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Exposure of US Personnel to NPPD [Also see “Tagants” (Tracking Agents) Issue]
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Exposure of US Personnel to NPPD [Also see “Tagants” (Tracking Agents) Issue]
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Exposure of US Personnel to NPPD
[Also see "Tagants" (Tracking Agents) Issue]
Box: 25
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection.
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
USSR-EXPSURE OF US PERSONNEL TO NPRD
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
25
2516
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9817 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO LINHARD RE
1
ND
B1
CHRONOLOGIES OF US AND SOVIET
INITIATIVES IN INF
[1 - 1 ]
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9818 MEMO
US INITIATIVES IN INF
7
ND
B1
[3 -9 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9819 CABLE
291437Z AUG 85
2 8/29/1985 B1
[ 14 15 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED INF
INFORMATION
NLRR F06-114/7 #9817
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
BY Gs NARADATE 7/7/08
FROM:
BOB LINHARD
SUBJECT:
Chronologies of US and Soviet Initiatives in INF
In October, 1983, ACDA provided us with a set of chronologies that
it had developed documenting US initiatives in both the START and
INF negotiations. The documents were initially developed to help
prepare Ken Adelman for testimony on the hill. They were provided
to us for information. After a review of their initial product,
we felt that they could serve a wider purpose and tasked ACDA to
to add corresponding Soviet initiatives and fully coordinate the
product within the community.
The attached are resulting chronologies of US and Soviet
initiatives taken in the INF negotiations. We have yet to see the
chronologies on the START negotiations.
hese chronologies should serve as very useful reference
documents. Once we receive the corresponding START chronologies
we will:
-- forward them for your review;
-- review the entire package for consistency,
-- and evaluate what further use we should make of these and
whether we should task ACDA to develop unclassified versions
of the full set of products.
Recommendation
That you scan the attached to familiarize yourself with this
product.
Approve
Disapprove
Concurrence: R.Lehman, Kraemer, Matlock
Info copies: Sims, C.Lehman, Fortier, Raymond, deGraffenreid
Attachment:
INF Chronologies (S)
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR.
SECRET
SECRET
0555
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
January 17, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Chronologies of US And SOVIET Initiatives in INF
Per your memo dated October 21, the attached chronology of US
initiatives has been updated and a chronology of Soviet
initiatives has been developed. Both papers have received
interagency concurrence.
Bttiples
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)-
CVS 7/16/02
SECRET
7385
SECRET
3
US INITIATIVES IN INF
US Initiative
Soviet Response
1. Agreed Data Base: December 4, 1981,
Negative: December 8, 1981,
Nitze informally suggests an
Kvitsinskiy states
agreed data base will be necessary
negotiations could become
to set a starting point for
"enmeshed" in data like
reductions.
MBFR.
2. Zero Proposal: December 11, 1981,
Negative: December 15, 1981,
Nitze formally presents the
Soviet side rejects as
concrete elements of the US
one-sided and biased.
"zero-zero" proposal.
3. Draft Treaty: February 2, 1982,
Negative: March 9, 1982,
US Delegation tables draft zero
following informal
Treaty text.
criticism Kvitsinskiy
formally states that US
draft Treaty is not a basis
for an acceptable
agreement.
4. Walk in the Woods: June 1982,
Negative: September 29,
Nitze initiates private discussion
1982, Kvitsinskiy states
with Kvitsinskiy to develop a
package rejected in Moscow
package meeting each side's
and presents Nitze with
fundamental concerns. Nitze and
five principles for
Kvitsinskiy agree to submit
agreement.
package to their governments for
consideration.
5. Data Working Group: June 7, 1982,
Positive: Kvitsinskiy
Nitze suggests the establishment
agrees. First Working
of working group on data.
Group meeting convened
June 16, 1982.
6. Treaty Text Working Group:
Positive: July 1, 1982,
June 24, 1982, Nitze proposes
Kvitsinskiy agrees. Treaty
establishment of working group
Text Working Group first
to discuss selected articles
meets on July 6.
of sides' respective draft
treaties with aim of arriving
at agreed langauge were possible.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR Fob-114/7*9818
BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
7. Missile Destruction Procedures:
Initially Negative:
October 28, 1982, Nitze tables
November 18, 1982,
general procedures necessary to
Kvitsinskiy states that
assure verification of missile
verification is secondary
destruction.
and must follow resolution
of main issues, and that
specific measures bear the
imprint of the inequitable
US approach. (Subsequently,
sides agree to discuss
destruction. See No. 17)
8. CBMs: Nov. 23, 1982, US formally
Negative: Nov. 23, 1982,
proposes agreement on advance
Kvitsinskiy rejects US
notification of INF ballistic
proposal on the basis it
missile test launches.
would imply acceptance of
P-II deployments.
9. Working Group on Verifica-
Negative: February 1, 1983,
tion: February 1, 1983, Nitze
Kvitsinskiy sees "no need"
proposes working group to
for such a working group
negotiate destruction procedures.
until agreement is reached
on central issues.
10. CBMs: February 1, 1983, Nitze
Negative: March 17, 1983,
tables draft text of a Treaty on
Kvitsinskiy states CBMs
advance notification of LRINF
cannot be considered in
ballistic missile launches and
isolation; CBMs must be
proposes formation of working
combined with progress on
group.
the central issues.
11. Criteria for an Agreement:
Negative: March 24, 1983,
February 3, 1983, Nitze sets forth
following informal
President's five criteria by
criticism Kvitsinskiy
which US will evaluate Soviet
formally rejects US
proposals.
criteria as reflective of
"zero-zero" position.
Insists on four Soviet
"prerequisites" for an
agreement.
12. Interim Agreement: March 29, 1983,
Negative: May 19, 1983,
US proposes Interim Agreement
When negotiations resume
which calls for reduced, equal
following recess,
levels of US and Soviet LRINF
Kvitsinskiy rejects the
missile warheads on a global basis.
interim solution because it
entails U.S. deployments
and no compensation for
third-country systems.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
13. Starting Date for Round V:
Positive: March 29, 1983,
March 28, 1983, Nitze proposes
Kvitsinskiy accepts early
that the sides begin Round V in
starting date.
mid-May (i.e. May 17) rather than
early June.
14. Interim Proposal Treaty:
Negative: July 12, 1983,
May 19, 1983, Delegation tables
following informal
draft Treaty based on proposal
criticism Kvitsinskiy
for Interim Agreement.
formally rejects as the
"stillborn twin brother" of
the Zero Treaty.
15. Specific Warhead Limits: June 16,
Negative: July 12, 1983
1983 Nitze proposes, within 0 and
Kvitsinskiy says any
572 constraints, LRINF missile
numerical combination in
warhead numbers, in increments
an "interim solution" is
of 50, between 50 and 450.
unacceptable.
16. Reciprocal Collateral Constraints:
Negative: July 11, 1983,
June 16, 1983, US Delegation
Kvitsinskiy asserts
suggests that it will consider
peripheral questions must
collateral constraints on shorter
wait until central issues
range INF missiles. US tables
are resolved.
revised Treaty language on
July 12, 1983 which applies
collateral constraints to US
Pershing I missile systems.
17. Destruction Working Group:
Positive: Sept. 22,
Sept. 13, 1983, Nitze urges
1983, Delegations
formation of working group to
agree that the reformed
discuss destruction measures
Data Experts/Destruction
without prejudice to composition
Working Group can discuss
of arms.
destruction procedures.
18. New Proposals: Sept. 22, 1983,
Negative: October 5, 1983,
Nitze introduces new US proposals
Kvitsinskiy affirms
elaborating on interim agreement
Andropov's Sept. 29
proposal, with respect to: limits
statement as authoritative
on land-based LRINF aircraft, US
and says that US proposals
LRINF missile levels in Europe,
are neither a basis for
and P-II/GLCM mix at reduced
productive work nor a
levels.
solution to the problem as
a whole.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
19. New Meeting Formats: Sept. 27, 1983
Negative: October 3, 1983
Nitze suggests less formal Heads
Soviet Delegation turns
of Delegation or limited attend-
down proposal; sees "no
ance plenaries to complement
useful purpose" in such a
existing procedures/and permit
meeting.
informal explorations of new
proposals.
20. 420 Warhead Proposal: November 15,
Negative: November 17, 1983
1983, Nitze proposes equal global
Kvitsinskiy states that
ceilings of 420 warheads within
putting a proposal within
context of the interim agreement,
the framework of an
matching Soviet-suggested numbers
unacceptable approach is not
for SS-20s oppostie NATO.
the way to an accord.
21. Round VI Resumption October 17,
Negative: November 23, 1983
1983: Executive Secretary proposes
Kvitsinskiy declares round
brief holiday break beginning
"discontinued" without date
December 15 and continuation of
for resumption.
round in January.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SOVIET INITIATIVES IN INF
Soviet Initiatives
US Responses
1. Joint Moratorium Proposal:
Negative: December 15, 1981,
December 1, 1981, Kvitsinskiy
Nitze states proposal would
tabled text of joint statement
perpetuate imbalance and
on a moratorium as proposed
would assure a unilateral
publicly by Brezhnev.
Soviet advantage.
2. Reductions Proposal: December
Non-Committal: December 15,
15, 1981, Kvitsinskiy proposes
1981, Nitze assures
reductions of NATO and USSR
Kvitsinskiy that both the
medium-range systems to 600
Delegation and Washington
by 1985 and 300 by 1990; calls
will give proposal careful
for UK and French systems to
consideration.
be included.
3. Draft Statement of Intentions:
Negative: March 9, 1982,
February 4, 1982, Kvitsinskiy
Nitze states that proposal
tables text of draft agreement
would perpetuate in-
that embodies the moratorium
equalities, denying US
and reduction proposals above.
right to deploy missiles and
permitting Soviet Union to
produce and deploy additional
systems.
4. Unilateral Moratorium: March 16,
Negative: April 6, 1982
1982, Brezhnev announces
SCG Chairman Burt notes that
a unilateral moratorium on the
SS-20 construction continues
deployment of medium-range nuclear
in Western USSR and else-
armaments in the European part of
where; moratorium does not
the USSR. States intention to
resolve Soviet superiority
unilaterally reduce a certain
in land-based INF missiles.
number of its medium-range missiles.
Publicly reaffirmed on May 18, 1982
by Brezhnev and presented in Geneva
on May 20, 1982.
5. Draft Treaty: May 25, 1982, Soviet
Negative: May 27, 1982,
Delegation tables draft treaty,
Nitze points out that
which embodies, with minor
draft treaty continues to
modifications, reduction scheme
result in an unequal
in Statement of Intentions.
outcome.
6. Variant of Reduction Proposal:
Negative: October 21, 1982,
October 21, 1982, Kvistinskiy
Nitze states that proposal
proposes that US reduce its
would guarantee Soviet
"medium-range" systems to zero;
superiority, preclude US
Soviet Union would retain
deployments, and remove
"medium-range" forces equal
from Europe all US dual-
to UK/FR.
capable aircraft.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
7. Sublimits for Missiles and Aircraft:
Positive and Negative:
November 10, 1982, Kvitsinskiy
January 27, 1983, Nitze
proposes an unspecified subceiling
notes that proposal
on medium-range missiles. January
recognizes the need to focus
27, 1983 Kvitsinskiy clarifies
on LRINF missiles as a first
proposal by linking missile launcher
priority. February 8, 1983
subceiling to level of UK/FR
Nitze concludes Soviet
daunchers.1
adjustment leaves its basic
position substantially
unchanged and is inadequate
basis for an effective
agreement.
8. Warhead Limits: May 17, 1983,
Positive and Negative:
Kvitsinskiy suggests that
June 30, 1983, Nitze states
Soviets are prepared to accept
that Soviet concept of
limits on warheads on INF systems.
warheads as unit of account
Willing to agree to equality in
is consistent with US view,
warheads and launchers in Europe,
but notes that Soviet
while taking into consideration
approach is basically
UK/FR systems. 2
unchanged.
9. Modified Line of Withdrawal:
Negative: June 23, 1983,
June 7, 1983, Kvitsinskiy offers to
Nitze states that revision is
adjust 80° withdrawal line in
insufficient as it does not
consideration of US argument
affect a single SS-20 base;
that areas of NATO Europe
moreover, because of the
would be within range of SS-20s
range, mobility, and trans-
in Asia.
portability of the SS-20,
limits should be global.
10. Starting Date for Round VI: June 15,
Positive: June 16, 1983
1983, Kvitsinskiy proposes that the
U.S. accepts early resump-
next round begin in early
tion of negotiations.
September (i.e. September 5) rather
than mid-September.
11. CBM Proposal: June 21, 1983
Positive: June 21, 1983
Kvitsinskiy tables new article to
Glitman notes that this is
Soviet draft treaty incorporating
a step in the right
CBMs. Calls for prior notifica-
direction.
tion of MRBM launches extending
beyond national borders, multiple
MRBM launches within ZRL, and
takeoffs of a significant number
of medium-range airplanes within
ZRL.
1. Proposal publicly announced by Andropov on December 21, 1982
2. Publicly announced by Andropov on May 3, 1983
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
12. Missile Destruction: September 6,
Positive and Negative:
1983 and clarified on September 15,
September 20, 1983 Nitze
Kvitsinskiy presents Soviet
comments that the Soviet
the
proposal to liquidate excess
proposal addresses the US
"medium-range" missiles in Europe
concerns on the disposition
rather than withdraw them. 3
of missiles associated with
excess launchers; notes,
however, absence of missile
inventory limits, and that
new missiles could continue
to be produced for deploy-
ments in ZRL or in eastern
USSR.
13. Proposal on Geoscope, Aircraft and
Positive and Negative:
Missile Limits: October 27, 1983,
November 9, 1983, Nitze
Kvitsinskiy presents Andropov
states the modification
proposal to freeze SS-20 levels in
contains some positive
Asia following entry into force of
elements regarding geoscope
an agreement on Europe, to
and treatment of aircraft,
establish equal levels of "medium-
although problems remain in
range" aircraft for USSR and NATO
both areas. However, Soviet
and reduce Soviet SS-20 launchers
position remains unchanged on
to 140 (equal to Soviet count of
barring U.S. deployments
UK/FR warheads) 4
while maintaining Soviet
superiority and on treatment
of third-country systems.
14. Suggestion for Equal Reductions:
Negative: November 19, 1983,
November 13, 1983 Kvitsinskiy
Nitze rejects suggestion on
suggests that if US proposes
the basis of barring U.S.
equal reductions of 572 warheads
deployments and perpetuating
in Europe, leaving the Soviets
a Soviet monopoly. Notes with
with approximately 120 missiles
interest indication of Soviet
in Europe, USSR could accept.
willingness to drop explicit
demand for compensation for
third country forces.
3. Publicly announced by Andropov on August 27, 1983
4. Presented publicly by Andropov October 27, 1983
SECRET
SECRET
JMatlock
10
6694
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASH NGTON. D.C. 20506
August 26, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Embassy Moscow
State has forwarded a draft Presidential letter (Tab A) to the
U.S. staff at Embassy Moscow and the Consulate General Leningrad.
Specifically, the letter praises our Embassy personnel for having
reacted with admirable calm to the news of their exposure to
chemical tracking agents. At Tab I is a memo from you to the
President which forwards the draft letter for his signature.
Speechwriters have cleared the text.
Maclock, gm Sestanovich to and Small concur.
(not ancilable)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum for the President
Tab A
Presidential Letter
6694
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad Staff
Issue
Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General Leningrad staff
regarding their exposure to chemical tracking agents.
Facts
On August 21, 1985, we issued a demarche to the Soviets which
strongly protests their increasing use of potentially dangerous
chemical compounds to track our diplomatic and other personnel in
the USSR. The Embassy personnel have been briefed and continue
to be handling the situation responsibly. A team of scientists
from the National Institute of Health and the Enviromental
Protection Agency is on its way to Moscow to determine the extent
of exposure by conducting on-site tests.
Discussion
At Tab A is a letter from you to Charge d'Affaires Dick Combs,
which expresses your personal concern for the well-being of our
personnel in Moscow and Leningrad. Speechwriters have cleared
the text.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you sign the letter to the staff of the
American Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad.
Attachments:
Tab A
Letter to Embassy Moscow and Consulate General
Leningrad
Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Dick:
I know that the last few days have been trying
ones for all of the staff in Moscow and Leningrad.
I simply want to let everyone there know through
you that you are not alone.
George Shultz has kept me informed about how
splendidly our people in Moscow and Leningrad are
coping with the disturbing news of your exposure
to tracking chemicals. I cannot say I was
surprised. I have seen all of you respond with
equal professionalism and dedication to too many
crises and challenges over the past few years for
that. Your response to this one simply reaffirms
my conviction that you -- and your families -- are
among the best the Foreign Service, and our
country, has to offer. We are terribly proud of
you.
I know how anxious everyone must be in the face of
so many unanswered questions. While I am
encouraged by preliminary indications that any
risk to which people may have been exposed is
small, I have made it clear that I want these
questions answered as soon as possible. As you
have been informed, a highly qualified team will
be in Moscow this week to begin the process. In
addition, every effort will be made back here to
wring as much information as we can out of the
data already available. I promise that your staff
will be kept fully informed as work proceeds. I
need not tell you that there will be serious
consequences if we determine that the Soviets have
not terminated this abhorrent practice.
2
As we deal with this problem, I know I can count
on you, Art Hartman, and your staff to continue to
do the job you do so well. The months ahead may
hold major opportunities for the development of
our relations with the Soviet Union. The insights
your people can contribute from the unique per-
spective of Moscow and Leningrad will be more
critical than ever if we are to take full
advantage of them.
Dick, let me ask you in closing to convey to all
the members of the American community in the USSR
that you are in our thoughts at this difficult
time. Don't hesitate to let us know back here if
there is anything we can do to make your task
easier.
Sincerely,
Mr. Richard A. Combs, Jr.
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
American Embassy Moscow
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1969
DTG: 291437Z AUG 85 PSN: 049493
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AN008255
TOR: 241/1632Z
CSN: HCE304
DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01 LEHR-01
MAT-01 /007 A2
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
SIT:
EOB:
S
OP IMMED
UTS8595
DE RUEHMO #1969 2411438
0 291437Z AUG 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
and
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4333
X
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 3790
D
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 1068
mather
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 1139
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 3237
S
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8057
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3365
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8123
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2969
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0569
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2341
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 4844
E
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 1709
AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 1049
X
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9441
D
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1222
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2752
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2987
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4461
DECLASSIFIED
S
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 3050
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0537
NLRR F06-114/7 #9819
CONFIDENTIAL
BY Gr NARADATE 7/7/08
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 11969
E
X
EXDIS
D
DEPT PASS USIA WASHDC
E.O. 12356: N/A
S
TAGS: UR, US, PREL
SUBJECT: BRIEFING OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY BY
MEDICAL TEAM
REF: (A) MOSCOW 11625; (B) MOSCOW 11556;
(C) STATE 258597
1. TWO BRIEFINGS OF THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY WERE HELD
AT SPASO HOUSE DURING THE MORNING OF AUGUST 29
BY THE MEDICAL SURVEY TEAM. THE CHARGE INTRODUCED
THE TEAM AND STRESSED THAT THE BRIEFINGS WERE FOR
THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND WERE NOT RPT NOT
PRESS BRIEFINGS. EACH OF THE BRIEFINGS, LASTING
A LITTLE MORE THAN 30 MINUTES, BEGAN WITH INTRODUC-
TION OF THE TEAM MEMBERS, A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THE
TEAM HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH, AND THE ROLE EACH WOULD
PLAY IN THE TEAM' S WORK. IT WAS STRESSED THAT
PARTICIPATION IN THE SURVEY WAS STRICTLY VOLUNTARY.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1969
DTG: 291437Z AUG 85 PSN: 049493
ON THE OTHER HAND, ANYONE WHO WISHED IT COULD ASK TO
BE SURVEYED AND EVERY ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO
ACCOMMODATE SUCH REQUESTS. PARTICIPATION BY NON-
E
EMBASSY PERSONNEL WOULD HAVE TO BE ON AN "OFF
X
THE RECORD BASIS," THAT IS, SUCH PARTICIPATION COULD
NOT BE THE SUBJECT OF NEWS REPORTS.
D
2. QUESTIONS DURING THE FIRST BRIEFING, AT WHICH
S
ONLY EMBASSY PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT, CONCENTRATED ON
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY AND THE NATURE OF THE
POPULATION TO BE SURVEYED. CONCERN WAS ALSO EXPRESSED
REGARDING POSSIBLE EFFECTS NPPD MIGHT HAVE ON EARLY
PREGNANCY. DURING THE SECOND SESSION, ATTENDED BY
JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND EMBASSY EMPLOYEES THAT HAD
NOT BEEN ABLE TO ATTEND THE EARLIER BRIEFING, THE
E
QUESTIONING FOCUSED ON THE NATURE OF NPPD ITSELF. SOME
OF THESE QUESTIONS WERE HYPOTHETICAL AND APPEARED
X
DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY JUST WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE
HEALTH EFFECTS OF THE CHEMICAL.
D
3. THE TEAM MEMBERS RESPONDED TO ALL QUESTIONS FULLY
S
AND CAREFULLY. THE MISSION CONSIDERS THE BRIEFINGS
USEFUL IN EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF THE VISITING TEAM
TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND IN INSURING THE COMMUNITY' S
COOPERATION IN THE SURVEY. COMBS
BT
E
X
D
S
E
X
D
S
CONFIDENTIAL