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Asia – USSR (2)
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Asia – USSR (2)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Asia - USSR (2)
Box: 21
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/21/2005
File Folder
USSR-ASIA 2/4
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
21
YARHI-MILO
2102
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8708 CABLE
260940Z FEB 81
2 2/26/1981 B1
8714 MEMO
ASEAN MILITARY COOPERATION
1 6/18/1981 B1
8709 MEMO
SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM: A
1
ND
B1
REVIEW
8722 CABLE
261217Z FEB 81
2 2/26/1981 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8723 MEMO
ASIAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL
1 3/24/1981 B1
ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8710 MEMO
KAMPUCHEA AT THE GENERAL
1
ND
B1
ASSEMBLY: MOSCOW DIGS IN
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8721 MEMO
NORTH KOREA--USSR: RELATIONS REMAIN
2 3/24/1981 B1
COOL
PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
8711 TABLE OF
EAST ASIA REVIEW
1 3/24/1981 B1
CONTENTS
PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/21/2005
File Folder
USSR-ASIA 2/4
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
21
YARHI-MILO
2102
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8712 MEMO
DOBRIANSKY RE SOVIET WORKING
4 4/14/1981 B1
GROUP: NOTES ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS
IN EAST ASIA
8713 MEMO
DOBRIANSKY RE SOVIET WORKING
2 4/16/1981 B1
GROUP: NOTES ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS
IN EAST ASIA
8724 MEMO
OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIETS AT CAM
2 4/24/1981 B1
RANH, VIETNAM
P
12/1/2009
F06-114/6
8715 CABLE
100400Z SEP 81
2 9/10/1981 B1
8725 CABLE
111547Z SEP 81
9 9/11/1981 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8726 CABLE
151639Z SEP 81
8 9/15/1981 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8727 CABLE
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN THE FAR
1 9/15/1981 B1
EAST
8728 CABLE
SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AID TO
1 10/5/1981 B1
KAMPUCHEA SUPPLANTS EMERGENCY
RELIEF
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/21/2005
File Folder
USSR-ASIA 2/4
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
21
YARHI-MILO
2102
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8716 MEMO
LILLEY TO ALLEN RE THAI PRIME
1 10/7/1981 B1
MINISTER PREM'S MEMORANDUM
R 3/19/2013 F2006-114/6
8729 PAPER
THAILAND
7 10/6/1981 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8730 PAPER
SOVIET REGIONAL SECURITY PROPOSALS
2 2/23/1982 B1
FOR ASIA
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8731 PAPER
ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY
6
ND
B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8717 MEMO
MOSCOW COURTS SEOUL
1 10/25/1982 B1
8718 MEMO
USSR: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
1 3/17/1983 B1
IN THE FAR EAST
8732 CABLE
260942Z JAN 83
4 1/26/1983 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8719 MEMO
USSR: MILITARY POSTURE IN THE FAR
1 1/27/1984 B1
EAST
8720 MEMO
COUNTERING SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO
2 2/26/1985 B1
PENETRATE THE SOUTH PACIFIC
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WALL STREET JOURNAL 12 FEBRUARY 1981 Pg. 24
PART II MAIN EDITION -- 12 FEBRUARY 1981
Soviets in Asia: Evolution of a Blueprint
suret
win
By MARIAN K. LEIGHTON
In 1969 Moscow floated a proposal for a
Soviet-sponsored collective security system
in Asia. Washington, preoccupied with the
U.S.S.R.
Vietnam war, tended to ignore the pro-
KURIL
posal, while most Asian capitals adopted a
ISLANDS
wait-and-see attitude. Peking denounced
the plan as a schedule to isolate and
"contain" China. The Soviet initiative
helped propel China into a rapprochement
with the United States.
Details of the Soviet proposal were de-
liberately vague (there were even hints
that Chinese participation would be wel-
come), but the USSR apparently aspired to
fill a vacuum that it foresaw as a result of
GHANISTAN
CHINA
the impending British withdrawal from
areas east of Suez and of a greatly reduced
PAKISTAN
U.S. military presence in post-Vietnam
Asia.
LAOS
Persian
INDIA
Pacific
With the hindsight of a decade, it is evi-
Gulf
BURMA
dent that Moscow has constructed the foun-
dations of an Asian security system under
South
its aegis. One aspect has been a Soviet dip-
China
lomatic offensive for closer relations with
the non-Communist governments of Asia,
Strait
See
PHILIPPINES
many of which harbor a traditional distrust
of
of the Kremlin. However, in view of the
Malacca
CAMBODIA
waning appeal of Communist ideology and
MALAYSIA
of Moscow's inability to match the West in
providing trade, economic aid and credits,
SINGAPORE
the overwhelming thrust of Soviet policy in
Asia has been military.
Aided by a favorable shift in the overall
for Cambodia, all these countries either lie
by virtue of unimpeded Soviet access to
U.S.-Soviet strategic equation, by an im-
along the Indian Ocean littoral or control
Cam Ranh Bay and other Vietnamese na-
pressive Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific
air access (by means of overflights in the
val facilities, has become a Communist
and Indian Oceans and by the consolidation
case of Afghanistan) to that ocean. They
lake.
of a united, militarily powerful Vietnamese
also constitute a gateway to the strategic
In addition to its strategic significance,
ally, the USSR has drawn Cambodia, Laos
Indian subcontinent, which forms as much
the South China Sea is believed to contain
and Afghanistan toward its orbit by sheer
of a linchpin for a potential Pax Sovietica
rich oil deposits and is the locus of regional
military force and has intimidated many
as it did for the British Empire.
disputes (for example, over ownership of
other Asian states with the specter of
the Paracel and Spratly Islands, or rights
growing military strength in the region and
The ultimate scope of Soviet ambitions
to seabed minerals) that are potentially as
willingness to use it.
in Asia was manifested in a Radio Moscow
serious as those among the quarreling
U.S. Reluctance
broadcast of Aug. 17, 1969, which declared
states of the Persian Gulf and as conducive
that "India, Pakistan and Afghanistan
For example, the perceived U.S. reluc-
to Soviet meddling. Also, naval and air su-
would form the nucleus of the [collective
tance to counteract the Soviet bid for
premacy in the South China Sea puts the
security] system, which would eventually
hegemony in Asia has led some members
Soviet Union in position to exert political
embrace all countries from the Middle
of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
pressure against the Philippines.
East to Japan." Soviet friendship treaties
tions (ASEAN) to contemplate closer ties
with such Asian states as Iraq (in 1972),
"Dumbbell" Strategy
with the USSR in the wake of the Cambo-
India (1971). Afghanistan and Vietnam
When one considers that dominance of
dian crisis and has prompted Pakistan and
(both in 1978) subsequently paved the way
the Strait of Malacca would enable the
Iran to reassess their foreign policies in
for an extension of Soviet influence in the
USSR to link the Pacific and Indian Ocean
view of the Soviet invasion of neighboring
Middle East, the subcontinent and South-
subregions, the far-reaching implications
Afghanistan.
east Asia. It is less well known, however,
of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective secu-
There is a further danger that the grow-
ing strength and influence of the Soviet
that in February 1978 Moscow handed To-
rity system emerge clearly. China has al-
Union in Asia will erode Peking's confi-
kyo the draft of a Soviet-Japanese treaty of
ready warned of a Soviet "dumbbell"
dence in close Sino-American ties and bol-
good neighborliness and cooperation. Ja.
strategy focused on the strait and aimed at
ster the position of those in the Chinese
pan rejected the pact, which apparently
outflanking Western Europe, the United
leadership who reportedly favor a rap-
aimed (without success) at forestalling a
States and Japan. The success of such a
prochement with the USSR.
Sino-Japanese peace treaty. Having failed
strategy would also effectively sever the
to win over Japan with diplomatic over-
links among the members of ASEAN by
Though membership in Moscow's pro-
posed system is ostensibly open to all coun-
tures, however, the Kremlin resorted to a
isolating Thailand and western Malaysia
pattern that has become distressingly fa-
from the rest of the group.
tries in the region, those singled out for
miliar elsewhere in Asia - a military
In this broad context, the Soviet inter-
mention in the original proposal (published
buildup (in this case, beginning in 1978 on
vention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese
in Izvestia May 28, 1969) offer a clue to So-
viet intentions. Political commentator Vi-
the disputed southern Kuril Islands) de-
invasion of Cambodia represent not iso-
signed to intimidate Japanese policymak-
lated regional crises but parts of a broader
kenty Matveyev, author of the article,
Soviet strategy. In its general outlines, a
ers.
cited India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma,
The invasions of Afghanistan by Soviet
Soviet-style collective security system al-
Singapore and Cambodia as important
troops and of Cambodia by those of Mos-
ready exists in Asia-in fact if not in
members of the proposed system. Except
cow's Vietnamese proxy bespeak the devel-
name.
opment of a two-pronged strategy aimed at
While the timing and tactics of Mos-
Marian K. Leighton is an analyst in the
Soviet control of access to the Persian Gulf
cow's move into Afghanistan were proba-
National Foreign Assessment Center of the
and the Strait of Malacca, key arteries for
bly dictated mainly by domestic develop-
Central Intelligence Agency. The article
transport of Middle Eastern oil to Western
ments in that country, the invasion sug-
does not imply a CIA endorsement of the
Europe and Japan. Moreover, the strait af-
author's views.
fords entree to the South China Sea which,
(See SOVIETS, Pg. 10-F)
ASIA foreast
(Thai(and) 5
814
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******E COPY
OP IMMED
STU1769
DE RUMTBK #1593. 571218
0 2612177 FEB 81
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2607
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4 16
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6311
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1552
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4858
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 6580
AMEMBASSY MANILA 4286
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1474
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7582
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2790
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3411
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 3955
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
(FYI)
CONFIDENTIAL BANGKOK 11593
&
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
EO 12065: GDS- 2 26 87 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ASEAN, VM, TH, UR
SUBJ: REACTION TO SOVIET DEMARCHE TO ASEAN ON INDOCHINA
REF: A. FBIS BK 240704, B. FBIS BK 240121, C. FBIS LD
212252, D. MANILA 4233, E. JAKARTA 2797
1. (c - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. THAIS RESPONDED NEGATIVELY TO THE SOVIET CALL FOR
DECLASSIFIED
ASEAN RECONSIDERATION OF THE INDOCHINESE STATES' PROPO-
NLS # F06-114/6#8722
SALS ON KAMPUCHEA. WITHOUT HAVING YET RECEIVED THE so-
VIET DEMARCHE, FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI SAVETSILA ON MON-
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
DAY, FEBRUARY 23, DISMISSED IT AND THE PARENT INDOCHI-
NESE PROPOSAL AS OLD HAT. NO OFFICIAL TEXT OF SITTHI'S
REMARKS HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE; BOTH THAI DOMESTIC RADIO
AND THE CLOSE-TO-THE-GOVERNMENT BANGKOK POST BRIEFLY
PARAPHRASED HIS REJECTION OF THE SOVIET EFFORT (REFS A
AND B). PM PREM HAS REPORTEDLY ALSO TOLD PRESS THAT THE
PROPOSAL OFFERS NOTHING NEW. A SOVIET EXPERT AT THE MFA,
HOWEVER, COULD NOT CONFIRM PREM'S STATEMENT, WHICH RE-
*WHSR COMMENT
COL VP
EOB:ECON,EA,PRC,EURE
PSN: 017823 PAGE 01
TOR:057/12:52Z DTG:261217Z FEB 81
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******E COPY
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******E COPY
CEIVED ALMOST NO MEDIA COVERAGE.
3. MFA DESK OFFICER SAID THAT THE SOVIET'S WRITTEN
DEMARCHE IS RECEIVING FURTHER STUDY, BUT THE THAIS
PROBABLY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT FORMALLY RESPOND. HE
SPECULATED THAT THE REGULAR ASEAN MEETING SCHEDULED FOR
JAKARTA IN TWO WEEKS MIGHT ISSUE SOME JOINT RESPONSE.
4. SOVIET EMBASSY MADE THE DEMARCHE HERE BY HAVING
AN ATTACHE LATE FEBRUARY 23 DELIVER PAPER TO MFA'S
EUROPEAN DIVISION. ENVELOPE WAS ADDRESSED TO PRIME
MINISTER AND CONTAINED UNSIGNED PAPER TITLED "APPEAL TO
THE THAI GOVERNMENT, THE TEXT BEING IN ESSENCE IDENTICAL
TO THAT GIVEN TO PHILIPPINES (REF D). BY THE TIME IT
DRIFTED UP TO SITTHI'S OFFICE, HE HAD ALREADY GONE
HOME FOR THE EVENING.
5. COMMENT: THE CASUAL, LOW-KEY SOVIET DELIVERY
OF THE MESSAGE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS DID
NOT EXPECT TO GET VERY FAR WITH IT HERE. THEY DIDN'T'
ABRAMOWITZ
BT
PSN: 17823
PAGE. 2
OF 02
TOR:057/12:52Z
DTG:261217Z FEB 81
*******C ONFIDENTIAL******* COPY
SECRETXEXDIS
USSR/ASIA USSR / ASIA
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS: MARCH 24, 1981
1.
ASIAN RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES
Brezhnev's proposal to discuss confidence building measures
(CBMS) in Asia is viewed by Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul as an
effort to drive a wedge between the US and its friends and allies.
While Brezhnev gave no details in his February 23 speech at the
Soviet Party Congress, the measures may involve notification
of military movements and exercises and the presence of observers,
as in Europe.
*
*
*
Japan views the proposal as a Soviet attempt to ease rela-
tions with Tokyo in order to short-circuit its efforts to build
a public consensus in favor of an expanded security role in
coordination with the US. The Japanese have not yet formally
replied to the Brezhnev proposal. But last week, Foreign Minister
Ito chided Soviet Ambassador Polyansky for talking about building
confidence and improving bilateral relations while the Soviet
Union was occupying (and constructing military facilities on)
Japan's "inherent" territory of the northern islands.
Ito indicated that a peace treaty between the two countries
could not be signed, or relations improved significantly, until
NLS F06-114/6#8723
LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
the Soviets squarely faced the northern islands issue. He also
told Polyansky that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and sup-
port for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea augered poorly for
building confidence in the USSR.
DECLASSIFIED
Beijing attributes Moscow's current emphasis on dialogue to
its internal and external problems and to its "unprecedented"
isolation in the world. The Chinese see CBMS as a tactical,
rather than a fundamental, shift in Soviet strategy to divide
Western Europe and the US. They also believe that reconnaissance
satellites reduce the value of CBMS. Beijing does not plan to
provide the Soviets with a formal response.
BY
South Korea sees Brezhnev's proposal as aimed at driving a
wedge between the US and the ROK -- perhaps to hamper such military
cooperation as the ongoing "Team Spirit '81" joint military exer-
cise. Seoul believes that any consideration of CBMS should be
preceded by a change in North Korea's posture toward the South,
including acceptance of the ROK's proposal for North-South talks
at presidential level and dual Korean UN membership.
North Korea has not commented publicly. It is likely to
feel even more isolated than usual by any indication -- perceived
or real -- that Moscow may be seeking an accommodation with the
US, Japan, and South Korea. Pyongyang probably believes that
neither Beijing nor Moscow is a dependable ally.
SECRET/EXDIS
ASIA
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
2. KAMPUCHEA AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: MOSCOW DIGS IN
Brezhnev's bilateral discussions with the leaders of Vietnam,
Laos, and Kampuchea earlier this month, and the recent tough Soviet
statement on Southeast Asia delivered to the ASEAN states, indicate
Moscow will show little flexibility on Kampuchea at this fall's
UNGA. Although there may be some cosmetic variations on the stan-
dard formulas, the Soviéts are evidently prepared to confront the
opposition head-on rather than take positions that might suggest
less than full endorsement of the Heng Samrin regime and its Viet-
namese supporters.
*
*
The Kampuchean issue appears to have been a major agenda item
for Brezhnev's recent meetings with each of the Indochinese party
leaders. The primary focus was on longer-term tactics to erode
ASEAN opposition to the Vietnamese occupation rather than on new
formulations to blunt the ASEAN UN offensive.
The USSR's Indochinese allies evidently intend to pursue con-
NLS F06-114/6*8710
sultations with the ASEAN states and to keep trying to improve
their ties with other third world countries. Among the ASEAN coun-
tries, Indonesia and Malaysia will be the object of particular
DECLASSIFIED
NARA, DATE
Soviet attention, since they are the most suspicious of Chinese
intentions in supporting the resistance in Kampuchea.
Soviet commentators likened Brezhnev's sessions with the Indo-
chinese to the Crimea bilaterals with the USSR's East European and
Mongolian allies. This comparison presumably was intended to
underscore the alliance relationship and therefore the firmness of
Soviet support for Indochinese interests. Vietnam received partic-
ularly solicitous treatment. Its primary role in Laos was affirmed
BY
when Brezhnev and Laotian leader Kaysone emphasized the importance
of Laos' ties with the other Indochinese states.
The UN conference on Kampuchea in July and vigorous efforts by
some of the ASEAN countries to unify and strengthen Kampuchean
opposition groups have added to the pressures on the Indochinese
regimes. They also face serious economic difficulties, continuing
diplomatic isolation, and varying degrees of popular opposition.
Soviet and Indochinese proposals for a regional conference,
already rejected by ASEAN, will not be an effective weapon in the
UN debate on Kampuchea. But the Soviets apparently have concluded
that under present circumstances any indications of flexibility
will be interpteted as a weakening of support for Vietnam and their
other Indochinese allies.
CONE IDENTIAL
SECRET
USSR/ASIA
FOIA(b) (3)
NORTH KOREA - USSR: RELATIONS REMAIN COOL
The atmospherics surrounding North Korea's partic-
ipation at the recent Soviet party congress indicate
that the relationship between the two countries remains
cool, despite Pyongyang's upgraded representation at the
congress. Soviet party leader Brezhnev, in his major
address on 23 February, omitted North Korea from the
list of "fraternal" socialist states in attendance and
made only a passing reference to Moscow's support for
Pyongyang.
Premier Yi Chong-ok, fifth ranking member of the
North Korean party, led the delegation to Moscow, thus
raising the level of Pyongyang's representation a notch
or two above that at similar gatherings in Moscow in
1971 and 1976. The selection of Yi, who visited China
in January, seemed calculated to reflect a more even-
handed approach by Pyongyang in its relations with Moscow
and Beijing. Yi was not received by Brezhnev but did
meet once with his Soviet counterpart, Premier Tikhonov,
on 4 March, one day after the congress closed.
The major impediment to improved relations between
the Soviet Union and North Korea is Kim Il-song's long-
standing ambition to reunify the Korean peninsula under
Pyongyang's control. Moscow, because of its broader
strategic interests, prefers the status quo in Northeast
Asia and is wary of Kim's propensity to escalate tensions
in an attempt to advance his reunification policy. The
Soviet distrust of Kim evidently is so strong that Moscow
has demonstrated little enthusiasm in recent years for
competing against China for influence with the North
Korean leader.
North Korea's determination to follow an independent
path has put Pyongyang at odds with Moscow on an increas-
ing number of issues. In the nonaligned movement, for
example, North Korea, in its efforts to curry favor with
the Third World, routinely warns against the danger of
24 March 1981
DECLASSIMED PART
1
SECRET
BY
Rw NLRR F06-114/6 #8771
MARA
DATE
11/16/15
10
SECRET
Soviet expansionism--the threat from so-called "domi-
nationist" forces. More recently North Korea took an
active hand in arranging a conference led by former
Kampuchean leader Sihanouk aimed at opposing the pro-
Soviet regime in Phnom Penh. These actions clearly
rankle the Soviets and call into question the serious-
ness of Pyongyang's efforts to repair its ties with
Moscow.
The Soviet Union is drafting an economic coopera-
tion agreement with North Korea for the period 1981-85.
According to a brief Soviet press announcement, Premier
Tikhonov discussed the five-year package with Yi Chong-ok
at their meeting in Moscow. The scope of that agreement
may help indicate the direction of Soviet-Korean rela-
tions. Soviet technicians continue to work on about
15 longstanding projects in North Korea, but no major
new ones appear to be in the works.
24 March 1981
2
SECRET
11
SECRET
FOIA(b) ( )
EAST ASIA REVIEW
24 March 1981
CONTENTS
North Korea - USSR: Relations Remain Cool
1
by
OPA,
The atmospherics surrounding North Korea's
participation at the recent Soviet party
congress indicate that the relationship
between the two countries remains cool,
despite Pyongyang's upgraded representa-
tion at the congress.
South Korea - Japan: Slight Thaw in
Relations
3
by
OPA,
President Chun Doo Hwan, believing that
South Korea holds a diplomatic advantage
over Japan, is pressing for concessions--
principally economic--as the two sides
move cautiously to improve their strained
relations.
Kampuchea: Hanoi's Elections
8
by
OPA,
Hanoi is likely to cite the results of
elections now under way in Kampuchea as
further evidence of a return to normalcy
there.
NOTE: Please change the serial number on the cover of the last
issue of East Asia Review, 10 March 1980, to read: PA EAR 81-005.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/64711
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15
SECRET
USSK ASIA
TOP SECRET/UMBRA/NOFORN
18
a
STATE
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
UMITED SWB . /
Current Analysis Series
April 24, 1981
POLITICO-MILITARY ANALYSES
Outlook for the Soviets at Cam Ranh, Vietnam (TOP SECRET/UMBRA/NOFORN) :
Improvements by the Soviets to the physical facilities at Cam
Ranh Bay Vietnam are continuing, and we expect that the Soviet
presence will slowly increase over the next 18 months. But we
believe that Cam Rann will continue to be only a forward operating
facility of very modest maintenance and logistic capability for
both ships and aircraft. Soviet warships will be supported primarily
by deployed tankers, repair and logistic ships (rather than by
elaborate shore facilities). Additional Tu-95 Bear naval recon-
naissance and anti-submarine, warfare aircraft deployments will
be limited unless the Soviets install significant maintenance
support units at the airfield.
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(FOIA(b) (3)
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The airfield improvements have been minor. They Soviets re-
furbished about six small barracks in February 1980 (possibly
for both Fix-24 and airfield personnel) and added some storage
sheds and a parking lot. In March the Soviets set up a ground
controlled approach system and runway lighting, and also installed
horizontal fuel tanks holding about three million liters of
aviation fuel, but they did not make runway improvements. Even
so, the Soviets were able to shift Tu-95 operations to shift from
Da Nang to Cam Ranh last summer.
Likewise, the Soviets have made little change in port facili-
ties, beyond improving road and pier surfaces, building a small
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
TOP SECRET/UMBRA/NOPORN
NLRR F06-114/6#8724 8724
RDS-2:4/24/01
BY RW NARA DATE 12/1/09
TCS-52247-81
TOP SECRET/RUFF/UMBRA/NOPORN
- 2 -
generator shed and a support building, and installing a water and
a fuel pipeline, the latter probably to the airfield fuel farm.
The 4,500-ton transporter dock, delivered in November 1980, can
provide only limited hull maintenance and is supplemented by the
continuous presence of a repair ship, which also has housed a naval
command element. The Lama-class missile tender was deployed only
temporarily during early 1980 to Cam Ranh, providing a "missile
magazine" for the additional Soviet ships deployed to the Indian
Ocean during the Afghanistan invasion and US-Iranian tensions.
In sum, the Soviets have made only a limited investment ashore--
one that could be removed within weeks and that conforms to their
austere operating pattern at Dahlak, Ethiopia. They can fuel
about 600 Tu-95 flying hours, but cannot at present maintain air-
craft to that extent. Moscow can support about six combatant ships
and two submarines, given its present level of one repair ship
and 6-9 other auxiliaries, and could support warship deployments
of about six months' duration. More support shipș could easily
be deployed.
Despite the limited nature of the improvements, Moscow:
--can more easily maintain a larger naval presence off South
China, in the Indian Ocean, and in the sea lanes between them;
--enjoys substantially better range, duration and responsive-
ness from its maritime surveillance operations in Indochina;
--can position a "surge force" for the Indian Ocean 7-10 days
closer than can be done from Vladivostok; and
--visibly signals support to Vietnam and the need for China and
ASEAN states to take the Soviets into account in their foreign
policies.
Briefly Noted:
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FOIA(b) (3)
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Prepared by: INR/PMA - T.Williams, M.Miller
Approved by: INR/CA - P.H. Stoddard
TOP SECRET/RUPP/UMBRA/NOFORN
ASiA
96
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(ASEAN)
IN
Jar East
PRIORITY
STU6887
DE RUEHMO #2808/01 2541558
P 111547Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOS COW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6854
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3476
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1432
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0650
NOTE
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0497
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0667
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0464
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0774
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4585
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1016
CONFINENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/11/01 (MCCALL, SHERROD B) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, IO, ASEAN
SUBJECT: SOVIET DISCUSSIONS WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES
1. (G-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: DURING INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MOCHTAR'S SEPTEMBER 4 STOPOVER IN MOSCOW, SOVIET
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6*8725
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FIRYUBIN APPEARED MOST
CONCERNED TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE HANOI'S
ISOLATION AND TO PROBE FOR INDONESIAN FLEXIBILITY
BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07
ON KAMPUCHEA, WHILE AVOIDING ANY CONCESSIONS ON
THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE HIMSELF. MOCHTAR EMPHASIZED
THAT THE WAY OUT FOR THE SOVIETS WAS TO ENCOURAGE
HANOI TO MEET ASEAN HALFWAY ON KAMPUCHEA ALONG
THE LINES OF THE UN RESOLUTION. HE ALSO SOUGHT
TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRIVE WEDGES
IN ASEAN BY SINGLING OUT INDONESIA FOR SPECIAL
TREATMENT WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND TO UNDERLINE
INDONESIAN COMMITMENT TO ASEAN UNITY. JUST BEFORE
THE MOCHTAR VISIT, THE MFA HAD CALLED IN OTHER
ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES TO HAND OVER A HARSH,
SIT:
EOB: NAU,GREGG,LILLEY,PIPES
WHSR COMMENTS:
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UNCOMPROMISING PAPER ON THE SOVIET POSITION ON
SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISSUES, A GESTURE THAT MAY HAVE
BEEN INTENDED TO INGRATIATE THE SOVIETS WITH
LE DUAN WHO ARRIVED IN MOSCOW AT THE SAME TIME
FOR HIS VISIT. THE INDONESIAN S TURNED ASIDE
SOVIET HINTS FOR A MOCHTAR-LE DUAN MEETING IN
MOSCOW. END SUMMARY.
3. ACCORDING TO THE INDONESIAN DCM (PROTECT),
FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WAS A
FAIRLY ROUTINE AFFAIR. THE INDONESIANS TURNED
ASIDE VARIOUS SOVIET OFFERS OF HOSPITALITY TO
EMPHASIZE THAT THIS WAS ONLY A STOPOVER, NOT AN
OFFICIAL VISIT, AND DID NOT ASK TO SEE GROMYKO
OR OTHER RANKING SOVIETS. (MOCHTAR PLANS TO COME
BACK FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT IN NOVEMBER.) WHILE MOST
OF MOCHTAR'S DISCUSSION DEALT WITH PURELY BILATERAL
AFFAIRS, FIRYUBIN DID MAKE A STRONG PITCH FOR
INDONESIAN SUPPORT FOR HANOI'S PROPOSALS FOR SOUTHEAST
ASIA. MOCHTAR EMPHASIZED THAT INDONESIA WAS
FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ASEAN AND SUPPORTED THE UN
RESOLUTION AS THE APPROPRIATE WAY TO SETTLE THE
KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE AND IMPROVE RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA. THE BULK OF FIRYUBINI'S TALKING POINTS
ARE INCLUDED IN THE HANDOUT GIVEN ASEAN COUNTRIES
QUOTED IN FULL IN PARAGRAPHS 6-14. THE INDONESIANS
DID, HOWEVER, NOTE HIS OBVIOUS CONCERN FOR HANOI'S
ISOLATION FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND
THE WORLD. TO AN EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE THAT
INDONESIA RETAINED DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH HANOI,
MOCHTAR REPLIED IT WAS NATURAL THEY SHOULD HAVE
RELATIONS AND THAT ASEAN HELD NO ILL-WILL FOR
VIETNAM. HE ARGUED FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENCOURAGE
HANOI TO BE MORE REASONABLE AND TO FOLLOW THROUGH
ON PROMISES MADE OF PEACEFUL INTENT. FIRYUBIN
STUCK TO HIS BRIEF AND MADE NO SUGGESTION THAT
MOS COW WOULD EXERT ANY PRESSURE ON HANOI.
4. THE INDONESIANS TELL US THAT MOCHTAR CONCLUDED
FROM HIS TALK THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PROBING FOR
WEAKNESSES IN ASEAN, LOOKING FOR POSSIBLE AREAS
OF COMPROMISE, AND HOPING THAT OTHER COUNTRIES
WOULD PUT FORWARD MORE PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT BE
COMBINED WITH SOME OF HANOI'S POSITIONS TO MOVE
TOWARD A SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA. THUS, HIS STRONG
EMPHASIS ON THE SOLIDITY OF ASEAN AND THE NEED
FOR HANOI TO COMPROMISE. HE TURNED ASIDE SOVIET
HINTS OF A POSSIBLE MEETING WITH LE DUAN WITH THE
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COMMENT THAT HE HAD NO REASON TO TALK TO THE
VIETNAMESE AT THE MOMENT. THE INDONESIANS ALSO
CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS
TO PROVE TO HANOI THEY WERE BACKING THE VIETNAMESE
FULLY IN ORDER TO FORESTALL ANY VIETNAMESE INTEREST
IN SEEKING ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA.
5. ON SEPTEMBER 2 (VIRTUALLY ON THE EVE OF THE
MOCHTAR AND LE DUAN VISITS), THE MFA CALLED IN
OTHER SENIOR ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESENT
THEM WITH A TOUGH STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION
BT
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IN
PRIORITY
STU6891
DE RUEHMO #2808/02 2541559
P 111547Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6855
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3477
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1433
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0651
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0498
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0668
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0465
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0775
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4586
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1017
CONFID ENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808
EXDIS
ON SOUTHEAST ASIA. REPORTEDLY THE MEETING WITH
THE SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIAN REPRESENTATIVES BECAME
I
HEATED AS THE SINGAPORE CHARGE REFUTED THE
STATEMENT POINT-BY-POINT. TEMPERS ON BOTH SIDES
FLARED UNTIL THE MALAYSIAN STEPPED IN TO EASE
THE TENSION. BY CONTRAST AT A SEPTEMBER 7 MEETING
IN WHICH THE PAPER WAS HANDED OVER TO THE INDONESIAN
AMBASSADOR, THE SOVIETS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO
BE CORDIAL AND EMPHASIZE THAT FIRYUBIN HAD ESSENTIALLY
ALREADY COVERED THE POINTS WITH MOCHTAR. THE
FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS CARRY THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET
PAPER HANDED OVER ON SEPTEMBER 2 AND 7. ADDRESSEES
SHOULD HOLD THE TEXT CLOSELY, AS WELL AS THE
INDONESIAN COMMENTS ABOUT THEIR ASEAN COLLEAGUES
AND THE MOCHTAR MEETING. BEGIN QUOTE:
6. CONTINUED TENSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND STEPPED
UP ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA BY FORCES HOSTILE TO THE
CAUSE OF PEACE AND SECURITY HAVE PROMPTED THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP TO APPROACH ANEW THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDONESIA.
SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENTS:
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7. THE AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,
AND ENGINEERING BY WASHINGTON AND PEKING OF
CONFLICT SITUATIONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE
WORLD HAVE AN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE
SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS WELL. IT IS
BECOMING INCREASINGLY OBVIOUS THAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PRC BRINGS WITH IT QUITE
A REAL AND TANGIBLE DANGER TO THE COUNTRIES OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE UNITED STATES NOT ONLY
ENCOURAGES CHINA TO PURSUE AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY,
BUT BY GIVING IT ACCESS TO AMERICAN ARSENALS THE
U.S. IN FACT PROVIDES PEKING WITH MATERIAL MEANS
FOR REALIZING CHINA'S FAR-REACHING AMBITIONS. THERE
CAN HARDLY BE ANY DOUBT THAT THESE MEANS WILL
SOONER OR LATER BE USED BY PEKING FOR ACHIEVING
ITS EXPANSIONIST AIMS IN THE AREA OF SOUTH AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH REGARD TO PLANS TO MILITARIZE
JAPAN, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH WILL NO
DOUBT AGGRAVATE EVEN FURTHER INSTABILITY IN ASIA.
8. IGNORING THE DESIRE OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, THE SAME CIRCLES ARE
TAKING VARIOUS STEPS TO UNDERMINE PROSPECTS FOR
NORMALIZING THE SITUATION IN THAT AREA, AND TO
ELIMINATE EVERYTHING POSITIVE THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED
IN ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ASEAN STATES
AND THE STATES OF INDOCHINA. THEY ARE WORKING FOR
A FURTHER EXACERBATION OF TENSION AROUND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA, AND SEEK TO PIT
THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AGAINST THE STATES OF INDOCHINA
IN AN OPEN CONFRONTATION.
9. TO THESE ENDS, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE
ALSO USED THE so CALLED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON KAMPUCHEA" RECENTLY HELD IN NEW YORK. THEY
DID EVERYTHING TO ERECT NEW OBSTACLES IN THE WAY
OF IMPROVING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN THE
WAY OF TURNING THAT AREA INTO A ZONE OF PEACE AND
STABILITY. THE HOLDING OF THAT "CONFERENCE" IN
DISREGARD OF THE PROTESTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA WAS NOTHING BUT
A FLAGRANT INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
A SOVEREIGN STATE. THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE HAVE MADE
THEIR CHOICE AND THEY ARE MARCHING WITH CONFIDENCE
ALONG THE ROAD OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVIVAL,
ALONG THE ROAD OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY.
THE RECENT ELECTIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
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KAMPUCHEA HAVE ONCE AGAIN CONVINCINGLY CONFIRMED
THE EXISTENCE OF A BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE PEOPLE'S
POWER, FOR ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES ON
THE PART OF THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY.
THEREFORE, ANY ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT THE KAMPUCHEAN
PEOPLE FROM THE CHOSEN PATH ARE HOPELESS AND DOOMED
TO FAILURE FROM THE VERY START.
10. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT GREAT-POWER INTERFERENCE
FROM THE OUTSIDE IN THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
BT
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IN
PRIORITY
STU6894
DE RUEHMO #2808/03 2541600
P 111547Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6856
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3478
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1434
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0652
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0499
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0669
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0466
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0776
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4587
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1018
CONFI DENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 12808
EXDIS
RUNS COUNTER TO THE BEST NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THAT REGION AND IS DIRECTED TOWARDS
CREATING CONDITIONS FOR IMPOSING IMPERIALIST AND
HEGEMONIST DIKTAT ON THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.
11. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT AN EASY PROCESS TO ELIMINATE
ENMITY, SUSPICION AND MISTRUST AND TO ESTABLISH
GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS, BUT THERE IS NO OTHER
WAY. INDEED, NOBODY HAS YET INVENTED A METHOD
OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES OTHER THAN THAT
OF EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS, DISCUSSION, AND NEGOTIATION.
ONLY BY SETTING ASIDE EVERYTHING THAT CAUSES
DIVISION IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND POINTS OF CONTACT,
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR ACHIEVING
OBJECTIVES COMMON TO THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.
12. FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS
SUPPORTED CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES
WHICH BRING CLOSER THE SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS
EXISTING ON THE ASIAN CONTINENT. STARTING FROM
THE DECISIONS OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE, WE HAPE
SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENTS:
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WELCOMED MANY INITIATIVES OF DEVELOPING STATES,
INCLUDING THOSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, AIMED AT ESTAB-
LISHING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE IN THAT REGION. NOW
AS WELL, WE IN THE SOVIET UNION NOTE WITH
SATISFACTION THE INTEREST DISPLAYED BY A NUMBER
OF ASIAN STATES IN STABILIZING THE SITUATION ON
THE ASIAN CONTINENT IN GENERAL AND IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA IN PARTICULAR. THE SOLUTION OF THAT PROBLEM IS
PRIMARILY THE CONCERN OF THE PEOPLES OF THE
COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED AND BY NO
MEANS THAT OF WASHINGTON OR PEKING, WHICH ARE
SEARCHING FOR EVER NEW MEANS TO AGGRAVATE
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND TO FOMENT CONFLICTS
AMONG PEOPLES.
13. WE SHARE THE INITIATIVES ADVANCED BY THE STATES
OF INDOCHINA AND SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF PROMINENT
PUBLIC AND POLITICAL FIGURES OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
CONCERNING REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS AND THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THAT REGION THROUGH THE
EFFORTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
THEMSELVES. THOSE INITIATIVES, AS HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY
STATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF VIETNAM, LAOS AND
KAMPUCHEA,
EMAIN IN FORCE. WHAT IS ALSO KNOWN
IS THE READINESS OF THE STATES OF INDOCHINA TO DIS-
CUSS ALL INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, INCLUDING THE SITUATION AROUND
KAMPUCHEA.
14. THE LEADERS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES, TOO, HAVE
MORE THAN ONCE DECLARED THEIR INTEREST IN
NEGOTIATIONS AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
WITH VIETNAM AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN INDOCHINA.
IT APPEARS TO US THAT IN THIS SITUATION THE INTERESTS
OF PEACEFUL FUTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA DICTATE THAT
THE STATES OF THE REGION BY DISPLAYING PATIENCE,
REALISM AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, SHOULD
REFRAIN FROM STEPS WHICH COULD MAKE THE SITUATION
STILL MORE COMPLICATED AND THAT THEY SHOULD RESUME
AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THE COMMON SEARCH FOR WAYS
TO NORMALIZE THE SITUATION. THERE IS NO DOUBT
THAT THE SOONER STEPS ARE MADE IN THIS DIRECTION,
THE EARLIER AN ATMOSPHERE OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS,
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION WILL BE
ESTABLISHED IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA,
WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE
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PEOPLES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD.
END QUOTE. MCCALL
BT
New
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IN
PRIORITY
STU4299
DE RUEHMO #2994/01 2581649
P 151639Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6991
NOTE
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0237
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3488
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1435
AMEMBASSY BONN 1380
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0602
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0653
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0500
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3525
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0670
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2057
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0486
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0777
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4594
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1021
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3815
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9883
CONFID ENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 12994
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/15/91 (MCCALL, SHERROD) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, UR, VN, ASEAN, CB, LA
SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA
DECLASSIFIED
1. a- ENTIRE TEXT.
NLS F06-114/6#8726 8726
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS HAVE
UNDERSCORED ONCE AGAIN THAT THE BASIC SOVIET
STRATEGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS TO HANG ON TO
ITS STRATEGIC FOOTHOLD IN VIETNAM DESPITE THE
CRIMP ON SOVIET RESOURCES, THE DAMAGE CAUSED
TO RELATIONS WITH THE MORE DYNAMIC COUNTRIES OF
ASEAN, AND THE INTERNATIONAL DISCOMFORT OF
SUPPORTING VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA.
THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN A COMPROMISE
SIT: PUBS
EOB: NAU,KEMP,GREGG,LILLEY,PIPES
WHSR COMMENTS:
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SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA ONLY TO THE EXTENT VIETNAM
IS AMENABLE. MEANWHILE, IT HELPS PROP UP THE
PEN SOVAN/HENG SAMRIN REGIME INTERNALLY AND
EXTERNALLY AND PRODS THIRD WORLD FRIENDS SUCH
AS INDIA AND SYRIA TO ASSIST. THE SOVIETS WILL
CONTINUE TO TRY TO COUNTER CHINESE ADVANCES IN
THE AREA AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND WILL BE PARTICULARLY
ATTENTIVE TO THE MOST ANTI-CHINESE STATES IN ASEAN: --
INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA - BUT EFFORTS IN NON-
COMMUNIST SOUTHEAST ASIA ARE BASICALLY TACTICAL
AND DESIGNED TO PROBE FOR WEAKNESSES IN ASEAN
RATHER THAN PART OF A LONG-TERM EFFORT TO DEVELOP
OTHER ALLIES IN THE REGION. VIETNAM IS THE KEY
TO SOVIET STRATEGY NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE VIS-A-VIS CHINA AND THE BASES IT PROVIDES
AGAINST THE U.S., BUT ALSO IN A TIME WHEN THE
SOVIETS FEEL UNDER PRESSURE, ONLY VIETNAM AND INDIA
CAN BE COUNTED AS SIGNIFICANT SOVIET FRIENDS IN ASIA.
GIVEN THE CURRENT SOVIET TOUGH AND UNCOMPROMISING
STANCE, WE SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW WOULD BE
WILLING TO RISK THIS TIE IN ANY WAY BY BROKERING
A COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO IMPROVE SOVIET-U.S. OR
SOVIET-ASEAN TIES. END SUMMARY.
3. THE RECENT VISITS OF SEVERAL SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS
TO MOSCOW HAS BROUGHT INTO SHARPER FOCUS
THE CENTRALITY OF VIETNAM IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY SEE THEIR
RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM AS AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY
THAT SHOULD BE NOURISHED AND DEVELOPED. IT PROVIDES
AN OBVIOUS DIVERSION FOR CHINA ON ITS SOUTHERN
FLANK, ITS CONTINUED HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES
HELPS CONSOLIDATE THE MAJOR U.S. DEFEAT THERE, AND
IT SERVES AS AN IMPORTANT STAGING AREA FOR SOVIET
SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT IN THE WORLDWIDE STRATEGIC
COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN AN OTHER-
WISE TOTALLY BLEAK LANDSCAPE OF SOVIET RELATIONS
IN EAST ASIA AND AT A TIME WHEN SOVIET POLICY MAKERS
FEEL BELEAGUERED ON ALL FRONTS, A FRIENDLY VIETNAM
SEEMS TO LOOM EVEN LARGER IN MOSCOW'S EYES. VIEWED
FROM MOSCOW, THE VIETNAM TIE IS ONLY SECOND TO THAT
WITH INDIA IN IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET STRATEGIC
POSITION IN ASIA.
4. THE SOVIETS ARE QUITE AWARE OF THE COSTS OF THIS
FRIENDSHIP. THEY KNOW THEIR ECONOMIC AID IS BEING
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USED INEFFICIENTLY AND GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN
ECONOMIC STRINGENCIES, THEY COULD USE THE RESOURCES
AT HOME. THE AID PROGRAM IS NOT POPULAR IN MOSCOW
AND MORE THAN ONE MUSCOVITE HAS AGREED THAT THEY ARE
POURING MONEY DOWN A RATHOLE. PRAVDA'S REPORT ON
THE LE DUAN - BREZHNEV MEETING, HOWEVER, STRONGLY
SUGGESTS THAT DESPITE THE GRUMBLING, SOVIET LEADERS
ARE WILLING TO INCREASE THE AID. SUPPORTING VIETNAM
ALSO MEANS, OF COURSE, BACKING HANOI'S HARDLY
NECESSARY AND STRATEGICALLY DUBIOUS (FROM THE SOVIET
POINT OF VIEW) OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA. WITH ASEAN'S
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DE RUEHMO #2994/02 2581650
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6992
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0238
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3489
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1436
AMEMBASSY BONN 1381
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0603
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0654
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0501
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3526
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0671
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2058
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0487
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0778
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4595
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1022
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3816
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9884
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 12994
EXDIS
OPPOSITION TO THIS OCCUPATION AND ITS EFFECTIVE
INTERNATIONAL LOBBYING, THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND WELL
THEY WILL CONTINUE TO PAY THE PRICE OF BAD RELATIONS
WITH THESE ECONOMICALLY DYNAMIC STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
AND EMBARRASSMENT AT THE UN AND ELSEWHERE ON AN ISSUE
IRRELEVANT TO THE USSR'S SECURITY INTERESTS.
.
5. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEM TO HAVE FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT
THE PRICKLY NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM.
THERE IS A NOTABLE LACK OF WARMTH IN ANY SOVIET
STATEMENTS PUBLIC OR PRIVATE ABOUT VIETNAM; NOTHING
IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THE TREATMENT OF INDIA OR
THE TREATMENT OF VIETNAM A DECADE AGO. VIETNAM
IS TREATED ESSENTIALLY FOR WHAT IT IS -- A RENTED
ALLY CREATED MORE BY MUTUAL ENMITY TOWARD CHINA
SIT:
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THAN IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY OR LONGSTANDING TIES
WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. (THE PERSONAL
CONNECTION WITH LE DUAN BY THE WAY MAY HAVE
RECENTLY UNDERGONE ADDITIONAL STRAIN IF A STORY
SOON TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE LOS ANGELES TIMES IS
CORRECT: LE DUAN'S DAUGHTER, WHO
LIVED IN MOSCOW WITH HER RUSSIAN HUSBAND, SUPPOSEDLY
DIED IN CHILDBIRTH A FEW WEEKS AGO DUE TO A KREMLIN
HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE, AND THERE WAS A RUCKUS ABOUT
CUSTODY OVER THE OTHER CHILDREN DURING LE DUAN'S
VISIT.) BECAUSE OF THE TOUCHINESS IN THE SOVIET-
VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIP, MOS COW APPEARS TO BE GOING
TO GREAT LENGTHS IN RECENT WEEKS TO AVOID ANY
SUGGESTIONS THAT IT IS STAKING OUT A POLICY OF
ITS OWN ON KAMPUCHEA OR DEVELOPING SEPARATE
STRONG TIES TO VIETNAM'S PUPPETS IN VIENTIANE
AND PHNOM PENH. LEAVING KAYSONE AND PEN SOVAN
TO COOL THEIR HEELS AT THE TIME OF THE CRIMEA
MEETINGS MUST HAVE BEEN MEANT AS A CALCULATED
DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET RECOGNITION OF HANOI'S
SUZERAIN ROLE. WE WERE TOLD THE LAOTIAN WAS IN
THE CRIMEA AND PEN SOVAN ALSO BY ALL APPEARANCES
WAS SET FOR A BREZHNEV MEETING, BUT A DECISION
WAS OBVIOUSLY MADE AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL TO SEE
LE DUAN FIRST IN MOSCOW. THE COMMUNIQUES ON THE
PEN SOVAN AND KAYSONE MEETINGS WITH BREZHNEV
WHEN THEY WERE EVENTUALLY HELD SEEMED DESIGNED
TO SHOW THEY WERE HUMDRUM AFFAIRS. SOVIET TIES
WITH LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA WERE DEEMPHASIZED: THE
LAOTIAN REPORT SPECIFICALLY NOTED THE NEED FOR
INCREASED INDOCHINESE UNITY AND KAMPUCHEA WAS
KEPT AT ARM'S LENGTH.
6. THIS KID GLOVE TREATMENT OF VIETNAM'S FEELINGS
IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN SOVIET HANDLING OF THE
EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE. THE
SOVIETS HAVE HAD REPEATED OPPORTUNITIES TO PORTRAY
THEMSELVES TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AS INTERESTED IN
A SETTLEMENT AND AS NUDGING VIETNAM IN THAT DIRECTION.
SOME ASEAN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE VIRTUALLY PLEADED
WITH THE SOVIETS TO HELP. HOWEVER, SUPPORT FOR
DISCOURSE HAS BEEN REMARKABLY CONSISTENT FOR THE
PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. MOSCOW IS, OF COURSE, AWARE
COUNTRIES AND HAS WATCHED NERVOUSLY WHILE CHINA
USED VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA TO IMPROVE
TIES IN THE AREA AND THE U.S. MOVED BACK IN TO REPAIR
ITS ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TO COUNTER THESE
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TRENDS, THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT TT PLAY ON ANTI-
CHINESE CONCERNS IN THE AREA, TREATED ASEAN EXTREMELY
LIGHTLY IN THEIR PROPAGANDA (E.G., THE U.S. AND CHINA
WERE BLAMED FOR THE KAMPUCHEA CONFERENCE), AND WARNED
THE ASEAN STATES ABOUT BECOMING TOOLS IN U.S.,
JAPANESE, AND CHINESE GLOBAL STRATEGIES. INDONESIA'S
CONTINUED FAILURE TO REESTABLISH EMBASSIES WITH
BEIJING AND RECENT ANTI-CHINESE STATEMENTS OUT OF
MALAYSIA HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING SIGNS FOR THEM.
HOWEVER, THE HANDLING OF MOCHTAR'S STOPOVER, AND THE
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6993
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0239
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3490
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1437
AMEMBASSY BONN 1382
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0604
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0655
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0502
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3527
AMEMBASSY MANILA 0672
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2059
AMEMBASSY PARIS 0488
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0779
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4596
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1023
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3817
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9885
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 12994
EXDIS
DEMARCHE TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES ON KAMPUCHEA
HAVE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED MOSCOW IS LITTLE CONCERNED
ABOUT ASEAN NEELINGS ON KAMPUCHEA, PREFERRING
INSTEAD TO SHOW LE DUAN THAT MOSCOW IS BACKING
VIETNAM'S KAMPUCHEA POLICY TO THE FULL.
7. THE MOCHTAR VISIT ALSO SHOWED SOVIET INTEREST
IN USING ITS POSITION TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FOR
VIETNAM AND ITS PUPPET REGIME IN KAMPUCHEA.
SIMILARLY, THE HEAVY SOVIET PROPAGANDA OUTPUT
ON HUN SEN'S RECENT NEW DELHI VISIT SOUGHT TO
WRING THE MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE FOR THE
REGIME OUT OF THE VISIT. NEW DELHI IS PROBABLY
UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE TO HELP IN OTHER WAYS, IN
PARTICULAR AT THE UPCOMING UN DEBATE, AND THE SOVIETS
SIT:
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WHSR COMMENTS:
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CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRESSURE THEIR OTHER THIRD WORLD
FRIENDS TO BE MORE HELPFUL TO VIETNAM ON KAMPUCHEA
THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST. SOVIET REPORTING
ON THE MEETING OF KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE LEADERS
IN SINGAPORE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THE THREAT OF
SIHANOUK'S PRESTIGE BEHIND THE RESISTANCE AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF A GROWING OPPOSITION TO VIETNAM
IN KAMPUCHEA ITSELF. THEIR RECENT REFERENCES TO
SIHANOUK HAVE BEEN HARSH AND THERE WERE HINTS OF
INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY AID TO VIETNAM DURING
LE DUAN'S VISIT. CLEARLY, THE SOVIETS WILL WORK TO
COUNTER ASEAN EFFORTS TO REPEAT THEIR STRONG SHOWING
IN THE UN.
8. GIVEN CURRENT SOVIET PRIORITIES IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, WE SEE VIRTUALLY NO HOPE THAT GROMYKO OR OTHER
SOVIET LEADERS WILL BE WILLING TO SHOW ANY INCLINATION
TO COMPROMISE ON KAMPUCHEA OR TO ENCOURAGE VIETNAM
TO MODERATE ITS POSITION ON A SETTLEMENT. EMPHASIZING
THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM AT THE PRESENT TIME,
THE SOVIETS SEE VERY HIGH COSTS IN ACCEDING TO OUR
DEMANDS FOR MODERATION ON THIS ISSUE. THEY SEEM
QUITE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO PAY TO KEEP VIETNAM
IN ITS ANTI-CHINESE POSTURE AND PROTECTED AGAINST
ANY VIETNAMESE-U.S. RAPPROCHEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN
SOME SPECULATION THATTHESOVIETS ARE HAPPY WITH THE
KAMPUCHEAN STANDOFF PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT KEEPS THE
VIETNAMESE IN A SUPPLICANT'S POSITION, DEPENDENT
ON SOVIET LARGESSE. OUR GUESS IS THAT THE
SOVIET CALCULATION OF THE PLUSES AND MINUSES IS NOT
THAT CLEARCUT AND LEANS TO ENCOURAGING A VIETNAMESE
WITHDRAWAL. HOWEVER, WHAT IS APPARENTLY QUITE
OBVIOUS IN MOSCOW, IS THAT IT IS NOT IN THE SOVIET
INTEREST TO CHANCE A VIETNAMESE SEARCH ELSEWHERE
FOR PARTNERS BY PRESSING HANOI TO TAKE A MORE
NUANCED APPROACH ON A KAMPUCHEA SETTLEMENT. MCCALL
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HSUT HS
SECRET
Cc.,Oipe, 42
MEMORANDUM
5848
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET WITH
TOP SECRET
ATTACHMENT
ACTION
October 7, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
JAMES LILLEY n
SUBJECT:
Thai Prime Minister Prem's Memorandum (U)
The attached memorandum was given to the President by Prem
after their lunch on 6 October. You have asked for my
immediate comments and recommendations. Here is what I've
done and what my recommendations are. (U)
The Thais also gave this same memorandum to State and Holdridge
and Company are reviewing it right now. Defense, according to
Rich Armitage, does not have a copy and would like one right
away. As far as I know, CIA does not have a copy. (C)
I've read the contents and almost all of these issues have
been discussed during Prem's visit. The Thais are asking for
a little more, but these matters are negotiable. (S)
I recommend:
-- That I send copies to Armitage and CIA;
-- That a meeting be convened of State, Defense and CIA
under the chairmanship of State to examine the paper and draft
an answer, and then establish the channel through which this
answer should be sent. (S)
RECOMMENDATION: That you approve my proceeding on these
lines.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A
Prem memo
SECRET WITH
DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
ATTACHMENT
NLRR Fo6- -114/6ᵗʰ714
Review 10/7/87
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/19/13
43
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#8729
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
Thailand is deeply concerned over the growing Soviet military presence and
influence in the Southeast Asian region. The Soviet Union now has a firm foothold
on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It has established facilities for its naval fleet
and airforce in Vietnam, and thus possesses greater capabilities than ever before to
project its power in Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Soviet Union's
increasingly influential role in regional affairs is assured by its Treaty of
Friendship with Vietnam as well as by the current instability in Kampuchea.
The Soviet entry into Southeast Asia represents yet another major
progression in its unwavering goal of global domination. The Soviet Union has
repeatedly demonstrated that it will exploit all opportunities and employ any
means, including the use of force, both directly and indirectly, as in Afghanistan
and Kampuchea, to gain strategic objectives.
Thailand and its ASEAN partners are important strategically, politically and
economically to the United States and U. S. strategic interests. For this reason, a
threat to ASEAN, either individually or collectively, constitutes a threat to the
free world. It is thus in the common interest of ASEAN and other like-minded
countries to undertake concerted actions to check Soviet expansionist ambition.
In Southeast Asia, Soviet ambition and interests are furthered through
Vietnam and its aggressive policy. Vietnam maintains close military and political
as well as economic ties with the Soviet Union. The one quarter million
Vietnamese troops in Laos and Kampuchea, deployed close to the Thai border and
supported by massive Soviet assistance, are an immediate and real threat to
Thailand's security. The Vietnamese record of disrespect for the territorial
integrity of others has aggravated this threat. In light of this, the possibility of
another Vietnamese incursion or even an outright invasion against Thailand must be
taken seriously.
Another matter of concern is the latent threat posed by China to the
security of the region. China continues to maintain active links with the various
communist parties in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This is a source of
disquiet and concern to the ASEAN countries in developing their bilateral relations
on a government-to-government basis with China. While at present China
advocates a moderating policy toward these countries, the future of this current
state of affairs may abruptly change for the worse should such a change be
perceived as favorable to China's long-term objectives.
TOPSECRET
2
44
TOP SECRET
Besides these external threats, the problems of communist infiltration and
subversion also constitute a challenge to the security and stability of Thailand and
other Southeast Asian countries. These problems provide further avenues for
outside powers to deepen their involvement and to expand their influence in
regional affairs. With Indochina already in the communist orbit, another victory by
a communist party in the area would have far-reaching implications to all other
countries in the region as well as beyond.
Appropriate response to the threats cited in the foregoing should, as a
minimum, consist of the following:
-
Reassertion of U.S. global role commensurate with its strength and
demonstration of its will to rise to the challenges from the Soviet
Union and its proxies.
-
Continued application of political and economic pressures on Vietnam
to desist from aggressive actions.
-
Continued denial of economic aid to and establishment of diplomatic
relations with Vietnam unless and until Vietnam agrees to a political
solution of the Kampuchean problem acceptable to ASEAN.
-
Continued U.S. support of the UN-proposed political solution to the
Kampuchean problem.
-
Assumption of greater responsibilities by Japan, Australia and New
Zealand in the task of safeguarding the peace and security in the
region.
-
Positive actions to strengthen the defense and economic capabilities
of ASEAN countries as a group and individually.
-
Strengthening of defense and economic capabilities of non-communist
countries in the Asian and Pacific region.
-
Being the "front-line" state affected by the Kampuchean conflict and
having already experienced Vietnamese incursions and harassments,
Thailand's military capabilities must be upgraded sufficiently to deter
possible external intervention and aggression.
(Annex)
-
Development of U.S.-Thai contingency plans to support Thailand in
the event of an all-out Vietnamese attack or aggression.
-
China at present is in a position to play a positive role in containing
Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia. China's future role, however, is
far from certain should circumstances change. With its strength and
interests in this region, the United States is in a strong position to
exercise a beneficial and stabilizing influence on the future
development of relations between the smaller countries in the region
and China.
3
45
TOP SECRET
ANNEX
In view of the Soviet and Vietnamese immediate as well as the potential
Chinese threat to Thailand's security, and, taking into account Thailand's military
requirements to deter such threats, increased security assistance support from the
U.S. Government is essential. Thailand is a strong advocate of self-help and has
budgeted 19.5% of the FY-82 budget for defense. This reflects an increase of 13.2%
over the FY-81 allocation.
Nonetheless, Thailand does need to have increased military sales credits on
more favorable terms than are presently available. Thailand therefore requests:
-
Increase in FMS Credits extended on government-to-government
basis; direct loans; and longer-term repayments. Thailand's FMS
Credit requirement for FY-83 is $120 million.
-
Grant of military material and equipment or the sale of such
equipment on concessionary or preferential terms.
-
Request approval of procurement from production procedure to
procurement from stock.
-
Sale of military equipment, ammunition, explosives and spare parts
according to the needs of the Thai Armed Forces.
-
Agreement on immediate delivery of military equipment replacement
for that destroyed in the event of external aggression.
-
Approval for the transfer of Electronic Communications equipment
and delivery of Strategic and Tactical Communications Systems
purchased by the Thai Armed Forces.
-
Effective military equipment support under the WSSSFAF
Regulations.
-
Increase in the enrollment of Thai officers under U.S. military
training programs on a continuing basis as well as an increase in
financial assistance under these programs.
-
Sending of qualified U.S. military advisors to Thailand. At the
present time, the number of U.S. military advisors assigned to
Thailand is not adequate for our requirements.
-
Provision of logistics support to Thailand in the event of external
aggression.
-
Access to more modern and higher level military technology.
-
Agreement to assist the Thai Armed Forces to upgrade all military
command communications to secure systems.
4
46
TOPSECRET
MEMORANDUM
THAI - U.S. ECONOMIC COOPERATION
The Government of Thailand has been greatly encouraged by the recent
manifestation of the U.S. Government in its awareness and interest in furthering
economic and political ties with the countries. of Southeast Asia. In particular, the
U.S. Government has reiterated its support for the political well-being and security
of Thailand. It is therefore hoped that the strengthening of Thai-U.S. political
relations will be supported by tangible economic cooperation, for only in this
manner can the security of Thailand be enhanced through economic progress and
development.
The Government of Thailand has continuously given foremost priority to
economic, social and especially rural development as well as eradication of
poverty, which were implemented throughout the two decades covered by the four
Five-Year Plans. At present, Thailand is embarking upon another Five-Year Plan,
with full awareness of difficulties ahead. But judging from the average annual
economic growth of over seven percent so far, we are optimistic and have
reasonable expectation that this objective will be achieved.
The Government of Thailand fully believes that the participation of the U.S.
Government and private enterprise would further ensure Thailand's economic
progress and further strengthen our existing relations.
However, as Thailand has diversified exports of agricultural and
agricultural-based products as well as industrial raw materials, it is inevitably
sensitive to the world market situation. Thailand is deeply concerned that the U.S.
Government policy should not adversely affect its interests, and wishes to invite
the U.S. Government's attention to the following areas of its anxiety and concern.
(a) International Commodity Agreements
Thailand is particularly concerned with the delay in the conclusion of
the Sixth International Tin Agreement and looks forward to the
renewal of the Multi Fiber Agreement under which the Thai-U.S.
bilateral agreement can be made to accommodate equitable interests
of both parties.
TOPSECRET
7
5
TOP SECRET
(b)
Surplus Disposal
The U.S. policy towards surplus disposal, especially in connection
with tin and certain agricultural products such as rice and maize,
may have unfavorable impact on Thailand. Therefore, prior
consultation on this matter between our two countries is highly
desirable and is requested.
(c)
Agricultural Exports
Thailand is of the opinion that agricultural exports should be bought
and sold in the international markets under competitive conditions
with minimal governmental, administrative, fiscal, and monetary
intervention.
(d)
Market Access
Thailand believes in the further improvement of import/export
facilities, further tariff liberalization and the removal of non-tarrif
barriers, and is particularly concerned with the U.S. policy to reduce
import of sugar and to impose an import levy on the product. It is
the earnest wish of the Government of Thailand that Thailand's
interest as a major sugar exporter should be given due consideration
by the U.S. Government.
(e)
Gatt Membership
It is Thailand's earnest hope that the U.S. Government, as Thailand's
major trading partner and ally, will take a positive attitude in the
forthcoming tarrif negotiations between Thailand and its trading
partners.
(f)
Technology Transfer
To achieve the objectives of the Fifth Plan, Thailand urges the U.S.
to participate fully in our development of medium and large
industries as outlined in the Plan, with particular emphasis on the
U.S. assistance in the training of its personnel in the field of energy
and resource development.
6 October 1981
TOPSECRET
6
48
TOPSECRET
MEMORANDUM
REFUGEE PROBLEM
Thailand still has a heavy burden with the refugee problem. Currently,
there are 189,036 Indochinese refugees in various refugee camps. Among these
94,496 are Kampucheans, 92,923 Laotians and 1,617 Vietnamese. Moreover,
Thailand is also faced with the problem of 170,000 Kampuchean people seeking
food along the Thai-Kampuchean border, as well as the problem of some 80,000
Thai families uprooted by the influx of these refugees into Thailand.
In solving the refugee problem, Thailand continues to pursue a policy based
on humanitarian and national security considerations. At the same time, Thailand
continues to cooperate closely with other nations and international organizations.
The implementation of this policy has resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees
being resettled in third countries or being voluntarily repatriated. Nonetheless, as
the above figures have shown, too many refugees still remain in Thailand and more
are expected to arrive due to the food shortage in Kampuchea after the next
harvest season. Therefore, Thailand has adopted measures in an effort to reduce
the number of refugees already in Thailand and humanely deter others from leaving
their countries. In this respect, the Thai Government, in cooperation with the
UNHCR, has set up a voluntary repatriation program for the refugees to their
country of origin. This program complements the voluntary relocation program
established for the Kampucheans. Those arriving after 15 August 1981 will no
longer be considered as genuine refugees. Furthermore, Thailand is closing down,
within the next year, all refugee camps, with the exception of four, located at
Khao-I-Dang, Panat Nikhom, Nakhon Panom and Loei provinces.
On this matter, the U.S. Government has been rendering positive and
beneficial cooperation and support which is greatly appreciated by the Thai
Government. Thailand also hopes for continued U.S. support to resolve the refugee
problem, especially in resettling the remaining refugees from Thailand and in
encouraging other nations to assist in the resettlement efforts as well as in
supporting Thailand's voluntary repatriation program.
6 October 1981
TOP SECRET
49
7
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM
NARCOTICS PROBLEMS
It is Thailand's firm policy to make a realistic effort and to fully cooperate
with the United States and other friendly nations in the suppression and prevention
of illicit narcotics trafficking. Thailand is strongly committed to solving the
narcotics problem as already stated in the Thai Prime Minister's Note of 5 August
1981, addressed to the President of the United States of America. The record of
the present Thai Government clearly demonstrates its determination and resolve to
deal seriously with the problem which is one of the major causes of human
suffering and socio-economic insecurity.
Thailand also attaches high priority to solving the problem of drug addicts
and to effectively eradicating opium cultivation. In this respect, U.S. cooperation
remains an essential element to Thailand's efforts. In particular, the Government
of Thailand is looking forward to further assistance from the U.S. on the following
matters:
-
Support of Preventive Education Program in terms of equipment,
technology, setting up of preventive educational mobile units,
training of key personnel and setting up of audio-visual aids
production centers.
-
Assistance in Treatment and Rehabilitation Program. The present
narcotics treatment centers can only admit 30,000 to 40,000 patients
annually, while Thailand has about 500,000 to 600,000 drug addicts.
-
Support of Narcotics Law Enforcement in terms of equipment and
training both inside Thailand and abroad.
-
Technical support to establish a Research and Information Center to
determine the best possible means to resolve the narcotics problem.
6 October 1981
TOP SECRET
ASIA
50
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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
00434
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
*
*
UNITED STATES OF
(U) SOVIET REGIONAL SECURITY PROPOSALS FOR ASIA
Key Judgments
BUREAU OF
(U) A series of Soviet regional schemes for
INTELLIGENCE
Asia includes proposals for an Asia-wide collective
security system and zones of peace for Southeast
AND RESEARCH
Asia and the Indian Ocean. In 1981, Chairman
Brezhnev proposed that confidence-building measures
(CBMs) be extended to the Far East, and Mongolian
party boss Tsedenbal proposed a convention on non-
aggression and the non-use of force among Asian
ASSESSMENTS
states which Brezhnev personally endorsed three
months later.
AND
(LOU) Soviet initiatives toward Asia usually
share features that suggest basic Soviet prior-
RESEARCH
ities. In advancing them, Moscow seeks to:
--assert its claim, as an Asian power, to a
voice in political arrangements throughout the
continent and in the western Pacific;
--insure recognition of existing borders dis-
puted by China and of Soviet possession of the
"northern territories" claimed by Japan;
--gain acceptance of the political status quo
whenever Soviet interests are concerned (now
including the Soviet-backed regime in
Afghanistan and the Vietnamese-backed regime
in Kampuchea); and
--prevent, or complicate, formation of coali-
NLS F06-114/6#8730
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
tions or alliances by other Asian countries
among themselves, or by Asian and non-Asian
countries (Moscow regards alignments which it
does not dominate as almost invariably
DECLASSIFIED
directed against itself).
(C) The 1981 proposals are not a comprehen-
sive master plan for Asia. Like most of the
SECRET
RDS-1,3 2/23/12 (Bellocchi, N.)
Report 323-AR
February 23, 1982
SECRET
51
- ii -
earlier schemes, they were conceived in response to specific,
often transient, political needs and will be altered, adapted, or
even abandoned in accordance with changing priorities and
circumstances. The Mongolian initiative seems designed primarily
to facilitate a more active role on the diplomatic stage for
Moscow's only dependable ally in North Asia. Its future, even as
useful propaganda, seems dim.
(C) On the other hand, Soviet tacticians probably will
attempt to develop the Asian CBMs initiative more extensively.
They are already using it as a major propaganda theme, especially
with respect to Japan, in the context of exploiting public
apprehension over military and nuclear tensions. Over the longer
term, Moscow apparently hopes to induce the powers in the region
to enter into negotiations on CBM-like measures, with the process
of engagement itself giving the Soviets more influence in the
region.
******
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F06-114/6#8731
SECRET
BY NLS LDJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
(LOU) Asian Collective Security
The first and broadest Soviet regional proposal for Asia
called for the establishment of a continent-wide collective
security system. Brezhnev suggested it in 1969. He was vague
about its intended structure or what it was to do, and Soviet
commentators have been similarly vague ever since. Surfacing so
soon after the flare of hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border, it
was widely regarded as an anti-Chinese propaganda ploy. In any
event, Moscow did little to promote it at the time, but Soviet
leaders began pushing it again in 1972.
The proposal's early, anti-Chinese tactical cast appeared to
give way gradually between 1969 and 1972 to one of broader stra-
tegic conceptions. The US was seeking to extricate itself from
Southeast Asia, and American-built alliances were dissolving.
(Brezhnev in 1971 suggested that a collective security system
would be the best replacement for existing political-military
groupings.) Moreover, the Soviet Union had just acted as mediator
between India and Pakistan after the 1971 war and perhaps had
visions of a similar mediating role continent-wide.
Soviet descriptions of Asian collective security in the years
since have differed as circumstances altered. At times they have
included vitriolic anti-Chinese polemics. On other occasions the
importance of Chinese participation in any such grouping was
stressed. Sometimes Moscow appeared to be trying to exclude the
US from the continent, describing regional security in terms of
Asia for Asians. Other formulations implied that the US would be
expected to take part or at least to cooperate. Soviet propa-
gandists have sometimes traced their scheme back to Asian roots,
especially the 1955 Bandung Conference. At other times, they
emphasized its European origin, describing it as "an application
of detente" in Asia with the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE) as a model.
The collective security proposal never aroused much interest
in Asia and, although it has never been formally abandoned, Moscow
has given it less attention in recent years. The Asian political
climate changed significantly at the end of the 1970s. With the
invasions of Kampuchea and Afghanistan and the Soviet military
buildup in the Far East, receptivity among non-communist Asian
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53
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states toward various forms of military and political cooperation
with each other, the US, and the PRC increased markedly. In
response, the USSR lessened its emphasis on comprehensive collec-
tive security schemes to enable it to fill the role of the
departing Americans and began to concentrate instead on more spe-
cific subregional initiatives, some of them longstanding, to help
prevent the Americans from returning. These initiatives included
the Southeast Asian zone of peace and stability, and CBMs for the
Far East.
Southeast Asian Zone of Peace and Stability
(LOU) The Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) first proposed a neutralization of the
region in November 1971. Their proposal, like ASEAN itself, was
long regarded with suspicion and hostility by Hanoi and by the
USSR. Moscow's attitude began to moderate in 1976, but Central
Committee Asian specialist Ivan Kovalenko still wrote dispar-
agingly that year that the Soviet collective security plan for all
of Asia would be more realistic, because it was "highly improbable
that the five ASEAN countries had adequate political, economic and
military strength to force the imperialist powers to withdraw from
Southeast Asia."
(U) In the late 1970s, however, the Soviets and their
Vietnamese allies began to express a more positive attitude toward
ASEAN. Judging from Moscow's statements, the Soviet change of
view was motivated primarily by the competition between its
Vietnamese ally and the PRC, which was itself wooing the ASEAN
states. The Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchea added impetus to
this shift in policy--it created a need to counter the ASEAN reac-
tion to the Kampuchean affair. In a communique following conver-
sations with the Thai Prime Minister in September 1979, the USSR
said it regarded the peace zone idea positively, although it still
opposed closed military, political, and economic blocs.
(LOU) The Indochinese states themselves subsequently began
pushing various versions of a Southeast Asian zone of peace. In
January 1981, the Foreign Ministers of Vietnam, Kampuchea, and
Laos proposed a regional conference of the Indochinese and ASEAN
states with the aim of concluding a "treaty on peace and stabil-
ity" in Southeast Asia. Laos elaborated on this idea in a
September 1981 memorandum on the principles of peaceful coexist-
ence between the two groups. These Indochinese initiatives were
obviously advanced to head off or moderate international reaction
to developments in Kampuchea and were so interpreted by ASEAN.
The political dialogue involved was intended to legitimize devel-
opments in Kampuchea and discourage security cooperation with the
US or the PRC.
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East Asia--Confidence-Building Measures
(S/NF) Brezhnev's February 1981 proposal that CBMs be
extended to Asia, "taking into account, of course, the region's
specific character," was repeated in a letter to President Reagan
in March. Soviet diplomats made formal demarches advocating such
measures (some of them accompanied by letters to chiefs of state
from Brezhnev) to Japan, China, North Korea, the US, and a number
of other countries. In the course of these representations, the
diplomatic spokespersons made a number of comments, not all of
them consistent, about the proposal:
--The region to which the measures were to be applied was
variously said to include "countries among which tension
exists," countries "where there are US military bases or
installations," and countries where "intensive military
activity is underway." The Soviet charge in Washington,
Bessmertnykh, stated specifically that the measures applied
only to the USSR, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. He
said the inclusion of Mongolia was not foreseen.
--Soviet representatives in Beijing told Chinese leaders that
measures the USSR contemplated included prior notification of
troop movements and exercises and provision for foreign
observers to attend large-scale maneuvers.
The status of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was left somewhat
ambiguous. Brezhnev specifically mentioned only three coun-
tries--China, Japan, and the USSR--as participants, although
US participation was implied by his references to US bases.
Some subsequent Soviet statements included North Korea, but
Soviet officials in Moscow later denied that the Korean
states would be included. The only clear expression of
intent to include the South Koreans was in the presentation
in Washington, when the Soviet chargé orally requested that
the US inform the ROK of the proposal. The Soviets for their
part apparently did approach the North Koreans directly. The
response they received is unknown, but North Korea had
rejected the earlier Soviet collective security proposal and
was unlikely to accept this one.
--Given the usual association of CBMs with easing geographical
tensions, the specific omission of Mongolia, whose long border
with China is policed jointly by Mongolian and Soviet forces,
is an anomaly which has been compounded by Mongolian state-
ments praising the CBMs proposal. Since the Soviets have
never publicly delimited the geographical area to be covered,
they may have deliberately created this ambiguity for tactical
reasons. Mongolian statements reinforce the impression that
Mongolia was left out of the original scheme in order to be
included at a later time as a bargaining concession.
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(S/NF) The apparent confusion in early Soviet efforts to
define the Brezhnev proposal more specifically, as well as a
notable lack of enthusiasm last spring and summer on the part of
several Soviet Foreign Ministry representatives nominally charged
with its promotion, suggests that Foreign Ministry officials may
not have been consulted in advance.
(C) While the proposal may have been somewhat ad hoc, it is
fully consistent with Soviet objectives in the Far East and has
since become a major theme in Moscow's diplomatic and propaganda
campaigns. A Soviet commentator recently remarked, "Like the
previous idea of collective security in Asia, this is one of those
long-term ideas which appears today to be relatively distant and
unrealistic but may become reality tomorrow." Moscow apparently
hopes the CBMs proposal will eventually prove useful in engaging
China, Japan, and the US in arms control discussions which would
improve Soviet leverage over their military activities in the
region. The Soviet commentator confirmed the model when he went
on to say, "As an example I will mention the idea of European
security. We promoted this idea for a very long time and in the
end we achieved Helsinki."
(C) By the end of April 1981 when it became clear that none
of the countries directly concerned was buying the proposal,
Soviet treatment of it changed. The Soviets have offered no
further official elucidation; instead, academicians and editorial
commentators have elaborated on it with considerable apparent
freedom. One Asian specialist, Henrik Trofimenko, said the CBMs
might include such measures as mutual provision of information on
troop locations and movements, naval movements, and exchanges of
information on such economic-security issues as open sea lanes.
Other commentaries implied that the measures could be worked out
bilaterally; still others appeared to be talking of multilateral
arrangements.
(U) The Director of the Soviet Institute of Oriental
Studies, E. M. Primakov, recently gave the CBMs the catch-all
quality of the old collective security proposal, saying that mea-
sures to enhance trust in the Far East could include a convention
on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force between the
countries of Asia and the Far East (i.e., the Mongolian initia-
tive). He went on to say they might also include coordinated
actions to:
--prevent accidents or non-sanctioned use of nuclear
arms;
--halt proliferation of nuclear arms;
--prevent armed conflicts;
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--renounce unilateral "control" of conflict situations;
--turn individual areas into zones of peace; and
--agree on the military neutralization of areas where
buildup of armed forces and armaments is taking place.
(C) CBMs and the Peace Offensive in Japan
Japan is a prime example of the Soviet effort to adapt to
Asia approaches which have proved effective in Europe. For some
time, the Soviets have been trying to broaden their relationships
with Japanese center and left political groups, and the festering
rift with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) has given them some-
what more freedom in this respect. Many Soviet officials,
including Ivan Kovalenko, the Central Committee International
Department official responsible for Japanese relations, period-
ically visit Japan. Kovalenko's last visit was in December 1981,
when he met with representatives of all political parties. The
USSR is making a special effort to cultivate the Socialists, the
largest opposition party.
These activities have not been notably successful, however.
CPSU letters to leftist parties in Japan last May urging support
for the Soviet peace offensive (the JCP, for example, was urged to
form a new "anti-American united front" on the left) failed,
partly because of the northern territories issue.
Still, high-level Soviet attention to Japan has been height-
ened by recent increases in the Japanese defense budget and US
statements concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Far
East. In an obvious attempt to build on Japanese fears about
nuclear confrontation, Radio Moscow in November charged that the
US was studying a plan to deploy theater nuclear arms, including
such intermediate-range missiles as the cruise and Pershing II, to
Japan and the surrounding waters. Another broadcast in December
observed that limiting medium-range nuclear arms had now emerged
as a pressing issue in the Far East and involved Japan because
"the introduction of nuclear arms into Japan is not in the least
controlled by the Japanese."
Soviet hints about limitations on missiles indicate that
these limitations must in the last analysis be multilateral. But
some variants of the Brezhnev CBM scheme are likely to be put
forward on a bilateral basis, in the Japanese case perhaps playing
to Japanese concern about the Soviet military buildup in the
Kuriles and the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the Far East. As
one Soviet commentator put it, "The [Japanese] attitude toward the
Soviet proposal offers an unmistakable criterion in determining
whether Japan really believes the figment of the Soviet threat or
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is using it to justify the anti-Soviet propaganda and the military
buildup."
In the gamut of Soviet peace proposals to Japan, the ultimate
goal is still a peace treaty. Intermediate goals include a treaty
on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force with confidence-
building measures a more immediate objective on that general route.
Mongolian Proposal for Non-Aggression Convention
(S/NF) Mongolian leader Tsedenbal proposed last May, at the
18th Congress of the Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party, that
Asian and Pacific states agree to a convention on mutual non-
aggression and non-use of force. This proposal was endorsed by
Brezhnev during his August meeting with Tsedenbal in the Crimea.
The Mongolians have subsequently said little about the content of
their scheme, except that the convention should be ratified at a
conference which they would convene. They have, however, been
busily promoting it through letters to chiefs of state (including
President Reagan) and sending delegations to Asian countries to
discuss the matter. Except for the expected endorsements from
Vietnam, the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, the
convention has met only silence.
(C) The most likely motivation for Tsedenbal's initiative
was less substantive than operational: the initiative provides an
issue around which to promote greater Mongolian diplomatic activ-
ity in Asia, something both Moscow and Ulan Bator find desirable
given China's new foreign policy activism. The other socialist
countries on the continent are either unreliable from the Soviet
point of view (North Korea) or so involved with internal diffi-
culties and regional rivalries (Vietnam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan)
to be of limited value as propaganda stalking-horses.
Prepared by Frank Crump
x28657
Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536
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8
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TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
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DTG: 260942Z JAN 83 PSN: ø16259
E0B940
AN009181
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CSN:HCE998
THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE
NEGOTIATIONS, IN THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT TO THE FEDERAL
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 GUHN-00 FE-00 NATO-00 /001 A2
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT
THAT "AMONG THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, THOSE
EXCEEDING THE NUMBER AGREED UPON IN THE EUROPEAN REGION,
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WILL PROBABLY BE DEPLOYED BEYOND THE BORDERLINE OF
SIT:
SIBERIA, FROM WHERE THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REACH THE
EOB:
TARGETS IN WEST EUROPE." AS WE HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY
MAKING CLEAR, OUR COUNTRY, ON ITS PART, DESIRES
SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS
ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND HOPES TO SEE
OP IMMED
THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BALANCED
STU6298
AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIET
DE RUEHKO #1609/01 0260949
UNION IS CONSIDERING THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERMEDIATE-
0 260942Z JAN 83
RANGE MISSILES BY MOVING THEM TO SIBERIA, AS A RESULT
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT BUT
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. WEST GERMAN PAPERS HAVE RECENTLY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9056
REPORTED THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY
ANDROPOV TOLD VOGEL, THE CANDIDATE FOR HEAD OF THE
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8351
GERMANY, THAT "SOME OF THE SOVIET WEAPONS WILL BE
AMEMBASSY BONN 7581
DISMANTLED, WHILE SOME OF THEM WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND
USMISSION GENEVA 5700
WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE FAR EAST, IN AN EFFORT TO
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9622
ACHIEVE A BALANCE WITH THE NEW BASES IN JAPAN." IF
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6992
THESE REPORTS ARE CORRECT, THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2362
ACCEPT THIS VIEWPOINT OF THE SOVIET SIDE, AND IT CANNOT
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7279
BUT REGRET SUCH A DANGEROUS WAY OF THINKING.
USMISSION USNATO 1201
-
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4462
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
5. FROM THE BEGINNING, JAPAN HAS SOUGHT ONLY THE
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
MINIMUM NECESSARY DETERRENT POWER AS REQUIRED FOR
COMNAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA
SELF-DEFENSE, AND WE CAN ONLY SAY THAT THE TRANSFER
CGUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA //IX CORPS//
OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE FAR EAST, ON THE
GROUNDS OF JAPANESE DETERRENT POWER FOR DEFENSE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 01609
PURPOSES, IS OFF THE MARK. THE TRANSFER OF NEW
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
MISSILES TO THE FAR EAST, IN ADDITION TO THE
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WHICH ARE ALREADY IN
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
THE FAR EAST, WILL UNNECESSARILY INCREASE TENSION
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
IN ASIA, AND IT WILL INCUR THE CRITICISM NOT ONLY
DEPLOYMENTS FOR THE FAR EAST--AND ON GOJ POLICIES
OF OUR COUNTRY, BUT ALSO OF OTHER ASIAN NATIONS. IN
ON DEFENSE, ROK, US
REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF MISSILES IN
THE FAR EAST, THE LATE GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV
CLARIFIED THE POSITION, IN MAY OF LAST YEAR, THAT
1. ENTIRE TEXT)
BT
2. MOFA SOVIET DIVISION PROVIDED EMBOFF JANUARY 25
WITH TEXT OF REPRESENTATION TO BE MADE LATER THAT
DAY TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR PAVLOV BY VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER NAKAJIMA PROTESTING SOVIET STATEMENTS ON
PLANS TO REDEPLOY SOME SS-20S FROM EUROPE TO SIBERIA
IN THE EVENT OF CONCLUSION OF AN INF AGREEMENT.
NAKAJIMA'S REPRESENTATION ALSO PROTESTS SOVIET
MEDIA ATTACKS ON THE JAPANESE DEFENSE BUDGET,
ON INTIMATIONS THAT THE F-16S IN MISAWA COULD
MAKE JAPAN A TARGET OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ATTACK, AND
ON SOVIET PRESS CRITICISM OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
VISITS TO THE ROK AND TO THE US. TEXT OF REPRESENTATION
FOLLOWS:
-
-
3. BEGIN TEXT
DECLASSIFIED
I WISH TO SET FORTH AS FOLLOWS, THE JAPANESE SIDE'S
BASIC VIEWS ABOUT THE RECENT STATEMENTS BY SOVIET LEADERS
NLS F06-114/6*8732
CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES
IN SIBERIA, AND THE RECENT COMMENTS BY SOVIET NEWS MEDIA
BY
LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
CONCERNING OUR COUNTRY'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES, ETC.
4. ON JANUARY 17, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TOUCHED UPON
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF DENTIAL
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AN009183
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ON THE US. IN REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF OUR COUNTRY'S
FISCAL 1983 DEFENSE BUDGET AND THE PROBLEM OF OUR
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
COUNTRY'S WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY TO THE US, THE SOVIET
MEDIA CRITICIZED THIS AS JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION,
IN A MORE POSITIVE WAY, IN THE UNITED STATES' WORLD
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
STRATEGY, AND AS A DANGEROUS MEASURE WHICH WILL LEAD
SIT:
IN THE DIRECTION OF MILITARISM. THE RECENT JAPAN-US
EOB:
SUMMIT TALKS WERE HELD FOR THE STILL GREATER STRENGTHENING
OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WITH THE US. HOWEVER, THE
SOVIET SIDE'S NEWS MEDIA CONCLUDED THAT THIS WILL MAKE
THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST AND ASIA, AS A WHOLE,
OP IMMED
STILL MORE COMPLICATED, AND EVEN WENT TO THE EXTENT
UTS3615
OF VOICING COMMENTS WHICH ACTUALLY SEEMED TO HINT AT
DE RUEHKO #1609/02 ø26ø951
THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR COUNTRY'S BECOMING AN OBJECT
0 260942Z JAN 83
OF THE SOVIET UNION'S NUCLEAR ATTACK.
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
8. THE JAPANESE SIDE CANNOT BUT VIEW THIS SERIES OF
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9057
COMMENTS BY THE SOVIET SIDE AS BEING EXTREMELY UNJUST
AND INAPPROPRIATE, AND THEY ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JAPANESE SIDE. OUR COUNTRY THINKS THAT THE STRENGTHENING
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8352
OF FRIENDLY AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE ROK,
AMEMBASSY BONN 7582
WHICH IS OUR NEIGHBOR, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
USMISSION GENEVA 5701
STABILITY OF ASIA. THERE IS NO REASON WHATSOEVER FOR A
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9623
VISIT ON THIS BASIS TO THE ROK BY OUR COUNTRY'S PRIME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6993
MINISTER TO BE CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. IT IS
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2363
ALSO A MATTER OF COURSE FOR OUR COUNTRY TO MAKE DEFENSE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7280
EXPENDITURES OF A PROPER SCALE TO ENSURE ITS OWN PEACE
USMISSION USNATO 1202
AND SECURITY, AND FOR JAPAN TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4463
SMOOTH OPERATION OF THE JAPAN-US SECURITY TREATY
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
STRUCTURE. THEY ARE NOT MATTERS WHICH CAN REASONABLY
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
BE CRITICIZED BY THE SOVIET SIDE. RELATIONS WITH THE US
COMNAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA
ARE THE BASIC AXIS OF OUR COUNTRY'S DIPLOMACY. OUR
CGUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA //IX CORPS//
COUNTRY'S STRENGTHENING ITS RELATIONSHIP OF FRIENDSHIP
AND TRUST WITH THE US WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 01609
STABILITY OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION, AND CONSEQUENTLY
THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. AS FOR THE COMMENT
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
WHICH COULD EVEN BE TAKEN AS HINTING AT A NUCLEAR
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
ATTACK AGAINST OUR COUNTRY, IT CANNOT BUT BE VIEWED AS
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
HAVING THE PURPOSE OF UNWARRANTEDLY STIRRING UP
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
UNEASINESS AMONG THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY.
THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH THE
POSSESSORS OF NUCLEAR MEANS, WHICH ARE IN CONFRONTATION
9. JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE NEIGHBORS TO
WITH SOVIET MISSILES. THIS ATTITUDE IS NO OTHER THAN
BT
THE "LOGIC OF THE STRONG," WHICH REFUSES EVEN TO HOLD
TALKS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WITH NATIONS WHICH DO NOT POSSESS NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.
6. STILL FURTHER, THE SOVIET UNION'S RAPID ARMAMENTS
EXPANSION IN THE FAR EAST IN RECENT YEARS IS GIVING
GREAT UNEASINESS TO THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THIS
REGION. IT IS EXTREMELY REGRETTABLE THAT, DESPITE
THE REPEATED PROTESTS BY THE JAPANESE SIDE, THE
SOVIET UNION'S ARMS BUILD-UP IN OUR COUNTRY'S
NORTHERN TERRITORY IS CONTINUING, SUCH AS THE
INTRODUCTION OF NEW SOVIET MILITARY PLANES, TO OUR
COUNTRY'S NORTHERNTERRITORY TOWARD THE END OF LAST
YEAR. ON THIS OCCASION, WE WISH TO EXPRESS THE
JAPANESE SIDE'S VIEWS ON THIS POINT, TOO.
-
7. WE ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS THE JAPANESE SIDE'S
VIEWPOINT IN REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS.
RECENTLY, THE SOVIET SIDE'S NEWS MEDIA HAVE BEEN CARRY-
ING EXTREMELY ONE-SIDED REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES REGARD-
ING OUR COUNTRY. IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE ROK, THE SOVIET MEDIA
EXPRESSED GROUNDLESS CRITICISM AGAINST WHAT THEY CALLED
A MILITARY COOPERATION STRUCTURE AMONG THE THREE
NATIONS, THAT IS, JAPAN, THE US AND THE ROK, CENTERING
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
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CSN: HCE005
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US IN EAST ASIA.
PAVLOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GROMYKO'S STATEMENT ON
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES WAS OFFICIAL
BUT HAD NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT SS-20'S IN SIBERIA.
INSTEAD, HE ASSERTED THAT JAPAN HAS NO GROUNDS
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WHATSOEVER FOR REFERRING TO A THREAT FROM THE
SIT:
SOVIET UNION AND COMPLAINED THAT JAPAN CONTINUES TO
EOB:
REJECT SOVIET PROPOSALS ON MEASURES FOR FOSTERING
MUTUAL TRUST. PAVLOV SAID THE SOVIET UNION COULD
NOT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT JAPAN HAD DISCUSSED THE
SOVIET UNION WITH BOTH THE US AND THE ROK. HE
OP IMMED
CLAIMED JAPAN WAS BECOMING MORE EMBROILED IN US
STU6307
STRATEGY, AS SHOWN BY GOJ CONCURRENCE WITH THE
DE RUEHKO #1609/03 ø26ø953
DEPLOYMENT OF F-16'S TO MISAWA. HE ALSO SAID THE
0 260942Z JAN 83
USSR HAS NO INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR FORCE FIRST,
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
BUT MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND ITSELF IN ASIA AND ELSE-
WHERE. TAKANO SAID THE VICE MINISTER MADE CLEAR THAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9058
NONE OF PAVLOV'S COMMENTS ANSWERED GOJ CONCERNS, AND
PAVLOV UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE TO MOSCOW.
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8353
AMEMBASSY BONN 7583
11. COMMENT: THE REPRESENTATION BY NAKAJIMA CONTAINS
USMISSION GENEVA 5702
SOME OF THE STRONGEST AND LEAST EQUIVOCAL LANGUAGE THE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9624
SOVIETS HAVE HEARD FROM THE JAPANESE FOR SOME TIME.
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6994
IT REPRESENTS NOT so MUCH A TOUGHENING OF THE GOJ
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2364
STANCE TOWARD THE USSR AS AN INEVITABLE JAPANESE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7281
REACTION TO A SERIES OF EXCEPTIONALLY CRUDE AND
USMISSION USNATO 1203
BLATANT ANTI-JAPANESE STATEMENTS FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4464
WHILE THERE HAS BEEN OFFICIAL JAPANESE CONCERN SINCE
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
THE INCEPTION OF THE INF PROCESS OVER THE POTENTIAL
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
THREAT TO THEMSELVES SHOULD AN EVENTUAL INF AGREEMENT
COMNAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA
BE CONCLUDED WITHOUT GLOBAL RESTRAINTS ON SS-20'S,
CGUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA //IX CORPS//
GROMYKO'S AND ANDROPOV'S REMARKS HAVE NOW MADE THE
THREAT SEEM MORE IMMINENT THAN POTENTIAL, AND HAVE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 04 TOKYO ø16ø9
BROUGHT THE PROBLEM TO THE ATTENTION OF THE JAPANESE
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
PUBLIC. ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME -- AS THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR -
HAS -- THAT GROMYKO AND ANDROPOV HAD THEIR ATTENTION
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
FOCUSED VERY FAR FROM JAPAN AT THE TIME. HOWEVER,
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
THAT DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE CRUDE ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE
EACH OTHER, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR SENSITIVITY WITH THE THREAT THAT
THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE AND
JAPAN COULD BECOME A TARGET OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
STABILITY OF ASIA, AND CONSEQUENTLY TO THE PEACE
BT
AND STABILITY OF THE WORLD. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO PERSEVERE IN ITS WISH TO HOLD TALKS WITH
THE SOVIET SIDE, BASED ON THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP,
IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE PENDING PROBLEM BETWEEN THE
TWO COUNTRIES AND THEREBY TO ESTABLISH TRUE RELATIONS
OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. IT DESIRES THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE WILL SHOW BY CONCRETE ACTIONS ITS WORDS
THAT IT DESIRES THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN-
SOVIET RELATIONS.
END TEXT
10. FOLLOWING VICE MINISTER NAKAJIMA'S MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR PAVLOV, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BRIEFED THE
PRESS CORPS IN DETAIL ON THE TEXT OF THE REPRESENTATION
AND ON NAKAJIMA'S AND PAVLOV'S EXCHANGE OF REMARKS.
LENGTHY ACCOUNTS APPEARED ON THE KYODO WIRE AND IN
THE TOKYO DAILIES, AND THERE WAS WIDE RADIO-TV
COVERAGE (DETAILS IN UNCLASSIFIED USIS MEDIA REACTION
REPORT FOR JANUARY 25, VIA SEPTEL). MOF A SOVIET
DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR TAKANO CONFIRMED THE
ACCURACY OF PRESS REPORTING ON THE MEETING AND
PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAILS. HE SAID PAVLOV HAD
DISMISSED GOJ PROTESTS OVER SOVIET PRESS ATTACKS
AS INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN "UNOFFICIAL" NATURE OF
SOVIET MEDIA. PAVLOV SAID SUCH SOVIET PRESS REACTION
WAS TO BE EXPECTED SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE USSR
IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT STRENGTHENED SECURITY
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
63
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
TOKYO 1609
DTG: 260942Z JAN 83 PSN: 016269
EOB943
AN009185
TOR: 026/1018Z
CSN: HCE006
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
OP IMMED
UTS3620
DE RUEHKO # 1609/04 0260955
O 260942Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9059
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8354
AMEMBASSY BONN 7584
USMISSION GENEVA 5703
AMEMBASSY LONDON 9625
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 6995
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2365
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7282
USMISSION USNATO 1204
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4465
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
COMNAVFORJAP YOKOSUKA JA
CGUSARJ CAMP ZAMA JA //IX CORPS//
CONFIDENTIA L SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 01609
CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, JA, KS, UR, US
SUBJECT: JAPAN PROTESTS SOVIET STATEMENTS: ON SS-20
IT IN FACT AROUSED MORE IRE THAN FEAR -- THE JAPANESE
UNDERSTANDABLY REACT MORE STRONGLY THAN MOST
TO THE SPECTACLE OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE THREATENING
A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE WITH NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST.
AS FAR AS WE CAN RECALL, THE SOVIETS HAVEN' T MADE THIS
PARTICULAR THREAT TO THE JAPANESE SINCE KHrUsHCHEV.
THE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON THE PRIME MINISTER AND ON HIS
TRAVELS TO THE ROK AND TO THE US SIMPLY ADDED INSULT
TO INJURY. THE GOJ IS GENERALLY RESTRAINED IN ITS
RESPONSES TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA, NOT WISHING TO STRAIN
RELATIONS UNNECESSARILY AND RESIGNED TO THE FUTILITY
OF DEBATING WITH THE SOVIETS OVER PRESS ATTACKS. SOVIET
PROPAGANDISTS HAVE THEREFORE OUTDONE THEMSELVES IN
MOUNTING AN ATTACK SIMULTANEOUSLY ON TWO OF THE VERY
FEW ISSUES THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT FAIL TO PRODUCE A
VIGOROUS JAPANESE RESPONSE. TAKANO COMMENTED THAT
"THE SOVIETS SIMPLY DO NOT WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AT THIS TIME." END COMMENT.
MANSFIELD
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
45
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
File
USSR/Asia-
WASHINGTON
Pacific
SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST
February 26, 1985
SECRET
Countering Soviet Attempts to Penetrate the South Pacific
Embassy Suva reports the Soviet Union is exploiting fisheries
issues -- our weakest point -- to gain a foothold in the South
Pacific. The USSR has selected two of the most economically
vulnerable island states as targets.
The Soviets are particularly exploiting the islanders'
resentment over the unrestrained activities of the U.S.
fishing fleet in the Pacific.
The Soviet effort comes at a time when our two traditional
allies, Kiribati and Tuvalu, are redefining their security rela-
tionships with the U.S. British retrenchment in economic
assistance has created an atmosphere of quiet desperation.
While the embassy believes President Tabai of Kiribati
would prefer licenses for fishing boats be sold to U.S.,
Japanese or Korean tuna boats, he will not jeopardize
his nation's economic future by refusing a Soviet offer
in the absence of assurances that U.S. boats will buy
licenses.
The embassy suggests we give high priority to early conclusion of
the regional fisheries agreement. It also recommends that con-
sideration be given to arranging high level briefings for the
U.S. industry and interested members of Congress on the Soviet
efforts, to try to obtain industry cooperation in avoiding
confrontations while regional negotiations continue.
The embassy also believes that by funding a portion of
Fiji's bilateral program out of what will be seen as
regional monies, we will put one of our closest and most
anti-Soviet regional allies in an awkward position with
respect to its neighbors.
Moreover, when leaders realize that Mara's visit to the
White House cost them money, it will not enhance his
influence as a regional leader.
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CLASSIFIED BY SUVA
NLS DECLASSIFIED F06-114/6*8720
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
SECRET
SECRET
66
SECRET
-2-
According to the embassy, only a commitment of additional resources
to the region, combined wiht active diplomacy aimed at both thwart-
ing the Soviet initiative and blunting the impact of New Zealand's
decision to ban U.S. warships, can protect the U.S. position. (S)
Suva 735, PSN 2079
SECRET
67
ITEM RETURNED
To NSC
SECRETARIAT
IN APRIL 1987
Log # TCS 2734/83 Pages Pub