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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron October 1985 (3)
Box: 12
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/12/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (3/12)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
12
YARHI-MILO
1201
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7884 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
2
ND
B1
PAPERS ON THE SOVIET UNION:
GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA
R 8/17/2011 M125/2
7885 PAPER
ORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA
4
ND
B1
PAR 8/17/2011 M125/2
7886 PAPER
THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN PERSPECTIVE
6
ND
B3
PAR 4/13/2011 F2006-114/3
7887 PAPER
USSR: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE IN
9
ND
B3
THE ECONOMY
PAR 4/13/2011
F2006-114/3
7888 MEMO
MATLOCK TO BUCHANAN RE ANATOLY
1 10/7/1985 B1
MICHELSON
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
matlock
7309 1
FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 5, 1985
Dear Professor Johnston:
Many thanks for your expression of
support for my August 19 Santa Barbara speech.
It is particularly gratifying to know that
people in the academic community will be
following up on the themes of that speech.
I also enjoyed reading your column from
the Roanoke Times and World News on Nicaragua.
It is precisely this kind of support that
enables us to pursue a principled, long-term
policy in Central America.
Again, many thanks for your letter.
Sincerely,
Robert McFarlane
Professor Whittle Johnston
Woodrow Wilson Department
of Government and Foreign Affairs
232 Cabell Hall
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901
2
7309
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 2, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK for
SUBJECT:
Letter of Support for Your Santa Barbara Speech
Attached at Tab A is a response to a letter received from
Professor Whittle Johnston of the University of Virginia.
Professor Johnston wrote to you to express his support for your
August 19 Santa Barbara speech.
Ray 9ir Burghardt concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
Approve
\
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A
Response to Professor Johnston
Tab B
Letter from Professor Johnston
SEP 10 1985
3
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901
TELEPHONE 804-924-3192
7309
WOODROW WILSON DEPARTMENT
9-13-85
OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
232 CABELL HALL
Sept. 6, 1985
ROMHAS SEEN
The Hon. Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. McFarlane:
I have just received from the State Department the text of
your address on August 19 in Santa Barbara. I was deeply impres-
sed by it, and encouraged that it helps set the tone for the
forthcoming Summit. I found the way you framed the central issue
particularly Valuable, i.e. "what kinds of change would do the
most to make Soviet-American relations more stable". I shall
make use of the three military and three political issues you
then discussed in my own lectures and writing on this subject.
I shall certainly have my many students read your speech. In
its directness, specificity, and strength it gives me sober
encouragement.
I have also enclosed a little piece I did some months back
in the on-going debate with the local press.
Sincerely yours,
Whitele Johnston
Whittle Johnston
Professor
Roomoke
Stop Reds in Nicaraqua
mitment to a "revolution without
caraguan freedom fighters as
By WHITTLE JOHNSTON
borders," and the most threatening
essential to avoid that involvement.
instance has been their backing of
If such indigenous forces should col-
I AM IN fundamental disagree-
violent efforts to overthrow the
lapse, however, the risk of direct
ment with the arguments expressed
democratically elected government
American involvement would sharp-
in the Roanoke Times & World-
of El Salvador.
ly increase, as Secretary Shultz
News editorial, "Nicaragua: Emo-
The Salvadoran guerrillas
made clear last Feb. 22.
tions blur facts" on April 19.
themselves have acknowledged this
Another crucial lesson we all
This opposition to the presi-
support from the Sandinistas. Under
should have learned from Vietnam
dent's policy will, I fear, do grave
Article 51 of the United Nations
is that those who rule out the role of
damage to our nation's interests.
Charter and Article 3 of the Rio
force simultaneously undercut the
Let me summarize the newspa-
Treaty, the United States was obli-
prospects for negotiation. Those
per's major points:
gated to take measures to end the
congressmen who have tied the
1. "The president is seeking au-
armed attack against El Salvador.
president's hands can expect only
thority to overthrow the govern-
Our aid to the Nicaraguan freedom
one "diplomatic" outcome: negotiat-
ment of a neighboring country with
fighters, and the mining of Nicara-
ed capitulation.
which the United States is not at
gua's harbors, is in accord with
With regard to Argument 4, the
war." The editorial describes this as
these obligations.
House of Representatives has acted
"contrary to international law, to
The political manipulation by
in accord with the advice of the
U.S. law and to our national princi-
Nicaragua of the World Court over
Roanoke Times & World-News and
ples."
the mining as a sorry instance of
said "no more." On April 24, it de-
2. The president's most recent
how the enemies of liberty may use
feated the president's proposal by
proposals are "a maneuver intended
the institutions of liberty to under-
240 to 180. On April 25 it defeated a
to gain sanction for continuing the
mine the prospects of liberty. Amer-
Republican alternative by 215 to
fighting" after 60 days. The editori-
ica could be brought before that
213. Had the two Virginia congress-
al maintains that most Latin Ameri-
court only if it voluntarily accepted
men (James Olin, D-Roanoke, and
cans see the contras as nothing
its compulsory jurisdiction. Eleven
Frederick Boucher. D-Abingdon)
more than "a surrogate U.S. force"
of the 16 justices that claimed to sit
who voted no on the second proposal
that holds no territory and has not
in judgment on the United States
supported it. it would have passed.
won "many hearts and minds out-
represented countries that, like Ni-
side the Reagan administration."
The problems our nation faces
caragua, did not themselves accept
3. Many congressmen cast wary
will not go away because we have,
such jurisdiction. To allow Nicara-
eyes on the president's proposals for
once again, found in our own sup-
gua to sue where it could not be sued
fear that the proposals could justify
posed immorality and illegality ex-
would have been a violation, not a
cuses for inaction. They will, on the
another Vietnam war.
confirmation, of the rule of law.
4. What the administration
contrary, grow and confront us in
wants to do in Nicaragua is "ill-ad-
Argument 2 omits the wide-
the future with dilemmas far more
vised, illegal and immoral;" Con-
spread evidence in support of the
difficult than those from which we
gress should say 'No more''
popular base of the contra opposi-
have sought, for the moment, to turn
tion. As one instance, many key
Argument 1 neglects the tyr-
away.
leaders of the opposition (e.g. Arturo
annical and aggressive action of the
As Undersecretary of Defense
Cruz, Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pas-
Sandinistas to which the president's
Ikle has said, the real costs of our
policy is a response. Support for the
tora) are themselves former Sandi-
inaction won't come at once, but "in
nista backers who broke with them
Nicaraguan revolution by neighbor-
two to three years, when the expan-
when the Sandinistas betrayed the
ing states and the Organization of
sionist phase begins" and Nicaragua
revolution. As another instance,
American States (OAS) in its resolu-
"tries to destroy democratic govern-
Huber Matos, a seasoned Cuban
tion of June 23, 1979. played impor-
ment in the region."
freedom fighter, recently traveled
tant parts in the overthrow of the
The real targets are likely to be
with the rebel forces in Nicaragua
Somoza regime. In return for this
Mexico and Panama, where dry tin-
and confirmed their mass populari-
support, the Sandinistas pledged to
ty. He reported that they constantly
der, inviting the match. lies in abun-
back free elections, political plural-
met farmers who wanted to join
dant supply. The stakes will be quite
ism, a mixed economy and nonalign-
different in kind from those we now
their ranks.
ment. From the moment they
confront.
acquired power, however, they have
The congressmen whose fears
At the root of the House's fail-
systematically violated all these
were cited in Argument 3 of the edi-
ure of prescription is a failure of
pledges. The persistent goal of the
torial draw precisely the wrong les-
diagnosis. Since the threat of Lenin's
president has been to hold the Sandi-
son from the Vietnam war. The
revolution was first posed in 1917,
nistas to their promises, and surely
president and his chief commanders
Americans have been of divided
this is in accord with America's
have made clear, repeatedly. their
mind on the appropriate response.
commitment to democracy and self-
concern for avoiding direct Ameri-
In World War I, House's counsel of
determination.
can military involvement in Central
patience prevailed over Lansing's
The most blatant aspect of San-
America. They see materiel and dip-
call for action, and Lenin's rule was
dinista illegality has been their com-
lomatic support to indigenous Ni-
consolidated. In World War II, Roo-
sevelt's pursuit of appeasement ov-
erruled Churchill's plea for
counterbalance, and Stalin's empire
was expanded to Eastern Europe. In
the 1970s, proponents of detente
were ascendant over advocates of
containment and the Soviet empire
- now with its own blue-water navy
- consolidated worldwide. from
Camranh Bay to South Yemen; from
Afghanistan to Nicaragua.
Unless the president is now
empowered to throw back this ag-
gression from Central America. we
shall next face it on our own bor-
ders.
Whittle Johnston, formerly
of Roanoke, is a professor at
the Woodrow Wilson
Department of Government
and Foreign Affairs at the
University of Virginia.
JMCS Jule 5
7991
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
October 7, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 65m
SUBJECT:
Papers on the Soviet Union: The Domestic Agenda
Attached is the next group of background papers for the President
on the Soviet Union. It deals with Gorbachev's domestic
agenda, particularly the economic challenges he faces.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the papers to
the President.
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve Bill Martin's sending copies of the papers to
Secretary Shultz and Don Regan.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda
Tab B
The Soviet Economy in Perspective
Tab C
USSR: The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economy
Tab II
Memorandum - Martin to Platt
Tab III
Memorandum - Martin to Chew
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By.
White House NARA, Date August 7/1/02
Guidelines,
7884
7001
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Papers on the Soviet Union: Gorbachev's Domestic
Agenda
You have previously read three groups of papers on the Soviet
Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the
problems of Soviet society, and the instruments of control. The
attached group looks at Gorbachev's domestic agenda, focusing
particularly on economic concerns.
Gorbachev's domestic priorities can roughly be divided into three
categories: consolidating his power, restoring public
confidence, and revitalizing the economy. He has moved quickly
in the first two areas, concentrating first and foremost on
getting his people in key positions. By July, after only four
months in office, he had already appointed more new people to the
Politburo than either of his two immediate predecessors. This
process is still underway.
To help restore public confidence in a leadership which had
become tainted with corruption in Brezhnev's declining years,
Gorbachev has vigorously carried on the anti-corruption drive
begun under Andropov and supplemented it with an anti-alcohol
campaign. In addition, he has carefully tailored his public
appearances and meetings with the Soviet man-in-the-street to
give the appearance of knowing and caring about the life of the
average citizen.
Revitalizing the economy may well be the toughest challenge of
them all - and if he does not succeed, he will be unable in the
long run to restore public confidence in the Soviet leadership.
Gorbachev has begun by replacing long-tenured, complacent
bureaucrats in the Party's Central Committee and in the Council
of Ministers. Only recently, on September 27, TASS announced the
removal of the Council's Chairman, Nikolay Tikhonov, and his
replacement by Gorbachev protoge Nikolay Ryzhkov.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR
BY RW NARA DATE 8/17/11
1
SECRET
Such personnel changes mean more in the Soviet context than they
would in a market economy. The Soviet economy is a centralized,
command economic system in which the Politburo acts much like the
board of directors of an enormous conglomerate. The Council of
Ministers runs a huge government bureaucracy which sets specific
output goals, determines wages and prices, allocates manpower and
regulates incentives.
Personnel changes alone, however, are not likely to revitalize an
economy plagued by low industrial productivity, declining
efficiency of investment, rising consumer expectations,
inefficient agriculture, and an outdated technological base.
Gorbachev has publicly spoken of the need to "re-equip" the
economy with technologically up-to-date machinery. This will
require sharp increases in investments in machinery production.
Gorbachev is likely to reveal further details of his economic
thinking when he unveils the 12th five year economic plan at the
Party Congress in February.
In financial terms, East-West trade is a relatively small factor
in the Soviet economy, with the notable exception of Soviet
imports of Western grain. The USSR continues to be the single
largest buyer of grain from the United States. Soviet machinery
imports, however, come largely from the East bloc, and in return
the Soviets provide Eastern Europe with raw materials,
particularly oil. The single greatest factor limiting Soviet
purchases in the West remains Moscow's chronic lack of hard
currency. Legal and illegal acquisition of advanced Western
technology, however, is critically important to modernizing the
Soviet technological base, particularly in the military area -
which traditionally has absolute precedence over civilian
industry.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you read the attached papers as
background for your upcoming meeting
with Gorbachev.
Attachments:
Tab A
Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda
Tab B
The Soviet Economy in Perspective
Tab C
USSR: The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economy
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
SECRET
7885
GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA
Since coming into office four months ago, Mikhail Gorbachev has
made rapid progress toward what historically has been every new
party chief's foremost goal--the expansion of his political
power. He is also off to an excellent start on another high
priority task--the reinvigoration of the party and state
apparatus. Much more, however, remains to be done to realize
his most difficult domestic tasks--the acceleration of Soviet
economic growth and the improvement of quality and performance
throughout the Soviet economy.
I. Expanding and Consolidating Power
Gorbachev has initially concentrated on expanding and consolidat-
ing his political power. To realize the full potential of his
office, the General Secretary must enjoy the active support of
other members of the ruling Politburo and be master of the
Secretariat, the party's principal executive agent.
In April, Gorbachev engineered the promotion of three of
his closest allies--Yegor Ligachev, Nikolay Ryzhkov, and KGB
chief Viktor Chebrikov--to full Politburo status. In July, he
ousted erstwhile rival Grigoriy Romanov from the Politburo and
Secretariat and elevated Georgian party boss Eduard Shevardnadze
to full Politburo membership. Shevardnadze was then quickly
appointed Foreign Minister. Former Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko was promoted to the largely ceremorial post of head of
state.
After only four months in office, Gorbachev has already engineered
a greater number of promotions to. 1 the Politburo than either Yuriy
Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko. He has also appointed as many
party secretaries, 2 as were named during Andropov's entire fifteen
months in office.
1
Under Andropov three officials--Geydar Aliyev, Mikhail
Solomentsev, and Vitaliy Vorotnikov--became full Politburo
members and Chebrikov was given candidate member status. There
were no promotions to the Politburo during Chernenko's tenure.
2
Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and Romanov became party secretaries
under Andropov. There were no promotions to the Secretariat
under Chernenko.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-125/2#785
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
8/17/11
SECRET
9
2
Despite this impressive display of power, there are hints that
Gorbachev does not enjoy the unqualified support of all
his Politburo colleagues. In a speech in Leningrad in May,
for example, Gorbachev criticized the Politburo for being too
timid in making a recent decision on agriculture. His criticism
suggested that he had favored a bolder approach to the question.
There also have been some unusual delays in the publication
of major Gorbachev speeches--another possible indication of
leadership disagreement. If Gorbachev's policies are indeed
encountering opposition, the remaining members of the Brezhnev
"old guard" are the most likely sources. Both former Premier
Nikolay Tikhonov and Moscow city party boss Viktor Grishin are
rumored to have opposed Gorbachev's accession to power.
II. Rebuilding Public Confidence
Rebuilding public confidence in the leadership and in officialdom
is one of Gorbachev's major objectives, and he has skillfully
tailored his public appearances and his media image to this end.
He takes great care to orchestrate his meetings with the public,
giving the appearance of knowing and caring about the life of
citizens.
In addition, he has continued Andropov's anti-corruption drive
and supplemented it with the anti-alcohol campaign.
The uniformed police have been bolstered by a new political
administration, and some 55,000 party members have been assigned
to the police. While the results cannot be measured, there is
evidence that Soviet officials are now far more careful about
bribe-taking or other illicit activities. Accounts of arrests
and massive sweeps of rural areas, however, suggest that
priority has now shifted away from corruption to the anti-alcohol
campaign. In any event, despite significant public approval
for the struggle against drinking and corruption in principle,
Gorbachev faces a long, difficult struggle before he can claim
significant results in either area.
III. Revitalizing the Economy
A. Shaking Up the Party and State Apparatus
Gorbachev has also set himself the formidable task of
reinvigorating the party and state apparatus through the
replacment of long-tenured and complacent bureaucrats, including
members of the Party's Central Committee. People on the Central
Committee occupy critical posts in the party and state machinery;
without their energetic support Gorbachev's domestic policy
initiatives would be nothing more than paper proposals.
SECRET
SECRET
During the 1970s, Brezhnev's policy of cadre stability--a
reaction to the frequent, often capricious personnel changes of
the Khrushchev years--gave the members of the Central Committee a
virtual guarantee of lifetime tenure. The resulting complacency
and inertia contributed to a decline in economic growth and a
rise in corruption.
Andropov launched a major campaign to replace incompetent and
corrupt officials. His efforts, however, were cut short by his
death. Under Chernenko, a champion of the Brezhnev old guard,
personnel turnover slowed.
Gorbachev has picked up where Andropov left off. He has already
replaced three heads of Central Committee departments, who play a
major role in overseeing domestic policy, and appointed new party
chiefs in the Georgian republic and Leningrad. The leadership of
thirteen other regional party committees has also changed
hands--more than during Chernenko's entire tenure.
Gorbachev has devoted particular effort to replacing poor
performers among economic officials in the Council of Ministers.
A deputy premier and ten ministerial-level officials have been
replaced, several after humiliating public criticism. And only
last week, on September 23, Tass announced that the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers, Nilokay Tikhonov, had resigned --
allegedly for reasons of poor health.
Still, some of the most powerful bureaucratic posts remain in the
hands of Brezhnev-era holdovers whose approach to their
assignments is the antithesis of Gorbachev's activism. Nikolay
Baybakov, for example, Chairman of the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan) is an elderly Brezhnev-era holdover likely to oppose
change in his powerful bureaucratic empire. Until he and many
others like him are removed from their posts, they are likely to
obstruct Gorbachev's campaign to transform the creaking state
machinery into an engine for change.
B. Improving Performance
Even sweeping personnel changes, however, will not be enough to
achieve the most difficult domestic goals that Gorbachev has
set--the acceleration of Soviet economic growth and higher
standards of quality and performance throughout the Soviet
economy. Gorbachev has acknowledged that this will require a
long-term effort.
SECRET
SECRET
The centerpiece of Gorbachev's economic strategy is a call
for re-equipping Soviet factories and farms with state-of-the-art
machinery--an effort that will require a major increase in
investment in the machine building sector. He apparently
recognizes that previous attempts to shift investment resources
have been frustrated by entrenched bureaucratic interests. To
avoid such problems he has indicated that a reorganization of the
economic bureaucracy will be a major part of his strategy.
Gorbachev is also banking on a stepped-up labor discipline
campaign to bolster economic growth while waiting for the more
long-term benefits of his modernization program and his
organizational changes. He is using the threat of penalties for
poor performance and a pledge to increase material rewards for
good performance, to encourage better labor productivity.
Gorbachev's economic strategy has much to recommend it.
Increased investment in the machine building sector is long
overdue and the economic apparatus is badly in need of change.
The outlook for his critically important industrial modernization
program, however, is problematical. Implementation would require
a degree of innovation in manufacturing that historically has
been lacking. In addition, there is the risk that stepped-up
investment in machinery manuacturing could divert resources from
consumer and defense industries to an extent the regime would
find unacceptable. Moreover, the increasing inaccessibility of
domestic oil, coal and iron ore could hamper prospects for
achieving high growth targets.
Gorbachev's achievements in expanding his power and in at
least partially reinvigorating the party and state machinery
should enhance his chances of pressing through with his economic
program, but will not guarantee the program's success. Like
previous Soviet party chiefs, he may discover that bureaucratic
obstructionism, though it may yield for a time, tends to
reemerge.
Sec.
As Amended
Prepared by:
13524
Donald Graves, Department of State
SECRET
7886
12
CONFIDENTIAL
THE SOVIET ECONOMY IN PERSPECTIVE
The Soviet economy, the second largest in the world,
has grown since 1950 from about one-third to more than
one-half the size of the US economy. The basic tenets of
Soviet growth strategy have been:
a high rate of investment in heavy industry,
fuels and power, and construction; a lower
rate in consumer goods and agriculture;
emphasis on modern, capital-intensive tech-
nology in the favored sectors; use of old-
fashioned, labor intensive methods in the low
priority sectors;
large expenditures on education and science
to raise the technical skills of the popu-
lation;
acquisition of advanced Western technology
and equipment in exchange for raw materials.
Making and Implementing Economic Policy
This is a "command economy". Basic economic decisions
are made by central administrative fiat rather than in the
market place:
The Politburo of the Communist Party makes
the major economic decisions.
A huge bureaucracy -- headed by the Council
of Ministers -- sets specific output goals,
allocates manpower and materials, fixes wages
and prices, and regulates incentives.
Lower down, state-owned industrial facilities
and collective farms translate the economic
plans into action.
The Politburo -- the highest executive arm of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party -- acts much like
the board of directors of an enormous conglomerate. As
chairman of the board, General Secretary Gorbachev presides
BY NARA DATE
over weekly Politburo meetings where decisions on general
economic priorities are reached. It is the Politburo that
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
decides on the division of resources between military and
civilian use and the distribution of investment between
industry and agriculture.
The Council of Ministers -- the government's highest
executive body -- can be likened to a senior management team
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
of the conglomerate. The new Chairman of the Council,
Nikolay Ryzhkov, has final responsibility for determining
the output of all major commodities, distributing resources,
and ensuring that plans are fulfilled. The organization
under the Council includes the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan), more than 50 functional economic ministries (such
as ferrous metallurgy, foreign trade, and agriculture), and
a host of state committees and main administrations
concerned with finance, prices, supply, and the like. The
State Planning Committee is now working on the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan for 1986-90.
Strengths
The Soviet economy has great crude economic strength,
based on a wealth of natural resources, a labor force half
again as large as that of the United States, a large and
growing stock of industrial facilities, and an unchallenged
leadership dedicated to continual expansion of industrial
and military might. Growth has been maintained by the brute
force method of allocating about one-third of national
output to investment and by extracting as large a work force
as possible out of the populance. This growth formula has
enabled the Soviets to amass an ever increasing arsenal of
sophisticated weapons, to continually expand their indus-
trial base, and to provide some increase in living standards
each year.
Weaknesses
A number of persistent problems that have plagued the
Soviet system for years have become particularly troublesome
since the mid-1970s.
Low productivity and the declining efficiency
of investment. Despite a growing volume of
investment per worker, labor productivity in
Soviet industry is only about half the US
level. This is particularly serious since
annual additions of men and equipment are
becoming smaller, and productivity gains must
be the future source of growth. An added
difficulty is the gradual exhaustion of
easily accessible natural resources and the
rising cost of exploiting new resources, many
located in remote and frozen areas of
Siberia.
Technology gap. Although the latest tech-
nology is employed in some areas -- particu-
larly in the defense and space industries --
technology in the civilian economy generally
lags far behind that of the West. The Soviet
system is particularly ineffective in moving
new ideas and products from the research and
development stage into full assembly-line
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
14
production. Moreover, Western equipment
frequently is not as productive in a Soviet
setting as it is on native ground. At the
same time that the USSR is struggling to
catch up, the United States, Western Europe,
and Japan are forging ahead with still newer
technology.
Rising consumer expectations. Though well-
fed and clothed compared with past gen-
erations, Soviet consumers are increasingly
aware of the disparity between Soviet and
Western living standards. Consumer griev-
ances are especially acute as to housing,
long queues, and the poor quality of durables
and other consumer goods and services.
Inefficient agriculture. Nearly one-fifth of
the labor force is still employed on the
farm; equipment is badly operated and main-
tained; and the cost of producing grain and
meat is far above world market prices.
Most of these problems are rooted in the Soviet system
of planning and management, which is too centralized and
clumsy for effectively managing the increasingly complex
economy. Central planning, for example, becomes more
difficult as the number of links between producers,
consumers, and suppliers multiplies.
The Soviet incentive system is especially ill-equipped
to deal with today's problems. Although it was effective in
maximizing physical output in the 1950s and 1960s when
resources and raw materials were cheap and readily avail-
able, in recent years it has led to industrial bottle-
necks, encouraged waste and mismanagement of resources,
contributed to irrational investment decisions, retarded
scientific technological innovation, and stimulated wide-
spread corruption and illegal economic activity.
As a result of these weaknesses, Mikhail Gorbachev
inherited a decade-old economic slowdown punctuated by
harvest failures, industrial bottlenecks, labor and energy
shortages, low productivity, and declining efficiency of
investment. Part of the problem has been the result of
external factors:
Harsh weather conditions that have depressed
farm output.
Declining increments to the working age
population that have led to labor shortages.
Rising costs and increasing difficulty of
extracting and transporting energy resources
and other raw materials, which have
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
4
exacerbated the squeeze on labor and capital
resources and intensified the impact of
bottlenecks already present in key sectors of
the economy.
But the key source of the USSR's economic slowdown -- as
Gorbachev himself has implied -- is systemic: existing
methods of planning and management are more and more
incapable of coping with a modern economy.
Economic Prospects Under Gorbachev
Since coming to power in March 1985, Gorbachev has
moved forcefully to place his personal stamp on economic
policy, telling managers that they must change the way they
do business or "get out of the way". His frankness illus-
trates the strong emphasis he is placing on the need for
competent personnel and for tougher standards of performance
evaluation. He seems to have a clear understanding of the
economy's problems and is determined to deal with them.
Gorbachev has described the acceleration of economic growth
as his major domestic goal and laid out a growth strategy
that includes increasing the pace of scientific and techno-
logical progress, restructuring investment, reorganizing
management and planning, and tightening economic discipline.
The key element in implementing this policy is to be
the "re-equipping" of the economy with high-quality, techno-
logically up-to-date machinery. This, he says, will require
sharp increases in machinery production and a larger share
of investment in machinery producing facilities. The other
significant known components of his plans for dealing with
the economy are essentially continuations of policies
introduced in recent years, but not effectively implemented.
These include vigorous application of Andropov's discipline
campaign which waned under Chernenko, linking wages more
closely to productivity, implementing Brezhnev's 1982 Food
Program of which he was primary architect, providing more
operational autonomy for enterprise managers, and sharply
curtailing the powers of the ministries.
Gorbachev has indicated that a reorganization of the
economic bureaucracy will be a major part of his strategy.
In a June speech he suggested that plans for such a reorga-
nization have now reached an advanced stage and that they
include the creation of superministerial bodies, starting
with agro-industrial and machine-building sectors. His
speeches also suggest that these super-ministries will be
restricted to "strategic" planning and leave operational
control of enterprises in the hands of the managers on the
scene.
Gorbachev's program could result in improved economic
performance if vigorously pushed. Priority development of
the food industry, for instance, coupled with greater
attention to transportation and storage facilities, could
considerably reduce the present enormous waste and spoilage
CONF IDENT IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
5
16
of agricultural produce. Moreover, the discipline campaign,
which was evidently a significant factor in the economic
upswing during Andropov's tenure, could again have a favor-
able impact on economic performance. Gorbachev is gambling
that an attack on corruption and inefficiency, not radical
reform, will turn the economy around. Although his approach
is risky -- previous attempts to redirect investment re-
sources and other economic initiatives generally have been
frustrated by entrenched bureaucratic interests--his pros-
pects for success should not be underestimated.
How much economic improvement occurs and how long it
lasts will depend largely on whether Gorbachev can deal
successfully with problems inherent in the economic system
itself. He has not, for example, squarely addressed such
problems as the arbitrary nature of Soviet prices, which
prevent planners from making economically rational
decisions, or the lack of sufficient consumer input into
decisions on what to produce. Nor has he explained how, in
a period of likely resource stringency, with investment to
grow at an accelerated rate and defense likely to have a
strong claim on resources, the consumer's needs can also be
addressed.
There have been hints, however, in Gorbachev's past and
recent speeches, and in the statements of some knowledgeable
Soviet officials, that the General Secretary may eventually
tackle some of these problems. In his Lenin Day Address in
April 1983, for example, Gorbachev stressed the importance
of greater reliance on prices as an economic lever. He
returned to this theme in his June 1985 address to the
Science and Technology conference, calling for a more
decisive shift from administration to economic methods of
regulating the economy. In the same address he also called
for an end to "the domination of the consumer by the
producer".
Gorbachev may well have decided to refrain from
translating such vague expressions of support for controver-
sial measures into specific proposals until he has fully
formulated his plans and/or consolidated his political
strength. A Soviet political commentator privately charac-
terized Gorbachev's current approach as one of first adopt-
ing uncontroversial economic measures while simultaneously
working on a long-range and more far-reaching program.
Alternatively, Gorbachev may have refrained from bolder
measures because he hopes that the steps he has already
proposed will be sufficient to remedy the economy's ills.
Indeed, he has made clear that he remains committed to the
basic system of central planning. In either event, the
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
6
17
political momentum he already enjoys augurs well for his
future ability to take bolder steps, and the ambitious
nature of the goals he has set increases the chances that he
will have to do so. Nevertheless, he is likely to find that
real improvements will be short-lived and limited so long as
the system is kept intact.
Drafted by:
CIA
CIA
FOIA(b)(3)
CONFIDENTIAL
7887
18
USSR: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE IN THE ECONOMY
Foreign trade plays an important, albeit not critical, role
in Soviet economic development. Although the Soviet economy
is largely self-sufficient--purchases from abroad account
for only about 10 percent of GNP--imports have helped Moscow
improve consumption, boost productivity, remove industrial
bottlenecks, and modernize weapon systems.
East-Versus West as a Source of Imports
The USSR has traditionally favored its Communist allies in
its foreign trade.
About 65 percent of the USSR's machinery and
equipment imports come from its Communist
allies, mostly the East European countries.
These imports represent nearly half of all
Soviet purchases from Communist countries.
(See Figure 1)
Although East European machinery and equipment is often of
lower quality than Western equipment, it is equal to or
better than Soviet produced goods in many instances. The
USSR also looks to Communist countries for manufactured
consumer goods to supplement its own production. More than
half of such imports -- primarily clothing and furniture--
are purchased in Eastern Europe.
While relying on Eastern Europe for much of its machinery
and equipment needs, imports of Western technology and
equipment have been essential to expand selected Soviet
industries (e.g. chemicals and automobiles), despite diffi-
culties in assimilation.
Imported chemical equipment in the 1970s was
largely responsible for a doubling in the
output of ammonia, nitrogen fertilizer, and
plastics during this period.
Construction of the Kama river truck plant,
which is based almost exclusively on Western
equipment and technology, has resulted in a
roughly 100 percent increase in Soviet heavy
truck output over the past decade.
Imports from the West also have played a key role in
supporting the energy sector.
The rapid construction of the Siberia-to-
Western Europe gas pipeline would not have
been possible without purchases of Western
turbines, compressors and pipe.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/3#7887
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
4/13/11
19
US Share of Soviet Equipment Orders, 1975-85
Percent
25
20
15
10
5
0
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
The value for 1985 is based on first half data.
SECRET
2
20
Deficiencies in Soviet drilling, pumping, and
exploration have prompted Moscow to purchase
almost $20 billion in oil and gas equipment
since 1975.
Imports of grain and other agricultural products have been
the largest component of the USSR's western trade. A series
of mediocre harvests during 1981-84 has pushed agricultural
imports to record levels -- with average annual purchases of
some $10 billion during this period. Because of the limited
ability of Communist countries to expand grain production,
Moscow has had to rely almost entirely on Western countries
to fill the gap between domestic output and requirements.
Finally, in addition to contributing to specific industrial
sectors and overall consumer well-being, acquisition of gas
and technology from the West has enhanced Soviet military
programs.
Access to specific technologies has permitted
improvements in a number of weapon and
military support systems.
Gains from trade, in general, have improved
the efficiency of the economy and thereby
reduced the burden of defense.
Composition of Soviet Exports
In contrast to its imports, Soviet exports are composed
mostly of raw materials, particularly energy. This concen-
tration of trade has become particularly prominent since the
mid-1970s as a result of rapidly rising fuel prices. By
1983, 70 percent of total Soviet exports to non-Communist
countries and 50 percent of exports to Communist countries
consisted of fuel shipments. (See Figure 2). Although arms
exports to non-Communist countries are not specified in
Soviet trade statistics, we estimate that this trade ac-
counted for some 15 percent of total Soviet exports in 1983.
Only 5 percent of Soviet exports are agricultural goods.
Soviet Trade With the Third World
Unlike Soviet trade with the developed West, which is
essentially an exchange of Soviet industrial raw materials
for technology and agricultural products, Soviet-LDC trade
consists of an exchange of Soviet manufactures--mainly
military supplies--for industrial and agricultural raw
materials. The LDCs represent Moscow's only major outlet
outside the Bloc for exports of civilian and military
manufactures.
Soviet military exports are the largest and most dynamic
element in LDC trade. Such exports totaled over $9 billion
in 1982 and 1983, an amount equal to almost 70 percent of
SECRET
Soviet Exports by Commodity, 1983
Communist Countries
Non-Communist Countries
1983 Total=37.8 Billion Rubles
1983 Total=24.9 Billion Rubles
Other
Other
Machinery
Machinery
Fuels
Fuels
Other Includes ferrous metals, agricultural
products, consumer goods and military trade.
SECRET
3
22
total Soviet exports to the LDCs. The military sales
program offers Moscow substantial benefits:
It is a major tool for establishing Soviet
presence and expanding influence in LDCs.
It provides Moscow with one of the few export
opportunities in which Soviet-manufactured
goods are somewhat competitive in price and
quality with Western products.
After credits and payments reschedulings are
netted out, it generates perhaps $5-6 billion
per year in hard currency revenues or their
equivalent.
US-Soviet Trade
With the exception of agricultural imports, Soviet trade
with the US has been relatively small. The US did
participate in the expansion in commercial relations that
accompanied East-West detente in the 1970s.
US exports to the USSR totaled only $100
million in 1970, or less than 5 percent of
Soviet hard currency imports.
By 1979, US sales totaled $3.8 billion,
nearly 20 percent of hard currency purchases.
(See Figure 3)
Following the sanctions imposed in the wake of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan and imposition of martial law in
Poland, US-Soviet trade dwindled. US machinery and equip-
ment sales suffered the most, plunging from a peak share of
20 percent of Soviet orders in 1978 to only one percent in
1983. Despite the partial grain embargo from January 1980
to April 1981, US-Soviet agricultural trade did not decline
nearly as much. Although the Soviets have increasingly
diversified their sources of grain supplies, the US, as the
largest and most stable exporter of gain, remains an
important source for Moscow.
The USSR continues to be the single largest
buyer of grain from the US.
During the 1984-85 market year, Soviet
purchases of gain reached a record 22.7
milion metric tons.
Foreign Trade Under Gorbachev
Since taking over as General Secretary in March, Gorbachev
has made it clear that improved economic performance is his
top priority. His plan focuses on modernizing the
industrial base with more and better machinery--a
SECRET
USSR: Imports from the United States, 1970-84
Billion Current US Dollars
30
25
20
Total Hard Currency
Imports
15
10
US Share of
Imports
5
0
1970
1975
1980
1984
SECRET
4
strategy which could lead to an increased role in both
Eastern Europe and the West.
Gorbachev is undoubtedly hoping for an increase in the flow
of machinery from Eastern Europe and has spoken about the
need for broader and tighter intergration within CEMA.
While such rhetoric is not new--the USSR has long advocated
joint production and specialization within CEMA as a means
of getting the East Europeans to cough-up more--Moscow seems
more intent than ever on pressing its allies to make firm
commitments on this issue. In this regard,
An agreement signed by CEMA Prime Ministers
in June pledged multilateral cooperation in
designing and producing computer controlled
systems.
The agreement follows a recent call in Pravda
for a 50-100 percent increase in the rate of
growth in machine-building in CEMA countries
during 1986-90.
Moscow is probably limited in just how much it can get from
its allies. Because most East European countries are
constrained by their own resource and economic difficulties,
any sharp increase in machinery exports to the USSR would
have to come at the expense of much needed domestic invest-
ment or sales to the West that bring in hard currency. Such
a shift would risk undermining growth prospects throughout
the area which could cause serious political problems.
The limited prospects for sharply boosting imports from
Eastern Europe increases Moscow's incentive to trade with
the West. In particular, Gorbachev probably will look to
the West for imports of technology and equipment for selected
sectors--energy and electronics, for example -- where no
good supply alternatives exist. Moreover, Moscow is pres-
ently in a good financial position to increase its purchases
of Western machinery and equipment -- at least in the
near-term.
With a relatively small debt and approximately
$10 billion in assets in Western banks at
year-end 1984, Moscow can easily obtain
commercial credits to finance new purchases.
Most West European countries are also offer-
ing generous terms on government-backed
credits in an effort to balance trade with
the Soviets and spur their own economies.
Over the longer term, however, Moscow's financial position
is much less certain -- falling world prices for oil and
declining domestic production could limit Soviet hard
currency earning capacity.
SECRET
Soviet Imports by Commodity, 1983
Communist Countries
Non-Communist Countries
1983 Total=33.7 Billion Rubles
1983 Total=25.7 Billion Rubles
Machinery
Ferrous Metals
Agricultural
Consumer Goods
Other
SECRET
5
24
Looking to the US
Prospects for an expansion of Soviet purchases of US
machinery and equipment appear good -- albeit from the
extremely low levels of recent years. The share of machinery
and equipment orders going to the US during first quarter
1985 -- 10 percent -- is substantially above last year's 6
percent figure and, if maintained, would be the highest
since 1979 (See Figure 4). Moreover, the US-Soviet Joint
Commercial Commission talks in May 1985 produced a Soviet
pledge to:
Try to do more business with US firms.
Put interested US firms on bidders' lists.
Fully consider US proposals on their economic
merit.
In this regard, we have seen an improved tenor in US-Soviet
contract negotiations since the beginning of the year. The
Soviets are currently discussing major deals with US firms
for the sale of personal computers, energy equipment, and
agricultural technology. Although these negotiations may be
protracted, some signings appear likely.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of Soviet purchases from the
US will continue to be agricultural products. Under the
current long-term US-Soviet grain agreement (which expires
in 1988), Moscow is committed to purchase a minimum of 8-9
million tons of grain per year, with a value of roughly $1
billion at current world prices. In poor crop years, Soviet
purchases can be expected to be much larger.
Prepared by:
FOIA(b) (3)
SECRET
27
7991
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev
Attached for Secretary Shultz is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with Gorbachev's domestic agenda, particularly the economic
challenges he faces.
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda
Tab B
The Soviet Economy in Perspective
Tab C
USSR: The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economy
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CVS
NARA, Date 7/1/02
QTY
7991
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAVID L. CHEW
SUBJECT:
Background Papers for the President's Meeting with
Gorbachev
Attached for Mr. Regan is a copy of the latest group of
background papers for the President on the Soviet Union. It
deals with Gorbachev's domestic agenda, particularly the
economic challenges he faces.
William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
Attachments
Tab A
Gorbachev's Domestic Agenda
Tab B
The Soviet Economy in Perspective
Tab C
USSR: The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economy
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
By
White House Guidelines, August 7/1/02 28,
Crs
NARA, Date
Declassify on: OADR
FILE a
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8507013
RECEIVED 06 SEP 85 16
TO
MCFARLANE
FROM KRONISH, HERB
DOCDATE 20 AUG 85
KEYWORDS: USSR
ISRAEL
HUMAN RIGHTS
MP
SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS RE HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE
DUE: 11 SEP 85 STATUS S FILES WH
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
SESTANOVICH
MANDEL
HALL
COVEY
STEINER
THOMPSON
RAYMOND
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG 8506195 8506781 NSCIFID
( DR
)
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
Rm 4 9/24
9/28
C 10/5 McFails Royd the
Jm,WH,WR Jm, WH, WR
gm, 55
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
30
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 7, 1985
Dear Ms. Schnur,
Thank you for your letter of August 20. We
appreciate your views and the support of your
organizations for our proposed handling of
the U.S. Soviet agenda in the upcoming
September and November meetings with Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and General Secretary
Gorbachev.
This Administration clearly equates human
rights with other issues such as arms control
and trade. We have repeatedly stated that
our concern for human rights, and Soviet
Jewry in particular, is integral to our
national interest and of major significance
to our foreign polciy.
Please be assured that we will continue to
press Soviet authorities on the issue of
Soviet Jewry, both publicly and through
diplomatic channels. Thank you again for
your letter.
Sincerely,
Robert McFarlane
Ms. Zeesy Schnur
Executive Director
Coalition to Free Soviet Jews
8 West 40th Street, Suite 602
New York, New York 10018
31
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 5, 1985
Dear Mr. Kronish,
Thank you for your letter of August 20. We
appreciate your views and the support of your
organizations for our proposed handling of
the U.S. Soviet agenda in the upcoming
September and November meetings with Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze and General Secretary
Gorbachev.
This Administration clearly equates human
rights with other issues such as arms control
and trade. We have repeatedly stated that
our concern for human rights, and Soviet
Jewry in particular, is integral to our
national interest and of major significance
to our foreign polciy.
Please be assured that we will continue to
press Soviet authorities on the issue of
Soviet Jewry, both publicly and through
diplomatic channels. Thank you again for
your letter.
Sincerely,
Mr. Herb Kronish
Chairman
Coalition to Free Soviet Jews
8 West 40th Street, Suite 602
New York, New York 10018
7013
32
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Elise
SUBJECT:
Letter from the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews
At Tab II is an August 20 letter from Zeesy Schnur and Herb
Kronish of the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews. They expressed
their support for the Administration's Policy on human rights and
the handling of the agenda for the upcoming meetings with the
Soviets. Specifically, they refer to a New York Times article in
which you are quoted as saying "even incremental improvements
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be hard to achieve
without changes in Moscow's approach and its thinking on major
issues." (Tab III)
Attached for your signature at Tab I are replies to Schnur and
Kronish thanking them for their support.
unavailable JM ss
Sestanovich, Covey, Raymond, Mandel, Steiner concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letters at Tab I to Schnur and Kronish.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Replies to Schnur and Kronish
Tab II
Letter from Schnur and Kronish, August 20, 1985
Tab III
New York Times Article, August 20, 1985
Free Sons of Israel, Hashachar,
American Zionist Federation,
New York Board of Rabbis,
COALITION TO FREE SOVIET JEWS
Rabbinical Council of America
American Jewish Committe
United Synagogue of America,
Representing concerned organizations in New York City, Long Island, Westchester, Rockland and
Bergen Counties.
Center for Russian Jewr
Westchester Jewish Conferenc
National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, International Network of Children of Jewish Holocaust Survivors, New York Legislators Coalition for Soviet Jewry, B'nai B'rith Youth Organization, Women's League for Conservativ
Judaism, Queens Council for Soviet Jewry, Brooklyn Coalition for Soviet Jewry, Herut Zionists of America,Rabbinical Assembly, Betar, Council of Jewish Organizations in Civil Service, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'ritl
N.Y. Legal Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, Survivors of Nazi Camps and Resistance Fighters, International League for the Repatriation of Russian Jews, Association of Orthodox Jewish Teachers, Poale Agudath Israel, Zionist
Organization of America, Jewish Community Council of Canarsie, B'nai B'rith Metropolitan Conference, Warsaw Ghetto Resistance Organization, Rockland County Committee for Soviet Jewry, Association of Reform Rabbi
of New York, Labor Zionists Alliance, Women's League for Israel, Staten Island Committee for Soviet Jewry, Americans For Progressive Israel, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Jewish War Veterans, B'na
B'rith Hillel Foundation, United Jewish Community of Bergen County, Manhattan Coalition for Soviet Jewry, American Jewish Congress, Oceanfront Council for Soviet Jewry, Jewish Association of College Youth/Hille
American ORT Federation, Queens Jewish Community Council, Emunah Women, Alumni Association Teachers Institute of Seminary College of Jewish Studies, Religious Zionists of America, B'nai Akiva, Student Struggle
for Soviet Jewry, National Council of Young Israel, Economists for Ida Nudel, Jewish Community House of Bensonhurst, Women's American ORT, Board of Jewish Education, Jewish Teachers Association, AMIT Womer
United Synagogue Youth, American Federation of Jewish Fighters, Camp Inmates and Nazi Victims, National Federation of Temple Youth, B'nai Zion, National Conference on Synagogue Youth, Association of Orthodo:
Jewish Scientists, Noar Mizrachi, Long Island Committee for Soviet Jewry, Jersey Action for Soviet Jewry. Washington Heights-Inwood Council for Soviet Jewry, Jewish Labor Committee, Young Israel Collegiates and Young
Adults, New York Federation of Reform Synagogues, Workmen's Circle, Pioneer Women, Jewish American Political Affairs Committee, Hadassah, National Council of Jewish Women, B'nai B'rith Women, Masada/ZOA
8 West 40th Street, Suite 602, New York, N.Y. 10018 (212) 354-1316
CHAIRMAN
Herbert Kronish
7013
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Zeesy Schnur
HONORARY CHAIRMAN
August 20, 1985
Elie Wiesel
PAST CHAIRMEN
Dr. Seymour P. Lachman
Mervin Riseman
pressured.
Hon. Robert Abrams
Hon. Eugene Gold
Stanley H. Lowell
Robert C. McFarlane
Rabbi Gilbert Klaperman
National Security Advisor
VICE CHAIRMEN
Irving L Bernstein
2201 C. Street, NW
Edith Everett
Hon. Howard Golden
Washington, D.C. 20520
Prof. Howard Greenberger
Seymour L. Katz
Ezra Levin
Dear Mr. McFarlane:
Rabbi Haskel Lookstein
Alan Pesky
Dr. Noam Shudofsky
Kenneth Smilen
On behalf of the Coalition to Free Soviet Jews, and our 85 affiliated
Melvin Stein
Rabbi Avraham Weiss
organizations, we would like to take this opportunity to voice our
RECORDING SECRETARY
Naomi Cohen
support for your administration's proposed handling of the U.S.-Soviet
CORRESPONDING SECRETARY
agenda in the upcoming September and November meetings with Foreign
Nechi Shudofsky
FINANCIAL SECRETARY
Minister Shevardnadze and Soviet Premier Gorbachev, respectively.
Leonard S. Kesten
TREASURER
Joshua Vogel
As you implied in the August 20th New York Times article, the United
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
David Bar-Illan
States must not be deterred by Soviet public relations gimmickry, but
Andrew Benerofe
Dorothy Bergman
rather must look deeper into the pre-existing framework of negotiations,
Jacob Birnbaum
Dr. Judith Bleich
and act within that context. To date, the Soviets obligated themselves
Bernard Breslin
to a number of treaties and agreements not the least of which are the
Hon. Karen Burstein
Samuel Eisenstadt
Helsinki Accords, which place great emphasis on the basic human rights
Henry Everett
Cecile Feder
of family reunification and the freedom of emigration and repatriation
Rabbi Myron Fenster
Hon. Stanley Fink
to one's homeland. It is not until there is an indication of progress
Hon. Harrison J Goldin
in this area that flexibility can be excercised.
Sally Goodgold
Blu Greenberg
Hon. Kenneth Gribetz
Pearl Hack
The agenda of the upcoming meetings with the Soviets are of major
Alvin Hellerstein
Rabbi David Hill
significance. We applaud the Reagan administration's understanding of
Dr. Albert Homblass
Bernard Kabak
the need to equate the importance of Soviet advancement in human rights
Abraham S. Karlikow
to other pressing issues such as arms control and trade.
Marilyn Katz
Alisa Kesten
George Klein
Naomi Lippman
We thank you for your support.
Sharon Mann
Matthew J. Maryles
Prof. Robert B McKay
Hon. Manfred Ohrenstein
Dr. Harold Proshansky
Sincerely
William Rapfogel
Burton Resnick
Irwin Robins
Judith Shapiro
Zeasy Zeesy Schnur Schmur
Hab Kromol
Hon. Sheldon Silver
Herb Kronish
Lynn Singer
Dr. Ronald B. Sobel
Executive Director
Chairman
Dorothea Steindl
David Weil
Supported by the
United Jewish Appeal of
Greater New York
and the Federation of
Jewish Philanthropies
*Formerly The Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry
related to weapons testing. American
SOVIET MUST SHIFT
officials. in refusing to join the Soviet
34
test moratorium. said continued test.
ing was needed as part of an effort to
ON MAJOR ISSUES,
catch up with Moscow in the drive to
NEW YORK TIMES
modernize nuclear weapons.
Advisor's Power Seen Growing
August 20, 1985
M'FARLANE INSISTS
The McFarlane speech, entitled
"U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Late 20th
Century," was delivered tb local civic
groups - the Channel City Club and the
CITES ARMS AND RIGHTS
Channel City Women's Forum. A text
was later made available by the White
House press office here.
The National Security Adviser
It was the second time in recent days
that the national security adviser had
delivered the Administration's think-
Draws Dark Picture in Talk
ing on a major issue, and it was consid-
on Russian Motives
ered to be yet another sign that his
power and influence was growing
within the Administration in the devel-
opment and articulation of foreign-
By GERALD M. BOYD
policy objectives.
Special to The New York Times
Last week, Mr. McFarlane gave the
Administration's response to a speech
SANTA BARBARA, Calif. Aug. 19
by President P.W. Botha of South Af-
Robert C. McFarlane, President Rea-
rica. Mr. McFarlane declined to criti-
gan's national security adviser, said to-
cize a lack of major concessions to the
day that "even incremental improve-
black majority in that country.
ments" in the relations between the
The tone of Mr. McFarlane's speech
United States and the Soviet Union
was reflected by assertions that the
would be hard to achieve without
Russians were undertaking an "ex-
changes in Moscow's approach and its
tremely large" research effort on de-
thinking on major issues.
fensive nuclear weapons systems.
While doing so, he said, it had criticized
In a speech that examined Russian
American research efforts and had in-
motives and behavior in both internal
sisted in public statements that it be
and external policies, Mr. McFarlane
ended.
drew bleak conclusions as he asked
Trouble Establishing a Dialogue
questions related to such issues as
arms control, regional concerns and
"And in a masterpiece of chutzpah,
human rights.
they insist repeatedly that ours is a pro-
gram designed to acquire a first-strike
The speech, made before a local
capability," he said. "In short, we're
group here while the President is on
having a lot of trouble establishing a
vacation, came as the White House an-
real dialogue."
nounced that Mr. Reagan and his top
Mr. McFariane said the Soviet lead-
advisers would meet in Washington
ership "should know that President
with the new Soviet Foreign Minister,
Reagan is ready, patiently and method-
Eduard A. Shevardnadze, on Sept. 27.
ically, to take small steps foreward and
The meeting, the first between the two
that we will respond in proportion to
men, will be in preparation for the
what we see from them."
Geneva meeting between Mr. Reagan
"But at this time of questioning in the
and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet
Soviet Union," he went on, "it seems to
leader, Nov. 19 and 20.
me that we should ask more of our-
selves and of the Russian side as well.
Propaganda Campaign Seen
We know cosmetic improvements
Mr. McFarlane's speech was broad
when we see them and we know the
in scope and appeared as a response to
meaning of the value of major change.
We should ask those questions and in-
claims by the Administration that the
sist on the answers that point the way."
Russians would be engaging in a propa-
ganda campaign between now and the
In discussing the Soviet Union. Mr.
summit meeting. Earlier in the day,
McFarlane raised questions about why
it had decided to produce chemical
Larry Speakes, the White House
weapons, which he said had forced the
spokesman, played down an offer by
United States to begin production of its
Mr. Gorbachev to hold an international
own such weapons after a 15-year ban.
conference on the militarization of
Similarly, he said, Moscow had de-
space.
cided to deploy within striking distance
Mr. Speakes said the two powers had
of Western Europe a new medium-
agreed in January to work out effective
range nuclear missile, the SS-20, which
agreements aimed at preventing an
he called the most "formidable" ever
arms race in space and terminating it
fielded by the East.
on the earth.
"The President has committed him-
"We are committed to those goals
self to meet the Soviet Union half way
and will continue to seek to engage the
in developing responsible solutions to
Soviets in serious negotiations in Gene-
outstanding problems," Mr. McFar-
va," Mr. Speakes said, referring to the
lane said. "I can restate that commit-
current round of arms-control talks.
ment today.
"If the Soviet Union has serious pro-
"But without some change in the
posals to make, they should do it in the
Soviet approach to security issues, in
forum both sides have established and
fact in the thinking that underlies it, I
fear that even incremental improve-
agreed to in Geneva."
ments will be extremely hard to reach.
U.S. Conducts Atomic Test
And they will be much less likely to
gather momentum to build on each
Mr. Speakes's statement was simil-
other."
iar to a recent dismissal of a morta-
Mr. McFarlane also used a sharp
torium on underground testing of nu-
tone as he talked about so-called re-
clear weapons begun on Aug. 6 by Mr.
gional issues, including Soviet assist-
Gorbachev. The United States has pro-
ance to Cuba and Libya and its combat
posed allowing Soviet inspections of an
role since 1979 in fighting the Afghan in-
underground test site in Nevada, a
surrection.
measure the Russians have rejected.
"Today, 120,000 Soviet soldiers there
In Washington, the Department of
are waging the most brutal war now
Energy said today that it had exploded
under way on the face of the earth," he
an underground nuclear device at its
said. "For what? It's not so easy to
Nevada test site on Saturday. the first
say."
'Soviet officials say that they need a
American nuclear explosion since the
friendly Afghanistan on their borders,'
Soviet Union declared its testing mora-
he went on. But how is friendship to be
torium.
built? Our proposition to the Soviet
The department said the explosion.
leadership is that their present policy is
which was the first since July 25, was
only increasing the Afghan people's ha-
tred."
CHeong
8004
35
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
File
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Mattash
INFORMATION
October 7, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
RCM HAS SEEN
FROM:
WALTER RAYMOND, JR. ur
SUBJECT:
Wick Letter to Zamyatin
Attached at Tab I is the letter from Wick to Zamyatin. For your
information, I have also attached a letter at Tab II that Wick
received from 66 Congressmen endorsing the Wick initiative, plus
Charlie's transmittal note to the President (Tab III) concerning
the Zamyatin letter.
Attachments
Tab I
Wick to Zamyatin Ltr, Jan 25, 85
Tab II
Ltr to Wick fr 66 Congressmen, March 21, 85
Tab III Wick Transmittal Ltr to President, Apr 6, 85
CC:
Jack Matlock
United States
Office of the Director
36
Information
Agency
Washington, DC 20547
USI
January 25, 1985
Mr. Leonid M. Zamyatin
Chief, International Information Department
Central Committee, Communist Party of The Soviet Union
Staraya Ploshchad' 4
Moscow, USSR
Dear Mr. Zamyatin:
In recent months Soviet media have levied a number of attacks on U.S. public
diplomacy and the U.S. Information Agency, especially on the Voice of America
and our new WORLDNET satellite television service. Your article in
Literaturnaya Gazeta ["Impasses of Confrontations and Horizons of
Cooperation," November 28, 1984] summarizes most of the charges and typifies
the underlying mindset. I am prompted to respond at this time to the
continuing stream of attacks because in a period when our two governments are
engaged in serious exploration of vital issues, such attacks are a disservice
to more positive relations.
My hope is to generate a constructive dialogue. TO initiate that dialogue I
extend two concrete offers. First, I ask that you offer your good offices to
facilitate using broadcast media to further mutual understanding. In this
regard, I suggest that you arrange for Soviet television to carry an address
by one of our top leaders which would be reciprocated on American television
by one of your top leaders. There is a precedent for this: Mr. Brezhnev and
Mr. Nixon made such speeches several years ago with considerable positive
effect.
Second, I propose that we carry further the dialogue by having you and other
Soviet officials and journalists take part in the WORLDNET program of which
you are so critical. Let us jointly plan a one- to two-hour satellite
television dialogue on WORLDNET in which Soviet journalists interview senior
U.S. officials on issues of mutual concern. At the same time, you should plan
with U.S. media a similar program in which American journalists freely and
spontaneously question senior Soviet officials. Coming at this important time
in our relations, such ventures could help make communication more reasoned
and reciprocal.
Incidentally, I am not surprised by your unwarranted criticisms of WORLDNET
and of our Agency. I have come to expect it. However, you should understand
that our country does not claim, as you do, that opposing ideas "subvert" our
system. We recognize instead that diversity of public opinion is one of the
great strengths of America. Thus, our society freely permits Soviet spokesmen
I
31
- 2 -
to state their views on American television and in print. In this regard, I
might note that Soviet journalists and Soviet officials are interviewed on
American television literally dozens of times per year. Surely the time has/
come for greater equality of treatment.
If the United States can confidently tolerate opposing views without fears of
"loosening" the system, wry then should the Soviet government act so
restrictively, even to the point of jamming our broadcasts in direct violation
of several international agreements to which the USSR is a signatory? Why not
allow greater independent public inquiry about your government's decisions and
policies? Why should American officials, in turn, not be permitted to state
their views on Soviet television and in the Soviet media? Our society has
never walked away from a fair challenge, and we look forward to engaging in a
peaceful contest of ideas with the USSR.
Your article is evidence of the need for this reasoned and open dialogue.
Charges of "piracy of the air," "radio warfare," "subversive purpose," and
"television propaganda aggression" only exacerbate the "impasses" and
"confrontations" to which you allude and delay our search for "horizons of
cooperation." Coming at this time, when the leaders of our two countries are
seeking new means for considering meaningful arms. reduction efforts and ways
to stabilize relations, your attacks are most unfortunate. Surely, everyone
concerned about U.S.-Soviet relations has a right to expect greater restraint
and accuracy.
Although I will not attempt in this letter to deal with the many errors and
distortions in your article, I would like to clarify the role and purpose of
the U.S. Information Agency, particularly the Voice of America and WORLDNET.
- USIA is not in the business of misrepresenting Soviet foreign policy, as
you allege. Its primary purpose is to present America to the rest of the
world and to explain U.S. foreign and domestic policies to people around
the world. In so doing, we present the news, good and bad.
- The Voice of America is a distinguished source of news and information
about the United States -- our policies, society, culture, and values. By
U.S. law, VOA is required to present "accurate, objective, and
comprehensive" information, to be truthful, and to be "seen as a
consistently reliable and authoritative source of news." Over 100 million
people throughout the world listen to VOA each week, all voluntarily, many
of them at risk to their safety.
- In modernizing and improving our communication facilities and seeking a
wider audience, our purpose is to allow a greater proportion of the
world's population to know what is going on in the world and be better
able to reach independent judgments on these events.
- WORLDNET is a modern television system linking Washington via satellite
with U.S. embassies, information centers, and a number of TV studios
throughout the world. WORLDNET is not forced on receiving nations.
38
- 3 -
Journalists in the participating nations freely choose the programming
that they wish to broadcast or write about or not use at all.
/
- WORLDNET enables foreign journalists to ask probing, unrehearsed questions
instantaneously, via satellite, directly to high-level American
officials. Your representatives from TASS, Pravda and other Soviet
puolications are welcome at official U.S. press conferences. They are
welcome, too, as observers in our WORLDNET studio.
Permitting a free flow of information is in the best interests of both our
societies and a necessary response to the times. The irreversible revolution
in communications, enabling prompt and comprehensive dissemination of news,
will make it increasingly harder to limit peoples' access to information.
All nations should ultimately welcome this: misunderstanding and ignorance
only serve to exacerbate tensions in the conduct of international relations.
Our nations need to know more about each other; we Americans are firmly
committed to providing the peoples of the Soviet Union and the world
community with an accurate picture of the United States. Similarly, we
hope to broaden our nation's understanding of the USSR.
I hope that you will enable Soviet journalists and television commentators to
participate actively, and very soon, in WORLDNET interviews of U.S. leaders to
be broadcast in the USSR. In turn, American journalists should have an equal
opportunity to interview your leaders for broadcast in the USA. This direct
dialogue would broaden the "horizons of cooperation" that you did not discuss
in your article, but that you, too, must want to see attained.
I look forward to your response to my offers that we exchange televised
interviews by top U.S. and Soviet leaders and that Soviet journalists and
officials participate in a WORLDNET dialogue with senior U.S. officials on
issues of mutual concern.
Sincerely,
Charles z. Wick
Director
28TH DISTRICT TEXAS
Congress of the United States
39
House of Representatives
lashington, DC 20515
March 21, 1985
Dear Mr. Wick,
We are writing to you today to express our support for your
recent proposal to Mr. Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief of the Inter-
national Information Department of the Soviet Union, to initiate
a constructive dialogue with the United States to further mutual
understanding.
We are convinced that increased communication between the
United States and the Soviet Union will reduce the chance of
conflict caused by misunderstanding. A program to increase
communication could be effectively implemented through the follow
two proposals outlined in your letter to Mr. Zamyatin.
First, the offer to use your offices to arrange for a high
level Soviet official to appear on American television if Mr.
Zamyatin would do likewise for a top American official on Soviet
television.
Second, your proposal to begin the joint planning of a one-
to-two hour satellite television dialogue on USIA's Worldnet
satellite facilities in which Soviet journalists would interview
U.S. officials on issues of mutual concern. This would be
reciprocated by a similar program in which American journalists
would freely and spontaneously question Soviet officials.
In conclusion, we strongly agree with your statement that,
"permitting a free flow of information is in the best interests
of both our societies and a necessary response to the times."
We, the undersigned Members of Congress, would like to lend
our support to further the implementation of your proposal. Onl
by opening new avenues of communication can we hope to establish
a more peaceful and open relationship with the Soviet Union.
Sincerely,
DICK
Duh ARMEY Army
BERKLEY Bubly BEDELL Bedell
BarreySearch
BARNEY FRANK
JACK Jackmy KEMP
ROBERT H. MICHEL
EDWARD Markey J. MARKEY
II
Dia M. Jeffords Jeffords
Courter Jun Counter
to
James
Jan . Caste
Jim
Silvio O. Conte
Edward
Ed Marbey
Frank Horton
Ba J. Silman Markey
Frank Horton
Benjamin A Gilman
Helen Delich putley
anlant Helen Delich tangelend Bentley
Jin
to Puch
Beau Boulter
NamamReid Arlan Stangeland
Harry M. Reid
Tom
Tom DeLay Daday
(Bill Bill Lower Lawry
Nobert J. Lagomarsino
Robert
Convie mack
John E. Grotberg
Connie Mack
Lungrer Lungun
Jim Saxton
Dan
Austin JJ Murphey
John
Great Trent Lott Lott
Bill X Porter Cucha
Bill Archer
Michael DeWine
Som Tom Loeffler Saffler
Nancy L Johnson Chann
Dymcan Hunter Bill Duncan Dannemeyer Hunter
Lynn Same Martin Martin
Bin Frenge
Bill Herron
Bill Frenzel
William M. Hendon
Coling Jmith
41
Carroll Campbell
Stephen Chris Smith L. Neal Real
Mark D. Siliander
Rod Chandler
from Robert S. Walker who
Hal Rogers
Cardin Callins
Hal Rogers
Cardiss Colling
Robind K. Dornan
Howard Howard L. Berman Buman
Robert VSWes R. Dornan
Street Bartill
Vin Daori Weber Devis
Steve Bartlett
David Dreier
Raymond Ramond J. McGrath Jhe Shath
Time mor
Drog George Wortley
Jim Moody
Done A. Marisa
Jack Fuild
John John Bruce R. A. Miller Morrison R. hiller
Jay
Jack Fields Oat
Dan Coats U.Ham
Marcy Kaptur
John John M. Spratt, MSmanja. Jr.
Delliam O. Lysinshi
Tim James Valentine V. Hansen Valenta
William O. Lipinski
Robut 4. Mrazek
Mickey Bob McEwen Leland
Robert J. Mrazek
BruncH. Monis
marth From
Bruce A. Morrison
Martin Frost
2885
42
United States
Director
Information
9
Agency
$ 501 218
Washington, D.C. 20547
A.Kingon
USIA
April 5, 1985
Dear Mr. President:
I wish to apprise you of a recent development concerning the
proposal made by me to Mr. Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief of the
International Information Department of the Soviet Communist
Party, for a constructive dialogue via international satellite
television.
On January 25, I extended two concrete offers to Mr. Zamyatin:
1. To arrange for a top level Soviet
official to appear on American television
if Mr. Zamyatin would do likewise for a top
American official on Soviet television;
2. To plan a one-to-two hour satellite
television dialogue on USIA's WORLDNET
satellite facilities in which Soviet
journalists would interview U.S. officials
on issues of mutual concern. This would be
reciprocated by a similar program in which
American journalists would freely and
spontaneously question senior Soviet
officials. (See Tab A)
As you may recall, this proposal was in response to an article
published by Mr. Zamyatin in the Russian language magazine
Literaturnaya Gazeta entitled "Impasses of Confrontations and
Horizons of Cooperation." In this article, Mr. Zamyatin
sharply criticized the international activities of USIA and
charged it with "television propaganda aggression."
In response, I said that "permitting a free flow of information
is in the best interests of both our societies and a necessary
response to the times." And, for this reason, I urged him to
respond favorably to my proposal.
To date, we have received no reply.
The President
The White House
In
43
-2-
However, domestic support is beginning to grow. On March 28, I
received in my office a letter signed by 66 members of the U.S.
House of Representatives. This letter, bipartisan in nature
and representative of a broad political spectrum, expresses
strong support for the Zamyatin initiative.
(See Tab B).
I shall keep you informed of other developments on this matter
as they unfold.
Sincerely,
Charles Z. Wick
(Dictated but not signed by the
Director in his absence from the office.)
44
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
October 7, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
Ism
SUBJECT:
Anatoly Michelson
We have repeatedly raised Michelson's case with the Soviets, but
as his 30 years of fruitless efforts indicate, the case is a
particularly difficult one. The Soviets are never pleased to let
spouses of American citizens emigrate, and are even more hard
line when the situation involves a Soviet defector.
It is hard to know whether a public mention of Michelson by the
President would be helpful at this point. As you suggest, if he
does so it would be best to include his name with others.
At the same time, it may be more effective if the President
personally presents Gorbachev with a list of names during a
private session in Geneva. If such a representation is made, we
will make sure that Michelson is included.
CC:
Bud Korengold
Judyt Mandel
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3 7888
BY Gr NARA DATE 10/30/07
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 1, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
BB
Anatoly Michelson, who defected from the Soviet Union in 1956 in
Vienna, and who has spent 30 unsuccessful years trying to get his
wife and daughter exit visas, came in to visit the other day.
According to State (1977), his is the oldest unresolved divided
family case on record. If the President -- in any radio speech
on Helsinki/human rights -- does listing of Helsinki violations
(Scharansky, Sakharov, etc.), can we include Michelson's name
among those we would like to see adressed in the atmosphere of
the Summit.
46
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 25, 1978
Mr. Anatoly Michelson
3235 Pine Valley Drive
Sarasota, Florida 33579
Dear Mr. Michelson:
With reference to your May 22 conversation with
Mr. William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs, I am writing to
confirm that, to the best of my knowledge, your
case is the oldest unresolved divided family case
among the US-Soviet cases.
Sincerely,
Leonard F. Willems
Bilateral Relations
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
DANTE B. FASCELL
CHAIRMAN
COMMISSION ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
February 10, 1977
The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
As you may know, the Department of State has in recent years made a
number of representations to the Soviet government in behalf of Mr. Anatol
Michelson of Columbus, Ohio, who has been trying for over twenty years to
bring his wife Galina, and daughter, Olga, from Moscow to this country to
be reunited with him. These representations, as well as requests from
several Members of Congress, have so far proved unavailing.
The Michelson family dilemma is unique in that no other immediate
relatives of a U.S. citizen have been unsuccessful for SO long in their
efforts to be reunited. Presumably, Soviet authorities are still punishing
Mr. Michelson for leaving the USSR on a tourist visa in 1956 and seeking
refuge in the West. The situation is further complicated by Mr. Michelson's
poor health and his need for heart surgery.
In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case, it appears
that extraordinary action is necessary. Mr. Michelson requests your
personal intervention to attempt, at the highest level, to persuade the
Soviet authorities to allow his family to be reunited. I would appreciate
your serious consideration of his plea.
Mr. Michelson has advised me of his availability to meet with you or
any member of your staff regarding this matter.
Thank you for your attention to this case.
Sincerely,
DANTE B. FASCELL
Chairman
Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe
CC: Mr. Michelson
DBF/mld
48
95тп CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S. CON. RES. 33
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 11 (legislative day, MAY 18), 1977
Mr. METZENBAUM (for himself, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. DURKIN, Mr.
PROXMIRE, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. BAYH, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. EAGLETON,
and Mr. HOLLINGS) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Urging the Soviet Union to grant visas to Galina and Olga
Michelson.
Whereas Anatol Michelson has been a citizen of the United
States for nine years, and has been separated for twenty
years from his wife, Galina Michelson, and daughter, Olga
Michelson, who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;
Whereas Galina Michelson and Olga Michelson seek to rejoin
Anatol Michelson, in the United States, and have been
denied permission to emigrate by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics;
Whereas the Department of State of the United States has
made extensive diplomatic initiatives on behalf of the
Michelson family;
V
55
2
Whereas many citizens of the United States have petitioned the
Congress to act for the relief of the Michelson family; and
Whereas the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics have agreed to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the subsequent Helsinki accord, which
acknowledge the right of an individual to leave his country:
Now, therefore, be it
1
Resolved by the United States Senate (the House of
2 Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the
3 Congress that Galina Michelson and Olga Michelson should
4 be granted exit visas by the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
5 lics for the purpose of allowing their reunion with Anatol
6 Michelson, their husband and father, respectively.
50
August 23, 1985
Dear Mr. Michelson:
Thank you for your letter of August 2nd with
the accompanying enclosures. I am referring
your material to the appropriate White House
office for consideration.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
Mr. Anatoly Michelson
1700 Ben Franklin Drive
Sarasota, FL 33577
CCF w/copy of inc to Fred Fielding
cc: C. Vedlik Room 93
PJB/CV/lynn (8PJB)
ANATOLY MICHELSON
51
1700 Ben Franklin Drive
Sarasota, Florida 33577
Phone (813) 388-1252
Csaba-
should we refer
their to counsel's ofc?
August 2, 1985
Honorable Patrick J. Buchanan
Assistant to the President
White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Buchanan:
For almost three decades (!) Soviets are terrorising this American's
family. The essence of the matter is more clearly and objectively dis-
closed in the attached copy of Senator Packwood's speech than could be
written by me here.
29 years experience had clearly shown that a routine approach of
Department of State to the subject matter is absolutely ineffective.
Only the White House can undertake realy effective actions. As
stated in enclosed letter of former Senator R. Schweiker, the unique-
ness of my case does justify extraordinary action!
I implore you to help me to bring this matter to the personal
attention of the President and to meet with a member of his staff.
Acting on this matter might also help the American people better
understand the terroristic nature of the Soviet regime.
Long experience has proven that referring this matter to the
Department of State is tantamount to ignoring it, since the Department
has no power to solve the problem.
I am looking forward to your favorable reply.
Sincerely,
Aillichelson
A. Michelson
Enclosures:
52
MARRISON A. WILLIAMS. IR. NI., CHAIRMAN
JENNINGS RANDOLPH, W. VA.
JACOB K. JAVITS
CLAIBURNE FILL R.I.
RICHAM SCHWEIKER, PA.
BOWARD M. KENNEUT, MARS.
ROBERT TAFT. JR. OHIO
GAYLOND NILSON, wis.
J. GLINN BEALL. JR., MO.
WALTER F. MONUALE. MINN.
ROBERT T. STAFFORD. VT.
THOMAS F. EAGLETON. MO.
PAUL LAXALT. NEV.
United States Senate
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, MAINE
COMMITTEE ON
DONALD ELISMING. GENERAL COUNSEL
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
MARJORIE M. WHITTAKER. CHIEF CLERK
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 28, 1975
Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Secretary Kissinger:
As you are aware, the Department of State has in recent
years made a number of representations to the Soviet Government
on behalf of the wife and daughter of Mr. Anatol Michelson, who
for 19 years has attempted to obtain exit visas in order to
emigrate to the United States. These representations, as well
as requests from several members of Congress, have so far
proved unavailing.
The Michelson Family dilemma is unique in that no other immediate
relatives of a United States citizen have for SO long been unsuccessful
in efforts to be reunited.
In view of the pressing and unequaled humanitarian considerations,
Mr. Michelson requests your personal intervention to attempt on a
higher level to persuade Soviet authorities to allow his family to
be reunited. It is believed that the extraordinary circumstances of
situation mandate extraordinary action. I would appreciate your serious
consideration of his plea.
Mr. Michelson has advised of his availability to meet with you
or any member of your staff regarding this matter.
Thank you for your attention regarding this matter.
Sincerely,
Richard Resha S. Schweiker
United States Senator
RSS:s1b
bee: Mr. Anatol Michelson
53
Congressional Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
96th
CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
Vol. 126
WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1980
No. 31
Senate
His story was published in newspapers
ANATOLY MICHELSON
in London and West Germany, Philadel-
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, for
phia, Pa., Canton, Ohio, Sarasota, Fla.,
almost 2 years I have patiently heeded
New York, Washington, D.C., and Port-
the advice of State Department officials
land. Each one portrayed the agony,
in the attempt to rectify one of the
loneliness and frustration experienced
most heart-rending human tragedies in
by a family trying to deal with an in-
the last quarter century. Today, I must
tractable and heartless government.
turn away from their advice and relate
Once, a short-lived ray of hope
to my colleagues and the American
brightened Michelson's day. That was
people the story of one American's per-
in March 1967, after the former Senator
sonal ordeal and mental anguish suf-
Hugh Scott had issued repeated pleas
fered at the hands of an insensitive So-
to Alleksey Kosygin and the London
viet Government.
Sunday Telegraph reported on Michel-
Mr. President, in June 1956, in a small
son's plight just prior to the Russion Pre-
Moscow apartment, Anatoly Michelson
mier's visit to England. Soviet officials
kissed his wife, Galina, and his 7-year-
unexpectedly informed Galina and Olga
old daughter Olga goodbye. The young,
that their application for visas to travel
creative and talented engineer was then
to the Uniited States would be approved
Director of the Soviet Central Engineer-
and for Anatoly Michelson it appeared a
ing Bureau, and had been selected as a
dream was about to come true. The U.S.
member of a group of Russian business-
State Department received the same sig-
men and government officials to visit
nal. Over the next few months letters
Austria. Michelson knew he would not
were exchanged between Galina, Olga,
return to Russia, his family did not.
and Anatoly as the family anticipated an
Several months before this scheduled
end to its ordeal and joyful reunion. It
trip, disillusioned with Soviet totali-
all fell apart, on June 30, 1967. when the
tarianism, Michelson had decided to de-
Soviet Government showed its most cruel
fect, believing, naively that the Sovfet
side. Galina and Olga were coldly noti-
fied that their applications for visas had
Government would permit his family to
been disapproved.
join him. After arriving in Austria,
One might ask why. We did. In re-
Michelson sought and received asylum
sponse to queries from Members of Con-
and immediately began to appeal for his
gress the Soviets wrote:
family's release. His 24-year nightmare
Please be informed that their appli-
had started.
cation was thoroughly considered by proper
Michelson spent the next 7 years in
Soviet authorities. At the present time the
West Germany. While there his appeals
answer was unfavorable for Mr. A. Michelson.
were sent through the Soviet Ambassa-
Mr. President, since that unjust blow,
dor in Bonn. the Soviet and German
Michelson has continued to seek free-
Red Cross, German Department of State
dom for his loved ones. Appeals have
and the International Red Cross.
been made time and again by Members
Nothing happened. In 1963 he moved to
of this body. The White House has
the United States and began to appeal
placed the Michelson case first on its
for help from the U.S. Government.
list of hardship requests. The Red Cross
Over the next 16 years his cause was
had pleaded through the League of Red
championed by 20 Members of Congress,
Cross Societies. The United Nations has
including 15 Senators. 12 of whom are
appealed in his behalf, and the Comis-
still here. Four administrations have
sion on Security and Cooperation, which
made personal appeals through Secre-
monitors the Helsinki accords. presented
taries of State or Presidents. Each time,
his case. All efforts were fruitless.
except once, their efforts fell on deaf
In 1977 Anatoly Michelson moved to
ears.
my State, Oregon, and soon thereafter
requested my help. I. too, have now ex-
perienced the frustration and anger of
Senators GLENN, MUSKIE, SCHWEIKER,
METZENBAUM, McGoverN, STONE, PERCY,
WILLIAMS, KENNEDY, and others before
them. In a time of so-called detente,
54
when we were appealing in the name of
human decency, urging the Soviets to
demonstrate good will and compassion,
our pleas were met with callousness and
implied disdain. I, personally, not only
received this treatment in correspond-
ence, but also in meeting with Ambassa-
dor Dobrynin.
Mr. President, we have recently wit-
nessed, as a result of the Soviet inva-
sion into Afghanistan, a flood of articles
and editorials proclaiming and be-
moaning the fact that détente is dead.
Several claim that the United States has
lost its chance to continue toward the
goal of peaceful coexistence. I, for one,
question whether that chance was ever
a reality. I, for one, question the thoughts
and motive of a government which
seems to take a sadistic delight in
punishing a family whose only crime is
having a desire to be reunited in a free
country. Some would say that one can-
not translate an isolated incident to na-
tional foreign policy. I say that there
are hundreds of cases such as this one,
and that these are indicators that dé-
tente to us was a dream of world stability
and to the Soviets it was a political ex-
pedient. Recent world events certainly
lend credibility to that theory.
Mr. President, I do not intend to let
this matter drop. I will persist in press-
ing the Soviets to attend to this matter
and live up to the spirit and intent of
the Helsinki accords. I welcome any of
my colleagues who wish to join in this
effort. This family has suffered enough.
Galina is now 58 and almost blind from
the work she was made to perform since
her husband left. Olga is now 31. At age
8 she was humilated in front of her
schoolmates and branded as the daughter
of a traitor. She was later denied the
chance to go to college. Anatoly, now 61,
has a serious heart condition. Yet all
this does not seem to make a difference
to the Soviets who continue to display
insensitive, singleminded and unforgiv-
ing attitude toward three helpless people.
Mr. President, the facts are clear.
They show me that Soviet promises are
empty, that Soviet attitudes toward hu-
man life are cold. ruthless, and based
on political motives. It shows me that
we, as a nation, can expect little from
a country that totally disregards the dig-
nity of a man and of all mankind.