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JGR/Women's Issues (4 of 5)
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135839720
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JGR/Women's Issues (4 of 5)
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
John Roberts' Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Women's Issues
(4 of 5)
Box: 58
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
women's rames
Section-by-section analysis of the Pension Equity Act of 1983
Section 1: Provides a short title for the Act.
Section 2: Lowers the minimum age for plan participation under
ERISA from age 25 to age 21.
Section 3: Lowers the minimum age requirement for plan vesting
under ERISA from age 22 to age 21.
Section 4: Provides that individuals on maternity or paternity
leave will not incur a break in service, on account of absence
from work for purposes of childbirth or child care for a natural
or adopted child, during the year of birth or adoption or, if
the credit is not needed in that year, during the subsequent
year.
Section 5:
a) Requires that the joint and survivor annuity be the normal
mode of benefit payment for any plan which offers an annuity as
an optional mode of benefit payment, not just those plans that
offer an annuity as the normal mode of benefit payment (i.e.,
overturns the court decision in BBS Associates.) Participants
would be permitted to elect not to have payments made in the
form of a joint and survivor annuity.
b) Deletes the present ERISA requirement that participants must
affirmatively elect to receive survivor coverage for the years
the participant is employed by the plan sponsor between early
retirement and normal retirement ages. Replaces this election
with automatic survivor annuity coverage for employees who have
reached early retirement age but have not yet retired.
Employees would be permitted to elect not to receive such
coverage.
c) Deletes the present requirement that a participant and spouse
must be married to each other both for the one-year period
ending on the participant's annuity starting date and for the
one-year period ending on the participant's date of death in
order for the spouse to receive the survivor annuity portion of
a joint and survivor annuity. Replaces this requirement with
one that stipulates only that plans may require that the
participant and spouse be married for the one-year period ending
on the participant's annuity starting date in order for the
spouse to receive a survivor annuity.
d) Deletes the present ERISA provision that permits plans to
specify that the occurrence of non-accidental death within two
years of a participant's election, or revocation of an election,
2
regarding survivor coverage will nullify the effect of the
election.
e) Requires that a participant's election not to take benefits
in the form of a joint and survivor annuity must have consent of
participant's spouse.
Section 6:
a) Specifies that ERISA's anti-assignment/alienation provisions
are not applicable to domestic relations orders that a plan
determines to be qualified. Domestic relations orders are
orders relating to child support, alimony payments, or marital
property rights. The orders must specifically identify the
participant and alternate payee and other details relating to
the payments to which the order applies. Although the order may
not require the plan to alter its basic practices relating to
such matters as the timing of benefit commencement or benefit
elections, etc., an order may require that a distribution to an
alternate payee who is an ex-spouse be paid in any. form of
benefits that would be available to the participant under the
plan.
b) Amends ERISA's preemption provisions to specify that, not-
withstanding state law, benefits under an employee benefit plan
may not be assigned or alienated except as expressly provided in
ERISA's anti-assignment/alienation provisions.
3
c) Clarifies the Internal Revenue Code provisions concerning
favorable tax treatment of lump-sum distributions to specify
that payment of a distribution to an alternate payee, pursuant
to a domestic relations order, from a participant's accrued
pension benefits will not affect the ability of the participant
to elect lump-sum treatment for those accrued benefits.
d) Permits an alternate payee who receives a lump-sum payment
from a participant's accrued pension benefits, pursuant to a
domestic relations order, to be eligible for the favorable tax
treatment of lump-sum distributions under the Internal Revenue
Code.
e) Prorates participant's employee pension contributions
(i.e., "the investment in the contract") between participant and
an alternate payee under a domestic relations order who is an
ex-spouse SO that ex-spouse may receive part of divorce
distribution on a tax-free basis.
f) Permits an alternate payee who is an ex-spouse and who
receives a lump-sum distribution pursuant to a qualified
domestic relations order to roll over the distribution to an
IRA.
Section 7: Requires that participants be notified, on their
individual employee benefit statements and the statements given
to terminated vested participants, of benefits that would be
4
forfeitable if the participant were to die before a specified
date.
Section 8: Increases the level at which a plan may cash out a
participant's accrued benefits from $1,750 to $3,500.
Section 9: Sets effective dates for the bill.
The bill, in general, would be effective as of enactment
for plans not in existence on the date of enactment. For
existing plans, the bill would be effective for plan years
beginning after December 31, 1984, (There would be a special
rule for collectively-bargained plans.)
The bill contains special effective dates for certain
provisions. The joint and survivor annuity rules would be
applicable only for participants who had not died or retired
before the bill's effective date.
The anti-assignment/alienation provisions basically would
be applicable as of the bill's enactment and would apply only to
domestic relations orders under which payments had not commenced
on or before enactment of the bill. Between the date of
enactment and the general effective date of the bill, however, a
plan would not be required to comply with the terms of a
5
domestic relations order which required the plan to alter the
form of benefits available under the plan.
The cash-out rules of the bill would be effective as of the
date of the bill's enactment.
6
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1983
FOR:
FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
PETER J. RUSTHOVEN
Galb
SUBJECT:
Memorandum for Kenneth Duberstein from
Robert McConnell on Equal Rights Amendment
John Roberts and I have reviewed the above-referenced memorandum,
which Assistant Attorney General McConnell blind-copied to you
(evidently on a "for your information" basis).
The memorandum reports that Representative James Sensenbrenner
(R.-Wis.) plans to offer an amendment to the re-introduced
Equal Rights Amendment, "clarifying" that the ERA will have no
effect on abortion issues. The memorandum further advises
that Representative Don Edwards (D.-Cal.), Chairman of the
relevant House Judiciary Subcommittee, plans to "pull" the ERA
from further consideration should Sensenbrenner's amendment be
adopted.
I see no problem with either the substance of Sensenbrenner's
proposed amendment or the practical effect it will have if it
is adopted and Edwards' "threat" is carried out. More generally,
neither John nor I see any need for comment on this memorandum
by our office, either to McConnell or Duberstein.
CC: John G. Roberts, Jr.
ID #
CU
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
o . OUTGOING
H . INTERNAL
I . INCOMING
PR/JR
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: Robert A. McConnell
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Equal Rights amendment and abortion
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
CUHOLL
ORIGINATOR 83,11,04
/ /
-
Referral Note:
WDT 09
A 83,11,04
/ /
WATI8
Referral Note:
A
83,11,04
/ 1
Referral Note:
/ /
/ /
-
Referral Note:
/ /
/ 1
-
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A- - Appropriate Action
1. - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A- Answered
C Completed
C . Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - . Non-Special Referral
S - Suspended
D Draft Response
S - For Signature
F. . Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
Department of Justice
Office of Legislative Affairs
bee: FRED FIELDING
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
November 1, 1983
MEMORANDUM
TO
:
Kenneth Duberstein
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs
FROM: Robert 2. McConnell
Assista Attorney General
RE
:
Equal Eights Amendment
During a meeting of House Judiciary Republicans prior
to full Committee markup this morning, Congressman
Sensenbrenner provided advance notice to other committee
members on the status of Don Edward's Subcommittee's acti-
vities on the Equal Rights Amendment.
He indicated that Edwards plans a markup for this
Friday and full committee action next week. He also indi-
cated that Edwards is planning to move on a fast track
through the Rules Committee onto the floor before Congress
breaks at the end of the month.
Jim indicated that he will be offering an amendment
relating to abortion. He described his amendment as
establishing that the ERA has nothing to do with abortion;
he wants to make it clear that abortion is a fight that will
have to be fought at a different time and on a different
legislative vehicle. He indicated that he has a 70-plus
page report from the Congressional Reference Service
indicating that were the Equal Rights Amendment to be adopted,
the Hyde amendment would be essentially overturned.
Sensenbrenner's amendment is designed to say that the Equal
Rights Amendment has nothing to do with abortion. He indi-
cates that during the hearings on the Equal Rights Amendment
he has questioned supporters of the ERA. All became annoyed
at being questioned on abortion, having taken the position
that the ERA has nothing to do with abortion. Nevertheless,
he also indicates that Edwards has told him that if the
Sensenbrenner amendment is adopted, Edwards will "pull" the
ERA from further consideration.
To date the Department has not been actively involved in
the legislative process on this item, however, I forward this
information to you for your use as you deem appropriate.
CC: The Attorney General
The Deputy Attorney General
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 8, 1983
FOR:
FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
SUBJECT:
Draft Memorandum to Selected Departments and
Agencies re the Interagency Committee on
Women's Business Enterprise
Richard Darman has asked for comments by c.o.b. November 9
on the above-referenced draft memorandum. The memorandum,
prepared by Becky Norton Dunlop, asks the appropriate
department and agency heads to designate an individual to
serve on the reactivated Interagency Committee on Women's
Business Enterprise. This Committee, established by
Executive Order 12138 (May 18, 1979) (copy attached), had
become inactive, but the President announced his intention
to reactivate it last May, originally naming Bay Buchanan as
the new chairperson. The purpose of the Committee is to
ensure and monitor implementation of the Executive Order,
which mandates "affirmative action" to promote women's
business enterprise.
You will recall that when we were consulted on this question
(one-half hour before the announcement), we expressed
reservations in light of the affirmative action language in
the Carter executive order, including language supporting
the acceptability of numerical set-asides. We did not block
the announcement on this ground, however, because the
affirmative action language was vague enought to fit (albeit
uncomfortably) within this Administration's definiton of
affirmative action, and because the Executive Order directed
all departments and agencies to consult with the Department
of Justice concerning what sorts of actions would be
appropriate. We raised the question with the Justice
Department (Civil Rights Division), and they had no
objection to reactivating the Committee.
Buchanan's tenure as chairperson was short-lived, because of
the requirement that those serving on the Committee be
government employees. Dunlop was named to succeed Buchanan,
and Nancy Risque and Ann Wrobleski have been named as
representatives of the Executive Office of the President.
The proposed memorandum asks agency heads to designate their
representatives and to cooperate with the Committee. It
-2-
also states "I expect the heads of all departments and
agencies to support this goal through federal programming
which provides equitable opportunities for women business
owners. " This could be taken by some to justify quotas, but
since it is phrased in terms of "opportunities, I have no
objection.
A draft is attached for your signature, noting that we have
no legal objection to the proposed memorandum.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 8, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDING
Orig. signed by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Draft Memorandum to Selected Departments and
Agencies re the Interagency Committee on
Women's Business Enterprise
Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced draft
memorandum, and finds no objection to it from a legal
perspective. In the last sentences of the fifth and sixth
paragraphs, however, "which" should be "that."
FFF: JGR:ph 11/8/83
CC: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subject
Chron.
Chapter 13-Business Credit and Assistance
SEC. 8. Prior Executive Order. Executive Order No. 11458 of March
5, 1969, is hereby superseded.
Executive Order 11871-Transferring the SCORE and ACE programs
from the ACTION Agency to the Small Business Administration
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 11871 of July 18, 1975, appear at 40 FR
30915, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 1011, unless otherwise noted.
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 12 of the Small
Business Act (72 Stat. 394, 15 U.S.C. 641), the Domestic Volunteer
Service Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 394, 42 U.S.C. 4951 et seq.), Section 301
of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United
States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
SECTION. 1. All functions, powers, and duties vested in the ACTION
Agency or its Director under Title III of the Domestic Volunteer Serv-
ice Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 404, 42 U.S.C. 5031, et seq.), which relate to a
Service Corps of Retired Executives ("SCORE") and an Active Corps
of Executives ("ACE") are hereby transferred to the Small Business
Administration.
SEC. 2. All the functions, powers, and duties vested in the ACTION
Agency or its Director under Title IV of the Domestic volunteer Serv-
ice Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 405, 42 U.S.C. 5041, et seq.), which are inci-
dental to or necessary for the performance of the functions, powers,
and duties transferred by Section 1 of this Order, are hereby transferred
to the Small Business Administration.
SEC. 3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude the ACTION Agency or
its Director from continuing, establishing, or conducting volunteer pro-
grams to carry out his other responsibilities as provided for in Title III
or Title IV of the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973.
SEC. 4. The authority of the President under Section 12 of the Small
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 641) to provide for appropriate transfers of re-
cords, property, necessary personnel, and unexpended balances of ap-
propriations and other funds in connection with the transfers provided
by this Order is hereby delegated to the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, who shall take such action as he deems appropri-
ate to enable the proper performance of the functions, powers, and
duties transferred by this Order.
SEC. 5. The rights, privileges, and disabilities attaching to volunteers
under Title III and Title IV of the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of
1973, and to Federal employees otherwise entitled to Civil Service pro-
tection and transferred hereunder, shall not be otherwise affected by
this transfer.
SEC. 6. This Order shall be effective on the fifteenth day of July,
1975.
Executive Order 12138-Creating a National Women's Business Enter-
prise Policy and prescribing arrangements for developing, coordinat-
ing and implementing a national program for women's business en-
terprise
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12138 of May 18, 1979, appear at 44 FR
29637, 3 CFR, 1979 Comp., p. 393, unless otherwise noted.
231
Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
In response to the findings of the Interagency Task Force on Women
Business Owners and congressional findings that recognize:
Depart
1. the significant role which small business and women entrepreneurs
sponsit
can play in promoting full employment and balanced growth in our
1-2.
economy;
Enterpr
2. the many obstacles facing women entrepreneurs; and
1-201
3. the need to aid and stimulate women's business enterprise;
in an el
By the authority vested in me as President of the United States of
on Wc:
America, in order to create a National Women's Business Enterprise
1-201
Policy and to prescribe arrangements for developing, coordinating and
Chairpe
implementing a national program for women's business enterprise, it is
be the I
ordered as follows:
prescriti
1-1. Responsibilities of the Federal Departments and Agencies.
The Ch
1-101. Within the constraints of statutory authority and as otherwise
office C
1-203
permitted by law:
(a) Each department and agency of the Executive Branch shall take
other m
from an
appropriate action to facilitate, preserve and strengthen women's busi-
ness enterprise and to ensure full participation by women in the free
pointme
consider
enterprise system.
(b) Each department and agency shall take affirmative action in sup-
departm
bers of
port of women's business enterprise in appropriate programs and activi-
ties including but not limited to:
Defense,
(1) management, technical, financial, and procurement assistance.
Develop
(2) business-related education, training, counseling and information
Federal
Science
dissemination, and
Small Bi
(3) procurement.
(c) Each department or agency empowered to extend Federal finan-
voting m
cial assistance to any program or activity shall issue regulations requir-
and at le
ing the recipient of such assistance to take appropriate affirmative
tive Office
1-204.
action in support of women's business enterprise and to prohibit actions
or policies which discriminate against women's business enterprise on
Chairper
the ground of sex. For purposes of this subsection, Federal financial as-
according
1-205.
sistance means assistance extended by way of grant, cooperative agree-
ment, loan or contract other than a contract of insurance of guaranty.
provide /
These regulations shall prescribe sanctions for noncompliance. Unless
support I
the Chief
otherwise specified by law, no agency sanctions shall be applied until
or in suc!
the agency or department concerned has advised the appropriate person
or persons of the failure to comply with its regulations and has deter-
policies e
mined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.
other pro
tee.
1-102. For purposes of this Order, affirmative action may include,
but is not limited to, creating or supporting new programs responsive to
1-3. Fu
the special needs of women's business enterprise, establishing incentives
consistent
to promote business or business-related opportunities for women's busi-
1-301. ]
ness enterprise, collecting and disseminating information in support of
erations e
women's business enterprise, and insuring to women's business enter-
which ma
prise knowledge of and ready access to business-related services and re-
ening of
sources. If, in implementing this order, an agency undertakes to use or
comprehe
to require compliance with numerical set-asides, or similar measures, it
women's
shall state the purpose of such measure, and the measure shall be de-
and agenc
signed on the basis of pertinent factual findings of discrimination against
1-302. )
women's business enterprise and the need for such measure.
to govern
1-103. In carrying out their responsibilities under Section 1-1, the de-
partments and agencies shall consult the Department of Justice, and the
2 EDITORI
Public Law 9
232
Chapter 13-Business Credit and Assistance
Department of Justice shall provide legal guidance concerning these re-
sponsibilities.
1-2. Establishment of the Interagency, Committee on Women's Business
Enterprise.
1-201. To help insure that the actions ordered above are carried out
in an effective manner, I hereby establish the Interagency Committee
on Women's Business Enterprise (hereinafter called the Committee).
1-202. The Chairperson of the Committee (hereinafter called the
Chairperson) shall be appointed by the President. The Chairperson shall
be the presiding officer of the Committee and shall have such duties as
prescribed in this Order or by the Committee in its rules of procedure.
The Chairperson may also represent his or her department, agency or
office on the Committee.
1-203. The Committee shall be comnposed of the Chairperson and
other members appointed by the heads of departments and agencies
from among high level policy-making officials. In making these ap-
pointments, the recommendations of the Chairperson shall be taken into
consideration. The following departments and agencies and such other
departments and agencies as the Chairperson shall select shall be mem-
bers of the Committee: the Departments of Agriculture; Commerce;
Defense; Energy; Health, Education, and Welfare;1 Housing and Urban
Development; Interior; Justice; Labor; Transportation; Treasury; the
Federal Trade Commission; General Services Administration; National
Science Foundation; Office of Federal Procurement Policy; and the
Small Business Administration. These members shall have a vote. Non-
voting members shall include the Executive Director of the Committee
and at least one but no more than three representatives from the Execu-
tive Office of the President appointed by the President.
1-204. The Committee shall meet at least quarterly at the call of the
Chairperson, and at such other times as may be determined to be useful
according to the rules of procedure adopted by the Committee.
1-205. The Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall
provide an Executive Director and adequate staff and administrative
support for the Committee. The staff shall be located in the Office of
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration,
or in such other office as may be established specifically to further the
policies expressed herein. Nothing in this Section prohibits the use of
other properly available funds and resources in support of the Commit-
tee.
1-3. Functions of the Committee. The Committee shall in a manner
consistent with law:
1-301. Promote, coordinate and monitor the plans, programs and op-
erations of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch
which may contribute to the establishment, preservation and strength-
ening of women's business enterprise. It may, as appropriate, develop
comprehensive interagency plans and specific program goals for
women's business enterprise with the cooperation of the departments
and agencies.
1-302. Establish such policies, definitions, procedures and guidelines
to govern the implementation, interpretation and application of this
1 EDITORIAL NOTE: Redesignated as the Department of Health and Human Services by
Public Law 96-88 (93 Stat. 695, 20 U.S.C. 3508).
233
Codification of Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders
order, and generally perform such functions and take such steps as the
Committee may deem to be necessary or appropriate to achieve the
purposes and carry out the provisions hereof.
1-303. Promote the mobilization of activities and resources of State
and local governments, business and trade associations, private industry,
colleges and universities, foundations, professional organizations, and
volunteer and other groups toward the growth of women's business en-
terprise, and facilitate the coordination of the efforts of these groups
with those of the departments and agencies.
1-304. Make an annual assessment of the progress made in the Feder-
al Government toward assisting women's business enterprise to enter
the mainstream of business ownership and to provide recommendations
for future actions to the President.
1-305. Convene and consult as necessary with persons inside and out-
side government to develop and promote new ideas concerning the de-
1
velopment of women's business enterprise.
1-306. Consider the findings and recommendations of government
and private sector investigations and studies of the problems of women
entrepreneurs, and promote further research into such problems.
(
1-307. Design a comprehensive and innovative plan for a joint Feder-
t
al and private sector effort to develop increased numbers of new
women-owned businesses and larger and more successful women-
I
owned businesses. The plan should set specific reasonable targets which
Il
can be achieved at reasonable and identifiable costs and should provide
for the measurement of progress towards these targets at the end of
S
two and five years. Related outcomes such as income and tax revenues
o
generated, jobs created, new products and services introduced or new
a
domestic or foreign markets created should also be projected and meas-
r
ured in relation to costs wherever possible. The Committee should
o
submit the plan to the President for approval within six months of the
tl
effective date of this Order.
n
1-4. Other Responsibilities of the Federal Departments and Agencies.
o
1-401. The head of each department and agency shall designate a
II
high level official to have the responsibility for the participation and
cooperation of that department or agency in carrying out this Execu-
th
tive order. This person may be the same person who is the department
or agency's representative to the Committee.
1-402. To the extent permitted by law, each department and agency
upon request by the Chairperson shall furnish information, assistance
and reports and otherwise cooperate with the Chairperson and the
Committee in the performance of their functions hereunder. Each de-
77
partment or agency shall ensure that systematic data collection process-
es are capable of providing the Committee current data helpful in eval-
U
uating and promoting the efforts herein described.
of
1-403. The officials designated under Section 1-401, when so request-
di
ed, shall review the policies and programs of the women's business en-
he
terprise program, and shall keep the Chairperson informed of proposed
budget, plans and programs of their departments or agencies affecting
women's business enterprise.
1-404. Each Federal department or agency, within constraints of law,
no
shall continue current efforts to foster and promote women's business
fiv
enterprise and to support the program herein set forth, and shall coop-
bu
234
Chapter 13-Business Credit and Assistance
erate with the Chairperson and the Committee in increasing the total
Federal effort.
1-5. Reports.
1-501. The Chairperson shall, promptly after the close of the fiscal
year, submit to the President a full report of the activities of the Com-
mittee hereunder during the previous fiscal year. Further, the Chairper-
son shall, from time to time, submit to the President the Committee's
recommendations for legislation or other action to promote the pur-
poses of this Order.
1-502. Each Federal department and agency shall report to the
Chairperson as hereinabove provided on a timely basis so that the
Chairperson and the Committee can consider such reports for the Com-
mittee report to the President.
1-6. Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following defini-
tions shall apply:
1-601. "Women-owned business" means a business that is at least 51
percent owned by a woman or women who also control and operate it.
"Control" in this context means exercising the power to make policy
decisions. "Operate" in this context means being actively involved in
the day-to-day management.
1-602. "Women's business enterprise" means a woman-owned busi-
ness or businesses or the efforts of a woman or women to establish,
maintain or develop such a business or businesses.
1-603. Nothing in subsections 1-601 or 1-602 of this Section (1-6)
should be construed to prohibit the use of other definitions of a woman-
owned business or women's business enterprise by departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch where other definitions are deemed
reasonable and useful for any purpose not inconsistent with the purpose
of this Order. Wherever feasible, departments and agencies should use
the definition of a woman-owned business in subsection 1-601 above for
monitoring performance with respect to women's business enterprise in
order to assure comparability of data throughout the Federal Govern-
ment.
1-7. Construction. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as limiting
the meaning or effect of any existing Executive order.
Executive Order 12190-Advisory Committee on Small and Minority
Business Ownership
SOURCE: The provisions of Executive Order 12190 of Feb. 1, 1980, appear at 45 FR
7773, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 136, unless otherwise noted.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the
United States of America and in order to implement Section 7(j)(3)(A)
of the Small Business Act (92 Stat. 1765, 15 U.S.C. 636(j)(3)(A)), which
directs the creation of an advisory committee for certain purposes, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
1-1. Establishment of Committee.
1-101. There is established an Advisory Committee on Small and Mi-
nority Business Ownership composed of five high-level officers from
five United States businesses and five representatives of minority small
businesses.
235
ID #.
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WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
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Subject: Draft Memorandum to Selected Departments
and agencies he: the Interaging Committee
on Women's Business Caterguise
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/
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-
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/ /
/ /
Referral Note:
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to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
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5/81
Document No.
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
11/4/83
11/9/83
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO SELECTED DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES RE
SUBJECT:
THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
HICKEY
MEESE
JENKINS
BAKER
McFARLANE
DEAVER
McMANUS
STOCKMAN
MURPHY
DARMAN
P
SS
ROGERS
DUBERSTEIN
SPEAKES
FELDSTEIN
SVAHN
FIELDING
VERSTANDIG
FULLER
WHITTLESEY
GERGEN
HERRINGTON
REMARKS:
May we have any edits/comments by close of business November 9.
Thank you.
RESPONSE:
6:40p
Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702
Received SS
1983 NOV -4 PM 3 26
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 4, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR DICK DARMAN
FROM:
BECKY NORTON DUNLOPU
BOND
SUBJECT:
Presidential Directive on
Interagency Committee on Women's
Business Enterprise
We are now at work on the reestablishment of
this Committee. Now that Nancy and Ann have
been cleared and announced, we are eager to
move ahead with the departmental and agency
representatives.
This memorandum from the President would firmly
establish this work as a priority and encourage
rapid decision-making on the membership.
I submit this draft for clearance. Please
advise me should you need further information
or material.
DRAFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
(those designated to provide member)
Recently, I reactivated the Interagency Committee on
Women's Business Enterprise.
Becky Norton Dunlop was appointed Chairperson and Nancy
Risque and Ann Wrobleski were appointed as
representatives of the Executive Office of the
President.
This Interagency Committee will promote, coordinate,
and monitor greater efforts on behalf of women-owned
businesses by the Federal government.
Federal Departments and Agencies are directed to
cooperate with the Committee and to take appropriate
action to facilitate, preserve and strengthen women's
business ownership. To that end, = have asked the
Chairperson to work with each of you to designate an
individual to serve on the Committee. At the same
time, you should appoint an alternate and provide for
support staff.
Although our attainments in this area have been
commendable to date, we cannot afford to slacken our
pace. I will be looking to each of you to strengthen
policies and programs which aid women's business
ownership.
We must ensure that women business owners can fully
participate in our economic system and this memorandum
emphasizes my personal commitment to support this goal.
I expect the heads of all departments and agencies to
support this goal through federal programming which
provides equitable opportunities for women business
owners.
With your commitment and cooperation, we can greatly
improve the opportunities for women business owners.
RONALD REAGAN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 15, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
DJR
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 1 -- Equal Rights Amendment
Richard Darman asked for immediate comments on the attached
proposed Administration policy statement. As you know, the
Equal Rights Amendment is being considered in the House
today on the suspension calendar -- only forty minutes of
debate, with no consideration of amendments. The proposed
policy statement objects to this procedure for a Constitu-
tional amendment, without comment on the merits beyond
reaffirming that the Administration supports equality of
rights for all citizens.
After conferring with Mr. Hauser, I advised Darman's office
that we had no legal objection to the proposed statement. I
also advised that we would not object should policy offices
in the White House desire to include a statement of our
continuing opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment on the
merits.
Attachment
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CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
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1
Name of Correspondent: Richard G. DARMAN
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Subject:
H.J. Res. / - Equal Rights amendment
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83/11/15
Referral Note:
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D 83,11,15
58311115
SAP
Referral Note:
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-
Referral Note:
Referral Note:
1 12
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
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1 Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
c Completed
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S -Suspended
D Draft Response
$ For Signature
F Furnish Fact Sheet
K Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
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"A"
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Comments:
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5/81
Document No.
WHITE' HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
DATE:
11/15/83
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
IMMEDIATELY
SUBJECT: H.J. RES. 1 -EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
HICKEY
MEESE
JENKINS
BAKER
McFARLANE
DEAVER
McMANUS
STOCKMAN
MURPHY
DARMAN
P
85 ROGERS
DUBERSTEIN
SPEAKES
FELDSTEIN
SVAHN
FIELDING
VERSTANDIG
FULLER
WHITTLESEY
GERGEN
HERRINGTON
REMARKS:
May we have any comments as soon as possible. This is scheduled for
suspension calendar in the House this morning. Thank you.
RESPONSE:
11/15
4.30am
Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702
OFFICE en 1 MMV PRESIDENT STATES a UNITED
STATEMENT OF
Received SS
ADMINISTRATION
1983 NOV 15 AM 9 14
POLICY
November 15, 1983
(House)
H.J. RES. 1 - Equal Rights Amendment
Although the Administration supports equality of rights for all
citizens, it believes it inappropriate to consider a Constitutional
Amendment on the suspension calendar. Thus, it recommends that
H.J. Res. 1 be removed from the suspension calendar for consider-
ation of amendments and further debate.
John G. Roberts, Jr.
112 OEOB
Associate Counsel to the President
WHITE HOU
DIGE
WHITE HOUSE DIGEST
is a service provided by the
White House Office of Media Relations and Planning
November 18, 1983
PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND DETERRENCE
The Administration's Policies and Programs
INTRODUCTION
Every American President has sought
to prevent conflict, reduce the risk of
war, and safeguard the peace. In
addition to these three fundamental
objectives, President Reagan is pursuing
a fourth: substantial reductions in
current levels of nuclear weapons
through genuine arms control.
Peace must be more than a slogan.
Keeping the peace requires hard work,
realistic programs, a commitment to
strong deterrent forces, and the
patience to pursue meaningful arms
reduction negotiations.
Throughout the post-World War II
era, the pursuit of peace with freedom
has been based upon the twin pillars of
For additional information on material contained in this
issue or the DIGEST call: Joseph Lehman, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (202) 632-0392
ii
defense and dialogue; upon the
maintenance of a military equilibrium
coupled with efforts to resolve
differences peacefully and to remove
sources of conflict. The US has been at
the forefront of efforts to limit and
reduce nuclear arsenals and to prevent
war.
American arms control efforts have
sought to strengthen both these pillars,
to stabilize a military balance at the
lowest possible levels, and at the same
time to enhance mutual confidence and
expand the area of understanding between
nations.
The Reagan Administration has
fashioned its security policies upon
this proven basis of defense and
dialogue, while giving added emphasis to
stability, significant reductions, and
effective verification as objectives for
arms control. The continued growth of
Soviet military power has required us to
improve our own defenses to assure a
credible deterrent, but it has also led
us to intensify and expand our efforts
through negotiations to reverse the
growth in armaments.
The nuclear age has given us a
special and most critical challenge --
that of removing the threat of nuclear
war. This Administration has been
especially aware of that challenge and
of the fact that there are no easy and
simple solutions. President Reagan
succintly expressed both the challenge
as we see it and the way to meet it:
"
in today's world, the existence of
nuclear weapons could mean, if not the
extinction of mankind, then surely the
end of civilization as we know it.
We must not allow ourselves to be
paralyzed by the problem, to abdicate
our moral duty
I intend to search for
peace along two parallel paths --
deterrence and arms reductions. I
believe these are the only paths that
offer any real hope for an enduring
"
peace.
iii
The following pages outline how we
are conducting the search for peace
today -- and the importance of both
deterrence and arms reductions to
building the more lasting peace we all
seek.
Section One describes America's
current arms control efforts. The
United States is embarked on the most
ambitious arms reductions agenda ever
developed, while also seeking measures
to reduce the possibility of
misunderstanding or miscalculation. The
record speaks for itself.
Section Two explains our deterrence
policy and describes the changed
military balance, the US modernization
programs required for deterrence, and
the reductions in the US nuclear weapons
stockpile.
Section Three provides a
representative collection of President
Reagan's personal views on questions of
peace, deterrence, and arms reduction.
SECTION I
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ARMS REDUCTION AGENDA
"We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple."
(President Reagan, 1983)
Today, we are embarked on the most ambitious arms reduction
agenda ever developed by any Administration. We are
negotiating directly with the Soviet Union about deep
reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
weapons. We and our NATO Allies are negotiating with the
Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies about cutting
conventional forces in Europe. And we are negotiating with
the Soviet Union and other interested nations about an
effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We have
also asked the Soviet Union to join us in efforts to ensure
that nuclear testing limits can be effectively verified.
And we have asked the Soviet Union and others to join with
us in the search for confidence-building agreements that can
help reduce the risk of accidental war.
The United States along with its Allies have periodically
and unilaterally reduced nuclear weapons inventories to
ensure that our posture is that needed for deterrence, and
no more and to serve as a positive example to other nations.
Today's efforts build upon the experience of more than three
decades, upon the agreements already achieved, and upon the
lessons learned from past successes and failures. Our
efforts have only one purpose -- to reverse the arms
build-up, to establish a more stable military balance at
lower force levels, and to enhance the prospects for lasting
peace.
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS -- THE TRACK RECORD
Strategic Arms Negotiations
The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) deal with the
principal elements of the U.S. andSoviet intercontinental
nuclear weapon. In these negotiations, which began in
Geneva in June 1982, the President has boldly sought to
reverse the trend of past agreements which simply ratified
greater and more destabilizing nuclear arsenals.
The U.S. approach is to secure an equitable,
verifiable agreement which will reduce the number of
ballistic missile warheads by one-third, gain substantial
reductions in the most destabilizing systems, by as much as
one-half, reduce the destructive capacity of nuclear
missiles, and establish limits on bombers and cruise
missiles.
2
In order to facilitate an agreement, the President
has made substantial adjustments to our initial position.
The adjustments made over the last few months have been
taken in close consultations with the Scowcroft Commission
and the Congress and take expressed Soviet concerns into
account. And they include a guaranteed mutual build-down as
recommended by many in the Congress. Strong, bipartisan
support of the Congress and the American people is essential
to success in the negotiations.
The President has expressed a willingness to agree
to trade-offs between areas of U.S. interest or advantage
and areas of Soviet interest and advantage. Everything is
on the table, and our negotiators have great flexibility.
While the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated a
similar flexibility toward reaching agreement, either by
responding positively to our recent initiatives or by
tabling new, more forthcoming proposals of its own, there is
reason for hope. Already, the Soviet Union has agreed to
the importance of reductions and has shown some limited
flexibility on secondary issues. Increased Congressional
support for our defense program and a new bipartisan spirit
in arms control will enhance the likelihood that the Soviets
will increasingly realize that it is time to begin to
negotiate seriously on the central issues.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Negotiations
The INF negotiations which began in November 1981 deal with
the growing imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces.
The focus of the negotiations between the US and the Soviet
Union is on the systems of greatest concern to the two sides
-- the land-based longer-range INF missiles. During the
past two years, the U.S. position has reflected four
initiatives in an effort to address Soviet concerns and to
improve prospects for reaching a stabilizing agreement.
This would reduce the threat to the peace posed by the
Soviet monopoly in this class of weapons and would enhance
the security of both sides.
In November 1981, President Reagan announced the
zero-zero option of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based
INF missiles. The President thereby offered to cancel the
planned deployment of 572 Pershing II and Ground-Launched
Cruise Missiles in return for Soviet elimination of its 600
SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with far more warheads, which
it had been unilaterally deploying for a number of years.
This proposal would eliminate an entire class of nuclear
weapons. The President made clear that the U.S. would also
carefully consider any serious Soviet proposal.
By March 1983, it was clear that the Soviets were
not ready to accept the U.S. proposal. In an effort to move
negotiations forward, the President announced a proposal for
an interim agreement: the U.S. would reduce the planned
3
deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, provided the Soviets
reduced the number of their warheads to an equal level on a
global basis. At the same time, the U.S. made clear that
the zero-zero proposal remained on the table. But no
meaningful Soviet counterproposal was offered.
Notwithstanding Soviet inflexibility, the
President on September 26 and on November 14, 1983,
announced further initiatives designed to move the
negotiations forward and responding to expressed Soviet
concerns. First, we agreed explicitly to include aircraft
in the negotiations and to consider foregoing deploying in
Europe the full complement of missiles we would be allowed
within a global limit. Second, we proposed a specific
interim global limit of 420 warheads on each side, although
we would prefer zero.
Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not yet demonstrated
comparable flexibility. Each Soviet proposal tabled since
the negotiations began in 1981 would have the same basic
outcome: the prohibition any of NATO deployments while the
Soviets retained their substantial monopoly in LRINF
missiles, which now have some 1,400 warheads to our zero.
Conventional Force Reductions in Europe
The negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR) are multilateral negotiations involving
NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. The negotiations, which began
in 1973, result from a NATO initiative to reduce the unequal
levels of military manpower of East and West in Central
Europe to equal and significantly lower levels. They are
part of broader efforts by the United States and its allies
to reduce the likelihood of conflict in Central Europe and
to strengthen East-West stability generally. Although the
Warsaw Pact nations nominally accept this goal, their
unwillingness thus far to address their present manpower
superiority, or to accept effective verfication measures to
ensure compliance with an MBFR agreement, remains the main
obstacle to progress.
The goal of the negotiations is the reduction of
each side's military manpower in Central Europe to parity at
a level of 700,000 ground force personnel and a maximum of
900,000 air and ground force personnel combined.
In MBFR's 10-year existence, both East and West
have made a variety of proposals. On both sides, however,
there has been a strong continuity in negotiating
objectives. The West has consistently sought parity of
forces at a reduced level. The East, with equal
consistency, has resisted effective acceptance of parity.
Initially, it rejected equality explicitly; later, it did SO
implicitly, accepting parity as a goal but refusing to admit
to the size of its current forces and, consequently, to the
size of reductions that would be needed to arrive at parity.
It has refused to provide sufficient detail on how it would
go about ensuring compliance.
4
In July 1982, the West tabled a new draft treaty,
marking a further effort to address expressed Warsaw
Pact/Soviet concerns while preserving the Western
requirement for parity and effective verification. The
major innovation of the Western draft is that it would bind
all direct participants in one agreement to undertake the
reductions required to reach the reduced ceiling. This
provision seeks to address the frequently expressed Soviet
concern that initial Soviet reductions might not be followed
by reductions in the forces of the United States' NATO
allies. The East has yet to respond constructively.
Confidence-Building Measures
Confidence-building measures are designed to enhance mutual
knowledge and understanding about military forces and
activities. Their overall purpose is to reduce the
possibility of an accidental East-West confrontation,
miscalculation, or failure of communication; to inhibit
opportunities for surprise attack; and to increase stability
in times of calm or crisis.
U.S.-Soviet confidence-building measures include
the "Hotline" Agreement and the "Accidents Measures" to
reduce the risk of accidential outbreak of nuclear war.
Multilateral measures in force are also contained in the
Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) signed in Helsinki in 1975. The principal
feature of the CSCE measures is the agreement of both East
and West to prior notification of large military maneuvers.
This concept has also been incorporated into the Western
proposals at the MBFR negotiations.
In 1982, President Reagan proposed a new set of
bilateral confidence-building measures, including prior
notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notifi-
cation of major military exercises, and expanded exchange of
forces data. These proposals have been tabled at the START
and INF negotiations. In addition, the US has proposed and
begun bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union to improve
the hotline, establish a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Military
Communications Link and improve embassy-capital
communications. We have also proposed a multilateral
agreement on consultations concerning unexplained nuclear
incidents. When the Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) begins in
Stockholm in January 1984, we will seek agreement on
additional measures which would inhibit opportunities for
surprise attack in Europe.
Chemical Weapons
The Soviet Union and its allies have employed chemical and
toxin weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos in
violation of existing arms control agreements outlawing use
5
of such weapons. An immediate challenge is to bring all
parties, including the Soviet Union, into compliance with
existing international agreements outlawing the use of
chemical weapons while also achieving agreement on new
accords that would impose a comprehensive and verifiable ban
on chemical weapons.
Towards these ends, the United States is seeking
to improve compliance with existing international
agreements. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the
United States and its allies are seeking a complete and
verifiable ban on chemical weapons production, stockpiling
possession, transfer, and use. Whether we can achieve this
objective will depend largely on whether the Soviet Union is
willing to accept effective provisions for verification and
compliance.
The US maintains a limited stock of chemical
weapons as a deterrent against the use of such weapons
against the US and our Allies, and as an incentive to the
Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable, worldwide chemical
weapons ban. Our program to begin modernization of this
deterrent stockpile after 14 years of unilateral restraint
is intended to increase the prospects for achieving such a
comprehensive ban.
Nuclear Testing
While achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing
remains the ultimate US objective, progress toward that goal
is a step-by-step process. In the 1970s, the US and the
USSR took steps in that direction when they signed the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty, which limit the size of underground nuclear tests.
However, serious questions have been raised about Soviet
compliance with the limits of these unratified Treaties and
about the adequacy of the Treaties' verification measures.
To help resolve these questions, the United States in 1982
proposed to the Soviet Union that we discuss means to
enhance the verification provisions of the Treaties.
Unfortunately, the Soviets have been unwilling to date to
enter into such discussions with us.
Nonproliferation
The United States is committed to a vigorous program to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This includes
strengthening the 1968 treaty against the spread of nuclear
weapons and our efforts to strengthen international
safeguards on nuclear material and more tightly to control
access to technology relating to the production of nuclear
weapons. Under the Reagan Administration, regular bilateral
talks have been initiated with the Soviet Union to focus on
problems of nuclear proliferation.
6
Outer Space Arms Control
The Administration is in the process of assessing the merits
of a number of outer space arms control proposals, but there
are a number of serious problems related to this area.
These include the difficulty of assuring effective
verification, and the question of the threat posed by the
existing Soviet anti-satellite interceptors and by present
and prospective Soviet satellites which, while not weapons
themselves, are designed to provide direct support to the
Soviet Union's terrestrial forces in the event of a
conflict. The US has been actively involved in establishing
a Working Group to discuss outer space issues at the
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, with a view to
determining what if any new arrangements might be needed or
desirable to further the peaceful uses of space.
7
SECTION II -- DETERRENCE
"The defense policy of the United States is based on a
simple premise: The United States does not start fights
We
maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against
aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace
This strategy
of deterrence
works. But what it takes to maintain
deterrence has changed." (President Reagan, 1983)
Our Policy
US military forces are organized and armed to deter attack and
coercion and to prevent war. It is our policy and that of our
Allies not to use any force, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, except
to deter and defend against aggression. Immediately following
World War II, the United States proposed through the Baruch Plan to
place nuclear weapons under the control of the infant United
Nations -- and out of the hands of any nation-state. Those efforts
foundered and steps had to be taken to ensure that, especially as
nuclear weapons proliferated, they would never be used. To that
end, United States nuclear weapons policy has focused solely on
preventing -- on deterring -- attack that might lead to nuclear
war. That policy has been successful for some 40 years, including
years of severe international tension. There has been no nuclear
conflict. Nor has there been direct military conflict of any sort
between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between East and
West in Europe.
We are under no illusions about the consequences of a nuclear war.
There would be no winners. Thus, deterrence is and must remain the
cornerstone of our nuclear policy and, indeed, of our entire
national security posture.
To this end, we seek to maintain the lowest possible force levels
consistent with the basic requirements of effective deterrence. We
must recognize that two decades of unabated Soviet military growth
and US restraint have created severe imbalances which we must
redress if we are to maintain an effective deterrent. This is why
we must modernize our aging forces even as we pursue genuine arms
control.
The Shifting Military Balance
The facts on the deployment of new military systems during the past
decade and more, reflect an unparalleled Soviet buildup, even in
the face of considerable US and Allied restraint. The facts
include the following:
8
--
Some 3/4 of nuclear warheads on US strategic weapons are on
systems which are more than 15 years old. But 3/4 of the
warheads on Soviet strategic weapons are on systems which are
less than 5 years old.
--
The US deployed no new strategic bomber since the last B-52
was deployed in 1962, while the Soviet Union has deployed more
than 230 intercontinental-range Backfire bombers and is
expected to deploy the Blackjack bomber as well.
--
The US, until last year, had deployed no new strategic
submarine (SSBN) for some 13 years, while the Soviet Union
deployed
6 new classes involving
62 new strategic
submarines during the same period.
--
The US deployed only one new strategic submarine missile
(SLBM) during the past 12 years, while the Soviets deployed 5
new types, involving hundreds of new missiles during the same
period.
--
The US deployed no new land-based strategic missile (ICBM)
since 1969, undertaking only a warhead improvement for a
proportion of its Minuteman force, while the Soviets deployed
at least 3 new types of systems involving over 800 new
missiles and are already testing 2 more new types.
--
While the US destroyed its biological warfare stocks in 1969
and produced no new chemical weapons for 14 years, the Soviet
Union greatly expanded its CBW efforts, and with its proxies
is employing chemicals and toxins against tribesmen in three
countries of Asia.
--
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have substantially
outpaced the United States and its NATO Allies in the
production and deployment of conventional offensive weapons,
including tanks, artillery, etc.
--
In addition to major asymmetries in the production and
deployment of weapons, the Soviet Union and its proxies have
aggressively expanded their military pressure throughout the
world.
The US Nuclear Stockpile
The United States nuclear stockpile and the modernization program
have one purpose and one purpose only: to maintain a military
posture sufficient to convince Soviet leaders that nuclear
aggression cannot, under any circumstances, be in their interest.
Our nuclear weapons are for deterrence and nothing else. This
clear purpose enables the United States to maintain the lowest
possible inventory of nuclear weapons consistent with sustaining a
credible deterrent. The facts provide unequivocal evidence.
9
The total numbers of nuclear weapons in the US stockpile
has declined significantly since its peak in the mid-sixties..
Today, the US has one-third fewer weapons than it had at that time.
Since then many thousands of US weapons have been disassembled and
destroyed, and today the US stockpile is at its lowest level in 20
years.
The destructive power as measured in total yield, or
megatonnage, of the US nuclear weapons stockpile has declined even
more sharply since its peak in the early 1960s. Today, the total
yield of our stockpile is only one-fourth as large as it was then.
Today, the total yield of the US stockpile is at its lowest level
in 25 years. The total yield of the stockpile will not change in
the years ahead.
The same reductions trend has taken place in Europe. In
December, 1979, NATO reached a decision to reduce immediately the
number of shorter-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. In
1980, we carried out that decision by removing 1,000 of these
weapons. The same decision also committed the Alliance to a
further review of the remaining systems of this category.
That review has now been completed, and a decision was made in
October, 1983, that the overall size of the NATO nuclear stockpile
will now be reduced by an additional 1,400 weapons, not counting
those to be withdrawn on a one-for-one basis as new INF systems are
deployed. When these 2,400 weapons have been withdrawn, the US
will have reduced its nuclear weapons in Europe by over one-third
from 1979 levels and NATO will have the lowest number of nuclear
weapons in 20 years.
What this means is that the Alliance will have removed five times
as many nuclear missile warheads as we will deploy if the
negotiations in Geneva do not lead to the agreement we are SO
earnestly seeking.
Conclusion
These numbers and comparisons make clear that due to more than a
decade of enormous Soviet expansion and relative US restraint, we
must modernize the three legs of the strategic triad, and our INF
forces, now if we are to retain the deterrent required to prevent
war, while also providing an incentive to the Soviet Union to
negotiate seriously. Modernization will help persuade the Soviets
that we are serious about deterring war by protecting peace and
freedom, and that it is in the best interest of the Soviet Union,
as well as ours, to achieve the substantial reductions we are
seeking in US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
10
SECTION III
PRESIDENT REAGAN ON PEACE, DETERRENCE, AND ARMS CONTROL
NUCLEAR MUST
"A nuclear war can never be won
NEVER BE FOUGHT
and must never be fought." "
Speech to Japanese
Parliament, Tokyo
November 11, 1983
NEGOTIATE
"We want to reduce the weapons
FOR
of war, pure and simple. All
REDUCTIONS
of our efforts in both the START
and the INF negotiations continue
to be guided by that objective."
Rose Garden
The White House
October 4, 1983
NUCLEAR WAR
"A nuclear war cannot be won and
MUST NEVER
must never be fought.'
BE FOUGHT
United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983
U.S. WILL
"I want to make an unequivocal
ACCEPT ANY
pledge to those gathered today in
EQUITABLE
this world arena. The United States
ARMS REDUCTION
AGREEMENT
seeks and will accept any equitable,
verifiable agreement that stabilizes
forces at lower levels than currently
exist. We are ready to be flexible in
our approach, indeed, willing to
compromise.'
United Nations,
New York
September 26, 1983
11
HIGHEST
"
I have no higher priority than
PRIORITY:
removing the threat of nuclear war
REMOVE THREAT
and seeking the stability necessary
OF NUCLEAR
for true peace. To achieve that
WEAPONS
objective, we must reduce the nuclear
arsenals of both the United States
and the Soviet Union."
Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983
LONG RANGE
"Our current goal must be the
GOAL: BAN ALL
reduction of nuclear arsenals --
NUCLEAR
and I for one believe we must
WEAPONS
never depart from the ultimate
goal of banning them from the face
of the Earth.
Radio Address to
the Nation
July 16, 1983
PROMISES MADE:
"Coming into office, I made two
PEACE THROUGH
promises to the American people
STRENGTH; SEEK
about peace and security: I
ARMS REDUCTIONS
promised to restore our neglected
defenses in order to strengthen
and preserve the peace, and I
promised to pursue reliable
agreements to reduce nuclear
weapons. Both these promises
are being kept. "
Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983
PROGRESS TOWARD
"I pledge to you, my goal-and I
ARMS REDUCTIONS
consider it a sacred trust-will
IS A SACRED TRUST
be to make progress toward arms
reductions in every one of the
several negotiations now underway."
Speech to
Los Angeles World
Affairs Council
March 31, 1983
12
ON INF, ZERO IS
"When it comes to intermediate
BEST. IF
nuclear missiles in Europe, it
SOVIETS WILL
would be better to have none
NOT AGREE, FEW
than to have some. But if there
IS BETTER THAN
must be some, it is better to have
MANY
few than to have many.
If the Soviets will not now agree
to the total elimination of these
weapons, I hope that they will at
least join us in an interim
agreement that would substantially
reduce these forces to equal levels
on both sides.
To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze
has informed his Soviet counterpart
that we are prepared to negotiate
an interim agreement in which the
United States would substantially
reduce its planned deployment of
Pershing II and ground-launched
cruise missiles, provided the
Soviet Union reduce the number of
its warheads on longer-range I.N.F.
missiles to an equal level on a
global basis."
White House Press
Release
March 30, 1983
U.S. MAINTAINS
"The defense policy of the United
STRENGTH TO
States is based on a simple
DETER
premise: The United States does
not start fights. We will never
be an aggressor. We maintain our
strength in order to deter and
defend against aggression-to
preserve freedom and peace.
13
Since the dawn of the atomic age,
we've sought to reduce the risk of
war by maintaining a strong deterrent
and by seeking genuine arms control.
"Deterrence" means simply this:
making sure any adversary who thinks
about attacking the United States, or
our allies, or our vital interests,
concludes that the risks to him
outweigh any potential gains. Once
he understands that, he won't attack.
We maintain the peace through our
strength; weakness only invites
aggression."
TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983
THE STRATEGY OF
"This strategy of deterrence has not
DETERRENCE WORKS
changed. It still works. But what
it takes to maintain deterrence has
changed."
TV Address to
the Nation
March 23, 1983
TAKE WHATEVER
"I remain firmly committed to take
STEPS NEEDED
whatever steps are necessary to
TO ACHIEVE
increase the likelihood of real,
EQUITABLE
substantive progress towards an
NEGOTIATIONS
agreement involving significant
reductions in U.S. and Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenals -- and
in the national security interests
of both sides. Above all, our goal
is to maintain a stable nuclear
balance in order to reduce the
risk of war. Our efforts in the
START negotiations must be guided
by that objective."
Statement on START
Negotiations
The White House
June 8, 1983
14
WHY
"Modernization goes hand-in-hand
MODERNIZATION
with a credible deterrent; both
OF ARMS?
are necessary incentives to
DETERRENCE AND
persuade the Soviets that it is
AS AN INCENTIVE
in their best interest as well
FOR NEGOTIATIONS
as ours to achieve meaningful
arms reductions."
Presidential Op Ed
Washington Post
May 24, 1983
NEGOTIATIONS
"The fundamental U.S. goal in
TO ENHANCE
negotiations concerning arms
SECURITY AND
reduction, and especially in
STABILITY
our approach to the START
negotiations, is to seek
agreements that would enhance
security and stability by
reducing overall force levels
while permitting modernization
of U.S. forces necessary for a
credible deterrent."
Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983
PRUDENT
"At the same time, let me
MODERNIZATION
emphasize that we do not
seek a first strike capability.
To this end, we will constrain
the number of Peacekeeper
missiles to the minimum number
needed to assure the effective-
ness of our deterrent and no more. "
Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983
15
PEACE WITH
"We must both defend freedom and
FREEDOM
preserve the peace. We must stand
true to our principles and our
friends while preventing a
holocaust
We cannot conduct
ourselves as if the special
danger of nuclear weapons did
not exist. But we must not
allow ourselves to be paralyzed
by the problem, to abdicate our
moral duty. This is the challenge
that history has left us. If
Letter to Senators
Percy, Nunn
and Cohen
May 12, 1983
PEACE THROUGH
"We desire peace, but peace is a
DETERRENCE AND
goal not a policy. Lasting peace
ARMS CONTROL
is what we hope for at the end of
our journey; it doesn't describe
the steps we must take, nor the
paths we should follow to reach
that goal. I intend to search
for peace along two parallel
paths-deterrence and arms
reductions. I believe these
are the only paths that offer
any real hope for an enduring
peace."
TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982
NATIONAL WILL
"
unless we demonstrate the
IS KEY TO
will to rebuild our strength
SUCCESS IN
and restore the military
NEGOTIATIONS
balance, the Soviets-since
they're so far ahead-have little
incentive to negotiate with us.
Let me repeat that point, since
it goes to the heart of our
policy. Unless we demonstrate
the will to rebuild our
16
strength, the Soviets have
little incentive to negotiate.
If we hadn't begun to modernize,
the Soviet negotiators would know
we had nothing to bargain with
except talk."
TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982
ABOVE ALL,
"Our children should not grow up
PEACE IS
frightened. They should not fear
THE GOAL
the future. We are working to
make it peaceful and free. I
believe their future can be the
brightest, most exciting of any
generation. We must reassure them
and let them know that their parents
and the leaders of this world are
seeking above all else to keep them
safe and at peace. I consider this
to be a sacred trust."
TV Address to
the Nation
November 22, 1982
REDUCE THE
"There are threats now to our
RISK OF WAR
freedom, indeed to our very
BY REDUCING
existence, that other generations
THE MEANS OF
could never even have imagined.
WAGING IT
There is first the threat of global
war. No President, no Congress, no
Prime Minister, no Parliament can
spend a day entirely free of this
threat. And I don't have to tell
you that in today's world the
existence of nuclear weapons could
mean, if not the extinction of
mankind, then surely the end of
civilization as we know it. That's
why negotiations on intermediate-
range nuclear forces now underway in
Europe and the START talks-Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks-which will
begin later this month, are not just
critical to American or Western
policy; they are critical to mankind.
Our commitment to early success in
these negotiations is firm and
17
unshakable, and our purpose is
clear: reducing the risk of war by
reducing the means of waging war on
both sides."
Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982
NEED TO
"If history teaches anything it
FACE FACTS
teaches self-delusion in the
face of unpleasant facts is
folly."
Address to the
British Parliament
June 8, 1982
DESIRE FOR
"My duty as President is to insure
PEACE MUST BE
that the ultimate nightmare never
MATCHED BY
occurs, that the prairies and the
HARD WORK
cities and the people who inhabit
them remain free and untouched by
nuclear conflict.
I wish more than anything there
were a simple policy that would
eliminate that nuclear danger.
But there are only difficult
policy choices through which
we can achieve a stable nuclear
balance at the lowest possible
level."
Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982
IT TAKES TWO
"We will negotiate seriously,
SIDES TO
in good faith, and carefully
NEGOTIATE
consider all proposals made by
the Soviet Union. If they
approach these negotiations in
the same spirit, I'm confident
that together we can achieve an
agreement of enduring value that
reduces the number of nuclear
18
weapons, halts the growth in
strategic forces, and opens the
way to even more far-reaching
steps in the future."
Commencement Address
Eureka College
May 9, 1982
John Ko perts
WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS
112/080B
November 16, 1983
ABC's "THE DAY AFTER"
"We are a people of peace. We understand the terrible
trauma of human suffering
A nuclear war can never
be won and must never be fought.'
President Reagan
Address to Japanese Diet
November 11, 1983
Nuclear Catastrophe
While the ABC film has already drawn a great deal of
criticism -- much of it justified -- there is one point
upon which all agree: nuclear war is a horror, almost
too awful to comprehend.
The film is powerful and graphic in presenting the
horrors of a nuclear holocaust, but it leaves
unanswered the central question: how do we prevent this
catastrophe from ever happening?
How to Prevent It
For nearly 40 years -- spanning 7 Presidencies,
Republican and Democratic -- the United States has
pursued a two-track policy to keep the nuclear peace:
(1) Deterrence
(2) Arms Control
And we have kept the peace! As columnist David Broder
wrote on November 16, 1983:
"
it is accurate to say that the single most
effective creation of the postwar world has been
the system of nuclear deterrence enforced by the
United States and the Soviet Union against each
other and, implicitly, against all other nuclear
powers in the world. That system was designed to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. As we
approach the end of the fourth decade of the
nuclear age, a period in which there have been
hundreds of other wars, it has worked to
perfection. That is a statement that can be made
about few other institutions or arrangements."
For additional information, call the White House Office of Public Affairs;
Mike Baroody, Director; 456-7170.
- 2 -
Peace Through Strength
The greatest threat to nuclear peace began to appear in
the 1970s as the Soviet Union engaged in the most
massive buildup of arms that the world has ever known.
They were challenging the system of deterrence. The
Soviet build-up, had it continued unchecked, would have
upset the balance of power.
President Reagan has sought to restore that balance --
and thus strengthened the prospects for peace. Today,
with our military preparedness improved and our
alliances cemented, the world is safer than it was
three years ago.
The President has also presented a bold, far-reaching
plan for the future that would lift the nuclear Sword
of Damocles once and for all. On March 23, 1983, the
President proposed a system of nuclear strategic
defense -- as opposed to current offensive weapons --
intended to stop war before it starts. This system
would destroy any attacking weapon before it reached
us. Scientists and others are currently working to put
the plan into place.
Arms Reductions on Both Sides
While working to strengthen U.S. deterrence on one
hand, President Reagan has also been making vigorous
efforts to end the arms race on the other.
In fact, this President is the first who has gone
beyond arms control -- he is seeking arms reductions.
"Our current goal," the President told the nation this
July, "must be reduction of nuclear arsenals -- and I
for one believe we must never depart from the ultimate
goal of banning them from the face of the Earth."
Over the past 3 years, the United States has engaged
the Soviets in more arms negotiations than ever before:
(1) START talks in Geneva -- The Reagan
Administration has proposed to cut the number
of strategic missile warheads by 1/3.
(2) INF talks in Geneva --- The President
first proposed the "zero-zero" option, which
would mean that neither the Soviets nor the
U.S. would deploy intermediate range
missiles. In view of Soviet intransigence,
the President has since made a series of
offers that would make a balanced reduction
- 3 -
in such missiles. Should the Soviets walk
out of the INF talks, as they have
threatened, the U.S. will remain at the
table, eager to negotiate.
(3) MBFR talks in Vienna -- These
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions are aimed at reducing each side's
military manpower in Central Europe. The
West put a new draft treaty on the table in
July, 1982, but the East has not yet
responded constructively.
(4) Chemical weapons talks in Geneva -- In
the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the
U.S. and its allies are seeking a complete
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons
production and stockpiling. The U.S. has
also drawn attention to violations of
existing accords by the Soviets and their
allies, who have employed chemical and toxin
weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos.
Note: In addition to these formal talks, the
U.S. under President Reagan has proposed to
the Soviets to begin negotiations on nuclear
testing and on a range of new
confidence-building measures (including prior
notification of ballistic missile lauches,
prior notification of major military
exercises, and expanded exchange of forces
data).
Other Points of Interest
There are federal plans for civil defense and the
Reagan administration is working to improve them, but
no one in this country believes that any plan -- no
matter how comprehensive and well-thought-out -- can
fully prepare for nuclear attack.
U.S. policies of deterrence are supported overseas and
by both parties here at home. This fall, for example,
the U.S. is deploying intermediate range missiles to
Europe at the request of NATO and under an agreement
reached by the Carter administration. Most of the
current Democratic contenders for President, including
Messrs. Mondale and Glenn, favor the deployment.
Critics frequently -- and mistakenly -- charge that the
U.S. is blindly building up stockpiles of weapons. In
- 4 -
fact, the U.S. has consistently tried to maintain the
lowest possible number of nuclear weapons. Today, the
U.S. has 1/3 fewer nuclear weapons than in 1965, and
the total yield (or megatonnage) is only 1/4 of what it
was in 1960.
Nuclear freeze advocates are citing the ABC film as
support for their view. What they fail to say is that
a freeze on the number of weapons at present levels
would freeze the risk at present levels. President
Reagan is commited to going beyond a freeze, reducing
both the numbers of weapons and the risks of war.
* * *