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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron October 1985 (12)
Box: 12
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/12/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (12/12)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
12
YARHI-MILO
1210
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7936 COVER SHEET MATLOCK RE GORDIYEVSKY
1
ND
B1
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7937 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 10/29/1985 B1
GORDIYEVSKY SUGGESTIONS
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7938 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
3
ND
B1
GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7944 PAPER
SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS
2
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3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
7939 COVER SHEET MATLOCK RE GORDIYEVSKY
1
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R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7940 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7937
1 10/29/1985 B1
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7941 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7938
3
ND
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R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
7945 PAPER
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7944
2
ND
B1
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3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
7942 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
3 10/30/1985 B1
GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTION
R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/12/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON OCTOBER 1985 (12/12)
FOIA
F06-114/3
Box Number
12
YARHI-MILO
1210
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
7946 PAPER
SAME TEXT AS DOC #7944
2
ND
B1
R
3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
7943 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 10/29/1985 B1
GORDIYEVSKY'S SUGGESTIONS
R
3/8/2011
F2006-114/3
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
JM/CI
8679
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
SECRET
October 28, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F.MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Materials for President's Interview with Soviet
Journalists
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from Bill Martin to Larry
Speakes forwarding the proposed responses (Tab A) to the five
written questions from TASS and themes (TAB B) for the President
to review prior to his oral interview, Thursday, October 31.
Subsequently we will forward a set of contingency questions for
the President to review prior to his oral interview.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the proposed responses to the written questions
and the themes for the oral interview and authorize Bill Martin
to forward the memorandum at Tab I to Larry Speakes.
Approve
Disapprove
Linhard, Covey and Ringdahl concur.
Attachments:
Tab I
Martin-Speakes Memorandum
Tab A
Written Questions
Tab B
Key Themes
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 2 1997
SECRET
By CAS
NARA, Date 7/1/02
Declassify on: OADR
8679
V
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY SPEAKES
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Materials for President's Interview with Soviet
Journalists
Attached at Tab A are the written responses to the five questions
posed by TASS for the President's interview with Soviet
journalists. At Tab B are key themes he may wish to review
prior to his oral interview with the journalists, October 31.
Subsequently we will be forwarding contingency questions with
suggested responses that may be raised in the oral interview.
Attachments:
Tab A
Written Responses
Tab B
Key Themes
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
White crs House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/1/02 28/1997
By
3
QUESTION ONE
QUESTION: The forthcoming meeting between General Secretary
Gorbachev and you, Mr. President, is for obvious reasons looked
upon as an event of special importance. Both sides have stated
their intention to make an effort to improve relations
between our two countries, to better the overall international
situation. The Soviet Union has, over a period of time, put
forward a whole set of concrete proposals and has unilaterally
taken steps in various areas directly aimed at achieving this
goal. What is the U.S. for its part going to do?
ANSWER: I fully agree that my meeting with General Secretary
Gorbachev has special significance, and I am personally looking
forward to it very much. I sincerely hope that we will be able
to put relations between our two countries on a safer and more
secure course. I, for my part, will certainly do all I can to
make that possible.
We of course study every Soviet proposal carefully and when
we find them promising we are happy to say so. If, on the other
hand, we find them one-sided in their effect, we explain why we
feel as we do. At the same time we, too, have made concrete
proposals -- dozens of them -- which also cover every sphere of
our relationship, from the elimination of chemical weapons and
resolution of regional conflicts to the expansion of contacts and
exchanges, and we hope these receive the same careful attention
that we give to Soviet proposals.
Let me give you a few examples. One thing that has created
enormous tension in U.S. -Soviet relations over the last few years
has been attempts to settle problems around the world by using
military force. The resort to arms, whether it be in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, or in Africa, has contributed nothing to
the prospects for peace or the resolution of indigenous problems,
and has only brought additional suffering to the peoples of these
regions. This is also dangerous, and we need to find a way to
stop attempts to solve problems by force. So I have proposed
that both our countries encourage parties to these conflicts to
lay down their arms and negotiate solutions -- and if they are
willing to do that our countries should find a way to agree to
support a peaceful solution and refrain from providing military
support to the warring parties. And if peace can be achieved,
the United States will contribute generously to an international
effort to restore war-ravaged economies -- just as we did after
the second world war, contributing to the recovery of friends and
foes alike, and as we have done on countless other occasions.
QUESTION ONE (cont'd)
2
Both of our governments agree that our nuclear arsenals are
much too large. We are both committed to radical arms
reductions. So the United States has made concrete proposals for
such reductions: to bring ballistic missile warheads down to
5,000 on each side, and to eliminate intermediate-range ballistic
missiles from our arsenals altogether. These have not been
"take-it-or-leave-it" proposals. We are prepared to negotiate,
since we know that negotiation is necessary if we are to reach a
solution under which neither side feels threatened. We are
willing to eliminate our advantages if you will agree to
eliminate yours. The important thing is to begin reducing these
terrible weapons in a way that both sides will feel secure, and
to continue that process until we have eliminated them
altogether.
Events of the past ten to fifteen years have greatly
increased mistrust between our countries. If we are to solve the
key problems in our relationship, we have to do something to
restore confidence in dealing with each other. This requires
better communication, more contact, and close attention to make
sure that both parties fulfill agreements reached. That is why
we have made literally 40 to 50 proposals to improve our working
relationship, expand communication and build confidence. For
example, we have proposed an agreement to cooperate on the
peaceful use of space. The Apollo-Soyuz joint mission was a
great success in 1975, and we should try to renew that sort of
cooperation. We have also made several proposals for more direct
contact by our military people. If they talked to each other
more, they might find-that at least some of their fears are
unfounded. But most of all, ordinary people in both countries
should have more contact, particularly our young people. The
future, after all, belongs to them. I'd like to see us sending
thousands of students to each other's country every year, to get
to know each other, to learn from each other and -- most of all
-- to come to understand that, even with our different
philosophies, we can and must live in peace.
Obviously we are not going to solve all the differences
between us at one meeting, but we would like to take some
concrete steps forward. Above all, I hope that our meeting will
give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that
we can agree on a course to take us toward a safer world for all
- and growing cooperation between our countries.
5
QUESTION TWO
QUESTION: The Soviet Union stands for peaceful coexistence with
countries which have different social systems, including the U.S.
In some of your statements, the point has been made that in spite
of differences between our countries, it is necessary to avoid a
military confrontation. In other words, we must learn how to
live in peace. Thus, both sides recognize the fact that the
issue of arms limitation and reduction is and will be determining
in these relations. The special responsibility of the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. for the fate of the world is an objective fact. What in
your opinion can be achieved in the area of security in your
meeting with Gorbachev?
ANSWER: Well, first of all, I would say that we think all
countries should live together in peace, whether they have the
same or different social systems. Even if social systems are
similar, this shouldn't give a country the right to use force
against another.
But you are absolutely right when you say that we must learn
to live in peace. As I have said many times, a nuclear war
cannot be won and must never be fought. And this means that our
countries must not find any type of war.
You are also right when you say that our countries bear a
special responsibility before the world. This is the case not
only because we possess enormous nuclear arsenals, but because as
great powers, whether we like it or not, our example and actions
affect all those around us.
Our relations involve not only negotiating new agreements,
but abiding by past agreements as well. Often we are accused by
your country of interfering in your "internal" affairs on such
questions as human rights, but this is a case in point. Ten
years ago we both became participants in the Helsinki Accords and
committed ourselves to certain standards of conduct. We are
living up to those commitments and expect others to do so also.
Soviet-American relations affect as well regional conflicts,
political relations among our friends and allies, and many other
areas.
The fact that our countries have the largest and most
destructive nuclear arsenals obliges us not only to make sure
they are never used, but to lead the world toward the elimination
of these awesome weapons.
I think that my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev can
start us on the road toward the goal our countries have set: the
radical reduction of nuclear weapons and steps to achieve their
complete elimination. We can do this by finding concrete ways to
overcome roadblocks in the negotiating process and thus give a
real impetus to our negotiators. Of course, we will also have to
deal with other problems, because it will be very hard to make
great progress in arms control unless we can also act to lower
tensions, reduce the use and threat of force, and build
confidence in our ability to deal constructively with each other.
QUESTION THREE
QUESTION: As is well known, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reached an
understanding last January in Geneva that the top priority of the
new negotiations must be the prevention of the arms race in
space. But now, the American delegation in Geneva is trying to
limit the discussion to consideration of the question of nuclear
arms and is refusing to talk about the prevention of the arms
race in space. How should we interpret this American position?
ANSWER: You have misstated the January agreement. Actually, our
Foreign Ministers agreed to "work out effective agreements aimed
at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth,
at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening
strategic stability." Further, they agreed that the "subject of
negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and
nuclear arms--both strategic and medium range--with all these
questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."
Since your question reflects a misunderstanding of the
United States position, let me review it for you:
First, we believe that the most threatening weapons facing
mankind today are nuclear weapons of mass destruction. These are
offensive weapons, and they exist today--in numbers that are much
too high. Our most urgent task therefore is to begin to reduce
them radically and to create conditions so that they can
eventually be eliminated. Since most of these weapons pass
through space to reach their targets, reducing them is as
important to prevent an arms race in space as it is to terminate-
an arms race on earth.
As I noted earlier, we have made concrete, specific
proposals to achieve this. Recently, your government finally
made some counterproposals, and we will be responding in a
genuine spirit of give-and-take in an effort to move toward
practical solutions both countries can agree on.
Second, we believe that offensive and defensive systems are
closely interrelated, and that these issues should be treated, as
our Foreign Ministers agreed, as interrelated. Our proposals are
fully consistent with this understanding. We are seeking right
now with Soviet negotiators in Geneva a thorough discussion of
how a balance of offensive and defensive systems could be
achieved, and how -- if scientists are able to develop effective
defenses in the future -- we might both use them to protect our
countries and allies without threatening the other. And if we
ever succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons, countries are going
to require a defense against them, in case some madman get his
hands on some and tries to blackmail other countries.
QUESTION THREE (cont'd)
2
Specifically, we have proposed:
--On strategic nuclear arms, a reduction of each side's nuclear
forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles. That would
be a very dramatic lowering of force levels, in a way that would
greatly enhance strategic stability. We have also offered to
negotiate strict limits on other kinds of weapons. Because our
force structures are different, and because the Soviet Union has
complained about having to reconfigure its forces, we have
offered to seek agreements which would balance these differing
areas of American and Soviet strength.
--On intermediate-range nuclear forces, we believe the best
course is to eliminate that entire category of forces, which
includes the 441 SS-20 missiles the Soviet Union has deployed,
and our Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. If this
is not immediately acceptable, we have also offered an interim
agreement which would establish an equal number of warheads on
U.S. and Soviet missiles in this category, at the lowest possible
level.
--In the area of space and defense, we are seeking to discuss
with Soviet negotiators the possibility that new technology might
allow both sides to carry out a transition to greater reliance on
defensive weapons, rather than basing security on offensive
nuclear forces.
So that there would be no misunderstandings about our
research program on new defensive systems which is being carried_
out in full compliance with the ABM Treaty, I sent the director
of our Strategic Defense research program to Geneva to brief
Soviet negotiators. Unfortuntely, we have not had a comparable
description of your research in this area, which we know is
long-standing and quite extensive.
Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why some people
have misunderstood and misinterpreted our position. The research
we are conducting in the United States regarding strategic
defense is in precisely the same areas as the research being
conducted in the Soviet Union. There are only two differences:
first the Soviet Union has been conducting research in many of
these areas longer than we have, and is ahead in some. Second, we
are openly discussing our program, because our political system
requires open debate before such decisions are made. But these
differences in approaches to policy decisions should not lead to
erroneous conclusions. Both sides are involved in similar
research, and there is nothing wrong in that.
8
QUESTION THREE (Cont'd)
3
However, this does make it rather hard for us to understand
why we should be accused of all sorts of aggressive intentions
when we are doing nothing more than you are. The important thing,
however, is for us to discuss these issues candidly.
In sum, what we are seeking is a balanced, fair, verifiable
agreement -- or series of agreements -- that will permit us to do
what was agreed in Geneva in January: to terminate the arms race
on earth and prevent it in space. The United States has no
"tricks" up its sleeve, and we have no desire to threaten the
Soviet Union in any way. Frankly, if the Soviet Union would take
a comparable attitude, we would be able to make very rapid
progress toward an agreement.
QUESTION FOUR
QUESTION: Mr. President, officials of your Administration claim
that the U.S., in its international relations, stands for the
forces of democracy. How can one reconcile statements of this
kind with the actual deeds of the U.S.? If you take any current
example, it seems that when a particular country wants to
exercise its right to independent development -- whether it be in
the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Central America in Asia
-- it is the U.S. in particular, which supports those who stand
against the majority of the people, against legitimate
governments.
ANSWER: Your assertion about U.S. actions are totally
unfounded. From your question, one might think that the United
States was engaged in a war in some other country and in so doing
had set itself against the majority of the people who want self
determination. I can assure you that this is not the case. I am
proud, as are all Americans, that not a single American soldier
is in combat anywhere in the world. If every country could say
the same, we would truly live in a world of less tension and
danger.
Yes, we are very supportive of democracy. It is the basis
of our political system and our whole philosophy. Our nation was
not founded on the basis of one ethnic group or culture, as are
many other countries, but on the basis of the democratic ideal.
For example we believe that governments are legitimate only if
they are created by the people, and that they are subordinate to
the people, who select in free elections those who govern them.
But democracy is more than elections in which all who wish can
compete. In our view there are many things that even properly
elected governments have no right to do. No American government
can restrict freedom of speech, or of religion, and no American
government can tell its people where they must live or whether
they can leave the country or not. These and the other
individual freedoms enshrined in our Constitution are the most
precious gift our forefathers bequeathed us and we will defend
them so long as we exist as a nation.
Now this doesn't mean that we think we are perfect. Of
course we are not. We have spent over 200 years trying to live
up to our ideals and correct faults in our society, and we're
still at it. It also doesn't mean that we think we have a right
to impose our system on others. We don't, because we believe
that every nation should have the right to determine its own way
of life. But when we see other nations threatened from the
outside by forces which would destroy their liberties and impose
the rule of a minority by force of arms, we will help them resist
that whenever we can. We would not be true to our democratic
ideals if we did not.
QUESTION FOUR (Cont'd)
2
We respond with force only as a last resort, and only when
we or our Allies are the victims of aggression. For example, in
World War II, we took a full and vigorous part in the successful
fight against Hitlerism, even though our country was not invaded
by the Nazis. We still remember our wartime alliance and the
heroism the peoples of the Soviet Union displayed in that
struggle. And we also remember that we never used our position
as one of the victors to add territory or to attempt to dominate
others. Rather we helped rebuild the devastated countries,
friends and erstwhile foes alike, and helped foster democracy
where there was once totalitarianism. Have we not all benefitted
from the fact that Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany are
today flourishing democracies, and strong pillars of a stable and
humane world order? Well, the German and Japanese people deserve
the most credit for this, but we believe we helped along the way.
In the areas you mention, we are heartened by trends we see,
although there are still many troubling areas. In the southern
part of Africa, Angola is torn by civil war, yet we have
determined not to supply arms to either side, and to urge a
peaceful settlement. In South Africa, the system of apartheid is
repugnant to all Americans, but here as well we seek a peaceful
solution and for many years we have refused to supply arms or
police equipment to the South African Government. In Latin
America, great progress in the transition from authoritarian to
democratic societies has been made, and now on that continent
there exist only four countries that do not have democratically
elected governments. Since 1979 seven Latin American countries
have made major strides from authoritarian to democratic systems,
Over the years, we have been a leading voice for decolonization
and have used our influence with our closest friends and allies
to hasten this process. We are gratified by the nearly completed
process of decolonization, and take pride in our role.
I should emphasize that our aim has been to encourage the
process of democratization through peaceful means. And not just
the American government, but the American people as a whole have
supported this process with actions and deeds.
American society has long been characterized by its spirit
of volunteerism and by its compassion for the less fortunate. At
home, we are proud of our record of support for those who cannot
manage for themselves. It is not simply that the government, but
the American people, through a host of voluntary organizations,
who bring help to the needy--the victims of floods and fires, the
old, the infirm and the handicapped. Americans have been no less
generous in giving to other peoples. I remember the efforts of
Herbert Hoover in organizing the American Relief effort to feed
Soviet victims of famine in the 1920's, and these efforts
continue to this day, whether it be food for the victims of
famine in Ethiopia, or of earthquakes in Mexico.
QUESTION FIVE
QUESTION. The Soviet Union has unilaterally taken a series of
major steps. It has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons. It has undertaken a moratorium on any kind of nuclear
tests. It has stopped deployment of intermediate-range missiles
in the European part of its territory and has even reduced their
number. Why hasn't the U.S. done anything comparable?
ANSWER: Actually, we have frequently taken steps intended to
lower tension and to show our good will, though these were rarely
reciprocated. Immediately after World War II, when we were the
only country with nuclear weapons, we proposed giving them up
altogether to an international authority, so that no country
would have such destructive power at its disposal. What a pity
that this idea was not accepted!
Not only did we not use our nuclear monopoly against others,
we signalled our peaceful intent by demobilizing our armed forces
in an extraordinarily rapid way. At the end of the war in 1945,
we had 12 million men under arms, but by the beginning of 1948 we
had reduced our forces to one-tenth of that number, 1.2 million.
Since the 1960's we have unilaterally cut back our own nuclear
arsenal: we now have considerably fewer weapons than in 1969,
and only one third of the destructive power which we had at that
time.
The United States and the NATO allies have repeatedly said
that we will never use our arms, conventional or nuclear, unless
we are attacked.
Let me add something that might not be widely known in the
Soviet Union. In agreement with the NATO countries, the United
States since 1979 has removed from Europe well over 1,000 nuclear
warheads. When all of our withdrawals have been completed, the
total number of warheads withdrawn will be over 2,400. That's a
withdrawal of about 5 nuclear weapons for every intermediate-
range missile we plan to deploy. It will bring our nuclear forces
in Europe to the lowest level in some twenty years. We have seen
no comparable Soviet restraint.
If the Soviet Union is now reducing its intermediate range
missiles in Europe, that's a long overdue step. The Soviet Union
has now deployed 441 SS-20 missiles, each with three
warheads--that is 1323 warheads. I don't have to remind you that
this Soviet deployment began when NATO had no comparable systems
in Europe. We first attempted to negotiate an end to these
systems, but when we could not reach agreement, NATO proceeded
with a limited response which will take place gradually. Today,
QUESTION FIVE (Cont'd)
2
the Soviet Union commands an advantage in warheads of 7 to 1 on
missiles already deployed. Our position remains as it has always
been, that it would be better to negotiate an end to all of these
types of missiles. But even if our hopes for an agreement are
disappointed and NATO has to go to full deployment, this will
only be a maximum of 572 single-warhead missiles.
Moreover, President Carter cancelled both the
enhanced-radiation warhead and the B-1 bomber in 1978, and the
Soviet Union made no corresponding move. In fact, when asked
what the Soviet Union would reduce in response, one of your
officials said, "We are not philanthropists." In 1977 and 1978
the United States also tried to negotiate a ban on developing
anti-satellite weapons. The Soviet Union refused, and proceeded
to develop and test an anti-satellite weapon. Having already
established an operational anti-satellite system, the Soviet
Union now proposes a "freeze" before the U.S. can test its own
system. Obviously, that sort of "freeze" does not look very fair
to us; if the shoe were on the other foot, it wouldn't look very
fair to you either.
The issues between our two countries are of such importance
that the positions of each government should be communicated
accurately to the people of both countries. In this process, the
media of both countries have an important role to play. We
should not attempt to "score points" against each other. And the
media should not distort our positions. We are committed to
examining every Soviet proposal with care, seeking to find areas
of agreement. It is important that the Soviet government do the_
same in regard to our proposals.
The important thing is that we both deal seriously with each
other's proposals, and make a genuine effort to bridge our
differences in a way which serves the interests of both countries
and the world as a whole. It is in this spirit that I will be
approaching my meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
BASIC THEMES FOR THE TASS INTERVIEW
1. America's Desire for Peace. Peace is my most fervent goal,
and that of the American people. We appreciate the enormous
suffering the Soviet people experienced during WWII. We are no
less committed to the cause of peace. A nuclear war can never
be won and must never be fought.
2. America Does Not Threaten the Soviet Union: We threaten no
one. We seek no territory. We do not seek to dominate other
states. But we will defend our interests and those of our
allies.
3. Confidence and Optimism: I believe in the future of
democracy. It is in the ascendancy. It responds to the dreams
of ordinary men and women. We will never, and need never, seek
to impose our preferred system on others. United States
foreign policy is firmly. grounded in the principles of freedom,
independence of states and the dignity of man.
4. U.S.-Soviet Common Interests: Despite current differences,
our two countries cooperated successfully in past. Heroism in
WWII. American soldiers died bringing aid to USSR; some lie
buried on Soviet soil. Despite the problems in U.S.-Soviet
relations, we have avoided war and cooperated in many areas --
nuclear non-proli feration, science, culture.
5. Realism. Our relations will be competitive in many
respects; we must find realistic ways to manage that
competition peacefully, and to expand areas of cooperation
where possible. This means seeking the attainable in our
relations: peace, recognition of other side's reasonable
interests, adherence to mutual obligations. We will do our
part; we insist that you do yours.
6. Contacts between People: Our relations should be more than
just relations between governments. We want ties between
peoples. We want to expand personal contacts, exchanges,
communication.
7. The November meeting. I look forward to productive talks in
Geneva. We want to get beyond stereotypes, compare hopes and
plans for the future, and set our governments to work in
solving problems. This is the hope of our two peoples and all
mankind.
DECLASSIFIED
By
White Crs House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 7/1/02
SECRET/SENSITIVE
JFMO 8
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CLASSIFIED
Gordifeuskg 14
Matlock
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3#7936
BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/07
NOT FOR SYSTEM
TFM08 JM-C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
October 29, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK ASMY
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
As you requested in your PROFs note, I have prepared a Memorandum
(TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the
paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOL 714/3 #7937
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR
BY Gs NARA DATE 10/36/07
16
NOT FOR SYSTEM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper
summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky
regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British
Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the
information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents
from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable
doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who
worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and
was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of
his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the
highest policy making levels.
His observations and assessments are in general accord with my
own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern
over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that
they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in
a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic
problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt
that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.
I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they
will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the
results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many
other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They
know that they would under no circumstances share such
information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part
are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view
such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.
Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however,
are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia"
"by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic
devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However,
he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building
measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for
cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are
well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in
these areas.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR FOL-114/3 #7938
BY Gs NARA DATE 10/30/07
SECRET
- 2 -
On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding
the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can
be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could
find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area
where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track
record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows
they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex
technologies).
I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to
press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening
about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike
strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give
us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether
there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange
for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without
crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable -- though not
likely -- that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify
turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases
in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is not
the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the
chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms
reduction would be much improved.
I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under
the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they
manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the
perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least
half believing them. "Therefore, I agree that you need to be very
clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful)
in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we seee them as
a threat.
Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I
believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply
it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete
prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of
having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such
leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on
the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet
egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role
in World War II.
Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming
increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy
is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be
"sold" as inproving Soviet ability to cope with their economic
problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the
traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real
arms reduction.
SECRET
SECRET
18
- 3 -
George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of
these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will
keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva
meeting.
Attachment:
Tab A
Summary of Gordievskiy's Points
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
CRET
SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS
1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in
strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic
strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information
about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick.
They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the
Soviet economy.
3. The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans
could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States
and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of
practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.
4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on reducing
offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defence.
This would avoid the need for an overall increase in military
expenditure.
5. But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence
if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people
by means of a greatly stepped up prcpaganda campaign against the
Untied States.
6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under
the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs
to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.
7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real
nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's
own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8.
Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United
States relations. Everything else is secondary.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR Fole- 7944
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
SECRET
- 2 -
20
9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United
States relations will be to gain better access to Soviet U.S.
technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success.
It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel
that they are the equal of the United States. United States/
Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.
10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all
in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at
present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the
United States.
11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve
the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they
have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably
prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.
12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people.
The military complex is a real power: and the military are
increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.
SECRET
Ju-c
System II
91123
21
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
ACTION
October 29, 1985
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE Asm
JACK F. MATLOCKA
NSC Meeting following SecState's Consultations in
Moscow
Recommendation
That you authorize Bill Martin to forward the Schedule Proposal
at Tab I to Fred Ryan requesting time with the President for a
debrief for the NSC following Secretary Shultz' consultations in
Moscow.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab I
Schedule Proposal for Fred Ryan
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By
White us House Guidelines, August
NARA, Date 7/1/02
System II
91123
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
REQUEST:
NSC Meeting.
PURPOSE:
Secretary Shultz will debrief the NSC
following his consultations in Moscow.
BACKGROUND:
Secretary Shultz, Robert C. McFarlane and
Jack Matlock will be in Moscow November 3-6
for consultations with General Secretary
Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
This meeting will enable the President to
hear their report of the discussions and to
provide guidance for the preparations for
Geneva.
PREVIOUS
None.
PARTICIPATION:
DATE & TIME:
Friday, November 8
DURATION: 60 minutes
LOCATION:
Cabinet Room
PARTICIPANTS:
The President, the Vice President, Secretary
Shultz, Mr. Regan, Mr. McFarlane, Jack
Matlock, and others as appropriate.
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:
Meeting with the President.
REMARKS REQUIRED:
None
MEDIA COVERAGE:
None
PROPOSED "PHOTO":
None
RECOMMENDED BY:
Robert C. McFarlane
OPPOSED BY:
None
PROJECT OFFICER:
Jack F. Matlock
Prepared by:
Tyrus Cobb
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
White us House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/1/02 1997
By
23
HE WHITE HOUSE
No5 Fox syste
WASHINGTON
godhyrisky
PRESERVATION COPY
MATUCK
DECLASSIFIED /RE/04SD)
NLRR F06-114/3 N7934
BY CH NARA DATE 10/30/07
SAY
NOT FOR SYSTEM
55mg 24
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
October 29, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Asay
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
As you requested in your PROFs note, I have prepared a Memorandum
(TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the
paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 806-114/3 *7940
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR
BY Car NARA DATE 10/30/07
25
NOT FOR SYSTEM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper
summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky
regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British
Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the
information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents
from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable
doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who
worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and
was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of
his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the
highest policy making levels.
His observations and assessments are in general accord with my
own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern
over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that
they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in
a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic
problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt
that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.
I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they
will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the
results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many
other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They
know that they would under no circumstances share such
information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part
are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view
such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.
Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however,
are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia"
"by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic
devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However,
he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building
measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for
cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are
well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in
these areas.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR R06-114/3 7948
BY CH NARA DATE 10/30/07
SECRET
26
- 2 -
On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding
the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can
be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could
find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area
where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track
record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows
they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex
technologies).
I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to
press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening
about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike
strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give
us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether
there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange
for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without
crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable -- though not
likely -- that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify
turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases
in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is not
the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the
chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms
reduction would be much improved.
I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under
the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they
manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the
perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least
half believing them. "Therefore, I agree that you need to be very
clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful)
in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we seee them as
a threat.
Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I
believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply
it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete
prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of
having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such
leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on
the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet
egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role
in World War II.
Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming
increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy
is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be
"sold" as inproving Soviet ability to cope with their economic
problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the
traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real
arms reduction.
SECRET
SECRET
21
- 3 -
George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of
these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will
keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva
meeting.
Attachment:
Tab A
Summary of Gordievskiy's Points
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
SECRET
24
SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS
1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in
strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic
strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information
about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick.
They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the
Soviet economy.
3. The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans
could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States
and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of
practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.
4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on reducing
offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defence.
This would avoid the need for an overall increase in military
expenditure.
5. But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence
if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people
by means of a greatly stepped up prcpaganda campaign against the
Untied States.
6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under
the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs
to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.
7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real
nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's
own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United
States relations. Everything else is secondary.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3*7945
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
SECRET
- 2 -
29
9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United
States relations will be to gain better access to Soviet U.S.
technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success.
It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel
that they are the equal of the United States. United States/
Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.
10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all
in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at
present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the
United States.
11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve
the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they
have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably
prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.
12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people.
The military complex is a real power: and the military are
increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.
SECRET
Mathrk
30
NOT FOR SYSTEM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SYSTEM II
91139
WASHINGTON
SECRET
October 30, 1985
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
de
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE am
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper
summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky
regarding dealing with Gorbachev. Gordiyevsky worked for British
Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the
information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents
from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable
doubt of his bona fides. His view would be that of a person who
worked in the most "sensitive" Soviet security organization and
was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of
his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the
highest policy making levels.
His observations and assessments are in general accord with my
own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern
over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that
they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in
a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic
problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt
that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.
I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they
will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the
results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many
other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They
know that they would under no circumstances share such
information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part
are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view
such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.
Gordiyevsky's suggestions for dealing with this problem, however,
are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet "paranoia"
"by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic
devices," we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However,
he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building
measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for
cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are
well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in
these areas.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR
BY as NARA DATE 6/30/07
SECRET
31
- 2 -
On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding
the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can
be applied to strategic defense. I don't see how Gorbachev could
find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area
where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track
record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows
they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex
technologies).
I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to
press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening
about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike
strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give
us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether
there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange
for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without
crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable -- though not
likely -- that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify
turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases
in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is not
the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the
chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms
reduction would be much improved.
I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under
the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they
manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the
perpetrators of lies often begin believing them -- or at least
half believing them. Therefore, I agree that you need to be very
clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful)
in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we seed them as
a threat.
Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success" -- which I
believe is real -- does give us a certain leverage, if we apply
it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete
prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of
having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such
leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on
the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet
egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role
in World War II.
Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming
increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy
is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be
"sold" as improving Soviet ability to cope with their economic
problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the
traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real
arms reduction.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
32
George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of
these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will
keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva
meeting.
Attachment:
Tab A
Summary of Gordievskiy's Points
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
SECRET
33
SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS
1.
Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in
strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic
strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information
about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick.
They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the
Soviet economy.
3.
The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans
could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States
and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of
practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.
4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on reducing
offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defence.
This would avoid the need for an overall increase in military
expenditure.
5.
But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence
if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people
by means of a greatly stepped up prcpaganda campaign against the
Untied States.
6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under
the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs
to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.
7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real
nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's
own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.
8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United
States relations. Everything else is secondary.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3#7946
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
- 2 -
34
9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United
States relations will be to gain better access to Soviet U.S.
technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success.
It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel
that they are the equal of the United States. United States/
Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.
10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all
in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at
present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the
United States.
11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve
the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they
have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably
prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.
12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people.
The military complex is a real power: and the military are
increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.
SECRET
35
SYSTEM II: 91139
NOT FOR SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
October 29, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK ASM
SUBJECT:
Gordiyevsky's Suggestions
As you requested in your PROFs note, I have prepared a Memorandum
(TAB I) for the President which discusses the points made in the
paper which Prime Minister Thatcher gave the President last week.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Summary of Gordiyevsky's Points
DECLASSIFIED
RW
10/30/07
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/3#937 7943
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11
JM-C36
8738
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
October 30, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 454
SUBJECT:
Soviet Films for the President
I think it would be extremely useful for the President to see two
Soviet films before his November meeting with Gorbachev.
The first film has been selected to help give him a feel for
everyday life in the USSR. The second will focus on Soviet
perceptions of World War II. Attached at Tab I is a Schedule
Proposal requesting that the first film be placed on the
President's calendar for this weekend, November 1-2, at Camp
David, for viewing at his leisure.
The film, "Moscow Doesn't Believe in Tears", traces the marriages
of three young women and, in the process, provides a rare look at
the social pretensions and prejudices at work in Soviet society.
A synopsis card is attached at Tab A. The film runs 2 hours 45
minutes. The 35 mm reels are in the East Wing projection room
ready for shipment to Camp David.
Johnathan) mf Miller concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you forward the attached Schedule Proposal to Fred Ryan.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Schedule Proposal
Tab A
Synoposis Card
DECLASSIFIED
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
White House Guidelines, August 1997
By
NARA, Date 7/1/02
37
8738
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
TO:
FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
REQUEST:
Soviet Film showing
PURPOSE:
To assist in preparing the President for his
November meeting with Gorbachev
BACKGROUND:
Several films were obtained from the Soviet
Embassy and previewed by Jack Matlock's
staff. Two have been selected as useful
preparation for the November meeting with
Gorbachev. One film will give the President
a feel for everyday life in the USSR, and the
second will focus on Soviet perceptions of
World War II. It is recommended that the
first film be viewed this weekend.
DATE & TIME:
November 2 or 3 at the President's leisure
DURATION: 2 hours and 45 minutes
LOCATION:
Camp David
PARTICIPANTS:
The President and Mrs. Reagan
OUTLINE OF EVENTS: View films
RECOMMENDED BY:
Jack F. Matlock
OPPOSED BY:
None
Attachment:
Tab A
Film Snyopsis
MOSCOW DOESN'T BELIEVE IN TEARS
This film traces the romances and marriages
of three young Soviet women. In the pro-
cess it is unusually frank in its portrayal
of Soviet life - revealing many of its pre-
tensions and prejudices. The story's
heroine rises from simple factory worker
to plant manager (a Soviet Horatio Alger)
despite the burdens of being a single
parent.
8761
JM-C9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
October 30, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THROUGH:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK for
SUBJECT:
Travel Request Ito Accompany Secretary of State
Shultz to Moscow November 2 - 5, 1985
I have been asked to accompany Secretary of State Shultz to
Moscow to participate in his talks with Soviet officials on
November 2-5, 1985, in preparation for the Geneva Meeting.
I will be traveling on government aircraft. Per Diem costs will
be covered by the Department of State.
RECOMMENDATION
Approve
Disapprove
cc: Administrative Office
AnDex II
NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
40
DATE:
October 30, 1985
1.
TRAVELER'S NAME:
JACK F. MATLOCK
2. PURPOSE (S), EVENT (S), DATE(S): Accompany SecState Shultz to Moscow
to participate in discussions with Soviet Officials re Geneva Meeting
November 19-20, 1985
3.
ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington/Helsinki/Moscow/Washington
DEPARTURE DATE Nov. 2
RETURN DATE Nov. 5, 1985
TIME
TIME
4.
MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR
POV
RAIL
OTHER
5.
ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION
PER DIEM
OTHER
TOTAL TRIP COST
X
6.
WHO PAYS EXPENSES:
NSC
OTHER
7.
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
X
B.
WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES
NO
9.
IF so, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler,
Describe Source and Arrangements):
10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED:
$
11. REMARKS : (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would
Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
(
12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE:
13. APPROVALS:
JM-C
SYSTE
::
41
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNC..
WASHINGTON D.C 2050
SECRET
October 31, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 5m and BOB LINHARD
SUBJECT:
Letter from President to Gorbachev
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending
that he sign the letter to Gorbachev which notifies Gorbachev of
our new proposals in the NST negotiations and supports Secretary
Shultz's meetings next week.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
President's Letter to Gorbachev
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Cs House Guidelines, 7/1/02
NARA, Date
By
42
SYSTEM :
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTO
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to Gorbachev
Issue
Whether to sign a letter to Gorbachev.
Facts
Shevardnadze delivered to you a letter from Gorbachev when you
met September 27. This letter has not yet been answered.
Discussion
Gorbachev's letter notified you that the Soviets would be making
new proposals at the Geneva negotiations. Now that we are
prepared to reply to that offer, it would be appropriate for you
to respond to Gorbachev's letter by notifying him of our new
proposals. This letter also serves to give your personal
endorsement to George Shultz's mission to Moscow next week.
Recommendation
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
OK
No
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
-
-
Attachment:
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Declassify on : OADR
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28,1997
By
CVS NARA, Date 7/1/02
43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New
York October 24, I have been giving careful
consideration to your letter dated September 12.
The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas
you have put forward are in many ways interesting,
and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before
replying.
Many of the specific points you addressed in your
letter have been or will be dealt with by our
delegations in the Geneva arms control negotia-
tions or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter
I will therefore focus on what I consider the most
significant issues you have raised.
You suggested in your letter that we might reach
an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear
war and other general principles which should
guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since
proposed specific language for our consideration.
As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my
view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought. I therefore have instructed
Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings
next week.
As we address this and other elements which may
figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I
believe it is important to give the most careful
consideration to our words. The experience of the
past has been that overly vague or rhetorical
language has led to expectations which, given the
competitive aspect of our relationship to which
you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.
Authority NLSF99-051 #358 smf 10/16/08
DECLASSIFIED /RE/SE)
or CAS
NARA, Date 7/1/02
44
If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings
and disillusionment, our own statements should be
clear and based on concrete achievements. I am
convinced that there is substantial common ground
on the range of areas we have been discussing in
connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I
would hope that this common ground can be expanded
during our meeting in Geneva.
You raised several specific areas in the security
field where this might be possible. Secretary
Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas
in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I
believe you will find that we are indeed prepared
to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meet-
ing is a productive one.
I do, however, want to address your response to
the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva
arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your
letter and which your delegation subsequently
tabled in Geneva.
We have been carefully assessing your counter-
proposal over the last month. As I stated in my
address to the United Nations on October 24, I
believe that within it there are seeds which we-
should nurture and that in the coming weeks we
should seek to establish a genuine process of give-
and-take.
In order to foster such a process, I have approved
a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build
upon the positive elements of your counterproposal
and bridge the positions of our two sides. I have
asked our negotiators to extend the current round
to permit your experts to achieve a full understan-
ding of our approach. This new proposal deals
with all three areas under discussion in the
Geneva negotiations. Its essence is a proposal
for radical and stabilizing reductions in
strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement
on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems,
both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also
propose that both sides provide assurances that
their strategic defense programs are and will
remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty.
Such assurances assume a resolution of our current
differences over compliance with the Treaty.
In the area of strategic arms, the United States
agrees with the objective of a fifty percent
reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our
proposal builds on this, applying the fifty
percent principle in a manner that is both
equitable and can enhance stability. In the area
of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also
looked for elements we find in common. While I
continue to firmly believe that the best outcome
would be the complete elimination of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new
proposal, we have also moved in your direction.
In defense and space we must begin now to
establish a framework for a cooperative transition
to more reliance on defenses and we would like to
see a more developed dialogue on how such a tran-
sition could be jointly undertaken.
We have designed our approach to provide for a
mutually acceptable resolution of the range of
nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of
the interrelationship between the offense and the
defense; and to address those concerns that you
and your negotiators have described as being of
great importance to you. I am convinced that this
new proposal can provide the basis for immediate
and genuine progress on the numerous and complex
issues facing us in the nuclear and space area,
and I look forward to discussing it with you in
Geneva later this month.
We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to
discuss the other areas which make up our rela-
tionship. Much work remains to be done if we are
to be able to announce specific progress on
regional and bilateral issues. I hope that
Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus
to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.
L
In conclusion, may I say once more that I am look-
ing forward to our meeting and that I sincerely
hope we will be able to set our countries on a
less confrontational and more cooperative course
in the years ahead. I will personally spare no
effort to help bring this about.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow