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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron March 1985 (2)
Box: 8
To see more digitized collections visit:
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To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (2/4)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
807
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6950 MEMCON
THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
11 1/8/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
6951 MEMCON
FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
16 1/8/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
6952 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GENEVA
2 2/11/1985 B1
MEMCONS
R 6/22/2011 M266/1
6953 MEMO
MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH
1 3/6/1985 B1
SHCHERBITSKIY
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
6954 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
3 3/5/1985 B1
SHCHERBITSKIY
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
6955 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING
1 3/6/1985 B1
MEMO FOR SHCHERBITSKIY
R 3/27/2012 M266/1
6956 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6953
1 3/7/1985 B1
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
6957 TALKING
MEETING WITH SHCHERBITSKIY
6
ND
B1
POINTS
R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/4/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1985 (2/4)
FOIA
F06-114/2
Box Number
8
YARHI-MILO
807
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
6958 TALKING
SAME TEXT AS DOC #6957
3
ND
B1
POINTS
R
11/21/2007
F06-114/2
6959 REPORT
REPORT
1
ND
B1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2#6950
BY
LOT NARA DATE 11/21/07
THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter
USSR
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
January 8, 1985; 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon
AND PLACE:
Soviet Mission, Geneva, Switzerland
Before proceeding with the formal meeting, the Secretary took
Minister Gromyko aside and told him about U.S. concerns in the
area of human rights. He named several individuals whose fate
was of particular concern and mentioned repression of Hebrew
teachers. Gromyko listened, but made no comments.
Gromyko opened the formal meeting by suggesting that since they
had no chairman, the discussions be conducted in a spontaneous
manner which he found to be very good.
The Secretary said that the proposal submitted by Gromyko toward
the end of the afternoon meeting yesterday was reasonable. In
this connection, the first point he wanted to make was that
having studied the Soviet proposal he could see that they were
suggesting genuinely new negotiations. We accepted that it is
new negotiations we are talking about.
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Secondly, Gromyko had suggested that we proceed in terms of three
different negotiating fora or baskets, or whatever they were to
be called. The Secretary accepted that and viewed it as a kind of
division of labor on the different subjects.
The Secretary's third point related to Gromyko's observation that
the subjects to be dealt with in these three bodies were
interrelated and that the three fora constituted one complex. He
agreed with Gromyko's statement that the issues are interrelated
and, therefore, consideration of these three elements in one
complex is acceptable to us. However, Gromyko had made the point
that an agreement reached in any one of the three fora would not
be consummated until there was final agreement -- in effect,
until there was agreement in all three. At the same time,
Gromyko had provided some exceptions to that rule and the
Secretary understood Gromyko's point; Gromyko had stated his view
on the relationship between the different fora. The Secretary
pointed out that the U.S. approach is different in that we are
seeking agreement in each of the fora, and if an agreement which
is considered to be mutually advantageous is reached in a given
setting, we will be willing to raise it as something that should
be considered for consummation. But, perhaps this falls within
the category of the exceptions that Gromyko had identified.
The Secretary then pointed out that we do not feel that we should
be bound by a self-denying ordinance and refuse to conclude
agreements which are in our mutual interest. He understood the
Soviet position, but was explaining ours.
Regarding the subjects and objectives of the third forum, the
Secretary observed that there is common ground in our approaches.
As he had said yesterday, our views differed with regard to the
third forum, but perhaps that difference is not so great in terms
of what is to be discussed in it.
Gromyko interjected that what the Secretary was calling the third
forum was really the first forum, and the Secretary indicated
that he considered the number used not important and agreed to
call it the first if Gromyko wished.
The Secretary went on to cite the second forum which would take
up strategic nuclear offensive arms, and said that the subjects
and objectives for that forum appear reasonable to us, and we
agree. He noted that in this forum the U.S. is prepared to
discuss trade-offs in whatever areas either the U.S. or the USSR
has an advantage. This is in recognition of the fact that if we
are to reach a reasonable agreement it will be most unlikely for
it to be a mere mirror image of the force structures of the two
parties. After all, we want to come out with a situation which
reflects genuine equality.
Turning to the third forum, the Secretary noted that it concerns
intermediate-range, or what the Soviets call medium-range,
nuclear forces; either term is acceptable to us. The subject and
objectives involved a problem that can be talked about. It
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seemed to him that in both cases Gromyko was looking to re-
ductions, perhaps radical reductions. We agree with this. He
added that Gromyko was familiar with our principles and ideas.
We are prepared to discuss different approaches toward working
out an agreement within equal global ceilings.
Turning to the first forum, Secretary Shultz said that in some
respects this is where the most difficult issues lie. At the
same time, it seemed to him, as he had already said, that it
might not be all that difficult to determine the subject matter
of that forum. He had offered Gromyko an explanation in response
to his perceptive question, and he had some further remarks.
Gromyko had suggested, Secretary Shultz continued, that the
subject be non-militarization or demilitarization of space.
(Gromyko interjected that he had not referred to demilitariza-
tion, but rather non-militarization.) The Secretary thought that
such statements involved an overly narrow definition. There is
no lack of willingness on our part to talk about and negotiate
matters regarding space arms. But the Soviet definition is too
narrow. What happens in space is a kind of abstraction, the
result of something done with respect to offensive or defensive
arms. He cited these two categories while recognizing that of-
fensive and defensive arms are interrelated. If Gromyko would
look at the subjects listed yesterday by the Secretary, he would
recognize that they are related to this forum. For example,
there are categories of anti-satellite systems which, though land-
based, operate in space. Thus, to repeat, the Soviet concept is
too narrow. Accordingly, we believe that this forum should deal
with the full range of defensive systems, regardless of their
basing mode. We are also prepared to deal with space arms
questions as proposed by the Soviet Union.
The Secretary added that we had taken into account the concerns
voiced by Gromyko several times last September concerning nuclear
arms and nuclear explosions in space. Thus we believe it would
be appropriate if the discussions in this forum were to focus
particularly on nuclear defensive systems, including existing
systems. While he agreed with Gromkyo that the ultimate goal
should be the elimination of nuclear arms, he thought that this
forum should include all such arms, whether offensive or defen-
sive. We certainly agree that the elimination of the entire
category of nuclear arms is desirable.
The Secretary continued by pointing out that the Soviet Union
has the world's only operational ASAT system, and -- as he
understood it -- had conducted some twenty tests of that system.
Moreover, while this system is land-based, the original launchers
intended for it could launch other systems. Since the ASAT
system operates in space, this could be considered to be
militarization of space. The U.S., in contrast, has not deployed
ASATs and has yet to test the system it has under development
against satellites. Thus, we are far behind the Soviet Union in
this area. On the Soviet side, in contrast, we see something
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that exists. Beyond that he could mention a number of systems
that are in space and have military uses, such as satellites for
verifying compliance with agreements, for communications purposes
and various other uses. To a very considerable extent we would
not want to dispense with these systems because they are useful.
Thus, the Secretary pointed out, "demilitarization" in one final
sweep is not practical or verifiable. In looking through the
record he had found, back at the ASAT talks in 1978 and 1979, a
statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet
delegation, Ambassador Khlestov, which ran as follows:
As for the concept of a 'comprehensive agreement, the
more we analyze it, the more doubts it causes us... From
a purely technical point of view, it is practically
impossible to single out, with sufficient precision, from
the whole complex of systems and services which we call
space technology, only those systems which would be
designed exclusively for countering satellites
...
we
propose that in the future we continue to concentrate our
efforts on the tasks which both sides recognize as
realistic and feasible.
The Secretary then turned to the matter of a space-based missile
defense system, to which the Soviet Union had directed great
attention, reviewing some thoughts he had tried to advance
yesterday.
-- First, U.S. scientists say that these systems are years off.
He did not know what Soviet scientists have to say on the basis
of their own research. One can never say what a "hot research
group" might come up with. The Secretary had personal experience
with many such research groups at the University of Chicago, at
Stanford and at MIT. And though none of those research groups
focussed on the subject under discussion here, he knew that it
was impossible to tell in what direction such research efforts
might lead. This effort, therefore, is long-term by its very
nature.
-- Second, deployment of these systems is covered by a number of
existing treaties. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear
detonations in space, the Outer of Space Treaty bans the
deployment of nuclear weapons in space, while the ABM Treaty
prohibits systems that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or
mobile land-based. Thus, there is a whole body of treaty lan-
guage that has been agreed upon in this area.
-- Third, regarding research as such, the Secretary had two
points. One, that an agreement on research, as we see it, is
virtually impossible to verify for a variety of reasons. Much
relevant research stems from objectives unrelated to the question
at hand. As an example he could point to advances in
computational ability. We are both engaged in such research and
this is impossible to stop. Beyond that -- and this was his
second point -- we think that, in the end, if there is the
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possibility of defense, it would offer a more comfortable and
secure form of strategic stability than the one now existing.
The Secretary recognized that Gromyko disagreed, but expressed
the hope that the Soviets would study our thinking. There is
much time to talk about this matter and to digest it. It seems
to us that if it is possible ultimately to determine a basis
where a major element of deterrence would be defensive, in
contrast to preponderantly offensive elements of deterrence we
have now, this might offer a more comfortable and more secure
form of strategic stability. If this can be accomplished it is
potentially desirable. Perhaps we will not be able to find
a way to do so. Therefore, for both these reasons the U.S.
believes that research should continue and in fact will continue.
Even if we were to agree on some limitation, it would be impos-
sible to verify it. If it should turn out that a particular
technology seems feasible, the U.S. would undertake more direct
discussions, as provided by the ABM Treaty. At any rate, this is
a matter for the future.
The Secretary said that this brought him back to a point in con-
nection with the first forum. The U.S. is fully prepared to
discuss and negotiate matters involving space arms and to take up
whatever proposals the USSR may make in this area. As he had
said yesterday, we are prepared to take up space arms questions
in either of the other two fora, if they are related to the
context of discussions there. As Gromyko had said yesterday, the
world is changing. Perhaps as the negotiations continue, even on
familiar subjects, we may want to approach them in different
ways. Regarding further details and potential content of
discussions in the first forum, the Secretary referred Gromyko to
his comments on this subject the day before.
Finally, the Secretary returned to the question of structuring
the negotiations. He recalled that Gromyko had said that they
would appoint leaders for the three negotiating groups, and that,
most likely, one would be named chairman of the overall
delegation. Gromyko had also invited us to do as we wished in
this regard. The Secretary observed that Gromyko's suggestion
concerning the structure was novel. We had not heard such a
suggestion previously and therefore we were still thinking about
it. He did not know at this point where we would come out in
terms of personnel appointments. To some extent he thought this
would be a reflection of who would be "Mr. One," "Mr. Two" and
"Mr. Three." Thus, this matter remained open so far as the U.S.
is concerned.
The Secretary then said that his delegation had prepared a state-
ment describing its proposals regarding the subjects and
objectives of the whole complex of negotiations. This text could
serve as a basis for discussion. He could give it to Gromyko
now, or perhaps Gromyko preferred to make some comments before
looking at the U.S. text.
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Gromyko responded that indeed he had some comments. He was
gratified to hear that certain aspects of the Soviet proposal
regarding the structure of possible negotiations are acceptable
to the U.S. On some other aspects of the Soviet proposal, the
Secretary had voiced some doubts or reservations. He hoped that
the Secretary would give added thought to these matters. It is
good that the Secretary recognized the interconnection among the
questions to be negotiated in the three groups. Nevertheless,
there is a difference in the Soviet and American understanding of
this interrelationship. The U.S. should be aware of this.
In dealing with this concept, Gromyko observed, the Soviet side
proceeds from the premise that the subject ("material") of the
negotiations compels us to consider the subject matter of the
three groups as interrelated. That is why he had said yesterday
that the problems must be solved in comprehensive fashion. In
particular, he had explained why it would be impossible to make
progress on some issues without agreement on space, more
precisely on the non-militarization of space. He had also
referred to a different interrelationship, namely that between
strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms.
When the Secretary referred to interrelationship, Gromyko
continued, he was talking about a different kind of interrela-
tionship -- that of offensive and defensive weapons. The
Soviet Union cannot accept this if for no other reason than
because the USSR did not recognize the category which the U.S.
called defensive systems. He had said clearly that these
systems, these concepts and this U.S. program were offensive
systems, offensive concepts and an offensive program. They are a
component part of a whole. One had to look at things from the
standpoint of their ultimate logic. He did not wish to repeat
what it would mean if the U.S. proceeded to implement its plan.
The Secretary observed that Gromyko had made hinself very clear
yesterday.
Gromyko continued that accordingly, we are speaking different
languages when we refer to an interrelationship. Nevertheless,
the very idea of an interrelationship does exist and that in
itself is a positive element. Still, the two sides attached
different meanings to it and this must be kept in mind.
The Secretary responded that, in practical terms, the question
would present itself in terms of what would happen if, for
example, we reached some kind of understanding in forum three or
forum two. Would it be converted into a formal agreement or not?
Under one interpretation of the interrelationship, the answer
would be "no." Under a different interpretation the answer would
be "yes."
Gromyko replied that this would not necessarily be the case. The
point is that there are different interpretations of the concept
of interrelationship. When we go beyond concrete specifics and
relate these matters to high policy, we have to recognize that
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1
the foundations of your plan and our plan are different.
Naturally, this is of major importance. Everything said and
written in the U.S. attributes defensive aims to your program --
as if everything in it is good and nothing bad. Even here in
Geneva, though perhaps in a more restrained fashion, this has
been the U.S. position. He, however, had told the Secretary that
this is not the case, that the objective of the U.S. program is
just the opposite. He had said this yesterday.
Gromyko then turned to the question of what agreements could be
concluded in the absence of an overall agreement. As he had
explained the day before, there are two groups of questions on
which agreement is possible in the absence of an overall
agreement. He did not preclude the possibility that it might be
possible to reach agreement on individual questions in one of
these groups which did not bear critically on the interrelation-
ship. The number of such questions would be small. In this in-
stance, there would be no need to await resolution of the other
questions with which the groups would be dealing. The other
category involved those questions which could be resolved and
agreed upon entirely independent of progress on any other issue
or group of issues. He had cited examples such as a
comprehensive nuclear test ban. This type of question could be
singled out, agreed upon, and an accord signed and brought into
force. There were also two agreements that had been negotiated
in the past, but had not entered into force. They were part of
the same category that Gromyko was talking about.
The Secretary said he understood.
Gromyko noted that he had listed them yesterday. He wanted to
provide additional clarification on one point because he felt
that the Secretary had not clearly understood the matter. Let us
assume that significant progress had been made in one or more of
the groups. As they saw it, it would not be necessary to wait
for the other groups to finish their work before discussing the
overall picture. The whole delegation should meet from time to
time to review their progress. It would be good if everything
could be completed at the same time, but this can hardly be
expected. There should be a periodic overall analysis, and this
would provide an organic connection of the work by all three
groups.
For example, Gromyko continued, let us assume that group "x" had
conducted ten meetings. At that point the delegation as a whole
could meet to see how things were going. This should be standard
practice. There would be one delegation that is split into three
groups. Thus, there would inevitably have to be consideration of
the interrelationship the ministers had talked about -- provided,
of course, both sides understood the meaning of the
interrelationship in the same way. One should not rely
exclusively on the literal meaning of the word, and one should
not impose a kind of law on the groups under which they had to
finish their work and wash their hands before a decision is made
how to proceed further.
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8
Gromyko said he hoped this explanation would be useful. He
offered it because he suspected that the Secretary had not fully
understood the Soviet concept.
The Secretary replied that this was an important clarification
which he found very interesting.
Gromyko then noted the U.S. concern over the concept of non-
militarization of space. Of course, one could invent some kind
of symbol to replace this word, but Gromyko did not believe that
it would be helpful to resort to algebraic techniques. If any-
thing, that could be harmful. He added that the Secretary knows
what the Soviet side means in this regard, and the Soviet side
knows what the U.S. has in mind. Gromyko reiterated that he was
convinced that the U.S. and USSR can prevent the militarization
of space. If such militarization were to occur, the USSR, the
U.S. and mankind as a whole will be pushed further toward the
abyss toward which we have been moving. This is what will happen
unless we find a way to halt such movement. Thus, even though
the U.S. might not like the term militarization and may on occa-
sion scorn it, he would urge honesty and precision in dealing
with this subject.
Secretary Shultz's statements, Gromyko continued, had been
reminiscent of those appearing in the U.S. press to the effect
that it is wrong to raise the question of the militarization of
space because space is already militarized. There are no scales
which would measure the falsity of this thesis. We all
understand that this is not the case. If we look at steps taken
by both countries, there are things we can learn. For example,
look at the U.S. space shuttle. If viewed in terms of its
potential, one could conclude that under certain circumstances it
could be used in ways in which no Soviet system can be used, and
therefore that space is already mi itarized. But this would be
an oversimplification. He did not want us to take this path
since it would only make it harder to reach the goals before us.
Gromyko then reiterated what he had said the day before regarding
space arms, or more precisely the non-militarization of space.
The latter implies that there should be a ban on the development,
testing and deployment of attack (or strike) space arms,
accompanied by the destruction of existing systems of this kind.
If such an approach is followed, far-reaching solutions to other
issues would become possible as well. In order not to dilute the
question of space arms by tangential issues, the Soviet side has
proposed to talk about attack (strike) space arms. By attack
space arms the Soviet Union means space arms based on any
physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which can strike
objects in space and which can strike objects on land, sea or in
the air, that is on the planet earth, from space. Of course,
this would include relevant anti-missile and ASAT systems.
Gromyko then said that, in referring to what he termed the U.S.
defensive system, Secretary Shultz had spoken at length about
research and about the difficulty in verifying a ban on research.
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To a considerable degree what the Secretary said about verifying
a research ban is true. But let us assume that all this
preparatory research should demonstrate that such systems can
indeed be developed. The U.S. position is "if it's possible,
then let's do it." The Soviet position is to exclude this
possibility since it would be a boon to mankind if this system is
never developed.
Gromyko continued that this situation reminded him of the story
of two men visiting Monaco. One of them suggests going to the
casino in the hope of winning something; the other one refuses
since he does not want to risk losing what he has. This
illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions.
The Soviets feel the wiser course is not to risk losing
everything. This is not just the unanimous view of the Soviet
leadership but is also shared by people everywhere. People
instinctively feel that this path should not be pursued because
it would generate a very great threat to peace and would
intensify the arms race. Nothing would do more to enhance U.S.
prestige than a decision to rule out that option. That was the
way to reduce nuclear arms, a goal mentioned by the Secretary,
the President, as well as the leadership of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, General Secretary Chernenko had said this on
numerous occasions and it had been repeated by Gromyko at this
very table. Nuclear arms should be reduced down to their com-
plete elimination from the arsenals of nations.
In the U.S., Gromyko continued, there is presently a popular
thesis to the effect that one should switch the character and
nature of deterrence and that instead of relying on strategic and
medium-range nuclear systems for deterrence, one should rely on
systems which the U.S. has baptized defensive systems. The
Soviet Union believed that this would not serve the cause of
peace, that this would increase the threat, that the threat would
become awesome if the large-scale missile defense system was de-
veloped. Under such circumstances, the nuclear arms race would
not be curbed by such systems but just the opposite would occur;
it would acquire new momentum. The USSR can not understand how
the U.S. fails to see this. It must be some kind of self-
hypnosis. This plan will intensify the nuclear arms race.
Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no further comments on the
substance, perhaps they should give some thought on how to
conclude their meetings. Earlier, the Secretary had mentioned a
draft which Gromyko assumed was a draft of a joint statement.
The Soviet delegation would certainly take a look at this draft
and consider it. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would
present its own draft. Gromyko thought that at this point it
would be advisable to have either a working break or to recess
for lunch, after which they could see how to proceed with regard
to the joint statement and consider where to go from there.
The Secretary replied that he liked Gromyko's procedural sug-
gestion, but wanted to make sure he understood clearly Gromyko's
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description of how the set of negotiating groups in the delegation
would work. Gromyko had mentioned a situation in which one of
the three groups, Group X, had held ten meetings and had come up
with something. It would then be appropriate -- and in any event
this would occur periodically -- for the whole group to consider
the results, and for Group X to report what it had agreed upon.
Gromyko confirmed that this was right.
The Secretary continued that he understood Gromyko had suggested
that the whole group engage in a kind of summary review to judge
whether this one thing that had been agreed upon could stand on
its own or whether it should wait. This would be the function of
such periodic meetings.
Gromyko again confirmed that this was correct; the overall
delegation would make a judgment on how the agreement reached
fits into the framework of the other questions being negotiated.
The Secretary noted that the structure proposed by Gromyko was
unusual and imaginative and the Secretary would have to testify
in Congress and explain how it worked. Thus, he added jokingly,
he might ask Gromyko to write his testimony.
The Secretary then presented the U.S. draft text of a joint
statement. (Attachment 1)
Gromyko simultaneously gave the Secretary the text of the Soviet
draft (Attachment 2).
The Secretary suggested that they adjourn for lunch and
reconvene at 2:30 P.M., which would give them the opportunity to
study each other's drafts and to respond at the afternoon
meeting.
The meeting adjourned at 12:00 Noon.
Drafted by: D. Arensburger; J.F. Matlock
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Attachment 1
TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT
The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new
complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of
nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups
will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin
the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nu-
clear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defen-
sive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall
be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strate-
gic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons.
Attachment 2
TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT
As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8,
1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, the U.S. Secre-
tary of State.
During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of
the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms.
The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a
complex of questions concerning space arms, as well as both stra-
tegic and medium-range nuclear arms; moreover, all these ques-
tions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.
The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective
agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, limiting
and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.
The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations,
just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead
to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.
The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of
these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels
within one month.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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NLS
DECLASSIFIED 806-114/2#695,
12
LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING
Geneva, January, 1985
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
U.S.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter
USSR
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign
Minister
Ambassador Viktor Karpov
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
DATE, TIME
January 8, 1985; 3:35 to 6:55 P.M.
AND PLACE:
United States Mission, Geneva, Switzerland
Secretary Shultz began the meeting by saying that the two sides
had reviewed each other's proposed press communiques. He had
some comments to make about the Soviet draft, but as Minister
Gromyko was the guest, he should have the floor first.
Gromyko responded that, frankly speaking, it would be hard for
the Soviet side to accept the U.S. text. For one thing the U.S.
referred to a new complex of negotiations whereas the Soviet side
felt the need to discuss the problems in a complex -- or
comprehensive -- fashion. The two concepts are not identical.
The U.S. draft then speaks of the three groups meeting in Geneva
on March 5 to begin work, although the sides had not yet agreed
to begin negotiations. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss
the possibility of holding negotiations. He had always taken
care to say that if the sides can agree on the subject and
objectives of the negotiations, then they could talk about the
date and site of the talks. He always began his remarks with the
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words "if we agree on the subject and objectives of the
negotiations.
The U.S. draft, Gromyko continued, then goes on to mention
defensive arms. Perhaps this is good for the U.S., but it is
unacceptable to the Soviet side, as he had already stated many
times. The USSR has a wholly different evaluation of the arms
the U.S. calls defensive. The only way to proceed here is to
find mutually acceptable language, and this is a matter of
principle. U.S. and Soviet assessments of the U.S. plans are
diametrically opposed to each other, and this is why the sides
must look in a different direction to find acceptable wording.
Gromyko then asked for the Secretary's reaction to the Soviet
draft statement.
Secretary Shultz said that as far as a date and place for
negotiations are concerned, he of course recognizes that this
would come only after reaching an agreement on the substance of
the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the substance, it
would be worthwhile to set a time and place so as to be
specific and leave nothing vague that could be clearly specified.
As for Gromyko's remarks about defense, the Secretary had
carefully listened to everything Gromyko said yesterday and
today, and he believed he completely understood what Gromyko
meant. He hoped that with time he and Gromyko would have an
opportunity to continue exchanges on this subject because it
represents a very deep issue.
The U.S. had identified one of the three fora agreed upon as
"nuclear defensive and space arms, the Secretary continued. He
recognized that Soviet attention is very much focused on space
arms, as signalled by statements made here and elsewhere by
Gromyko and also by Chairman Chernenko. The U.S. understands
this and is prepared to discuss space arms. But, as he had
mentioned this morning, the U.S. sees this issue as essentially a
broader one. There should be clarity about the defensive
arrangements the Soviet Union now has underway (the U.S. at least
would call them defensive). In the U.S. view this Soviet program
is a massive one and should be discussed. The USSR has research
programs in particle beams, directed energy and lasers, and has
as well a deployed ABM system that is being upgraded. It also
has a massive air defense infrastructure. The United States,
for its part, has done very little in defense. So it is
incorrect to discuss U.S. plans and research programs without
looking at the large Soviet defense program. For this reason the
U.S. believes that this negotiating forum should address the
question of defense broadly speaking.
The structure of the Soviet draft statement, the Secretary
continued, provides a basis with which to work, and so the U.S.
side has made an effort to integrate its ideas into its two
drafts. The U.S. draft adopts the first and second paragraphs of
the Soviet draft without change. The third paragraph of the
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14
Soviet draft was slightly changed, and the last two paragraphs
dropped in favor of a U.S. text. Shultz handed over to Gromyko a
copy of the following statement:
As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gro-
myko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of
the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Mini-
sters of the USRR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR, and George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the
USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985 in Geneva.
The question regarding the subject and objectives of the
forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space
arms was discussed during the meeting.
The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be
those interrelated questions pertaining to nuclear and
space arms with these questions to be discussed and re-
solved in a complex of negotiations.
To this end, the negotiating groups will be convened in
Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process
of negotiating agreements on nuclear defensive and space
arms, strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-
range nuclear arms.
The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduc-
tion of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic
stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimi-
nation of nuclear arms.
Gromyko observed that the U.S. had added the phrase "defensive
arms" and this was unacceptable. He did not want to get into
polemics, but all the credit ascribed by the Secretary to Soviet
activity in the field of defense is not true to fact. This is
not acceptable wording, and any wording that is not acceptable to
both sides must be dropped.
Secretary Shultz asked whether the main problem involved the word
"defensive", or was it something else?
Gromyko replied that "outer space" is absent from the U.S. draft
as an objective of the negotiations.
The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. draft reads "negotiations
on nuclear and space arms."
Gromyko said that the concept of outer space must not get lost
here. It must be put in first place.
The Secretary replied that the U.S. does not want to lose it, but
wants to discuss outer space. He read out the following
alternative to the last paragraph:
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15
The objective of the negotiations will be to work out
effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race,
limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening
strategic stability on earth and in space.
Gromyko objected that this means relegating space to the
backyard. The U.S. could call its strategic defense plan a plan
to strengthen strategic stability if it wished.
Secretary Shultz said that, just as in baseball the number four
hitter is the "clean-up hitter, he was saving the best for last.
The phrase "strengthening strategic stability on earth and in
space" could be interpreted in the Soviet way or in the U.S. way.
Gromyko said there should be no room for ambiguity here. He
suggested taking a 15-minute break so that both sides could look
over the drafts.
Secretary Shultz agreed, and the U.S. delegation left the room at
3:05 p.m.
*******
At 3:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned and the meeting
resumed.
Gromyko presented the following draft of a joint statement:
As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and
8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George
P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.
In accordance with the arrangement previously reached in
principle between the USSR and the USA to enter into new
negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the two sides
focused their attention, as had been agreed, on discus-
sing the question of the subject and specific objectives
of these negotiations. The discussions were useful.
Both sides agreed that the ultimate objective of these
negotiations, in the course of which all questions will
be considered and resolved in their interrelationship as
generally the two sides' efforts in the field of arms
limitation and reduction, should be the gradual exclusion
of nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of states
until they are completely eliminated.
The exchange of views will be continued and the sides
will seek to elaborate as early as possible an agreed
approach to resolving the questions under question at
this meeting.
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Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Shultz agreed to continue
the exchange of views, for which purpose they will meet
again in early March. The date and venue of the meeting
will be agreed additionally.
Secretary Shultz remarked that there was one place in the third
paragraph that was unclear linguistically, but he did not
disagree with the meaning of the sentence.
Gromyko explained that the Soviet side was referring to the
ultimate goal of the negotiations and all actions taken to
achieve that goal.
The Secretary said he wished to discuss this, but first he had a
few questions. At this morning's meeting the two of them had
discussed at length the Soviet proposal for structuring the
negotiations in three groups. He thought they had made quite a
bit of headway in discussing it. Essentially they were
struggling with the description of one of the three fora, but now
it seemed that the Soviet side was withdrawing this idea. He did
not object, and in fact looked forward to another meeting with
Gromyko, but why did Gromyko not now want to go ahead with this
idea? The Soviet side had proposed and the U.S. had accepted the
basic notion of a related complex of three negotiations.
Gromyko complained that he now had to repeat himself once again.
He did not understand why the Secretary was not paying attention
to him. He had stated the Soviet views on how to structure the
negotiations, provided agreement was reached to hold them. Every
time he mentions this, he makes this reservation because the two
sides have not yet agreed on this. If we agreed when to meet
next time to discuss the subject and objectives of the talks, he
said, then everything he said about the structure would still be
valid. He was not taking back a single word of what he had said.
The Secretary observed that there is a difference of view in how
the sides interpret research on defensive measures. He doubted
there would be any change in these views by early March, and he
doubted it could be resolved by then. It was more likely to be
resolved through the process of negotiations.
Gromyko said he did not wish to single out any one question. He
would suggest just continuing these talks and see what the
outcome would be. They had come to no final result here yet, and
he would suggest continuing these conversations, if the Secretary
found this acceptable.
Secretary Shultz suggested that the two delegations separate for
a few minutes in order to caucus and look at the direction in
which they were going.
The U.S. delegation left the room at 3:42 p.m.
*
*
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At 4:28 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.
Gromyko joked that he hadn't expected to see the Secretary again
until the second crow of the rooster.
Secretary Shultz replied that if today had been Sunday, the U.S.
delegation would have been busy watching football in the other
room. He said he was puzzled and could not figure out what was
causing Gromyko to draw back from what had already been agreed
upon. Certainly the two sides disagree on how to characterize
what seem to the U.S. to be defensive systems, and which the
Soviet Union feels are offensive. He expected that if we met six
months or a year from now they might well still disagree,
although there would be time for reflection. Although they
disagree on what to call these arms, they do not disagree that it
is important to discuss them. The U.S. is prepared to discuss
them and Gromyko has indicated the same. The Secretary had
developed in one of his presentations the sense in which
technology is making certain distinctions in the ABM Treaty
difficult to establish makes it difficult to establish, and
therefore there is a need to examine a variety of technologies.
The Secretary noted that he had already pointed out that the
deployed Soviet ABM system depends on nuclear explosions in the
upper atmosphere or space. And so the U.S. had tried to define
the subject matter of the first working group or forum so as to
include what the Soviets want to talk about in space as well as
things on the ground that seem relevant or important to the U.S.
If we do not agree on the content, that is one problem. But if
we do agree on the content -- and the U.S. has excluded nothing
-- then we should be able to find the words to express this. If
Gromyko's problem concerns the word "defensive," the Secretary
could suggest some alternative wording. But perhaps this is not
the problem. The Secretary thought that if they could capitalize
on the extensive discussions that have taken place here, they
certainly should. He had other language to suggest, but observed
that perhaps Gromyko was not interested and had already decided
to back away from the direction in which he had been going.
"Don't try to pretend that you don't understand us," Gromyko
rejoined. He categorically rejected the reproach that he
had retreated from his position. Each word he had spoken was
valid. "Have we reached agreement on the subject and aims of the
negotiations?" he asked rhetorically. Each time he had spoken of
the structure of the possible negotiations, he had said, "when
and if we agree on the subject and objectives of the
negotiations, this is the structure we envision." He had spoken
of one delegation divided into three groups. Of course, the
negotiations would deal with the subjects for discussion in each
group. These three groups would take stock of their progress and
present reports on their work. This is how the Soviet side sees
this issue. Let us talk seriously now. There would be one
single negotiation made up of three groups working in three
directions. Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on
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this. Tell us, Gromyko asked the Secretary, if this proposal is
unacceptable.
Gromyko said that the Secretary had again raised the subject of
Soviet ABM systems and certain other issues. If the Secretary
insisted on this, Gromyko would have to repeat all that he had
already said. Is it really necessary to do so? If we could
reach agreement on these questions, we could name the date for
the negotiations to begin, i.e., March 1 or April 1, although the
latter was not a very good date. But we are not in a position to
do that now.
Secretary Shultz inquired what precisely was the essence of their
disagreement. He thought it boiled down to the subject or way of
describing the first group. If this is the problem, he had a
proposal, but perhaps this is not the problem.
Gromyko responded that this is indeed the main issue. "You don't
want to accept our proposal to deal with the militarization of
space,' he added. Whenever he had raised this question, the
Secretary began to speak of research, U.S. plans and so forth.
The Soviet side does not share the U.S. view that it is essential
to carry out this research. This is the first stage of
implementing the U.S. plan. The Soviet side proposes to continue
discussing this important question, but here there is absolutely
no agreement on it. They had touched on other important
questions as well, but this is the main one. If they had reached
agreement on questions related to space, they could now set the
time and place of the new negotiations, but they have no such
agreement now. If you think we cannot exist without a new round
of talks, then your idea is far from the truth. Such an exchange
is in the interest of both sides. If this does not suit you,
Gromyko said, tell us and we will not speak of it again. This
was his short reply to the Secretary's remarks. He noted that
time was running out and the sides should be brief.
The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood. Was
Gromyko saying that they would establish these negotiating fora
whenever the U.S. says that it will cease it research program on
strategic defense?
Gromyko replied that he would not discuss that now. He proposed
it for subsequent discussion. He wanted to discuss a whole
series of questions by way of continuing the conversation here,
but this would take several days. The Secretary certainly must
understand, said Gromyko, that the Soviet side cannot accept the
U.S. concept, point of view or policy on outer space. The U.S.
must clearly understand the Soviet position on this. However,
the Soviets are prepared to continue discussing all these issues.
If a continued exchange does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us.
This is a proposal, not a request.
The Secretary replied that the U.S. would not stop its research
program.
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19
Gromyko commented that the Secretary had already said this.
Secretary Shultz had said that if the essence is that the Soviet
Union is waiting for the U.S. to stop its research program, this
was useless because the U.S. would not stop. Gromyko repeated
that the Secretary had already said this. He said that the
Soviet assessment of the U.S. concept on space would not change,
but the Soviet side is nonetheless prepared to. continue the
discussion.
The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had proposed that such a
discussion take place in the first working group. This was
implied by the draft joint statement Gromyko had presented at the
morning meeting. This negotiating group would discuss the
questions the two sides agree upon, but the U.S. wants it to
discuss other questions too. This is what the sides should work
toward, but this may not be acceptable to the Soviet side.
Gromyko replied that this problem would be discussed in one of
the three groups.
Secretary Shultz said he agreed.
However, Gromyko continued, we have not yet cleared the way for
the beginning of negotiations. If, for example, we agree now
that this working group would meet on March 1, it would have the
same problems at its first meeting that we are having here. What
kind of negotiations would those be? At least one working group,
or perhaps the whole delegation, would have to discuss this
problem, and he thought it was better to discuss it at the
ministerial level. It is not a question for a working group, but
for a higher, more fundamental, level.
The Secretary remarked that he had given Gromyko a list of what
he considered to be appropriate subject matter for this group,
and it was a meaty set of material omyko could see this in
his notes. The Secretary thought this area is important to both
sides and is negotiable.
Gromyko said it is not possible to begin discussing the work
program of the working groups now. First they must agree on the
objectives of the working group and when the negotiations would
begin.
The Secretary asked whether Gromyko felt that further discussion
of this question now would be fruitless.
Gromyko replied that he was not saying that; there was plenty of
time left before tomorrow morning and of course they could sit
here until then, but he thought it was hardly necessary to repeat
what had already been said. There was no one but himself and the
Secretary to discuss these questions. Their leaders had charged
them with discussing them. Did he understand the Secretary to
say that the idea of the two of them continuing their discussions
was unsuitable? If so, one mode of action was indicated, but if
not so, another mode of action was indicated.
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The Secretary replied, "No, it is not unsuitable." But it is
also suitable to get the negotiations going as soon as possible.
As he had said, he thought that the negotiations, once begun,
should be closely followed and discussed at a high political
level. The two sides have much to discuss. He was striving to
understand the reason Gromyko did not wish to begin the
negotiating process. Gromyko had handed him a proposed
communique announcing the beginning of negotiations. Although no
date was set, the objective of the talks was stated. And now,
apparently Gromyko did not want this to happen.
[At this point, Korniyenko remarked to Gromyko in Russian, "Then
they should take our text.
Gromyko said that they want the negotiations to begin. But, he
said, it is impossible to agree on the timing because there is as
yet no agreed understanding on the subject and objectives of the
negotiations. We are speaking of a common objective: both sides
agree to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms. But
this is the only thing we agree on, and therefore it is too early
now to talk about a date for beginning the negotiations. He did
not know whether at the next meeting they would be able to agree
upon these questions and so he proposed to meet again in order to
continue this discussion.
He said that the Secretary tried to interpret the fact that he
would not agree to set a date for negotiations to mean that the
Soviet side had changed its position and did not want to have
negotiations. But Gromyko had said all along that they could not
agree upon the date if they had not agreed on the subject and
objectives of the negotiations. Don't try to pressure us,
Gromyko warned, first of all, because we don't like it, and
second, because it is hardly in either of our interests for our
delegations to meet at the talks and immediately find
themselves at an impasse so that the negotiations fall apart.
This would be advantageous to neither side. Would it not be
better to hold negotiations on a more reliable basis?
The Secretary noted that questions may arise over what is meant
in the final sentence of the Soviet draft statement, which reads
as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and
the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic
channels within one month."
Gromyko replied that he considered this normal. The sides could
specify the month in which the talks would begin if the U.S. side
feels this is important. They would not name a date, but would
specify a month, or the 15th of a certain month. Gromyko had no
desire to create any vagueness or uncertainty.
Korniyenko asked whether the U.S. accepts the subject and
definition of the negotiations.
The Secretary replied that the U.S. could not accept the Soviet
draft but could use it as a basis for discussion.
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Gromyko suggested that instead of a date we could say that a
meeting and exchange of views would take place in March. If it
is so important we could specify the first half of March.
February would not be convenient for him for several reasons and
March would be better.
The Secretary replied that he was trying to find a sense of
direction, not to pin down a date. The Soviet draft implies that
we agree there will be negotiations and that perhaps Hartman and
Korniyenko or Dobrynin and he would discuss the time and place.
Gromyko asked whether this would be later on.
The Secretary said yes. If the date were to be in March, this
would be settled by discussion between them. This was his
understanding.
Gromyko rejoined that it would not be hard to agree to meet in
March. It would, in any case, be easier than climbing Mont
Blanc.
The Secretary concurred that it would be no problem to find a
time and place. The problem was to work together and come up
with a joint text of a statement.
Gromyko replied that they had drafted their text taking account
of the U.S. position and the views the Secretary had expressed
here. If the two of them are to work out an agreed text,
everything in it must be acceptable to both sides since it will
be made public.
The Secretary said that if the statement is made public, it would
imply that the date and place of the negotiations would be agreed
upon through diplomatic channels. The two delegations would then
meet and, having the benefit of our discussions, divide into
three groups and get down to work. This is how Shultz understood
the statement.
Gromyko said that if at the next meeting they reached a degree of
mutual understanding that warranted beginning negotiations, they
could agree on the date. They could name the month if this suits
the Secretary more. If they agree to another meeting, it makes
no sense to draw things out.
The Secretary said that Gromyko was in effect changing the Soviet
text to read as follows' "The date of the beginning of the
negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed at
the next meeting of foreign ministers in early March."
Gromyko replied that it is one thing to begin the negotiations
and another thing to mention the date of another ministerial
meeting. Either version would be all right with him. One
version concerns the next meeting between himself and
Secretary Shultz, and the other concerns the date on which
negotiations would begin, although a month is not specified.
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Perhaps after the next meeting they would be in a position to
specify the date and place of the negotiations. Alternatively
they could set the date through diplomatic channels. He saw no
big problem here, especially with the next ministerial meeting.
This should be a simple matter and he asked Shultz to believe him
that he had no tricks up his sleeve. He assumed that the most
recent Soviet draft is acceptable to the U.S. side. It mentions
the negotiations and the date of the next ministerial meeting,
though no date is set for the negotiations. To state things more
simply, two versions are on the table. Which is more acceptable
to the U.S. side?
The Secretary answered that both versions are acceptable in the
sense that it is important to get the negotiations underway if we
can structure them properly. It is also important for the two of
them to continue to talk, not only directly as during these two
days, but also in March or whenever. They could be in touch
through diplomatic channels in the meantime. The question now
was whether to announce the beginning of negotiations or to
announce another ministerial meeting. In response to Gromyko's
question of which he prefers, he would answer in typical
Washington fashion that he prefers both. He wished to point out
that for the U.S. the beginning of negotiations involves many
complications. The U.S. must decide upon a leader of the
delegation. Under the structure poposed by the Soviets, who
would be the leader of the leaders? The U.S. choice would be
affected by what is intended for the negotiations. On the
question of intermediate-range forces, Ambassador Nitze, who led
similar negotiations in the past, prefers not to continue in this
duty, although he had promised to stay on as the Secretary's left
or right-hand man [Ambassador Nitze was sitting to the
Secretary's left]. So another person must be found to take his
place. The U.S. must prepare itself for the negotiations because
they are new and embody changes. This cannot be done instantly
because a position must be developed in order to be ready for the
talks. The Secretary thought that early March might be a little
too early. All this must be taken into account if the talks are
to begin, and it is best to say so now. This merely emphasizes
the importance of further discussions at the ministerial level.
Gromyko said that a clear statement is needed to resolve these
questions, yet the Secretary had not yet made such a statement.
Does he accept that the date of negotiations will be settled
through diplomatic channels? This afternoon the Secretary had
remarked that he was puzzled by the Soviet draft. What in it was
puzzling?
The Secretary replied that he was perplexed by the second Soviet
draft, not the first. He was prepared to take the first draft as
a framework and work through it. He was prepared to say that the
time and place of negotiations will be agreed by diplomatic
channels, although if we can set it ourselves, this would be
preferable. He thought a few things in the draft could be
changed or added to. At the same time, he thought the statement
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 12 -
23
could say that he and Gromyko had agreed to another meeting in
March.
Gromyko said that Shultz had still not expressed himself clearly.
The Soviet draft was drawn up taking account of the U.S.
position, and if it is accepted, the question of a ministerial
meeting is no longer urgent. The Soviet side had put a reference
to another ministerial meeting in the second text because the
U.S. had not agreed to their morning text. Reference to the
ministerial meeting could be pigeon-holed. Gromyko understood
that the Secretary was hesitating between the two texts. In one
text the idea is clearly stated that negotiations will begin. If
another meeting between them should be necessary, there would be
no problem -- they can meet. World public opinion would be
favorable to such a meeting. In fact, if such a meeting were
announced, the U.S. delegation would probably be met with flags
at the airport when it returned home.
The Secretary replied that first we must accomplish this between
us and then the world could learn about it. He said he liked the
implication in the first text that we have agreed to begin
negotiations. While the structure of the Soviet text is
acceptable to the U.S., there are a few aspects we wish to
change. Although he could not accept the text in its present
form, it deserves discussion. At the same time, with or without
this text, a further meeting between the ministers would be
useful because there is much to discuss, and not only questions
related to arms.
Gromyko said he was alarmed by the Secretary's statement that he
wished to make some changes.
The Secretary asked if Gromyko really expected him to accept the
Soviet text without comment.
Gromyko replied that the text had been drafted after yesterday's
meeting, taking into account the remarks Secretary Shultz had
made.
The Secretary said that his delegation had also drafted its text
taking into account what Gromyko had said both yesterday and
during his trip to Washington. They had tried to reflect in its
text the views Gromyko had expressed.
Gromyko stated that everything he had said is based on the text
the Soviet side had drawn up. He did not know what the Secretary
might suggest now; perhaps the Secretary would make him want to
hang the whole thing up.
The Secretary asked whether Gromyko was interested in discussing
this or not. He would assume that he was. He suggested going
through the text to determine what could be done to make it
acceptable to the U.S.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 13 -
24
Gromyko suggested that the two delegations part for a few minutes
to review the text.
The Secretary agreed and the U.S. delegation left the room at
5:50 p.m.
*******
At 6:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.
The Secretary explained that the first and second paragraphs of
the Soviet text are acceptable as they stand. In the third
paragraph the U.S. wishes to drop the reference to strategic and
medium-range arms. It proposes a paragraph reading as follows:
"The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a
complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms, with all
these questions considered and resolved in their interrelation-
ship."
Secretary Shultz proposed several additions to the fourth
paragraph, which would read as follows: "The objective of the
negotiations will be to work out effective agreements by a
delegation divided into three negotiating groups, aimed at
preventing an arms race on earth and in space, limiting and
reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability."
He explained that here he had added a reference to the three
groups, and clarified that the arms race meant on earth as well
as in space.
Secretary Shultz said that the fifth paragraph of the Soviet
draft would remain unchanged, although linguistically speaking,
it did not read smoothly. He thought this was not worth arguing
over. The final paragraph was acceptable as written. He thought
if the sides could agree to fix the time and place of the negotia-
tions, this would be desirable, but he would not insist on it.
Gromyko requested another break in order to examine the proposed
U.S. changes.
The U.S. delegation left the room at 6:35 p.m.
*******
At 7:00 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.
Gromyko remarked that some of the suggested changes were
acceptable and some were not. The first paragraph was as solid
as granite, and the second paragraph was also unchanged. He
proposed that the third paragraph read as follows: "The sides
agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of
questions concerning space and nuclear arms -- both strategic and
medium-range -- with all these questions considered and resolved
in their interrelationship."
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 14 -
25
Gromyko also proposed an amended version of the fourth paragraph:
"The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective
agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and termi-
nating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at
strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be con-
ducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups.
"
By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an
arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore
we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as
yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one
there. He said the Soviet side accepts the U.S. idea of
referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers
to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the
statement stand unchanged.
The Secretary said this version of the text sounds reasonable,
but he would like to caucus once again to look it over.
The U.S. delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out,
Mr. McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about
the meaning of space arms (reported below).
*
The U.S. delegation returned at 7:22 p.m.
The Secretary asked Mr. McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had
had with Karpov so that he could make sure it represented the
Soviet view.
Mr. McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text,
which states that "the sides agree that the subject of the
negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and
nuclear arms.' When referring to space arms, McFarlane
inquired, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that
attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that
attack targets on earth?
Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When
referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space
weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to
attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the
air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant,
although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that
this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM
systems.
McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space objects
include weapons which attack ballistic missile systems. Do the
"corresponding ABM systems" to which Gromyko had referred include
those ABM systems covered by the ABM Treaty?
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
26
- 15 -
Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems
permitted by the ABM Treaty.
McFarlane asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons
which are within this meaning.
Gromyko answered: "It is exactly as I said -- I cannot add or
subtract anything else.' "
McFarlane said in that case the ABM system around Moscow is a
space weapon.
The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He then
made a suggestion for the third paragraph that would stress this
concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a clari-
fying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of the
paragraph would read as it stands.
Gromyko objected to this, saying that this would lead them into a
jungle. Why mention targeting and why complicate the issue?
What is unclear about this sentence? Why complicate an already
clear sentence?
The Secretary wished to clarify another point. This paragraph
also contains a reference to medium-range arms. As he understood
it, the Soviet draft would say "medium-range arms" and the U.S.
draft would say "intermediate-range arms."
Gromyko confirmed this, saying it was fine with him. Both the
U.S. and Soviet sides are accustomed to certain specific
parameters agreed on long ago. These parameters define those
arms that are considered strategic, as well as where tactical
arms end and medium-range arms begin. Everything here is
mathematically precise.
The Secretary repeated that the U.S. would say "intermediate-
range" and the Soviet side would say "medium-range." He had one
more point to bring up. The U.S. side suggests that the fourth
paragraph of the text be amended to read "agreements aimed at
preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth by
limiting and reducing nuclear arms. The word "by" is the change
suggested here.
Gromyko objected that this would worsen the paragraph and change
its meaning. Neither side needed this change.
The Secretary replied that it was not a big point, but it did
explain how the sides would end the arms race -- by limiting and
reducing nuclear arms.
Gromyko again objected that this was a worse solution, and Sec-
retary Shultz agreed to drop it. Although he believed his
wording made the point more powerful, he would agree to leave the
paragraph as it stands.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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21
- 16 -
Gromyko wondered if the Secretary had found any other "heresy" in
the Soviet draft.
The Secretary replied that he had found no heresy he was willing
to disclose to Gromyko. He would now have a clean copy of the
text typed up in English.
While the text was being typed, there was discussion of the time
the joint statement would be released.
Gromvko asked that it be released at midnight Geneva time because
of the time difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
The announcement would not get into Soviet media until tomorrow,
but it would make the news in the U.S. today. Gromyko said that
Shultz would have something to announce even if he did not read
the statement -- he could announce that a statement had been
agreed upon.
Secretary Shultz said that he would appear at a press conference
this evening, and that he would be too sleepy to answer questions
if he waited until midnight. He thought even 10:00 P.M. was
late. It. is possible to embargo the announcement, but on such a
big story he doubted the embargo would be observed.
Gromyko pressed Shultz repeatedly not to make the announcement
before midnight.
Secretary Shultz suggested a compromise of 11 p.m. Gromyko
accepted, saying that the U.S. side wants the Soviet side to meet
it more than half way. Shultz replied that Gromyko drives a very
hard bargain.
When the clean copy of the joint statement arrived, the Secretary
gave it to Gromyko.
Before departing, Gromyko expressed his satisfaction with the
frank and business-like atmosphere that had prevailed at these
discussions.
Secretary Shultz, in his turn, thanked Gromyko for his kind words
and said he appreciated the cordial discussions that had taken
place. Gromyko had used the word "useful" in earlier remarks,
and Shultz thought this word could be applied here too.
The meeting ended at 7:55 p.m.
Drafted by: Carolyn Smith; J.F. Matlock
SECRET,
28
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90075 add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
February 11, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
RCM HAS SEEN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Aam As
SIGNED
SUBJECT:
GENEVA MEMCONS
Regarding page 14 of Tab D, the interpreter's record (attached)
reads essentially as I had in the record.
I recorded the sentence myself -- I thought at the time --
verbatim. My notes read as follows:
"When you refer to space arms, do you intend to encompass systems
on earth which attack targets in space, as well as systems in
space which attack targets on earth?"
Paul Nitze was also taking notes and provided me with his mark-up
of the interpreter's text. He did not note an alteration here.
However, I can check with him directly if you wish.
I am sensitive to the point here, and don't believe I would have
missed the qualifier -- though that is always possible when the
conversation is flowing rapidly.
Attachment: Page 14 of interpreter's record
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M09-266#6952
BY RW NARA DATE 6/22/11
SECRET/SENSITIVE
a
14
Interpriter's record
By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not
prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and
therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since
there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try
to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the US
idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but
it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two
paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.
Shultz said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but
he would like to caucus once again to look it over. The US
delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, National
Security Advisor McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador
Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).
The US delegation returned at 7:22 p.m. Shultz asked
McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that
the US side could confirm this conversation.
McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet
text, which states that "the sides agree that the subject of
the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning
space and nuclear arms...". When referring to space arms,
McFarlane wondered, does the Soviet side include land-based
systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based
systems that attack targets on earth?
Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday.
When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means
space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are
designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space
objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is
what is meant, although it is expressed more economically.
Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and
corresponding ABM systems.
McFarlane said that land-based systems that attack space
objects include weapons which attack ABM systems. Are the
"corresponding ABM systems" Gromyko referred to ABM systems
within the meaning of the ABM Treaty?
Gromyko replied that this applies not only to the systems
permitted by the ABM Treaty. McFarlane asked whether Gromyko
calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning.
Gromyko answered: "It is exactly as I said -- I cannot add or
subtract anything else." McFarlane said that he assumed
Gromyko's answer is yes and that the ABM system around Moscow
is considered a space weapon.
Shultz thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He had a
suggestion to make for the third paragraph that would stress
this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a
clarifying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of
the paragraph would read as it stands.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
30
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90075
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET SENSITIVE
January 24, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 9am
SUBJECT:
Records of Shultz-Gromyko Meetings in Geneva,
January 7-8, 1985
Attached at Tabs A, B, C and D are the edited memoranda of
conversation covering the Geneva meetings.
You may wish to review in particular pages 8 and 9 of the record
of the second meeting (Tab B), and pages 14 and 15 of the record
of the fourth meeting (Tab D).
Please let me know if you detect any inaccuracy in the memoranda
so corrections can be entered before they are placed in the
permanent record.
At Tab I is a Kimmitt-Platt memorandum to transmit the records to
State when they are approved.
Recommendation:
That you authorize transmission of the Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
at Tab I.
Approve REM
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Platt Memorandum
Tab A - First Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
Tab B - Second Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
Tab C - Third Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
Tab D - Fourth Shultz-Gromyko Meeting
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CAS
NARA, Date 6/14/02
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
The President has seen
MLS F06-114/2*6953
90240 SYSTEM 31,
BY
LOI NARA, DATE 11/21/07
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADD-ON
JM-C
WASHINGTON
SECRET
March 6, 1985
MEETING WITH POLITBURO MEMBER SHCHERBITSKY
PR
DATE:
March 7, 1985
LOCATION:
Oval Office
TIME:
3:00 P.M.
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE PCM
I.
PURPOSE:
To explain your approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.
II.
BACKGROUND:
Shcherbitsky is visiting the U.S. as head of a Soviet
"parliamentary" delegation. His presence provides an
opportunity to convey your position on key issues to the
Soviet leadership.
III. PARTICIPANTS:
United States:
The President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Krichand NSC Burt, Assistant state scoutary)
Regan
Jack F. Matlock,
Mr MMichael Dearer
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
Address Danil MURPHLY Chref or steff
USSR:
Richard BuRT
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter
IV. PRESS PLAN:
Photo opportunity.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
3:00-3:10
-
Photo opportunity - Oval Office
3:10-3:40
-
Discussion
Presentation of your views to Shcherbitsky, followed by his
comment.
Attachments:
Tab A
Talking Points & Bio
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
SECRET
CC VP : Regan: Deaver: Sims
SECRET The
President has seen
32
DECLASSIFIED F06-114/2#6954
SYSTEM
II
NLS NARA. DATE 11/21/07
90240
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 5, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE
pr
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE Ray
SUBJECT:
Politburo Member Shcherbitsky's Visit to the U.S.
You will be meeting Thursday with Soviet Politburo Member
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who is in the U.S. this week as head of a
Soviet "parliamentary" delegation. I will be forwarding
suggested talking points shortly, but thought that you might want
to have some information in advance regarding how this visit fits
into the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Background
The Soviets responded a few weeks ago to an invitation issued in
Tip O'Neill's name by Tom Foley and Dick Cheney when they visited
Moscow the summer of 1983. (You will recall that they briefed
you on their trip following their return to Washington.)
Therefore, the Soviets picked the time for the visit, and also
decided that it would be, in Soviet terms, a high-level one by
selecting a full Politburo member to head it.
The Soviet decision to send the delegation to the U.S. at this
time was an important one. Several factors probably entered into
this decision:
(1) A desire to symbolize the intensification of contacts
with the U.S., following the "freeze" of much of last year;
(2) A desire to influence American public opinion, and
especially Congress, as negotiations at Geneva are about to begin
and as Congress debates our defense modernization program;
(3) The felt need for a political "reconnaissance mission"
at a high level and outside formal Foreign Ministry channels; and
(4) Perhaps -- on the part of some Soviet officials -- a
desire to expose one of their more provincial and reputedly hard-
line Politburo members to realities in the United States.
The fact that this decision was made despite ongoing leadership
uncertainty in Moscow is interesting in itself. Given
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify: on OADR
SECRET
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
SECRET
33
Chernenko's parlous health, full Politburo members, aside from
Gromyko who must continue to function as Foreign Minister, might
be expected to limit their foreign travel unless the question of
succession has been decided in principle. I would consider the
decision to send Shcherbitsky here for ten days as tending to
corroborate reports that a decision has been made on the
succession -- or that medical advice is that Chernenko is likely
to hang on for at least a month or so.
Discussion
Although one of the Soviet objectives is doubtless to influence
Congress and our public opinion, I do not believe that this group
will be notably effective on that score. Shcherbitsky has none
of the charm and PR skill that Gorbachev used to such good
advantage in the UK last December.
I believe that we can make best use of this visit by seeing to it
that Shcherbitsky receives an accurate impression of our strength
and resolve, and at the same time, of our desire to move
decisively to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and to forge a
better working relationship with the Soviets. The visits the
Congressional hosts have planned for the delegation to California
and Texas should do a lot to impress the provincial Shcherbitsky
with our basic economic, social and political health. No Soviet
official comes back from such exposure to the U.S. without being
shaken by the palpable evidence of U.S. strength and well being.
This being the case, I believe that you should devote the thirty
minutes you have available for your meeting with Shcherbitsky to
driving home some of the points you made to Gromyko last
September. Specifically, I believe you should concentrate on the
following themes:
-- Your desire to move toward a radical reduction in
offensive nuclear weapons;
-- Your determination to keep U.S. defenses adequate and
specifically to continue present programs until there is a fair
agreement to limit them;
-- The fallacy of the Soviet attack on SDI research, making
plain that the current Soviet ploy will fail;
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
SECRET
34
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
-- The reasons we are concerned with the Soviet military
build-up and in particular with the problem posed by their prompt
hard-target kill capability, which suggests a first-strike
strategy; and
-- The necessity for improvements in the human rights
situation if relations in general are to improve.
I will soon be sending you suggested talking points along these
lines, but in the meantime you may wish to scan the CIA study
"What to Expect from Shcherbitsky" at Tab A, and the biography of
Shcherbitsky at Tab B.
Attachments:
Tab A - "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky"
Tab B
-
Biography of Shcherbitsky
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
CC: Vice President
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
6955
S
35
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90240
ADD-ON
JFMQ3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
March 6, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 1pm
SUBJECT:
Meeting Memorandum for Shcherbitsky
Attached at Tab I and Tab A are the Meeting Memorandum and
Talking Points for the President's meeting with Shcherbitsky.
Since there is no pre-brief, you might wish to discuss the
meeting with the President at your 9:30 meeting tomorrow. Since
it is important for Shcherbitsky to hear and carry back to Moscow
the President's views on the key issues, I believe the President
should present these views at the beginning of the meeting, as he
did with Gromyko last September.
I have tried to keep the talking points as brief as possible,
given the importance of the issues. Since these are all issues
with which the President is thoroughly familiar, I hope this will
present no problem. I have tried to cast them in a friendly and
forthcoming tone, while keeping a firm attitude on substance and
not shirking mention of problems.
The essential elements, I believe, are the following:
-- Commitment to radical reductions of offensive. weapons;
-- Explanation of SDI position;
-- Concern with Soviet military build-up;
-- Mention of regional issues and human rights;
-- Reference to wartime collaboration and Soviet sacrifices;
-- Desire to solve problems on basis of equality.
win
Bill Martin concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I and the Talking
Points at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Meeting Memorandum
Tab A
Talking Points & Bio
Tab II
Clearance List
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR M266 6955
Declassify: on OADR
BY KML NARA DATE 3/27/12
DECLASSIFIED
NLS
F06-114/2#6956
SYSTEM II
30
LOT NARA, DATE 11/21/07
90240
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADD-ON
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH POLITBURO MEMBER SHCHERBITSKY
DATE:
March 7, 1985
LOCATION:
Oval Office
TIME:
3:00 P.M.
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE
I. PURPOSE:
To explain your approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.
II. BACKGROUND:
Shcherbitsky is visiting the U.S. as head of a Soviet
"parliamentary" delegation. His presence provides an
opportunity to convey your position on key issues to the
Soviet leadership.
III. PARTICIPANTS:
United States:
The President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
USSR:
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter
IV. PRESS PLAN:
Photo opportunity.
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
3:00-3:10 - Photo opportunity Oval Office
3:10-3:40 - Discussion
Presentation of your views to Shcherbitsky, followed by his
comment.
Attachments:
Tab A
Talking Points & Bio
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Decassifye OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/2 #6957
SYSTEM II
37
90240
HJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
ADD-ON
TALKING POINTS
Introductory
-- Welcome you to Washington. Happy you will see California and
Texas.
-- Convey my personal regards to Chairman Chernenko and to your
other Politburo colleagues.
-- As I told Gromyko in September, we want to improve relations.
It is particularly urgent to get the high levels of nuclear
weapons down, and get on a course toward their complete elimina-
tion.
-- But this can only be done if we face the problems realistically
and frankly.
-- Since our time is short, let me tell you how I view the
situation. I hope you will let your colleagues on the Politburo
know what I have in mind.
Geneva Negotiations
-- We both recognize that, even though our systems and political
beliefs are different, we both have a vital interest in reducing
the threat of nuclear war.
38
2
-- We are both committed to starting on a path of radical reduc-
tion of nuclear weapons. I take this commitment seriously, and
hope you do too.
-- I am pleased that we will be starting new negotiations in
Geneva next week.
-- Our negotiators will make every effort to reach an agreement
for radical reductions in offensive weapons. If yours have com-
parable instructions, we should be able to make rapid progress.
SDI
-- Must say that I am concerned with the way Soviet media are
casting suspicion on our approach to the Geneva talks.
-- In particular, we see an effort to distort our defensive
research program and must wonder if you are trying to create a
pretext to avoid implementing the goal of reducing offensive
weapons.
3
39
-- Your country has devoted much more effort to defensive systems
than we have. You have been conducting research for years in the
same areas we are. Yours is the only country to deploy an ABM
system.
-- It is natural, therefore, for us to conduct research in this
area as well.
-- In fact, there are sound reasons for both of us to examine the
future potential of defensive technologies. If we continue to
rely on offensive weapons alone to provide strategic balance, we
will find that new technologies will make that increasingly
difficult.
-- There are also moral reasons for exploring the potential for
defensive technologies. No leader should have to defend his
country by threatening to destroy millions of innocent people.
-- As far as the U.S. is concerned, we have absolutely no
aggressive intent toward the Soviet Union and do not aspire to
superiority or to a first-strike capability.
-- There are, however, many aspects of Soviet strategic weaponry
which suggest that you may wish to preserve that capability. If
that is in fact the case, then agreement between us will of
course be impossible.
40
4
-- Nevertheless, we are committed to adhere to the ABM Treaty.
Our research effort is in full accord with it, and we are com-
mitted to consult with you if new forms of strategic defense
become feasible.
-- We look forward to discussing these matters with you in
Geneva. We are willing to take your concerns into account, but
you must also be prepared to understand ours.
Other Issues
-- Arms control is not the only problem we face. We need to try
to make progress across the board in improving the relationship.
-- Frankly, we believe that your policies in a number of critical
regions are designed more to fuel conflict than to bring about
the peaceful resolution of disputes.
-- For example, we are concerned that last year you doubled the
amount of arms you shipped to Nicaragua over the 1983 level. And
the war goes on in Afghanistan with great human suffering.
-- We must find ways to move toward a world where such disputes
can be settled peacefully. That is why we have proposed holding
regular consultations on world problems.
5
41
-- In our bilateral relations, much can be done to improve the
relationship.
-- We would like to see expanding trade, increased contacts and a
more healthy dialogue.
-- In this connection, I cannot stress too much how important
humanitarian issues are to the American people.
-- We are a nation of immigrants, with people from all over the
world, so naturally our people take an interest in what happens
in the home countries of their ancestors.
-- We take our obligations under the Helsinki Final Act seriously
and expect other signatories to do the same.
-- I am sure members of Congress have let you know how they feel
on these issues. I feel the same.
-- I would hope that you would give careful consideration to
these concerns. If we are to improve our relationship signifi-
cantly, our citizens must be convinced that the Soviet government
lives up to its commitments in this area, and in others as well.
42
6
Conclusion
-- Have explained some of our concerns with Soviet actions and
policies since we must be frank with each other if we are to
solve the problems.
-- At the same time, I want you to know that we are aware of the
suffering wars have brought to your people in the past -- and of
our successful cooperation in World War II in defeating a common
enemy.
-- If our children and grandchildren are to live in peace, we
must learn to stress our common interests and work toward solving
these problems.
-- We are committed to solving as many problems as we can. Want
to deal with your government realistically, as equals. Seek no
advantage.
-- Please take this message back to your colleagues.
-- Hope your visit is a pleasant one, and that we will see more
of your colleagues in the United States in the months to come.
43
MEETING WITH VLADIMIR SHCHERBITSKY
-- WELCOME. PERSONAL REGARDS TO CHERNENKO.
-- WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND GET THE HIGH
LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOWN.
-- NEED TO FACE PROBLEMS REALISTICALLY AND
FRANKLY.
-- WE BOTH HAVE VITAL INTEREST IN REDUCING THREAT
OF NUCLEAR WAR.
-- I TAKE THIS COMMITMENT TO REDUCE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS SERIOUSLY, AND HOPE YOU DO TOO.
2
PLEASED THAT WE WILL BE STARTING NEW
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA NEXT WEEK.
-- OUR NEGOTIATORS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH
LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07
AGREEMENT. IF YOURS MAKE SAME EFFORT, WE SHOULD BE
ABLE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS.
CONCERNED WITH WAY SOVIET MEDIA ARE CASTING
SUSPICION ON OUR APPROACH TO GENEVA.
-- IN PARTICULAR, WE SEE EFFORT TO DISTORT OUR
DEFENSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM AND MUST WONDER IF YOU
ARE TRYING TO CREATE A PRETEXT TO AVOID IMPLE-
MENTING THE GOAL OF REDUCING OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.
5TIN
3
-- YOU DEVOTE MORE EFFORT TO DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
THAN WE. YOU HAVE BEEN CONDUCTING RESEARCH FOR
YEARS IN THE SAME AREAS. YOURS IS THE ONLY COUNTRY
TO DEPLOY AN ABM SYSTEM.
-- NATURAL FOR US TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN THIS AREA
AS WELL.
-- SOUND REASONS FOR BOTH OF US TO EXAMINE FUTURE
POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES. NEW OFFENSIVE
TECHNOLOGIES WILL MAKE DETERRENCE INCREASINGLY
DIFFICULT IN FUTURE.
-- ALSO MORAL REASONS: NO LEADER SHOULD HAVE TO
DEFEND HIS COUNTRY BY THREATENING TO DESTROY
INNOCENT PEOPLE.
4
-- U.S. HAS ABSOLUTELY NO AGGRESSIVE INTENT TOWARD
THE SOVIET UNION AND DOES NOT ASPIRE TO
SUPERIORITY OR TO FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY.
44
-- MANY ASPECTS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONRY
SUGGEST THAT YOU MAY WISH TO PRESERVE THAT
CAPABILITY. IF THAT IS IN FACT THE CASE, THEN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.
-- U.S. IS COMMITTED TO ADHERE TO THE ABM TREATY
AND TO CONSULT WITH YOU IF NEW FORMS OF STRATEGIC
DEFENSE BECOME FEASIBLE.
-- WILLING TO TAKE YOUR CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT AT
GENEVA, BUT YOU MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO
UNDERSTAND OURS.
5
-- ARMS CONTROL IS NOT OUR ONLY PROBLEM. NEED
FOR PROGRESS ACROSS THE BOARD.
-- BELIEVE SOVIET POLICIES IN CRITICAL REGIONS
ARE DESIGNED MORE TO FUEL CONFLICT THAN TO BRING
PEACE.
-- CONCERNED THAT LAST YEAR SOVIET UNION DOUBLED
THE AMOUNT OF ARMS SHIPPED TO NICARAGUA OVER THE
1983 LEVEL. WAR GOES ON IN AFGHANISTAN WITH GREAT
HUMAN SUFFERING.
-- MUST FIND WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLE-
MENTS. WE HAVE PROPOSED REGULAR CONSULTATIONS.
6
-- IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, MUCH CAN BE DONE TO
IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP.
-- WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND TRADE, INCREASE CONTACTS
AND ESTABLISH MORE HEALTHY DIALOGUE.
-- IMPORTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.
-- WE ARE NATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND OUR PEOPLE TAK
AN INTEREST IN WHAT HAPPENS IN HOME COUNTRIES OF
THEIR ANCESTORS.
-- WE TAKE OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI
FINAL ACT SERIOUSLY. EXPECT OTHER SIGNATORIES TO
DO SAME.
7
-- SURE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE LET YOU KNOW HOW
THEY FEEL. I FEEL THE SAME.
-- HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
TO THESE CONCERNS. IF WE ARE TO IMPROVE OUR
RELATIONSHIP, AMERICANS MUST BE CONVINCED THAT
SOVIET GOVERNMENT LIVES UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS.
-- HAVE EXPLAINED SOME OF OUR CONCERNS SINCE WE
MUST BE FRANK IF WE ARE TO SOLVE PROBLEMS.
-- AT SAME TIME, WE ARE AWARE OF SUFFERING WARS
HAVE BROUGHT TO SOVIET PROPLE IN THE PAST -- AND
ARE PROUD OF OUR SUCCESSFUL COOPERATION IN WORLD
WAR II.
8
-- IF OUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN ARE TO LIVE
IN PEACE, WE MUST LEARN TO STRESS COMMON INTEREST
AND WORK TOWARD SOLVING PROBLEMS.
-- U.S. IS COMMITTED TO SOLVING AS MANY PROBLEMS
AS WE CAN. WANT TO DEAL WITH SOVIET GOVERNMENT
REALISTICALLY, AS EQUALS. SEEK NO ADVANTAGE.
-- PLEASE TAKE THIS MESSAGE BACK TO YOUR
COLLEAGUES.
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
47
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Please admit the following appointments on
March 7
, 19 85
for THE PRESIDENT
of
:
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
U.S.
The President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Jack F. Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter
Richard BURT
USSR
Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter
MEETING LOCATION
Building West Wing
Jack F. Matlock/Stella Brackm
Requested by
Room No Oval Office/Cab.Rm.
Room No 368 Telephone
395-5112
Time of Meeting
3:00
Date of request
March 6, 1985
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (05-78)
JM-C
1821
48
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
UNCLASSIFIED
March 6, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 48
SUBJECT:
Kettering Invitation
I would put it in the "nice to do," but not essential category.
It would, however, be useful to have at least one NSC staffer
present.
Steve SRS Sestanovich, Constantine Menges and Oliver or North concur.
not available
RECOMMENDATION
That you appoint a member from the NSC staff to attend.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab A
Letter from Kettering Foundation
49
1821
444 North Capitol Street, N.W.
5335 Far Hills Avenue
6 East 39th Street
Suite 408
Suite 300
(9th Floor)
Washington, D. C. 20001
Dayton, Ohio 45429
New York, NY 10016
202-393-4478
513-434-7300
212-686-7016
Kettering
Foundation
March 1, 1985
Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt
General Counsel and Director of Legislative
Affairs and Security Assistance
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
OEOB, Room 372
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. Kimmitt:
The Dartmouth Conference Task Force on Regional Conflict Management has been
invited to Moscow in April for discussions on Central America and the Caribbean. The
American participants include William D. Rogers, Susan Purcell, Harold Saunders,
Robert Leiken and Philip Stewart.
Prior to the trip, we are holding a discussion with a few interested and knowledge-
able colleagues on topics related to this upcoming Soviet trip. We would be most pleased
if you would join us.
We will meet on Wednesday, March 13, 1985 at 11:30 A.M. and will break promptly at
2:30 P.M. Discussion will continue through a working lunch which we will provide. The
meeting will take place at the Washington Office of the Kettering Foundation, Suite 408,
Hall of States Building, 444 No. Capitol Street, N.W. If you will be able to join us,
please confirm with Shelly Weinstein, the Director of the Washington Office. She can be
reached at 202/393-4478.
We would like to have prospectuses on such questions as: 1) the main trends in and
around Nicaragua and El Salvador; 2) significant directions in Cuba's role in the region
and relation to the Soviet Union; 3) the impact of events in Central America on the broader
US-Soviet relationship; 4) aspects of the Central and Latin American debt crises that
might be productively discussed with Soviet colleagues.
We plan a follow-up seminar after the Moscow meeting and hope that you will be able
to join us for both of these discussions.
Sincerely yours,
Phul Stewart
Hal Saunders
Phil Stewart mm Hal Saunders mm
4
1625 (Add On)
MEMORANDUM
chin
50
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
March 6, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
STEVEN E. STEINER
steve
SUBJECT:
Presidential Sendoff for Geneva Negotiators,
March 8, 10:00 a.m., Oval Office and Rose
Garden
At Tab I for your approval is the meeting memorandum for the
President's sendoff for Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and
Glitman. We have set this up as a ten-minute private meeting
in the Oval Office with the three Ambassadors, followed by
remarks to the press in the Rose Garden (Roosevelt Room in
case of rain).
The proposed Presidential remarks are at Tab II. We received
Mark Palmer's contribution and worked with Speechwriters and
NSC Staffers to develop this agreed text. Once you have
approved, the final will be submitted to the President through
the Speechwriters' channel.
Bob Linhard, Sven Kraemer, Walt Raymond, Bob Sims and Karna
SES
Small concur.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
2) That you approve the text at Tab II so that I can convey
final NSC concurrence to Speechwriters.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to the President
Tab II
Proposed Presidential Remarks
1625
51
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING WITH SENIOR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS
DATE: March 8, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office and Rose Garden
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m.
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE
I.
PURPOSE
To give a sendoff to our negotiators and to reiter-
ate your commitment to try to achieve progress in
the new U.S.-Soviet negotiations.
II.
BACKGROUND
Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman leave for
Europe later the same day, first to brief NATO on
March 11 and then to begin the new talks with the
Soviets in Geneva on March 12. Your private meeting
will allow you to put a final touch on your instruc-
tions to them. Your remarks in the Rose Garden
following the meeting will provide an excellent
opportunity to put your own public spin on our
negotiating objectives by giving them a high moral
cast. (I will follow up by providing some more
specifics at my press briefing Friday afternoon.)
III.
PARTICIPANTS
Robert C. McFarlane, Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower
and Glitman.
IV.
PRESS PLAN
Ovál Office meeting is private. Full press coverage
of Rose Garden remarks.
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Our three senior negotiators, along with Secretaries
Shultz and Weinberger, will take part in your
Congressional breakfast, following which you will
escort them to the Oval Office for a 10-minute,
private meeting. The three negotiators will then
join you at the podium in the Rose Garden, where you
will give brief remarks to the press. Our full
delegation will be gathered in the Rose Garden. (In
case of inclement weather, remarks will be given in
the Roosevelt Room.) Proposed remarks will be
provided separately.
Prepared by:
Steven E. Steiner
(State/NSC)
March 6, 1985
7:00 p.m.
52
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT: SEND-OFF FOR U.S. NEGOTIATORS
FRIDAY, MARCH 8, 1985
The challenge of statesmanship is to have the vision to
dream of a better, safer world and the courage, persistence and
patience to turn that dream into reality. Since the dawn of the
nuclear era, each generation has lived with the reality of
nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear devastation. We face a
moral imperative -- we cannot allow our children and their
children to grow up with the fear of nuclear war.
Today we reaffirm a new vision -- of a world striving toward
the elimination of nuclear weapons, of a world in which
technology provides ever greater safety, rather than ever greater
fear. Today we set out on a new path -- toward agreements which
radically reduce the size and destructive power of existing
nuclear arsenals.
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko said last month: "Our
ultimate objective here is the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons everywhere on this planet, the complete removal of the
threat of nuclear war." I welcome that statement and assure
Mr. Chernenko that the elimination of nuclear weapons is also the
ultimate objective of the American Government and the American
people.
It is now our task and responsibility to take practical
steps to turn this vision into reality. We should have no
illusions that this will be easy. Any venture of this magnitude
will take time. Since the most vital security interests of both
II
Page 2
53
sides are at stake, this will clearly be long and difficult. And
- we are realistic, because we know that our differences with the
Soviet Union are great. Patience, strength, and Western unity
will therefore be required if we are to have a successful
outcome.
Next week, the United States and the Soviet Union meet in
Geneva to begin a new dialogue on these vital issues. For our
part, the United States is ready -- with firmness, patience, and
understanding -- to negotiate fair and equitable agreements
reducing the dangers of nuclear war and enhancing strategic
stability. And, above all, we seek agreement as soon as possible
on real and verifiable reductions in American and Soviet
offensive nuclear arms.
I have just concluded a very good meeting with our three
negotiators -- Ambassadors Max M. Kampelman, John Tower, and
Mike Glitman -- which culminates an intensive round of
preparations. In the meeting, I gave my instructions for the
first round of the talks. These instructions enable our
negotiators to explore every promising avenue for progress. The
negotiators have my strongest personal support. Like Americans
everywhere, I want these negotiations to succeed. I will do
everything I can to ensure that this happens, and I pray that the
Soviet leadership is prepared to make the same commitment.
I want to thank our team for the fine work you have already
done in getting ready for this endeavor. And, as you prepare to
leave for Geneva, I cannot think of a more welcome message than
Page 3
54
an unmistakable vote of confidence from the American people and
the Congress.
Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman, and all the
members of our negotiating team, I know that all of our fellow
Americans wish you every success. And I know from my
conversations with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress that
the Congress of the United States joins in supporting you.
So, to all of you -- those who will be in Geneva, and those
who will be supporting this crucial effort from Washington --
best wishes and God bless you.