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Matlock Chron December 1984 (1)
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135840598
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Matlock Chron December 1984 (1)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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1986-12-31
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1986
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1983-01-01
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1983
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron December 1984 (1)
Box: 6
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 3/23/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (1/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
6
YARHI-MILO
611
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6298 MEMO
MEMO TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE
1
ND
B1
KOIVISTO LETTER TO GEORGE BUSH [2]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6316 LETTER
LETTER TO GEORGE BUSH [5-6]
2 10/29/1984 B1
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6299 MEMO
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH
3
ND
B1
DOBRYNIN [12-14]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6300 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT
1 12/5/1984 B1
SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [15]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6301 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE
1 12/4/1984 B1
RE GENEVA [18]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6302 MEMO
MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE
1
ND
B1
DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA
[19]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6303 MEMO
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH
3
ND
B1
DOBRYNIN [21-23]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
3/23/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (1/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
6
YARHI-MILO
611
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6304 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT
1 12/5/1984 B1
SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [24]
R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6305 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS FROM ROBERT MCFARLANE
1 12/4/1984 B1
RE GENEVA [30]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6306 MEMO
MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE
1
ND
B1
DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA
[32]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6307 MEMO
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH
3
ND
B1
DOBRYNIN [34-36]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6308 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE NEXT
1 12/4/1984 B1
SHULTZ/DOBRYNIN MEETING [37]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6309 MEMO
MEMO FOR GEORGE SHULTZ RE
1
ND
B1
DISCUSSION WITH DOBRYNIN ON GENEVA
[39]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
6310 MEMO
TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
2
ND
B1
DOBRYNIN [41]
R
2/26/2009
GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 3/23/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON DECEMBER 1984 (1/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
6
YARHI-MILO
611
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6311 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE
6 12/6/1984 B1
CHANNEL TO USSR [44-49]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6312 MEMO
MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.
1 12/6/1984 B1
STRATEGY ON WORLD WAR 2
ANNIVERSARIES [50]
R
11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6313 MEMO
MEMO FOR SHULTZ RE U.S. STRATEGY ON
2 12/6/1984 B1
WORLD WAR 2 ANNIVERSARIES [51-52]
R
11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6314 MEMO
MEMO FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM
3 11/29/1984 B1
GEORGE SHULTZ [56-58]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6315 MEMO
MEMO FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE RE U.S.
1 12/3/1984 B1
STRATEGOY ON WORLD WAR 2
ANNIVERSARIES [59]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
R. Mc I ailane
THE WHITE HOUSE
Cleran File Dec -84
WASHINGTON
D
=
Eyes only Please
and Jack mat lock
SECRET
NSC
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
CAS 6/10/02
PRESERVATION COPY
V
SECRET/EYES ONLY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DECLASSIFIED
To: RCM
NLRR fob-114/,*
FROM: Jack Matlode
BY G'
NARA
298
SUB: Koivisto Le Her to V.P.
1/27/17
1) Obviously Krivisto was curong that the
Soviets would not "reopen negotiations"
part. / He impties, 2 course, that it
in the absence 8 a qesture an our
would moratoriums.) take an INF deplay ment
2) J am not sure what oral merages
may (or may not) Lane accompanied
this correspondence.
Unlers there were some which
alter the thust I. the letter, the
latter is not very helpful.
3) Nevertheles, J believe that it would
he useful to maintain same sort
of private dialogue with Krivisto.
4) J have not discussed any of this with
anyone else. If you wish, J can
follow up with Dan Gregg.
Jack 2PIs do.
11/13
2A
RCM:
Do you wish to share with staff?
Yes: E.O. to mattoch
No
Wilma
SECRET
3
THIS IS A COVER SHEET
The information in this document
is classified and as such will be
treated according to OSD Security
Instructions. Writing on this
cover sheet is prohibited.
UNCLASSIFIED OF CLASSIFIED UPON ENCLOSURE(S) REMOVAL Lts 6/10/02
SECRET
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
It
WASHINGTON, D.C.
November 13, 1984
SECRET
NOTE FOR BUD McFARLANE
FROM:
DON GREGG Dg
I am attaching a copy of
President Koivisto's most recent
letter to the Vice President for
your information.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
as 6/10/02
SECRET
Helsinki, 29 October 1984
5
Dear Mr. Vice President,
I am writing to you, Mr. Vice President, now that we might
be approaching a new turning point in international rela-
tions. The direction of the future developments in great
power relations may be determined by decisions to be made
in the coming months.
When I wrote you last spring I expressed the fear that
there would be a long period of deadlock ahead of us.
Although this deadlock has hardly been opened yet, we have
been able to note signs of improvement in great power rela-
tions, above all the meeting of President Reagan and Mr.
Gromyko. The door may be ajar, but WE are still far from
the resumption of the negotiations, not to speak about
concrete results.
A number of optimistic assessments have been published
recently implying that the arms control negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union are to be
resumed soon after the US elections. To open a dialogue is
not SO difficult as to attain concrete results. I am
convinced that the Soviet Union is not prepared to re-open
the negotiations without some degree of certainty in regard
to positive results.
In the light of the discussions and contacts we have
recently had, I, for my own part, am not SO optimistic as
His Excellency
Vice President George Bush
Washington D.C.
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASED
NLRR F06-114/1 6316
BY Cir NARA DATE 11/25/07
many specialists of international politics are. Hence I
wish to emphasize the urgent need of building confidence
in the relations between the US and the USSR. I would
also like to reiterate what I already said in my two
previous letters: a freeze on further deployment of INF
systems in Europe could, in my mind, considerably
contribute to building mutual confidence, even if I
recognize the inherent problems of such a step.
I highly appreciate the opportunity to write to you in
this way and for my part I am ready to continue to main-
tain our contacts.
With best personal regards,
k Yours sincerely
8650 Chron
let
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
method File
2
December 3, 1984
Dear Patricia:
I appreciated your letter of November 23 in
which you described your plans for taking
Raggedy Ann to Moscow.
This seems a very worthy project and I hope
you are able to bring it to fruition.
Thanks for keeping me informed.
know Please before Sincerely, Robert C. McFarlane
Ms. Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
ESIPA
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223
ESIPA
2
November 23, 1984
Matteck
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
RCM SEEN 71-26-84
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. McFarlane:
As you will recall, we met last spring in Washington at
Queen Noor's table during the Arab Women's Cultural and Educa-
tional Benefit. Thank you so much for the kind letter you sent
regarding our program.
The purpose of this letter. is to bring you up to date on a new
ESIPA project which you might be interested to learn about. In
September I was invited to meet with Deputy Minister of Culture,
George Ivanov, in Moscow. We discussed an exchange between our
theatre, The Empire State Institute for the Performing Arts-State
University of New York, and a theatre from Moscow and or Leningrad.
Tentatively they will perform in our theatre in 1985-86 and we will
tour to Moscow and Leningrad in 1986-87. It is also possible that
the tour plans might reverse and we would tour in 1985-86 and they
in 1986-87. I have kept Mr. John Zimmerman, the United States Cul-
tural Officer for the Soviet Union, up to date and he has been most
helpful with communications between our Institute and the Ministry
of Culture in Moscow through the diplomatic pouch.
To give you a little background, in 1974 I directed a production
of The Wizard of Oz which toured to Moscow under the sponsorship of
The State University of New York and the Soviet Ministry of Culture,
with underwriting from the Chase Manhattan Bank and Finnair. At that
time Walter Stoessel was our ambassador to the Soviet Union. Our per-
formances were received most enthusiastically and prior to our depar-
ture from Moscow we were invited for a return engagement. During the
interim, between 1974 and 1976, our theatre program moved from the
State University of New York Albany campus and was instituted as a
State mandated professional theatre as part of the State University
of New York university-wide programs. Two years ago I was approached
The Empire State Institute for the Performina Arts/SINY/GNARESPPACC
by Natalia Sats, the Director of the Moscow Musical Theatre for
Children, regarding the possibility of an exchange between her
company and our company and was invited to Moscow to discuss the
possibility last spring. Unfortunately our schedule at ESIPA was
so hectic it was impossible for me to get away until September of
this year.
The work that we would take to Moscow would be a new produc-
tion of Raggedy Ann. The book has been written by William Gibson
and the lyrics and score by Joe Raposo. Mr. Raposo has informed
me that he has spoken to Mrs. Reagan about this exchange. As you
may know, Mr. Raposo has written the music for Mrs. Reagan's Foster
Grandparents Program.
We will continue to work through Mr. Zimmerman, but since I
had the pleasure of meeting you last spring and since discussions
between the Soviet Union and the United States are commencing,
I thought I would communicate this information directly to you.
The State University of New York Chancellor, Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.,
to whom I report, is most supportive about this project and we would
all like to see it realized. If you have any suggestions, I would be
most pleased to receive them.
Sincerely,
Jifaa Patricia B. Snyder
Producing Director
8650
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
November 27, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 4am
SUBJECT:
Letter from Patricia B. Snyder
Patricia Snyder has written you a letter (Tab II) informing you
of her plans to propose staging an American play in the Moscow
Musical Theater for Children.
Attached is a letter of acknowledgment (Tab I), should you wish
to send one.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Proposed letter of acknowledgment to Patricia
Snyder
Tab II
Incoming letter from Patricia Snyder
MAtloch Chron 11
an
National Security Council
The White House
System #
II
Package # 91239
$
1464
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
1
Bob Kimmitt
2
&
-
3
John Poindexter
of
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
4
Bud McFarlane
5
3
A
Bob Kimmitt
L:
K
NSC Secretariat
7
DEC By.198 1984
D TabA
Situation Room
only K
Shirty.
I= Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
cc:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Tab IV remains relevant and timely.
Other Tabs are OBE.
Tab IV is very good.
I
SECRET
SYSTEM II
12
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 1 -
91239
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN
Introductory
We are pleased that we have been able to agree to start new
negotiations on the whole arms control area and I am looking
forward to my meetings with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva.
-- I thought it would be useful for us to touch base regarding
some of the arrangements for the meeting, and also to discuss the
sort of issues to be covered.
Arrangements
-- I am planning to arrive with my party in Geneva the evening of
January 6 and will be available throughout the next two days for
as many meetings as are convenient to Mr. Gromyko.
-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that
we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These
could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day
could be at one and those on the second at the other.
-- I would also suggest that it might be useful to have a dinner
for our delegations the evening of January 7, and -- if it does
not crowd the schedule too much -- a working lunch with smaller
groups on the 8th.
-- Although I will probably have a number of people travelling
=
with me, I would intend to keep the number of people with me in
the official meetings very small. I will have Paul Nitze, who is
helping me prepare for the meetings, with me, and probably just
one or two others. If,Mr. Gromyko would like my remarks
translated into Russian, I can have an interpreter, but if he
feels comfortable with my English we could dispense with him and
just depend on Viktor to interpret Mr. Gromyko's comments.
Agenda
-- Since we have arranged the meeting specifically to begin new
negotiations on arms control, I think that clearly should be our
primary focus.
-- However, arms control is only a part of the relationship, and
it might be useful to use the occasion for a review of where we
stand on regional and bilateral issues, if we can find the time
to do so without detracting from our primary purpose.
-- We could, for example, review some of these issues at the
working lunch. Or, if we have exhausted the arms control issues
by noon Tuesday, devote the fourth session to them. I suspect,
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1 #6299
SECRET
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
13
however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our
arms control discussion
-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these
other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant
Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review
them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues
which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.
Objectives
-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should
seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to
reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to
draw up agreed objectives for them.
-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic
discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors
which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will
need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.
-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad
and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be
realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I
think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to
be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement
what we have agreed upon.
-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting.
He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various
=
issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day
basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If
Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr.
Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could
move things along more rapidly.
-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large
delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an
assistant and a notetaker.
-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko
feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.
Soviet Views
-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss,
but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any
thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.
-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days,
and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring
back to us, he of course will pleased to receive them.
SECRET
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Conclusion
-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part
to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very
difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways
to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope
your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve
a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach
our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am
confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our
relations.
SECRET
6300
System II
MEMORANDUM
91239
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
5 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
Ron
FROM:
RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting
Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to
Secretary Shultz (Tab IV) suggesting talking points (Tab A) for a
meeting late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at
last night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The
focus of the suggested talking points are certain format,
logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive
points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they
have in mind.
Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining
how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the
Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking
on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and
questions.
At Tab I is recommended language for use today as a White House
statement. It differs from the language in your profs note ( (Tab
III) in that it takes into account the photo opportunity and uses
speakers to elaborate on the delegation by mentioning the SACG.
- It also deletes the modifiers on Nitze's advisory status to give
us maximum flexibility and also protect us if the statement is
used before Shultz talks to Gromyko. Likewise, a modification is
made on the delegation statement to provide flexibility.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State
sending him your suggestions for talking points.
That you approve the White House statement at Tab I.
Approve Rcm
Disapprove
Approve
OBE
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - President's Statement
Tab II - Speakers Material
Tab III - Profs Note
Tab IV - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
DECLASSIFIED
Tab A - Talking Points
White House Guidelines, 28, 1997
By
NARA, Date
SECRET-SENSITIVE
Declassify by OADR
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today
asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as advisor to the Secretary
for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of
distinguished service to his country and I am very pleased that
he has accepted.
ok
SPEAKERS' Q&A
Q. Ambassador Paul Niztze has a new office in the seventh floor
of the State Department. Has he been named the arms control
"Czar" or a "special envoy."
A. At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President
today has asked Ambassador Nitze to serve as the personal advisor
to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. The balance of the
interagency delegation will be drawn largely from the White House
Senior Arms Control Group. The President has met with Ambassador
Nitze today and is currently meeting with key arms control
officials to discuss our preparations for the Geneva talks.
&
6301
18
LOOK AT THE NOTE
E01
From: NSRCM --CPUA
Date and time
12/04/84 17:22:52
To: NSJMP --CPUA
SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
Subject: Reply to Note 12/04/84 13:52 Delegation for Geneva
I have talked to Shultz about it. I have urged him toward a small group for
the actual sessions with Gromyko. My idea is three people--Shultz, Paul and a
notetaker. He could take more people on the plane--indeed he is willing to
take reps drawn from the SACG from each interested agency. And he is
willing--even eager--to take Richard Perle. I asked him today to put together
a draft announcement which we could put out tomorrow. They were working on
something to say today from State but I think the announcement of Paul ought
to have a Presidential association and should wait until after the Lusinchi
visit so as not to step on that story. I urged him to express it along the
lines "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President has
today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as an advisor to the Secretary in
preparations for the Geneva talks and beyond. The balance of the US delegation
will include representatives from each of the interested agencies and will be
drawn from the Senior Arms Control Group." Ron is also working on a draft and
DECLASSIFIED
By
White C/L House Guidelines,
NARA, Date 2/26/07
6302
SECRET
19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET-SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva
I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin
would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in
Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of
talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary
arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva.
Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues
now, we do need to express our views on a number of items.
Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would
prove useful.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
By
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 2/26/09
SECRET-SENSITIVE
Declassify by: OADR
1
2°
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Jack- place call
Ron behaman
8:30 am
Dec 6
Chronfile-
Dec.
DECLASSIFIED
6303 12/5/89 21
White at House Guidelines, August 28, 1907
NARA, Date 2/26/09
CHRON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 1 -
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN
Introductory
-- We are pleased that we have been able to agree to start new
negotiations on the whole arms control area and I am looking
forward to my meetings with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva.
-- I thought it would be useful for us to touch base regarding
some of the arrangements for the meeting, and also to discuss the
sort of issues to be covered.
Arrangements
-- I am planning to arrive with my party in Geneva the evening of
January 6 and will be available throughout the next two days for
as many meetings as are convenient to Mr. Gromyko.
-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that
we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These
could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day
could be at one and those on the. second at the other.
-- I would also suggest that it might be useful to have a dinner
for our delegations the evening of January 7, and -- if it does
not crowd the schedule too much -- a working lunch with smaller
groups on the 8th.
-- Although I will probably have a number of people travelling
with me, I would intend to keep the number of people with me in
the official meetings very small. I will have Paul Nitze, who is
helping me prepare for the meetings, with me, and probably just
one or two others. If Mr. Gromyko would like my remarks
translated into Russian, I can have an interpreter, but if he
feels comfortable with my English we could dispense with him and
just depend on Viktor to interpret Mr. Gromyko's comments.
Agenda
-- Since we have arranged the meeting specifically to begin new
negotiations on arms control, I think that clearly should be our
primary focus.
-- However, arms control is only a part of the relationship, and
it might be useful to use the occasion for a review of where we
stand on regional and bilateral issues, if we can find the time
to do so without detracting from 'our primary purpose.
-- We could, for example, review some of these issues at the
working lunch. Or, if we have exhausted the arms control issues
by noon Tuesday, devote the fourth session to them. I suspect,
-
22
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our
arms control discussion.
-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these
other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant
Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review
them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues
which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.
Objectives
-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should
seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to
reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to
draw up agreed objectives for them.
-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic
discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors
which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will
need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.
-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad
and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be
realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I
think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to
be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement
what we have agreed upon.
-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting.
He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various
issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day
basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If
Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr.
Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could
move things along more rapidly.
-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large
delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an
assistant and a notetaker.
-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko
feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.
Soviet Views
-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss,
but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any
thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.
-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days,
and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring
back to us, we of course will pleased to receive them.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
23
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Conclusion
-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part
to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very
difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways
to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope
your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve
a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach
our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am
confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our
relations.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECREI
6304
System II
MEMORANDUM
91239
24
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET SENSITIVE
ACTION
5 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting
Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to
Secretary Shultz (Tab IV) suggesting talking points (Tab A) for a
meeting late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at
last night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The
focus of the suggested talking points are certain format,
logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive
points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they
have in mind.
Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining
how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the
Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking
on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and
questions.
At Tab I is recommended language for use today as a White House
statement. It differs from the language in your profs note ( (Tab
III) in that it takes into account the photo opportunity and uses
speakers to elaborate on the delegation by mentioning the SACG.
It also deletes the modifiers on Nitze's advisory status to give
us maximum flexibility and also protect us if the statement is
used before Shultz talks to Gromyko. Likewise, a modification is
made on the delegation statement to provide flexibility.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State
sending him your suggestions for talking points.
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve the White House statement at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
- President's Statement
Tab II - Speakers Material
Tab III - Profs Note
Tab IV - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
DECLASSIFIED
Tab A - Talking Points
White House Guidelines,
NARA, Date
SECRET-SENSITIVE
Declassify by OADR
SECRET
SENSITIVE
HAM I
24
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today
asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as advisor to the Secretary
for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of
distinguished service to his country and I am very pleased that
he has accepted.
II I
I
Le
28
SPEAKERS' Q.& A
Q. Ambassador Paul Niztze has a new office in the seventh floor
of the State Department. Has he been named the arms control
"Czar" or a "special envoy."
A. At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President
today has asked Ambassador Nitze to serve as the personal advisor
to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. The balance of the
interagency delegation will be drawn largely from the White House
Senior Arms Control Group. The President has met with Ambassador
Nitze today and is currently meeting with key arms control
officials to discuss our preparations for the Geneva talks.
HAM
III
$
6305
LOOK AT THE NOTE
E01
From: NSRCM -CPUA
Date and time
12/04/84 17:22:52
To: NSJMP --CPUA
30
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
Subject: Reply to Note 12/04/84 13:52 Delegation for Geneva
I have talked to Shultz about it. I have urged him toward a small group for
the actual sessions with Gromyko. My idea is three people--Shultz, Paul and a
notetaker. He could take more people on the plane--indeed he is willing to
take reps drawn from the SACG from each interested agency. And he is
willing--even eager--to take Richard Perle. I asked him today to put together
a draft announcement which we could put out tomorrow. They were working on
something to say today from State but I think the announcement of Paul ought
to have a Presidential association and should wait until after the Lusinchi
visit so as not to step on that story. I urged him to express it along the
lines "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, the President has
today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as an advisor to the Secretary in
preparations for the Geneva talks and beyond. The balance of the US delegation
will include representatives from each of the interested agencies and will be
drawn from the Senior Arms Control Group." Ron is also working on a draft and
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28. 1997
By
NARA, Date 2/26/99
HAA
IV
18
SECRET
6306
32
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET -SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva
I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin
would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in
Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of
talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary
arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva.
Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues
now, we do need to express our views on a number of items.
Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would
prove useful.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, NARA, Date you
SECRET-SENSITIVE
Declassify by: OADR
SECRET
SENSITIVE
HAM A
as
SECRET
63L7
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 1 -
34
SUGGESTED POINTS TO COVER WITH DOBRYNIN
Introductory
-- We are pleased that we have been able to agree to start new
negotiations on the whole arms control area and I am looking
forward to my meetings with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva.
-- I thought it would be useful for us to touch base regarding
some of the arrangements for the meeting, and also to discuss the
sort of issues to be covered.
Arrangements
-- I am planning to arrive with my party in Geneva the evening of
January 6 and will be available throughout the next two days for
as many meetings as are convenient to Mr. Gromyko.
-- Since we have a lot of ground to cover, I would suggest that
we schedule morning and afternoon meetings on both days. These
could alternate between our missions, or the meetings on one day
could be at one and those on the second at the other.
-- I would also suggest that it might be useful to have a dinner
for our delegations the evening of January 7, and -- if it does
not crowd the schedule too much -- a working lunch with smaller
groups on the 8th.
-- Although I will probably have a number of people travelling
with me, I would intend to keep the number of people with me in
the official meetings very small. I will have Paul Nitze, who is
helping me prepare for the meetings, with me, and probably just
one or two others. If Mr. Gromyko would like my remarks
translated into Russian, I can have an interpreter, but if he
feels comfortable with my English we could dispense with him and
just depend on Viktor to interpret Mr. Gromyko's comments.
Agenda
-- Since we have arranged the meeting specifically to begin new
negotiations on arms control, I think that clearly should be our
primary focus.
-- However, arms control is only a part of the relationship, and
it might be useful to use the occasion for a review of where we
stand on regional and bilateral issues, if we can find the time
to do so without detracting from our primary purpose.
-- We could, for example, review some of these issues at the
working lunch. Or, if we have exhausted the arms control issues
by noon Tuesday, devote the fourth session to them. I suspect,
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28. 1997
NARA, Date 2/26/09
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
however, that we will need that fourth session to conclude our
arms control discussion.
-- Another way to provide for a thorough consultation on these
other issues might be for each of us to delegate an Assistant
Secretary or Deputy Minister to meet separately Monday to review
them, then report to us so that we can take up briefly any issues
which seem to require our attention sometime on Tuesday.
Objectives
-- As for our objectives, I believe that, at a minimum, we should
seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed statement, that is to
reach agreement on a basic agenda for future negotiations and to
draw up agreed objectives for them.
-- I think it would also be very useful to have a basic
discussion of our longer term objectives, and of the factors
which will affect the strategic balance in the future. We will
need this to guide our discussion of our immediate tasks.
-- Although we hope that the meeting will result in some broad
and very specific agreements for negotiation, we must be
realistic regarding what we can expect to achieve in two days. I
think it is very likely that a number of questions will remain to
be settled when we finish -- if only regarding how to implement
what we have agreed upon.
-- As I mentioned, I will have Paul Nitze with me at the meeting.
He will be thoroughly familiar with our thinking on the various
issues, and will be in a position to follow up -- on a day-to-day
basis if necessary -- in working out any remaining problems. If
Mr. Gromyko would like to name a counterpart to meet with Mr.
Nitze following our sessions in Geneva, I believe that this could
move things along more rapidly.
-- I'm not suggesting elaborate, formal meetings of large
delegations. Just Nitze and his counterpart, perhaps with an
assistant and a notetaker.
-- This is something we can discuss at Geneva, or if Mr. Gromyko
feels it is a good idea, we could agree on it in advance.
Soviet Views
-- I know you'll have to check these matters out with your boss,
but I'd be very interested in your own reaction and in any
thoughts you have for us as we prepare for Geneva.
-- Art Hartman will be coming back on consultation in a few days,
and if the Foreign Minister has any suggestions that he can bring
back to us, he of course will pleased to receive them.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
SECRET /SENSITIVE
SECRET
3u
Conclusion
-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, and will do our part
to see that they are successful. We know the issues are very
difficult, and will be looking for innovative and creative ways
to bridge some of the distance between our positions. We hope
your folks will do the same and that we can find a way to achieve
a real breakthrough. In any event, if Mr. Gromyko can approach
our talks in the same positive spirit I will bring, I am
confident that the meeting will mark a turning point in our
relations.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BECKET
91239
6308
MEMORANDUM
Chron
31
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
4 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
RON LEHMAN/JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Next Shultz/Dobrynin Meeting
Attached for your consideration is a short memorandum from you to
Secretary Shultz (Tab I) suggesting talking points for a meeting
late this week with Ambassador Dobrynin. We had agreed at last
night's meeting to give him our thoughts on this subject. The
focus of the suggested talking points are certain format,
logistics and protocol preliminaries and then some substantive
points designed mainly to draw out the Soviet Union on what they
have in mind.
Key items include setting the focus on arms control, explaining
how we might deal with regional and other issues, giving the
Soviets some advance knowledge of Nitze, explaining our thinking
on a delegations, and put down some substantive markers and
questions.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the Secretary of State
sending him your suggestions for talking points.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Memorandum to Secretary Shultz
Tab A - Your Talking Points
DECLASSIFIED
White House
By
SECRET SENSITIVE
Declassify by OADR
SECRET
SENSITIVE
HAAH
Sc
SECRE
6309
3r
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET-SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Discussion with Dobrynin on Geneva
I believe that a preliminary discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin
would be very helpful in our preparations for the meeting in
Geneva on January 7th and 8th. Attached you will find a number of
talking points which are designed to address certain preliminary
arrangements and reduce the number of misunderstandings in Geneva.
Although we clearly do not want to get into substantive issues
now, we do need to express our views on a number of items.
Furthermore, more information on Soviet views of Geneva would
prove useful.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28 1997
NARA, Date 2/26/09
SECRET SENSITIVE
Declassify by: OADR
SECRET
SENSITIVE
T B A A
SECRET
6310
41
SECRET-SENSITIVE
TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH DOBRYNIN
OO We have not met since our two governments agreed to begin new
negotiations in Geneva this January. We are looking forward
to those sessions. I though it might be useful if we could
discuss some items which might make preparation easier and the
meetings more successful.
OO With respect to format, I would like to offer the following:
-- We intend to arrive on the evening of the 6th of January
and would propose that we meet in the morning of the 7th.
-- We believe that plenary sessions focused on arms control
should be scheduled for both days. Morning and afternoon
sessions on each day would be appropriate. That would
give us four sessions. We might leave the agenda for the
fourth session open, reserving the option to continue on
arms control or turn to other issues of concern.
-- Except for the possibility of the fourth session,
regional and other issues should be handled on the
margin. However, we would be prepared to schedule
parallel meetings on such bilateral issues to be
conducted by Assistant Secretary Burt, or a comparable
figure.
-- The number of people on both sides during the actual arms
control plenaries should be small, perhaps 3 to 5 people
plus an interpreter. On the US side, I intend to have
Paul Nitze accompany me and to be with me during the
plenary session.
-- It might be useful for each side to host a lunch or
dinner so as to provide the best climate and
opportunities for informal exchanges on arms control and
other issues. I would suggest a dinner on Monday night
and a working lunch on Tuesday.
We have agreed to begin new negotiations. At a minimum,
we should seek to fulfill the promise of the agreed
statement; namely completion of a basic agenda and
objectives for the new negotiations.
We believe it would be essential also to have a basic
discussion of our longer term objectives which guide the
more immediate discussions.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET-SENSITIVE
White House Guidelines, August 28. 1992
By
NARA, Date 2/26/07
SECRET
SENSITIVE
42
SECRET SENSITVE
-- We are approaching these talks hopefully, but we
recognize that the issues involved are difficult. We
hope that both sides can enter these discussions in a
positive spirt. We are prepared to discuss these issues
at a number of levels of specificity, but we realize that
in two days, there are limits to what we can cover.
What is your thinking in this regard?
SECRET-SENSITIVE
SECRET
SENSITIVE
EXES ONLY
Chron- 12/6/84
MATLOCK
UNCLASSIFIED UPON ENCLOSE
43
PRESERVATION COPY
Cas 6/16/12 REMOVAL
6311
44
NOT FOR SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
December 6, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Private Channel to Soviets
Following on our discussion with Secretary Shultz Monday, I have
revised my general paper on the use of special channels and
attach it at Tab I in case you wish to show it to the Secretary.
It does not deal specifically with my earlier contacts with
Zagladin and Menshikov or with the possibility of reviving that
channel.
However, I am increasingly convinced of several things:
-- Zagladin and the people in his office certainly seem to
want a contact. They have informed us that Gromyko approved the
contact, and probably interpret our failure to follow up on my
meeting with Menshikov in New York either as lack of interest on
our part, or as the result of bureaucratic problems here. (This
was implicit in Menshikov's comment to Giffen last week that,
although they desired direct contact with the White House, they
did not wish to create misunderstanding here by making a proposal
which could be misunderstood. What Menshikov knew, and Giffen
did not, was that he had informed us that the contact with
Zagladin had been approved and we did not follow up.)
-- Probably the most useful informal contact we can have is
precisely with Zagladin and his staff, since it is the most
senior level which deals with overall foreign policy under the
Politburo and staffs Politburo decisions.
-- A contact before the Geneva meeting could possibly --
though not certainly -- be of assistance to us in formulating our
position for Geneva, since it would give the Soviets the
opportunity, if they chose, of getting comments to us privately.
-- From our standpoint, I would not suggest that such a
meeting be used to telegraph our negotiating position at Geneva
-- even if we were sure what it would be. Rather, it should be
part philosophical discussion and part probe of Soviet intentions
and bureaucratic considerations. Conceivably, some insights into
the succession struggle might also emerge.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
Steps Necessary to Activate
If Secretary Shultz decides that he wishes to explore whether the
Soviets are still willing to allow a continuation of my contact
with Zagladin, we can initiate the matter as follows:
-- Request Ambassador Hartman, by secure telephone, to pass a
message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the
comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we
feel a meeting might be useful.
-- If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond
favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the
time is not ripe from their point of view.
-- If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to
Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a
trip with other stops). If he prefers to meet somewhere in
Western Europe, that also could be arranged -- and might be
preferable.
-- After setting a date, the talking points could be developed,
discussed, and cleared in detail.
Practically speaking, if we are to do this before Geneva, the
decision must be made by this weekend. (With Shultz out of town
next week and Christmas and New Year's coming up, time to make
the arrangements has almost run out as it is.) It will also take
some advance preparation if we are to arrange the contact
discreetly, since a sudden visit by me to Embassy Moscow for
consultation could well attract attention at the Embassy and in
EUR unless we have some time to develop a plausible reason for my
travel. (If Zagladin is going to be in Western Europe and
proposes a meeting there, it would be easier.)
Recommendation:
That you discuss with Secretary Shultz the desirability of
reestablishing the Zagladin contact before Shultz leaves for New
York and Europe Sunday.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I - "Private Channels to the Soviet Leadership: Some Basic
Considerations"
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
PRIVATE CHANNELS TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
Some Basic Considerations
Experience has shown that, in working out agreements with the
Soviets, private means of unofficial communication can play a
very helpful role. The Secretary may therefore wish to consider
whether it would be useful to him to employ one or more private
channels in support of his effort to bring the Soviets into a
more constructive negotiating posture. I have summarized below
some of the considerations which I believe are relevant to such a
decision.
Reasons for Channel:
-- Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off
the official record. Given Soviet psychological inhibitions to
be seen in public compromising "basic principles," they need very
private consultation to arrange for compromises outside the
public eye.
-- Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet
decision-making. We have very little insight into which precise
arguments are being made within the Soviet leadership. Private
contacts with important elements in the staffing process can
provide additional insights.
-- Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without
the Foreign Ministry filter. The fact that the staff of the
Party Secretariat processes and comments on recommendations from
the various ministries before they are considered by the
Politburo suggests that senior officials in the Secretariat
apparatus should be a prime target in this respect.
-- Need for total confidentiality, the best insurance for which
is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the
channel exists.
Possible Modes:
There are many possible modes for private communication, none of
which are mutually exclusive. The utility of each (and their
disadvantages) depends on the specific purpose of the
communication. Some possibilities are the following:
-- Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.
While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is
not immediately available to us because of Soviet
bureaucratic hang-ups. We should not accept an arrangement
whereby the Soviet Ambassador is used exclusively.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
-- Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President's and
Secretary's thinking and the decision-making process in
Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic
contact.
The first qualification is necessary to ensure the
reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of
feed-back; the second to get around Soviet "turf"
considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact
appears to be "counterpart to counterpart."
-- Use of "private sessions" between heads of delegation engaged
in specific negotiations.
Essential to progress in the negotiations, but subject
matter normally limited to issues in the specific
negotiation.
-- Use of intermediaries for specific messages.
Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for
one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange through
Vogel), but of limited utility for a broader discussion
since it does not provide direct contact with persons active
in the decision-making process.
-- Use of indirect messages through private citizens.
Probably the most unsatisfactory of the various options,
since it is difficult for both sides to judge the
reliability of the messages, and the risk of leaks is always
present. Nevertheless, it is the method the Soviets resort
to when other channels do not exist (we are receiving
frequent alleged indirect messages these days, and these are
often difficult to evaluate).
Soviet Attitudes
-- They understand the need for confidential and informal
consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious
about solving problems.
-- They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole
interlocutor on broad issues, since this would serve their
interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but
denying the same to us.
-- Since we have made it clear that an exclusive role for
Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the
Soviets desire informal contacts in another form.
-- "Knowledgeable" officials have been suggesting such since
the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several
approaches, beginning in 1981).
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 3 -
48
-- Central Committee officials have periodically sent
"messages" via third parties, implicit invitations to
initiate a dialogue.
-- We were informed earlier this year that White
House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the
Politburo, including Gromyko.
-- The Soviets doubtless feel "burned" by some of the earlier
efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.
-- The contact with Kampelman regarding Shcharansky
backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective
briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge
of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations
at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in
Washington.
-- Publicity given the "walk in the woods" and the
subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and
Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for
some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the
private level.
-- The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became
public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet
diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the
press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our
ability or willingness to keep any contact completely
private.
-- Before the election, we had to consider the possibility that
the Soviets would suspect that we were seeking contacts for their
own sake (i.e., just to claim that we are negotiating for a
public impact). Such suspicions should now be attenuated. If we
judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a
good time to try again.
Basic Operating Principles
-- A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any
other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may
help both sides to make formal channels as productive as
possible.
-- Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the chan-
nel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously
confidential.
On our side this will require direct knowledge of the
channel to be limited to a very small number of the most
senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a
strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the
list, including personal aides and secretaries.
Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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the President and the Secretary of State, the Vice
President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and our
Ambassador in Moscow.
-- It should be used for conditioning Soviet policy makers to the
broad factors that underly our thinking and to tactical policy
guidance, not for concrete negotiations or precise commitments.
At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., "if you
do X, we will respond with y"). Any general understandings
reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation
in formal channels.
-- All positions taken in the "channel" -- including general
guidelines for "personal remarks" -- should be cleared in advance
by the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for
National Security, and as regards the more important issues, by
the President personally.
-- A clear understanding should be reached with the Soviet
interlocutor on these matters (except those relating to internal
USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that
establishing a special "channel" does not imply an effort to
bypass any principal policymaker in either country.
-- It should be kept in mind throughout that such informal
consultation as the "channel" would provide is no substitute for
formal negotiation, but only a means of supplementary private
communication to assist the Secretary of State in his
negotiations and to assist him and the President in better
understanding Soviet motives and bureaucratic factors which are
relevant to our policy making.
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The President has seen
MEMORANDUM
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INFORMATION
December 6, 1984
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Chron
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANERO
SUBJECT:
U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries
Secretary Shultz has sent you a memo (Tab A) outlining the
various policy considerations that we must address in managing
the series of anniversaries that will commemorate the 40th
Anniversary of the end of World War II. You will remember the
German sensitivities that Chancellor Kohl expressed so eloquently
last Friday, as well as his invitation for you to extend your
stay in Germany for two days, beyond the Bonn Summit.
We have an approach in mind which would avoid embarrassing the
Germans and would keep us from being in a defensive position
should the Soviets invite us to their ceremonies. Subject to
British, French and German agreement, we could invite the Soviets
and East Germans to a joint commemoration ceremony celebrating
the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps in
Berlin (in both East and West) Our central theme would be
reconciliation. The Soviets would likely reject such an
invitation, but we would be better positioned to turn down a
Soviet invitation designed to exclude the West Germans, and call
attention to alleged German revanchism.
George will be seeing his colleagues at the NATO Ministerial
meeting in Brussels next week, and I am asking him to consult
with the British, French and Germans about their plans and their
views on Soviet participation. Based on these consultations, I
will ask George to make specific recommendations concerning your
participation, Allied and Soviet participation, and the possible
extension of your stay in Germany.
Attachment
Tab A - Secretary Shultz's Memo
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8691
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 6, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries
(U)
Chancellor Kohl's invitation for the President to extend his stay
in Germany for two days beyond the Bonn Economic Summit, i.e. May
5 and 6, 1985, to participate in ceremonies commemorating the
40th Anniversary of the end of World II offers us an opportunity
to develop a coordinated Allied approach. Your recent memo aptly
outlined the various policy considerations. We now need to
develop some specific suggestions. (S)
We believe we should consider approaches which could preempt a
Soviet invitation aimed at embarrassing our German Allies. One
idea which you may wish to consider is for the Western Allies and
West Germans to invite the Soviets and East Germans to a joint
commemoration ceremony celebrating the end of World War II and
the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps in Berlin (in both East and
West). Our central theme would be reconciliation. Although the
Soviets would likely reject such an invitation, its extension
would preempt Soviet efforts to secure high-level Western
participation in ceremonies directed at German "militarism" and
"revanchism." (S)
Your trip to Brussels offers an opportunity to begin consulta-
tions. Indeed, you may wish to inform the British and French in
advance so they would be in a position to respond. If you
consider the idea outlined above sound, you may inform the
British and French that the President has asked if it would not
be best to seize the high ground by inviting the Soviets and East
Germans to participate in a joint ceremony. You could also
inform the British and French of Kohl's invitation for the
President to extend his stay in Germany, and that the President
is inclined to accept, schedule permitting. Following your
discussion with the British and the French, we ask that you seek
German views on proposals that might be made to the East. (S)
We are concerned that the Soviets could put us in a defensive
position by extending invitations to the Western Allies before we
have developed a coordinated Allied approach. Therefore, we
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would greatly appreciate a memo, shortly after your return,
making specific recommendations concerning the President's
participation in anniversary ceremonies, Allied and Soviet
participation and the extension of the President's stay in
Germany. (S)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Bud Robert C. McFarlane
CC: Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
SECRET
8691
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Log Number
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Subject:
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Judge Clark
Cmdr. Dur
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Ltc. Linhard
Ms. Reger
Mr. Tyson
Adm. Poindexter
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Manfredi
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Weiss
Sit. Room
Mr. Helm
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Gen. Russell
Mr. Wettering
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Kemp
Mr. Matlock
Col. Rye
Exec. Secretary
Mr. Brazil
Mr. Kraemer
Mr. McMinn
Mr. Sapia-Bosch
NSC Secretariat
Mr. Beal
Mr. Laux
Mr. Morris
Mr. Sigur
NSC Registry
Ltc. Childress
Mr. C. Lehman
Col. Myer
Capt. Sims
NSC Admin.
Ltc. Cobb
Mr. R. Lehman
Mr. North
Mr. Shull
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Mr. Levine
Mr. Pollock
Mr. Sommer
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Col. Lilac
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THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Exec sec/Room 7241
ORIGINAL
12/6/84
1630
S/S-I CHStange
THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of State
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
CHAIRMAN us INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
DIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or Pickup
CHAIRMAN, JCS
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOB
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851
THE SECRETARY OF, ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal Bldg
DIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of State
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119
DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOB
DIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NW
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SW
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street,
DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon
8691
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Log Number
54
DECLASSIFIED
DISTRIBUTION RECORD
White CAS House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
DEC 06 1984
By
NARA, Date 6/10/02 Date
Subject:
WW II ANNIVERSARIES
CLASSIFICATION:
TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
Judge Clark
Cmdr. Dur
Mr. Lord
Mr. Raymond
Cmdr. Thompson
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Fontaine
Ltc. Linhard
Ms. Reger
Mr. Tyson
Adm. Poindexter
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Manfredi
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Weiss
Sit. Room
Mr. Helm
Mr. Martin
Gen. Russell
Mr. Wettering
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Kemp
Mr. Matlock
Col. Rye
Exec. Secretary
Mr. Brazil
Mr. Kraemer
Mr. McMinn
Mr. Sapia-Bosch
NSC Secretariat
Mr. Beal
Mr. Laux
Mr. Morris
Mr. Sigur
NSC Registry
Ltc. Childress
Mr. C. Lehman
Col. Myer
Capt. Sims
NSC Admin.
Ltc. Cobb
Mr. R. Lehman
Mr. North
Mr. Shull
NSC MSG Center
Mr. De Graffenreid
Mr. Levine
Mr. Pollock
Mr. Sommer
Ms. Dobriansky
Col. Lilac
3 Mr. Poe
Mr. Teicher
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
# CYS
Date
Time
Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OFSTATE
Exec sec/Room 7241
ORIGINAL
THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
120034
1
1610
X33216
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of State
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
DIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or Pickup
CHAIRMAN, JCS
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOB
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851
THE SECRETARY OF, ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal Bldg
DIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of State
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119
DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOB
DIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NW
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SW
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street,
DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon
8691
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Log Number
5
DISTRIBUTION RECORD
White DECLASSIFIED Guidelines, August 28, 1997
Date DEC 06 1984
Subject:
WW II ANNIVERSARIES
House CAS NARA, Date 6/10/02
CLASSIFICATION:
TOP SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
Judge Clark
Cmdr. Dur
Mr. Lord
Mr. Raymond
Cmdr. Thompson
Mr. McFarlane
Mr. Fontaine
Ltc. Linhard
Ms. Reger
Mr. Tyson
Adm. Poindexter
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Manfredi
Mr. Robinson
Mr. Weiss
Sit. Room
Mr. Helm
Mr. Martin
Gen. Russell
Mr. Wettering
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Kemp
Mr. Matlock
Col. Rye
Exec. Secretary
Mr. Brazil
Mr. Kraemer
Mr. McMinn
Mr. Sapia-Bosch
NSC Secretariat
Mr. Beal
Mr. Laux
Mr. Morris
Mr. Sigur
NSC Registry
Ltc. Childress
Mr. C. Lehman
Col. Myer
Capt. Sims
NSC Admin.
Ltc. Cobb
Mr. R. Lehman
Mr. North
Mr. Shull
NSC MSG Center
Mr. De Graffenreid
Mr. Levine
Mr. Pollock
Mr. Sommer
Ms. Dobriansky
Col. Lilac
3. Mr. Poe
Mr. Teicher
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
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Date
Time
Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Exec sec/Room 7241
ORIGINAL
12/6/84
420
Jack
THE SECRETARYOF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Pentagon
15/4/81 1465 R bill
DIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of State
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
DIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or Pickup
CHAIRMAN, JCS
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOB
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851
THE SECRETARY OF, ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal Bldg
DIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of State
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119
DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOB
DIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NW
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SW
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street,
DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon
DATE TIME 2. SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT. SITUATION ROOM. WHITE HOUSE
S/S 8432068
8691
56
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
November 29, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From:
George P. Shultz wis
Subject:
U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries
Background
1985 will mark the fortieth anniversary of the end of World
War II and the many wartime and postwar events associated with
it. These anniversaries will also highlight the several steps
taken by the United States and other victorious powers to
establish a postwar order. 1985 also happens to be the
thirtieth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, West German
entry into NATO and establishment of the Warsaw Pact, and the
tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act -- all major
milestones in the political settlement which emerged from the
war.
These anniversaries are already drawing considerable
worldwide attention. The world's media will focus on US-Soviet
relations and on our ties to the democratic states of Europe
and Asia. In Europe, especially in the FRG, there will be
debates over the historic decisions which divided Germany and
created two military alliances. The West Germans are already
nervous about being isolated from their Western allies in the
anniversary festivities and the Japanese will probably be
anxious as well. In the US, Congressional interest will be
high, and various private veterans, Jewish or peace groups will
wish to participate in these occasions to further their own
causes.
The focal point of the anniversaries in Europe will be V-E
Day -- May 8. You and the leaders of all the major
participants in the war except the Soviets and the Chinese will
be in Bonn May 2-4 for the 1985 Economic Summit. Chancellor
Kohl undoubtedly scheduled the Summit on these dates in order
to draw a connection to the V-E Day anniversary. We will need
to consult closely with our allies to ensure that an
appropriate commemoration is arranged.
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If well handled, events connected with these anniversaries
can serve important American interests. We can use the public
attention focussed on the commemorations to stress the unity of
democratic nations which emerged from the war, while at the
same time stressing our desire for reconciliation among all
nations, East and West. However, without a well thought-out,
positive and forward-looking approach we could find ourselves
at odds with important allies and at a disadvantage vis-a-vis
Soviet efforts to use the commemorations for their own
purposes. The Soviets have already launched a major program at
home and abroad, stressing their role and downplaying the
contribution of the US and other Western allies. The Soviets
are arguing that the postwar order is unchangeable and are
attacking us for trying to alter it.
Policy Implications
Our policy concerning the anniversaries will take account
of several basic questions, including;
-- How to deal with the Soviet Union. Ideally, these
anniversaries could provide an impulse to improved ties with
the USSR, but the Soviets must be willing to cooperate. If
they concentrate their commemoration on anti-American or
anti-German themes, we must reply. There is also likely to be
considerable pressure for a US-Soviet summit in connection with
these anniversaries. I am considering how best to approach the
issue with the Soviets. My January meeting with Gromyko might
provide an opportunity to broach this issue.
-- The best means to organize a Western commemoration. The
Bonn economic summit is the most likely focus for a Western
commemoration. Chancellor Kohl may wis to add a commemorative
ceremony to summit activities. We shou d discuss this aspect
in detail with the Germans and other allies. Kohl's visit this
week could provide a chance for a first exchange.
-- Whether to add more events to your German trip. We can
expect a German request that you visit Berlin again in May.
Visiting Berlin would provide an excellent opportunity to
stress our view of the meaning of V-E day. If we desire, it
could also provide an opportunity for a joint commemoration
with the Soviets, but managing the symbolism of such an event
-- the victorious Allies meeting in the still-divided German
capital -- would be difficult.
-- How best to include Japan. We will of course work with
the Japanese on the special V-J day aspects, but we should also
seek to include Japan in the "Western" observance. Again, the
economic summit provides an excellent vehicle. Japanese Prime
Minister Nakasone's January visit could provide a chance for an
initial exchange of views.
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-- Which themes to stress. The best way to turn the
anniversaries into opportunities with our allies and with the
USSR is to offer a positive message. A strong and attractive
approach would be:
O We and our allies used the defeat of fascism and
militarism to build a new world on the basis of democracy,
reconciliation, freedom, prosperity and peace, while the
Soviets did not;
o We have built further on these achievements at Helsinki
and elsewhere to ease the tensions and hardships caused by
Soviet rejection of a democratic course.
o While we are not seeking to revise the post-1945
territorial settlement in Europe, our goals remain to overcome
the division of Europe and erase the danger of war between East
and West. We intend to pursue this approach and invite the
Soviets to join us to seeking mutual arrangements permitting
reduction of tensions and peaceful change in Europe, to the
betterment of all our peoples.
Our message to the Soviets should stress our desire for
peace. To our allies, we should underline the important
contribution our democratic experience has made in realizing
our common goals. We should also underline our common
conviction that peace and democracy must go together. Peace
cannot be assured if human aspirations are not set free. We
should not hide our cooperation with the Soviets during World
War II, but we should stress the kind of world we had hoped to
build and which we are still striving for. This is the
positive lesson to be learned from World War II.
I have directed the Departme at's European and East Asian
and Pacific Bureaus to take the lead in coordinating our
official participation in these World War II commemorations,
consistent with the general policy considerations outlined in
this memorandum. We intend to commence discussions with major
allies, especially the West Germans and the Japanese, as soon
as possible. I will provide more detail to Bud McFarlane and
our discussions progress and will keep you informed of policy
issues as they arise.
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
December 3, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK/PETER SOMMER
49m Reamme
SIGNED
SUBJECT:
U.S. Strategy on World War II Anniversaries
Secretary Shultz has sent the President a memo addressing how to manage
and mark the 40th Anniversary of the end of World War II. The Secretary's
memo aptly outlines the various policy considerations, but is woefully
short on specifics.
We have a suggested approach which could only be done with the full
agreement of the British, French and Germans. With their agreement, we
could propose to the Soviets and the East Germans a joint ceremony
commemorating the end of World War II and the defeat of Nazism -- perhaps
in Berlin (both parts) or Potsdam. The message would be reconciliation,
and we would need to take special steps so as not to embarrass our West
German Allies. The Soviets would likely reject such an invitation, but
its extension would preempt the Soviets, and make it easier for us to turn
down a Soviet invitation.
Chancellor Kohl's invitation for the President to extend his stay in
Germany for two days beyond the Bonn Summitt, i.e., May 5 and 6 offers us
the opportunity to develop a coordinated position with our Allies. But we
need to move out smartly; Secretary Shultz's trip to NATO next week offers
an opportunity to begin intense consultations.
RECOMMENDATION
1.
That you sign the Tab I memo to the President forwarding Secretary
Shultz's memo, and noting that you intend to ask the Secretary to
consult with his British French and German colleagues at the up-
coming NATO Ministerial .eeting and to report back to the President
with a specific V-E Day plan.
Approve
Disapprove
2.
That you sign the Tab II memo to Shultz, asking him to consult with
our Allies and make specific recommendations.
Approve
Disapprove
Rm
Ron Lehman concurs
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab A - Shultz Memo
DECLASSIFIED
Tab II
Memo to Secretary Shultz
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