,000, enough to accommodate all the anticipated cases. Current estimates are that there are only 300 to 1,000 inmates now serving life sentences under habitual criminal statutes. Since the prisons started in the first year of the program would not open until the fourth year, there would be a delay in accepting any of these state inmates. While the federal prison system has enough flexibility to absorb medium security inmates, whether federal or state, life sentence violent criminals would require the highest security level and the few federal facilities suitable for these offenders are presently filled to their safe capacity. The total cost of the camps and prisons for state inmates would be $270-300 million per year, including construction and operating costs. -23- C. Federal Financial Assistance for State Prison Construction Like construction of the Interstate Highway System, this endeavor can appropriately be a joint one. The proper federal role is to meet emergency needs by opening temporary prison camps and to help meet long term needs by securing financing, e.g., by guaranteeing loans. In the mid-term, the federal government should at least contribute toward construction costs in proportion to the inmates it could have, but did not prosecute in federal court. In other words, there should be a presumption that in enacting the various statutes that created concurrent federal jurisdiction for drug trafficking and certain violent crimes, even though plenary state jurisdiction was already in existence, Congress intended substantial federal participation in one form or other. Generally, that means federal prosecution leading to incarceration in federal prisons. Where, however, state prosecution is initiated, the federal role should be to help pay for the prisons to house the persons so convicted. Surely, an equitable and empirically sound formula could be worked out. By rough estimate, perhaps 1/3 of all robbers (and all bank and store robbers) involve federal responsibility. Drug traffickers require a more arbitrary determination. Tech- nically, all sellers are a federal problem for all sales are a -24- federal offense. Besides, even the lowest level dealer is nearly always connected to an interstate network. Often he is a "soldier" in an established organization. Yet a "street seller" who sells in quantities of one bag of heroin or a "user's" amount of a dangerous drug seems too small an operator to be considered truly a federal responsibility. For simplicity, perhaps all possession cases, except those rare cases involving very large quantities, should be deemed state cases and all. sale cases, except of "single user" quantities, federal cases. In any event, the federal government would pay for a proportional part of the cost of all new prisons constructed by various states in the next five years. The federal share of the cost can be calculated with data available to the National Institute of Corrections. It would be about $5 billion, depending on how fast the states started new prisons. Since most states failed to build any new prisons in recent decades, the financial incentive of "matching federal grants" is apparent- ly needed. It can be expected to work because the states now recognize the urgency. In order to control and limit such federal grants and fix the total annual appropriation for budgetary purposes, Congress could put a cap of $1 billion per year on the prison fund. Generally, it might be operated much like the highway construction trust fund, making grants avail- able to qualifying states on a first come, first served basis. -25- This procedure might further increase the incentive for states to begin a serious building program promptly. Indeed, the Congress could stipulate that the funds could only be used in the year appropriated, if still stronger incentives are needed to get the states started on a crash building program. Research and Development and Support The balance of $500 million of the $2 billion appropriated for federal activity would go to federal agencies to double the resources presently available for research and development and for training and support of state and local criminal justice agencies. The objectives would include developing means to end plea bargaining and trial delays. Computer technology would be adapted both to investigative and calendar control tasks. Training would be greatly expanded and identification and lab support speeded up. 6. State Assistance Some $6 billion per year would be given to state and local authorities for new and augmentation programs for police, courts and corrections specifically for career criminals and violent offenders. The goal would be to assure swifter apprehension, sufficient evidencefor for conviction of the major charge, greatly expedited trial and sentencing, and corrections programs designed to rehabilitate first or second offenders convicted of violent felonies-with the emphasis on training in marketable job skills and basic English reading and writing, and incapacitate -26- third offenders with lengthy sentences of between 15 years and life. Thus, the program, described below, to improve rehabil- itation programs complements the approach of S. 1688, The Armed Career Criminal Act, which was passed by the Senate on September 30, 1982 by vote of 92 to 1. The Act requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years up to life for a third conviction of robbery or burglary when a gun is used in the new offense. The approach for these hardened violent offenders is "to throw away the key." a. Special Police Squads The theory is that at every stage from the commission of the offense through service of sentence, violent offenders and career criminals would be singled out for special attention, handling and treatment. The first goal would be to: double the apprehension rate (15% to 30% for professional burglars); (19% to 40% for professional robbers, etc.). This would mean creating or expanding special police squads of highly trained investigators who would respond immediately and in force to the scene of every violent felony and conduct full-scale investi- gations there, including intensive interviews of all witnesses, and who would follow-up on all leads, vigorously and continuously. It would require greater use of undercover operations like "stings" and "decoys", greater use of forensic laboratory services, more extensive efforts to trace firearms and stolen property and many other steps. The results would be: -27- 1. More career criminals would get caught; 2. they would be arrested sooner; 3. the evidence would be stronger; and 4. a higher percentage would be convicted of the main crime and sentenced to appropriate terms. The ultimate consequences would be a sharp increase in deterrence which should substantially lower the rate of violent felonies for profit. Those not deterred would be incapacitated with strong cases, fast trials and long sentences. This would further lower the violent crime rate. In many cities, the Police Department would have to create special detective squads for rape, robbery, burglary, narcotics trafficking, etc. Most cities already have a Homicide Squad. Its operations and techniques could provide a very useful general model for the new squads. The federal role would be to stimulate the creation of these squads, paying full costs for one year. If further federal funding were thought essential, starting in the second year, states could be required to assume costs in 25% annual increments. Thus, in its first "transitional" year the squad would be paid for 75% with federal funds. Federal support would decrease to 50% in the second year and to 25% in the third year. In the fourth year, local authorities would pay -28- the full cost. Under the first approach, 100 cities per year could be given $5 million for one year. Thus, 500 cities could be helped. Under the second approach, 100 cities could be helped in the first year and an additional 50 cities in each succeeding year for a total of 300 cities. In specific terms, formation of such squads in a typical city would mean hiring and training (or retraining), on the average, about 100 detectives. In cities which already have such units, the goal would be to double their size. The cost per city would average about $5 million per year, including costs of training, salaries, support personnel, space (where needed) and other such costs. The total cost to thus assist police departments in cities would be $500 million per year. b. Career Criminal Units In similar fashion, money should be spent to create or double the size of the Career Criminal Units or specialized prosecution units for rape, robbery, burglary and drug trafficking in the U.S. Attorney and district attorney's offices in the 500 largest counties in the U.S. These units assign a prosecutor to stay with each case from start to finish for thorough preparation and aggressive handling without plea-bargaining. The results are significantly higher conviction rates and far longer sentences for career criminals -29- and violent felons. Such programs, which were started in district attorneys offices in 25 major cities (counties) between 1975-80, proved to have high impact and, at an average of only $1 million per city, to be highly cost-effective. The program would cost $100 million per year. It would provide $1 million for one year only to 100 cities per year for a total of 500 jurisdictions. C. Case Screening and Diversion The most crucial reform needed in U.S. criminal justice is the elimination of plea-bargaining in violent crime cases. More than any other cause, plea-bargaining results in dangerous repeat offenders being released on probation or after serving brief jail sentences. Although in most states, robbery, a major felony, is punishable by 10-20 years imprisonment in the state penitentiary, many defendants convicted of robbery receive only misdemeanor sentences and serve less than two years, often less than one year, in the county jail. In fact, the average time served for robbery in the United States is less than three years. Even defendants with prior felony convictions serve, on the average, less than four years. Such inadequate sentences result from plea-bargains made under duress by prosecutors because the state courts in most urban areas simply cannot try enough cases. Indeed, in many cities, up to 80% of the cases, including violent felonies, are disposed of not by trial but by guilty plea based on -30- concessions by the government on sentencing. Court congestion and trial delays in combination with ever increasing caseloads that reflect ever increasing crime create the pressure for plea-bargaining. Overcrowded jails and prisons only increase the pressure felt by judges to accept plea and sentence agree- ments that do not reflect the seriousness of the crime or the criminal. To try more major cases requires trying fewer minor cases. Diversion of minor and non-violent cases involving defendants who can be rehabilitated is an essential step. It has been tried and proven highly effective in many populous jurisdictions, including Philadelphia where, as District Attorney, I instituted a diversion program called Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition. Cases were carefully screened for inclusion in the A.R.D. program which disposed of several hundred cases a week despite using only one judge for one day. Defendants were placed on probation without conviction. The National Commission of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recognized this program and recommended such diversion programs as appropriated and essential to immediately reducing and ultimately eliminating plea-bargaining, which the Commission also recommended. Similar diversion programs have been successfully utilized in federal courts, particularly for drug offenders who were -31- essentially addicts as opposed to traffickers. Although such programs are essential to relieving court congestion, they are not as widely used as they should be. Federal "seed money" is needed to help persuade additional jurisdictions to institute diversion programs. Once authorities see the benefits demon- strated in their own courts, they can be expected to continue and expand the programs and to assume the costs. Better screening of cases entering both misdemeanor and felony courts is also needed. With their overwhelming case- loads, courts cannot afford to waste scarce resources -- judges, prosecutors, defenders -- on cases that cannot realis- tically be expected to lead to conviction. All possible judicial time must be carefully husbanded to and applied to disposing of major and violent cases. Intake programs have proven effective in many different kinds of jurisdictions. They should be implemented in all jurisdictions that face crowded court dockets. Again, federal seed money is needed to stim lulate the start of such programs in new places. For $100 million per year, 100 cities each year can institute these programs. d. Diagnostic and Classification Improvements for Prisoners Just as better case screening will improve the results of court efforts, better screening of convicts will improve the -32- odds of reducing recidivism. It is true that many convicted persons are adversely influenced by their fellow inmates and that, for them, prisons become schools for crime. But this problem can be diminished although not eliminated by better classification procedures so younger and less serious offenders are not intermingled with career criminals and other hardened or older offenders. In addition, better diagnosis of the specific nature of any drug or alcohol addiction and deficiencies in basic literacy and job skills can greatly improve the chances of rehabilitation if coupled with resources to provide more training, education, counselling, detoxification and prison industry. Specific programs should be formulated individually, for each inmate to encourage him to attain basic English literacy, which most violent crime convicts lack, and to acquire marketable job skills in order to have a realistic chance of obtaining and keeping employment. Resources for rehabilitation will always be less than the need. Therefore, none can be wasted on inmates who are unlikely to profit from them or misdirected to inmates who need some other kind of training than what is provided to them. The reality is that virtually all first offenders and most second offenders convicted of violent crimes will be released within a few years. Improving public safety requires reducing the recidivism of these groups as much as it requires lengthy incarceration of career criminals with three or more felony convictions. -33- The U. S. Bureau of Prisons and several state prison systems have sufficiently perfected techniques for diagnostic and classification services and for individualized correctional programming to warrant the replication of these programs in all state prison systems and county jails that do not already have them. The emphasis, of course, should be on the state prisons and on violent offenders. For $300 million per year, all state systems could begin or expand such programs. By the end of a five year period, enough evidence of lower recidivism rates should have been accumulated to convince the recipients to continue these programs with state and local funding. Meanwhile, the public, not to mention the inmates, would derive important benefits in reduced crime rates. The importance of these steps cannot be overestimated. Recent studies show that a small percentage of offenders commit the majority of all violent offenses. Accordingly, a small reduction in the recidivism rate for these offenders when released from prison following a first or second conviction should produce a large reduction in the crime rates. e. Training in Job Skills and Basic Literacy The evidence is overwhelming that most offenders convicted of violent crimes are functionally illiterate and practically -34- unemployable. Mandatory programs should be instituted in all state prisons to teach 6th grade literacy and basic industrial and commercial skills to all inmates, except the very few who lack the ability or will to achieve even these modest goals. Many state systems and the federal prison system have developed various techniques, including prison industries, for these purposes. Unfortunately, many state institutions do not have adequate programs and some have none at all. For $300 million a year, all state institutions could, over a five year period, begin or expand such training. On the average, each state would receive $6 million per year. The realities of local and state politics, all the more SO in these times of economic distress, simply preclude getting such funding from most state legislatures. Again, the hope is that once started, the value to public safety of such programs will ultimately be sufficiently recognized to warrant their continuation with state funds. f. Juvenile Delinquent Intervention About one-third of all violent crime is committed by young offenders. Nearly all these offenders have a long history of escalating criminality, typically starting at about age 9 or 10 with truancy and shoplifting, then burglary of vacant premises at 12, burglary of residences at 14, followed by robbery at 16 and armed robbery at 18. To control and -35- reduce violent crime in this country, we must prevent adults sent to prison from simply being replaced by such "graduating" juveniles. Recent studies by Professor Marvin Wolfgang and others reveal that only 6% of the juveniles who commit any offense commit about 70% of all the crime committed by their age group. Moreover, procedures have been developed by the Rand Corporation for identifying this group, so the efforts to cut off this escalating crime cycle can be concentrated on the small percentage of juvenile offenders who are on this path toward major violence. It is proposed to grant to state and local authorities $700 million per year to vastly increase counselling and other efforts to intervene vigorously and early enough to divert the juvenile from a life of felonious violence. Such intervention should focus on juveniles in the 10-13 age group to have optimal chances of success. The funds would enable 100 cities to each spend $7 million each year to create or expand such intervention capabilities to prevent development of future career robbers. If local authorities are required to assume the costs in 25% annual increments, starting in the second year, an additional 200 jurisdictions could participate over a five year period. Two closely related programs are also recommended: (1) crime prevention in schools -- $500 million per year; and (2) 3 runaways and missing children -- $700 million per year. -36- g. Crime Prevention in Schools The school program would focus on elementary and junior high school students and apply counselling and other services to potential juvenile delinquents upon the earliest signs of trouble. According to studies and testimony before the Sub- committee on Juvenile Justice, teachers often identify future criminals even earlier than Juvenile Court authorities. For those youth who do get taken to court, the schools must become part of any correctional program for the individual that may be ordered by the court and implemented primarily by probation personnel. Resources for such efforts are vastly inadequate. Poli- tically, they are difficult to secure from state and local legislative bodies. Any additional resources that might become available to schools would ordinarily go to the instructional program. The purpose of federal funding would be to replicate proven successes from comparable school systems in all systems with the need. The $500 million per year would pay for the institution of such programs in several hundred school systems. The programs would stress not so much services to individ- ual youth, but improving the discipline in the school by preventing classroom and hallway violence, drug trafficking and vandalism. Thus, in addition to special counselling, the programs could include additional security personnel and devices. -37- h. Runaways and Missing Children The program for runaways would provide funds to maintain, expand or build suitable facilities for homeless youth so they are not intermingled with juvenile offenders or placed in prison-like facilities. One of the great successes of the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention was the de-institutionalization of runaways and other youth who had committed no crime. On the average, each state would receive $6 million per year for a total national investment of $300 million. The money would also help pay for computerized and other information services so important to the families of missing children. Often these children have been the subject of "parental kidnapping". The spouse with whom they had been living have no knowledge of the child's whereabouts or welfare. i. Adult Crime Prevention Programs at $500 million per year each are also proposed for Neighborhood and Commercial Crime Prevention. Numerous well-proven models exist and would be replicated in hundreds of new cities and thousands of new neighborhoods. An example of the former is the neighborhood watch programs in which volunteer residents patrol their area with radio and other equipment provided by the government. They report suspicious persons and events to police who exclusively handle -38- all investigative or enforcement actions. An example of the latter is the installation in stores of cameras and other security devices to help deter crime as well as assist in the identification and apprehension of criminals. For instance, money marked with a strong dye might be furnished to store tellers and clerks to be given to any robbers. The funding level would allow 500 cities per year to participate in these two programs. Funding would be for a singlę year. Thus, over five years, 2,500 cities and towns would benefit. j. Drug Treatment One of the best possible crime prevention measures would be improved efforts to detoxify drug addicts and habitual abusers of controlled substances. Studies show that a high percentage of crime, including violent crime, is committed by addicts. One study showed that of 243 randomly selected addicts, 238 committed crimes. Moreover, they committed an astonishing 500,000 crimes over an 11 year period. They averaged 2,000 major and minor offenses for every year on the street and committed one or more crimes on nearly 350 days of the year. Another study showed that a group of robbers serving state prison sentences were mostly addicts and committed six drug sales for every robbery. -39- The proposal is to add $500 million per year to the treatment efforts of state and local authorities, concentrating on addicts who are violent offenders. The money would be for starting or expanding treatment programs and would benefit several hundred jurisdictions over a five year period. If spent in $1 million amounts, on the average, it could help 500 cities and towns per year. Better results might be obtained by giving larger amounts to 1 or 200 cities and continuing the grants for several years. k. Victim Witness Assistance Studies and experience show that monetary and other assistance is often needed by victims and witnesses whose willing cooperation is crucial to securing convictions of violent offenders and career criminals. Medical bills and wages lost on days in court are the greatest financial problems. Information to keep witnesses abreast of developments as their cases proceed through the court system is also important to assuring the availability and attitude of cooperation of witnesses. For the $500 million per year that is proposed, programs copying well-established models could be started in up to 500 communities a year. While compensation to victims for injuries is somewhat controversial, our society should not tolerate the anomaly -40- that if accidentally injured on the job, a worker is compen- sated while if intentionally beaten and robbed going home, he is not. It is just unacceptable for the victim to have to pay his own medical bills. Thus, the program proposes that if compensation is not available from state, local or private sources, as a last resort the federal government should pay medical bills of the victims of violent crime. 1. Court Calendar Control Nothing is more important in improving criminal justice than assuring speedy trial. All states should, as a pre- requisite of federal justice assistance, require that all criminal trials be concluded in six months or less. The standard for violent offenses should be three months with the average being six weeks. Reducing delays also requires implementing reforms in the administration of criminal case dockets. Computers can play an important role in large jurisdictions. In many situations, adoption of the Individual Judge Calendars used so successfully in federal courts would greatly speed trial dispositions. Reforms of discovery rules can also play an important role. To end plea bargaining, more cases must be disposed of by trial and trials must be conducted more efficiently. Causes of delay are numerous and vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some, delays in obtaining trial transcripts -41- can delay disposition of post-trial motions and imposition of sentence for many, many months. In others, different problems plague the system. The National Center for State Courts and other similar. institutions have developed and refined analytical techniques to pinpoint the problems and solutions in a particular jurisdiction. The proposed $200 million per year would support analysis in hundreds of jurisdictions by these institutions that can dispatch teams to work closely with responsible local officials. It would also support application of computer technology to management of the criminal caseload in these jurisdictions. Improvement in case management is essential to improving public safety. Dispersal of State Assistance Funds No new federal bureaucracy would be created. Little discretion is entrusted to federal Executive Branch officials and employees because Congress will have decided, as it does for national defense, how much will be spent for what, in each functional area. This proposal is no LEAA program. There would be no layers of government through which funds would filter to the user. Instead, the money would go directly from the Justice Department to the state or local agency that will spend it. Nor would there be complicated application forms or extended -42- processing time. If a jurisdiction will use money from a specific budget line item for the purpose stipulated, it will get the money. Where more jurisdictions apply than the funds can accommodate, a "first come, first served" approach would be utilized. As to the size of a grant to a particular agency, for example, a metropolitan court administrator's office, a few simple formulas based on population and/or violent crime rate could be readily devised. To avoid creating an excessive dependency on federal financing, matching state funds could be required. To give the program maximum immediate impact, however, the first year's grant would not require a match. Pacing The Program The increase of $8 billion could not all be absorbed in the first year of this program, but most of it could. The increases for federal programs mostly concern on-going operations of agencies like FBI which would hire, train and integrate new personnel. Doing this efficiently and without major disruption would require starting slowly and then increasing the rate. The annual expenditures will be rela- tively low in the first year and grow sharply in succeeding years, as the money is nearly all used for salaries of new personnel. Thus, the total of $1 billion for federal person- nel would not be reached until the fourth or fifth year. -43- By contrast, the funds for most state programs such as prison construction can and should be allocated in full right from the start. They can be committed under contract very quickly. Even money earmarked for local police depart- ments could be spent quickly since creating a new squad of 50 or 100 detectives is best accomplished in a short time frame. Moreover, adding 100 new employees in departments with thousands represents a small enough percentage increase that no significant disruption is expected. Most of the funds for state programs should be appro- priated as "no year money", meaning that it may be obligated and expended in years subsequent to the year appropriated. Money for all federal programs should be appropriated in due course. Even the funds for federal prison construction can be normal appropriations. since for these facilities, unlike state facilities, Congress has both the obligation and the capability to manage the money on an annual basis. If, as might be expected in the first year, the states do not obligate all funds available for construction, these funds would accumulate. Therefore, in the third year, for example, the fund might contain twice the annual appro- priation. However, since the large construction bills would come due in that period, the larger amounts would be needed then. Thus, the full amount for state assistance should be appropriated in the first year of the program. Adjusting the Funding If the construction fund ever grew larger, even than anticipated needs, in later years of the program the annual appropriation could be decreased. The program is flexible. Reducing and Ending the Program The increased appropriations for federal enforcement operations would probably be continued in large part even beyond the period of the program, but the money for new state construction and new units and operations is intended as a one-time boost to state justice systems in a period of emergency. It could be largely discontinued after about five years, if the 50% decrease is achieved before the end of 10 years. In any event, it would end after 10 years. It could be predicted that at least half of the $1 billion for federal investigative operations would become part of the permanent budget base. Cut-backs would be appro- priate for example in the fugitive programs once the backlogs of unserved warrants are eliminated. The $500 million for construction of new federal pri- sons could be also largely discontinued after a few years. Even the $500 million for training and research could be greatly reduced if not totally eliminated. Therefore, the $8 billion program would not become a permanent part of the federal budget. Less than $1 billion would remain. That a large assistance program can be term- inated without significant political cost was proven by the abolition of LEAA.

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    "ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Roberts, John G.: Files\nFolder Title: Specter, Senator (2 of 2)\nBox: 51\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nMAR / /\nNo and\nto\nto Dog we for time at\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 11, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD A. HAUSER\nFROM:\nJOHN G. ROBERTS\nOBR\nSUBJECT:\nSenator Specter's \"White Paper\" on a\nNational Program to Cut Violent Crime\nYou have asked for my comments on the above-referenced White\nPaper, which was sent to you by Paul R. Michel of Senator\nSpecter's staff. The paper details a series of criminal\njustice proposals costing $8 billion per year over a 5-10\nyear period which allegedly will reduce violent crime by 50\npercent. Mr. Michel indicates that they are considering\nintroducing legislation to implement this program early in\nthe 98th Congress.\nThe proposals in the White Paper would increase Federal law\nenforcement expenditures by $2 billion, primarily by increas-\ning resources available to DEA, FBI, USMS, and the U.S.\nAttorneys. Training, laboratory, and research resources\nwould be doubled; the Bureau of Prisons would receive $500\nmillion for new construction.\nState and local law enforcement would receive an additional\n$6 billion. The biggest ticket items comprising the $6\nbillion include $1 billion for state prisons, $700 million\nfor juvenile delinquent programs, and $500 million each for\nspecial detective squads, compensation for victims and\nwitnesses, school police and counselors, neighborhood crime\nprevention programs, commercial crime prevention programs,\nand drug treatment programs.\nAt a time when a very modest increase in narcotics law\nenforcement resources requires an all-out effort by the\nDepartment of Justice and the Attorney General, it is\nunlikely that the major increases called for by this White\nPaper will receive any serious consideration. The proposals\nare the epitome of the \"throw money at the problem\" approach\nrepeatedly rejected by Administration spokesmen. I have\ntalked with Marshall Cain, Deputy Assistant Attorney General\nin the Office of Legislative Affairs, who did not recall a\ncopy of the package being delivered to Justice. Cain\nadvised that Michel often tries to obtain White House\n-2-\napproval of legislative proposals rather than dealing with\nJustice, and recommended that the package be forwarded to\nJustice for appropriate handling. I have prepared a letter\nto Michel for your signature, thanking him for the package\nand advising that you have transmitted it to Justice for\nappropriate consideration. A transmittal memorandum to Stan\nMorris is also attached.\nAttachments\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 11, 1983\nDear Paul:\nThank you for providing me with a copy of your draft \"white\npaper\" on a national program to cut violent crime. Please\nbe assured that the package will be reviewed with interest.\nI have also taken the liberty of forwarding a copy to the\nDepartment of Justice for appropriate consideration. As you\nknow, that Department is responsible for preparing Administra-\ntion legislative proposals in this area, and for developing\nAdministration responses to other legislative proposals.\nThank you for advising us concerning your efforts.\nSincerely,\nRichard A. Hauser\nDeputy Counsel\nto the President\nMr. Paul R. Michel\nc/o The Honorable Arlen Specter\nUnited States Senate\nWashington, D.C. 20510\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMarch 11, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR STANLEY E. MORRIS\nASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL\nFROM:\nRICHARD A. HAUSER\nRAA\nDEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT:\nSenator Specter's \"White Paper\" on a\nNational Program to Cut Violent Crime\nAttached for whatever consideration and handling you deem\nappropriate is a \"white paper\" describing a legislative\nproposal prepared by Paul R. Michel of Senator Specter's\nstaff.\nAttachment\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nVHBFINGTON\nMarch 11, 1983\nDear Paul:\nThank you for providing me with a copy of your draft \"white\npaper\" on a national program to cut violent crime. Please\nbe assured that the package will be reviewed with interest.\nI have also taken the liberty of forwarding a copy to the\nDepartment of Justice for appropriate consideration. As you\nknow, that Department is responsible for preparing Administra-\ntion legislative proposals in this area, and for developing\nAdministration responses to other legislative proposals.\nThank you for advising us concerning your efforts.\nSincerely,\nRichard A. Hauser\nDeputy Counsel\nto the President\nMr. Paul R. Michel\nc/o The Honorable Arlen Specter\nUnited States Senate\nWashington, D.C. 20510\nRAH: JGR:aw 3/11/83\nCC: RAHauser\nJGRoberts\nSubj.\nChron\n2/8/83\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTO: John Roberts\nFROM: Richard Á. Hauser\nDeputy Counsel to the President\nFYI:\nCOMMENT:\nACTION:\nFEB\n7\n1932\nCOMMITTEES:\nARLEN SPECTER\nJUDICIARY\nPENNSYLVANIA\nAPPROPRIATIONS\nVETERANS' AFFAIRS\nUnited States Senate\nWASHINGTON.\nJanuary 25, 1983\nThe Honorable Richard A. Hauser\nDeputy Counsel to the President\nThe White House\nWashington, D.C. 20500\nDear Mr. Hauser:\nEnclosed is a draft \"white paper\" outlining a major new\nFederal law enforcement effort aimed at substantially reducing\nviolent crime and drug trafficking.\nThe paper proposes a comprehensive program based on Senator\nSpecter's experience as District Attorney of Philadelphia,\nJudiciary Committee hearings of the past two years, the Report\nof the Attorney General's Violent Crime Task Force, and the\nconclusion of the 1973 National Commission on Criminal Justice\nStandards and Goals on which Senator Specter served.\nWith such a comprehensive program, we believe violent\ncrime could be reduced by 50%. The program will cost money,\nbut there is no other way to end the crime epidemic. We\nbelieve the American people will support the program as essen-\ntial \"domestic defense\". We are suggesting an additional 1%\nof the federal budget be directed to this effort for a period\nof 5-10 years. The annual cost would be about $8 billion. In\nour view, this expenditure will save many times that amount.\nWe are confident the program will succeed and be cost-\neffective, because, as the paper explains in great detail, the\nmoney would be applied to very specific and critical needs of\nthe American criminal justice system. This program is, there-\nfore, very different from LEAA or other prior efforts.\nWe are considering introducing legislation to implement\nsuch a program early in the 98th Congress. We would appre-\nciate receiving your reaction and any suggestions you or your\nstaff may have.\nPlease send your comments to me at 342 Russell Senate\nOffice Building or call me at 224-9017. Thank you.\nSincerely,\nPaul\nPaul R. Michel\nPRM: wmw\nEnclosure:\nDRAFT\nPaul R.Michd\nExecutive Summary: National Program to Cut Violent Crime\n1/19/83\nThe United States now suffers four times more violent\ncrime than in your youth and 20 to 100 times more than other\nindustrial democracies. Random violence afflicts 1 in 10\nAmerican households every year, serious crime, 1 in every 3.\nThe total loss to our society reaches $100 billion a year.\nDomestic criminals have succeeded where foreign armies\nfailed: They have terrorized not only the millions victimized,\nbut all Americans, denying our Constitutional rights and our\ninalienable birthright to the pursuit of happiness. According\nto repeated polls of public opinion, Americans worry more\nabout crime than anything other than economic distress. Not\neven the Soviet threat is viewed as more serious.\nMost violent felonies are premeditated crimes for profit,\ncommitted, without passion or provocation, against strangers\nby repeat offenders whose chosen livelihood is to prey on\npersons who appear vulnerable. Although an arrest is made\nin only 1 felony in 5, most of these \"career criminals\" are\nultimately arrested repeatedly, even if for only a tiny\nfraction of the scores or hundreds of crimes they commit.\nOnce taken into our criminal justice system, however, they\noften evade justice as effectively as they did arrest in\nother cases. Dismissals, delays, plea bargains, judge-\nshopping, unrealistic bail, lenient sentencing, early parole,\ncrowded prisons, lack of job training, idleness and many\nother problems all help nullify laws, blunt deterrence and\nundermine public safety. Usually, the career criminals are\nback on the street soon, if not immediately. Even career\nrobbers who are sent to prison serve, on the average, less\nthan four years. Many serve only a few months.\nIn short, as the President has said, the problem is a\n\"breakdown\" in the system. The solution is simply to reorient\nit; treat serious defendants seriously. Since career criminals,\nthough comprising less than 10% of all arrested commit more\nthan 70% of all offenses, they warrant our greatest efforts.\nFrom investigation to release, violent career criminals\nshould be singled out for highly concentrated attention and:\nrapid, realistic disposition by all concerned. That is not\nimproper \"selective prosecution\", just common sense, if\nuncommon practice.\n-2-\nViolent crime for profit truly can be cut in half in\nfive years as proposed in 1973 by the National Commission on\nCriminal Justice Standards and Goals. What is required is a\ncrash effort to focus far greater resources far more narrowly\non correcting the specific deficiencies in the system that\nprevent it from incapacitating the truly dangerous.\nThe program proposes spending 1% of the federal budget\non strengthening \"domestic defense\" against violent crime by\nincreasing federal manpower and improving state criminal\njustice systems which would still handle 90% of the violent\ncrime caseload. The budget allocation for criminal justice\nwould rise from $5 to $13 billion (out of 800). The $13\nbillion comprises a small fraction of the projected Pentagon\nbudget of $300 billion for the same years. Indeed, an increase\nof $8 billion over a period of years compares with the addition\nin 1982 alone of $50 billion for defense.\nCutting serious crime in half would cut the annual cost\nof crime in half, saving $50 billion. Adding a few billion\nper year would not only save $50 billion per year, but would\nalso make the other 99% of the federal budget buy billions\nmore value. In short, the program, which requires modest\ninvestment \"up front\", would more than pay for itself within\na few years.\nThe most serious difficulty is not whether our country\ncan find and afford the funds, but whether we now know enough\nabout preventing violent career crime to pinpoint the new\nexpenditures like laser beams rather than, as in the past,\ndisperse them like a light bulb and whether doing so would,\nin fact, produce so large a reduction. The answer, in a\nword, is \"yes\". The attached chart shows in a page how this\ngoal can be accomplished.\nReally, the country cannot afford not to undertake this\nprogram.\nThe full cost of crime is incalculable. Property damage\njust from reported robberies and burglaries amounts to $5\nbillion annually. The unreported losses may well equal that\nfigure.\nApplying the legal concept of pain and suffering and\npsychological distress, which are measurable and compensable\ndamages under U. S. law, crime victims probably sustain an\nadditional $100 billion.\n-3-\nThe full psychological impact, however, cannot be\nquantified; because it is suffered not by actual victims,\nbut by potential victims -- all of us:\nWhat dollar amount can be attributed to the fright\nAmericans experience when they hear an unexpected\nnoise at 3:00 a.m. wondering if a burglar is in\nthe house?\nWhat dollar amount can be attributed to the fear\nwomen experience as they walk home at night and a\nsudden movement toward them suggests a rape or\nassault or worse?\nWhat losses are sustained when business oppor-\ntunities are ignored because of the risk of crime?\nWhat dollar amount can be attributed to cancella-\ntions and reschedulings to avoid events which\nconclude after dark?\nConservatively, the economically measurable cost of\ncrime in this country approximates $100 billion *and the\ntotal cost, including the psychological effect on the entire\npopulation, reaches $500 billion.\nAdding to the anguish above the estimated dollar loss,\ncrime is an intentional act unlike damages resulting from\naccidents or natural disasters beyond man's control. Com-\npounding the agony, much crime is preventable -- if only the\nmurderer had not been paroled, the robber had not been placed\non probation, the burglar had not been acquitted because the\npoliceman erroneously filled out a search warrant, or the\nrapist had not been on bail for 6 months, without being\ntried!\nGovernment at all levels -- Federal, state and local --\nnow spends $25 billion on crime control covering police,\nprosecutors, defenders, courts, prison and parole.\nThis program proposes an increased expenditure of $8\nbillion per year, constituting 1% of the Federal budget with\nthe realistic prospect of reducing violent crime by 50%.\n/ The figure $100 billion is based on calculations by Dr.\nMark Cannon, Administrative Aide to the Chief Justice of the\nUnited States. Based on figures supplied by the National\nInstitute of Justice, this total has been used by Dr. Cannon\nin various speeches and articles.\nSUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION\nINCREASE\nUSE\nRESULT\n(Thousands)\nmillions\n$8,000\nNational attack on violent\nReduce violent crime\ncrime.\nby 50% in five years.\nFEDERAL\n200\nFugitive programs.\nTriple arrest rate.\n300\nFederal robbery prosecutions.\nTriple arrests.\n500\nDrug enforcement.\nTriple the number of\nmajor arrests, seizures\nand forfeitures.\n250\nTraining and support services\nExpand training and\nto states.\nspeed up support.\n250\nResearch and development.\nE.g., weapons detectors\nand computerization.\n200\nConstruction of federal\nAccommodate increased\nprisons.\nfederal population.\n300\nTemporary detention facilities End state overcrowding.\nfor state inmate \"overflow\"\nand permanent prisons for\nstate habitual offenders sen-\ntenced to life.\n$2,000\nSTATE\n500\nSpecial detective squads.\nDouble arrest rate to 40%.\n100\nCase screening and diversion.\nCut minor and non-violent\ntrials in half.\n100\nCareer criminal units.\nEnd plea bargains.\n300\nDiagnosis classification, and\nCut adult crime cycle.\ncorrectional programming.\n1,000\nPrison construction.\nEnd overcrowding that\ncauses short sentences.\n300\nJob and literacy training.\nMake convicts employable.\n700\nJuvenile delinquent inter-\nCut off escalating crime\nvention.\ncycle.\n300\nHousing for Runaways.\nKeep them out of prisons.\n500\nVictim/Witness assistance.\nCompensation.\n500\nCrime prevention -- schools.\nCut violence and drugs in hal:\n500\nCrime \" -- neighborhoods.\nCut burglaries in half.\n500\nCrime \" -- commercial.\nCut robberies in half.\n500\nDrug treatment.\nEnd addiction.\n200\nCalendar control.\nEnd delays.\nSUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION\nCREASE\nHOUSANDS)\nUSE\nAGENCY\nRESULT\nIlions\nReduce violent crime\n.000\nNational attack on Violent Crime -\n\"SAVE\" - Safety Against Violent Events\nby 50% in five years\nderal\nFugitive programs\nUSMS : 80; FBI: 60;\nIncrease arrests from\n200\nDEA:40; others 20\n40% to 90% of 80,000\nQuadruple resources.\nwarrants per year for\nfederal and state vio-\nlent and drug offenders\n300\nNew Federal prosecutions for violent\nFBI 250 (4,000\nIncrease federal arrests\ncrimes, such as bank and commer-\nslots) and US\nfrom 3 to 13,000 per year,\ncial robbery\nAttorneys 50 (500\nfor robberies, especially\nprosecutors).\narmed career robbers.\n500\nDrug Enforcement\n200 to double DEA\nTriple the number of\n(1900) investigators\nmajor arrests, seizures\n100 for accountants,\nand forfeitures. Focus\n(1,000 CPA Corps)\naction on financing as\n100 for FBI, 50 for\nmuch as on commodities\nCustoms, 50 for\nto take profit away. Im-\nadditional 500 Assi-\nmobilize major organiza-\nstant US Attorneys\ntions.\n(20% increase).\nS\n250\nTraining, lab, identification, and\nFBI, Treasury, DEA,\nExpand training and speed\nother support services and tech-\nNIC, DOJ, NIJ\nup support to respond to\nnical assistance to states by\nDouble resources.\nall state requests in\nFederal agencies\ntimely fashion.\n250\nResearch and Development. Design\nBJS, NIJ, FBI\nUrgent violent crime pro-\nmeans to end plea-bargaining and\nLEAA, others\njects, including weapons\ncut trial delays in half.\nDouble resources.\ndetectors and computeri-\nzation of fingerprints, modi\noperandi weapons, prior\nrecords, stolen property,\nco-conspirators, and case\nmanagement and court\ncalendars.\n200\nConstruction of correctional facilities\nBOP starts 4 new\nBuild new prisons for in-\nfor federal inmates and operating\nprisons and 4 new\ncreased federal population\ncosts.\ncamps each year.\nto prevent crowding and\ndecreased security.\n300\nTemporary detention facilities for\nBOP starts 8 camps\nBuild new prison camps\nstate inmate \"overflow\" and perma-\nand 2 prisons per\nand maximum security\nnent prisons for confinement of all\nyear.\npenitentiaries to end all\nstate habitùal offenders sentenced to\nstate overcrowding.\nlife.\n-2-\nCREASE\nTOUSANDS)\nUSE\nAGENCY\nRESULT\ntate\nmillions\n500\nImprove investigations with special\nLocal police depart-\nDouble violent crime\nments - 100 cities\narrest rate to 40%\ndetective squads\nper year.\nImprove case screening and diversion\nLocal prosecution,\nCut minor and non-\n00\ncourts, and probation\nviolent trials in half and\nagencies in 100 metro-\nincrease violent crime\npolitan jurisdictions\ntrials so plea bargains\nper year.\ncan be reduced, then\neliminated\nImprove violent crime prosecutions\nPolice, prosecution,\nEnd plea bargains\n100\nby forming career criminal units\ncourt administration\n100 cities per year.\nImprove convict diagnosis, classifica-\nState prison systems;\nCut adult crime cycle,\n300\ntion, and correctional programming\nall states\nisolate hardened offenders\nPrison and other construction\nState prison systems;\nEnd short sentences and\n000\nall states with over-\nother problems resulting\ncrowding-about 40.\nfrom overcrowding\nJob training/prison industry/functional\nAll state prison\nEnd pressure of economic\n300\nliteracy training\nsystems.\nneed as a cause of\nrecidivism for unhardened\nconvicts\nJuvenile delinquent intervention\nState and local\nCut off escalating crime\n700\nauthorities.\ncycle\nState authorities.\nCreate homes so these\n300\nRunaways and missing children\nyouth are not mingled\nwith juvenile offenders\nor placed in prison-like\nfacilities\nVictim/witness\nState authorities.\nAid and Compensation,\n500\nwhere none other is\navailable, for medical\ncosts and lost wages\n500\nSchool police and\nCut violence and drug\nCrime prevention - Schools\ncounselors.\nsales by or to students\nin half\nCrime prevention - Neighborhoods\nVolunteer observers.\nCut burglaries in half\n500\n500\nCrime prevention - Commercial\nSecurity devices.\nCut robberies in half\nDrug treatment\nLocal courts.\nEnd addiction whenever\n500\npossible\n200\nCalendar control applying Research\nLocal courts.\nEnd delays and judge\nand Development results to specific\nshopping\nlocalities\n6,000\nA REALISTIC PROGRAM TO REDUCE VIOLENT CRIME BY 50%\nI.\nIntroduction\nNearly ten years ago, after a decade of increasing crime\nand violence, the National Commission on Criminal Justice\nStandards and Goals recommended steps for reducing violent\ncrime in America by 50%. Unfortunately, many of its key\nrecommendations, such as abolition of plea-bargaining, were\nnever implemented. Now, after another decade of escalating\nstreet crime, Americans are still waiting for the \"crime\ncontrol\" and \"safe streets\" promised by Congress in a 1968\nstatute. In fact, the streets have gotten even more dangerous\nand crime more out of control.\nInstead of being decreased 50%, as the Commission urged\nin 1973, violent crime increased 100%. Just since 1978, the\nviolent crime rate has increased 30%. America's serious crime\nrate has risen 200% since 1960 and 400% since World War II.\nYear in and year out, increases in the crime rate exceeded\nincreases in inflation. And, crime costs citizens even more\nthan inflation and hurts them even worse.\nNot only has crime continually increased for decades, but it\nis vastly worse in America than in any comparable country.\nThe United States suffers much more crime per person than\nother industrial democracies -- 20 times more than England and\n100 times more than Japan.\n-2-\nOur crime wave has grown so powerful that now it is\ndestroying whole neighborhoods, bankrupting businesses,\nshrinking tax revenues, subverting schools and terrorizing\nsenior citizens. The only bigger problem in America today is\nunemployment. Unemployment has numerous causes as many people\nrealize, but few realize that crime is one of them. In fact,\ncrime is cited by businesses at the most common cause for\nclosings -- not taxes, not government regulation, not foreign\ncompetition, but crime.\nNor is violent crime a disaster limited, like a tornado,\nto some narrow swath. Once the scourge mainly of inner city\nslums, it now reaches everywhere -- cities, suburbs, towns and\nrural areas; its devastating impact hurts people at all economic\nlevels; it condemns all Americans to living in fear. One in\nevery three American households suffers from crime each year.\nNo epidemic disease or natural disaster has ever ravaged so\nmany Americans. Nor, in the past decade, has war. More Ameri-\ncans are killed each year by criminals than by enemy soldiers.\nAs one witness wryly noted in a hearing before a Judiciary\nSubcommittee, the \"score is: Americans killed by Russians --\n0; Americans killed by criminals -- 23,000 every year. \"\nThe psychological harm from our crime epidemic is immeasur-\nable; the economic harm is not. More economic loss results\nfrom crime than from all natural disasters and disease epidemics\n-3-\nput together. Each year, crime costs Americans an astonishing\n125 billion dollars. Property stolen just in burglaries\naccounts for $4 billion. The total price of crime, however,\nis paid not just by the hapless victims, but by all of us --\nin the form of higher prices, higher insurance rates and\nhigher taxes.\nOur national tolerance for the intolerable dismays\nAmerica's allies and convinces critics that we are a stupid,\nsuicidal, \"sick\" society. Tolerating crime breeds disrespect\nfor law. Allowing so many to become actual victims and\neveryone else to become potential victims threatens to\nsabotage the social compact. When the law abiding see the\nlawless getting away with it, and sometimes getting rich, too,\nwhat happens to their own willingness to serve in the military,\nsupport their community, assist their schools, and pay their\ntaxes? Crime threatens not only the safety of individuals,\nbut the security of society. Yet, we still have not resolved\nto reduce it!\nEliminating crime must await utopia, but reducing violent\ncrime cannot wait any longer. Strangely, we rarely even talk\nanymore about \"reducing\" crime. We talk, sometimes, about\n\"crime control\". That merely means stopping further increases!\nThat) concedes defeat! We talk, often, about the \"causes of\ncrime\", as a mystery which, once understood, would magically\n-4-\nend our national nightmare of random, anonymous criminal\nviolence -- the muggings and murders, the rapes and robberies,\nthe break-ins and burglaries.\nWe are, I suspect, resigned to this much crime because we\nhave come to believe that we have no alternative. This conclu-\nsion has been corroborated each year by relentlessly rising\ncrime rates.\nSome social commentators argue that we cannot begin reducing\ncrime until we finish eliminating poverty. Others urge minor\nadjustments in the criminal process as if it were an end in\nitself. They imply that further refinements in what is already\nby far the most complex, costly and cumbersome justice system\nin the world will somehow reduce crime. Still others minimize\nthe role of the judicial process, arguing that decreasing the\nnumber of offenses requires increasing the number of policemen.\nAlmost no one anymore believes that hardened criminals can be\nrehabilitated at will by correctional programs. For humanitarian\nreasons, prison reform is still championed by concerned persons.\nBut, few believe that reducing prison overcrowding will reduce\nrecidivism.\nOur criminal justice system exists primarily to secure\nsafety for citizens -- in our streets, schools and homes. It\nmust be fair, but also effective. Judged by its results, our\nsystem is failing. As President Reagan said, our criminal\n-5-\njustice system has suffered a \"breakdown\". Actually, the\nbreakdown is in the state courts, which have been overwhelmed\nby the volume of cases. State enforcement efforts need federal\nhelp.\nCombatting violent crime has traditionally been, and I\nbelieve should remain, primarily a local responsibility.\nPrimarily, but not exclusively. Indeed, the Constitution of\nthe United States makes clear that crime control is also a\nfederal responsibility. It obligates our national government\nto secure \"the general welfare\", and the Executive \"to see\nthat the laws are faithfully executed.\" In taking their oaths\nof office, federal officials swear to defend the Constitution\nand the country from \"all enemies, foreign and domestic.\" And\nviolent criminals are our most harmful domestic enemies.\nMore protection from crime means more resources. Our\nChief Justice asserts that \"domestic defense\" is no less\nurgent than national defense. I believe the Justice Department\nneeds sufficient resources as much as the Pentagon. Yet, we\nspent more than 35% of our federal budget on national defense,\nand less than 1/2 of 1% on domestic defense. Recently, we\nhave -- I think properly -- increased the defense budget sharply,\neven after accounting for inflation, to compensate for years\nof neglect. But, we have neglected to raise our Justice budget\nenough to offset inflation. Few Americans realize that since\n1975, while the number of soldiers increased, the number of\nFBI agents decreased.\n-6-\nOther ironies abound in this comparison.\nFor years, we heard of the \"missile gap\", but not of the\n\"sentencing gap\". Legislatures make robbery a crime punishable\nby 10 to 20 years imprisonment, but many courts regularly give\nfirst time robbers probation or short jail sentences; even\nrepeaters, on the average, serve less than four years.\nWe worry, properly, about foreign adversaries having \"a\ndefinite margin of superiority\" in strategic arms. What\nabout the \"inferiority\" of the law abiding citizen to the\ncareer criminal? The criminal goes about freely; the citizen\nchanges his lifestyle. Or the \"inferiority\" of the manpower\nand equipment -- planes, boats, radios -- of the drug enforcers,\ncompared to the drug traffickers.\nWe are concerned, correctly, that imbalance in military\nforces has opened a \"window of vulnerability.\" With three\nmillion burglaries a year in our country, one for every 14\nAmerican households, another \"window of vulnerability\" we need\nto be concerned about is every window in our homes.\nWe believe instinctively in deterrence against the Soviets.\nWe take it on faith that potential adversaries are deterred by\nthe threat of retaliation. Yet, we lack faith that criminals\ntoo can be deterred. Instead, some scholars demand massive\nempirical proof of this obvious fact. Some then declare the\nevidence unreliable and the results inconclusive. Always,\nhowever, they recommend further research. More studies are\nnot needed, more action is.\n-7-\nIn the past 15 years, we have created five national\ncommissions to make recommendations on combatting crime and\nviolence, and spent more than $7 billion on federal financial\nassistance. The money, by and large, was not wisely spent.\nThe recommendations, were, by and large, ignored. Now we are\ndoing it once again.\nThe report of the most recent commission, the Attorney\nGeneral's Violent Crime Task Force, was presented well over a\nyear ago -- on August 17, 1981. It contained 64 principal\nrecommendations and scores of subsidiary ones on actions the\nfederal government should take. Most would entail increased\nexpenditures; nearly all of these have been silently shunned.\nWhile, indiscriminate spending would produce as little progress\nas in the past, these recommendations are practical, proven\nand cost-effective. Their vigorous implementation is needed\ndesperately. The required actions are affordable. In fact,\nwhat we cannot afford is inaction.\nThe total cost of implementing these and other necessary\nsteps would be $8 billion a year. If our country can afford\nto increase defense spending by more than $50 billion this\nyear alone, we can certainly afford 1/6 of that increase to\nreduce violent crime.\nI spent fifteen years in law enforcement, served two\nterms as District Attorney of Philadelphia and was a member of\nthe National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and\n-8-\nGoals. From my personal experience, I am convinced that a\npractical program for this price can, in fact, cut violent\ncrime in this country in half in five years.\nThe basic outlines of the program can be found in the\nreports of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards\nand Goals: eliminate plea bargaining, concentrate on career\ncriminals, make punishment swift, sure and sufficient, assure\nspeedy trials and appeals, teach short-term prisoners marketable\njob skills, incarcerate unrehabilitatable repeat violent felons\nfor lengthy periods. On specifics, some of the necessary\nactions were set forth in the Violent Crime Task Force Report\n-- reform bail laws for dangerous offenders, eliminate early\nrelease on parole, and, most importantly, increase federal law\nenforcement, prosecutive, and correctional personnel and facilities,\nand provide the states with the financial assistance they need\nto curtail crime.\nThe rest of the actions needed are set forth in my Program\nfor Violent Crime.\nIn truth, we have as much know-how for crime curtailment\nas for national defense or space exploration. We can find the\nfunds. We lack only the will.\nII. The Program\nIt is a program, not just a set of goals and guidelines.\nIn essence, it targets specific \"program activities\" in the\nfederal budget for increases that will reduce crime.\n-9-\n1. Fugitives\nThere were more than 40,000 violent crime fugitives whom\nthe federal government was responsible for locating and appre-\nhending as of 1981. In all, there were 180,000 fugitives\nbeing sought, a very large portion of the non-violent offenders\nbeing drug traffickers. The vast majority have fled from\nlocal authorities. They are a federal resonsibility because\nthey are thought to have fled across state lines. Federal\nwarrants have been issued for their arrest. Federal agents\nmust find them.\nThe Marshals Service is the principal federal agency\nresponsible for finding them. It is a most difficult investi-\ngative task since by definition fugitives are specifically\ntrying to avoid being found and therefore avoid former homes,\nwork places and friends. They often have many months \"head\nstart\" on the Marshals who seldom receive productive investiga-\ntive leads when they receive the warrants. Despite these\ndifficulties, because of other essential duties and insufficient\nmanpower, the Marshals Service is able to devote only 400\nemployees to criminal fugitive warrants in the entire country.\nNor are all of them Deputy Marshals. Some are cierks and\nother support personnel.\nAs a result, only a small fraction of these violent and\ndrug fugitive cases can be actively investigated on an on-going\n-10-\nbasis. In most cases, the warrant is merely kept on file\nshould the person be arrested again. Paradoxically, if they\nare later arrested for a serious crime, execution of the\nwarrant will be both too late -- since the further offense\nwill already have been committed -- and unnecessary -- since\nthe new offense itself will probably lead to incarceration.\nThe Marshals' fugitive manpower should be at least\ndoubled over the next two and a half years and redoubled by\nthe end of five years. The cost of increasing the warrant\nmanpower from 400 to 1600 would be about $80 million per year.\nThe result would be to prevent tens of thousands of\nviolent felonies. The program would result in far faster\napprehensions as well as apprehensions of many fugitives who\notherwise would never be found at all. Most of these offenders\nare recidivists who fled precisely because they feared long\njail sentences. Many are true \"career criminals\" --- offenders\nwho commit scores or even hundreds of offenses each year.\nSome average a felony a day. Apprehending just one such vio-\nlent fugitive a year earlier, would thus prevent more than 300\nserious crimes, save 300 people from being victims, avoid many\nthousands or tens of thousands of dollars in losses. Each\nsuch arrest would measurably reduce violent crime.\nAt present, the Marshals receive twice as many warrants\nas they can serve each year and now have a backlog of about\n-11-\n40,000 warrants. They receive 63,000 warrants of t he total\nof about 77,000 issued each year. They serve about 40%. The\nwarrant program consumes about $18 million per year. Raising\nthe investment to $80 million would double and redouble the\nmanpower and increase the clearance rate from 40% to 90%,\neliminate the backlog, allow the Marshals to stay current and\nenable them to catch more major fugitives.\nProportional increases in the fugitive personnel of: the\nFBI; (2) DEA; and (3) all the other agencies would also be\nrequired, costing $120 million a year. These increases are\nimportant too, for often the agency that originally investigated\nthe fugitive from federal court will be best equipped to find\nhim. Thus, when a federal drug defendant jumps bail before\ntrial, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is the respons-\nible agency, is best prepared to succeed. (The Marshals are\nresponsible after trial, regardless of offense.) The same\nreasoning applies to the FBI for bank robbers, terrorists and\norganized crime goons and other agencies for other offenders.\nThe FBI currently devotes about 300 positions and $14\nmillion to fugitive work and has primary responsibility for\nabout 2500 federal violent crime warrants. The clearance rate\nis 40%. Therefore, $60 million would be added to its fugitive\nprogram, allowing a doubling of manpower in 2 1/2 years and a\nredoubling in 5 years. DEA would receive $40 million. The\nbalance of $20 million would be divided among ATF, Customs,\nIRS, Secret Service, et al.\n-12-\n2.\nThe FBI Bank Robbery Program\nAnother manpower increase which would surely be cost-\neffective against violent offenders would be in the FBI\nPersonal Crimes Program. The major offense in this program is\nbank robbery. While every bank robbery is a federal felony\nand nearly all bank robberies were once investigated entirely\nby the FBI, today the majority of these cases are turned over\nto local police and prosecutors shortly after an initial FBI\nresponse team rushes to the scene of the robbery. Many of\nthese transfers are justified. For example, where a sole,\nunarmed robber is caught in the bank or trying to escape, the\nnationwide capabilities and expertise of the FBI are hardly\nneeded. However, insufficient manpower in the FBI requires\ntransfer of many cases in which apprehension by FBI would be\nmore likely and faster.\nMoreover, federal prosecutions are far faster and federal\nsentences far longer than in most urban state courts. Federal\nrobbery trials are nearly always held within two months of\nindictment, whereas in many state courts such cases remain\nuntried 6-9-12 months after indictment. State robbery sentences\n(all types) actually served averaged less than four years,\neven for offenders with prior convictions. Federal sentences\nimposed on bank robbers average more than 12 years. There-\nfore, federal handling vastly reduces the chances for the bank\nrobber to escape arrest or to continue to commit violent felonies\n-13-\nbefore trial or upon early release from prison. Nor do bank\nrobberies constitute an unmanageable burden since there are\nabout 9000 per year in the entire country. They represent a\nsmall, stable and clearly defined sub category of all robberies,\ncomprising well under 2%. At present, the FBI handles less\nthan 4,000, making arrests in about 2,000 cases.\nThe FBI manpower allocated to the Personal Crimes (bank\nrobbery) Program has been greatly reduced in recent years and\nnow stands at about 1000 and $45 million. Meanwhile, bank\nrobberies rose 70% since 1977. Thus, FBI now handles a smaller\npercentage of the cases that need FBI handling. In order to\nhandle all the bank robberies that can be better handled at\nthe federal level, the FBI's allocation to this program should\nbe doubled and redoubled over the next five years. The cost\nwould be about $200 million per year. The FBI could then\nhandle 6-7,000 cases.\n3. The Commercial Robbery Program\nUnder the Hobbs Act, any robbery that \"interferes with\"\nor \"in any degree affects interstate commerce\" is a federal\nfelony. The policy of the Justice Department, however, has\nbeen not to prosecute such robberies, except in rare cases\ninvolving \"wide-ranging schemes\" or \"organized crime\" groups.\nThe statute itself contains no such restrictions. Nor does it\nrequire that a firearm was used, that the perpetrators abused\n-14-\nthe instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the mails\nor that they travelled in interstate commerce in connection\nwith the robbery. In fact, court opinions on the coverage of\nthe Hobbs Act have made plain that the Act applies even to\n\"local\" robberies where the effect on interstate commerce is\n\"indirect\" and \"minimal\". Indirect effects have been found\nwhenever the taking depleted the inventory or assets of a\nbusiness which buys goods in interstate commerce. There is\nlittle doubt therefore, that the Hobbs Act applies to vir-\ntually every robbery of a store, business office, factory,\nrestaurant, hotel or other place of public accommodation.\nDespite this broad statute that potentially could result\nin many thousands of federal robbery prosecutions (in addition\nto those for bank robbery), in fact fewer than 50 cases a year\nare brought for these \"commercial robberies\" in the entire\ncountry. The lack of resources and the declination policy\nhave virtually nullified this Congressional enactment.\nThe justification has been that commercial robberies are\nadequately handled in the state system. Yet, it is indi-\nsputable that in many cities, the backlogs in state court\ncombined with plea-bargaining result in short \"misdemeanor\"\nsentences, if not probation, for these serious felonies. Rob-\nbery, after all, is one of the five violent felonies historically\nregarded as so serious as to warrant application of the \"felony\n-15-\nmurder rule\" whereby a killing in the course of such a felony\nis automatically first degree murder, even where the felon(s)\noriginally had no plan or intent to kill.\nAlthough recent Congresses have considered bills to make\nit a federal offense to rob a pharmacy, no efforts have been\nmade to compel, encourage or enable the Attorney General to\nenforce the Hobbs Act and use it in such cases. Two strong\narguments in favor of the pharmacy bill were that very often\nthe perpetrators are narcotics addicts and carry firearms.\nThus, pharmacy robberies tend to be rather aggravated and\ndangerous and to involve serious offenders with narcotics\nhabits and long criminal records. Pharmacy robberies thus\nshare some of the characteristics of bank robberies that\nhelped make the latter appropriate for federal action. Many\nrobberies of business offices, hotels and restaurants also\nshare these characteristics.\nFederal resources currently allocated to these \"commer-\ncial robberies\" are negligible. To be capable of handling all\ncommercial robberies that are highly complicated or conspiratorial,\nplainly interstate, or in which guns are discharged, the FBI\nwould have to be expanded by about 1000 persons over a five\nyear period. The cost would be about $50 million. Estimates\nare that 10,000 robberies per year fit one or more of these\nthree criteria. With 1,000 persons, the FBI could handle at\nleast half these cases.\n-16-\nCorresponding increases in prosecutors would be necessary.\nFor $50 million, 500 prosecutors could be added to the existing\ncorps of nearly 2,000 and could handle the additional bank\nrobbery and commercial robbery cases.\n4. DEA and the Drug Enforcement Program\nInterstate drug trafficking, unlike bank robbery or commer-\ncial robbery, is primarily, if not exclusively, a federal\nenforcement responsibility. Yet, DEA has only about 1500\ninvestigative agents to cover all the cities that serve as\ndistribution points in the trafficking networks. There are at\nleast twenty cities that are major hubs and dozens more that\nare minor hubs. In addition, DEA has regulatory, training,\noverseas and intelligence responsibilities that are critical\nand divert personnel. Thus, only about 1500 agents of a total\nof 1900 actually investigate in U.S. cities. Therefore, there\nare fewer than 100 agents on the average to cover each major\nhub city. In the other hubs, DEA offices typically have fewer\nthan a dozen agents. That is not even enough manpower to\nstaff even one wiretap! Clearly, two to four times as many\nagents are needed.\nDEA's annual budget is about $227 million. To double its\nmanpower would cost $200 million a year. Since a high percentage\nof robberies and violent crimes are committed by narcotics ad-\ndicts and since addicts commit offenses six times more frequently\n-17-\nwhen taking drugs than in periods of abstinence, reducing the\navailability of narcotics will help reduce violent crime.\nAccording to testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee\non Juvenile Justice by Dr. John Ball and other experts, these\naddict/criminals each commit multiple crimes nearly everyday\nof the year. They are thus the very worst of the career criminals\nwho as a group comprise less than 10% of all persons arrested\nbut are responsible for more than 70% of all violent offenses\ncommitted.\nIn addition, DEA should hire, train and integrate with\nits investigators, financial analysts with CPA credentials. A\ncorps of 500 such accountants should be gradually built up\nover a five year period. They must be supported by \"accounting\nassistants\" on a one-for-one basis, as well as, secretaries\nand clerks. The total cost would be about $100 million per\nyear. It should soon result in additional forfeitures of many\ntimes that amount. Until the vast profits are taken out of\ndrug trafficking, there will always be ample replacements for\nthose imprisoned. Adequate deterrence against drug traffickers\nrequires that the government capture the profits too.\nCorresponding increases in FBI and prosecution manpower\ndevoted to drug enforcement would be required. To pay for\nthe 2,000 FBI personnel would cost $100 million per year.\nAnother $50 million would be needed for 500 additional prosecutors.\nThe U. S. Customs Service would get $50 million for 1,000\nadditional personnel to improve enforcement at the borders\nand the country's air and sea ports.\n-18-\nWith these additional resources, we could triple the\n9,000 drug arrests and the major seizures and forfeitures\nper year.\n5. The Emergency Corrections Program\nThe federal manpower increases called for above will, of\ncourse, produce more federal prison inmates. Adding investi-\ngators will produce predictable increases in arrests, prosecu-\ntions and convictions in each of four categories: fugitives,\nbank robbers, commercial robbers and drug traffickers. Once\nconvicted, nearly all of these felons will be sentenced to\nprison, most of them for substantial terms. Indeed, the bulk\nof the present federal prison population consists of bank\nrobbers and drug traffickers. Consequently, substantial\nincreases will be needed in federal prison capacity to accom-\nmodate these additional convicts. The state prison systems\ncertainly cannot help, for most of them are severely overcrowded\nalready.\na. Start New Federal Prisons\nThe solutions are, first, to build new permanent federal\nfacilities, for federal inmates, starting four medium or maximum\nsecurity institutions (capacity 500) per year for the next five\nyears and four prison camps. The cost to build and operate\nthem will be about $200-230 million per year.\n-19-\nThe camps could be opened in about one year of the start\nand the prisons in about four years of the start of site acquisition.\nIn the meanwhile, increases in the medium to maximum security\npopulation could and would be absorbed by existing institutions.\nb. Open Temporary Prison Camps For State Convicts\nSecond, in the meanwhile, extensive use should be made,\non a temporary basis, of military barracks on abandoned military\nbases or unused portions of bases, for state inmates. Existing\nbuildings can be renovated within 6-18 months at modest cost.\nSince there is no need for the military to charge rent for the\nbuildings and grounds, most of the cost will be for renovation,\nupkeep and staff. For 200 million dollars per year, the U.S.\nBureau of Prisons, within 1-2 years, could open 8 minimum\nsecurity prison camps per year that could house some 4 thousand\ninmates for up to three years. These facilities would be used\nprimarily to relieve state overcrowding pending completion of\npermanent state prison buildings. They could also handle any\nfederal \"overflow\" of minimum security inmates.\nThis temporary program is essential since it takes nearly\nfive years to build a prison--from the initial decision to the\nentry of inmates. Thus, the states cannot eliminate their\novercrowding fast enough to meet court orders (usually federal)\nto release inmates, even those who have not served their sentences\nor are unready for release, in order for the remaining inmates\n-20-\nto \"fit\" in the prison buildings under constitutionally per-\nmitted circumstances. More than half the states presently\nface such a situation. So that the federal government is\nassured that necessary state prison space will be made avail-\nable as soon as possible, it could pre-condition a state's\neligibility for the federal emergency program for state inmates\non the state's beginning construction of prisons for the same\nnumber of inmates the federal government is being asked to\nhouse temporarily.\nAlthough such temporary \"barracks style\" facilities would\nbe unsuitable for robbers and for some of the drug traffickers,\nthe Federal Prison System's three next largest population sub-\ngroups are immigration violators, theft defendants and fraud\nconvicts, most of whom could safely be placed there. Among\nstate prison populations, about 1/3 are \"property offenders\",\nmost of whom probably are suitable for such facilities.\nChanging prosecution policies and increasing manpower for\noffenses like \"commercial robbery\" will itself relieve state\nprison overcrowding, as will using temporary federal prison\ncamps to house state \"property\" inmates. Nevertheless, more\nthan 95% of violent criminals are now in the state systems and\nthese changes will not alter the division by about more than\n10%. Therefore, the long range needs of public safety cannot\n-21-\nbe met in any other way than by expanding the capacity of the\njails in nearly every major city and the prisons in nearly\nevery populous state. This step, strongly advocated by the\nAttorney General's Task Force, will require large and continu-\ning expenditures. Billions of dollars must be spent over a\nfive to ten year period to build more state prisons. There is\nno way to avoid it and still reduce violent and major crime.\nHowever, an additional way the Federal Government could\nhelp relieve overcrowding in state prisons would be to house\nstate inmates sentenced to life imprisonment under the habitual\ncriminal statutes in force in some 45 states. These inmates\nare unusually costly to house both because of the high level\nof security required and the length of their incarceration.\nOften they are confined in the most severely overcrowded\nfacility in the state.\nAt present, the habitual criminal statutes are rarely\nused to impose life sentences even for convicts with four,\nsix or eight prior felony convictions. One of the main\ndeterrents is the overcrowding. Another may be the cost.\nWith current knowledge about the realities of recidivism and\nrehabilitation for this limited group of repeat offenders,\nthe logical policy is incapacitation by imprisonment for\nlife or an equivalent term. While for less hardened offenders,\ngreatly increased efforts at rehabilitation are justified,\nfor this group they are not.\n-22-\nTherefore, to encourage state authorities, in appropriate\ncases in accordance with existing state law, to impose life\nsentences on career criminals it is proposed that the Federal\nGovernment offer to house such inmates on behalf of the states.\nEach year, two maximum security federal prisons would be\nstarted for this purpose, costing $70 million per year to\nbuild and operate. Their capacity when completed would be\n4-5,000, enough to accommodate all the anticipated cases.\nCurrent estimates are that there are only 300 to 1,000\ninmates now serving life sentences under habitual criminal\nstatutes.\nSince the prisons started in the first year of the\nprogram would not open until the fourth year, there would be\na delay in accepting any of these state inmates. While the\nfederal prison system has enough flexibility to absorb medium\nsecurity inmates, whether federal or state, life sentence\nviolent criminals would require the highest security level\nand the few federal facilities suitable for these offenders\nare presently filled to their safe capacity.\nThe total cost of the camps and prisons for state inmates\nwould be $270-300 million per year, including construction\nand operating costs.\n-23-\nC. Federal Financial Assistance for State\nPrison Construction\nLike construction of the Interstate Highway System, this\nendeavor can appropriately be a joint one. The proper federal\nrole is to meet emergency needs by opening temporary prison\ncamps and to help meet long term needs by securing financing,\ne.g., by guaranteeing loans. In the mid-term, the federal\ngovernment should at least contribute toward construction\ncosts in proportion to the inmates it could have, but did not\nprosecute in federal court. In other words, there should be a\npresumption that in enacting the various statutes that created\nconcurrent federal jurisdiction for drug trafficking and certain\nviolent crimes, even though plenary state jurisdiction was\nalready in existence, Congress intended substantial federal\nparticipation in one form or other. Generally, that means\nfederal prosecution leading to incarceration in federal prisons.\nWhere, however, state prosecution is initiated, the federal\nrole should be to help pay for the prisons to house the persons\nso convicted.\nSurely, an equitable and empirically sound formula could\nbe worked out. By rough estimate, perhaps 1/3 of all robbers\n(and all bank and store robbers) involve federal responsibility.\nDrug traffickers require a more arbitrary determination. Tech-\nnically, all sellers are a federal problem for all sales are a\n-24-\nfederal offense. Besides, even the lowest level dealer is\nnearly always connected to an interstate network. Often he is\na \"soldier\" in an established organization. Yet a \"street\nseller\" who sells in quantities of one bag of heroin or a\n\"user's\" amount of a dangerous drug seems too small an operator\nto be considered truly a federal responsibility. For simplicity,\nperhaps all possession cases, except those rare cases involving\nvery large quantities, should be deemed state cases and all.\nsale cases, except of \"single user\" quantities, federal cases.\nIn any event, the federal government would pay for a\nproportional part of the cost of all new prisons constructed\nby various states in the next five years. The federal share\nof the cost can be calculated with data available to the\nNational Institute of Corrections. It would be about $5 billion,\ndepending on how fast the states started new prisons. Since\nmost states failed to build any new prisons in recent decades,\nthe financial incentive of \"matching federal grants\" is apparent-\nly needed. It can be expected to work because the states now\nrecognize the urgency. In order to control and limit such\nfederal grants and fix the total annual appropriation for\nbudgetary purposes, Congress could put a cap of $1 billion per\nyear on the prison fund. Generally, it might be operated much\nlike the highway construction trust fund, making grants avail-\nable to qualifying states on a first come, first served basis.\n-25-\nThis procedure might further increase the incentive for states\nto begin a serious building program promptly. Indeed, the\nCongress could stipulate that the funds could only be used in\nthe year appropriated, if still stronger incentives are needed\nto get the states started on a crash building program.\nResearch and Development and Support\nThe balance of $500 million of the $2 billion appropriated\nfor federal activity would go to federal agencies to double\nthe resources presently available for research and development\nand for training and support of state and local criminal justice\nagencies. The objectives would include developing means to\nend plea bargaining and trial delays. Computer technology\nwould be adapted both to investigative and calendar control\ntasks. Training would be greatly expanded and identification\nand lab support speeded up.\n6.\nState Assistance\nSome $6 billion per year would be given to state and\nlocal authorities for new and augmentation programs for police,\ncourts and corrections specifically for career criminals and\nviolent offenders. The goal would be to assure swifter apprehension,\nsufficient evidencefor for conviction of the major charge,\ngreatly expedited trial and sentencing, and corrections programs\ndesigned to rehabilitate first or second offenders convicted\nof violent felonies-with the emphasis on training in marketable\njob skills and basic English reading and writing, and incapacitate\n-26-\nthird offenders with lengthy sentences of between 15 years and\nlife. Thus, the program, described below, to improve rehabil-\nitation programs complements the approach of S. 1688, The\nArmed Career Criminal Act, which was passed by the Senate on\nSeptember 30, 1982 by vote of 92 to 1. The Act requires a\nmandatory minimum sentence of 15 years up to life for a third\nconviction of robbery or burglary when a gun is used in the\nnew offense. The approach for these hardened violent offenders\nis \"to throw away the key.\"\na. Special Police Squads\nThe theory is that at every stage from the commission of\nthe offense through service of sentence, violent offenders and\ncareer criminals would be singled out for special attention,\nhandling and treatment. The first goal would be to: double\nthe apprehension rate (15% to 30% for professional burglars);\n(19% to 40% for professional robbers, etc.). This would mean\ncreating or expanding special police squads of highly trained\ninvestigators who would respond immediately and in force to\nthe scene of every violent felony and conduct full-scale investi-\ngations there, including intensive interviews of all witnesses,\nand who would follow-up on all leads, vigorously and continuously.\nIt would require greater use of undercover operations like\n\"stings\" and \"decoys\", greater use of forensic laboratory\nservices, more extensive efforts to trace firearms and stolen\nproperty and many other steps. The results would be:\n-27-\n1. More career criminals would get caught;\n2. they would be arrested sooner;\n3. the evidence would be stronger; and\n4. a higher percentage would be convicted of the\nmain crime and sentenced to appropriate terms.\nThe ultimate consequences would be a sharp increase in\ndeterrence which should substantially lower the rate of violent\nfelonies for profit. Those not deterred would be incapacitated\nwith strong cases, fast trials and long sentences. This would\nfurther lower the violent crime rate.\nIn many cities, the Police Department would have to create\nspecial detective squads for rape, robbery, burglary, narcotics\ntrafficking, etc. Most cities already have a Homicide Squad.\nIts operations and techniques could provide a very useful\ngeneral model for the new squads.\nThe federal role would be to stimulate the creation of\nthese squads, paying full costs for one year. If further\nfederal funding were thought essential, starting in the second\nyear, states could be required to assume costs in 25% annual\nincrements. Thus, in its first \"transitional\" year the squad\nwould be paid for 75% with federal funds. Federal support\nwould decrease to 50% in the second year and to 25% in the\nthird year. In the fourth year, local authorities would pay\n-28-\nthe full cost. Under the first approach, 100 cities per year\ncould be given $5 million for one year. Thus, 500 cities\ncould be helped. Under the second approach, 100 cities could\nbe helped in the first year and an additional 50 cities in\neach succeeding year for a total of 300 cities.\nIn specific terms, formation of such squads in a typical\ncity would mean hiring and training (or retraining), on the\naverage, about 100 detectives. In cities which already have\nsuch units, the goal would be to double their size. The cost\nper city would average about $5 million per year, including\ncosts of training, salaries, support personnel, space (where\nneeded) and other such costs.\nThe total cost to thus assist police departments in\ncities would be $500 million per year.\nb. Career Criminal Units\nIn similar fashion, money should be spent to create or\ndouble the size of the Career Criminal Units or specialized\nprosecution units for rape, robbery, burglary and drug\ntrafficking in the U.S. Attorney and district attorney's\noffices in the 500 largest counties in the U.S. These units\nassign a prosecutor to stay with each case from start to\nfinish for thorough preparation and aggressive handling\nwithout plea-bargaining. The results are significantly higher\nconviction rates and far longer sentences for career criminals\n-29-\nand violent felons. Such programs, which were started in\ndistrict attorneys offices in 25 major cities (counties)\nbetween 1975-80, proved to have high impact and, at an average\nof only $1 million per city, to be highly cost-effective. The\nprogram would cost $100 million per year. It would provide $1\nmillion for one year only to 100 cities per year for a total\nof 500 jurisdictions.\nC. Case Screening and Diversion\nThe most crucial reform needed in U.S. criminal justice\nis the elimination of plea-bargaining in violent crime cases.\nMore than any other cause, plea-bargaining results in dangerous\nrepeat offenders being released on probation or after serving\nbrief jail sentences. Although in most states, robbery, a\nmajor felony, is punishable by 10-20 years imprisonment in the\nstate penitentiary, many defendants convicted of robbery\nreceive only misdemeanor sentences and serve less than two\nyears, often less than one year, in the county jail. In fact,\nthe average time served for robbery in the United States is\nless than three years. Even defendants with prior felony\nconvictions serve, on the average, less than four years.\nSuch inadequate sentences result from plea-bargains made\nunder duress by prosecutors because the state courts in most\nurban areas simply cannot try enough cases. Indeed, in many\ncities, up to 80% of the cases, including violent felonies,\nare disposed of not by trial but by guilty plea based on\n-30-\nconcessions by the government on sentencing. Court congestion\nand trial delays in combination with ever increasing caseloads\nthat reflect ever increasing crime create the pressure for\nplea-bargaining. Overcrowded jails and prisons only increase\nthe pressure felt by judges to accept plea and sentence agree-\nments that do not reflect the seriousness of the crime or the\ncriminal.\nTo try more major cases requires trying fewer minor\ncases. Diversion of minor and non-violent cases involving\ndefendants who can be rehabilitated is an essential step. It\nhas been tried and proven highly effective in many populous\njurisdictions, including Philadelphia where, as District\nAttorney, I instituted a diversion program called Accelerated\nRehabilitative Disposition. Cases were carefully screened for\ninclusion in the A.R.D. program which disposed of several\nhundred cases a week despite using only one judge for one day.\nDefendants were placed on probation without conviction. The\nNational Commission of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals\nrecognized this program and recommended such diversion\nprograms as appropriated and essential to immediately reducing\nand ultimately eliminating plea-bargaining, which the Commission\nalso recommended.\nSimilar diversion programs have been successfully utilized\nin federal courts, particularly for drug offenders who were\n-31-\nessentially addicts as opposed to traffickers. Although such\nprograms are essential to relieving court congestion, they are\nnot as widely used as they should be. Federal \"seed money\" is\nneeded to help persuade additional jurisdictions to institute\ndiversion programs. Once authorities see the benefits demon-\nstrated in their own courts, they can be expected to continue\nand expand the programs and to assume the costs.\nBetter screening of cases entering both misdemeanor and\nfelony courts is also needed. With their overwhelming case-\nloads, courts cannot afford to waste scarce resources --\njudges, prosecutors, defenders -- on cases that cannot realis-\ntically be expected to lead to conviction. All possible\njudicial time must be carefully husbanded to and applied to\ndisposing of major and violent cases. Intake programs have\nproven effective in many different kinds of jurisdictions.\nThey should be implemented in all jurisdictions that face\ncrowded court dockets. Again, federal seed money is needed to\nstim lulate the start of such programs in new places.\nFor $100 million per year, 100 cities each year can\ninstitute these programs.\nd. Diagnostic and Classification Improvements\nfor Prisoners\nJust as better case screening will improve the results of\ncourt efforts, better screening of convicts will improve the\n-32-\nodds of reducing recidivism. It is true that many convicted\npersons are adversely influenced by their fellow inmates and\nthat, for them, prisons become schools for crime. But this\nproblem can be diminished although not eliminated by better\nclassification procedures so younger and less serious\noffenders are not intermingled with career criminals and other\nhardened or older offenders. In addition, better diagnosis of\nthe specific nature of any drug or alcohol addiction and\ndeficiencies in basic literacy and job skills can greatly\nimprove the chances of rehabilitation if coupled with resources\nto provide more training, education, counselling, detoxification\nand prison industry. Specific programs should be formulated\nindividually, for each inmate to encourage him to attain basic\nEnglish literacy, which most violent crime convicts lack, and\nto acquire marketable job skills in order to have a realistic\nchance of obtaining and keeping employment.\nResources for rehabilitation will always be less than the\nneed. Therefore, none can be wasted on inmates who are unlikely\nto profit from them or misdirected to inmates who need some\nother kind of training than what is provided to them. The\nreality is that virtually all first offenders and most second\noffenders convicted of violent crimes will be released within\na few years. Improving public safety requires reducing the\nrecidivism of these groups as much as it requires lengthy\nincarceration of career criminals with three or more felony\nconvictions.\n-33-\nThe U. S. Bureau of Prisons and several state prison\nsystems have sufficiently perfected techniques for diagnostic\nand classification services and for individualized correctional\nprogramming to warrant the replication of these programs in\nall state prison systems and county jails that do not already\nhave them. The emphasis, of course, should be on the state\nprisons and on violent offenders.\nFor $300 million per year, all state systems could begin\nor expand such programs. By the end of a five year period,\nenough evidence of lower recidivism rates should have been\naccumulated to convince the recipients to continue these\nprograms with state and local funding. Meanwhile, the public,\nnot to mention the inmates, would derive important benefits in\nreduced crime rates.\nThe importance of these steps cannot be overestimated.\nRecent studies show that a small percentage of offenders\ncommit the majority of all violent offenses. Accordingly, a\nsmall reduction in the recidivism rate for these offenders\nwhen released from prison following a first or second\nconviction should produce a large reduction in the crime\nrates.\ne. Training in Job Skills and Basic Literacy\nThe evidence is overwhelming that most offenders convicted\nof violent crimes are functionally illiterate and practically\n-34-\nunemployable. Mandatory programs should be instituted in all\nstate prisons to teach 6th grade literacy and basic industrial\nand commercial skills to all inmates, except the very few who\nlack the ability or will to achieve even these modest goals.\nMany state systems and the federal prison system have\ndeveloped various techniques, including prison industries, for\nthese purposes. Unfortunately, many state institutions do not\nhave adequate programs and some have none at all.\nFor $300 million a year, all state institutions could,\nover a five year period, begin or expand such training. On\nthe average, each state would receive $6 million per year.\nThe realities of local and state politics, all the more\nSO in these times of economic distress, simply preclude\ngetting such funding from most state legislatures. Again, the\nhope is that once started, the value to public safety of such\nprograms will ultimately be sufficiently recognized to warrant\ntheir continuation with state funds.\nf. Juvenile Delinquent Intervention\nAbout one-third of all violent crime is committed by\nyoung offenders. Nearly all these offenders have a long\nhistory of escalating criminality, typically starting at about\nage 9 or 10 with truancy and shoplifting, then burglary of\nvacant premises at 12, burglary of residences at 14, followed\nby robbery at 16 and armed robbery at 18. To control and\n-35-\nreduce violent crime in this country, we must prevent adults\nsent to prison from simply being replaced by such \"graduating\"\njuveniles. Recent studies by Professor Marvin Wolfgang and\nothers reveal that only 6% of the juveniles who commit any\noffense commit about 70% of all the crime committed by their\nage group. Moreover, procedures have been developed by the\nRand Corporation for identifying this group, so the efforts to\ncut off this escalating crime cycle can be concentrated on the\nsmall percentage of juvenile offenders who are on this path\ntoward major violence.\nIt is proposed to grant to state and local authorities\n$700 million per year to vastly increase counselling and other\nefforts to intervene vigorously and early enough to divert the\njuvenile from a life of felonious violence. Such intervention\nshould focus on juveniles in the 10-13 age group to have\noptimal chances of success. The funds would enable 100 cities\nto each spend $7 million each year to create or expand such\nintervention capabilities to prevent development of future\ncareer robbers. If local authorities are required to assume\nthe costs in 25% annual increments, starting in the second\nyear, an additional 200 jurisdictions could participate over a\nfive year period.\nTwo closely related programs are also recommended: (1)\ncrime prevention in schools -- $500 million per year; and (2)\n3\nrunaways and missing children -- $700 million per year.\n-36-\ng. Crime Prevention in Schools\nThe school program would focus on elementary and junior\nhigh school students and apply counselling and other services\nto potential juvenile delinquents upon the earliest signs of\ntrouble. According to studies and testimony before the Sub-\ncommittee on Juvenile Justice, teachers often identify future\ncriminals even earlier than Juvenile Court authorities. For\nthose youth who do get taken to court, the schools must become\npart of any correctional program for the individual that may\nbe ordered by the court and implemented primarily by probation\npersonnel.\nResources for such efforts are vastly inadequate. Poli-\ntically, they are difficult to secure from state and local\nlegislative bodies. Any additional resources that might become\navailable to schools would ordinarily go to the instructional\nprogram. The purpose of federal funding would be to replicate\nproven successes from comparable school systems in all systems\nwith the need. The $500 million per year would pay for the\ninstitution of such programs in several hundred school systems.\nThe programs would stress not so much services to individ-\nual youth, but improving the discipline in the school by preventing\nclassroom and hallway violence, drug trafficking and vandalism.\nThus, in addition to special counselling, the programs could\ninclude additional security personnel and devices.\n-37-\nh. Runaways and Missing Children\nThe program for runaways would provide funds to maintain,\nexpand or build suitable facilities for homeless youth so they\nare not intermingled with juvenile offenders or placed in\nprison-like facilities. One of the great successes of the\nfederal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention\nwas the de-institutionalization of runaways and other youth\nwho had committed no crime.\nOn the average, each state would receive $6 million per\nyear for a total national investment of $300 million.\nThe money would also help pay for computerized and other\ninformation services so important to the families of missing\nchildren. Often these children have been the subject of\n\"parental kidnapping\". The spouse with whom they had been\nliving have no knowledge of the child's whereabouts or welfare.\ni. Adult Crime Prevention\nPrograms at $500 million per year each are also proposed\nfor Neighborhood and Commercial Crime Prevention. Numerous\nwell-proven models exist and would be replicated in hundreds\nof new cities and thousands of new neighborhoods. An example\nof the former is the neighborhood watch programs in which\nvolunteer residents patrol their area with radio and other\nequipment provided by the government. They report suspicious\npersons and events to police who exclusively handle\n-38-\nall investigative or enforcement actions. An example of the\nlatter is the installation in stores of cameras and other\nsecurity devices to help deter crime as well as assist in the\nidentification and apprehension of criminals. For instance,\nmoney marked with a strong dye might be furnished to store\ntellers and clerks to be given to any robbers.\nThe funding level would allow 500 cities per year to\nparticipate in these two programs. Funding would be for a\nsinglę year. Thus, over five years, 2,500 cities and towns\nwould benefit.\nj. Drug Treatment\nOne of the best possible crime prevention measures would\nbe improved efforts to detoxify drug addicts and habitual\nabusers of controlled substances. Studies show that a high\npercentage of crime, including violent crime, is committed by\naddicts. One study showed that of 243 randomly selected addicts,\n238 committed crimes. Moreover, they committed an astonishing\n500,000 crimes over an 11 year period. They averaged 2,000\nmajor and minor offenses for every year on the street and\ncommitted one or more crimes on nearly 350 days of the year.\nAnother study showed that a group of robbers serving state\nprison sentences were mostly addicts and committed six drug\nsales for every robbery.\n-39-\nThe proposal is to add $500 million per year to the\ntreatment efforts of state and local authorities, concentrating\non addicts who are violent offenders. The money would be for\nstarting or expanding treatment programs and would benefit\nseveral hundred jurisdictions over a five year period. If\nspent in $1 million amounts, on the average, it could help\n500 cities and towns per year. Better results might be obtained\nby giving larger amounts to 1 or 200 cities and continuing the\ngrants for several years.\nk. Victim Witness Assistance\nStudies and experience show that monetary and other assistance\nis often needed by victims and witnesses whose willing cooperation\nis crucial to securing convictions of violent offenders and\ncareer criminals. Medical bills and wages lost on days in\ncourt are the greatest financial problems. Information to\nkeep witnesses abreast of developments as their cases proceed\nthrough the court system is also important to assuring the\navailability and attitude of cooperation of witnesses.\nFor the $500 million per year that is proposed, programs\ncopying well-established models could be started in up to 500\ncommunities a year.\nWhile compensation to victims for injuries is somewhat\ncontroversial, our society should not tolerate the anomaly\n-40-\nthat if accidentally injured on the job, a worker is compen-\nsated while if intentionally beaten and robbed going home, he\nis not. It is just unacceptable for the victim to have to pay\nhis own medical bills. Thus, the program proposes that if\ncompensation is not available from state, local or private\nsources, as a last resort the federal government should pay\nmedical bills of the victims of violent crime.\n1. Court Calendar Control\nNothing is more important in improving criminal justice\nthan assuring speedy trial. All states should, as a pre-\nrequisite of federal justice assistance, require that all\ncriminal trials be concluded in six months or less. The\nstandard for violent offenses should be three months with the\naverage being six weeks.\nReducing delays also requires implementing reforms in the\nadministration of criminal case dockets. Computers can play\nan important role in large jurisdictions. In many situations,\nadoption of the Individual Judge Calendars used so successfully\nin federal courts would greatly speed trial dispositions.\nReforms of discovery rules can also play an important role.\nTo end plea bargaining, more cases must be disposed of by\ntrial and trials must be conducted more efficiently. Causes\nof delay are numerous and vary greatly from jurisdiction to\njurisdiction. In some, delays in obtaining trial transcripts\n-41-\ncan delay disposition of post-trial motions and imposition of\nsentence for many, many months. In others, different problems\nplague the system.\nThe National Center for State Courts and other similar.\ninstitutions have developed and refined analytical techniques\nto pinpoint the problems and solutions in a particular jurisdiction.\nThe proposed $200 million per year would support analysis\nin hundreds of jurisdictions by these institutions that can\ndispatch teams to work closely with responsible local officials.\nIt would also support application of computer technology to\nmanagement of the criminal caseload in these jurisdictions.\nImprovement in case management is essential to improving public\nsafety.\nDispersal of State Assistance Funds\nNo new federal bureaucracy would be created. Little\ndiscretion is entrusted to federal Executive Branch officials and\nemployees because Congress will have decided, as it does for\nnational defense, how much will be spent for what, in each\nfunctional area.\nThis proposal is no LEAA program. There would be no\nlayers of government through which funds would filter to the\nuser. Instead, the money would go directly from the Justice\nDepartment to the state or local agency that will spend it.\nNor would there be complicated application forms or extended\n-42-\nprocessing time. If a jurisdiction will use money from a\nspecific budget line item for the purpose stipulated, it will\nget the money.\nWhere more jurisdictions apply than the funds can accommodate,\na \"first come, first served\" approach would be utilized. As\nto the size of a grant to a particular agency, for example, a\nmetropolitan court administrator's office, a few simple formulas\nbased on population and/or violent crime rate could be readily\ndevised.\nTo avoid creating an excessive dependency on federal\nfinancing, matching state funds could be required. To give\nthe program maximum immediate impact, however, the first year's\ngrant would not require a match.\nPacing The Program\nThe increase of $8 billion could not all be absorbed in\nthe first year of this program, but most of it could. The\nincreases for federal programs mostly concern on-going\noperations of agencies like FBI which would hire, train and\nintegrate new personnel. Doing this efficiently and without\nmajor disruption would require starting slowly and then\nincreasing the rate. The annual expenditures will be rela-\ntively low in the first year and grow sharply in succeeding\nyears, as the money is nearly all used for salaries of new\npersonnel. Thus, the total of $1 billion for federal person-\nnel would not be reached until the fourth or fifth year.\n-43-\nBy contrast, the funds for most state programs such as\nprison construction can and should be allocated in full\nright from the start. They can be committed under contract\nvery quickly. Even money earmarked for local police depart-\nments could be spent quickly since creating a new squad of\n50 or 100 detectives is best accomplished in a short time\nframe. Moreover, adding 100 new employees in departments\nwith thousands represents a small enough percentage increase\nthat no significant disruption is expected.\nMost of the funds for state programs should be appro-\npriated as \"no year money\", meaning that it may be obligated\nand expended in years subsequent to the year appropriated.\nMoney for all federal programs should be appropriated in due\ncourse. Even the funds for federal prison construction can\nbe normal appropriations. since for these facilities, unlike\nstate facilities, Congress has both the obligation and the\ncapability to manage the money on an annual basis.\nIf, as might be expected in the first year, the states\ndo not obligate all funds available for construction, these\nfunds would accumulate. Therefore, in the third year, for\nexample, the fund might contain twice the annual appro-\npriation. However, since the large construction bills would\ncome due in that period, the larger amounts would be needed\nthen. Thus, the full amount for state assistance should be\nappropriated in the first year of the program.\nAdjusting the Funding\nIf the construction fund ever grew larger, even than\nanticipated needs, in later years of the program the annual\nappropriation could be decreased. The program is flexible.\nReducing and Ending the Program\nThe increased appropriations for federal enforcement\noperations would probably be continued in large part even\nbeyond the period of the program, but the money for new\nstate construction and new units and operations is intended\nas a one-time boost to state justice systems in a period of\nemergency. It could be largely discontinued after about\nfive years, if the 50% decrease is achieved before the end\nof 10 years. In any event, it would end after 10 years.\nIt could be predicted that at least half of the $1\nbillion for federal investigative operations would become\npart of the permanent budget base. Cut-backs would be appro-\npriate for example in the fugitive programs once the backlogs\nof unserved warrants are eliminated.\nThe $500 million for construction of new federal pri-\nsons could be also largely discontinued after a few years.\nEven the $500 million for training and research could be\ngreatly reduced if not totally eliminated.\nTherefore, the $8 billion program would not become a\npermanent part of the federal budget. Less than $1 billion\nwould remain. That a large assistance program can be term-\ninated without significant political cost was proven by the\nabolition of LEAA."
}