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    "ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Roberts, John G.: Files\nFolder Title: JGR/Testimony Approval\n(07/01/1982-12/31/1982)\nBox: 52\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 2, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING\nFROM:\nJOHN G. ROBERTS\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Testimony of Lowell Jensen on Labor\nDepartment Organized Crime Inspector Generals\nThe Justice Department has provided a copy of testimony\nLowell Jensen proposes to give tomorrow before the Senate\nCommittee on Labor and Human Resources on the adequacy of\nthe law enforcement powers available to the Inspector\nGeneral's Office of Organized Crime within the Labor Depart-\nment. Agents from that office are assigned to Justice\nstrike forces and U.S. attorneys to assist in investigating\nand prosecuting organized criminal activity involving labor\nunions and pension funds. The testimony opposes a proposal\nto permit those agents to carry weapons, make arrests, and\nconduct searches. As is currently done, when such powers\nare necessary the agents can be made deputy marshalls on a\ncase-by-case basis. The testimony also opposes giving the\nLabor agents independent investigatory authority, prefering\nto keep the FBI and Justice Department in control of\ninvestigations. Finally, the testimony urges passage of\nlegislation to make union office immediately forfeit upon\nfelony conviction, rather than upon exhaustion of all\nappeals.\nThis proposed testimony is consistent with prior Administra-\ntion positions. I see no legal objections and no need for\naction on your part.\nID #.\nCU\nWHITE HOUSE\nCORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET\no . OUTGOING\nH . INTERNAL\nI - INCOMING\nDate Correspondence\nReceived (YY/MM/DD)\n/\n/\nName of Correspondent:\nD. Lowell Jennen\nMI Mail Report\nUser Codes: (A)\n(B)\n(C)\nSubject: statement Me: the adequacy of law. enforcement\npowers available to the Inspector Gearral's\nDept of Labol\noffice of organized crime had racketing\nROUTE TO:\nACTION\nDISPOSITION\nTracking\nType\nCompletion\nAction\nDate\nof\nDate\nOffice/Agency\n(Staff Name)\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nResponse\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nCo Holland\nORIGINATOR 83,01,31\n/ 1\nReferral Note:\nw AT 18\nA 83.01.31\n5 83,02,02\nReferral Note:\n1\n1\n/ 1\nReferral Note:\n/\nI\n/\n1\nReferral Note:\n/\n/\n1\n/\nReferral Note:\nACTION CODES:\nDISPOSITION CODES:\nA - Appropriate Action\n1 - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary\nAnswered\nc Completed\nc . Comment/Recommendation\nDirect Reply NilCopy\nNon-Special Referral\ns Suspended\nD Draft Response\nfier Signature\nF . Furnish Fact Sheet\nInterim Reply\nto be used as Enclosure\nFOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:\nType of Response - Initials of Signer\nCode\n=\n\"A\"\nCompletion Date - Date of Outgoing\nComments:\nKeep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.\nSend all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).\nAlways return completed correspondence record to Central Files.\nRefer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.\n5/81\nU.S. Department of Justice\nDRAFT\n31\nRoberts\nSTATEMENT\nOF\nD. LOWELL JENSEN\nASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL\nCRIMINAL DIVISION\nBEFORE\nTHE\nCOMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES\nUNITED STATES SENATE\nCONCERNING\nTHE ADEQUACY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS\nAVAILABLE TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE OF\nORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING,\nUNITED STATED DEPARTMENT OF LABOR\nON\nFEBRUARY 3, 1983\nI am pleased to be here today to present the views of the\nDepartment of Justice on the adequacy of law enforcement powers\navailable to criminal investigative agents assigned to the\nInspector General's Office of Organized Crime and Racketeering in\nthe United States Department of Labor. These are agents who since\n1978 have been assigned by the Labor Department to carry out that\nDepartment's participation in the organized crime program. Seventy\nfive such Labor Department agents are currently assigned along with\nother criminal investigative agencies to assist the Justice\nDepartment's strike forces and United States Attorneys' offices\nwith the investigation and prosecution of organized criminal\nactivity related to labor unions and pension or welfare employee\nbenefit plans. The work of these agents, whom I shall refer to as\n\"Labor OC agents\" for brevity's sake, has been clearly productive\nand has contributed significantly to the organized crime program.\nThe Department holds the opinion that the law enforcement powers\ncurrently exercised by these agents are adequate to do the job\nwhich the agents are expected to perform.\nAs I advised the Senate Subcommittee on Labor one year ago\nwhen I testified on labor racketeering legislation proposed at that\ntime, we believe that while there may have been problems in the\npast, the Labor Department is now cooperating with the organized\ncrime program to a high degree. Although the level of their\nperformance has varied over the past five years from strike force\nto strike force, we are pleased with the overall performance of the\nLabor OC agents insofar as they have endeavored to primarily focus\n- 2 -\ntheir investigative efforts on so-called \"white collar crime\" in\nlabor unions, employee benefit plan affairs, and labor-management\nrelations. The strengths which the Justice Department has sought\nand will continue to seek from these Labor OC agents lie primarily\nin their ability to deal with documentary evidence associated with\nthese types of investigations, to understand the workings of the\nlabor movement and its component organizations, and to develop\nsources of information within those organizations. A recently\npublished list of labor racketeering prosecutions investigated by\nLabor OC agents since 1978 discloses that a large majority\n(approximately 70%) of such investigations involved the cooperation\nof other investigative agencies. Our figures indicate that\napproximately half of the open investigations in which Labor OC\nagents are currently engaged already involve the cooperation of\nother investigative agencies. We think that this experience\nreflects the fact that the Labor OC agents are able to obtain the\nassistance of the FBI and other criminal law enforcement agencies\nwhen required in particular cases.\nTherefore, we think that the Justice Department's policy with\nrespect to the authorization of Labor OC agents to act as deputy\nUnited States Marshals is a sound one. In general, we believe that\nthe carrying of weapons by Labor OC agents should be restricted to\nthose instances where the FBI or other criminal investigative\nagency, all of whose agents are regularly trained in the use of\nweapons, is unable to assist in situations where the personal\nsafety of an informant is in jeopardy or where the personal safety\n- 3 -\nof an agent is endangered as the result of his investigative\nactivities in a particular case. We think that this policy is\nconsistent with the strike force concept that participating\nagencies will regularly cooperate and complement each others'\n11\nefforts while maintaining their own respective areas of specialized\nexpertise.\nSince the vast majority of arrests are made in strike force\nlabor racketeering cases only after an indictment or criminal\ninformation has been returned, arrest powers and the authority to\ncarry weapons for the purpose of making arrests is not required for\nLabor OC agents. Where arrests are required, there is ample time\nto secure the cooperation of the United States Marshal's Service or\nother federal law enforcement agencies in executing court-ordered\narrests. In those rare instances where searches for documentary\nevidence were required as part of Labor OC investigations, the\nMarshal's Service or other federal law enforcement agencies with\nweapons have also cooperated in the execution of the searches.\nOn February 3, 1982, before the Subcommittee on Labor I also\ntestified against applicable portions of proposed legislation which\nwould have conferred authority on the Department of Labor,\nconcurrently with the FBI and other investigative agencies, to\ninvestigate all criminal violations involving employee pension and\nwelfare benefit plans. The legislative proposal, which was opposed\nby the Administration, would have authorized the Labor Department\n11\n- 4 -\nto commence investigations under Title 18 and other provisions of\nthe United States Code outside Title 29 for which existing\nmemoranda of understanding between the Departments of Justice and\nLabor require a specific assignment of investigative\nresponsibilities to Labor Department investigators on a\ncase-by-case basis. We prefer to make these assignments in Title\n18 on a case-by-case basis.\nIn general, we believe that proposals to expand the Labor\nDepartment's existing criminal investigative responsibilities in\nterms of broader subject matter or additional investigative\nprocedures, such as those requiring weapons, may jeopardize certain\nimportant concepts which we think have contributed significantly to\nthe successful investigation and prosecution of organized criminal\nelements in the labor-management and pension-welfare fields. I am\nspeaking here of the close coordination of covert investigations\ninvolving undercover operations or judicially authorized electronic\nsurveillance and the strict accountability of investigators to\nJustice Department supervisors, particularly in multi-district\ninvestigations. At present the Federal Bureau of Investigation\nexercises the primary responsibility among investigative agencies\nwith respect to covert investigations of organized crime and labor\nracketeering. It does so within the organizational framework of\nthe Justice Department and subject to the direct supervision of\nJustice Department administrators.\n- 5 -\nAlthough other investigative agencies like the Labor\nDepartment Inspector General's Office of Organized Crime and\nRacketeering can furnish vitally important expertise in connection\nwith the internal operation of labor unions and employee benefit\nplans, which flows from the other regulatory responsibilities of\nthe Labor Department we do not believe that the expansion of\nresponsibility in another investigative agency which duplicates the\nFBI's responsibility in regard to labor racketeering is an\nappropriate and wise course of action. We do think that the\nconduct of an organized crime investigative program with the\nDepartment of Labor as an efficient and cooperative partner which\ncomplements the role played by the FBI is the proper and desirable\ncourse of action.\nThe FBI is already performing covert investigations with\nconsiderable success. In order to continue to conduct its\norganized crime program efficiently, the FBI has advised that it\nneeds to receive information of other agencies' investigative\nefforts in regard to organized crime members and associates on a\nregular and recurring basis. We agree that such intelligence is\nnecessary if the FBI is to be able to meaningfully influence other\nagencies' decisions to commence their inquiries in regard to\npersons and organizations who may already be the subject of\nsensitive covert investigation by the FBI. We are hopeful that\ncurrent discussions between the Labor Department's Office of\nOrganized Crime and Racketeering and the FBI will result in even\ngreater cooperative efforts between the two investigative agencies.\n- 6 -\nFinally, I would like to comment on our efforts to combat\nlabor racketeering by organized criminal elements. Recent\nconvictions involving labor-management corruption on the waterfront\nand in other industries have demonstrated the continuing need for\nI\nfederal legislation to address the problem of the infiltration of\nlabor unions and their affiliated organizations by organized crime.\nIn September 1982 the reputed number three man in the Chicago\nsyndicate was sentenced along with seven other defendants who had\nheld office in or who had been affiliated with the Laborers\nInternational Union of North America. At sentencing four of the\ndefendants, including the reputed organized crime leader, who then\nheld union office were removed under the forfeiture provisions of\nthe Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The\ntrial court was able to accomplish that removal because the\ndefendants' conduct, in furtherance of a scheme to obtain kickbacks\nin return for awarding union insurance and health services\nbusiness, was sufficiently pervasive to permit prosecution as a\npattern of racketeering activity under the RICO statute. In\naddition, the organized crime leader was also sentenced to 20\nyears' imprisonment.\nIn December, 1982 another reputed organized crime street boss\nin the Chicago syndicate together with the General President of the\nTeamsters union, a service provider to the Teamsters' Central\nStates Welfare Fund with reputed ties to organized crime, and two\nemployees of the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund were\n- 7 -\nconvicted after trial for conspiracy to bribe a United States\nSenator and other crimes in regard to a scheme involving\nderegulation in the trucking industry. The service provider was\nmurdered two weeks ago. In this case, however, the government was\nnot able to use any federal statute which would result in immediate\nremoval from union office on conviction in the trial court.\nBecause Section 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and\nDisclosure Act does not permit the removal of a convicted\nindividual until all his appeals are exhausted, the primary federal\nstatute governing disqualification from union office may not be\ninvoked until many months after sentencing.\nAs the Attorney General testified last week before the Senate\nJudiciary Committee, disqualification from positions in labor\nunions, employer associations and employee pension or welfare\nbenefit plans should become effective immediately upon conviction\nin the trial court. Similar legislation to that which the Attorney\nGeneral was recommending as an additional tool in the fight against\norganized crime and labor racketeering was passed by the Senate\nlast year as part of a proposed Labor Racketeering Act. It was\ndefeated in the House. I urge this Committee to support such\nlegislation in the 98th Congress. If this legislation had already\nbeen enacted into law, Section 504 would have immediately\ndisqualified the individuals in both these cases from holding labor\nunion or benefit plan office upon sentencing in the trial court.\n- 8 -\nIn summary, for the reasons which I have discussed, the\nDepartment of Justice recommends against legislation which would\nrequire a change in the current allocation of investigative\nresponsibilities among the several criminal law enforcement\nagencies which now participate in the organized crime program.\nWe believe that the current allocation of investigative\nresponsibilities strikes an appropriate balance among all the\nagencies charged with enforcement of the federal criminal laws\ndealing with labor racketeering.\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 16, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING\nFROM:\nJOHN G. ROBERTS\nSUBJECT:\nTestimony of Carlton Turner Before\nSubcommittee on Crime, House\nCommittee on the Judiciary\nRichard Darman has asked for comments to be provided directly\nto Ed Harper by 3:30 today on the above-referenced proposed\ntestimony. Carlton Turner is to deliver the testimony, on\nthe coordination of drug enforcement efforts, at 9:30\ntomorrow morning. The testimony reviews the five-part\nfederal strategy for prevention of drug abuse and drug\ntrafficking (international cooperation, law enforcement,\neducation and prevention, detoxification and treatment,\nresearch), and indicates that discernible progress -- in the\nform of declining levels of drug abuse -- is being made.\nThe testimony discusses the history of drug law enforcement,\nand the executive oversight roles of Turner's own office\n(Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office) and the Cabinet\nCouncils. The testimony also surveys the LECC program\n(coordinating federal, state, and local resources), the\nFBI's new role, and the new organized crime task force\ninitiative. Turner concludes that the current system of\ncoordination works well.\nThe hearings at which Turner will testify are an outgrowth\nof the President's veto of the \"drug czar\" bill. Turner's\ntestimony effectively reviews the existing devices for\ncoordination. I see no legal objection, and have prepared a\nmemorandum to Harper to that effect for your signature.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 16, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN L. HARPER\nASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nFRED F. FIELDING\nCOUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT:\nTestimony of Carlton Turner Before\nSubcommittee on Crime, House\nCommittee on the Judiciary\nCounsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed\ntestimony and finds no objection to it from a legal\nperspective.\nCC: Richard G. Darman\nFFF:JGR:aw 2/16/83\nCC: FFFielding\nJGRoberts\nSubj.\nChron\nID #\nCU\nWHITE HOUSE\nCORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET\no OUTGOING\nH INTERNAL\nI . INCOMING\nDate Correspondence\nReceived (YY/MM/DD)\n/\n/\nName of Correspondent:\nRichard G. Darman\nMI Mall Report\nUser Codes: (A)\n(B)\n(C)\nSubject: Astimoniz af Carlton turner before\nsubcommittee on Crime, House Committee\non the Judiciary\nROUTE TO:\nACTION\nDISPOSITION\nTracking\nType\nCompletion\nAction\nDate\nof\nDate\nOffice/Agency\n(Staff Name)\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nResponse\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nW Holland\nORIGINATOR 83,02,16\n/ /\nReferral Note:\nWAT18\nD 83/02/16\n583,0216\nReferral Note:\n/\n/\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\n/\n/\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\n/\n/\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\nACTION CODES:\nDISPOSITION CODES:\nA Appropriate Action\nI - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary\nA Answered\nC Completed\nC Comment/Recommendation\nR - Direct Reply w/Copy\nB - Non-Special Referral\nS Suspended\nD Draft Response\nS For Signature\nF Furnish Fact Sheet\nX Interim Reply\nto be used as Enclosure\nFOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:\nType of Response = Initials of Signer\nCode = \"A\"\nCompletion Date = Date of Outgoing\nComments:\nKeep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.\nSend all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).\nAlways return completed correspondence record to Central Files.\nRefer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.\n5/81\nDocument No.\nWHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM\nDATE: February 16\nACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3:30 TODAY\nTESTIMONY OF CARLTON TURNER BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME,\nSUBJECT:\nHOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY\nACTION FYI\nACTION FYI\nVICE PRESIDENT\nGERGEN\n\"\nMEESE\nHARPER\nBAKER\nJENKINS\nDEAVER\nMURPHY\nSTOCKMAN\nROLLINS\nCLARK\nWHITTLESEY\nDARMAN\nP\nISS\nWILLIAMSON\nDUBERSTEIN\n\"\nVON DAMM\nFELDSTEIN\nBRADY/SPEAKES\nFIELDING\nROGERS\nFULLER\nRemarks:\nPlease provide any comments/edits di\nHampen\nThank you.\nRichard G. Darman\nAssistant to the President\n(x2702)\nResponse:\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 16, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN\nFROM:\nPUMEDWIN EDWIN L. HARPER by ?. Ruck\nSUBJECT:\nTestimony for Carlton Turner\nAttached is a copy of Carlton Turner's testimony on coordination\nof drug enforcement efforts before the House of Representatives\nCommittee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime for clearance.\nHe is scheduled to testify tomorrow at 9:30am, I would appreciate\nclearance no later than 3:30pm today.\nBRAFT\nSTATEMENT\nOF\nCARLTON E. TURNER\nDIRECTOR\nDRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE\nOFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT\nON\nTHE COORDINATION OF\nDRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS\nBEFORE THE\nSUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME\nCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY\nUNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nFEBRUARY 17, 1983\nDRAFT\nPage 1\nMr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee on Crime, it is\na pleasure to appear before you today. We share a common\nconcern: the problem of drug abuse in America. The subject of\nthis hearing, the coordination of drug enforcement efforts, is a\nkey element of the overall drug abuse program. During the past\ndecade, a great deal of attention was placed on improving\ncoordination between drug law enforcement agencies. Both new\ncoordinating mechanisms and major reorganizations were used. The\nDrug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created in 1973 as part\nof one such effort.\nPresident Reagan has added an important element to the drug\nabuse effort. He has emphasized increasing the overall\neffectiveness of drug law enforcement by bringing all available\nFederal, State and local statutes, expertise and resources to\nbear on the full spectrum of drug trafficking and related\ncriminal activities.\nThe special expertise in drug interdiction provided by the\nU.S. Customs Service, for example, is a product of their total\nmission, of which drug enforcement activities are only a part.\nThe same is true for the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau\nof Investigation. Other agencies, such as the Internal Revenue\nService, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the\nImmigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Marshals\nService, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department\nof Defense each bring important resources and capabilities to the\nPage 2\ntotal effort. These Federal agencies, working together, have a\nsynergistic effect which could not be achieved by a single drug\nenforcement agency, regardless of its size.\nBefore I discuss drug law enforcement, I would like to give\nyou a brief summary of the overall Federal Strategy which is\nguiding our drug abuse policy. In addition to enforcement\nactivities which are part of the overall supply reduction effort,\nwe also sponsor diplomatic efforts overseas and a major domestic\neffort to reduce the demand for illicit drugs.\nPresident Reagan called drug abuse \"one of the gravest\nproblems facing us.\" His Administration has recognized from the\noutset that there is no simple answer to this national problem.\nThe President's five point plan of action, as outlined in the\n1982 Federal Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug\nTrafficking, includes:\nInternational Cooperation - To eliminate illicit drugs at\ntheir source;\nDrug Law Enforcement - To stop the drugs and apprehend\nthose responsible for transporting and distributing illicit\ndrugs;\nEducation and Prevention - To discourage drug and alcohol\nuse among school-aged children, and to reduce the abuse of\ndrugs in all age groups;\nDetoxification and Treatment - To encourage use of the\nleast expensive and most effective treatment methods to\nhelp the individual user learn to live without drugs; and\nResearch - To support basic and applied research and to\ndisseminate the results in a timely and meaningful form.\nThe President's drug program also includes full support of the\nDepartment of Defense program to achieve a military force which\nis free of the effects of drug and alcohol abuse.\nPage 3\nIn addition to the Federal programs which are part of the\nFederal budget, the President has included private sector support\nby individuals and organizations as an integral part of the\nnational drug abuse program. The President has called for every\nsegment of our society, both public and private, to take action\nagainst the particular drug problems on which they can have the\ngreatest impact. Cabinet officials, legislators, state\ngovernors, law enforcement officers, health care professionals,\nbusinessmen, community and civic leaders, professional sports\nassociations, teachers, students, parents, and wives have\nresponded, as concerned citizens, to the call.\nAs the President's drug adviser, my job is to ensure that the\nactivities of all the agencies are consistent with the\nPresident's established policies and his national strategy, to\nprovide coordination between the numerous agencies involved in\nall aspects of the total drug abuse program, and to stimulate\nprivate sector involvement. Department and agency heads are\nresponsible for achieving the most effective and efficient use of\nthe resources assigned to them by statute and the President. The\nconsensus of department heads, agency heads and many observers is\nthat existing interagency cooperation is the best they have ever\nseen.\nMost importantly, we are making visible progress in the fight\nagainst drug abuse. According to the National Household Survey\non Drug Abuse, the annual High School Senior Survey, and several\nindependent surveys, the number of Americans who currently use\nvarious illicit drugs dropped significantly between 1979 and\nPage 4\n1982. Daily use of marijuana among high school seniors declined\nto approximately the same level as in 1975. The rapid increase\nin cocaine use by young Americans (aged 12-25) during the late\n1970's has leveled off. Other data indicate that the number of\nheroin addicts in the country remains relatively constant.\nWe still have an unacceptably high level of drug abuse in the\nUnited States. Drug related injuries and deaths have increased,\nprimarily because of chronic use, increasing dose, more dangerous\nroutes of administration (especially cocaine and heroin), and the\nuse of combinations of drugs. Nevertheless, our efforts have\nestablished a foothold and we are working to accelerate the\ndownward trend.\nOn October 2, 1982, President Reagan said, \"The mood toward\ndrugs is changing in this country and the momentum is with us.\nWe're making no excuses for drugs, hard, soft or otherwise.\nDrugs are bad and we're going after them.\" The recent survey\nresults confirm this mood change. The public is becoming aware\nof the hazards of drug abuse and its profound effects on our\nsociety, economy and future. We are no longer dealing only with\nheroin use in urban centers. The effects of drug abuse have\nreached into nearly every family and every community throughout\nthe United States. This has led both to a widespread public\ndemand for action against all drugs of abuse and a willingness\non the part of individuals and organizations throughout the\nprivate sector to get involved in doing something about their\nimmediate drug situation.\nPage 5\nI am convinced that we have a rare opportunity to make real\nprogress in reducing drug abuse in the United States and we must\nnot fail to take advantage of the opportunity.\nDRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT\nDrug law enforcement is a key element of the Federal Strategy\nas part of the supply reduction effort. Each of the six Federal\nStrategies which have been published since 1973 have included\nstrong law enforcement as an essential element of the drug abuse\nprogram. However, it would be wrong to suggest that interdiction\nor investigations, alone, provide the ultimate answer to drug\nabuse. We must have a broad effort directed at all links in the\nchain from producer to user. Stated simply, we must take the\ndrugs away from the user through supply reduction efforts and\ntake the user away from the drugs through prevention, education,\nand treatment.\nControls on narcotics and psychotropic substances have\nevolved from a patchwork of laws and agreements targeted at\nvarious segments of the drug supply chain, to complex\ninternational treaties and comprehensive Federal and state\nlegislation which address all aspects of drug supply and demand.\nSince 1915, when the Bureau of Internal Revenue was assigned\nresponsibility for enforcing the Harrison Narcotic Act, drug\ncontrol in the United States has evolved from a domestic narcotic\nrevenue collection matter to a sophisticated network of supply\nreduction and demand reduction efforts against many different\ndrugs throughout the country and around the world. Our\norganization for drug law enforcement has evolved significantly\nduring the past two decades.\nPage 6\nAn Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse was\nestablished by President Kennedy in the early 1960's to provide\nrecommendations on the nations's drug problem. In 1963, the\nCommission recommended that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)\nbe transferred to Department of Justice; and a new unit be\nestablished in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to\nregulate the licit distribution of narcotic and dangerous drugs\nand to determine their safety.\nIn early 1966, the Drug Abuse Control Amendments to the Food,\nDrug and Cosmetics Act were passed, providing control over\ndepressant, stimulant and hallucinogenic drugs, requiring\npractitioner and manufacturer registration, and giving the Food\nand Drug Administration (FDA) enforcement powers. FDA\nestablished the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control (BDAC). By February\n1966, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Customs and BDAC were\nenforcing the drug laws in our nation.\nIn 1968, under Reorganization Plan No. 1, BDAC and FBN were\nabolished and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)\nwas created in the Department of Justice. U.S. Customs retained\nsmuggling jurisdiction.\nIn 1969, President Nixon sent a special message to Congress\nwhich called for fundamental revision of both Federal and state\nlegislation to control what President Nixon called \"this rising\nsickness in our land.\" The resulting Comprehensive Drug Abuse\nPrevention and Control Act of 1970 replaced more than 50 pieces\nof drug legislation patched together in as many years. Title II,\nthe Controlled Substances Act, was built on new Constitutional\nPage 7\ngrounds, resting on the authority of the Congress to regulate\ninterstate commerce. In response to the President's call for \"a\nmore coordinated effort,\" a companion piece of legislation, the\nUniform Controlled Substances Act, was made ready to synchronize\nState drug laws.\nIn 1972, two offices were created within the Department of\nJustice, the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) to\nattack drug trafficking at the street level, and the Office of\nNational Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) to coordinate the\ncollection, analysis and dissemination of drug intelligence.\nContinuing allegations of excessive competition and lack of\ncooperation between Federal drug law enforcement agencies led to\na major reorganization in 1973 when the Drug Enforcement\nAdministration (DEA) was established in the Department of\nJustice. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 transferred all of\nthe Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the U.S. Customs\nagents who were primarily involved in drug investigations, ODALE\nand ONNI, providing approximately 2,000 agents for the newly\ncreated DEA. The consolidation of drug enforcement forces under\na single command did not eliminate charges of interagency rivalry\nand lack of cooperation. However, much of the continuing problem\ninvolved the absence of a clear dividing line between\ninterdiction (anti-smuggling activities) and drug trafficking\ninvestigations. It should be noted that the same systemic\nproblem allegedly existed prior to the reorganization as an\ninternal matter between Customs investigators and Customs\ninspectors.\nPage 8\nSignificant innovations have occurred in drug law enforcement\nduring the past two years in response to the President's call for\naggressive investigation and prosecution of all criminal\nactivities associated with drug trafficking. Emphasis has been\nplaced on cooperation between law enforcement officials and\nprosecutors at all levels of government. The Administration has\ncreated Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees across the\ncountry. For the first time in its history, the Federal Bureau\nof Investigation (FBI) entered into the fight against drugs. An\nexception to the Posse Comitatus Act now permits military\nassistance in identifying the drug traffic. The South Florida\nTask Force and the 12 Drug Enforcement Task Forces which are\nbeing established around the country have brought law enforcement\nand prosecutorial-resources together in an integrated effort\nagainst the highest levels of the drug traffic in each area. As\nI stated earlier, the agency heads report that current inter-\nagency cooperation is the best they have ever seen.\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT\nAt this point, I would like to address the Executive Office\noversight function, with particular attention on drug law\nenforcement coordination. To put the present organization for\noversight and coordination in perspective, I will present a brief\nhistorical review of the management of the Federal drug program.\nThe need for Executive Office oversight of the drug abuse\nprogram was recognized as far back as 1963 when the Advisory\nCommission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse recommended \"the President\nappoint a Special Assistant for Narcotic and Drug Abuse from the\nPage 9\nWhite House staff to provide continuous advice and assistance in\nlaunching a coordinated attack.\" The Special Assistant was to\nhave general coordinating authority and the organizational\nresponsibility to follow through on the evaluation and\nimplementation of the Commission's recommendations.\nFrom the beginning of the Nixon Administration, drug abuse\npolicy was set by people working in the Executive Office of the\nPresident. The Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention\n(SAODAP) was established as an Executive Office agency in 1971.\nHowever, the authorization expired in 1975 and some of the staff\nmembers were transferred to the National Institute on Drug Abuse,\ncreated in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in\n1974.\nIn early 1973, a separate Federal Drug Management Staff was\ncreated within the Office of Management and Budget. Cabinet\nCommittees were established to coordinate activities for\nInternational Narcotics Control and Drug Law Enforcement. In\naddition, a Strategy Council was authorized by the Drug Abuse\nOffice and Treatment Act of 1973, but was never fully\nimplemented.\nThe Congress authorized and provided appropriations for an\nOffice of Drug Abuse Policy (ODAP) in 1976 and ODAP was opened in\nMarch 1977. On March 31, 1978, ODAP was abolished and recreated\nas part of the Domestic Policy Staff, reporting to a Special\nAssistant to the President for Health Issues. The stated intent\nof the change was to integrate drug abuse policy into the\nmainstream of policy development within the Executive Office.\nPage 10\nPresident Reagan has assigned drug abuse responsibilities to\ntwo Cabinet Councils and established the White House Drug Abuse\nPolicy Office to provide coordination of the drug effort. The\nCabinet Councils provide an excellent forum for the President to\ndiscuss drug abuse policy matters with his Cabinet members.\nWorking Groups on Drug Supply Reduction and on the Drug Abuse\nHealth Issues have been established under the Cabinet Councils to\nassist in implementation of Federal Strategy objectives.\nOn June 24, 1982, President Reagan signed Executive Order\n12368, formally designating the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy\nOffice in the White House Office of Policy Development as his\nadviser on drug abuse policy matters, responsible for White House\noversight and coordination of all drug abuse matters.\nAs the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office, I am\nresponsible for the overall coordination of drug abuse policies\nand overseeing all Federal domestic and international efforts to\nprevent drug abuse and drug trafficking. My responsibilities\nalso include development of the Federal Strategy, overseeing its\nimplementation, fostering cooperation among the agencies,\nmediating problems and seeking support for the President's drug\nprogram.\nTo assist in coordinating all elements of the Federal drug\nabuse program, including international control, drug law\nenforcement and the health agencies, I have established the\nOversight Working Group. The Oversight Working Group is\ncomprised of senior officials from eleven agencies, including the\nAdministrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; the Commissioner,\nPage 11\nU.S. Customs Service; the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; the\nDirector, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director, Bureau\nof Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Deputy Assistant Secretary\nof Defense for Drug and Alcohol Abuse; the Chief, Department of\nJustice Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section; the Director,\nNational Institute on Drug Abuse; the Director, National\nInstitute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism; the Commissioner, Food\nand Drug Administration; and the Assistant Secretary of State for\nInternational Narcotics Matters.\nThe group meets with me each month and the agenda includes a\nmonthly progress report on operations and ongoing issues. We\ndiscuss anticipated policy and management issues and identify how\nthe members can assist each other.\nI believe that the current Executive Office system for\noversight and coordination of the drug abuse program is working\nwell. This system was set up by the President and I am confident\nhis keen interest and personal support will insure its continued\nsuccess.\nOTHER COORDINATION ACTIVITIES\nOther mechanisms and initiatives exist which involve\ncoordination of specific elements of the drug program. I shall\nbriefly mention a few of these which contribute to coordination\nof law enforcement activities at the operational level.\nThe Attorney General has created Law Enforcement Coordinating\nCommittees (LECC's) in each of the 94 Federal judicial districts\n-- a network covering the entire nation. The heads of Federal,\nState and local prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies in the\nPage 12\narea are members and work together to focus all available\nresources on the most serious crimes in each district. In\nvirtually every district, the LECC's have identified drug\ntrafficking as the single worst problem facing all levels of law\nenforcement. Major investigations are coordinated from their\ninception in order to ensure the highest possible rate of\nconviction for drug traffickers, the seizure of their assets and\nultimate destruction of their criminal organizations.\nOn January 21, 1982, the Attorney General assigned to the FBI\nconcurrent jurisdiction with DEA to investigate drug law\nenforcement and assigned to the Director of the FBI general\nsupervision over drug law enforcement efforts and policies.\nSince that time, the carefully planned implementation of\nprocedural guidelines and completion of cross training are\nresulting in full integration of FBI resources and expertise into\ndrug investigative activities. The Attorney General recently\nreported that the FBI had less than 100 significant drug\ninvestigations underway in January 1982 and one year later, in\nJanuary 1983, had 1,115 significant drug investigations underway.\nThe South Florida Task Force was created by President Reagan\non January 28, 1982, to address the special problems of drug\ntrafficking and related crime in the South Florida area. Vice\nPresident Bush heads the Task Force which is an exemplary\ncooperative effort by the Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S.\nCustoms Service; U.S. Coast Guard; Federal AviCtion\nAdministration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Internal Revenue\nService; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Attorney's\nOffice; U.S. military personnel; and State and local authorities.\nPage 13\nOn October 14, 1982, President Reagan announced a major new\nprogram, headed by the Attorney General, to combat drug\ntrafficking by organized crime. Twelve joint investigative task\nforces have been established across the country, in addition to\nthe South Florida Task Force. Guidelines for the Drug\nEnforcement Task Forces were developed jointly by the agencies\ninvolved, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug\nEnforcement Administration, the U.S. Attorneys, the Internal\nRevenue Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Bureau of\nAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The task forces will be at full\nstrength by the end of the summer and represent an immediate\ninfusion of resources to priority drug trafficking investigations\nin each core area.\nSUMMARY\nWe have an extremely efficient system for coordination of the\nentire Federal drug effort. President Reagan provides strong\npersonal leadership. An effective mechanism is in place to\nensure operational coordination and to bring major difficulties\npromptly to the President's attention at the Cabinet Council on\nLegal Policy and the Cabinet Council on Human Resources. Policy\noversight and coordination is provided by the Director of the\nDrug Abuse Policy Office. The Cabinet Council Working Groups on\nDrug Supply Reduction and Drug Abuse Health Issues work in close\ncooperation with their respective Cabinet Councils and with the\nDrug Abuse Policy Office.\nThe system works well. The spirit of cooperation and\ninnovation is apparent at all levels, from the Executive Office\nPage 14\nof the President and the Cabinet members to the agency heads and\nindividual law enforcement officers and support personnel.\nThe President has assigned a high priority to the total drug\nabuse program and has provided strong personal leadership in\nsupporting each area, including international cooperation, drug\nlaw enforcement, and drug abuse health activities. I would like\nto reiterate that a key element of the President's drug abuse\nprogram is to bring to bear all available Federal, State and\nlocal resources, including private sector support, in fighting\ndrug abuse. Most importantly, we are making progress in the\nfight against drug abuse.\nI encourage and welcome your support. Working together we\ncan do much toward eliminating drug abuse in the United States.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 22, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING\nFROM:\nJOHN G. ROBERTS &\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Testimony of Stan Morris\non Justice System Improvement Act\nStan Morris has submitted testimony he proposes to deliver\non February 23 before the House Judiciary Committee Subcom-\nmittee on Crime. The testimony details the work of the\nBureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Institute\nof Justice (NIJ), indicates Administration support for what\nis essentially a \"mini-LEAA\" program, and describes the\nAdministration proposal to create an Office of Justice\nAssistance headed by a new Assistant Attorney General. The\ntestimony is occasioned by the imminent (September 30)\nexpiration of the programs authorized by the Justice Systems\nImprovement Act, including BJS and NIJ.\n1. The review of the work of BJS and NIJ is generally\nnon-controversial, except for a reference to the recent NIJ\nexclusionary rule study. This study found that 30% of those\narrested for drug felonies in Los Angeles in 1981 were\nreleased because of perceived exclusionary rule problems.\nThe study, referred to in President Reagan's speech on\nFriday before the Conservative Political Action Conference,\nrefutes the implications of a previously much-touted GAO\nstudy on court dismissals of federal prosecutions because of\nthe exclusionary rule. The NIJ study is being used in the\nAdministration campaign to reform the exclusionary rule, and\nunsympathetic subcommittee members may view it as evidence\nof the \"politicization\" of the research and statistics\nagencies within DOJ.\n2. Morris states that the Administration agreed, after\nmeetings with the Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking Minority\nMember, and members of the Senate, \"to endorse the concept\nof a modest, highly targetted program of assistance to state\nand local criminal justice operating from within a stream-\nlined and efficient organizational structure.\" The proposal\nhe details calls for proportional allocation to each state\nof 50/50 Federal matching funds, the Federal funding of any\nproject to last no more than three years.\n-2-\n3. The reorganization proposal would establish the Office\nof Justice Assistance, headed by a new Assistant Attorney\nGeneral. The Office would supervise BJS, NIJ, and a new\nBureau of Justice Programs (BJP), each headed by a director\nappointed by the Attorney General. BJP would administer the\nnew mini-LEAA program. The new Assistant Attorney General\nwould be advised by a board appointed by the President,\nwhich would replace the current separate Presidential boards\nadvising NIJ and BJS.\nThe current situation at BJS and NIJ is intolerable.\nPresidential appointees or prospective Presidential\nappointees -- the directors of NIJ and BJS -- report to the\nAttorney General through a career official, the Acting (for\ntwo years) Director of the Office of Justice Assistance,\nResearch, and Statistics (OJARS). Apparently the appoint-\nment of a new OJARS director has been postponed pending the\nreorganization described in this testimony. I see no\nobjection to the contemplated reorganization, but the\nCongress may object to having NIJ, BJS, and BJP directors\nappointed by the Attorney General rather than the President,\nsince this removes the Senate's advice and consent role over\nwhat can be sensitive positions. In this regard, it may be\nadvisable to have Morris delete the paragraph-long reference\nto NIJ's exclusionary rule study, since that reference\nhighlights the political sensitivity of the area. I do not,\nhowever, feel strongly about this. I can call Morris with\nthe suggested deletion if you agree.\n125805\nID #\nCU\nJV\nWHITE HOUSE\nFG017\nCORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET\no OUTGOING\nRoberts\nH INTERNAL\nI . INCOMING\nDate Correspondence\nReceived (YY/MM/DD)\n/\n/\nName of Correspondent:\nStanley E. Morris\nMI Mail Report\nUser Codes: (A)\n(B)\n(C)\nSubject:\nStatement before the Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on\nthe Judiciary concerning Reauthorization of the Justice\nSystem Improvement Act\nROUTE TO:\nACTION\nDISPOSITION\nTracking\nType\nCompletion\nAction\nDate\nof\nDate\nOffice/Agency\n(Staff Name)\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nResponse\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nDD\nWHalland\nORIGINATOR 83,02,17\n/\n/\nReferral Note:\nWATI8\nA and 83,02,17\n58302222\nReferral Note:\n/ /\n/ /\n-\nReferral Note:\n/ /\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\n/ /\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\nACTION CODES:\nDISPOSITION CODES:\nA Appropriate Action\nI Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary\nA Answered\nC Completed\nC Comment/Recommendation\nR. Direct Reply w/Copy\n8 - . Non-Special Referral\nS Suspended\nD Draft Response\nS. For Signature\nF - Furnish Fact Sheet\nX - Interim Reply\nto be used as Enclosure\nFOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:\nDD\nType of Response = Initials of Signer\nCode = \"A\"\nComments: SECID 082719cu\nCompletion Date = Date of Outgoing\nKeep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.\nSend all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).\nAlways return completed correspondence record to Central Files.\nRefer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.\n5/81\nDRAFT\n125805\nSTATEMENT\nOF\nSTANLEY E. MORRIS\nASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nBEFORE THE\nSUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME\nCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY\nU.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nCONCERNING\nREAUTHORIZATION OF THE\nJUSTICE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT ACT\nFEEBRUARY 23, 1983\nMr. Chairman, I am pleased to present the views of the Department\nof Justice concerning the proposed reauthorization of the Justice\nSystem Improvement Act.\nAs you know, the current programs authorized by the JSIA,\nincluding the criminal justice research and statistics programs,\nwill expire next September 30th. Consequently, we share the\nSubcommittee's sense of urgency and commitment to the enactment\nof reauthorizing legislation. We also share your interest in\ndesigning a new Federal effort to assist state and local criminal\njustice agencies in their battle against violent crime and the\ncriminal element responsible for a major portion of the serious\ncrimes in our Nation.\nBefore I discuss the Administration's proposal for the future of\nthe JSIA agencies, the Subcommittee may be interested in a brief\nreview of the recent and current activities of the Bureau of\nJustice Statistics and the National Institute of Justice.\nSince its inception, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has\ntaken major steps toward meeting its statutory mandate.\nSpecifically, it maintains major on-going national statistical\nseries, supports state statistical analysis centers; informs the\nAdministration, Congress and the public concerning issues in\ncriminal justice; expanded its analytic function in support of\nDepartmental policy making; established Federal criminal and\ncivil justice statistical series; developed national criminal\njustice statistical policy; completed state and local information\nsystem development efforts; and, evaluated its own and other\nmajor Department of Justice statistical programs.\nBJS has become the national repository of criminal justice\ninformation, either by initiating new statistical series or by\nassuming responsibility for on-going data programs from other\nFederal agencies. Perhaps the best known BJS data program is the\nNational Crime Survey, which provides victimization data on the\nextent and severity of crime in America and which is the third\nlargest survey sponsored by the Federal Government. Other major\ndata programs and statistical series now sponsored by BJS include\nthe National Prisoner Statistics, National Court Statistics, the\nUniform Parole and National Probation Reports, and the\nExpenditure and Employment series which provides information on\nthe expenditures, manpower and total operation costs of state and\nlocal criminal justice systems. These and the other national BJS\nprograms provide extensive coverage of all aspects of the\nadministration of justice.\nIn creating the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Congress\ndirected that attention be given to the problems of state and\nlocal justice systems. In addition to the scope and coverage of\nthe national statistics, BJS meets this responsibility through\ncooperative agreement programs with state statistical analysis\ncenters and uniform crime reporting agencies. The Bureau now\nsupports a state statistical capability in over forty states\nwhich provides information services and policy recommendations on\ncriminal justice matters to the Governors and legislatures of\nthese jurisdictions. The Bureau also assists the operation of\nuniform crime reporting programs, also in over forty states, in\norder to facilitate the submission and improve the quality of\narrest and clearance data submitted to the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation by local police agencies.\nAfter over a decade of developing criminal justice data bases,\nthe Bureau is now placing its primary emphasis on the analysis,\npublication, and wide dissemination of the data. The Bureau now\nproduces topical Bulletins and Reports to provide brief, concise,\nand non-technical interpretations of the key data bases; such\npublications include Households Touched by Crime, Characteristics\nof the Parole Population, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice\nStatistics, Crime and the Elderly, and Violent Crime by\nStrangers. It has initiated focused analytical projects that\nutilize the Bureau's major data programs and statistical series\nto address topics of particular relevance to policy makers at all\nlevels of government, including career criminals and recidivism,\nsentencing, bail reform, and plea bargaining. BJS also supports\na national criminal justice data archive to assist outside\nacademic analysis of its data bases.\nHaving been at the forefront of developments related to the\nsecurity, privacy, and confidentiality of criminal justice\nrecords and histories, BJS will continue to focus on issues in\ninformation policy such as the interstate exchange of criminal\nrecords, disclosure to adult courts of the juvenile justice\nrecords of violent juvenile offenders, new kinds of white collar\ncrime appearing as computer and data communications technology\nadvances and matures, and related fraud and abuse issues.\nIn perhaps its two most important efforts, the Bureau is now\nsupporting and directing evaluations of the Uniform Crime Reports\nprogram of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its own\nNational Crime Survey of personal and household victimizations.\nImplementation of the findings and recommendations of these\nassessments in 1985-1986 will enhance this nation's two most\nimportant indicators of the extent and magnitude of crime\nbehavior in American society.\nThe National Institute of Justice is the research arm of the\nDepartment of Justice. It conducts research, development,\nevaluation and dissemination activities aimed at increasing\nknowledge about the causes and control of crime and improving the\neffectiveness of the criminal justice system. During the past\nyear, the Institute has made fundamental changes in the way it\nsets its research agenda in order to better bridge the gap\nbetween theory and practice. We expect these efforts to continue\nunder the administration's reauthorization proposal.\nIn the spring of 1982, the Department began a process to better\nsharpen and focus its research programs by convening under the\nauspices of the National Academy of Sciences a panel to recommend\npriorities for research and to suggest how research could be\nbetter managed. The report prepared by the panel was widely\ncirculated to criminal justice practitioners.\nThe panel report and the practitioner responses were reviewed and\nthe conclusion was drawn that a very wide gulf had developed that\nneeded to be closed if research was going to fulfill its real\npotential to influence criminal justice policy and\ndecisionmaking. Further meetings were held between the Board and\nInstitute staff members at Atlanta and New Orleans. The\nInstitute's research agenda for the next two years is now being\nprepared on the basis of this input.\nThe Institute also has undertaken several other initiatives\ndesigned to enhance the impact of research resources. In January\nof this year, a $1.8 million award was made to the Police\nFoundation to conduct an 18-month experiment in two cities\ndesigned to reduce the fear of crime in inner-city neighborhoods,\npreserve commercial vitality in these areas, and have an impact\non the crime rate itself. Based in Houston and Newark, the\nproject will involve citizens and police working together in\nformulating and implementing strategies to reduce the fear of\ncrime and to test the premise that citizens can regain control of\ntheir streets and neighborhoods from the violent criminal.\nEarlier, the results of the Institute's six-year study by the\nRAND Corporation on career criminals were released at the first\nAnnual Repeat Offender Conference jointly sponsored by the\nInstitute and the State of Maryland. This research corroborates\nearlier findings that a relatively few offenders commit a larger\namount of crime. The research provides evidence of the magnitude\nof crime committed by a relatively few violent predators. The\nstudy goes beyond existing knowledge in identifying some of the\ncharacteristics of these offenders that police, prosecutors,\njudges, and parole officials may ultimately be able to use to\nidentify them and make more informed judgements about their\ndisposition and treatment.\nThe Institute has also in the past year attempted to divert some\nof its staff resources to short-term studies designed to\nilluminate the debate over implementation of policy at the\nnational level. A recent study was completed by the Institute on\nthe impact of the exclusionary rule in California. It shows that\na significant number of felony cases declined for prosecution\nwere rejected because of search and seizure problems. The NIJ\nstudy indicates that effects of the exclusionary rule were\nconcentrated on felony narcotics cases. Approximately half of\nthe defendants released because of the exclusionary rule were\nrearrested an average of three times each within two years for\nnew offenses. The study is cited in the amicus curiae brief\nprepared by the Department of Justice in Gates vs. Illinois.\nThe Institute also is taking steps to improve its dissemination\nefforts and to achieve greater implementation of research results\nat less cost. Toward this end a two-day seminar on crime\nprevention was recently held in Detroit. At the seminar, an\nInstltute-sponsored study \"Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime\nPrevention\" was released. The 67-page report is based on a\nsurvey of 59 crime prevention programs across the country, some\nof which have prompted actual crime reduction and can be\nreplicated in other urban neighborhoods.\nViolent crime has been consistently shown to be a national\nproblem of major proportions, both in the number of violent\ncrimes committed annually and in the public perception of crime\nas a leading personal concern. The national news media have\ngiven unusual prominence to the problem of crime, heightening\npublic awareness of its magnitude and sustaining the public's\ndemand for effective action by government at all levels.\nThe burden of dealing with the so-called \"fear crimes\" falls\nalmost entirely on state and local governments, which increased\ntheir expenditures for criminal justice by 146 percent during the\n1970's. State and local governments account for 87 percent of\nthe total expenditures for criminal justice, while the Federal\nGovernment accounts for 13 percent. Consequently, in periods of\nrunaway inflation such as we experienced in the late 1970's and\nthe difficult economic readjustment period of the early 1980's,\nthe disparity between needs and available resources is magnified,\nparticularly with regard to maintenance of the capacity for\neffective law enforcement.\nIn recognition of these factors, the Administration agreed,\nfollowing meetings with the Subcommittee Chairman and Ranking\nMinority Member and members of the Senate, to endorse the concept\nof a modest, highly targetted program of assistance to state and\nlocal criminal justice operating from within a streamlined and\nefficient organizational structure. We do not advocate a return\nto the past by resurrecting the former LEAA program of across the\nboard \"criminal justice improvement\". Instead, we propose a new\nbeginning which incorporates the lessons learned from the LEAA\nexperience and sharpens the focus of the Federal effort, so that\nthe limited available resources can be brought to bear on a\nlimited number of high-priority objectives. Those objectives can\nbe summarized as violent crime, repeat offenders, and crime\nprevention.\nAs presently structured, the assistance program merited wide\nranging criticism. It was too broadly targetted, providing funds\nfor all aspects of the criminal justice system; bound in red tape\ngenerated by extensive, statutorily mandated administrative\nrequirements; costly, because of both the complex funding\nformulas prescribed in the Act and the unrealistically ambitious\nobjectives of the program; and cast in an inefficient and\nambiguous administrative structure.\nThe state and local financial assistance portion of the Act, the\nold LEAA program, has been phased out. No funds for that\nactivity had been appropriated since FY 1980. The prior history\nof LEAA, however, provides us with some important lessons. It\nshows, for example, that after the expenditure of $8 billion over\n12 years, money alone was not the answer to the problem of\ncrime. It demonstrated that a program whose priorities were\nunclear and constantly shifting resulted in scattershot funding\nwith minimal payoff. And the history indicates that overly\ndetailed statutory and regulatory specification produces\nmountains of red tape but little progress in the battle against\ncrime.\nOn the positive side, we have learned that the concept of Federal\nseed money for carefully designed programs does work and can\nresult in a high rate of cost assumption by state and local\ngovernments: that a small amount of Federal money can be an\ninvaluable resource for innovation at the state and local levels.\nThe Administration proposal is designed to reflect an\nappreciation for these lessons and to embody the program concepts\nagreed upon last year in the discussions between members of the\nSubcommittee, the Senate and representatives of the\nAdministration. Moreover, evidence of the durability of the\nAdministration's commitment can be found in the FY 1984 budget\nproposal submitted to the Congress last month.\nI would like to highlight the key provisions and objectives of\nthe Administration proposal.\nThe proposal would establish an Office of Justice Assistance\n(OJA), headed by an Assistant Attorney General. Within this\nOffice would be three separate units - the Bureau of Justice\nStatistics (BJS), the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and a\nnew Bureau of Justice Programs (BJP) - each headed by a director\nappointed by the Attorney General. The directors would be\nresponsible for the day-to-day management of their units and\nwould have grantmaking authority, subject to the coordination and\npolicy direction of the Assistant Attorney General. LEAA and the\nOffice of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics would be\nabolished.\nBoth the National Institute of Justice and the Bureau of Justice\nStatistics would continue to carry out justice research and\nstatistical programs as authorizd in the current statute. The\nBureau of Justice Programs would administer the new technical and\nfinancial assistance program.\nAdvising the Assistant Attorney General would be a Justice\nAssistance Advisory Board appointed by the President. This\nboard, replacing the two separate boards advising NIJ and BJS,\nwould consider the full range of criminal justice issues and\npolicies, rather than the compartmentalized consideration of only\nresearch, or only statistical programs.\nUnder the Administration proposal, the BJP would have the\nresponsibility to provide technical assistance, training and\nfunds to state and local criminal justice and nonprofit\norganizations. This assistance would be provided through a\ncombination of block and discretionary grant funds.\nUnder the block grant provision, each State would receive an\nallocation based on its relative population with the requirement\nthat a proportional share of the funds be passed-through to local\ngovernments. The Federal funds would be matched 50/50 and\nindividual projects would be limited to no more than three years\nof Federal assistance. The use of these funds would be limited\nto specific types of activities based on program models with a\ndemonstrated track record of success.\nThe discretionary funds would focus on technical assistance,\ntraining and multi-jurisdictional or national programs, all\nrelated to the same objectives specified for the block grant\nfunds. In addition, discretionary funds may be used for\ndemonstration programs to test the effectivenes of new ideas.\nThe Administration proposal strips away the complex and\nburdensome application submission and review processes required\nunder the current legislation. It retains only those\nadministrative provisions necessary to exercise appropriate\nstewardship over public funds and to assure that the funds are\nbeing effectively used for the purposes identified in the\nproposal.\nThe proposal would also require a single, comprehensive annual\nreport and it would establish an emergency assistance program to\naid state or local jurisdictions confronted by unique law\nenforcement problems.\nI hope, Mr. Chairman, that you recognize in my description of the\nAdministration proposal the many similarities it bears to H.R.\n1338. When you have the opportunity to examine the text of the\nproposed legislation you will see that we have drawn much of the\nlanguage directly from H.R. 1338 and its predecessor in the past\nSession of Congress. Where differences exist, we believe they\ncan be justified in favor of the Administration proposal. More\nimportantly, we want to work with you, Mr. Sawyer, and others who\nshare our objective of assisting state and local law enforcement\nthrough a program targetted on those aspects of the crime problem\nwhich are of major concern to public officials and the public we\nserve.\nI will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 22, 1983\nMEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING\nFROM:\nJOHN G. ROBERTS\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Testimony of Gary Liming, Deputy\nAssistant Administrator of DEA, on Organized\nCrime in the Mid-Atlantic Region\nThe above-referenced testimony is scheduled to be delivered\nFebruary 23 before the Permanent Subcommittee on\nInvestigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental\nAffairs. The testimony concerns two themes: the\ninvolvement of Mid-Atlantic Mafia families and the Pagan\nmotorcycle gang in drug trafficking. It describes the drug\ndealings of the New Jersey Gambino family and the links\nbetween this family and Sicilian heroin sources. The\ntestimony also covers the growing involvement of the\nPhiladelphia Bruno family in methamphetamine production and\ndistribution. Finally, the testimony describes the growth,\norganization, and activities of the Pagan motorcycle gang,\nfounded in Prince George's County 24 years ago, and now\nactive throughout the Mid-Atlantic area. I see no legal\nobjection to the testimony.\nID #\nCU\nWHITE HOUSE\nCORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET\nRoberts\no OUTGOING\nH. INTERNAL\n1. INCOMING\nDate Correspondence\nReceived (YY/MM/DD)\n/\n/\nName of Correspondent:\nGary D. Liming\nMI Mail Report\nUser Codes: (A)\n(B)\n(C)\nSubject:\nStatement on Organized Crime-Mid-Atlantic Region\nROUTE TO:\nACTION\nDISPOSITION\nTracking\nType\nCompletion\nAction\nDate\nof\nDate\nOffice/Agency (Staff Name)\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nResponse\nCode\nYY/MM/DD\nWHolland\nORIGINATOR 83,02,21\n/\n/\nReferral Note:\nCUAT18\nA 83/02/21\n5831022\nReferral Note:\n/ /\n/ /\n-\nReferral Note:\n/\n/\n/\n/\n-\nReferral Note:\n/ /\n/ /\nReferral Note:\nACTION CODES:\nDISPOSITION CODES:\nA - Appropriate Action\nI . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary\nA- Answered\nC Completed\nC Comment/Recommendation\nR - Direct Reply w/Copy\nB - - Non-Special Referral\nS - Suspended\nD - Draft Response\nS - For Signature\nF - Furnish Fact Sheet\nX. Interim Reply\nto be used as Enclosure\nFOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:\nType of Response = Initials of Signer\nCode = \"A\"\nCompletion Date = Date of Outgoing\nComments:\nKeep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.\nSend all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).\nAlways return completed correspondence record to Central Files.\nRefer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.\n5/81\nDRAFT\nSTATEMENT OF\nGARY D. LIMING\nDEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE\nDRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION\nU.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE\nON\nORGANIZED CRIME - MID-ATLANTIC REGION\nBEFORE THE\nCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\nPERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS\nUNITED STATES SENATE\nWILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., CHAIRMAN\nFEBRUARY 23, 1983\nMR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I AM PLEASED TO\nAPPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT DISCUSSIONS\nREGARDING ORGANIZED CRIME INCLUDE THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT\nADMINISTRATION (DEA) SINCE DRUG TRAFFICKING IS INHERENTLY\nAN \"ORGANIZED\" CRIME, INVOLVING SOPHISTICATED GROUPS FROM A\nVARIETY OF ETHNIC, CULTURAL, AND GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUNDS, AT\nANY POINT IN TIME, GROUPS FROM DIVERSE BACKGROUNDS ARE ENGAGED\nIN ORGANIZED CRIME TO VARYING DEGREES. DEA MAINTAINS THE\nFLEXIBILITY TO TARGET THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INDIVIDUALS AND\nGROUPS, WHOEVER THEY MAY BE, IT IS THESE HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED\nGROUPS THAT DEA CONSIDERS TO BE ORGANIZED CRIME. DEA RECORDS\nINDICATE THAT, DURING FY-82, A TOTAL OF 12,183 DRUG TRAFFICKERS\nWERE ARRESTED OF WHICH 2,119 WERE MAJOR VIOLATORS, THIS IS\nA SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE LEADING FIGURES BEHIND THE BILLIONS\nOF DOLLARS IN RETAIL DRUG SALES MADE IN THE UNITED STATES\nANNUALLY. DRUG TRAFFICKING, AS WELL AS A MYRIAD OF OTHER\nCRIMES, INCLUDING PROSTITUTION, COUNTERFEITING, THEFT, ASSAULT,\nAND MURDER, IN WHICH ORGANIZED CRIME ENGAGES, HAS A DEVASTATING\nEFFECT ON OUR SOCIETY AND ECONOMY.\nIN THE UNITED STATES, THERE ARE BETWEEN 25-30 COMPLEX CRIMINAL\nORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH OTHER IN WHAT IS KNOWN AS\nTHE AMERICAN MAFIA, THE MoB, THE SYNDICATE, OR LA COSA NOSTRA,\nTHESE GROUPS OPERATE EXTENSIVE, SOPHISTICATED, POWERFUL DRUG\nTRAFFICKING NETWORKS AND POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO DRUG LAW\nENFORCEMENT FOR SEVERAL REASONS:\nO\nAs YOU ARE AWARE, TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME\nORGANIZATIONS ARE USUALLY BOUND BY BLOOD AS WELL\nAS BY PHILOSOPHY, IN THE UNITED STATES IT FRE-\nQUENTLY DIRECTS ITS BUSINESSES IN MUCH THE SAME\nMANNER AS RELATIVES LEAD THE CLANS IN SICILY AND\nOTHER PARTS OF ITALY. OFTEN, SICILIAN AND OTHER\nITALIAN ORGANIZED CRIME HEROIN SOURCES OF SUPPLY\nWILL ONLY DEAL WITH THOSE U.S. CUSTOMERS BOUND BY\nBLOOD.\nO\nBECAUSE OF THE EXTREMELY SECRETIVE NATURE OF THESE\nGROUPS, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFTEN FINDS IT DIFFICULT\nTO PENETRATE THEIR DRUG TRAFFICKING OPERATIONS.\nO\nTRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IS ALSO INVOLVED WITH\nA MULTITUDE OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE BUSINESSES,\nWHICH ARE USED TO MEET THE NEEDS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING\nOPERATIONS. IN SOME INSTANCES, TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED\nCRIME CAN CONTROL THE DRUGS FROM THE TIME OF ENTRY,\nUNTIL THEY REACH THE STREET MARKET. OTHER DRUG\nORGANIZATIONS OFTEN PAY \"TRIBUTE\" TO TRADITIONAL\nORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES WHICH CONTROL THE GEOGRAPHIC\nAREAS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION THE TRAFFICKERS MUST\nUSE TO CONDUCT THEIR ACTIVITIES. THIS NOT ONLY PROVIDES\nTRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME WITH ADDITIONAL INCOME,\nBUT ALSO WITH AN INFLUENCE OVER AN IMPORTANT PORTION\nOF THE DRUG TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES.\nDURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES HAVE\nMADE SIGNIFICANT STRIDES TOWARDS THE DISRUPTION OF TRADITIONAL\nORGANIZED CRIME'S INVOLVEMENT IN DRUG TRAFFICKING. FOR EXAMPLE,\nLAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, AND OTHER\nFOREIGN COUNTRIES RECENTLY JOINED FORCES TO BREAK UP AN INTRICATE\nCONSPIRACY WHICH INVOLVED ITALIAN ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN\nITALY THAT WERE SMUGGLING HEROIN INTO THE UNITED STATES TO\nRELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES IN AMERICAN TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME\nFAMILIES. WE BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE PRIMARY RECIPIENTS OF\nTHIS HEROIN WAS THE NEW JERSEY GAMBINO FAMILY, LED BY THE\nBROTHERS ROSARIO AND GIUSEPPE.\nALTHOUGH RELATED TO THE LATE CARLO GAMBINO FAMILY OF NEW YORK,\nTHE NEW JERSEY GAMBINO DRUG OPERATIONS ARE INDEPENDENT FROM THE\nNEW YORK FAMILY. THERE ARE DIRECT LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND\nINFLUENCE BASED ON ACTUAL BLOOD TIES BETWEEN THE NEW JERSEY\nGAMBINOs AND OTHER TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES IN\nNEW YORK. GAMBINO FAMILY MEMBERS OWN SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS\nIN THE PIZZA INDUSTRY IN SOUTH JERSEY AND PARTS OF PENNSYLVANIA.\nTHESE BUSINESSES HAVE BEEN USED FOR CONCEALING ILLEGAL SICILIAN\nIMMIGRANTS, FOR LAUNDERING MONEY AND FOR. STORING DRUGS. THEY\nARE KNOWN TO HAVE EMPLOYED ILLEGAL ALIENS AND OTHER NON-FAMILY\nMEMBERS WHO WERE MORE EXPERIENCED IN DRUG TRAFFICKING TO SMUGGLE\nHEROIN INTO AND TRANSPORT IT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.\nTHE GAMBINOs DID NOT ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE LARGE URBAN\nAREAS AS DID THEIR OLDER RELATIVES. INSTEAD, THEY ESTABLISHED\nBOTH LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE BUSINESSES IN THE SUBURBS OF\nNEW JERSEY, THEY ARE CURRENTLY HEADQUARTERED IN CHERRY HILL,\nNEW JERSEY. THIS MOVE FROM LARGE URBAN CENTERS IS ALSO EVIDENT\nAMONG OTHER TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES THROUGHOUT THE\nUNITED STATES.\nIN MARCH 1980, GIUSEPPE AND ROSARIO GAMBINO WERE ARRESTED IN\nTHEIR CHERRY HILL RESTAURANT AND CHARGED WITH PARTICIPATING IN\nAN INTERNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING OPERATION AFTER POLICE IN\nMILAN, ITALY, CONFISCATED 41.5 KILOGRAMS OF HEROIN DESTINED\nFOR THE UNITED STATES. THE HEROIN HAD AN ESTIMATED STREET\nVALUE OF ABOUT $60 MILLION, ONE OF THE SUSPECTS ARRESTED IN\nITALY HAD OWNED AND MANAGED PIZZA SHOPS IN NEW JERSEY AND\nPENNSYLVANIA. You ARE PROBABLY AWARE THAT THE GAMBINO BROTHERS\nWERE RECENTLY ACQUITTED OF CHARGES RELATING TO THIS SEIZURE.\nTHE GAMBINOs MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN THE INTENDED RECIPIENTS FOR\nONE OR MORE OF THE SHIPMENTS OF HEROIN SEIZED FROM ALITALIA\nFLIGHTS FROM ITALY AT JFK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE ALITALIA\nCASES CONSIST OF SIX SEPARATE INCIDENTS BETWEEN DECEMBER 1977\nAND OCTOBER 1980 IN WHICH APPROXIMATELY 31 KILOGRAMS OF HIGH\nQUALITY SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN WAS SEIZED. COMPLICITY OF\nALITALIA EMPLOYEES WAS FOUND IN SEVERAL CASES AND SUSPECTED\nIN OTHERS.\nWE BELIEVE THAT GAMBINO FAMILY ASSOCIATES RESIDING IN SOUTH\nJERSEY CONTINUE TO BE INVOLVED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HEROIN\nTRAFFIC,\nTHE REASONS FOR THE MARCH 21, 1980, ASSASSINATION OF ANGELO\nBRUNO, LEADER OF THE PHILADELPHIA ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILY FOR\nTWO DECADES, HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED. No ONE HAS BEEN\nARRESTED FOR THAT MURDER. BRUNO ALLEGEDLY TRIED TO PREVENT HIS\nPEOPLE FROM DEALING DRUGS AND HIS DEATH COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED\nBY INTERNAL FAMILY DIFFERENCES OVER WHETHER TO BECOME INVOLVED\nIN THE HEROIN, COCAINE, AND METHAMPHETAMINE TRAFFIC, THE\nSUBSEQUENT GANGLAND-STYLE MURDERS IN PHILADELPHIA ARE BELIEVED\nTO BE THE RESULT OF A CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE\nFAMILY,\nIT IS NOW EVIDENT THAT THE BRUNO FACTION ADVOCATING INVOLVEMENT\nIN DRUGS HAS THE UPPER HAND IN THIS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH THERE\nCONTINUE TO BE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT HIGH LEVEL BRUNO FAMILY\nASSOCIATES ARE INVOLVED IN HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN THE PHILADELPHIA/\nSOUTH JERSEY AREA, AND THAT THEY ARE NEGOTIATING FOR COCAINE\nAND MARIHUANA SHIPMENTS, THEY ARE PREDOMINANTLY INVOLVED IN THE\nMANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. FAMILY MEMBERS\nARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN MANUFACTURING P2P, AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING\nNEW OVERSEAS SUPPLIERS FOR THIS PRECURSOR CHEMICAL THAT IS\nESSENTIAL TO METHAMPHETAMINE PRODUCTION.\n5\nIN FACT IT IS IN THE AREA OF DANGEROUS DRUG TRAFFICKING THAT\nTHESE TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES BECAME INVOLVED WITH\nANOTHER GROUP THAT HAS RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION\nDURING THESE HEARINGS, THE PAGAN MOTORCYCLE CLUB,\nTHE PAGANS AND SEVERAL TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME FAMILIES\nOPERATE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE MID-\nATLANTIC REGION, BUT FRICTION IS AVOIDED BY THE FACT THAT THE\nTWO GROUPS HAVE SEPARATE TERRITORIES AND ALSO BY THEIR FEAR OF\nONE ANOTHER. DURING THE 1970's, THE TRADITIONAL ORGANIZED\nCRIME FAMILIES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES DID NOT EXERT SUFFI-\nCIENT CONTROL AND THE PAGANS WERE CONSEQUENTLY ALLOWED TO GAIN A\nSTRONGHOLD IN THE AREA, SINCE THAT TIME THE TWO GROUPS HAVE\nOCCASIONALLY COOPERATED FOR MUTUAL FINANCIAL GAIN ON VARIOUS\nENDEAVORS INCLUDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE. THERE\nIS CURRENTLY NO OPEN RIVALRY BETWEEN THE PAGANS AND TRADITIONAL\nORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOMETIMES OPEN\nCONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE PAGANS AND OTHER OUTLAW GROUPS,\nTHE PAGANS ARE ONE OF THE FOUR MOST SIGNIFICANT OUTLAW MOTOR-\nCYCLE GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES, A NUMBER OF SMALLER GROUPS,\nSUCH AS THE BREED AND THE WARLOCKS, OPERATE IN THE MID-ATLANTIC\nREGION, BUT THE PAGANS ARE THE MAJOR MOTORCYCLE GANG IN THE\nAREA. THE ORGANIZATION ORIGINATED IN PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY,\nMARYLAND, IN 1959 AND SINCE THAT TIME IT HAS EXPANDED ALONG\nTHE ENTIRE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE CENTER\n6\nOF INFLUENCE CONTINUED TO BE THE BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON, D. C.,\nAREA UNTIL 1975 WHEN THE CLUB'S HEADQUARTERS WAS MOVED TO\nMARCUS HooK, PENNSYLVANIA, FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF SEVERAL\nMEMBERS INVOLVED IN A MASS MURDER IN VIRGINIA. AFTER A MASSIVE\nLAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST THE PAGANS IN PENNSYLVANIA\nRESULTED IN NUMEROUS ARRESTS ON DRUG AND FIREARMS CHARGES ABOUT\nA YEAR LATER, THE HEADQUARTERS WAS AGAIN MOVED, THIS TIME TO\nISLIP, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK,\nALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME DISAGREEMENT AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS\nAS TO THE LOCATIONS OF CHAPTERS, IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THERE\nARE 40 TO 45 CHAPTERS NATIONWIDE, AT LEAST 26 OF WHICH ARE IN\nTHE FOUR STATE AREA OF NEW JERSEY, PENNSYLVANIA, DELAWARE, AND\nMARYLAND. SOME CITIES HAVE MORE THAN ONE CHAPTER, SUCH AS\nPITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA, WHICH IS REPUTED TO HAVE FOUR SEPARATE\nCHAPTERS, IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO ASSOCIATE MEMBERS\nWITH A SPECIFIC CHAPTER SINCE MEMBERS OF DIFFERENT CHAPTERS\nCONSTANTLY ASSOCIATE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND BECAUSE EXISTING\nCHAPTERS SOMETIMES CLOSE IN THE FACE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SCRUTINY\nOR DECLINING PROFITS. NEW CHAPTERS ARE ALSO FORMED WHEN AN\nOPPORTUNITY FOR PROFIT IS IDENTIFIED.\nTHE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE \"PAGAN NATION\" IS UNKNOWN, BUT\nESTIMATES RANGE FROM 450 TO 800 ACTIVE MEMBERS. THERE MAY BE\n400 MEMBERS IN PENNSYLVANIA ALONE, APPROXIMATELY 600 MEMBERS\nAND ASSOCIATES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NATIONALLY. UNLIKE THE HELLS\nANGELS, OUTLAWS, AND BANDIDOS, THE OTHER THREE MAJOR NATIONAL\n7\nGANGS, THE PAGANS DO NOT GENERALLY HAVE FORMAL CLUBHOUSES, BUT\nRATHER MEET IN EACH OTHER'S HOMES OR OTHER LOCATIONS, FURTHER\nCOMPOUNDING THE DIFFICULTY OF DETERMINING THE CHAPTER MEMBER-\nSHIP OF AN INDIVIDUAL,\nTHE PAGANS ARE ORGANIZED IN THE MANNER OF 1930's TO 1940's\nTRADITIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME ORGANIZATIONS, WITH WELL-DEFINED\nPOWER FIGURES AND STRICT RULES. THE ORGANIZATION IS HEADED BY\nA NATIONAL PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, THE INDIVIDUALS\nOCCUPYING THESE POSITIONS ARE GENERALLY FIGUREHEADS, ALTHOUGH\nTHEY DO PARTICIPATE IN THE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CLUB.\nTHE PRESIDENT IS IN A POSITION TO SKIM PROFITS OFF THE TOP\nOF MOST CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, MAKING HIS POSITION A VERY PROFIT-\nABLE ONE. THE SECOND ECHELON OF THE PAGANS IS OCCUPIED BY THE\nMOTHER CLUB, WHICH HAS APPROXIMATELY 20 MEMBERS, THE MOTHER\nCLUB, WHICH ACTS AS A GOVERNING BODY IN SETTING NATIONAL POLICY,\nIS UNIQUE TO THE PAGANS ALTHOUGH IT IS SIMILAR IN SOME RESPECTS\nTO THE NOMAD CLUB OF THE BANDIDOS AND OTHER GANGS. THE MOTHER\nCLUB GIVES ADVICE AND GUIDANCE TO CHAPTERS IN A SPECIFIC GEO-\nGRAPHIC AREA, RULES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CHAPTERS, AND\nLITERALLY SERVES AS ENFORCER OF CLUB POLICY, OFTEN VIOLENTLY\nPUNISHING MEMBERS WHO FAIL TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS. THE MOTHER\nCLUB SETS UP ILLEGAL VENTURES, SUCH AS SYNDICATES TO TRAFFIC\nIN DRUGS OR STOLEN VEHICLES, AND DELEGATES MOST OF THE WORK\nAND RISK TO THE NEXT ECHELON IN THE PAGAN HIERARCHY, THE\nCHAPTERS. THE MOTHER CLUB RECEIVES MUCH OF THE PROFIT FROM\n8\nTHESE ACTIVITIES, KEEPING A PORTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS\nAND PAYING A PERCENTAGE INTO THE PAGAN TREASURY AND DEFENSE/\nBAIL FUND. EACH CHAPTER IS GOVERNED BY ITS OWN SET OF OFFICERS,\nIN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICY SET BY THE MOTHER CLUB,\nTHE PRIMARY MOTIVE FOR FORMING NEW CHAPTERS AND ACCEPTING NEW\nMEMBERS IS PROFIT. NEW MEMBERS ARE ACCEPTED ONLY ON THE RECOM-\nMENDATION OF A CURRENT MEMBER AND PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF THE\nPROSPECTIVE MEMBER'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO COMMIT ILLEGAL\nAND SOMETIMES VIOLENT ACTS FOR PROFIT AND TO TURN MUCH OF THAT\nPROFIT OVER TO THE PAGANS.\nTHE SIGNIFICANT PROFITS GENERATED BY DRUG TRAFFICKING MAKE IT\nAN ATTRACTIVE VENTURE FOR THE CLUB, PER DOLLAR OF PROFIT, THE\nRISKS ARE PROBABLY LESS THAN THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER CRIMES,\nIT IS ESTIMATED THAT OVER 50% OF THE PAGANS ARE INVOLVED IN\nDRUG TRAFFICKING. THEY HAVE A LARGE CONTROL OVER THE MANUFAC-\nTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND PCP IN THE NORTH-\nEAST AND HAVE DEALT IN COCAINE AND MARIHUANA AS WELL. BASED\nON SEIZURES, IT IS CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED THAT THE STREET\nVALUE OF THE METHAMPHETAMINES AND PCP DISTRIBUTED BY THE PAGANS\nANNUALLY IS $15.5 MILLION, THEY MANUFACTURE SIGNIFICANT\nADDITIONAL QUANTITIES WHICH ARE CONSUMED WITHIN THE CLUB, LEADING\nTO STILL INCREASED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO SUPPORT THE HABIT. PAGAN\nMEMBERS OPERATE NUMEROUS OTHER BUSINESSES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC\nSTATES, WHICH UNTIL SCRUTINIZED APPEAR TO BE LEGITIMATE, THESE\nINCLUDE MOTORCYCLE SHOPS, BARS AND RESTAURANTS, WHICH ARE USED\nAS FRONTS FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND TO LAUNDER THE MONEY INVOLVED\nIN THESE ACTIVITIES.\nPAGAN MOTHER CLUB MEMBERS DOMINATE THE DRUG DISTRIBUTION\nACTIVITIES ALMOST ENTIRELY. THE FEAR AND GREED OF LOWER-ECHELON\nMEMBERS DRIVE THEM TO ASSIST IN DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES, EACH\nTIME THE DRUGS MOVE BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS IN THE HIERARCHY, TWO\nTHINGS OCCUR: ONE, THE DRUGS ARE CUT WITH ADULTERANTS AND, TWO,\nMONEY CHANGES HANDS. By THE TIME THE DRUGS REACH THE ULTIMATE\nCUSTOMER, IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR THEM TO HAVE BEEN DILUTED 500%\nAND FOR THE PRICE TO HAVE INCREASED 1000%. FREQUENTLY AT THIS\nSTAGE THE DRUGS ARE DILUTED so MUCH THAT THEY ARE NOT WORTH\nTHE PRICE BEING ASKED, THE CHAPTER MEMBER, HOWEVER, FINDS A\nWAY TO SELL THE INFERIOR PRODUCT BECAUSE HE FEARS RETRIBUTION\nIF HE FAILS TO CARRY OUT HIS ASSIGNMENT. THERE IS NO SHORTAGE\nOF PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS WAITING TO REPLACE THOSE WHO FAIL TO\nPERFORM. THE ONLY CHECK ON SENIOR MEMBERS IS THEIR CONSTANT\nAWARENESS THAT, IF THEIR ENEMIES OUTNUMBER THEIR FRIENDS, THEY\nTOO COULD BE ON THE RECEIVING END OF THE VIOLENCE THAT PERMEATES\nTHE ORGANIZATION.\nTHERE ARE A NUMBER OF READILY IDENTIFIABLE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED\nWITH INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME. FOREMOST IS THE FACT\nTHAT SENIOR LEVEL PERSONNEL ARE USUALLY WELL INSULATED BY\n10\nLOWER LEVEL MEMBERS WHO RISK DETECTION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT\nPERSONNEL. SECOND, THE CODE OF SECRECY AND THREAT OF VIOLENCE\nINHIBIT MEMBERS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE SUCCUMB TO LAW ENFORCEMENT\nEFFORTS TO GATHER INFORMATION. MEMBERS ARE STRICTLY CONTROLLED\nBY THE ORGANIZATION. LASTLY, BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY\nOF THESE ORGANIZATIONS, MORE TIME AND EXPERTISE ARE REQUIRED TO\nCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS. THIS AFFECTS NOT ONLY FEDERAL LAW\nENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, BUT ALSO STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS. BECAUSE\nOF THE PROMINENCE THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAVE GAINED DURING\nTHE LAST DECADE, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE BEEN TARGETED FOR ENFORCEMENT\nACTION BY VARIOUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING DEA\nAND THE FBI. THERE ARE CURRENTLY A NUMBER OF COOPERATIVE EFFORTS\nUNDER WAY WHICH ARE TARGETED AT THEIR OPERATIONS IN THE MID-\nATLANTIC REGION AND HOPEFULLY, THESE EFFORTS WILL HAVE A MAJOR\nIMPACT ON THEIR ILLICIT ACTIVITIES.\nI WANT TO THANK YOU FOR INVITING DEA TO PARTICIPATE. STEPS\nTHAT THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS TAKEN IN THE PAST TO EXPOSE ORGANIZED\nCRIME HAVE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON THE LIVES OF ALL\nAMERICANS. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE HEARINGS WILL CONTINUE TO\nFOCUS ATTENTION ON A GROWING THREAT TO THE SAFETY AND SECURITY\nOF OUR CITIZENS, AND TO PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DEALING\nWITH THIS THREAT.\n11"
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