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1985 Correspondence – Related Material (5)
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1985 Correspondence – Related Material (5)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: 1985 Correspondence - Related
Material (5)
Box: 7
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 10/31/1985
File Folder
1985 CORRESPONDENCE RELATED MATERIALS (5/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
7
YARHI-MILO
712
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6593 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1 10/31/1985 B1
LETTER TO GORBACHEV [11]
R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES
6594 MEMO
MATLOCK AND LINHARD TO MCFARLANE
1 10/31/1985 B1
RE LETTER FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
GORBACHEV [12]
R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES
6621 CABLE
010828Z NOV 85 [17-18]
2 11/1/1985 B1
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6595 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1 11/1/1985 B1
REPLY TO GORBACHEV'S LETTER [20]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6597 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6595 [24]
1 11/1/1985 B1
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6599 MEMO
PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE LETTER TO
1 10/31/1985 B1
GORBACHEV [26]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6601 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 12/18/1985 B1
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
ON REGIONAL ISSUES [39]
R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 10/31/1985
File Folder
1985 CORRESPONDENCE RELATED MATERIALS (5/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
7
YARHI-MILO
712
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6605 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1 12/23/1985 B1
LETTER TO GORBACHEV [40]
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6623 LETTER
PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT LETTER
3 12/13/1985 B1
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [49-
51]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6606 MEMO
MEMO TO BILL RE PRESIDENT REAGAN
1
ND
B1
LETTER TO GORBACHEV [52]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6609 LETTER
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [54-
3
ND
B1
56]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6610 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6606 [59]
1
ND
B1
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6611 LETTER
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6609 [61-63]
3
ND
B1
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6613 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6605 [66]
1 12/23/1985 B1
R
3/3/2011
F2006-114/1
6616 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6601 [67]
1 12/18/1985 B1
R 2/17/2010 GUIDELINES
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 10/31/1985
File Folder
1985 CORRESPONDENCE RELATED MATERIALS (5/5)
FOIA
F06-114/1
Box Number
7
YARHI-MILO
712
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6625 LETTER
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6623 [72-74]
3 12/13/1985 B1
R
11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6617 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6606 [75]
1
ND
B1
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
6626 LETTER
PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GORBACHEV [77-
3
ND
B1
79]
R 11/27/2007 NLRRF06-114/1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Oct29 1
Reyphoo
NSC/S PROFILE
CONF IDENTIAL
ID 8508881
RECEIVED 04 NOV 85 10
TO
PRESIDENT
FROM RYZHKOV, NIKOLAY
DOCDATE 29 OCT 85
PLATT, N
DECLASSIFIED
GS Guidelines, August 28 1997
File
Menau 02 NOV 85
By
NARA, Date 6/12/02
KEYWORDS: USSR
pres
DOBRYNIN, ANATOLIY F
SUBJECT: RYZHKOV RESPONSE TO PRES CONGRATULATORY LTR / NEW POSITION AS CHAIRMAN
ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES
DUE:
STATUS C FILES WH
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
SESTANOVICH
MANDEL
LENCZOWSKI
COMMENTS
REF#
8532539
LOG
NSCIFID
( HW HW )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
S/S 8532539
3
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
November 2, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Ryzhkov Response to President's Congratulatory Letter
In a letter to the President, Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of
the Soviet Council of Ministers, expressed his appreciation for
the earlier letter from the President congratulating him on his
new position. Ambassador Dobrynin handed the text of the
letter to the Secretary on October 31. The text with
translation is attached.
fn
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
Rv as NARA, Date 6/12/02
4
RELEASED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
Unofficial translation
His Excellency
Ronald W. .REAGAN
The President of the
United States of America
The White House, Washington, D.C.
October 29, 1985
Dear Mr.President,
Thank you for your congratulations on my appointment
to the post of the Chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers.
I am confident that a constructive development of the
relations between the USSR and USA on an equal basis would
be in the interests of the peoples of our countries and in
the interests of peace.
N.RYZHKOV
The Kremlin, Moscow
5
EΓo Превосходительству
Рональду У.Рейгану
Президенту Соединенных
Штатов Америки
Белый дом, Вашингтон
Уважаемый господин Президент,
Благодарю Bac 3a Ваши поздравления B связи C моим назначением
Ha пост председателя CoBeTa Министров CCCP.
Уверен, что конструктивное развитие отношений между CCCP И США
Ha равноправной ocHoBe отвечало бы интересам народов наших cTpaH,
интересам мира.
Н.РЫЖКОВ
MocKBa, Кремль
29 октября I985 Γ.
DECLASSIFIED (ReleAse)
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS NARA, Date 6/12/02
Tit 3/
6
backup
MATLOCK
SYSTEM II
91135
FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 31, 1985
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New
York October 24, I have been giving careful
consideration to your letter dated September 12.
The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas
you have put forward are in many ways interesting,
and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before
replying.
Many of the specific points you addressed in your
letter have been or will be dealt with by our
delegations in the Geneva arms control negotia-
tions or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter
I will therefore focus on what I consider the most
significant issues you have raised.
You suggested in your letter that we might reach
an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear
war and other general principles which should
guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since
proposed specific language for our consideration.
As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my
view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought. I therefore have instructed
Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings
next week.
As we address this and other elements which may
figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I
believe it is important to give the most careful
consideration to our words. The experience of the
past has been that overly vague or rhetorical
language has led to expectations which, given the
competitive aspect of our relationship to which
you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.
ASSIFIED
/Pe/eASers
NISF99-051 NARA, Date #358 6/12/02
SMF
16/16/88
Authority
BY
CAS
2
If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings
and disillusionment, our own statements should be
clear and based on concrete achievements. I am
convinced that there is substantial common ground
on the range of areas we have been discussing in
connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I
would hope that this common ground can be expanded
during our meeting in Geneva.
You raised several specific areas in the security
field where this might be possible. Secretary
Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas
in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I
believe you will find that we are indeed prepared
to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meet-
ing is a productive one.
I do, however, want to address your response to
the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva
arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your
letter and which your delegation subsequently
tabled in Geneva.
We have been carefully assessing your counter-
proposal over the last month. As I stated in my
address to the United Nations on October 24, I
believe that within it there are seeds which we
should nurture and that in the coming weeks we
should seek to establish a genuine process of give-
and-take.
In order to foster such a process, I have approved
a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build
upon the positive elements of your counterproposal
and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have
asked our negotiators to extend the current round
to permit your experts to achieve a full understan-
ding of our approach. This new proposal deals
with all three areas under discussion in the
Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal
for radical and stabilizing reductions in
strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement
on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems,
both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also
propose that both sides provide assurances that
their strategic defense programs are and will
remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty.
3
Such assurances assume a resolution of our current
differences over compliance with the Treaty.
In the area of strategic arms, the United States
agrees with the objective of a fifty percent
reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our
proposal builds on this, applying the fifty
percent principle in a manner that is both
equitable and can enhance stability. In the area
of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also
looked for elements we find in common. While I
continue to firmly believe that the best outcome
would be the complete elimination of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new
proposal, we have also moved in your direction.
In defense and space we must begin now to
establish a framework for a cooperative transition
to more reliance on defenses and we would like to
see a more developed dialogue on how such a tran-
sition could be jointly undertaken.
We have designed our approach to provide for a
mutually acceptable resolution of the range of
nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of
the interrelationship between the offense and the
defense; and to address those concerns that you
and your negotiators have described as being of
great importance to you. I am convinced that this
new proposal can provide the basis for immediate
and genuine progress on the numerous and complex
issues facing us in the nuclear and space area,
and I look forward to discussing it with you in
Geneva later this month.
We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to
discuss the other areas which make up our rela-
tionship. Much work remains to be done if we are
to be able to announce specific progress on
regional and bilateral issues. I hope that
Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus
to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.
10
4
In conclusion, may I say once more that I am look-
ing forward to our meeting and that I sincerely
hope we will be able to set our countries on a
less confrontational and more cooperative course
in the years ahead. I will personally spare no
effort to help bring this about.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow
SYSTEM II
91135
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
October 31, 1985
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev
Issue
Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev.
Facts
Shevardnadze delivered to you a letter from Gorbachev when you
met September 27. This letter has not yet been answered.
Discussion
Gorbachev's letter notified you that the Soviets would be making
new proposals at the Geneva negotiations. Now that we are
prepared to reply to that offer, it would be appropriate for you
to respond to Gorbachev's letter by notifying him of our new
proposals. This letter also serves to give your personal
endorsement to George Shultz's mission to Moscow next week.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
OK
No
RR
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
1
Attachment:
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Declassify on : OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Cuidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA as , DATE 2/17/10
SYSTEM II
91135
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
October 31, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SIGNED
8ml
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK and BOB LINHARD
SUBJECT:
Letter from President to Gorbachev
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending
that he sign the letter to Gorbachev which notifies Gorbachev of
our new proposals in the NST negotiations and supports Secretary
Shultz's meetings next week.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
-RR
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
President's Letter to Gorbachev
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
MARA White House Guidelines, DATE Sept. 2/17/10
13
DRAFT GORBACHEV LETTER
Dear Mr. General Secretary,
As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October
24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter
dated September 12. The issues you raise are important ones,
the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting,
and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.
Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter
have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the
Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers.
In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the
most significant issues you have raised.
You suggested in your letter that I am opposed to the
possibility of a military clash between our two countries, and
that language to this effect be incorporated into a concluding
document for our Geneva meeting. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As
I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a
nuclear war can not be won and must not be fought. I therefore
see no reason in principle why it should not be possible to
reach agreement on this point and have instructed Secretary
Shultz to develop appropriate language while he is in Moscow.
I believe it is important, however, that as we address this
and other elements which may figure in any documents we may
issue in Geneva, we give the most careful consideration to our
words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague
or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the
competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in
your letter, can not be sustained.
If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and
disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based
on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is
substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been
discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting. I see no
reason why we should not be in a position to announce
agreements in a number of fields when we meet in November if
the Soviet side is prepared to show the necessary flexibility.
You raised several specific areas in the security field
where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be
prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he
is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed
prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting
is a productive one.
DECLASSIFIED
RELEASED
SMF
10/4/00
Authority
BY
CAS
NARA,
Date
6/12/02
- 2 -
gives
Kabby
I do, however, want to address your response to the
proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control
talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your
delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.
We have been carefully assessing your counterproposal over
the last month. As I stated in my address to the United
Nations on October 24, I believe that within it there are seeds
which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should
seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.
In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new
and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive
elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of
our two sides. This new proposal deals with all three areas
under discussion in the Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a
proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic
offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range
nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet
ideas. [we also propose that both sides reaffirm that their
a.
strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord
with the ABM Treaty. Such reaffirmation must be contingent
upon a prior resolution of our current ifferences over
compliance with the treaty.
)
We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually
acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms
issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the
offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you
and your negotiators have described as being of great
importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can
provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the
numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space
area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva
later this month.
We will also, of course, have the opportunity in Geneva to
discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much
work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce
specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope
that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to
rapid progress in the weeks ahead.
Before closing, I would like to reiterate the importance I
personally attach to some movement on the Soviet side in the
human rights field by the time of our meeting. As you know, I
stressed this point to Foreign Minister Shevrdnadze during our
New York conversation. I understand your sensitivities and
principles in this area and I do not ask you to compromise
15
- 3 -
them. But there are many cases which it would be possible for
you to resolve without your having to do so. I can not tell
you what an impact this would have on popular perceptions of
the Soviet Union in this country and, I believe, in the world.
I have asked Secretary Shultz to convey my best wishes, and
my hopes for major progress in our preparations for the Geneva
meeting during his visit and in the weeks remaining.
Sincerely,
Ronald W. Reagan
0 $1 16
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
Prescor your
PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 5660
DTG: 010828Z NOV 85 PSN: 068010
EOB624
AN008454
TOR: 305/1425Z
CSN: HCE648
DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 SEST-01 LENC-01 LEHR-01 MAT-01
DANZ-01 /007 A2
N
0
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
SIT: MATL LINH SIT PUBS VP EOB
EOB:
S
OP IMMED
STU0762
DECLASSIFIED
DE RUEHMO #5660 3050828
O 010828Z NOV 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
NLRR FO6 214/, #6621
N
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6741
0
S E CRE T MOSCOW 15660
BY as NARA DATE 11/27/07
D
NODIS
S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
REF: STATE 335446
N
1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
0
D
2. AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 9:00 A.M.
MOSCOW TIME NOVEMBER 1. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT
S
THE LETTER SET FORTH THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS ON THE
OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE UPCOMING
GENEVA MEETING. IN PARTICULAR, THE LETTER EXPLAINED
THE BASIS FOR OUR RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET COUNTER-
PROPOSALS OUTLINED IN GORBACHE V' S SEPTEMBER 12 LETTER
TO THE PRESIDENT. AND IT PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT'S
REACTION TO SOME OF THE PROPOSALS SHEVARDNADZE C-
N
RECENTLY HAD PUT FORWARD TO US IN NEW YORK. THE
0
LETTER ALSO INDICATED THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAD BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO EXPLAIN OUR PROPOSALS MORE FULLY IN
D
GENEVA. OF COURSE, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, SECRETARY
SHULTZ WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN
DETAIL DURING HIS UPCOMING MOSCOW VISIT.
--
S
3. AFTER THANKING THE AMBASSADOR FOR CONVEYING THE
PRESIDENT' S LETTER, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE LETTER WOULD
BE STUDIED THOROUGHLY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME
EVERYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE IN IT, AND A REPORT WOULD BE
SENT TO GORBACHEV BY THE END OF THE DAY. SHEVARDNADZE
SAID THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED YESTERDAY
(OCTOBER 31) FROM THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA
REGARDING THE U.S. DESIRE TO EXTEND THE CURRENT
ROUND, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SUPPORTED THIS IDEA.
--
4. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED HE WOULD BE LEAVING FOR
HELSINKI LATE NOVEMBER 1 TO JOIN THE SECRETARY THERE.
SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT AS DOBRYNIN HAD TOLD THE
SECRETARY, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD WELCOME THE
SECRETARY' S COMING DIRECTLY TO MOSCOW ON SATURDAY
OR SUNDAY, BUT OF COURSE THAT WAS ENTIRELY UP TO THE
SECRET
IX
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 5660
DTG: 010828Z NOV 85 PSN: 068010
SECRETARY. SHEVARDADZE ASKED THAT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
CONVEY SHEVARDNADZE'S BEST REGARDS TO SECRETARY
SHULTZ. HARTMAN
N
BT
0
D
I
S
N
0
D
I
S
N
0
D
I
S
C-
N
0
D
I
S
SECRET
Nov 1,198519 19
back up material
20
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
November 1, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE Impor
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Letter on Private Channel
You will recall that you mentioned to Shevardnadze during your
private conversation on September 27 that it might be useful to
establish a direct and unofficial channel of communication
between you and Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded in a letter dated
October 12 (Tab B), in which he named Dobrynin as his
interlocutor. Obviously, what the letter implies is that the
Soviets would like to reactivate the arrangement which Kissinger
used -- a special channel through Dobrynin.
Such an arrangement is not in our interest since it gives
Dobrynin access to our decision makers while denying us access to
theirs. It also would mean that we rely entirely on Dobrynin to
interpret and explain our positions to his government, which of
course is not a desirable thing to do.
I suggest, therefore, that you reply to Gorbachev -- in a letter
George Shultz or I could deliver to him personally -- that we of
course will use Dobrynin to the same degree that they use
Hartman. In other words, if they want to do things through
established channels, fine. But if we use their man, they have
to use ours.
Recommendation
OK
No
RR
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
-
Attachment:
Tab A
Letter to. General Secretary Gorbachev
Tab B
Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1#6595
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
21
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
This is in reply to your letter of October 12,
1985, concerning the possibility of a confidential
exchange of opinions on a non-official basis. My
reasons for mentioning this possibility to Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze were twofold.
First, it seemed that there could be some
intrinsic value in exchanging opinions informally
and privately without the constraints imposed by
official formality. But I also wished to resolve
certain ambiguities in how we communicate. From
time to time in recent months Soviet officials
have approached American officials or private
citizens who are in touch with senior officials in
our government and have offered comments which,
they suggest, represent your views. Naturally, I
have paid close attention to these comments since
I take your opinions very seriously and wish to do
the utmost to understand them with full clarity.
However, the comments received in this manner have
not always been consistent and thus I have dif-
ficulty determining to what degree they in fact
represent your views. It therefore seemed worth-
while to seek a clarification.
I judge from your reply that you consider established
channels adequate for communication between us.
That is agreeable to me. Consequently Secretary
Shultz will continue to look forward to receiving
Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department.
Similarly, we will expect that Ambassador Hartmann
will enjoy corresponding access to you. in Moscow.
Authority NLS597-001 DECLASSIFIED (HELASED) "105 smf 10/22/99
BY
CKS
NARA,
6/12/07
22
2
I hope that the meetings Secretary Shultz has in
Moscow will lay the groundwork for a productive
meeting between us in Geneva. I am very much
looking forward to meeting you there and continue
to hope that we will succeed in setting relations
between our two contries on a more constructive
course.
Sincerely yours,
Renuld Regan
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Mosocw
23
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
MODE
PAGES
IMMEDIATE
SECURE FAX #
DTG
PRIORITY
ADMIN FAX n
RELEASER
ROUTINE
RECORD #
FROM/LOCATION
DAVID CHEW/WHITE HOUSE
1.
TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
JIM KUHN/CAMP DAVID (FOR THE PRESIDENT)
1.
2.
3.
4.
David Chew,
5.
We need to get this signal
6.
7.
toright so Bud can carry
INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCA1 it tomorrow Request you
1.
DACOM to Camp David
2.
&
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
Jim: Please call me as soon as the President has had an opportunity
to sign this. Thanks.
David
11/1/85
545 p.m. per Jim Kuhn
President signed.
Secret
&. Emery
CLASSIFICATION
WHCA FORM 8. 15 OCTOBER 84
24
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
November 1, 1985
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE proper
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Letter on Private Channel
You will recall that you mentioned to Shevardnadze during your
private conversation on September 27 that it might be useful to
establish a direct and unofficial channel of communication
between you and Gorbachev. Gorbachev responded in a letter dated
October 12 (Tab B), in which he named Dobrynin as his
interlocutor. Obviously, what the letter implies is that the
Soviets would like to reactivate the arrangement which Kissinger
used -- a special channel through Dobrynin.
Such an arrangement is not in our interest since it gives
Dobrynin access to our decision makers while denying us access to
theirs. It also would mean that we rely entirely on Dobrynin to
interpret and explain our positions to his government, which of
course is not a desirable thing to do.
I suggest, therefore, that you reply to Gorbachev -- in a letter
George Shultz or I could deliver to him personally -- that we of
course will use Dobrynin to the same degree that they use
Hartman. In other words, if they want to do things through
established channels, fine. But if we use their man, they have
to use ours.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
-
-
Attachment:
Tab A
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Tab B
Letter from General Secretary Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/1#6597
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
25
TAB B
SUPER SENSITIVE 8532370
United States Department of State 26
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET SENSITIVE
October 31, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
The Soviets have responded to our suggestion of a
special channel of communications between the President and
General Secretary Gorbachev by nominating Ambassador
Dobrynin. Gorbachev's letter of October 12 is attached at
Tab 2.
The Department believes that we should respond
symmetrically by nominating Ambassador Hartman as our
Moscow point of contact. The draft Presidential response
at Tab 1 makes the point that Secretary Shultz and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze should be part of the process.
for Nicholas Bomckmley Platt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/, #6599
DECL:OADR
BY as NARA DATE 11/07/07
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
21
SUGGESTED REPLY
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I enjoyed once again the opportunity to talk with Foreign
Minister Mr. Shevardnadze during his visit to New York for the
UN 40th Anniversary ceremonies. We had a good, if brief, chat,
and he and George Shultz had the opportunity to continue their
more extensive discussions.
I would like in this letter to respond to your letter of
October 12 on the question of channels of communication between
us. I fully agree that it is important that we be able to
communicate confidentially and rapidly on matters of concern to
us and to the entire world.
We will be happy to work with Ambassador Dobrynin here in
Washington. He should deal directly with Secretary Shultz, who
will inform me immediately of any messages the Ambassador may
convey. I will also continue to use Ambassador Hartman in
Moscow to convey my thoughts on these most delicate and-weighty
matters directly to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, who, I am
confident, will relay them directly to you.
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
DECLASSIFIED |RE|OASED
BY
Authority CAS NL5597-001 #107 SMF 10/22/99
,
NARA, Date 6/12/02
Strictly confidential
Unofficial translation
28
Authority NLSS97 CAS DECLASSIFIED #104 smf10/22/99
NARA, Date 6/12/02
October 12, 1985
BY
Dear Mr.President,
Our Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has informed me
in detail about his conversation with you in Washington
on September 27.
While there exist substantial differences in the positions
of the two sides regarding concrete issues, which surfaced
also in the course of that conversation and which I shall
not touch upon in this letter, we deem it important that
you, like us, proceed from the objective fact that we all live
on the same planet and must learn to live together. It really
is a fundamental judgement.
Here I would like to give you my answer only to one specific
question you raised during the conversation with Eduard A.
Shevardnadze, namely with regard to a confidential exchange
of opinions between us bypassing, should it become necessary,
the usual diplomatic channel. I am in favor of this. Indeed,
there may arise the need to contact each other on matters on
whose solution depend both the state of Soviet-American rela-
tions and the world situation as a whole.
On our side to maintain the confidential liason with a
person who will be designated by you for this purpose is
entrusted to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.
Sincerely yours,
M.GORBACHEV
His Excellency Ronald W.REAGAN
The President of the United States of America,
Nov. 7 a
back up
30
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
File
PAGE 01
SECSTATE WASHDC 5548
DTG: 010536Z NOV 85 PSN: 067375
EOB294
AN008218
TOR: 305 0602Z
CSN HCE481
DISTRIBUTION: MILL-01 STEI-01 DOBR-01 NSCS-01 SEST-01 LENC-01
LEHR-01 MAT-01 DANZ-01 /009 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #5548 3050537
O 010536Z NOV 85
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9807
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0094
CONFIDENTIA L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 335548
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PPDC, PDIP, UR, US
SUBJECT: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE
-
1. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME
PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 7 THE FOLLOWING NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ANDREI GROMYKO, CHAIRMAN OF THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET:
BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:
ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I WISH TO CONGRATULATE
THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE OCCASION OF THE
NATIONAL DAY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.
I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV IN GENEVA LATER THIS MONTH. THIS MEETING
PROVIDES AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOGETHER TO
CREATE AN AGENDA FOR A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, ONE WHICH COULD REDUCE THE
THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR, ASSIST IN RESOLVING REGIONAL
CONFLICTS, AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN OUR
GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO
DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO ATTAIN THESE GOALS, WHICH
ARE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PEOPLES OF BOTH OUR
NATIONS AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.
HIS EXCELLENCY
ANDREI ANDREYEVICH GROMYKO
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDIUM OF THE supreme SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW. END TEXT.
2. WE DO NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE BUT HAVE NO
OBJECTION OT ITS RELEASE BY THE SOVIETS. THERE WILL BE
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.
SHULTZ
BT
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
CONF IDENTIAL
31
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ID 8508538
REFERRAL
DATE: 04 NOV 85
MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 04 NOV 85
KEYWORDS: USSR
SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD
SUBJ: PRES THANK YOU LTR TO SHEVARDNADZE
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUEDATE:
COMMENTS:
for WILLIAM F. MARTIN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
32
] backup- - Nov. 4
Pres. thank you
noto & S Shev
33
F.le- pres Mattock cour
8538
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 4, 1985
Dear Mr. Minister:
I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet
with you at the White House and in New York
to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual
concern to our two countries. I look forward
to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
in November and establishing a bilateral
dialogue to bring about a more stable future
for both of our peoples.
Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs.
Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you
brought for us. We are pleased to have the
samovar and matching tray and the lacquered
box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry
of your fellow countrymen.
With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze,
and to your colleagues as we approach our
meeting in Geneva,
Sincerely,
Ronald Reagon
His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow
$
34
8538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 31, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN E. HILBOLDT
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN hAPE
SUBJECT:
Letter from the President to Shevardnadze
The NSC has reviewed the draft text of a letter from the
President to Shevardnadze thanking him for the gifts he presented
during his September visit. We have made some minor suggestions,
included in the draft at Tab A, primarily to reflect the
President's recent meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.
Attachments
Tab A
NSC suggested text for Presidential letter
Tab B
Original draft
Dear Mr. Minister:
I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet
with you at the White House and in New York
to discuss a broad range of issues of mutual
concern to our two countries. I look forward
to meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
in November and establishing a bilateral
dialogue to bring about a more stable future
for both of our peoples.
Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs.
Shevardnadze for the handsome gifts you
brought for us. We are pleased to have the
samovar and matching tray and the lacquered
box as remembrances of the exquisite artistry
of your fellow countrymen.
With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze,
and to your colleagues as we approach our
meeting in Geneva,
Sincerely,
His Excellency Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mosdow
RR: AVH : CMF : JEH pps
Dispatch thru State via NSC.
36
8538
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
NSC Draft Letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Dear Mr. Minister:
I truly appreciated the opportunity to meet with you at the White
House and in New York to discuss a broad range of issues of
mutual concern to our two countries. I look forward to meeting
with General Secretary Gorbachev in November and establishing a
bilateral dialogue to bring about a more stable future for both
of our peoples.
Nancy and I want to thank you and Mrs. Shevardnadze for the
handsome gifts you brought for us. We are pleased to have the
samovar and matching tray and the lacquered box as remembrances
of the exquisite artistry of your fellow countrymen.
With our best wishes to you, Mrs. Shevardnadze, and to your
collegues as we approach our meeting in Geneva,
1
Sincerely,
RR
8th
37
38
Nov.25
THE WHITE HOUSE
November 25, 1985
Dear Mrs. Gorbacheva:
I know my husband will be writing to
your husband, but I do want to personally
thank you for your kind hospitality at
dinner and tea in Geneva. Also, I want
to express my thanks to you for your
lovely gifts of jewelry and the porcelain
tea set. They shall be constant reminders
of a most memorable visit.
I shall look forward to our meeting again
next year.
Sincerely,
Uaucy Reagoo
Mrs. Raisa Gorbacheva
The Central Committee of
The Communist Party
Moscow, U.S.S.R.
S
39
SYSTEM II
91241
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
SECRET
December 18, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Lockun
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Regional
Issues
A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at
Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more
formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten
letter.
Srs
PR
SR.Q
Sestanovich, Ringdahl, Tahir-Kheli and Covey concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B
Platt-McFarlane Memo
DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
BY NARA OH , DATE 2/17/10
SYSTEM II
40
91241
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Issue
Whether to sign a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.
Facts
In your handwritten letter of November 28, you promised Gorbachev
a more formal letter with detailed suggestions regarding some of
the issues before us.
Discussion
The letter at Tab A urges steps to move toward a peaceful
settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Africa and
reiterates your concern regarding the Soviet action in supplying
SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
-
Attachments:
Tab A
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06- F06-114/1#6605
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I have already written to you informally to
express some of my thoughts on the issues facing
us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva. I would
like in this letter to deal with some of the
particularly pressing regional issues which I
believe we must address in the months ahead.
I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but
I would like to share with you some further
thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the re-
gional question on which we spent the most time in
Geneva. You expressed Soviet readiness to see an
agreement emerge from the United Nations nego-
tiating process which would entail a ceasefire,
withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and
international guarantees. The discussion recalled
the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my
government had "opportunities to confirm by its
actions" our readiness to reach a political
settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my
October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to
cooperate with others on practical steps. Three
elements could form the basis for a lasting
solution: A process of negotiations among the
warring parties including the Soviet Union;
verified elimination of the foreign military
presence and restraint on the flow of outside
arms; and movement toward political self-
determination and economic reconstruction.
As you know, we have been disappointed with the
results of the proximity talks conducted by the
U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative.
Five rounds in Geneva have not addressed the real
issue on which a resolution of this problem
depends -- withdrawal of your forces. No other
element of the problem presents real difficulty.
Authority VLSF-99-051 DECLASSIFIED #364 RELEASED SMF, 10/16/80
BY
CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
2
To underscore this, we have formally notified the
Secretary General that we accept the agreed
formulation on guarantees. For your part, I
believe that the talks would gain a real impetus
from Soviet action to permit discussion of a
timetable for withdrawal at Geneva and a public
announcement to that effect. Were such action
taken by the time of our Ministers' next meeting,
it would enable them to have a more focussed and
productive discussion.
Another area where I believe movement is possible
is Southern Africa. Because we have covered this
ground often in the past, the point I need to make
is a simple one.
As I am sure you are aware, I am reviewing our
policy in Southern Africa, specifically with
respect to the war in Angola. This review might
not be necessary if there were real evidence that
the outside forces in that country could be
reduced, and then withdrawn, making possible the
reconciliation of the indigenous parties to the
war. Such an outcome, of course, would dramati-
cally improve prospects for the establishment of
an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC
Resolution 435 -- an objective we share with the
U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, the evidence is clear
that your own involvement in Angola is deepening.
As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to
reduce, not increase, military involvement by the
superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.
I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that
the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in
calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the
same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at
least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 Air
Defense Missiles to be supplied by the Soviet
Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in
restraint in this region with the provision of
advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless
behavior is a major danger to regional stability.
Because we view this development with utmost
43
3
seriousness, I was disappointed to see that the
Soviet response to our presentation failed to
address the transfer of these weapons to Libya.
Our Ministers and experts should address this
vital matter, since it raises the prospect of
dangerous incidents that I hope you want to avoid
as much as we do.
If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional
subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next
meeting.
In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with
our agreement in Geneva to put our regional
experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in
Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of
us to avoid a U.S.- Soviet clash over regional
conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe
that we must move forward on some of these issues
before we meet again. In that regard, I was
pleased to note that in your remarks to Secretary
Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing
with regional trouble spots.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow
44
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CROSSRATER ACTION SKEET
MISSAGE # 368
DATE TIME:
IT IS THI RESPONSIBILITY or TXI COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE
DLP NC SLC FRIDE TO THI ASSIGNED DUI DATE.
ACTION OFFICER
COMMENT OFFICER
INFO
PLAYSON
Matlock
Sestanovich
Eingdahl Common
Covey
ACTION: CONCLE TO DEP EXIC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HIRE AND HANDCAI
TO DEP EXIC SEC DUE DATE: 12/17
ACTION OFFICER CONSENTS:
CLEARED BY:
DATE:
TIME:
CLEARED TO:
DATE:
TIME:
1
CLASSIFICATION
DECLASSIFIED
White House Buidelines, 28/ 1997
By CAS
NARA, Date August 6/12/02
ORIGINAL
45
ECRET
12/12
EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEDELNAN
12/16/85 632-9606 WANG 2139P
THE ACTING SECRETARY
EUR/SOV:MPARRIS
EUR:MPALMER
AF/S:JDAVIROE
NEA:RPECK
P:RARMACOST
S/S:
NSC:JMATLOCK
S/S-O
IMMEDIATE MOSCOE
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
JU
EE
TAGS: PREL, us, UR
MP
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY
MA
-
GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES
S/S
1. is - ENTIRE TEXT}
2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AT
PARA POSSIBLE. 3 TO HIGHEST APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL AS SOON AS
3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY.
I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU INFORMALLY TO EXPRESS SOME
OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES FACING us IN THE WAKE OF OUR
MEETING IN GENEVA. I would LIKE IN THIS LETTER TO DEAL
WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULARLY PRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES
WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ADDRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.
I MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN MY EARLIER LETTER, BUT I HOULD
LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS.
AFGHANISTAN WAS, AFTER ALL, THE REGIONAL QUESTION ON
WHICH WE SPENT THE MOST TIME IN geneva. YOU EXPRESSED
-
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
BY CVS
Authority NL5F99-051 #364 smp 10/16/00
NARA, Date 6/12/02
46
SECRET
SOVIET READINESS TO SEE AK AGREEMENT EMERGE FROM THE
UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH MOULD ENTAIL A
CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES
AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THE DISCUSSION RECALLED
THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR JUNE 10 LETTER THAT MY GOVERNMENT
MAD "OPPORTUNITIES TO CONFIRM BY ITS ACTIONS" OUR
READINESS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE
UNGA, WC ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS OK
PRACTICAL STEPS. THREE ELEMENTS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR
1 LASTING SOLUTION: A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS ARONG THE
WARRING PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNIONA VERIFIED
ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND
RESTRAINT OK THE FLOE OF OUTSIDE ARMS AND ROVEMENT
TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION. POLITICAL SELF-DETERKINATION AND ECONOMIC
AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEK DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS
OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE U.N. SECRETARY
GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. FIVE ROUNDS IN GENEVA
HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE REAL ISSUE ON WHICH A RESOLUTION
OF THIS PROBLEM DEPENDS -- WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. NO
OTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM PRESENTS REAL BIFFICULTY.
TO UNDERSCORE THIS, WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE
SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ACCEPT THE AGREED FORMULATION
ON GUARANTEES. FOR YOUR PART, I BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS
WOULD GAIN A REAL IMPETUS FROM SOVIET ACTION TO PERMIT
DISCUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AT GENEVA AND A
PUBLIC ANNOUCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. WERE SUCH ACTION
TAKEN BY THE TIME OF OUR MINISTERS' NEXT MEETING, IT
WOULD DISCUSSION. ENABLE THEM TO HAVE A MORE FOCUSSED AND PRODUCTIVE
ANOTHER AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS
SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE HAVE COVERED THIS GROUND
ONE. OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE POINT I NEED TO MAKE IS A SIMPLE
AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, I AM REVIEWING OUR POLICY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR IN
ANGOLA. THIS REVIEW MIGHT NOT BE NECESSASRY IF THERE
WERE REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES IN THAT
COUNTRY COULD BE REDUCED, AND THEN WITHDRAWN, MAKING
POSSIBLE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PARTIES TO
THE WAR. SUCH AN OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD DRAMATICALLY
IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT
NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435 -- AN
OBJECTIVE WE SHARE WITH THE U.S.S.R. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS
SECRET
47
SECRET
I
3
DEEPENING.
AS I SAID AT THE UK IN OCTOBER, OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE, NOT
INCREASE. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN
LOCAL DISPUTES LIKE THAT IN ANGOLA.
I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSE) AN INTEREST IN CALMING
TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT
APPEARS THAT LIBYA IS PREPARING AT LEAST TWO SITES FOR
THE EMPLACEMENT OF SA-5 AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO BE
SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HARD TO RECONCILE
SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRAINT IN THIS REGION WITH THE
PROVISION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO A LEADER WHOSE RECKLESS
BEHAVIOR IS A MAJOR DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY.
BECAUSE WE VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS,
I WAS BISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR
PRESENTATION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF THESE
WEAPONS TO LIBYA. OUR MINISTERS AND EXPERTS SHOULD
ADDRESS THIS VITAL MATTER, SINCE IT RAISES THE PROSPECT
OF BANGEROUS INCIDENTS THAT I HOPE YOU WANT TO AVOID AS
MUCH AS WE DO.
IF YOU AGREE, BOTH ANGOLA AND LIBYA ARE ADDITIONAL
SUBJECTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT TAKE UP IN THEIR NEXT MEETING.
IN CLOSING, LET ME UNDERLINE MY SATISFACTION WITH OUR
AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO PUT OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS ON
A REGULAR BASIS. WHEN WE MET IN GENEVA WE AGREED THAT IT
WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF us TO AVOID A U.S. - SOVIET
CLASH OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS and TO WORK FOR SOLUTIONS.
I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE FORMARD ON SOME OF THESE
ISSUES BEFORE WE MEET AGAIN. IN THAT REGARD, I HAS
PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR REMARKS TO SECRETARY
BALBRIGE YOU REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH
REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS.
---SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN
END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
4. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
YY
48
SYSTEM II PROFILE
SENSITIVE
ID 8591241
RECEIVED 05 DEC 85 14
TO
PRESIDENT
FROM SHULTZ, G
DOCDATE 04 DEC 85
DECLASSIFIED
By
White AS House Guidelines, August 28. 1997
NARA, Date 6/12/02
KEYWORDS: USSR
AFGHANISTAN
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
HS
SUBJECT: PRES FOLLOW UP LTR TO GORBACHEV RE DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA SUMMIT
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES
DUE: 06 DEC 85 STATUS S FILES SII
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
SESTANOVICH
TAHIR-KHELI
COVEY
Matlock
MATLOCK Runsdule
SESTAMOVIEH
URGENT
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG 8591243
NSCIFID
(B/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
Sestinovich S 12/13 ricd state draft the whom Some
MAtlock X 12/17 Prepare memd to Pres
PR, SE
-
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
ES SENSITIVE
8536708
49
United States Department of State
SYSTEM II
Washington, D.C. 20520
91241 dd-
December 13, 1985
SECRET / SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Letter for General Secretary Gorbachev
We are providing a revised text of a draft Presidential
letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on regional issues. This
draft urges forward movement on Afghanistan and southern Africa
and reiterates U.S. concern over Soviet supply of SA-5 air
defense missiles to Libya.
Micholes Plan
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06714/1+6623
BY as NARA DATE 11/27/07
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
so
SECRET SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. General Secretary,
I have already written to you informally to express
some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of
our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to
deal with some of the particularly pressing regional
issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.
I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I
would like to share with you some further thoughts.
Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which
we spent the most time in Geneva. I was struck by your
businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an
agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating
process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of
troops, return of the refugees and international
guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in
your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities
to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a
political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my
October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take
practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for
a lasting solution: a process of negotiations among the
warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified
elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint
on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political
self-determination and economic reconstruction.
As an initial contribution to this process, in advance
of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we
have formally notified the United Nations that we accept
the agreed formulation on guarantees. I hope that this
will give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative. For real progress to be
made it is important that the sixth round of talks in
Geneva get down to the central issue of troop withdrawals.
In any event, I believe Afghanistan deserves more in-depth
treatment at the next meeting between our ministers.
Another area where I believe movement is possible is
southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground
that we have covered often in the past. The point I want
to make is a simple one.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
51
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 2 -
As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a
difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa,
specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I
would not face this decision if there were some evidence
that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in
the outside forces in that country which would make
possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such
an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve
prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia
in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we
share with the U.S.S.R.
As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce,
not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in
local disputes like that in Angola.
I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the
Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions
between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears
that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the
emplacement of SA-5, air defense missiles to be supplied by
the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest
in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced
weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major
danger to regional stability. We view this development
with utmost seriousness. I hope that our ministers and
experts will address this subject and eliminate any
prospect of an incident between us.
If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional
subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.
In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our
agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on
a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it
was important for both of us to avoid a U.S. - Soviet
clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions.
I believe that we must move forward on some of these
issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was
pleased to note that in your remarks to Mac Baldrige you
referred to the importance of dealing with regional
trouble spots.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan
52
The Will hous:
System (
Package (
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEE:
to 0 Person Biu -
W
I dismond This with Ja
Jo/
night. First litter is a lita OPT
Accident's hand written note) and
Pa
The wrong Thrust on Afghauster. we
W
do need 6 start, novever, on a
Bu
unger who , hat pride ,m follow.up
W
points in President arruised in
MS
his, ine second like 1> nine urgen
Si
since 2 gather There is some lesire
- to have carry it ant
[
on his drip.
a
Suggest we give to Steve S.
tn action with condination / unum
to Ty Cobb. my sumed calle
deaft to tack is Europe to get in
views Need do process bg mid-lay
Tourrow.
Dan
DECLASSIFIED/LE/0430) /RE/0450)
NLRR Fob-114/, H 6606
BY Cir NARA DATE 11/27/07
SYSTEM II
91241
53
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
rs
SUBJECT:
Letters to Gorbachev
We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your
meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of
interest to us. The most significant:
-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward
a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense
relationship;
-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's
suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement
and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a
more serious discussion of Southern Africa;
-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up
on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the
possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the
Soviets if we saw progress.
I have attached for your approval two draft letters to
Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva
talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze
and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in
January. The second addresses human rights, and could be
delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next
week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on
the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the
relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's
mission, it should be sent this week.
Attachments: As indicated
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
Authority NISF99051#367 DECLASSIFIED CAS 7/25/00
BY
CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
SYSTEM : :
91241
54
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. General Secretary,
I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by
the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent
meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction
by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment
in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsi-
bility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and
those hopes, are not in vain.
I do not intend in this letter to get into an
exnaustive review of where our relationship stands after
our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain
issues, however, which I do feel merit particular
attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with
you some thoughts on how we may approach them.
On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed
anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on
some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks
and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I
took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I
hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern
that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both
consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are
ungrounded.
This is not the place to go over once again the
terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our
discussion convinced me that some of our positions,
divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually
exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we
can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months
ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is
my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the
sides will in fact be able to build common elements on
which to realize concrete progress before we meet again
next year.
Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic
defense in principle. There must be a practical way to
approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our
negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow
up on these possibilities when they return in January. I
think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 714/1 +6609
BY City NARA DATE 11/27/07
54
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 3 -
that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in
the outside forces in that country which would make
possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such
an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve
prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia
in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we
share with the USSR.
AS I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce,
not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in
local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is
another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.
Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the
candor and detail of our discussion on human rights
issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better
understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us --
is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of
Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a
meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council.
He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our
discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully
consider.
In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated
the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with
you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be
invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate
and expand the start we made there in putting our
relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have
received separately an invitation to visit Washington in
late June of next year. I hope that you will find the
timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident
you will find a productive and informative visit.
From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is
important that we do not allow the momentum which we
established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this
channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the
agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out
some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I
believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet
periodically to review progress and identify areas where
work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We
would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the
United States for this purpose in late January of next
year.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan
behad 57
Dec 80
58
SYSTEM II PROFILE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ID 8591241
RECEIVED 05 DEC 85 14
TO
PRESIDENT
FROM SHULTZ, G
DOCDATE 04 DEC 85
DECLASSIFIED
By
White CAS House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 6/12/02
File GORBACHEV, lence uc
KEYWORDS: USSR
AFGHANISTAN
MIKHAIL S
HS
SUBJECT: PRES FOLLOW UP LTR TO GORBACHEV RE DISCUSSIONS SUMMIT
The
counds ofts
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES
DUE: 06 DEC 85 STATUS S FILES SII
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
SESTANOVICH
TAHIR-KHELI
COVEY
MATLOCK
COMMENTS
JRGENT
REF#
LOG 8591243
NSCIFID
(B/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
59
National
Coundi
The White House
System #
II
91241
Package #
SEQUENCE TO
HAS seen
DISPOSITION
Bo Pearson Biu -
I discussed This with JMP Last
W
night. First letter is a little OBE (given
Joi
President's hand written note) and nos
Pa
The wrong Thrust on Afghauster. we
W
do need TO start, nowever, on a
Bu
unger user , hat provide ,m follow-up
W
points The President promised in
NS
his. ine second letter 1> nine urgent
Si
since 2 gather There is some lesire
-
to have Bacdridge carry it int
I
on his trip.
a
Suggest we give to Steve S.
tn action with cordination cable / unum
deaft to tack is Eumpe to set wis
to Ty Cobb. my sumed
views Need to process bg mid-lay
Tourrow.
Dan
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASO
NLRR F06 714/, #6610
BY as NARA DATE 11/27/07
SYSTEM II
3
91241
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
rrs
SUBJECT:
Letters to Gorbachev
We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your
meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of
interest to us. The most significant:
-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward
a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense
relationship;
-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's
suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement
and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a
more serious discussion of Southern Africa;
-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up
on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the
possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the
Soviets if we saw progress.
I have attached for your approval two draft letters to
Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva
talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze
and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in
January. The second addresses human rights, and could be
delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next
week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on
the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the
relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's
mission, it should be sent this week.
Attachments: As indicated
DECL: OADR
DECI ASSIFIED
BY
Authority NLSF99-05 CAS #367 GS 7/25/00
NARA, Date 6/12/02
SYSTEM II
91241
61
SECRET SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. General Secretary,
I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by
the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent
meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction
by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment
in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsi-
bility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and
those hopes, are not in vain.
I do not intend in this letter to get into an
exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after
our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain
issues, however, which I do feel merit particular
attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with
you some thoughts on how we may approach them.
On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed
anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on
some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks
and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I
took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I
hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern
that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both
consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are
ungrounded.
This is not the place to go over once again the
terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our
discussion convinced me that some of our positions,
divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually
exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we
can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months
ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is
my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the
sides will in fact be able to build common elements on
which to realize concrete progress before we meet again
next year.
Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic
defense in principle. There must be a practical way to
approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our
negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow
up on these possibilities when they return in January. I
think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06 114/1 #6611
BY Cis NARA DATE 11/27/07
62
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
should also be prepared to address these issues further
when they meet.
In addition to the Geneva talks, I would hope that we
can register some forward motion on some of the regional
issues we discussed in Geneva before we meet again.
The regional question on which we spent the most time
in Geneva, of course, was Afghanistan. I was struck by
your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an
agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating
process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of
troops, return of the refugees and international
guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in
your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities
to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a
political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my
October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take
practical steps, including the three elements I
mentioned: a dialogue among the warring parties;
cessation of outside military presence and supplies; and
economic reconstruction.
I believe that our two countries might in the first
instance seek agreement on the question of guarantees and
a timetable for withdrawal. As an initial contribution to
this process, in advance of the next round of the
proximity talks in Geneva, we will formally notify the
United Nations that we accept their formulation on
guarantees. Perhaps the U.S. and the USSR also could work
out together an explicit statement that we are prepared to
guarantee an appropriate settlement, including a
reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of your forces.
This could give an impetus to the efforts of the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative. If you agree,
we might seek to develop such a statement by the time
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next
meet so as to enable them to have a more focussed and
productive discussion on Afghanistan.
Another area where I believe movement is possible is
southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground
that we have covered often in the past. The point I want
to make is a simple one.
As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a
difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa,
specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I
would not face this decision if there were some evidence
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 3 -
that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in
the outside forces in that country which would make
possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such
an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve
prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia
in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we
share with the USSR.
As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce,
not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in
local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is
another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.
Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the
candor and detail of our discussion on human rights
issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better
understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us --
is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of
Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a
meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council.
He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our
discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully
consider.
In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated
the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with
you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be
invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate
and expand the start we made there in putting our
relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have
received separately an invitation to visit Washington in
late June of next year. I hope that you will find the
timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident
you will find a productive and informative visit.
From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is
important that we do not allow the momentum which we
established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this
channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the
agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out
some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I
believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet
periodically to review progress and identify areas where
work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We
would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the
United States for this purpose in late January of next
year.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
64 ID 8591241
REFERRAL
DATE: 26 DEC 85
MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:
TO: GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
SOURCE: PRESIDENT
DATE: 26 DEC 85
KEYWORDS: USSR
AFGHANISTAN
GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S
HS
SUBJ: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV
REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUEDATE:
COMMENTS:
Julie K.Madison
FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR NSC USE ONLY
FOR INFO
F SII
OBC
Dec. Dr.26.856 26 856
backgourd
SECRET
The President has seen 12/24
SYSTEM II
91241
Roceived US
THE WHITE HOUSE
66
1095 DEC 23 FII S 31
WASHINGTON
SECRET
December 23, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE mb
SUBJECT:
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Issue
Whether to sign a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.
Facts
In your handwritten letter of November 28, you promised Gorbachev
a more formal letter with detailed suggestions regarding some of
the issues before us.
t
Discussion
The letter at Tab A urges steps to move toward a peaceful
settlement of conflicts in Afghanistan and Southern Africa and
reiterates your concern regarding the Soviet action in supplying
SA-5 air defense missiles to Libya.
Recommendation
OK
No
A
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
-
Attachments:
Tab A
Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
CC Vice President
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/1+6613
BY RW NARA DATE 3/3/11
SYSTEM II
ig
91241
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
December 18, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Regional
Issues
A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at
Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more
formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten
letter.
Sestanovich, SRS Ringdahl, Tahir-Kheli and Covey concur.
PR
SP.Q
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve 4
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
Tab B
Platt-McFarlane Memo
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
Declassify on: OADR
BY NARA Gl. DATE 2/17/10
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
68
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CROSSRATCH ACTION SKIET
MISSAGE o 3681
DATE TIME:
IT 13 TXI RESPONSIBILITY or THI COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR VITE THE
DLP NIC SLC PRIOR TO THI ASSIGNED DUE DATE.
ACTION OFFICER
COMMENT OFFICER
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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28/1997
By CAS
NARA, Date 6/12/02
ORIGINAL
SECRET
D
12/16 69
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EUR/SOV/MULTI:EEDELMAN
12/16/85 632-9806 WANG 2139P
THE ACTING SECRETARY
EUR/SOV:MPARRIS
AF/S:JBAVIDOM
EUR: MPALMER
P:MARMACOST
NEA:RPECK
S/S:
NSC:JMATLOCK
5/5-0
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
JU
EE
TAGS: PREL, us, UR
MP
J
SUBJECT: - PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GENERAL SECRETARY
MA
GORBACHEV ON REGIONAL ISSUES
S/S
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT}
2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AT
PARA POSSIBLE. 3 TO HIGHEST APPROPRIATE MFA OFFICIAL AS SOON AS
3. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY.
I HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO YOU INFORMALLY TO EXPRESS SOME
OF MY THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES FACING us IN THE WAKE OF OUR
MEETING IN geneva. I WOULD LIKE IN THIS LETTER TO DEAL
WITH SOME OF THE PARTICULARLY PRESSING REGIONAL ISSUES
WHICH I BELIEVE WE MUST ADDRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.
I MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN MY EARLIER LETTER, BUT I HOULD
LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS.
AFGHANISTAN WAS, AFTER ALL, THE REGIONAL QUESTION ON
WHICH WE SPENT THE MOST TIME IN GENEVA. YOU EXPRESSED
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CAS NARA, Date 10/12/02
BY
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SOVIET READINESS TO SEE AN AGREEMENT EMERGE FROM THE
UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH WOULD ENTAIL A
CEASEFIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, RETURN OF THE REFUGEES
AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THE DISCUSSION RECALLED
THE SUGGESTION IN YOUR JUNE 10 LETTER THAT MY GOVERNMENT
MAD "OPPORTUNITIES TO CONFIRM BY ITS ACTIONS" OUR
READINESS TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN. AS I EXPLAINED IN MY OCTOBER SPEECH TO THE
UNGA, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS ON
PRACTICAL STEPS. THREE ELEMENTS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR
A LASTING SOLUTION: A PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE
WARRING PARTIES INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION: VERIFIED
ELIMINATION OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE AND
RESTRAINT ON THE FLOW OF OUTSIDE ARMS: AND MOVEMENT
TOMARD RECONSTRUCTION. POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION and ECONOMIC
AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS
OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS CONDUCTED BY THE U.N. SECRETARY
GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. FIVE ROUNDS IN GENEVA
HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE REAL ISSUE ON WHICH A RESOLUTION
OF THIS PROBLEM DEPENDS -- WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES. NO
OTHER ELEMENT OF THE PROBLEM PRESENTS REAL DIFFICULTY.
TO UNDERSCORE THIS, WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE
SECRETARY GENERAL THAT WE ACCEPT THE AGREED FORMULATION
ON GUARANTEES. FOR YOUR PART, I BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS
WOULD GAIN A REAL IMPETUS FROM SOVIET ACTION TO PERMIT
DISCUSSION OF A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AT GENEVA AND A
PUBLIC ANNOUCEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. WERE SUCH ACTION
TAKEN BY THE TIME OF OUR MINISTERS' NEXT MEETING, IT
WOULD DISCUSSION. ENABLE THEM TO HAVE A MORE FOCUSSED AND PRODUCTIVE
ANOTHER AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE IS
SOUTHERN AFRICA. BECAUSE WE HAVE COVERED THIS GROUND
ONE. OFTEN IN THE PAST, THE POINT I NEED TO MAKE IS A SIMPLE
AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, I AM REVIEWING OUR POLICY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA, SPECIFICALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE WAR IN
ANGOLA. THIS REVIEW MIGHT NOT BE NECESSASRY IF THERE
WERE REAL EVIDENCE THAT THE OUTSIDE FORCES IN THAT
COUNTRY COULD BE REDUCED, AND THEN WITHDRAWN, MAKING
POSSIBLE THE RECONCILIATION OF THE INDIGENOUS PARTIES TO
THE WAR. SUCH AN OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD DRAMATICALLY
IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT
NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435 -- AN
OBJECTIVE WE SHARE WITH THE U.S.S.R. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
EVIDENCE IS CLEAR THAT YOUR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS
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DEEPENING.
AS I SAID AT THE UN IN OCTOBER, OUR AIM IS TO REDUCE, NOT
INCREASE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY THE SUPERPOWERS IN
LOCAL DISPUTES LIKE THAT IN ANGOLA.
I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD EXPRESSED an INTEREST IN CALMING
TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND EGYPT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT
APPEARS THAT LIBYA IS PREPARING AT LEAST TWO SITES FOR
THE EMPLACEMENT OF SA-5 AIR DEFENSE MISSILES TO BE
SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS HARD TO RECONCILE
SOVIET INTEREST IN RESTRAINT IN THIS REGION WITH THE
PROVISION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO A LEADER WHOSE RECKLESS
BEHAVIOR IS A MAJOR DANGER TO REGIONAL STABILITY.
BECAUSE VE VIEW THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH UTMOST SERIOUSNESS,
I WAS DISAPPOINTED TO SEE THAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR
PRESENTATION FAILED TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER OF THESE
WEAPONS TO LIBYA. OUR MINISTERS AND EXPERTS SHOULD
ADDRESS THIS VITAL MATTER, SINCE IT RAISES THE PROSPECT
OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS THAT I HOPE YOU WANT TO AVOID AS
MUCH AS WE DO.
IF YOU AGREE, BOTH ANGOLA AND LIBYA ARE ADDITIONAL
SUBJECTS WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT TAKE UP IN THEIR NEXT MEETING.
IN CLOSING, LET ME UNDERLINE MY SATISFACTION WITH OUR
AGREEMENT IN GENEVA TO PUT OUR REGIONAL EXPERTS' TALKS ON
A REGULAR BASIS. WHEN WE MET IN geneva WE AGREED THAT IT
WAS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH OF us TO AVOID A U.S. - SOVIET
CLASH OVER REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND TO WORK FOR SOLUTIONS.
I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST MOVE FORWARD ON SOME OF THESE
ISSUES BEFORE WE MEET AGAIN. IN THAT REGARD, I YAS
PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IN YOUR REMARKS TO SECRETARY
BALDRIGE YOU REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH
REGIONAL TROUBLE SPOTS.
---SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN
END TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL LETTER
4. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
YY
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United States Department of State
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Washington, D.C. 20520
91241 dd-
December 13, 1985
F13:12
SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Draft Letter for General Secretary Gorbachev
We are providing a revised text of a draft Presidential
letter to General Secretary Gorbachev on regional issues. This
draft urges forward movement on Afghanistan and southern Africa
and reiterates U.S. concern over Soviet supply of SA-5 air
defense missiles to Libya.
Micholes Plan
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
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Dear Mr. General Secretary,
I have already written to you informally to express
some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of
our meeting in Geneva. I would like in this letter to
deal with some of the particularly pressing regional
issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.
I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I
would like to share with you some further thoughts.
Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which
we spent the most time in Geneva. I was struck by your
businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an
agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating
process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of
troops, return of the refugees and international
guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in
your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities
to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a
political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my
October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take
practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for
a lasting solution: a process of negotiations among the
warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified
elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint
on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political
self-determination and economic reconstruction.
As an initial contribution to this process, in advance
of the next round of the proximity talks in Geneva, we
have formally notified the United Nations that we accept
changer
the agreed formulation on guarantees. I hope that this
will give an impetus to the efforts of the UN Secretary
General's Special Representative. For real progress to be
made it is important that the sixth round of talks in
Geneva get down to the central issue of troop withdrawals.
In any event, I believe Afghanistan deserves more in-depth
treatment at the next meeting between our ministers.
Another area where I believe movement is possible is
southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground
that we have covered often in the past. The point I want
to make is a simple one.
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As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a
difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa,
specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I
would not face this decision if there were some evidence
that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in
the outside forces in that country which would make
possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such
an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve
prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia
in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we
share with the U.S.S.R.
As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce,
not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in
local disputes like that in Angola.
I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the
Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions
between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears
that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the
emplacement of SA-5, air defense missiles to be supplied by
the Soviet Union. It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest
in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced
weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major
danger to regional stability. We view this development
with utmost seriousness. I hope that our ministers and
experts will address this subject and eliminate any
prospect of an incident between us.
If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional
subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.
In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our
agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on
a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it
was important for both of us to avoid a U.S. - Soviet
clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions.
I believe that we must move forward on some of these
issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was
pleased to note that in your remarks to Mac Baldrige you
referred to the importance of dealing with regional
trouble spots.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan
75
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II
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Dan
DECLASSIFIED /RELEASED
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BY Ces NARA DATE 11/27/07
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91241
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz ros
SUBJECT:
Letters to Gorbachev
We need to take advantage of the momentum generated by your
meeting with Gorbachev to move ahead in a number of fields of
interest to us. The most significant:
-- In the Geneva talks, we want to prod the Soviets toward
a more constructive dialogue on the offense/defense
relationship;
-- On regional issues, we should pursue Gorbachev's
suggestion of greater seriousness on an Afghanistan settlement
and use our review of aid to UNITA to engage the Soviets in a
more serious discussion of Southern Africa;
-- On human rights, you indicated you wanted to follow up
on your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the
possibilities which would open up in areas of interest to the
Soviets if we saw progress.
I have attached for your approval two draft letters to
Gorbachev on these issues. The first deals with the Geneva
talks and regional questions, and proposes that Shevardnadze
and I take up these and other issues at a meeting here in
January. The second addresses human rights, and could be
delivered by Mac Baldrige during his visit to Moscow next
week. Using Mac as a channel would reinforce our message on
the inherent links between human rights and other areas of the
relationship. As the first letter refers in passing to Mac's
mission, it should be sent this week.
Attachments: As indicated
CAj 7/25/00
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BY
CVS
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Date
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DECL: OADR
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91241
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Dear Mr. General Secretary,
I have been heartened since returning from Geneva by
the enthusiasm and hope with which reports of our recent
meeting have been greeted around the world. This reaction
by men and women everywhere confirms our joint assessment
in Geneva of the utility of our meeting, and the responsi-
bility we both share to ensure that that enthusiasm, and
those hopes, are not in vain.
I do not intend in this letter to get into an
exhaustive review of where our relationship stands after
our meeting, or of where it may go. There are certain
issues, however, which I do feel merit particular
attention in the weeks ahead. I would like to share with
you some thoughts on how we may approach them.
On substance, if our discussions in Geneva revealed
anything, they revealed the extent of our differences on
some of the core issues in the Geneva arms control talks
and of the depth of our convictions on these issues. I
took to heart the concerns you expressed so eloquently; I
hope that you came to appreciate better my own concern
that we not make the nuclear arms reductions we both
consider overdue hostage to fears I am convinced are
ungrounded.
This is not the place to go over once again the
terrain we covered in Geneva. I wish only to say that our
discussion convinced me that some of our positions,
divergent at present to be sure, are not mutually
exclusive. I am instructing my experts to explore how we
can bridge the gap in the Geneva talks in the months
ahead; I trust you are giving similar instructions. It is
my hope that, with a joint effort in this regard, the
sides will in fact be able to build common elements on
which to realize concrete progress before we meet again
next year.
Surely the Soviet Union cannot be opposed to strategic
defense in principle. There must be a practical way to
approach the relationship of offense and defense. Our
negotiators in Geneva will of course be prepared to follow
up on these possibilities when they return in January. I
think Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
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should also be prepared to address these issues further
when they meet.
In addition to the Geneva talks, I would hope that we
can register some forward motion on some of the regional
issues we discussed in Geneva before we meet again.
The regional question on which we spent the most time
in Geneva, of course, was Afghanistan. I was struck by
your businesslike exposition of Soviet readiness to see an
agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating
process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of
troops, return of the refugees and international
guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in
your June 10 letter that my government had "opportunities
to confirm by its actions" our readiness to reach a
political settlement in Afghanistan. As I explained in my
October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to take
practical steps, including the three elements I
mentioned: a dialogue among the warring parties;
cessation of outside military presence and supplies; and
economic reconstruction.
I believe that our two countries might in the first
instance seek agreement on the question of guarantees and
a timetable for withdrawal. As an initial contribution to
this process, in advance of the next round of the
proximity talks in Geneva, we will formally notify the
United Nations that we accept their formulation on
guarantees. Perhaps the U.S. and the USSR also could work
out together an explicit statement that we are prepared to
guarantee an appropriate settlement, including a
reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of your forces.
This could give an impetus to the efforts of the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative. If you agree,
we might seek to develop such a statement by the time
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze next
meet so as to enable them to have a more focussed and
productive discussion on Afghanistan.
Another area where I believe movement is possible is
southern Africa. Again, I do not intend to go over ground
that we have covered often in the past. The point I want
to make is a simple one.
As I am sure you are aware, I currently face a
difficult decision on our policy in southern Africa,
specifically with respect to the civil war in Angola. I
would not face this decision if there were some evidence
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
that it would be possible to bring about a reduction in
the outside forces in that country which would make
possible the reconciliation of the parties involved. Such
an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve
prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia
in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435 -- an objective we
share with the USSR.
As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce,
not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in
local disputes like that in Angola. If you agree, this is
another issue which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.
Finally, I wanted to reiterate how much I valued the
candor and detail of our discussion on human rights
issues. I hope you left that conversation with a better
understanding of how I want to deal with what -- for us --
is a key determinant of our relationship. Secretary of
Commerce Baldrige will be in Moscow December 9 - 11 for a
meeting of the U.S. - Soviet Trade and Economic Council.
He will be carrying a letter from me which builds on our
discussion in Geneva, and which I hope you will carefully
consider.
In closing, let me reiterate how much I appreciated
the opportunity to establish a personal relationship with
you in Geneva. I am confident that that tie will be
invaluable in the months ahead as we seek to consolidate
and expand the start we made there in putting our
relations on a more satisfactory basis. You will have
received separately an invitation to visit Washington in
late June of next year. I hope that you will find the
timing convenient, and look forward to what I am confident
you will find a productive and informative visit.
From the standpoint of procedure, I think it is
important that we do not allow the momentum which we
established in Geneva to wane. We will be able in this
channel and through our embassies to follow-up on the
agreements reached in the past few weeks and to flesh out
some of the new ideas which emerged from our meeting. I
believe it would be useful, nonetheless, for Secretary
Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to meet
periodically to review progress and identify areas where
work is necessary in advance of our next meeting. We
would be delighted if Mr. Shevardnadze could come to the
United States for this purpose in late January of next
year.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan