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135840554
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Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)
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135840554
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Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)
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351
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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1986-12-31
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1986
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1983-01-01
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1983
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)
Box: 4
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)
Date: 5/30/97
Box4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert MeP arlane re Speech by
5/22/84
P1
(4073)
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer (1 p.)
R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 # 83
2. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Speech by DAS
n.d.
P1
(4073)
Palmer (1 p.)
R11/20/98 NUSF95
074+84
3. memo
Charles Hill to Robert MeFarlane re Draft Copy of
5/19/84
P1
(4073)
Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-014 #85
4. memo
duplicate of document #1 (1 p.)
5/22/84
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-034 # 86
S. memo
duplicate of document #2 (1 p.)
nd.
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-074 #87
6. memo
duplicate of document #3 (1 p.)
5/19/84
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-074
#88
7 memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US USSR
5/21/84
P1
(3447)
relationship (2 pp.) R 11/22/99 NL5F95- 074 #89
8. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US USSR
n.d.
P1
(3447)
relationship (1 p.)
R 11/22/99 NLSF9
5-074 #90
memo
Charles Hill to Robert McF Farlane re US USSR
4/28/84
P1
(3447)
relationship (3 pp.)
R 11/22/99 NLSF
95-074 #91
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
-1 National security classified information ((a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
³-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
3-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue ((b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRAJ.
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2) Box 90887 4
Date: 5/30/97
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
+. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert MeP arlane re Speech by
5/22/84
P1
(4073)
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer (1p)
R 11/20/98 NLSF95-074 # 83
2. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Speech by DAS
n.d.
P1
(4073)
Palmer (1 p.)
R11/20/98 NUSF95
074+84
3. memo
Charles Hill to Robert MeP Farlane re Draft Copy of
5/19/84
P1
(4073)
Speech by DAS Palmer (1 p.)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-014 #85
4. memo
duplicate of document #1 (1 p.)
5/22/84
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-034 # 86
S. memo
duplicate of document #2 (1 p.)
nd.
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-074 #87
6. memo
duplicate of document #3 (1 p.)
5/19/84
P1
(4073)
R 11/20/98 NCSF95-074
#88
7. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US USSR
5/21/84
P1
(3447)
relationship (2 pp.) R 11/22/99 NLSF95-074 89
&. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US USSR
n.d.
P1
(3447)
relationship (1 p.)
R 11/22/99 NLSF9
5-074 #90
9. memo
Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane Te US-USSR
4/28/84
P1
(3447)
relationship (3 pp.)
R 11/22/99 NLSA
95-074 #91
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
'-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIA].
2-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
³-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRAJ.
the FOIA].
2-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue ((b)(3) of the FOIA].
information ((a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
3.5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information ((b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRAJ.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
'6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRAJ.
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes ((b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (2)
Date: 5/30/97
Box 4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
10. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Next Steps on
5/19/84
P1
(90605)
Sakharov (1 p.)
R 11/22/99 NLSF95
-074 #92
14 memo
Robert McI Farlane to the President re Next Steps on
n.d.
P1
Sakharov (1 p.)
R 11/22/99 NLSF95-
074#93
12. memo
George Shultz to the President re Next Steps on
5/18/84
P1
(90605)
Sakharov (3 pp.) P 11/22/99 NLSF95-074
# 94
R 10/12/05 M1480 #9
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
CAS 4/3/2007
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1984 (2)
FOIA
M03-1480
Box Number
4
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date
Pages
12 MEMO
SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE NEXT
3 5/18/1984
MVH 5/19/08
STEPS ON SAKHAROV (#9)
4078
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 22, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK for
SUBJECT:
Response to Rather Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC
Please sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley
which forwards a response to a letter from Father Bagdanavicius
to Linas Kojelis.
Walt Raymond concurs.
we
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley with attachments
4078
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Response to Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC
We have reviewed and concur in the response prepared by the
Department of State to Father Bagdanavicius's letter of
April 30, regarding the problems of bringing religious books,
written in Lithuanian, into the Soviet Union.
Attachments
4078
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
O4 MAY P 3: 56
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s 8413810
Date May 19, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To:
Linas Kojelis
From: Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius, MIC
Date: 4/30/84
Subject: Writer questions Soviet regulation
of books written in Lithuanian or of religious nature, carried into
Lithuania by U.S. travelers and requests assistance in recommending
proper channel through which he may send books to R.C Bishop in Lithuania
WH Referral Dated: 5/9/84
NSC ID# 225650
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
XX
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Problem
for
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Dear Father Bagdanavicius:
Thank you for the letter describing the
difficulties which travellers to Lithuania are having
in bringing in religious books to that country.
We are aware of this reprehensible behavior by
Soviet customs officials, and we believe that this
kind of anti-religious activity is indicative of the
fear which the Soviet Union has for any
manifestations of personal belief that do not conform
to its own rigid and atheistic ideology.
Unfortunately, so long as the U.S.S.R. continues to
exercise control over Lithuania, there is little that
can be done to change Soviet customs procedures.
With regard to your request for a sure method to
send books to Bishop Povilonis, it is not possible to
facilitate this effort without putting the Lithuanian
recipients at very substantial risk.
We have sought for many years to encourage the
Soviets to allow better information and media
exchanges. Your thoughtful letter describing the
unjust customs procedures affecting Lithuania reminds
us of how much remains to be done in this area.
Sincerely,
Father Vytautas Bagdanavicius MIC,
Lietuviskos Knygos Klubas,
4545 West 63rd Street,
Chicago, Illinois.
8413810
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
MAY 9, 1984
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
225650
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 1984
TO:
LINAS KOJELIS
FROM:
FATHER VYTAUTAS BAGDANAVICIUS MIC
LIETUVISKOS KNYGOS KLUBAS
4545 WEST 63RD STREET
CHICAGO IL 60629
SUBJECT: WRITER QUESTIONS SOVIET REGULATIONS OF BOOKS
WRITTEN IN LITHUANIAN OR OF RELIGIOUS
NATURE, CARRIED INTO LITHUANIA BY U. S.
TRAVELERS AND REQUESTS ASSISTANCE IN
RECOMMENDING PROPER CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH
HE MAY SEND BOOKS TO R. C. BISHOP IN
LITHUANIA
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE\
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
r/
ID #
225650
C0/65
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
o . OUTGOING
H - INTERNAL
I - INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: Fr Vytantas Bagdanavicius, MIC
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Writer Questions Soriet regulations of books written in Uthuanian or
of religious nature, carried Lithuania by U.S. travelers
and requests assistance in recommending proper channel
through which he may send books to R.C. Bishop in lithuania.
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
PL KOJE
ORIGINATOR 84,05,07
/
/
Referral Note:
99 DOS
D 84/05/010
/
/
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
)
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A - Appropriate Action
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D - Draft Response
S For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
8413810
***
LIETUVISKOS KNYGOS KLUBAS
4545 W. 63 STREET CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60629
225650
April 30, 1984
Mr. Linas Kojelis
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Kojelis:
My name is Father Vytautas Bagdanavičius and
I am director of The Lithuanian Book Club, based
in Chicago, which publishes books in the Lithuanian
language by authors residing in the U.S. I was
dismayed to learn that since about 1983 travelers
to occupied Lithuania are being denied the right
to keep among their personal possessions even a
single book for their personal reading, if that
book happens to be written in Lithuanian. The
situation is especially embarrassing for travelers
carrying books of a religious nature. Among the
instructions issued to Soviet customs officials is
that visitors are forbidden to have this type of
book, in whatever language, in their possession
when they enter the Soviet Union. I wonder if such
a regulation is compatible with the Helsinki agree-
ments?
I am requesting your assistance in two matters:
1/ in drawing the attention of responsible officials
of the U.S. government to this fact and suggesting
steps to prevent this violation of our citizens'
rights by the Soviets, 2/ in recommending me to the
proper channel in the State Department, which would
be able to facilitate my sending a few books to The
Most Reverend Liudvikas Povilomis, the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Kaunas /233000 Kaumas, Vilnius 4, Lithuania/.
Respectfully,
Fr. vet. we
/Father/ Vytautas Bagdanavičius, MIC
4077
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 22, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK form
SUBJECT:
Proposed Response to Mr. Alex Balaban
Please sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley
indicating our approval of the proposed response to Mr. Alex
Balaban.
Walt Raymond concurs.
62
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley with attachments
4077
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Proposed Response to Mr. Alex Balaban
We have reviewed and concur in the proposed response prepared by
the Department of State to Mr. Balaban's letter of April 17,
1984, to President Reagan requesting that honorary citizenship be
granted to Mr. Yuriy Shukhevych on humanitarian grounds.
Attachments
4011
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s
8412715
Date
May 19, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To:
President Reagan From: Mr. Alex Balaban
Date: April 17, 1984 Subject: Proposes that President grant
honorary U.S. citizenship to YURIY SHUKHEVYCH based on humanitarian
grounds
WH Referral Dated: April 27, 1984
NSC ID# 223673
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
X
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
for
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
(Classification)
SUGGESTED REPLY
Dear Mr. Balaban:
I am writing in response to your letter of April 17 urging
that the President grant honorary United States citizenship to
Yuriy Shukhevych.
We recognize the motives which moved you to propose this
singular honor. While we continue to be concerned about his
plight, we believe that granting of honorary citizenship to Mr.
Shukhevych would not be appropriate.
The granting of honorary citizenship calls for a Joint
Resolution of the Congress authorizing and directing that the
President issue a Proclamation to that effect. There have been
only two occasions in our history where the United States has
done so: Winston Churchill in 1963 and Raoul Wallenberg in
1981. The unique and exceptional circumstances present in
those cases would not appear to be present in the case of Mr.
Shukhevych.
Mr. Alex Balaban
1080 - 18th Avenue
Newark, New Jersey 07106
-2-
Under international law, honorary citizenship does not
carry with it the rights and privileges of ordinary
citizenship. Thus an honorary citizen of the United States
would not be entitled to receive diplomatic or other protection
of the United States, nor does such status confer any special
immigration benefits upon the honoree or the honoree's
relatives and descendents.
On the other hand, conferral of honorary United States
citizenship does recognize an honoree's close ties with and
commitment to the democratic principles of the United States.
Mr. Shukhevych would not be >likely to benefit by the close
association with the United States implicit in the granting of
this honor. On the contrary, such status might provide the
Soviet authorities a pretext for further persecution of him.
Let me assure you that while we do not believe that the
granting of honorary citizenship would be appropriate in this
case, we remain committed to doing all we can to help Mr.
Shukhevych and other Ukrainians imprisoned for practicing their
culture or expressing their beliefs.
Sincerely,
DRAFTED BY:CA/PPT/C:WBWharton/CA/PPT:JDBlevins:st
5/8/84 (S/S #8412715) x20800
Clearances:
EUR/SOV:JBoris (by phone)
L/CA:JGHergen
HA/EUR:DMatthews
H:AMSchloss (by phone)
CA/PPT:JDBlevins
CA:ERowell
CA:JMClark
RICA Dalaran
1080 - 18th Avenue
Newark, N.J. 07106
(201)648-2537 DAY
April 17, 1984
8412715
223673
Mr. Linas J. Kojelis, Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Kojelis:
As a Ukrainian-American, I would like to thank you for
your support at a recent NYC demonstration in support of Yuriy Shukhe-
vych.
Despite many pleas from the Ukrainian-American community
to liberate Yuriy, and despite many petition drives and demonstrations;
the KGB remains steadfast in its desire to make a mockery of Ukrainian
nationalism through the continual torture of innocent Yuriy Shukhevych.
As a result, I and my family urge you to propose to
President Reagan that he grant honorary U.S. citizenship to Yuriy
Shukhevych based on humanitarian grounds. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian
nationalists are far too many to be eliminated by the KGB today, and
they stand a hundred percent behind President Reagan's offensive against
Soviet expansionist global campaign.
I urge you once again to propose the citizenship idea to
President Regan.
I Understand the many demands on your time, and I thank
you for any help you can render in this crucial situation.
4219 JOHN BOROLIS
Sincerely
Alex Balaban
Clonic Balaba
Gloria Balaban
Man Balaban
Maria Balaban
L)alter Walter Balaban
ID #. 223673
SV
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
Hu
0. OUTGOING
H - INTERNAL
1. INCOMING
Date Correspondence
/
/
Received (YY/MM/DD)
M... R, ha.
8412715
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
APRIL 27, 1984
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
223673
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 17, 1984
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
MR. ALEX BALABAN
1080 18TH AVENUE
NEWARK NJ 07106
SUBJECT: PROPOSES THAT THE PRESIDENT GRANT HONORARY
U. S. MEMBERSHIP TO YURIY SHUKHEVYCH BASED
ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEV
S
4073
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
May 22, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 95
SUBJECT:
Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer
Attached at Tab II is a draft copy of the remarks to be given by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark
Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade and
Economic Council in New York, May 23. I have no objection to the
speech and have received none. A memorandum to Charles Hill for
signature by Bob Kimmitt is attached at Tab I.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve forwarding the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II
State's memorandum, May 19
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By
smp NARA, Date 11/20/98
CONFIDENTIAL
4073
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Speech by DAS Palmer (U)
We have reviewed and have no objection to the draft speech to be
given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council in New York on May 23. (C)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By
smp
NARA, Date 11/20/98
CONFIDENTIAL
7015
8414872
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL-
May 19, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer
Attached is a draft copy of remarks to be given by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer
before the plenary session of the US-USSR Trade and Economic
Council in New York May 23.
Charles Covey Hill
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
smp NARA, Date 11/20/98
CONFIDENTIAL
Decl: OADR
4073
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
May 22, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 950mg
SUBJECT:
Speech by Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer
Attached at Tab II is a draft copy of the remarks to be given by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark
Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S. -USSR Trade and
Economic Council in New York, May 23. I have no objection to the
speech and have received none. A memorandum to Charles Hill for
signature by Bob Kimmitt is attached at Tab I.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve forwarding the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II
State's memorandum, May 19
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By
sml NARA, Date 11/20/98
Remarks to the
U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council Meeting,
May 23, 1984
By
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Mark Palmer
USTEC is meeting today at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations
are "normal". Unfortunately since the Second World War the norm
has been that we were not doing much constructive business
together. With only very brief periods of limited cooperation,
practically every year has found us focussed more on our
differences than on the fact that the two most powerful nations
in the world should work together.
The past decade has witnessed several sustained efforts at
cooperation by the United States. Speaking frankly, we believe
that each of them has been cut-short because of Soviet
actions. Not because we want to engage in an academic exercise
in history, but because we believe greater understanding is
essential as we strive to open a new and more durable period in
our relations, I would like to review our understanding of the
two most recent, ultimately stillborn efforts by this
country.
During the first half of 1983 we were beginning to make
some tangible progress. Both sides emerged from the round of
START talks which concluded last summer with the view that
progress was being made. We had each taken steps to meet the
other's concerns. While there was still a long way to go, at
least the direction was positive. Similarily we were able to
conclude a new long-term grains agreement which raised the
levels for both sides. And in the United States the release of
the Pentecostalists was interpreted as a gesture of goodwill.
- 2 -
We are all aware of the tragedy of the Korean airliner.
Some 69 Americans were killed. Nevertheless in the course of
the fall, President Reagan proposed further steps in both the
strategic and intermediate-range nuçlear arms talks in Geneva.
He recognized, as has every American President since Harry
Truman, that in the nuclear era their is no sane alternative to
efforts at nuclear arms control between the two nations with
the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.
Despite these sincere efforts, and despite the fact that
the United States had agreed to sit down at the negotiating
table and to stay there for two years while the Soviet Union
deployed ever-larger numbers of SS-20 missiles, when NATO began
its deployments the Soviet Union walked out of the talks.
Again, despite this negative Soviet action the President
determined early this year to once more attempt to move in a
positive direction.
Our policy of dealing with the Soviet Union on the basis of
strength, realism and negotiation was authoritatively expressed
by the President in his January 16th address. At that time, he
stated his personal commitment to seeking ways to bridge the
very real differences between our two countries.
The President subsequently reaffirmed and expanded on the
substance of his January 16th speech in a series of personal
letters that he despatched to General Secretary Chernenko.
We have followed up the President's statements in
diplomatic channels. We made clear to the Soviet leadership
that we are prepared to engage in substantive dialogue on
problems now before the two countries, including many of those
issues identified by the Soviet side as well as by the United
States. In recent months Secretary Shultz has met a number of
- 3 -
times with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. Ambassador
Hartman, who has returned several times to Washington for
special consultations and meetings with the President on this
subject, has had similar sessions with First Deputy Chairman
Gromyko.
In the course of both this correspondence and these
meetings, we have put forward concrete proposals.
In the field of arms control, we have, of course, urged the
resumption of formal START and INF negotiations in Geneva, but
have also stressed our readiness to explore the substance of
these issues in private channels away from any publicity and
without preconditions. In doing so, we have underscored our
readiness to pursue a give-and-take process in which the
concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of
the two sides are to be taken into account.
As you are aware, during this period we also tabled a new
draft chemical weapons treaty at the Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva. We have introduced a new initiative at the
conventional force talks in Vienna, which attempts to build
upon constructive elements of the East's latest proposals, and
to find a creative way around the long-standing dispute over
data.
Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we
invited the Soviet Delegation head to Washington during this
past recess. Because he was unable to come, U.S. delegation
chief James Goodby went instead to Moscow late last month to
explore the possibilities for moving forward and particularly
to permit full discussion of eastern and western proposals.
At our initiative, a team of U.S. communications experts
went to Moscow as well in late April to discuss our proposals
- 4 -
to improve the "Hotline" linking our two capitals. Considerable
progress was made on most technical aspects, yet the Soviet
side seems to be raising issues to prevent the early conclusion
of the draft agreement we have tabled.
In its public statements, the Soviet Union has expressed
concern over the dangers posed by "militarization of outer
space." We have offered to conduct a private, high-level
exchange of views on space arms control. Moreover last year,
in response to Soviet concerns, we proposed discussions on the
President's Strategic Defense Initiative and its implications
among our government's experts in START and the Standing
Consultative Commission. While the Soviets turned aside this
offer, we have in the latest session of the SCC proposed a
special working group on strategic defense issues.
We have proposed to the Soviet Union consultations on a
number of regional issues, including southern Africa and the
Middle East. We stand ready to proceed with such exchanges.
We have proposed a series of steps to improve bilateral
relations, which I will not detail here.
It was logical to assume that this long list of constructive
initiatives would have been greeted positively by the Soviet
side, at least with a recognition that we were moving in the
right direction. But quite the opposite has occurred.
Indeed, it appears that the Soviet Union made a deliberate
decision in late April to chill bilateral relations with us.
The Olympic boycott is but the most visible action. In
addition, the Soviet side has turned down our invitation to
Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov to meet to discuss
space arms control; and introduced obstacles to progress on a
range of bilateral issues.
- 5 -
There has been a sudden, sharp increase in attacks on the
United States. Senior Soviet officials had for years said that
our rhetoric was the chief obstacle to improving relations.
Now they dismiss as of no importance the constructive
statements of the Administration. The Soviet side called on us
to discuss a variety of subjects, from anti-satellite weapons
to the Middle East. We have agreed and now the Soviet Union is
unwilling to sit down to talk.
Whatever the specific motives behind these negative
actions, the pattern seems to be that whenever the Soviet
leadership comes up against hard decisions, it chooses a path
that results in no serious discussion and no practical
cooperation. This is obviously not the Soviet role we would
prefer. Rather we seek a Soviet Union ready to be a serious
partner in negotiations on a full range of issues as the means
of building a more constructive relationship.
We will neither be discouraged nor intimidated by the
current Soviet approach. We will neither reward nor imitate
Soviet tactics. As Secretary Shultz has said: "We will
continue to be realistic and we will continue to be
reasonable and ready to sit down (the Soviet Union) whenever
they are of a like mind."
One area where our two countries have shown they can work
together to mutual benefit is the one you are meeting to
discuss -- trade. Our economic relationship with the USSR has
been the subject of much debate and study in recent years.
Unfortunately, much of this discussion has taken place based on
a misunderstanding of what the Administration's policies
towards economic relations with the Soviet Union actually are.
I hope to clear up some of that confusion today.
- 6 -
Our policy towards trade with the USSR is clear. Trade can
go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, does not
subsidize the Soviet economy, and does not contribute to the
Soviet strategic or military capability. Let me stress this --
our policy is not one of economic warfare. We have been able
to take a number of small positive steps of benefit to both
sides inthe field of trade. This waas in accord with our
efforts to preserve the structure of our economic relationship
with the Soviets. We want that structure in place to build
upon if future conditions permit.
We signed a new long-term grain agreement providing for
a 50 percent increase in the minimum Soviet purchase
requirement last August.
Our Fisheries Agreement with the Soviets, which permits
the joint fisheries venture to operate in Seattle and
Nakhodka, has been renewed three times, most recently for
an 18-month term.
We are currently considering the renewal of our 10-year
Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation
Agreement. We are hopeful this agreement can be extended.
Last October, the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council
co-sponsored an agribusiness trade show in Moscow. We
think this is a good example of the kind of trade between
our two countries for which our policy calls. We endorsed
that exhibition, as we are supporting this plenary session
with our presence. We will continue to support Council
activities appropriate to our policy on trade with the
Soviet Union.
Additional steps forward in the trade relationship are
possible. However, the prospects for such steps will
- 7 -
necessarily be influenced by the Soviet approach to our
concerns across the broad range of our relationship -- arms
control, regional issues, human rights, as well as trade.
Trade is not a "golden bridge" that by itself will lead to
better relations between our two countries. But it can be an
important part in a process of slow expansion and improvement
of relations in many fields. That is our hope; that is our
objective.
I cannot appear before an audience which includes a number
of influential officials from the Soviet Union without
mentioning a case which weighs heavily on the minds of the
American people today. There is great warmth in this country
for the peoples of the Soviet Union. When we are together as
human beings, there is a natural affinity, a spontaneous
closeness and respect. When we think about you, we remember
most of all your incredible courage during the war and the
great intellectual contributions and courage of individual
Russian writers, scientists and others throughout history.
Among your many extraordinary peoples, there are two who are
particularly close to our hearts -- a woman who was wounded
three times in the war, and a man who was honored with every
possible Soviet award and the Nobel Prize for Peace. We
earnestly hope that you will be true to the best of your
traditions and respond to their appeal. They are following the
path of non-violence which Tolstoy and Gandhi trod. They
deserve your respect and support.
#0194A
CONF IDENTIAL
4073
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Speech by DAS Palmer (U)
We have reviewed and have no objection to the draft speech to be
given by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
R. Mark Palmer before the plenary session of the U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council in New York on May 23. 16t
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By smp NARA, Date 11/20/98
CONFIDENTIAL
76 /
8414872
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
May 19, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Copy of Speech by DAS Palmer
Attached is a draft copy of remarks to be given by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs R. Mark Palmer
before the plenary session of the US-USSR Trade and Economic
Council in New York May 23.
Charles Covey Hill
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By smp NARA, Date 11/20/98
CONFIDENTIAL
Decl: OADR
Remarks to the
U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council Meeting,
May 23, 1984
By
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Mark Palmer
USTEC is meeting today at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations
are "normal". Unfortunately since the Second World War the norm
has been that we were not doing much constructive business
together. With only very brief periods of limited cooperation,
practically every year has found us focussed more on our
differences than on the fact that the two most powerful nations
in the world should work together.
The past decade has witnessed several sustained efforts at
cooperation by the United States. Speaking frankly, we believe
that each of them has been cut-short because of Soviet
actions. Not because we want to engage in an academic exercise
in history, but because we believe greater understanding is
essential as we strive to open a new and more durable period in
our relations, I would like to review our understanding of the
two most recent, ultimately stillborn efforts by this
country.
During the first half of 1983 we were beginning to make
some tangible progress. Both sides emerged from the round of
START talks which concluded last summer with the view that
progress was being made. We had each taken steps to meet the
other's concerns. While there was still a long way to go, at
least the direction was positive. Similarily we were able to
conclude a new long-term grains agreement which raised the
levels for both sides. And in the United States the release of
the Pentecostalists was interpreted as a gesture of goodwill.
- 2 -
We are all aware of the tragedy of the Korean airliner.
Some 69 Americans were killed. Nevertheless in the course of
the fall, President Reagan proposed further steps in both the
strategic and intermediate-range nuçlear arms talks in Geneva.
He recognized, as has every American President since Harry
Truman, that in the nuclear era their is no sane alternative to
efforts at nuclear arms control between the two nations with
the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.
Despite these sincere efforts, and despite the fact that
the United States had agreed to sit down at the negotiating
table and to stay there for two years while the Soviet Union
deployed ever-larger numbers of SS-20 missiles, when NATO began
its deployments the Soviet Union walked out of the talks.
Again, despite this negative Soviet action the President
determined early this year to once more attempt to move in a
positive direction.
Our policy of dealing with the Soviet Union on the basis of
strength, realism and negotiation was authoritatively expressed
by the President in his January 16th address. At that time, he
stated his personal commitment to seeking ways to bridge the
very real differences between our two countries.
The President subsequently reaffirmed and expanded on the
substance of his January 16th speech in a series of personal
letters that he despatched to General Secretary Chernenko.
We have followed up the President's statements in
diplomatic channels. We made clear to the Soviet leadership
that we are prepared to engage in substantive dialogue on
problems now before the two countries, including many of those
issues identified by the Soviet side as well as by the United
States. In recent months Secretary Shultz has met a number of
- 3 -
times with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. Ambassador
Hartman, who has returned several times to Washington for
special consultations and meetings with the President on this
subject, has had similar sessions with First Deputy Chairman
Gromyko.
In the course of both this correspondence and these
meetings, we have put forward concrete proposals.
In the field of arms control, we have, of course, urged the
resumption of formal START and INF negotiations in Geneva, but
have also stressed our readiness to explore the substance of
these issues in private channels away from any publicity and
without preconditions. In doing so, we have underscored our
readiness to pursue a give-and-take process in which the
concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of
the two sides are to be taken into account.
As you are aware, during this period we also tabled a new
draft chemical weapons treaty at the Committee on Disarmament
in Geneva. We have introduced a new initiative at the
conventional force talks in Vienna, which attempts to build
upon constructive elements of the East's latest proposals, and
to find a creative way around the long-standing dispute over
data.
Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we
invited the Soviet Delegation head to Washington during this
past recess. Because he was unable to come, U.S. delegation
chief James Goodby went instead to Moscow late last month to
explore the possibilities for moving forward and particularly
to permit full discussion of eastern and western proposals.
At our initiative, a team of U.S. communications experts
went to Moscow as well in late April to discuss our proposals
- 4 -
to improve the "Hotline" linking our two capitals. Considerable
progress was made on most technical aspects, yet the Soviet
side seems to be raising issues to prevent the early conclusion
of the draft agreement we have tabled.
In its public statements, the Soviet Union has expressed
concern over the dangers posed by "militarization of outer
space." We have offered to conduct a private, high-level
exchange of views on space arms control. Moreover last year,
in response to Soviet concerns, we proposed discussions on the
President's Strategic Defense Initiative and its implications
among our government's experts in START and the Standing
Consultative Commission. While the Soviets turned aside this
offer, we have in the latest session of the SCC proposed a
special working group on strategic defense issues.
We have proposed to the Soviet Union consultations on a
number of regional issues, including southern Africa and the
Middle East. We stand ready to proceed with such exchanges.
We have proposed a series of steps to improve bilateral
relations, which I will not detail here.
It was logical to assume that this long list of constructive
initiatives would have been greeted positively by the Soviet
side, at least with a recognition that we were moving in the
right direction. But quite the opposite has occurred.
Indeed, it appears that the Soviet Union made a deliberate
decision in late April to chill bilateral relations with us.
The Olympic boycott is but the most visible action. In
addition, the Soviet side has turned down our invitation to
Academy of Sciences Vice President Velikhov to meet to discuss
space arms control; and introduced obstacles to progress on a
range of bilateral issues.
- 5 -
There has been a sudden, sharp increase in attacks on the
United States. Senior Soviet officials had for years said that
our rhetoric was the chief obstacle to improving relations.
Now they dismiss as of no importance the constructive
statements of the Administration. The Soviet side called on us
to discuss a variety of subjects, from anti-satellite weapons
to the Middle East. We have agreed and now the Soviet Union is
unwilling to sit down to talk.
Whatever the specific motives behind these negative
actions, the pattern seems to be that whenever the Soviet
leadership comes up against hard decisions, it chooses a path
that results in no serious discussion and no practical
cooperation. This is obviously not the Soviet role we would
prefer. Rather we seek a Soviet Union ready to be a serious
partner in negotiations on a full range of issues as the means
of building a more constructive relationship.
We will neither be discouraged nor intimidated by the
current Soviet approach. We will neither reward nor imitate
Soviet tactics. As Secretary Shultz has said: "We will
continue to be realistic and we will continue to be
reasonable and ready to sit down (the Soviet Union) whenever
they are of a like mind." "
One area where our two countries have shown they can work
together to mutual benefit is the one you are meeting to
discuss -- trade. Our economic relationship with the USSR has
been the subject of much debate and study in recent years.
Unfortunately, much of this discussion has taken place based on
a misunderstanding of what the Administration's policies
towards economic relations with the Soviet Union actually are.
I hope to clear up some of that confusion today.
- 6 -
Our policy towards trade with the USSR is clear. Trade can
go forward as long as it is mutually beneficial, does not
subsidize the Soviet economy, and does not contribute to the
Soviet strategic or military capability. Let me stress this --
our policy is not one of economic warfare. We have been able
to take a number of small positive steps of benefit to both
sides inthe field of trade. This waas in accord with our
efforts to preserve the structure of our economic relationship
with the Soviets. We want that structure in place to build
upon if future conditions permit.
We signed a new long-term grain agreement providing for
a 50 percent increase in the minimum Soviet purchase
requirement last August.
Our Fisheries Agreement with the Soviets, which permits
the joint fisheries venture to operate in Seattle and
Nakhodka, has been renewed three times, most recently for
an 18-month term.
We are currently considering the renewal of our 10-year
Long-Term Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation
Agreement. We are hopeful this agreement can be extended.
Last October, the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council
co-sponsored an agribusiness trade show in Moscow. We
think this is a good example of the kind of trade between
our two countries for which our policy calls. We endorsed
that exhibition, as we are supporting this plenary session
with our presence. We will continue to support Council
activities appropriate to our policy on trade with the
Soviet Union.
Additional steps forward in the trade relationship are
possible. However, the prospects for such steps will
- 7 -
necessarily be influenced by the Soviet approach to our
concerns across the broad range of our relationship -- arms
control, regional issues, human rights, as well as trade.
Trade is not a "golden bridge" that by itself will lead to
better relations between our two countries. But it can be an
important part in a process of slow expansion and improvement
of relations in many fields. That is our hope; that is our
objective.
I cannot appear before an audience which includes a number
of influential officials from the Soviet Union without
mentioning a case which weighs heavily on the minds of the
American people today. There is great warmth in this country
for the peoples of the Soviet Union. When we are together as
human beings, there is a natural affinity, a spontaneous
closeness and respect. When we think about you, we remember
most of all your incredible courage during the war and the
great intellectual contributions and courage of individual
Russian writers, scientists and others throughout history.
Among your many extraordinary peoples, there are two who are
particularly close to our hearts -- a woman who was wounded
three times in the war, and a man who was honored with every
possible Soviet award and the Nobel Prize for Peace. We
earnestly hope that you will be true to the best of your
traditions and respond to their appeal. They are following the
path of non-violence which Tolstoy and Gandhi trod. They
deserve your respect and support.
#0194A
3447
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
May21, 1984
ACTION
FROM:
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCHARLANE Jam
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship
The interagency review of measures proposed last year by
Congressman Breaux regarding the fisheries relationship with the
USSR has been completed. You will recall that Breaux had
proposed removing the Afghanistan sanction and restoring our
bilateral fisheries relationship with the Soviets. Recently, we
agreed with the Soviets to extend the existing fisheries
agreement to December 31, 1985, but no allocation of fish was
made to the USSR.
Following the interagency review, State and Commerce recommend
that two steps be taken:
-- restore a directed allocation of 50,000 metric tons,
conditioned on a Soviet commitment to increase the existing
joint venture with an American firm commensurately; and
-- permit further joint ventures providing there are no over-
riding security problems.
The IG considered a third step -- to seek renegotiation of the
bilateral fisheries agreement at this time -- but concluded that
this step should not be taken now, but should be kept under
review with regard to the future development of political
conditions.
Discussion:
The reasons given by the IG for restoring a small fisheries
allocation to the Soviets (50,000 metric tons would be one tenth
of the allocation they had before Afghanistan) and allowing
further joint ventures are based on a judgment that these moves
would be of benefit to the American fishing industry, which is
currently depressed.
Given the strong Congressional interest (from the Pacific
Northwest and Alaska) in restoring the bilateral fisheries
relationship and the desirability of maintaining a minimal
framework for non-strategic economic interaction with the
Soviets, I believe that the IG's recommendations should be
approved eventually.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074 #89
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
BY sup NARA, DATE 11/22/99
CONF IDENTIAL
2
However, I believe that at the moment the timing is bad. The
Soviets are still engaged in a major offensive in Afghanistan,
and we face a possible tragedy in the Soviet handling of the
Sakharov's hunger strike. I recommend, therefore, that State be
requested to review its recommendation in light of the present
political situation, and provide its views on whether a decision
on this issue should be made now, or should be deferred in light
of current additional strains in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
&
SRS
Lenczowski, Levine and Sestanovich concur.
Recommendation:
That you authorize transmittal of the attached Kimmitt-Hill
memorandum, which requests State to review its recommendation in
respect to timing.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed Kimmitt to Hill memorandum
Tab II
Hill to McFarlane memorandum, April 28, 1984
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3447
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Review of U.S.-USSR Fishing Relationship
JCJ
Since your memorandum of April 28, 1984, on this subject was
sent, a number of additional strains have developed in the
U.S. -Soviet relationship. These include the Soviet boycott of
the Olympics, the intensification of the war in Afghanistan, and
the steps taken against Mrs. Bonner and Academician Sakharov. (C)
In view of the above, the Department's views are requested on the
question of timing the President's decision on the fisheries
matter. Specifically, should such a step be taken now, and if
so, how should we explain a favorable decision on this matter in
light of present circumstances?
-
Upon receipt of the Department's views on the timing question,
the matter will be forwarded to the President for decision.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074 #90
BY smp NARA, DATE 11/22/99
CONFIDENTIAL
3447
8412440
XR 8412439
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Review of US - USSR Fishing Relationship
The NSC on March 21, 1983, requested an interagency review
of measures proposed by Congressman Breaux regarding the
fisheries relationship with the USSR. Breaux's proposals would
remove an Afghanistan sanction and restore our bilateral
fisheries relationship. They are strongly supported by the
fishing industry and other Senators and Congressmen from the
Pacific Northwest and Alaska. We and the Soviets just agreed to
extend the existing fisheries agreement for eighteen months,
through December 31, 1985.
The interagency review, interrupted by the KAL incident, has
been completed. The concerned agencies (State and Commerce; NSC
unable to attend) considered the following three steps:
--granting the Soviets a directed fish allocation of
approximately 50,000 metric tons to permit expansion of the
existing joint venture based in Seattle. Prior to the
Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets had a 500,000-ton
allocation. A directed allocation would permit Soviet
vessels to remain on station fishing when weather conditions
require the smaller U.S. fishing boats to seek shelter.
This would permit an expanded Soviet processing capability
to remain in place for longer periods of time, which would
benefit the joint venture. At present, Soviet vessels can
only process U.S.-caught fish;
--allow further joint ventures in other areas of the U.S.
fishing zone as they are proposed, assuming there are no
overriding security problems;
--inform the Soviets we are prepared to renegotiate the
US-Soviet fisheries agreement, with the possibility of
negotiating an agreement to allow US fishermen access to
Soviet fisheries. This would almost certainly require a
large directed allocation to the Soviets in return.
The IG determined that there are strong economic reasons to
restore the fisheries relationship and that the current
sanctions are imposing economic hardships on the U.S. fishing
industry:
-- The US firm currently involved in the existing joint
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F95-074 #91
CONF IDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
BY omf NARA, DATE 11/22/99
CONFIDENTIAL
venture has stated that it expects to increase the joint venture
operations by the amount of the direct allocation given to the
USSR. The joint venture currently processes about 160,000 MT of
US-caught fish annually, valued at $30 million, and involving 40
US vessels which otherwise would not be employed. An additional
50,000 MT caught by the joint venture would result in an
estimated $8 million increase in proceeds to participating US
fishermen.
-- Establishment of new joint ventures with the Soviets in
US waters would increase our leverage with other countries now
fishing off the US coast (Japan and Korea) to expand cooperation
with the US fishing industry.
-- The US fishing industry is depressed and the impact from
the joint ventures is substantial; the multiplier effect on
local fish-related industries from each dollar earned by the
present joint venture is estimated at four to one.
-- There has been a significant reverse flow of technology
and expertise to the US fishing industry from the Soviets as the
result of the joint venture and our cooperative fisheries
research programs. Restoration of Soviet fishing privileges
would enhance our opportunities to take greater advantage of
these benefits.
The IG also concluded that forward movement would be
consistent with the President's January 16 speech calling for a
constructive dialogue with the Soviets. The fishing sanction on
Poland has been removed and the restoration of Soviet privileges
would underscore our commitment to review sanctions to ensure
that US business interests are not unfairly penalized. Finally
this action parallels negotiation of the the new LTA.
The Departments of State and Commerce have concluded that we
should now take the first two steps: restoring a directed
allocation of 50,000 MT, conditioned on a Soviet commitment to
increase the existing joint venture commensurately; and,
permitting further joint ventures providing there are no
overriding security problems. We would not publicly encourage
new joint ventures, however. The allocation would be granted in
at least two stages to permit observation of Soviet
performance.
It was deemed inappropriate to seek renegotiation of the
bilateral fisheries agreement at this time. We will keep this
step under review should political conditions permit our moving
in that direction in the future.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
We now request NSC concurrence with the recommendations of
the interagency review and that the matter be forwarded to the
President for his review of all the options and decision.
bor
Executive Secretary
3989 add-on
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
May 21, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK fam
SUBJECT:
Brown's Speech to US-USSR Trade and Economic
Council
I concur with the draft text of Clarence J. Brown's speech to the
US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, provided the suggestions by
State incorporated in the Wishard-Kimmitt Memorandum of May 18
are incorporated, and a further change is made in the sentence at
the end of paragraph 1, page 2 to read:
"These talks are especially needed at times when relations
between our countries need improvement."
Since we have not yet seen a full revised and coordinated text, I
would suggest that we convey our agreement in principle with a
text incorporating these changes, but request a revised text
before formal clearance is given.
Recommendation:
That you authorize a telephone call to Commerce to convey the
above, that is, agreement in principle with a text with the
suggested changes, but a request for the revised text before
formal clearance is granted.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I -- Brown-McFarlane letter of May 16 and Wishard-Kimmitt
Memo of May 18, with attachments
1169 an
National Security Council
May 18
1200
The White House
System #
H
When action package 3989 comes
back from Matlock. Please put
Package # 3989
this note with it.
Van Wishard with Clarence Brown
is waiting for approval or comments
on the speech. They want the
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
comments today. If RCM approves,
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
1
)
please call Wishard on 377 5151 and
let him know what comments we have.
Bob Kimmitt
2
K
John Poindexter
X
A
Kay
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
X
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
MaHock
3
A
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
time already called Commerce Please
resubrict comments an new duft.
attached
3989
DIRACTMENT OF COMMERCE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C 20230
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
84 MAY 18 P5: 13
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT KIMMETT
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs
FROM:
Wm. Van Dusen Wishard Van Wishard
Special Assistant
SUBJECT:
Clarence J. Brown's Speech to US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council
Attached is the paragraph the State Department has asked
to be inserted in Deputy Secretary Brown's speech. They
suggest it be inserted on page 7 between the last two
paragraphs.
Other changes recommended by State;
-- Page 3, line 8: delete "computer"
Line 10: delete "the latest"
-- Page 4, second paragraph: delete the second
sentence about Japan becoming world's second largest
economy.
-- Page 2: strike last line
-- Page 8, second paragraph, second sentence
should read "for national security and foreign
policy reasons"
-- Page 10, line 3: change "encourage" to "support"
Line 7: change "encourages" to "supports"
Second paragraph, strike the third sentence
Second paragraph, line 7 should read "Agreement,
currently under consideration for renewal, could
provide us with a solid basis for improving."
2
-- Page 14, second sentence should read "The
economic cooperation bred by trade is integral
to this progress. "
Strike what was the remainder of that sentence.
Attachment
3989
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Asm
SUBJECT:
U.S. -USSR Trade and Economic Council's Speech
I have a number of problems with Brown's draft speech, but
Mark Palmer tells me that State was sent the same draft
you were and is working on suggested changes.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Bob Kimmitt or me to ask Commerce to
send us a draft as coordinated with State before we
review the text in detail.
Approve
RMK
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Mr. Brown's letter and draft speech
CC: Mr. Lenczowski
Mr. McMinn
Ms. Small
Mr. Sestanovich
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Fortier
3989
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
May 16, 1984
Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.
20500
Dear Bud,
Enclosed is a draft of my forthcoming speech
to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.
As I mentioned yesterday, I would value any
guidance and suggestions you might have both
for the speech and for any broader contribu-
tion I might make while I am at the Council's
meeting in New York.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Bid
Clarence J. Brown
Enclosure
CJB/VW/bs
and 2 1050
4009
d
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
May 21, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK fam
SUBJECT:
Baldrige-Sushkov Meeting
Secretary Baldrige has sent you a letter outlining his plans for
a meeting with Bill Verity and Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign
Trade Sushkov. The meeting is scheduled for May 25, a few hours
before you have a scheduled meeting with Verity and Sushkov.
Baldrige's plans for the meeting seem consistent with our earlier
consultations and I perceive no problems with them.
Lenczowski, JL McMign, M. Robinson Birth and Sestanovich SRS concur.
Attachment:
TAB I - Letter from Secretary Baldridge of May 15, 1984
4009
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
84 MAY P12: 02
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
MAY 1 7 1984
May 15, 1984
Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Bud,
On May 25 I will be meeting with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade,
Vladimir Sushkov, who is coming to the United States to cochair the meeting of
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in New York.
A few days ago I discussed with Ambassador Hartman my meeting with Sushkov and
the President's recent approval for extending the U.S.-Soviet Economic, Indus-
trial and Technical Cooperation Agreement (EITCA) and for exploring the possi-
bility of a meeting of a Working Group of Experts under the Agreement.
In the course of our conversation the Ambassador noted that news of the President's
decision would be conveyed to the Soviets at the working level of the State Depart-
ment. He agreed that it would be a good idea for me to follow up on this by rais-
ing the subject of the EITCA Working Group with Sushkov. The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Commercial Commission (JCC) is specifically charged with convening the Working
Group of Experts under the terms of the EITCA.
The Working Group is headed on the Soviet side by an official of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, and for the U.S. side it should be headed by the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for International Economic Policy.
The Working Group would be responsible for exchanging information and forecasts
on economic industrial and commercial trends to assist enterprises and trading
organizations in both countries in identifying fields for "mutually beneficial
contracts."
The level and character of this exchange would be entirely within current policy
guidelines and should contribute to the objective the President enunciated in his
January 16 speech of finding areas for U.S. Soviet cooperation in order to move
toward a more constructive relationship. Observers from other departments, and
certainly from the NSC staff, will be invited to participate.
Sincerely,
Mac
Secretary of Commerce
SYSTEM II
90605
Chron
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK JSW
SUBJECT:
Next Steps on Sakharov
Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President
reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to
encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.
It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you
send it to the President for his information.
unevoilable
Walt Raymond concurs.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS F95-074 #92
Declassify: OADR
BY smf NARA, DATE 11/22/99
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Next Steps on Sakharov
George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the
steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve
the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are
now underway.
George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public
statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is
moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other
statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their
interest to the Soviet leaders.
Attachment:
Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
DECL: OADR
NLS F95-074 #93
BY snf NARA, DATE 11/22/79
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90605
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1984 59
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
From:
George P. Shultz was
Subject:
Next Steps on Sakharov
Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth
day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out
for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities
to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and
thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike.
According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr.
Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to
prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have
thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening
to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.
The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to
encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the
Sakharovs:
-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the
Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with
Dobrynin).
-- The Department has released two public statements
condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.
-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third
World capitals to request the help of host governments and
international political organizations in convincing the Soviets
to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have
already responded, and there is a possiblity that Mitterand may
precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's
case.
-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov
case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our
own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New
Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.
-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences
President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies
of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and
caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow
will not take place as planned.
-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for
dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS M1480#9
DECL: OADR
BY soft NARA, DATE 12/12/05
SECRET
- 2 -
posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21)
and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents
on the situation.
-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family
members in this country, and are advising posts where they can
be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to
other countries.
-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not
in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to
use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already
undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of
an upcoming trip to the USSR.
Action Plan for Additional Efforts
In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place
increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is
to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation
favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an
issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a
U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.
-- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a
private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since
this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As
you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your
behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response,
both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having
conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation.
The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on
Sakharov.
-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to
raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international
nature of concern about the Sakharovs.
-- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer
Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to
determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in
trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the
Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited
prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide
the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation
short of tragedy.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
-- We will also be going privately to other governments who
have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the
Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their
part to trade for Sakharov.
-- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last
week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where
appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public
efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.
-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the
Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.
SECRET
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90605
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
From:
George P. Shultz was
Subject:
Next Steps on Sakharov
Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth
day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out
for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities
to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and
thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike.
According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr.
Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to
prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have
thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening
to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.
The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to
encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the
Sakharovs:
-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the
Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with
Dobrynin).
-- The Department has released two public statements
condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.
-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third
World capitals to request the help of host governments and
international political organizations in convincing the Soviets
to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have
already responded, and there is a possiblity that Mitterand may
precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's
case.
-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov
case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our
own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New
Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.
-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences
President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies
of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and
caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow
will not take place as planned.
-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for
dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLS F95-074-94
DECL: OADR
By
smf NARA, Date 11/22/99
SECRET
- 2 -
posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21)
and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents
on the situation.
-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family
members in this country, and are advising posts where they can
be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to
other countries.
-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not
in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to
use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already
undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of
an upcoming trip to the USSR.
Action Plan for Additional Efforts
In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place
increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is
to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation
favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an
issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a
U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.
-- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a
private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since
this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As
you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your
behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response,
both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having
conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation.
The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on
Sakharov.
-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to
raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international
nature of concern about the Sakharovs.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
-- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last
week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where
appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public
efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.
-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the
Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.
SECRET
3989
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Asm
SUBJECT:
U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council's Speech
I have a number of problems with Brown's draft speech, but
Mark Palmer tells me that State was sent the same draft
you were and is working on suggested changes.
RECOMMENDATION
That you authorize Bob Kimmitt or me to ask Commerce to
send us a draft as coordinated with State before we
review the text in detail.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Mr. Brown's letter and draft speech
CC: Mr. Lenczowski
Mr. McMinn
Ms. Small
Mr. Sestanovich
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Fortier
3989
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230
May 16, 1984
Honorable Robert McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.
20500
Dear Bud,
Enclosed is a draft of my forthcoming speech
to the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council.
As I mentioned yesterday, I would value any
guidance and suggestions you might have both
for the speech and for any broader contribu-
tion I might make while I am at the Council's
meeting in New York.
With best wishes.
Sincerely,
Bid
Clarence J. Brown
Enclosure
CJB/VW/bs
398
DRAFT
5/16/84
US-USSR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL
MAY 24, 1984
MR. VERITY, MR. SUSHKOV, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, DISTINGUISHED
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. IT IS A PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE WITH
YOU TODAY; TO REPRESENT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AT THIS
OCCASION; AND TO TAKE PART IN AN EVENT THAT HOLDS THE GERM
OF PROMISE AND POSSIBILITY FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES,
You HAVE BEEN MEETING HERE TO DEVELOP WIDE-RANGING MUTUAL
ADVANTAGES FOR OUR NATIONS
ADVANTAGES THAT CAN MEAN
PROGRESS AND PEACE FOR THE PEOPLES WE REPRESENT.
THIS MEETING
THE TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL'S FIRST
FULL MEMBERSHIP MEETING IN THE UNITED STATES IN SEVEN YEARS
IS A SINGULAR EVENT. THE COUNCIL PLAYS A UNIQUE ROLE
BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS
INDEED, IN THE WORLD.
2
THROUGH FAIR AND STORMY WEATHER, THE COUNCIL HAS CARRIED
THE BANNER OF AMERICAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IN THE
ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL GOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS ON NON-AGRICULTURAL
TRADE, THE COUNCIL HAS SERVED AS A FORUM FOR COMMERCIAL
DISCUSSIONS ON MANY LEVELS, THESE TALKS ARE ESPECIALLY
//
NEEDED AT TIMES WHEN OUR DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
SYSTEMS PRODUCE UNCERTAINTY AND TENSION.
WE MEET TODAY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF DRAMATIC CHANGE
SWEEPING ACROSS THE EARTH. PROPELLING THIS CHANGE IS THE
DOUBLING EVERY DECADE OF THE WORLD'S BODY OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE, THE TORRENT OF TECHNOLOGY THIS KNOWLEDGE
CREATES IS ALTERING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONS, AND
IT HOLDS BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE US-SOVIET RELATIONS.
3
THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE BRINGING OUR NATIONS TO THE
VERGE OF THE GREATEST ECONOMIC EXPANSION SINCE ELECTRICITY,
CHEMICALS AND AUTOMOBILES CHANGED POWER SOURCES, MATERIALS
AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF INDUSTRY A CENTURY AGO, THEY ARE
RESTRUCTURING THE PATTERN OF WORLD ECONOMIC PRODUCTION AS
SURELY AND FUNDAMENTALLY AS THE CHANGES MADE DURING THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION A CENTURY EARLIER,
WITH THE COMING OF LOW COST COMPUTER-TELECOMMUNICATIONS
NETWORKS, ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS IN EVERY PART OF THE
GLOBE NOW HAVE INSTANT ACCESS TO THE LATEST TECHNOLOGY AND
PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES. THE ABILITY OF PEOPLE TO ADAPT TO
THESE INFORMATION-BASED ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IS PLAYING AN
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN NATIONAL ECONOMIES. THE
VERY CONCEPT OF AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ECONOMY IS
CRUMBLING AND TAKING WITH IT OUTDATED ECONOMIC THEORIES,
4
KNOWLEDGE HAS REPLACED LABOR AND RAW MATERIALS AS THE
PRIMARY SOURCE OF WEALTH, THUS ALLOWING NATIONS TO CREATE
THEIR OWN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE EVEN WHEN NOT GIFTED WITH
RAW MATERIALS.
IN THIS VERY WAY JAPAN HAS DISPLACED AMERICA AS THE WORLD'S
LEADING AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER: THEY HAVE DISPLACED GERMANY
AS THE WORLD'S MAJOR CAMERA MAKER: AND THEY HAVE DISPLACED
SWITZERLAND AS THE WORLD'S PREMIER WATCH PRODUCER, ON THE
BASIS OF SUCH DYNAMISM, JAPAN COULD BECOME THE WORLD'S
SECOND LARGEST ECONOMY, NEED I MENTION THAT JAPAN IS
LIMITED IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCE BY COMPARISON TO THE U.S. OR
THE USSR, AND IT HAS ACCOMPLISHED ITS POSITION IN ONLY ONE
GENERATION SINCE ITS ABJECT DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II.
BUT IT'S NOT JUST JAPAN.
5
GERMANY IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST EXPORTER OF MANUFACTURED
GOODS. HONG KONG IS THE WORLD'S THIRD LARGEST FINANCIAL
SUPERMARKET. KOREA BOASTS THE WORLD'S LARGEST SHIPBUILDING
YARDS, BRAZIL HAS MOVED INTO THE FRONT RANK OF COMMODITY
STEEL PRODUCTION. SINGAPORE IS THE WORLD'S SECOND-LARGEST
PRODUCER OF OIL DRILLING RIGS, SOME 15 THIRD WORLD
COUNTRIES ALONE HAVE OVER 1,300 FOREIGN MANUFACTURING AND
TRADING SUBSIDIARIES.
WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION
IS BECOMING GLOBAL. ANY NATION -- EVEN LESSER DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES WITH LIMITED RESOURCES -- CAN OVERLEAP MORE
DEVELOPED WORLD LEADERS IF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES
ARE WISELY ORGANIZED. NATIONS. ARE INCREASINGLY PART OF A
WORLDWIDE SYSTEM OF RESEARCH, INVENTION, FINANCING,
PRODUCTION, MARKETING AND CONSUMPTION. THUS THE WORLD BANK
REPORTS THAT 25 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING PRODUCED IN THE WORLD
IS SOLD ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS.
6
EACH NATION IS STRUGGLING TO ADJUST TO THIS NEW SITUATION.
IN MY OWN COUNTRY, FOR EXAMPLE, 70 PERCENT OF EVERYTHING
SOLD TO CONSUMERS COMPETES AGAINST PRODUCTS FROM OTHER
NATIONS, THE SHARE OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT DERIVED
FROM TRADE HAS DOUBLED IN THE PAST DECADE, WE EXPORT
20 PERCENT OF OUR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND MORE THAN
40 PERCENT OF OUR FARM PRODUCE, EXPORTS ACCOUNT FOR THE
JOBS OF APPROXIMATELY 5 MILLION AMERICANS.
IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT WE VIEW THE REQUIREMENTS OF U.S.
TRADE. TRADE IS NO LONGER A SECONDARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY.
IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PRODUCTION PROCESS,
AND so WE SEEK TO EXPAND OUR TRADE RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL
NATIONS, INCLUDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
7
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE
IMPORTANCE OF TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, TRADE
OFFERS OPPORTUNITIES FOR BENEFICIAL COOPERATION,
PRESIDENT REAGAN NOTED RECENTLY THAT PEACEFUL TRADE HELPS
IN THE EFFORT TO DEVELOP CONSTRUCTIVE AMERICAN-SOVIET
RELATIONS.
YET TRADE IS ONLY ONE FACET OF THE TOTAL AMERICAN-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP
#
A RELATIONSHIP WHICH TOUCHES VIRTUALLY
EVERY AREA OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS,
IN SUCH A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP, TRADE CANNOT BE SEPARATED
FROM EVERYTHING ELSE.
8
THIS IS A POINT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ALSO MADE OVER THE
YEARS, EVEN WHEN EXPECTATIONS FOR TRADE BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES WERE GREATEST, WE EACH RECOGNIZED, IN WRITING,
THE RIGHT OF EITHER GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ANY ACTION IT
DEEMED NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF ITS SECURITY
INTERESTS.
As YOU WELL KNOW, WE HAVE EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND SHORT SUPPLY REASONS. BUT
CUTSIDE OF EXPORTS PROHIBITED FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS,
A LARGE RANGE OF PRODUCTS EXISTS WHICH CAN FREELY BE
EXPORTED FROM THE U.S. TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE
JUST ISSUED A BOOKLET WHICH DETAILS SOME OF THE AREAS OF
TRADE ACCEPTABLE UNDER OUR REGULATIONS,
9
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS PROVIDING BENEFITS TO BOTH COUNTRIES
COVER A WIDE RANGE OF PRODUCTS, BULLDOZERS AND SUPER DUMP
TRUCKS, SOFT DRINK AND BABY FOOD PLANTS, PLATINUM GROUP
METALS, FERTILIZERS AND FUELS ARE EXAMPLES WHICH COME TO
MIND.
As TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, I COULD THINK OF SALES TO THE
USSR OF AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND PLANT TO MANUFACTURE SUCH
EQUIPMENT. THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS ENCOURAGED THIS TYPE
OF TRADE IN SEVERAL WAYS, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE
COUNCIL'S "AGRIBUSINESS-USA" AS WELL AS ASSURANCE OF
EXTENSION OF EXPORT LICENSES, I AM SURE THAT DURING THIS
MEETING YOU HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING MANY NEW IDEAS FOR
COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE. WE. HOPE THAT THESE WILL
TRANSLATE INTO INCREASED TRADE,
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PERHAPS IT HAS NOT BEEN AS CLEAR TO AMERICAN AND SOVIET
BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES AS IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THAT WE
ENCOURAGE U.S. FIRMS TO DEVELOP NON-STRATEGIC TRADE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION. OUR NEGOTIATION OF AN EXPANDED
GRAIN AGREEMENT LAST YEAR MAKES CLEAR OUR POLICY ON
AGRICULTURAL TRADE. I HOPE MY PRESENCE HERE PROVIDES
REASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. ALSO ENCOURAGES NON-STRATEGIC
TRADE IN OTHER AREAS,
WE HAVE ENSURED THE PRESERVATION OF KEY ELEMENTS IN THE
BILATERAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK. THERE IS A GRAIN AGREEMENT,
AN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND A FISHERIES
AGREEMENT. THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION REMAINS TO
OVERSEE TRADE RELATIONS. RENEWAL OF THE
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION
AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE US WITH A SOLID BASIS FOR IMPROVING
THE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC
SPHERE,
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OUR MISSION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE IS BOTH TO
PROMOTE EXPORTS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO ADMINISTER EXPORT
CONTROLS WHERE NECESSARY, THIS IS A DIFFICULT AND, AT TIMES,
CONTRADICTORY TASK, SUCH A JOB IMPRESSES UPON US THE NEED
FOR AS STABLE A WORLD TRADING ENVIRONMENT AS POSSIBLE, THIS
IS THE REASON THAT, WHILE WE SEEK AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER
CONTROLS EFFECTIVELY, WE ALSO SUPPORT MEASURES TO PROVIDE A
REASONABLE DEGREE OF CONTRACT SANCTITY.
OUR GOVERNMENT IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING RENEWAL OF THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION AcT. PRESIDENT REAGAN SUPPORTS
INCLUSION IN THE NEW ACT OF A PROVISION ON CONTRACT SANCTITY,
THIS PROVISION ACKNOWLEDGES THAT BUSINESS CONTRACTS SHOULD
NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE BROKEN FOR REASONS OF FOREIGN
POLICY, YET IT PROVIDES THE PRESIDENT WITH THE FLEXIBILITY
TO BREAK CONTRACTS UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
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THIS WOULD COMPLEMENT THE CONTRACT SANCTITY FOR AGRICULTURAL
EXPORTS ALREADY PROVIDED BY THE COMMODITY FUTURES AcT. IT
WOULD HELP MANIFEST PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INSISTENCE THAT
THE UNITED STATES BE A RELIABLE TRADING PARTNER, OF
COURSE, THE CONGRESS IS STILL DELIBERATING THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT, AND WE HAVE NO WAY OF PREDICTING
THE OUTCOME.
LET ME STRESS THAT, IN LOOKING AT THE BROADER SCOPE OF
US-SOVIET RELATIONS, NO ONE IS HAPPY ABOUT THEIR CURRENT
STATE. THE FUTURE OF MANKIND OBLIGES OUR TWO NATIONS
TO PEACEFULLY RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES. PRESIDENT REAGAN
RECOGNIZED THIS IN HIS SPEECH ON JANUARY 16. "NEITHER WE NOR
THE SOVIET UNION," HE SAID, "CAN WISH AWAY THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN OUR TWO SOCIETIES AND OUR PHILOSOPHIES, BUT WE
SHOULD ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT WE DO HAVE COMMON INTERESTS,
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AND THE FOREMOST AMONG THEM," THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED,
"IS TO AVOID WAR AND REDUCE THE LEVEL OF ARMS, THERE IS NO
RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STEER A COURSE WHICH I WOULD
CALL CREDIBLE DETERENCE AND PEACEFUL COMPETITION; AND IF WE
DO so," HE CONCLUDED, "WE MIGHT FIND AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD
ENGAGE IN CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION."
THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH OUR DIFFERENCES
WITH THE SOVIET UNION PEACEFULLY, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.
WE'RE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US AND TO
WORK FOR PRACTICAL, FAIR SOLUTIONS ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL
COMPROMISE. THE UNITED STATES WILL NEVER RETREAT FROM
NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WE INSIST THAT NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH
REAL PROBLEMS AND SEEK GENUINE SOLUTIONS, THE TIME FOR
POSTURING BEFORE WORLD AUDIENCES HAS LONG PASSED,
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IN CLOSING, I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT NEVER HAVE THE PEOPLE
OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SO HOPED FOR PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE
AS THEY DO TODAY. THE INTERDEPENDENCE BRED BY TRADE IS
INTEGRAL TO THIS PROGRESS, AS PEOPLE ARE LESS LIKELY TO
SHOOT AT SOMEONE ELSE IF THEY KNOW THEY WILL HIT
THEMSELVES IN THEIR OWN POCKETBOOK. TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE
HAVE GIVEN US THE TOOLS LITERALLY TO SHAPE A NEW ERA, AN
ERA WHICH CAN FEED, CLOTHE AND HOUSE EVERY MEMBER OF THE
HUMAN FAMILY. AN ERA WHERE FEAR OF ANNIHILATION IS
A RELIC OF BYGONE TIMES. AN ERA THAT COULD TAKE NATIONS
BEYOND HISTORIC RIVALRIES. AN ERA OF FULFILLMENT FOR ALL
PEOPLES,
THAT IS THE HEART OF THE TASK FACING OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND
THIS COUNCIL, AS WE SEEK TO EXPAND OUR COMMERCE AND TRADE,
THANK YOU.