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JGR/Testimony Approval (07/21/1983-08/31/1983)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Testimony Approval
(07/21/1983-08/31/1983)
Box: 53
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS 2R
SUBJECT:
Statement of Robert A. Bryden on
Drug Interdiction on the Gulf Coast
Robert A. Bryden, Special Agent-In-Charge of DEA's New
Orleans office, proposes to deliver the attached statement
before the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and
Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, meeting in Biloxi on July
23. The testimony is factual in nature, reviewing the drug
smuggling problem in the four states -- Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas -- covered by the New
Orleans office. I have reviewed the testimony and see no
legal objections.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR GREGORY JONES
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDING Orig
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Statement of Robert A. Bryden on
Drug Interdiction on the Gulf Coast
Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed
testimony, and finds no objection to it from a legal
perspective.
FFF:JGR:aw 7/21/83
CC: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subj.
Chron
ID
all
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
JR
0 . OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
I . INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent:
Great Jones
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject:
Statement of Robert a. Bryden
on Crast Drug Interdiction on the Hulf
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
*Y/MM/DD
W Holland
ORIGINATOR 83,07,20
1
/
Referral Note:
WAT 18
D 83,07,21
583,07,22
Referral Note:
1
1
/ 1
Referral Note:
1
/
Referral Note:
/
/
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
4 . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
R . Direct Reply w/Copy
B . Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D . Draft Response
S For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X . Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response - Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date - Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
Statement
DRAFT
of
Robert A. Bryden
Special Agent-In-Charge
New Orleans Field Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Department of Justice
on
Drug Interdiction on the Gulf Coast
Before
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense
and the
Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus
at
Biloxi, Mississippi
July 23, 1983
I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee to
discuss the role of the Drug Enforcement Administration in the
interdiction of illegal drugs along the Gulf Coast.
The United States Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard are the
primary federal agencies tasked with interdiction of narcotics. DEA
provides the agencies with intelligence from both our domestic and
overseas offices. DEA is responsible for the follow-up investigations
of seizures made by these agencies. DEA's New Orleans Divisional Office 5
area of jurisdiction includes four southern states: Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas. All except Arkansas have coast
lines on the northern Gulf of Mexico. The District encompasses an area
of 200,952 square miles and has a population of 12,144,000. There are a
total of 671 airports within the District and it is estimated that an
additional 150 landing strips could be used by small aircraft. There
are six deep water ports capable of loading ships, including New Orleans
which has surpassed New York as the largest port in the United States in
gross tonnage.
The state of Louisiana has over 600 miles of jagged, irregular coastline
highly conducive to maritime smuggling. This coastal area, largely
unpopulated, has always been considered a haven for smugglers, having
been used in the late 1700's and early 1800's by the infamous pirate,Jean
Lafitte.
Louisiana's attraction for smuggling is due not only to the vast, mostly
unpatrolled waterways, but also the presence of hundreds of vessels
engaged in maritime activities. These activities include shipping,
servicing offshore oil rigs, and fishing for shrimp, oysters, and
menhaden. Since Louisiana's topography is flat, coastal plains (the
highest point in the state is 535 feet), it contains a relatively large
inland water area of 3,593 square miles.
Mississippi and Alabama are equally attractive to narcotics smugglers.
Mississippi has deep water ports in Gulfport and Pasagoula capable of
handling cargo ships and banana boats from South America. A chain of
uninhabited barrier islands off the coast of Mississippi have been
utilized on numerous occasions to facilitate smuggling. Although only a
relatively minor portion of Alabama's boundary is accessible by water,
over 100 miles of shoreline are available to the maritime smuggler,
mostly on Mobile Bay.
Although Arkansas is not as attractive for air smugglers as the
previously mentioned states due to its distance from the coast, several
instances of marijuana smuggling have been reported. Arkansas has
limited access for maritime smuggling through the Mississippi River
which forms the eastern boundary of the state.
Because much of the New Orleans Divisionsjurisdiction encompasses Gulf
Coast states, a large percentage of the drug removals are seizures
involving multi-ton quantities of marijuana and multi-pound quantities
of cocaine. Examination of seizure statistics for the past two years
reveals increased cocaine smuggling, and increased use of aircraft in
smuggling ventures. Cocaine seizures have increased from a total of 30
pounds in CY 1981 to 1560 pounds in CY 1982. Included in the CY 1982
figure are 1197 pounds of cocaine seized in cattle feed bags from a
Convair 880 in New Iberia, LA on May 18, 1982. DEA's intelligence
indicates that as much as 1900 pounds of cocaine was successfully
air-dropped frm a Lockheed Lodestar before it crashed on a pipeline
right-of-way in Northeast Mississippi. This year 742 pounds of cocaine
was seized from a private aircraft which landed in Dothan, Alabama.
The influx of cocaine in not confined to aircraft alone. In October
1981, the vessel ANDORIA was seized in New Orleans with 96 pounds of
cocaine, along with 22,000 pounds of marijuana. In September 1982, 77
pounds of cocaine was seized in Kenner, LA.
Marijuana seizures have declined significantly from 340,659 pounds in CY
1981 to 44,716 pounds in CY 1982. Included in the latter figure are
40,000 pounds seized from the Carabella Negra off the coast of
Mississippi in August 1982. This drop in marijuana seizures may reflect
the decreasing use of smuggling by vessel. An exception to this trend
occurred in June of this year when an ocean-going tug and barge was
seized in Lafayette, LA after successfully off-loading an estimated
200,000 pounds of marijuana. An additional 40,000 pounds remained in
the barge, but was probably left behind by the smugglers as it was
soaked in water and fuel.
As these smuggling ventures involve larger and larger amounts of cocaine
and marijuana, the violator's capital investment correspondingly
increases. To protect the huge sums inveted in the narcotic shipments,
violators are increasingly offering large amounts of money for police
protection during the off-loading phase of the smuggling attempt. In
the past two years, 11 law enforcement officers in coastal regions have
been arrested for corruption. Although this kind of corruption is not
often encountered, it tends to make a difficult job even harder.
There are signs of improvement. Total arrests for the first quarter of
1983 are up 86% from a similar period in 1982. In the first quarter of
this year alone, we have made 25 arrests of Class I violators, compared
with 55 for all of 1982. Class I is the designation given to the
highest level of violator in a drug organization - those responsible for
masterminding, arranging, and financing these major smuggling ventures.
Increasing use of Continuing Criminal Enterprise statutes and asset
forfeiture laws are effectively neutraling major violators who
previously would have continued their smuggling eneterprise. These
successes were possible with the cooperative efforts of many of the
agencies represented here today. I know we all appreciate your interest
and demonstrated concern about drug interdiction efforts along the Gulf
Coast.
Thank you.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 29, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
SUBJECT:
Statement of Jim Knapp Re: Efforts
of the Department of Justice to
Improve the Collection of Fines
The above-referenced testimony is to be delivered on August
3, 1983. It reviews statistics on outstanding criminal
fines, noting that there are some 21,000 individual cases
with a balance due of $132 million. The testimony discusses
some of the problems associated with collecting assessed
fines, and notes that under this Administration the Justice
Department has made collection of fines a priority item.
Finally, the testimony urges favorable legislative action on
the sentencing provisions of the proposed Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1983, which would improve the
collectibility of criminal fines. I have no objections to
the proposed statement.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 29, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR GREG JONES
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDINGSFig. signed by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Statement of Jim Knapp Re: Efforts
of the Department of Justice to
Improve the Collection of Fines
Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed
testimony and finds no objection to it from a legal
perspective.
FFF:JGR:aw 7/29/83
CC: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subj.
Chron
ID #
CU
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
O OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
I INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent:
Greq Jones
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject:
Statement of Jim Knapp re: efforts
of the Dept. of pastice to improve the
collection of flace
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
W Holland
ORIGINATOR 83,07,29
/
/
Referral Note:
WAT 18
A/D 83,0729
583,08,02
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A Appropriate Action
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S. For Signature
F Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
Statement of
DRAFT
Jim Criminal knopp DAAG
aug 3, 1983
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcom-
mittee to discuss the efforts of the Department of Justice to
improve the collection of criminal fines.
Fines are an important part of the penalty structure of
federal criminal law. They are particularly appropriate sanc-
tions for economic crimes and for especially lucrative criminal
activity such as drug trafficking. However, imposition of a fine
serves no punitive or deterrent purpose if it goes unpaid. For
this reason, we are committed to improving our collection
efforts.
The total balance of unpaid criminal fines is immense.
Presently, there are more than twenty-one thousand (21,058) cases
in which criminal fines have not been fully paid. As of May of
this year, the aggregate outstanding balance of unpaid fines
amounted to nearly one hundred and thirty-two million dollars
($131,917,602). It should first be pointed out that one-fourth
of these twenty-one thousand outstanding cases (5,787) are over
ten years old. They offer little prospect of collection. In
approximately eighty percent of this over ten year old group of
cases, the location of the debtor is no longer known. In most of
the remaining cases in this category the debtor has no assets
upon which to levy. No statute of limitations operates to close
these cases after a period of years, so they will continue to
appear as uncollected fines until the death of the convicted
- 2 -
person. While these stale cases with little promise of collec-
tion make up one-fourth of the total number of cases, the unpaid
fines involved amount to only about five percent of the one
hundred thirty million dollars of fines owed.
It should also be borne in mind that the remaining $125
million in unpaid fines includes cases which are still under
appeal, cases in which defendants are making partial payments
over several years as a condition of probation, and cases in
which debtors are currently serving terms of imprisonment and any
payment is unlikely to commence until after their release.
These characteristics of both the most recent and oldest
cases put the problem of fine collection in a better perspective,
but it nonetheless remains a serious one the Department of
Justice is committed to addressing. For the reference of the
Subcommittee, there is attached to my statement a brief analysis
of statistics on our outstanding criminal fine cases.
In order for the Subcommittee to better understand the
nature of the fine collection problem and the steps we are taking
to increase our rate of success, I would like to briefly describe
the way in which criminal fines are imposed and collected in the
federal system.
Most federal offenses prescribe a maximum fine that may be
imposed either alone or in addition to a sentence of imprison-
ment. At sentencing, the court receives a presentence report
which includes information about the financial condition of the
- 3 -
defendant However, the court is not required to consider the
ability of the defendant to pay in imposing a particular fine.
Thus, there are cases in which large fines are imposed that are
from the outset beyond the ability of the defendant to pay and so
hold no realistic prospect of full collection. (On the other
hand, there are also cases in which no fine or a small fine is
imposed despite tne fact that a large fine would seem merited in
light of the severity of the offense and the extensive financial
resources of the defendant.)
Fines are generally imposed in one of two ways. The trial
judge may impose a "straight fine." Alternatively, payment of a
fine may be imposed as a condition of probation. The collection
procedures for these two types of fines are different.
With a straight fine, if payment is not made, the responsi-
bility for collection falls on the United States Attorney's
Office. In the 120 days following sentencing, the court may
correct or reduce the sentence of fine, 2/ but after this period
the amount of the fine is set and the court's role in collection
efforts will be limited to instances in which a contempt sanction
is sought for willful failure to pay. 3/
1/ See Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2/ See Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
31 The exception is the case of a "stand committed" fine. In
these cases, the court will order the imprisonment of the
defendant until he pays the fine. If the defendant demonstrates
to the court that he is indigent, he must be released. The fine
owed is not discharged, however. See 18 U.S.C. $3569.
- 4 -
Information on the imposition and payment of criminal fines
is not automatically transmitted by the court to the United
States Attorney's Office. The attorney in charge of collections
must learn of the fine from the prosecuting attorney or clerk of
the court. Information on the case is then entered into the case
tracking system of the U.S. Attorney's Office so its status can
be monitored and updated.
Criminal fines must be enforced in the same manner as money
judgments in civil cases. This fact means tnat in collecting a
criminal fine, the United States is put in the same position as
an ordinary creditor and must follow State law and procedure with
respect to various steps of recording or docketing judgment,
perfection and attachment of liens, levy and execution, and
foreclosure and sale. The procedures, which differ considerably
from State to State, are often cumbersome, and during delays in
meeting these various procedures, the rights of other creditors
may gain preference over those of the United States. Moreover,
the laws of the States will limit the life of any lien and exempt
differing types and amounts of the debtor's property from
execution or foreclosure.
Where payment of a fine is imposed as a condition of
probation, the situation is quite different. First, in deter-
mining the specific condition of payment, the court may set a
schedule of partial payments to be made over the course of the
4, See 18 U.S.C. $3565.
- 5 -
term of probation. Since payment of the fine is a condition of
probation, collection responsibility rests with the Probation
Office 5/
Because the court retains the power to modify conditions of
probation and to impose sanctions for violation of these condi-
tions, the enforcement of fines in the probation context has
advantages of flexibility and strong incentive for payment. lf
the probationer has not made a good faith effort to meet his
obligations, the court may modify, extend, or even revoke his
probation. On the other hand, if a probationer is unable to pay
the fine despite his best efforts, the court may modify the
amount of payment or extend the period for payment up to the
maximum five year term of probation. Generally, where the debtor
has made a good faith effort to pay his fine during the probation
period, the court will remit any unpaid balance at the end of his
probation. Should an outstanding balance remain after probation,
however, the responsibility shifts to the United States Attor-
neys' Offices to collect the fine in the same manner as when a
straight fine is imposed initially.
Collecting criminal fines is often a difficult task. Cases
involving outstanding fines fall into two categories. In one
category of cases, collection efforts are virtually doomed from
the outset because the offender has few if any available assets
5, The U.S. Attorney's Offices do keep track of status of
fines in these cases, and may record the fine as a lien against
property of the defendant to assure against disposition of assets
to avoid payment.
- 6 -
and poor employment prospects. In the other category, however,
the fines, or a substantial portion thereof, are collectable
because the offender has significant assets or the ability to
earn a steady, sizable income. It is with respect to this latter
category of cases that we can improve our collection efforts.
In our view, solutions to the fine collection problem lie in
two areas. The first set of solutions must come from within the
Department of Justice, for they concern policy decisions regard-
ing the priority we place on the collection of criminal fines.
One reason that the rate of collection has been so poor in the
past is that collection efforts were assigned low priority by
both officials in Washington and the United States Attorneys in
the field. Few resources were devotea to collections. Collec-
tion cases were assigned to the most inexperienced attorneys or
even support staff who were offered no specialized training;
information about individual cases and new collection techniques
was inadequate; and aggressive collection was by far the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
In the past few years, the Justice Department has done much
to break this pattern. In 1981, the Attorney General Smith
directed that the collection of debts owed to the United States,
including criminal fines, was to be a priority of the Department.
We are now working in a number of ways to fulfill the Attorney
General's mandate. Each newly appointed United States Attorney
has been apprised of the Department's emphasis on effective
- 7 -
collection, and the Attorney General has taken steps to offici-
ally acknowledge those U.S. Attorneys who have shown special
initiative in this area. Moreover, a Department-wide Debt
Collection Task Force which will coordinate our efforts is now
functioning under the direction of the Assistant Attorney General
of the Civil Division.
Providing assistance to the United States Attorneys is a
large part of this effort. The Executive Office for United
States Attorneys is sending teams into the field to audit
collection activities and report to the United States Attorneys
on particular problems within their offices. The Executive
Office is also providing training to our attorneys in innovative,
aggressive collection techniques and is in charge of bringing on
board much needed additional administrative personnel to support
the work of our attorneys in the field. Much is also being done
by the Executive Office to modernize the case tracking system in
the U.S. Attorney's Offices so that information on the status of
collection cases and on the location of the debtor and his assets
is easily updated and accessible.
Assistance specifically geared towards the collection of
criminal fines is also provided through the Department's Criminal
Division. Professional staff with expertise in fine collection
- 8 -
monitors the progress of individual cases in the field, maintain-
ing direct contact with Assistant U.S. Attorneys and support
personnel. An important part of this direct contact is discus-
sion of effective strategies for collection, including innovative
and aggressive techniques.
Too often, criminal collection work has been viewed as a
passive activity, consisting of little more than filing liens and
sending dunning letters. That is not enough! For example, one
serious problem in collecting large fines is the fact that a
defendant may actively conceal his assets to shield them from the
government. These cases must be actively pursued through
investigation, deposition of the defendant and third parties,
and, where necessary, litigation to obtain court orders and
contempt sanctions. This sort of aggressive approach is an
important part of the Justice Department's new policy and is
beginning to produce results.
Three recent cases illustrate how this new approach can pay
off. Leroy "Nicky" Barnes, a notorious drug dealer, was convic-
tea in 1978 and is currently serving a life sentence for narco-
tics offenses. Barnes owes the government $125,000 in criminal
fines and more than $400,000 in taxes. An aggressive investiga-
tion of Barnes' financial holdings showed evidence suggesting a
sophisticated scheme to shield his assets from the government. He
invested hundreds of thousands of dollars in a Michigan real
estate venture, but was to receive virtually nothing from the
sale of the underlying project. As a result of extensive
- 9 -
discovery of the role of third parties in these financial
manipulations, the government is now pursuing not only an alleged
fraud against the government regarding the criminal fine but also
alleged tax law violations.
A case involving a $300,000 fine owed by Richard Kones
provides an example of both the difficulties that are posed in
fine collections and how persistence and ingenuity -- in this
case on the part of Assistant United States Attorney Robert
Jupiter -- can produce results. Kones was convicted of a 1.5
million dollar Medicare swindle and sentenced to seven years'
imprisonment and a $300,000 fine. Routine fine collection
efforts failed. when deposed, both Kones and his wife refused to
testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment.
While the FBI was unable to locate any stateside assets, its
investigation revealed that Kones had transferred funds to a
branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank in the Bahamas. AUSA Jupiter
levied a writ of execution on the bank's New York office and a
hotly contested law suit ensued. Mr. Jupiter eventually won this
action, but by that time the account was void of funds.
AUSA Jupiter continued his efforts and determined that Kones
had assets in the Grand Cayman Islands, which are favored as a
haven for hidden assets because of their bank secrecy laws. In
the Caymans, Mr. Jupiter retained local counsel and succeeded in
obtaining a court order temporarily freezing Kones' assets. AUSA
Jupiter then sought a court order in New York requiring Kones to
reveal all his assets and transfer them to the United States.
- 10 -
Failure to comply would mean contempt charges. Faced with this
action, Kones finally agreed to transfer the amount of the fine
to his attorney in the United States, and to make an immediate
payment of $50,000 with the remaining balance of the fine to be
paid over three years.
Sometimes, effective fine collection depends on a combina-
tion of alertness and follow-up action. For example, Gordon
Liddy, years after nis conviction, had still not paid an out-
standing fine, yet his financial success as a writer and lecturer
was publicly reported. One of our collections attorneys quickly
brought the situation to the attention of the United States
Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia. Depositions of
Liddy and his accountants followed and, as a result, the govern-
ment was able to collect the fine from money owed Liddy in New
York for books and lectures.
These cases demonstrate that if the collection of criminal
fines is assigned appropriate priority by the Department and
sufficient resources are devoted to this effort, even difficult
collection cases can be solved. Improving collection rates
through necessary policy and administrative changes is a strategy
to which the Department of Justice is committed. It is, however,
only a partial solution to the fine collection problem. Legisla-
tive changes are also necessary to improve the manner in which
fines are imposed and collected.
- 11 -
Such legislative improvements are incorporated in the
sentencing title of the President's "Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1983," introduced in the House as H.R. 2151. The basic
contours of these sentencing reforms are no doubt familiar to
many members of the Subcommittee. Their purpose is to provide
greater rationality and consistency in criminal sentencing
through application of articulated guidelines developed by an
independent sentencing commission.
In addition to making the imposition of fines, as well as
terms of imprisonment or probation, subject to guidelines based
on consideration of both offense and offender characteristics,
these sentencing reforms include several provisions that would
directly address certain problems that have arisen in collecting
criminal fines. First, courts would, for the first time, be
required by statute to consider the financial resources of the
defendant and his obligation to support dependents in determining
the amount of fine to be imposea. This requirement should reduce
the number of cases in which fines are largely uncollectable ab
initio because they far exceed the ability of the defendant to
pay. Second, at sentencing, the court could impose a specified
schedule of payment, a very workable approach that is presently
confined to instances in which payment of a fine is imposed as a
condition of probation. Third, if a defendant had made at least
some payment toward his fine, the court could, upon a showing of
changed circumstances, modify the method of payment or reduce the
amount of the fine. Again, this sort of flexibility is now
- 12 -
possible only where payment of a fine is imposed as a condition
of probation. These features allow the court to remain involved
in the collection process and to respond to changed circumstances
of defendants.
In addition to these improvements in the manner in which
fines are imposed, our bill also enhances the government's
ability to collect fines. First, the court would be required to
transmit to the United States Attorney's Office information on
fines imposed and payments made. The ad hoc information sharing
arrangements currently in place are not sufficient. Secona, a
twenty-year statute of limitations would apply to the collection
of a criminal fine. Presently, liability ceases only upon
payment in full, death of the debtor, or a Presidential pardon.
This limitation period will allow the United States Attorneys to
close cases that are so old that collection is unlikely.
Thira, and most important, unpaid criminal fines could be
collected in the same efficient manner as taxes owed to the
United States. Much of the cumbersome clerical procedure and
litigation in State courts now necessary to create and enforce
judgment liens to collect unpaid fines would be eliminated. A
lien would arise at the time of imposition of the fine and
extend to all the property of the defendant. The lien could be
enforced like a tax lien through efficient administrative levy
procedures set out in the Internal Revenue Code. In addition to
these efficient collection procedures, provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code designed to protect the interests of innocent third
- 13 -
parties and to allow release of the lien upon the debtor's
payment of a bond or discharge of part of the lien where remain-
ing encumbered property is sufficient to satisfy the fine, would
apply. In sum, application of these procedures would not only
provide a more efficient collection mechanism, but also create a
strong incentive for payment because of the debtor's desire to
remove liens clouding the title to his assets.
These legislative improvements, combined with the policy and
administrative changes already undertaken by the Department of
Justice, would, in our view, significantly increase our ability
to collect criminal fines. The Department of Justice and others
are also considering additional concepts for improving fine
collection rates. These include making payment of a fine a
mandatory condition of probation where a sentence of fine is also
imposed and similarly making fine payments a mandatory condition
of parole; providing a statutory mechanism whereby a court,
consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bearden V.
Georgia,
U.S.
(May 24, 1983), could resentence a
defendant to an authorized term of imprisonment if he failed to
pay a fine and the default was culpable or an alternative penalty
of imprisonment was necessary to serve the purposes of punishment
and deterrence; and making willful failure to pay a fine a
specific criminal offense.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I
would be pleased to respond to any questions you or members of
the Subcommittee may have.
Statistical Analysis of Criminal Fine Collections
Data as of May 31, 1983, show a total of 21,082 criminal
fines outstanding with an outstanding balance of $131,917,602.
These are Department-wide figures and include fines imposed
in criminal, tax, anti-trust, and lands cases.
Of these approximately 21,000 outstanding fines, about
6,000 are more than 10 years old, while 12,000 are less than
five years old. The remaining 3,000 are between 5 and 10
years old.
Number of
Amount
Date of Imposition
Outstanding fines
Outstanding
Prior to 1973
5,787
$ 6,613,536
1973-1977
3,213
15,167,529
1978-May 1983
12,058
110,136,537
21,058
$131,917,602
Fines Imposed Prior to 1973
Of the approximately 6,000 fines imposed prior to 1973,
the oldest is a 1902 case with a $2,100 balance. About 50%
of these cases have an outstanding balance of less than $500.
There is little information about most of these pre-1973 cases
beyond the name of the debtor and date and amount of the
fine imposed. The location of the debtor is unknown in about
5,000 of these cases and most of the remaining 1,000 debtors
have no assets upon which to levy. The majority of these
cases involved violations of the alcohol tax laws.
Fines Imposed 1973-1978
of the approximately 3,000 fines imposed from 1973 through
1978, more than half have balances of less than $1,000. About
1,500 of the debtors are equally divided between those who
- 2 -
are presently in prison, those who have no assets, and those
whose location is unknown. In fiscal year 1982, approximately
one million dollars was collected from the 1973-1978 group
of debtors. As of May 31, 1983, $350,000 had been collected
from this group for the present fiscal year.
Number of
Amount
Year of Imposition
Outstanding Fines
Outstanding
1973
288
$ 1,863,482
1974
1069
3,026,063
1975
624
2,623,474
1976
535
3,411,094
1977
697
4,243,416
3213
$15,167,529
Fines Imposed 1978-May 1983
Of the 12,000 debtors owing $110,000 for the most recent
period, 1978 through May, 1983, more than half have fines with
balances under $2,500. On the other had, 3% of these debtors
owe more than half of the $110 million outstanding. (This 3%
includes antitrust cases in which particularly large fines
were imposed.)
A considerable number of fines are not immediately paid
when they are imposed because conviction is appealed. In others,
the court directs that fines be paid during the term of probation,
which runs up to 5 years. Still others involve a prison term
and payment begins only after the offender is released and
finds employment.
Number of
Amount
Year of Imposition
Outstanding Fines
Outstanding
1978
834
$ 8,174,662
1979
1145
6,385,704
1980
1808
12,296,485
1981
2904
23,463,198
1982
3430
43,107,245
January-May 1983
1937
16,709,243
058
$110.136.537
- 3 -
Summary of Collections for Fiscal Years 1968-1983
The attached table summarizes criminal fine collections
for fiscal years 1968-1983. Apparent disparities between
these figures and those cited above are due to the use of
a fiscal year rather than a calendar year base. In addition,
the somewhat larger totals in the table reflect inclusion
of data from an additional month (June 1983) and projections
through the end of this fiscal year.
S of:06/30/83
U.S. ATTORNEY
CRIMINAL FINE COLLECTIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1968 - 1983
Beginning
1/
Ending
'ear
Balance
Imposed
Collected
Other
Balance
983
$120,323,443 $78,871,595P $33,743,792P $18,349,699P $147,101,547₽
1982
91,765,932
62,828,522
28,553,655
5,717,356
120,323,443
1981
79,823,972
42,114,094
27,554,503
2,617,631
91,765,932
1980
67,121,338
37,498,821
21,336,483
3,459,704
79,823,972
1979
61,835,477
32,461,879
24,909,919
2,266,099
67,121,338
1978
50,695,130
31,117,197
18,312,620
1,664,230
61,835,477
1977
38,225,709
42,991,301
18,665,388
11,856,492
50,695,130
1976
34,067,592
21,570,846
14,923,614
2,489,115
38,225,709
1975
28,245,260
20,830,527
12,739,098
2,269,097
34,067,592
1974
25,296,613
17,656,757
12,179,797
2,528,313
28,245,260
1973
20,980,322
19,693,603
14,034,547
1,342,765
25,296,613
1972
17,733,098
12,801,716
8,701,245
853,247
20,980,322
1971
15,937,978
11,683,897
8,590,932
1,297,845
17,733,098
1970
14,491,540
7,369,778
5,923,340
I
15,937,978
1969
13,108,133
6,924,010
5,540,603
-
14,491,540
1968
11,666,808
6,885,440
5,444,115
-
13,108,133
16 Year Totals
$453,299,983
$261,153,651
$56,711,593
8 Changes +931%
+1,045 s
+520%
+1,3148
+1,022%
For FY 1983, P = Projected based on statistics through June 30, 1983
(minus 9 PROMIS Districts for all or portions of FY 83)
Receivables
$464,966,791
Other Termination (56,711,593)
Net Receivables
$408,255,198
Collected
$261,153,651
Net Effective Rate = 64%
1/ Includes fines remitted by the court at end of term of
probation and those discharged by pardon, death of the
debtor and reversal of conviction on appeal.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 3, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
SUBJECT:
Statement of Lowell Jensen Re:
Proposed Office of Drug
Enforcement on August 4, 1983
Lowell Jensen proposes to deliver the attached statement
before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary
Committee tomorrow. The proposed testimony reviews
Administration objections to the various pending "drug czar"
proposals. The testimony begins by discussing current
efforts to improve coordination of the anti-drug effort,
including the law enforcement coordinating committees, the
cabinet council, and the task forces. It then criticizes
the "drug czar" approach as a deviation from historic
cabinet government, duplicative of existing coordination
mechanisms, and ill-suited to the need to distribute
resources among drug enforcement and other, unrelated areas.
The testimony concludes by urging Congress to give the
Administration coordination initiatives time to work.
I see no objections, and, in light of the short turn-around,
will so advise Greg Jones orally if you concur.
DONE
8SR
Attachment
ID #
CU
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
o OUTGOING
H INTERNAL,
I INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: greg Jones
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Statement of Lowell Jensen re Proposed
office of Drug Enforcement on august 4, 1983
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
WHOll
ORIGINATOR 83,08,03
/
/
Referral Note:
WAT18
D
83,08,03
58308,03
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
I
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A Appropriate Action
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D - Draft Response
S - For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X - Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
DRAFT
STATEMENT
OF
D. LOWELL JENSEN
ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE
THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONCERNING
THE PROPOSED OFFICE OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ON
AUGUST 4, 1983
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate this opportunity to testify regarding proposals
aimed at securing improved coordination in connection with the
national drug enforcement effort. The issue of a "drug czar" has
been much discussed in recent months but this is the first oppor-
tunity which the Department of Justice has had to testify regard-
ing what we consider to be a proposal which would work fundamental
change in Executive Branch organization. We are grateful to
this Subcommittee for providing a forum within which this issue
can be discussed and our concerns aired.
NO DISAGREEMENT AS TO THE NEED FOR COORDINATION
When this Administration assumed office in 1981, we recog-
nized that there was inadequate coordination and cooperation in
the area of law enforcement generally and drug enforcement in
particular. The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime
confirmed this assessment and recommended specific measures to
improve coordination and cooperation. We have, therefore, taken
a number of administrative steps to address this recognized need.
Of course, the greatest need for coordination is in an area
which federal legislation cannot directly reach: cooperation
among State and local enforcement agencies and their federal
counterparts. No federal "drug czar" can direct the policies and
practices of the State and local agencies which comprise more
than 90 percent of our total national law enforcement resources.
We are, however, attempting to enhance coordination and coopera-
tion with State and local law enforcement through the Law Enforce-
ment Coordinating Committees (LECCs) which the Attorney General
has directed to be established in every federal judicial district,
and through the Executive Working Group whose membership is com-
posed of representatives of the National Association of Attorneys
General, the National District Attorneys Association, and the
Department of Justice. The level of commitment which has been
made and which is continuing to be devoted to the national LECC
program is unprecedented in the history of the Department of
Justice.
CURRENT COORDINATION INITIATIVES ARE UNPRECEDENTED
With respect to coordination within the federal law enforce-
ment community, our approach has been to proceed on two levels:
policy and operations. To achieve coordination of law enforce-
ment policy, we have in place the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy
to consider basic policy issues in this area and to resolve
disputes which may arise among the different federal departments
and agencies with respect to law enforcement matters generally.
In addition the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction, which I
chair, is in place to bring policy issues to the Council for
decision.
In addition to providing a mechanism for establishing drug
law enforcement policy, the very existence of these bodies -- by
providing a series of forums within which differences of opinion
can be aired and resolved -- has served to encourage officials
of the different agencies to work out disagreements among them-
selves with the result that problems are now settled quickly
which might have taken weeks or months to resolve. Of course,
the White House Office on Drug Abuse Policy is also playing an
- 2 -
important role with respect to drug education, prevention and
treatment. Moreover, this Office exercises leadership with re-
spect to the overall drug problem which menaces this country.
From the standpoint of operations, one of our early acts
was to bring the forces of the FBI into the drug enforcement
effort. This made additional resources available to drug enforce-
ment and improved coordination and cooperation between the FBI
and the DEA. More recently, we put in place our Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces bringing together the forces of the
Departments of Justice and Treasury and numerous State and
local law enforcement agencies in an important new program of
investigation and prosecution targeted at the nation's major
drug trafficking rings.
Early reports are that the cases being worked by the Drug
Task Forces are going extremely well. Some of these cases had
previously been handled by single agencies and they are now being
pursued more effectively through the task force approach. All
indications are that the various agencies are cooperating with
each other and that investigative and prosecutorial personnel
are pleased with the task force program. We expect major suc-
cesses in the months ahead. In fact several cases have already
reached the stage of indictment and arrest and in each instance
there has been significant participation and close coordination
of Federal, State and local agencies.
These initiatives, if allowed some time to work and some
room to breathe -- can achieve the enhanced success in drug
reduction which all of us seek. In fact, I would submit that
- 3 -
current drug enforcement efforts are better managed, better
coordinated and more effective than at any time in our history.
Although we are continuing to strive toward improved effective-
ness, our performance is improving and we seriously question
whether any modification would yield better results.
CONCERNS RAISED BY "DRUG CZAR" PROPOSALS
A. Basic Organizational Theory
Obviously, the concept of a "drug czar" has superficial
appeal because many federal departments and agencies have respon-
sibilities over different aspects of the drug problem. Of
course, this is not unique to drug enforcement; law enforcement
generally is of concern to virtually all agencies. Fraud against
the government, for example, is a concern for all the statutory
offices of Inspector General as well of the Department of Justice.
Fraud against individual citizens may also involve the efforts of
a number of Federal agencies. A colorable argument could be
made that we need a "white collar crime czar." Similarly "czar"
could be created in many areas, perhaps to form themselves into
a "Super Cabinet".
We question whether the concept of a "drug czar" represents
sound policy purely from the standpoint of management and organi-
zation. We believe the Cabinet system has served the American
Government well for almost two centuries. The "drug czar" propo-
sal would inherently undermine the authority of Cabinet Members
and exacerbate rather than eliminate coordination problems.
In the final analysis, only the President can resolve dis-
agreements which may arise among Department heads. No "czar"
- 4 -
can replace the President with respect to policy or operational
disagreements among Cabinet officers; in fact, the creation of a
"drug czar" would merely complicate and delay the resolution of
inter-departmental disputes.
Moreover, to suggest that a "drug czar" can reach down with-
in Executive Branch departments and agencies is to suggest a
duplication of lines of authority and responsibility that would
be fatal to good management. Not only would this promote fric-
tion among departments and agencies; it would promote friction
within departments and agencies by undermining the authority of
agency heads.
B. A "Drug Czar" Will Largely Duplicate Work Already Being Per-
formed
Every federal law enforcement agency now has numerous offi-
cials whose duties are to establish policy and to coordinate,
both internally and externally, efforts of the agencies. Much
of the headquarters operation at the FBI, for example, is devoted
to oversight and coordination of the operation of 59 FBI field
offices and to coordination of FBI operations with those of
other enforcement agencies, the various offices of Inspector
General, and so forth. The Office of the Associate Attorney
General, in turn, is devoted largely to policy formulation and
to coordination of all the various investigative (FBI, DEA INS,
USMS) and prosecutive (U.S. Attorneys, Criminal Division) compo-
nents of the Department of Justice. The Office of the Associate
Attorney General also devotes substantial effort to coordination
of Justice enforcement efforts with those of other Departments
- 5 -
and agencies. To create a new level of bureaucracy to oversee
such day-to-day operational efforts would thus be duplicative of
existing effort. On the other hand, to create a new level of
bureaucracy concerned solely with policy matters and not day-to-
day operations would result in less informed policy determina-
tions. A "drug czar" would thus duplicate existing efforts --
consuming scarce enforcement resources in the process -- or
create a policy unit ill-qualified to make policy.
C. A "Drug Czar" Would Be Prone to Jeopardize Law Enforcement,
National Security and Foreign Policy Interests
As important as drug enforcement is, and, as already alluded
to, there are other federal law enforcement responsibilities
which must be met. A "drug czar", by focusing entirely upon the
single issue of drug enforcement, might direct that Department
of Justice resources devoted to organized crime, public corrup-
tion, fraud and other priority offenses be diverted to drug
enforcement. The Attorney General is in the best position to
allocate Department resources among its various enforcement respon-
sibilities. A "drug czar" would also be tempted to intrude into
pending investigations and prosecutions thereby jeopardizing sen-
sitive cases.
Similarly, a "drug czar" may be inclined to order Depart-
ment of Defense support of enforcement operations without proper
regard for military preparedness. */ The Secretary of Defense
*/ In P.L. 97-86, which authorizes limited military assistance
to civilian law enforcement, the Congress specifically directed
that the military may not assist civilian law enforcement if to
do so would jeopardize military preparedness.
- 6 -
is in the best position to assess the level of support which the
military can properly provide to law enforcement.
A "drug czar" may be inclined to focus Coast Guard resources
on drug interdiction to the exclusion of its important safety
and navigational responsibilities. He may be tempted to focus
Customs Service and IRS efforts upon drug enforcement to the
exclusion of collection of customs duties and tax administration.
The Secretaries of Transportation and Treasury are in the best
position to allocate their resources among their various areas
of responsibility.
A single-minded "drug czar" may also be inclined to make
the same mistakes made by some Members of Congress who have
introduced legislation to cut off all military and foreign assis-
tance to foreign nations which do not cooperate adequately with
the United States in drug enforcement -- without regard to other
foreign policy considerations or the ability of the foreign gov-
ernment, given internal political considerations, to stop drug
production or trafficking within its own boundaries. Such a
single-minded and inflexible approach to foreign policy would be
dangerous. The Secretary of State is in the best position to
conduct foreign policy.
Cabinet heads can best manage their own Departments and
only the President can balance all of those competing interests
with respect to issues that transcend Departmental lines. A
"drug czar" would be totally ill-equipped to assess overall
defense, foreign relations, criminal justice, tax collection,
public safety and national security needs. The Founding Fathers
- 7 -
were wise to establish one office to oversee the Executive Branch:
the Presidency. Prudence would distate caution in tampering with
that arrangement, particularly over the objection of the President.
Our belief has been and continues to be that creation of a
"drug czar" with vague and expansive powers would actually set
back drug enforcement efforts. The only question in our minds
has been how great that setback would be and what additional
adverse side-effects such legislation would produce for our nation
and our traditional system of Executive Branch organization.
No one doubts the enormous magnitude of the drug problem.
Everyone wants to see greater success in all areas of our drug
control effort. Certainly, I can understand that there will
always be disagreement as to whether existing drug policy is
sufficiently detailed or whether each of the various components
of that policy is receiving appropriate emphasis. I can under-
stand how the incredible complexity of the drug problem can lead
some to conclude that there can never be enough coordination of
effort. I can understand how the tremendous difficulties inherent
in attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of our drug programs
can produce wildly varying appraisals as to the level of success
which we are achieving.
Again, however, the simple fact is that this Administration
has taken unprecedented steps to establish a cohesive and well
orchestrated drug control program. We in the Executive Branch
have the ideal organizational arrangement to produce a coordinat-
ed effort. The various agencies and Departments with responsi-
bilities over the diverse aspects of the drug problem all serve
- 8 -
under the President, and the heads of those components serve at
his pleasure. Moreover, the strong public commitment to drug
control -- which we fully share -- provides the impetus for
coordination of our federal effort.
BILLS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE
Turning to the two specific proposals before the Subcommit-
tee, I note that H.R. 3326, like previous proposals would estab-
lish a "Director of National and International Drug Operations
and Policy." The Director, however, would be the Vice President
or a Cabinet Officer. While this proposal is well intended
beyond any doubt, it threatens the system of Executive Branch
organization which has served us well for two centuries.
It is important to bear in mind that the President could,
administratively, achieve these changes if he so desired. He has
not chosen to do so and neither Vice President Bush or Attorney
General Smith have sought nor desire such powers. While we
recognize that H.R. 3326 seeks to accommodate concerns raised by
the Administration with respect to previous "drug czar" proposals,
it fails to do so as our concern does not relate to the identity
of the person holding that position but rather is based upon the
broad and unprecedented powers which the "drug czar" would be
given.
Similarly, H.R. 3664 seeks to address the concerns we have
raised with respect to previous drug czar proposals. Although
somewhat more precise than prior bills, the broad powers con-
ferred upon the Director by H.R. 3664 raise serious concerns.
- 9 -
H.R. 3664 does represent an improvement over other proposals
in two respects. First, this bill recognizes the existence of
the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the White House and seeks to
enlarge the powers and responsibilities of that existing organi-
zation rather than creating an entirely new entity which would
be superimposed upon the existing structure. This has obvious
advantages both from the standpoint of avoiding needless dupli-
cation of effort and of building upon established organizational
structure.
Second, H.R. 3664 states that the responsibility of the drug
coordinator is to coordinate and oversee federal drug enforcement
efforts and to make recommendations to the President regarding or-
ganizational, management, budget and resource allocation matters.
By comparison, other proposals imply that the "drug czar" could
unilaterally overrule federal departments and agencies with re-
spect to such matters. The new § 202 in H.R. 3664 does raise
questions, however. For example, does the authority of the
Director to establish policies and priorities (§ 202(a)) mean
that the Director could determine that half of the FBI and Crimi-
nal Division resources devoted to labor racketeering or bank-
related fraud must be diverted to narcotics enforcement? In
short, the limits of the drug coordinator's powers to establish
policies and priorities appear unbounded.
Conclusion
As I have indicated, we believe that drug coordination
legislation is not only unnecessary but undesirable. We now
have in place unprecedented coordination mechanisms and will
- 10 -
likely experience some disruption of effort as the result of
any externally imposed change in our existing structure. We
would hope, therefore, that you could see fit to support the
coordination initiatives undertaken by the Administration rather
than acting to modify the structure of the Executive Branch at
this time. In short, we would hope the Congress could forebear
from changing horses in mid-stream.
We all have the same goal. Perhaps we are fortunate that
our major disagreement is how to best organize to achieve it.
I would hope that our approach will not be rejected without having
been given an opportunity to prove itself. We are confident that
the mechanisms now in place will work.
- 11 -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 18, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR GREG JONES
=
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDING Orig. 2 some C by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Statement of Vinsik before the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed
testimony, and finds no objection to it from a legal perspec-
tive.
FFF:JGR:ph 8/18/83
cc: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subject
Chron.