Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
215438778
label
Eastern Europe General – USSR
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
215438778
contentType
document
title
Eastern Europe General – USSR
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
215438778
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
595da1cda35dd608
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Eastern Europe General - USSR
Box: 25
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/5/2005
File Folder
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE GENERAL
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
25
2501
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9589 CABLE
UK CONTRIBUTION FOR NATO
1 2/26/1981 B1
REGIONAL EXPERTS' MEETING ON
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE
[1 - 1 ]
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9590 PAPER
UK CONTRIBUTION FOR NATO
20 3/3/1981 B1
REGIONAL EXPERTS' MEETING ON
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE 3-6
MARCH 1981
[2 - 11 ]
9591 CABLE
FRG CONTRIBUTION FOR NATO
2 3/17/1981 B1
REGIONAL EXPERTS' MEETING ON THE
SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
[12 - 12 ]
R
11/24/2009 F06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/5/2005
File Folder
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE GENERAL
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
25
2501
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9592 PAPER
FRG CONTRIBUTION FOR NATO
52 2/20/1981 B1
REGIONAL EXPERTS' MEETING ON THE
SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
[13 - 38 ]
9587 MEMO
HANDWRITTEN MEMO ON EASTERN
2
ND
B1
EUROPE ECONOMICS
[39 40 ]
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9588 MEMO
USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: CUTBACK IN
1 12/7/1981 B1
SOVIET OIL EXPORTS
[46 46 ]
9593 PAPER
THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH ITS EAST
11 1/11/1985 B1
EUROPEAN ALLIES
[48 - 53 ]
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SOViET union /E.E.I
GENERAL
AIRGRAM
90-0977
HANDLING
CLASSIFICATION
MESSAGE REFERENCE NO.
CONFIDENTIAL
A-02
POL-3
AMB DCM
TO:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLAD
D/POLAD
INFO:
AmEmbassy BELGRADE, AmEmbassy BERLIN, AmEmbassy BUCHAREST,
XO
AmEmbassy BUDAPEST, AmEmbassy LONDON, AmEmbassy MADRID,
ODA-2
AmEmbassy MOSCOW, AmEmbassy PRAGUE, AmEmbassy SOFIA,
FILES
AmEmbassy WARSAW
12
FROM:
USMISSION TO NATO BRUSSELS
DATE: FEBRUARY 26, 1981
E.O. 11652:
RDS-1 2-25-87 (Bennett, W. Tapley) OR-M
TAGS:
NATO, UR, PL, RO, CSCE, ECON, PEPR
SUBJECT:
(U) UK Contribution for NATO Regional Experts' Meeting on
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
REF:
DEPT. DISTRIBUTION 11
ORIGIN/ACTION
Pm*
MADRID FOR US DEL CSCE
AF
ARA
CU
EA
Attached for addressees' information is the UK national
contribution for the NATO Regional Experts' meeting on Soviet
EB
EUR
INR
10
J
)
Union and Eastern Europe, March 3-6. The contribution is a
L
package of six short papers dealing with: (a) the Soviet Five
NEA
PER
PM
Year Plan, (b) Soviet tactics at Madrid CSCE meeting, (c) the
REP
SCI
SS
SY
Brezhnev Persian Gulf proposals, (d) the Polish situation,
1981 MAR 10
(e) Romanian economic policy and (f) Yugoslav developments.
,
J
HA
a/c
S/IL
None of the papers strikes us as being particularly exceptional --
most sticking to a straightforward treatment of the issue at
\
AGR
hand. This is particularly true of the three papers on the
AID
AIR
ARMY
Soviet Union. The paper on Poland, however, departs somewhat
CIA
COM
DOD
DOT
from this rather bland, factual approach, and we find interest-
ing its development of the thesis "that a system of alternative
FRB
HEW
INT
LAB
institutions is being created matching those controlled by the
Party".
NAVY
NSA
NSC
OPIC
DECLASSIFIED
STR
TAR
TRSY
USIA
BENNETT
WTB
NLRR F66-114/7 #9589
XMB
att
Attachments: As noted above.
BY Gr NARADATE 7/7/08
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION
DRAFTED BY: ovy
DRAFTING DATE
PHONE NO.
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION approved BY:
POL: TMSavage mlh
2-24-81
5717
W. Tapley, Bennett, Jr.
CLEARANCES:
D/POLAD: JHHawes
HTP formB
(FORMERLY FS- DS-323)
XO: HTPerlow NYP
50247-101
OPTIONAL FORM 247
MARCH 1975
GPO : 1975 579-100
DEPT. OF STATE
( MAKE A NEW FICE
SOVIET UNiON/
12
AIRGRAM
P810 04 - 1721
EASTERN EUROPE
GENERAL.
HANDLING
CLASSIFICATION
MESSAGE REFERENCE NO.
CONFI DENTIAL
A-03
POL-3
TO:
Department of State
AMB
DCM
INFO:
Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow,
POLAD
Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, U.S. Mission Berlin
D/POLAD
ODA-2
FILES
FROM:
USNATO
DATE: March 17, 1981
]2065:
E.O. XXX5X
RDS-1 03/17/88 (Bennett, W. Tapley) OR-M
TAGS:
NATO, UR, PL, BU, GE ECON, PINT, PEPR, GW
SUBJECT:
(U) FRG Contribution for NATO Regional Experts'
Meeting on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
REF:
(a) USNATO A-02 (NOTAL), (b) USNATO 1026 (NOTAL)
ORIGIN/ACTION DEPT. DISTRIBUTION 49
Ear
1. (C - Entire Text).
Eur
2. Attached for addressees' information is the FRG
AF
ARA
CU
EA
national contribution for the March 3-6 NATO Regional
Experts Meeting on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
EB
EUR
INR
10
Part I of the paper focusses almost exclusively on the
L
Soviet Union, concluding with brief treatments of the
NEA
PER
PM
situations in Poland and in Bulgaria. (The section on
REP
SCI
SS
SY
Poland appears to have been prepared prior to the FRG
assessment following the 8th Plenum contained in Ref (b)
C
Part II deals exclusively (and notably separately) with
\
the GDR. Part III addresses the situations in Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania and Hungary.
MAR 31 PM 1 27
AGR
AID
AIR
ARMY
CIA
COM
DOD
DOT
3. The FRG papers contain little new and stick to the
basically factual format which national contributions
FRB
for this semi-annual NATO meeting have assumed over the
HEW
INT
LAB
years. Its all-too-brief treatment of general trends
in Soviet foreign policy (pp.6-7), however, does pro-
NAVY
NSA
NSC
OPIC
vide a forward-looking, analytical chapeau for the sub-
STR
TAR
TRSY
USIA
sequent region-by-region review of Soviet policy, and,
in doing so, also provides some interesting insight
into the FRG's thinking on what is apparently perceived
XMB
as Moscow's current predicament. The paper on the GDR
follows closely the reporting from AmEmbassies Berlin
and Bonn, and concludes that GDR foreign and domestic
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION:
CONF IDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION
DRAFTED BY:
POL: TMSavage: Nay m/h/vbh
DRAFTING DATE
PHONE NO.
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
3-2-81
57]7
AMB: W. Tapley Bennett
CLEARANCES: D/POLAD: JHHawes, XO: HTPernow
Fir
B
OPTIONAL FORM 247
HTP
50247-101
(FORMERLY FS- DS-323)
DECLASSIFIED
MARCH 1975
GPO: 1975 o - 579-100
DEPT. OF STATE
NLRR #9591
BY RW
NARA DATE 11/24/09
12A
CONF IDENTIAL
Page 2
policy during past six months "was determined to a decisive ex-
tent by events in Poland, with ideological aspects increasingly
coming to the fore again".
4. The analyses of the situations in Czechoslovakia and Romania
give heavy emphasis to the impact and import of events in Poland.
The FRG sees signs that Prague will assume a more active military
aid role -- especially in the Middle East -- to help relieve the
Soviet Union. Manifestations of Romania's independent foreign
policy have become rarer, in Bonn's view; but the FRG notes a
"cautious opening" on Albania's part towards its neighbors.
Trends in Hungary are addressed basically from an economic vantage
point, while Yugoslavia is considered in terms of "post-Tito"
coping.
BENNETT
CONF IDENTIAL
39
tim extersive to inclusive? Is
talues repteur due an?
DECLASSIFIED /RELEASES
165hn
NLRR 806-114/7 #9587
BY Civ NARADATE 7/7/08
Difference helw. policy x refunes.
Eun. vehic to he meanured neverb have mahel includens. other
are usually ( bours' ch - but no ral maher).
NEM
1. success stury - Huyany ph what it rel me to do - currect laye hard
cervency delh. lata-ro nammed x eliminard - it has hear
accuplished. NEVIVAL lates to eliminate had awam delh.
2. Dauhu are puslicy Mand to adept Hupanan refun (ml
yupilar under mangement) but uput new this would he
disarts.
3. Huyany rives answer pinces tradily. Y-5/0 annal inflation.
4. Huyay is me a maket country world mices an duplicard but
no Gree murchent of puier - los of mu curture. even "Wee cusumer"
pucer are whilled. AMCULLND nuces quli exampt.
S. nept of culopmer to duchage within -
6. theopier have no granhe they will excel -haulmplery feashle.
7. Ner coup differenties.
8. Ownner: no hiddis for investment andit, uu capital wanchet
insurer rute ).
9, Majur olstacle degree of insecently (umeupl. X Gancapas) that
can. ellivency require we allowed. Investment awhmen to he
wurtched. Fines dur excenively secur.
10. the is mt ophwite abrut futur.
11. Nnde with COMELON w hased on ral mahel.
Amcultr wales her !
lu Hunjary you call have people curverite with ecus. policy.
lase punite plus.
40
Hujawin pupulation autended.
Geclubovuluia : "Ecumme measures" hook-podge of Hyermux over
hyper. tall of making dweshi puces rland to unld Mices.
Mild central planty. Electric
GDn - rites on organational itequ, ammunt & little.
Rumain 1978 NEM introduced. Decular. an engineery me
ecumic. Pay. "wules parkap."= "= representation (mercenty -)
cunmete.
Dulgani Afaci mainly puncy us shecteral.
Solidarly is auti-vefum.
41
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Friday, April 17, 1981
Please admit the following appointments on
. 19
for
Richard Pipes
of NSC
..
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(AGENCY)
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe
Jeremy AZRAEL
Robert BARAZ
Paul COOK
Robert DEAN
Eugene DOUGLAS
Philip KAPLAN
Marty KOHN Briefer
Martha MAUTNER
James NOREN
NSC:
Bill Stearman
Allen Lenz
Paula Dobriansky
MEETING LOCATION
OEOB
FRancesca Lapinski
Building
Requested by
Room No
305
Room No
368Telephone x5646
Time of Meeting
12:00 noon
Date of request April 17, 1981
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - - 456-6742
UNITED states SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (05-78)
UNCL
42
DRAFT
DRAFT
DRAFT
DRAFT
DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT
SOVIET /EAST. EUROP,
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
EMIGRATION
FOR: Mr. Mike Guhin
EOB Room 365
Pocicies / CEVELS
FROM: Ada Adler
SUBJECT: DRAFT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Dear Mr. Chairman:
[On behalf of the President] I am pleased to transmit the
information required by the Refugee Act of 1980 in preparation
for the consultations on refugee admissions for Fiscal Year
1982. This document includes [the President's] the
Administration's proposed admissions levels and allocations
among groups of special humanitarian concern to the United
States or whose admission is otherwise in the national
interest. [The President] I will make [his] a final
determination before the beginning of the fiscal year, after
taking into consideration Congressional and other views
expressed at the consultations. [The President] I welcome[s]
your written comments.
Sincerely,
Enclosures:
1.
Executive Summary of the Proposed Refugee
Admissions and Allocations for Fiscal Year 1982
2.
Proposed Refugee Admissions and Allocations for
Fiscal Year 1982
3.
Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation
Refugee Processing
UNCL
43
II - 12
2. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Proposed Ceiling. For FY 1982, the proposed admis-
sions ceiling for refugees from the Soviet Union is 33,000
and from Eastern Europe 9,500. 1
The Administration remains both concerned with the
plight of refugees from this region and committed to the
principal of freedom of movement. Maintaining a ceiling
of 33,000 for Soviet refugee admissions despite lowered
intake in FY 1981 reflects this concern and commitment. A
higher ceiling for Eastern European admissions in FY 1982
is proposed to enable the United States to do its part in
the international effort to resettle the sharply increased
numbers of Eastern European refugees who have been
arriving in Western Europe, particularly in Australia,
this year.
Soviet Union. The Soviet Government strictly controls
the movement of its citizens and limits emigration to
ethnic Germans, Jews and Armenians who apply officially to
go to West Germany, Israel or the United States. Family
reunification is the only justification officially ac-
knowledged by Soviet authorities for emigration from the
Soviet Union, although the vast majority of people actu-
ally leaving the Soviet Union cite dissatisfaction with
the political system and discrimination on the basis of
race or religion. By limiting emigration to individuals
who qualify for family reunification, the Soviets effec-
tively prevent many thousands of their dissatisfied and
persecuted citizens from leaving the USSR.
Our policy toward Soviet refugee admissions is founded
on a strong commitment to the principle of freedom of
movement, which we have supported since the end of World
War II. Our commitment has been strengthened by Congres-
sional action, including the Jackson-Vanik amendment to
the Trade Act of 1974 and our adherence in 1975 to the
Helsinki Final Act. We pressed this commitment strongly
this year at the Madrid meeting of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
International Resettlement. We anticipate that refu-
gees admitted from the Soviet Union under this ceiling in
FY 1982 will be principally Jews and Armenians.
See Table VI - REFUGEE ARRIVALS TO THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
UNCL
44
II - 13
A smaller proportion of Jews allowed to leave the
Soviet Union have chosen to resettle in Israel in recent
years. Soviet Jews leaving the USSR travel to Austria,
where some leave for Israel. Refugees electing to re-
settle in countries other than Israel proceed to Rome
where they are processed by INS and assisted by voluntary
agencies. Approximately 80 percent of these refugees now
resettle in the United States, less than 20 percent elect
to resettle in Israel and the remainder go to Australia,
Canada, New Zealand and Western Europe. Those entering
the United States are resettled with the cooperation of
the American Jewish community in locations throughout the
country. Large numbers go to New York, Boston, Chicago,
Dallas, and Los Angeles. Congressional concern over the
situation of Soviet Jewry and support for admitting into
this country those Jews who are able to leave the Soviet
Union continues to be strong, as is Congressional interest
in U.S. Government efforts to facilitate their emigration
and resettlement in the free world.
Armerians who leave the Soviet Union are almost ex-
clusively those with relatives in the United States.
Armenians apply for entry to the United States under a
Third Country Processing (TCP) program, which involves
pre-screening in Moscow by U.S. consular officers, comple-
tion of security checks and verification of sponsorship in
the United States before departure. They receive pro-
forma U.S. visas, then fly to Rome, where they are inter-
viewed by INS for admission as refugees, and finally fly
to the United States.
Eastern Europe. During the first six months of calen-
dar year 1981, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of Eastern European refugees and emigrants arriving
in Western Europe, particularly in Austria, where 8,000
persons arrived between January and June. Austrian of-
ficials have estimated that if the trend continues, there
may be as many as 20,000 Eastern European entrants in
their country by the end of December. The greatest in-
crease is in the number of Poles, although there are also
considerably more Czechs arriving than in previous years.
As a result of this sudden surge, refugee processing
facilities and hotels are overcrowded and Austrian facili-
ties and resources are strained. In addition to those who
have claimed refugee status, there are reportedly thou-
sands of Poles in Austria who have not yet requested
asylum or third country resettlement because they are
uncertain about political developments in Poland.
45
UNCL
II - 4
1. Asia
Proposed Ceiling. The proposed admissions ceiling for
Asian refugees for FY 1982 is 120,000.
of this number, 96,000 will be newly processed refu-
gees and 24,000 will be refugees who were interviewed and
approved by INS for U.S. resettlement during FY 1981.
These 24,000 were not physically admitted during FY 1981
because employable adults from this group were placed in
intensive English language and cultural orientation
training courses prior to departure to the United States
to facilitate their smooth integration into American
society. of the proposed admissions, 200 will be reserved
for Asians other than Indochinese.
Justification. Progress has been achieved in reducing
the Indochinese refugee numbers since the 1979 Geneva Con-
ference on Indochinese refugees at which several nations
undertook major resettlement commitments (including a U.S.
pledge to double its resettlement rate) and Vietnam indi-
cated it would cease expelling or facilitating the depar-
ture of large numbers of its citizens. Overall refugee
camp populations have been reduced, significant resettle-
ment has taken place in other countries,¹ some small-
scale repatriation of refugees from Laos has been
accomplished, and an Orderly Departure Program (ODP)
negotiated with Hanoi and initiated in December 1980 has
so far provided a safe and legal channel for the departure
of nearly 1400 Vietnamese to the United States. Addi-
tional numbers of Vietnamese have gone directly to other
countries under their own form of "orderly departure".
The Indochinese refugee problem, however, remains
serious and requires the sustained attention and efforts
of the international community. Because of the special
humanitarian concern for these refugees generated by our
historic involvement and continuing interests in Southeast
Asia, it remains our policy to play a leading role in this
cooperative effort to provide resettlement opportunities
in the absence of other solutions.
As of June 30, 1981, there were approximately 300,000
Indochinese still in camps in Southeast Asia: approxi-
mately 100,000 from Laos consisting of ethnic Lao, Hmong
and other hill-tribespeople; 100,000 Khmer; and 70,000
Vietnamese. Nearly 50,000 additional refugees were in
See Table IV - INDOCHINESE DEPARTURES TO U.S. AND THIRD
COUNTRIES APRIL 1975 TO JUNE 1981
ITEM RETURNED
To NSC
SECRETARIAT
IN APRIL 1987
Log # PUB 01158 USYR+EASTERN EUROPE
SECRET
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DEPARTMENT
OF
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
STATE
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
File
*
*
THIS
ADVANCE
POR
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE OR
CITE IN LISTINGS OF FINISHED
INTELLIGENCE,
(U)
THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH ITS
EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES
BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
(C) Summary
AND RESEARCH
The USSR regards its East European allies as
crucial to its security. In the decades since
World War II, the USSR has sought to bind these
members of the "socialist commonwealth" into a
tight alliance through a program of military, eco-
nomic, and political integration. A variety of
ASSESSMENTS
institutional links and trade patterns that devel-
oped over the years between itself and other mem-
AND
bers of the Warsaw Pact:
--give the USSR full control of most non-Soviet
RESEARCH
Warsaw Pact forces in the event of war;
--substantially tie the industry of the region
to that of the USSR through dependency on
Soviet raw material and energy sources as well
as markets; and
--regularize coordination of Warsaw Pact foreign
policy positions on major issues.
Despite Soviet efforts to weave a strong net
of common ties, there has always been tension
between the USSR and its allies, stemming in part
from diversities with deep historical roots.
Developments in recent years such as the Soviet
BY NARADATE NARA DATE 7/7/08
invasion of Afghanistan, unrest in Poland, and NATO
NLRR F06-114/7139593
DECLASSIFIED
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment
and USSR counterdeployment have exacerbated this
relationship to the point where the USSR is encoun-
tering serious problems with more countries on its
western periphery than at any time since the death
of Stalin.
Many of these problems are traceable to
conflicting policy signals from the Kremlin, or to
lack of consistent guidance and/or consultation
within the alliance. In addition, a resurgence of
SECRET
Declassify: OADR (multiple sources)
WARNING NOTICE
Report 994-AR (Rev.)
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED
January 11, 1985
Y8A
SECRET
- ii -
nationalistic feelings in the region has led to public disagree-
ment on the relative importance of national versus international
priorities. The Kremlin's greatest concern at the moment is that
Soviet allies keep their foreign policy meshed with that of the
USSR.
Adding to the problem are lingering differences in approaches
to socialism and attitudes toward the USSR combined with internal
and external friction among Eastern Europe's many ethnic groups.
The usual Soviet response to manifestations of local independence
has been to suppress them and concentrate on strengthening bloc
institutions (the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance-- CEMA). In present circumstances, however, the wide-
spread nature of East European resistance is making the tradi-
tional response more difficult than ever before.
******
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
49
SECRET
(C)
Pre-Andropov Period
The last six years of leadership uncertainty in the USSR has
taken its toll on the Warsaw Pact alliance. Moscow's hesitancy in
handling of the Solidarity crisis in Poland in the early 1980s--a
period that coincided with Brezhnev's declining health--highlighted
the lack of strong leadership in Moscow. The East Europeans sensed
a loosening of the Soviet grip and quickly became accustomed to a
freer hand in determining their own policies.
On the economic front, Moscow found it increasingly difficult
to line up support in East European councils for its economic
policies. In particular, the CEMA members have been unable to
agree on integration issues, commodity pricing, energy and raw
material supplies, and terms of trade. As a result, the CEMA
summit proposed by Ceausescu in 1980 and Brezhnev in 1981 to
settle the differences did not materialize until mid-1984.
Andropov Period
(C) Andropov took over a Soviet leadership committed to
restoration of bloc coordination and unity. In January 1983 he
chaired the Warsaw Pact summit meeting which issued a declaration
calling for "strengthening cooperation and cohesion" within the
bloc and stressed that each country must pursue a "correct polit-
ical line." In his June 1983 CPSU Central Committee plenum speech
he repeated the call. Little happened, however. The deadlock on
economic issues persisted and Andropov also failed to get a unani-
mous East European endorsement of his military response to NATO's
INF deployments.
(S/NF/NC/OC) Both the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia did agree in 1983 to Soviet INF counterdeployment
on their territory, but both populations and officialdom left no
doubts they questioned the wisdom of this action. All non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members except Czechoslovakia reportedly
resisted Soviet lobbying for a tough statement on countermeasures
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
49A
SECRET
- 2 -
to Western INF at the October 1983 session of Warsaw Pact Foreign
Ministers. Previous disagreements had involved individual coun-
tries; this apparently was the first time Moscow ran into a broad
East European opposition front. Andropov's illness throughout
most of his time in office, meanwhile, prevented the personal
interaction and contacts essential to reversing the trend.
(C) Chernenko Takes Over
Chernenko's election as CPSU General Secretary was greeted
with mixed feelings in Eastern Europe. Moscow's allies generally
seemed to react to his accession somewhat more positively than
they had to Andropov's, seeing in him an interim figure rather
than an innovator. Some reportedly now expected a return to the
less disruptive policies of the Brezhnev era.
The Chernenko regime nevertheless has continued the promotion
of greater bloc cohesion, stressing Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy
especially on questions of foreign policy. A New Times article
published on the eve of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting
in Budapest in April 1984 thus denounced tendencies of unnamed
East European countries to follow an "independent foreign policy
course" that differed from agreed Warsaw Pact policies. It also
attacked suggestions that small communist states might have a role
in facilitating "compromises among the superpowers. That same
month Oleg Rakhmanin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Department
for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Coun-
tries, warned that international tensions made close policy coor-
dination within the bloc particularly important and complained
that "in a number of fraternal countries" ideological thought had
not reached the "necessary intensity and depth."
(C) Continued Resistance
The Soviets encountered East European resistance, however.
Most NSWP countries that went along with Moscow's boycott of the
Los Angeles Olympics made no secret of their reluctance to do so.
Likewise, several NSWP states have made known their disagreement
with the Soviet "revanchist" campaign against the Federal Republic
of Germany.
The East Europeans also continue to resist Soviet efforts to
forge a united front vis-a-vis the West in the economic arena.
The Soviets recognize the advantages that flow from increased
economic ties with the West but they are increasingly leery that
these ties, if unchecked, can develop into dependencies that would
make the CEMA countries more vulnerable to Western sanctions. The
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
50
SECRET
- 3 -
Soviets also were concerned that East European determination to
continue dealing with the West would undercut Soviet efforts to
project an image of being unable to deal with the West because of
INF. The recent Geneva talks have taken some of the edge out of
these concerns, but the Soviets continue to be of two minds about
the value and the wisdom of extensive economic dealings with the
West.
In any event, the last-minute cancellation of GDR leader
Honecker's and Bulgarian leader Zhivkov's scheduled visits to the
FRG in September testify to the USSR's determination to control
the scope and pace of its allies' activities vis-a-vis the West.
The East Europeans for their part remain equally determined to
maintain their contacts with the West, underscoring in the process
the importance they attach to their individual approaches in these
contacts.
Hungary's Kadar, who earlier raised the thesis that "small
countries" could contribute to softening the East-West confron-
tation, has already hosted United Kingdom Prime Minister Thatcher,
Italian Prime Minister Craxi, and FRG Chancellor Kohl. During his
trip to Paris in October, Kadar again strongly defended coopera-
tion between countries of different social systems, claiming that
an "upswing" in economic relations would help detente and that no
one would benefit if East-West economic cooperation "narrowed" and
was "impeded" by political measures. And Romania's Ceausescu keeps
reiterating his call for small countries to "take direct responsi-
bility" for promoting detente and not "wait for results of talks"
between superpowers.
(C) Bulgaria
Political crises such as have occurred in Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and Poland are not likely to find counterparts in
Bulgaria. Yet even the compliant Zhivkov was engaged in his own
political opening to the FRG until Soviet pressure caused him to
cancel his September 1984 meeting with Kohl. Since then, the
Bulgarian Government has maintained a low profile on the
international scene.
Bulgaria's greatest concern at the moment is the outcome of
the papal assassination case. The Bulgarians fear, albeit without
concrete grounds, that their formal implication in the plot might
trigger Western economic sanctions that could deny them access to
coveted Western technology. They also face a succession problem--
Zhivkov is now 73--and the transition promises to be worrisome to
Bulgarians and Soviets alike.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
50A
SECRET
- 4 -
(C)
Czechoslovakia
Since the fall of Dubcek in April 1969, Husak has relied on
the Kremlin for political and economic support and guidance and
has become the most zealous East European advocate of greater
political coordination within the Warsaw Pact and economic
integration within CEMA. Even if the Husak regime had private
reservations about the Soviet decision to deploy nuclear missiles
on Czechoslovak territory, it publicly endorsed the decision--
despite public dissatisfaction and indications of uneasiness on
the part of local officials. Whatever the domestic reaction, the
Czechoslovak leaders evidently saw no alternative to what Moscow
was demanding of them. The aging, faction-ridden leadership in
Prague has shown increasingly little inclination to seek greater
latitude in its foreign or domestic policy or to take any initia-
tives without prior approval from the Kremlin.
Mounting economic problems and popular disgruntlement over
declining living standards eventually may force the regime to seek
greater economic/financial ties with selected Western countries.
Thus far, however, Czechoslovakia's only initiative has been to
vent hostility toward the US, i.e., media attacks against vir-
tually every facet of US foreign policy and society.
German Democratic Republic
The GDR is the USSR's most valuable economic partner, account-
ing for more than 10 percent of its total foreign trade. As such
it is also the most important source for advanced technology.
Despite a long history of GDR adherence to Soviet policy lines, a
degree of bilateral tension especially over the issue of inner-
German relations surfaced last summer when Pravda warned that the
FRG hoped to use its economic leverage to subvert the GDR.
The show of Soviet concern closely followed agreements in
July for a second FRG loan of 1 billion Deutsche marks to the GDR
(the first such agreement had been made the previous summer).
The GDR for its part relaxed its emigration restrictions to allow
some 40,000 East German citizens to go to West Germany by the end
of 1984.
Symbolic of the improved atmospherics, East German party
leader Honecker was negotiating a visit to the FRG in September.
Although the Soviets undoubtedly had been consulted throughout,
they became increasingly concerned that the publicity, specula-
tion, and expectations generated by these developments were
injecting too much of a dynamic into the inner-German
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
SI
SECRET
- 5 -
relationship. Although the East Germans reaffirmed an intent to
move ahead with the FRG and to "limit the damage" caused to inner-
German relations by the INF deployments (as Honecker put it in
1983), and although the GDR had widespread support in Eastern
Europe for efforts to improve relations with the FRG, Honecker
nevertheless postponed his visit to Bonn.
(C) Hungary
Since the suppression of the 1956 uprising, Hungarian-Soviet
relations have been characterized by an informal trade-off of
Hungarian support of Soviet foreign policy initiatives for a rela-
tively free-hand approach in domestic affairs, especially in the
economic sphere.
Economic stagnation and the rise of a new generation of
Hungarians oblivious of the lessons of 1956 have affected the
country's domestic stability. Hungary's desire to move forward
with economic reform--which is far more advanced than that of
other East European countries--and to pursue greater economic
ties with the West has run afoul of Moscow's stress on restoring
cohesion within the Warsaw Pact.
The element arousing greatest Soviet concern was the degree
to which Kadar was promoting "dialogue" with Western partners at a
time when the USSR's own relations with the West were stagnating.
Hungary's declaration that "small- and medium-sized countries in
both camps" have a role to play, especially during the period of
US-Soviet chill, also has come under attack from the USSR and
other orthodox allies.
The Kremlin evidently intends to extract a price if Kadar
wants to maintain his present course. As it has done to other
East Europeans, the USSR already is insisting on an even greater
share of Hungary's exports salable in the West. The USSR
continues to press Budapest to tighten domestic controls. The
outlook is thus for a continued tug-of-war as Kadar seeks to
reconcile the conflicting need of maintaining the Western economic
ties to meet Hungary's hard currency requirement.
(c)
(C)
Poland
Polish-Soviet relations received their severest test with the
rise of Solidarity in 1980. Although the imposition of martial
law in December 1981 blunted the challenge, the Kremlin continues
to have serious reservations about the way Jaruzelski has gone
about achieving "normalization." It has taken particular issue
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
51x
SECRET
- 6 -
with his failure to revitalize the party, restore it to tradi-
tional prominence, and reduce the military's involvement in
running the country; his cautious handling of the opposition and
the underground; and the regime's benign toleration and outright
courting of the Catholic Church as a way of maintaining domestic
peace. The Soviets also have criticized Poland's heavy economic
reliance on the West during the 1970s which now renders largely
ineffective efforts to tilt Poland's economy closer to CEMA (i.e.,
the USSR) and Warsaw's chronic inability to collectivize
agriculture (some 75 percent of land remains in private hands).
Jaruzelski must avoid a situation in which Moscow and Warsaw
hardliners force his regime to crack down on the Solidarity oppo-
sition. Such a course would set back what little progress was
made with the July 1984 amnesty, complicate Jaruzelski's relations
with the church hierarchy, and interrupt the recent thaw in
Poland's relations with the West. But as long as there is no
crackdown, Polish-Soviet relations probably still will be charac-
terized by strain and a good deal of suspicion. Even so, the
Soviets appear to have concluded that they have no practical
alternatives to the Jaruzelski regime no matter how troublesome
they find it. Their efforts to exert pressure on Poland have
foundered consistently on the resistance of an independent Polish
society that is now increasingly radicalized.
(C)
Romania
Romania's longstanding policy disputes with the Kremlin
appeared to have worsened during the past few years. Ceausescu was
the only Warsaw Pact leader who failed to endorse bloc counter-
measures against NATO INF deployments: Instead, he criticized both
superpowers, arguing that no new missiles should be deployed by
either side and that those already in place should be removed. In
defiance of bloc discipline, Romania did not send a delegation to a
December 1983 meeting of ideology secretaries which met in Moscow.
(Romania was the first Warsaw Pact state to have missed such a
meeting since these annual high-level consultations began in 1973.)
And, despite apparent Soviet pressuring, Romania broke with the
USSR's boycott and sent a team to the Los Angeles Olympics.
Despite the troubled relationship, Ceausescu seems to have
decided to work more closely with the Soviet Union in the economic-
commercial area. As one result, the Soviets apparently agreed
during Ceausescu's June 1984 visit to Moscow to increase their
deliveries of oil and other raw materials over the next several
years in return for Romanian agricultural produce and possible
participation in joint projects.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
52
SECRET
- 7 -
Although an increase in Romania's economic dependence on the
USSR and Soviet influence in Bucharest may result from these
arrangements, the warming trend is likely to be evanescent.
Ceausescu does not appear ready to abandon his independent
stance even though Romania's domestic economic problems are seri-
ous. For example, he proceeded with a trip to Bonn in October
after Honecker and Zhivkov had postponed theirs.
(C) Role of CEMA
Economic issues traditionally have been a chronic source of
friction between the Soviets and their East European partners.
The inability of CEMA to agree on integration issues, commodity
pricing, energy and raw material supplies, and terms of trade
prevented the convening of a CEMA summit from 1980 until 1984.
Even then, the meeting resulted in only superficial agreements on
these and other matters, leaving the final resolution of conten-
tious issues up to working groups that may take years to work out
details.
The most public disagreement between the USSR and its East
European partners has been over trade and credits with the West.
The Soviets openly fear that too much dependence on Western
credits, goods, and technology increases Eastern vulnerability to
economic pressure (e.g., the sanctions imposed after the invasion
of Afghanistan and the institution of martial law in Poland).
They also are concerned that economic ties to the West could
encourage greater economic and political deviations, as they have
in Hungary and Romania. The Soviets thus have argued for a reduc-
tion in the level of such contacts and have encouraged a revival
of intra-CEMA trade. Their campaign has met with strong resist-
ance in the GDR and Hungary, in particular, but has gotten a
better reception in Poland and Romania, where economic pressures
have made increased Western trade a less viable option.
More recently the Soviets also have demanded from their
European partners increased investment in Soviet energy and raw
material production and transportation facilities, backing up the
demands in some cases with threats of cutbacks in energy deliv-
eries. Such pressure tactics are certain to exacerbate East
European grievances about supplies and pricing.
A further area of controversy within CEMA has been the pres-
sure from non-European members (Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia) as
well as a number of observer states for development aid. The Euro-
pean members do not feel financially strong enough to engage in even
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
52A
SECRET
- 8 -
token developmental assistance and continue to resist pressures to
increase their level of trade with the non-European members.
Warsaw Pact
(8/NF) The USSR controls almost all military aspects of the
Warsaw Pact. The Pact General Staff, its commander, and its chief
of staff are Soviet officers; NSWP members of the staff have no
significant effect on Pact military policy. In case of hostili-
ties, the Soviets have established procedures that effectively
remove all meaningful control of NSWP forces from their national
command authorities. The one exception is Romania, which has
refused to accede to these procedures.
(e)
Most of the NSWP nations, however, have resisted efforts
to involve them in the recent Soviet anti-US campaign. All report-
edly opposed INF counterdeployment initially; the GDR and Czecho-
slovakia agreed only reluctantly to the stationing of such missiles
on their soil, and most NSWPs failed to endorse counterdeployments
unambiguously.
(0)
Most also have been resisting Soviet pressure over the
past several years for force modernization (many NSWP military
forces are still equipped with 1950s- and 1960s-vintage weapons).
Given serious economic problems bloc-wide, the NSWPs prefer to
utilize their resources for more productive purposes. Poland,
Hungary, and Romania in particular, but also Bulgaria and Czecho-
slovakia and to a lesser extent the GDR, have been slow to fulfill
Pact agreements on military modernization.
(C)
Persistent attempts by the Soviets to strengthen perma-
nent Pact political organizations in order to exert the same
control over the political side as they exert over the military
have made only slow progress. NSWP resistance on this score is
just as persistent as it has been in other areas.
(S/NF/NC/OC) The Warsaw Treaty will expire in June 1985 and
Moscow currently is negotiating a renewal. Romania, tacitly sup-
ported by Hungary and others, evidently is still pushing to have
the term of validity much shorter than that proposed by Moscow.
Romania apparently is engaged in this dispute primarily to extort
some economic concessions from the Soviets--no Pact members will
refuse to agree to a renewal--but is helped by the strong under-
current through Eastern Europe of dissatisfaction with the idea of
blocs in general. While the East Europeans accept some limits on
their autonomy--as a ranking Czechoslovak party official lamented
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
53
SECRET
- 9 -
recently regarding Soviet missile deployments in his country, "we
were obligated" - they continue to seek maximum flexibility for
policymaking where they can.
Prepared by Anita Friedt, SEE analysts
632-8657
Approved by Martha M. Mautner
632-9536
SECRET/WOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR