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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Sino-Soviet Relations - Soviet Union (1)
Box: 34
To see more digitized collections visit:
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To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/24/2005
File Folder
SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 1/3
FOIA
F06-114/10
Box Number
34
YARHI-MILO
3410
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11404 MEMCON
ZHANG WEN GIN, ROBERT WEST, AND
4 10/27/1980 B1
ZUMWALT
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11405 MEMCON
GENG BIAO, ZUMWALT, AND ROBERT WEST
4 10/28/1980 B1
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200935Z MAR 81
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CHINA/USSR
6 3/23/1981 B1 B3
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CHINA
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UK ASSESSMENT ON CHINA
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
ZUMWALT/BAGLEY REPORT
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Distributed 8/1/80)
THE BEAR AND TWO TIGERS?
by Elmo, R. Zumwalt Jr. and Worth H. Bagley
(c) 1980, Los Angeles Times Syndicate
The authors held discussions with the defense team of the People's
Republic of China, during its recent visit and subsequently. The two
sides both had quite similar views on Soviet strategy in the Pacific
and Indian oceans: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet activity
in Southeast Asia are ultimately designed to merge the Southwestern
Pacific and Indian Ocean into a single theater, completing the encirclement
of Asia and the Middle East.
We agreed that Moscow's seizure of Afghanistan had other local
and worldwide objectives:
--Preventing the defeat of its client Marxist regime by Afghani
loyalists.
--Sealing,off the 45 million Moslems in Soviet southern provinces
from the theological fervor that would flow as a result of a successful
Afghani loyalist victory.
--Frightening NATO Europe and embarrassing the U.S. with a successful
demonstration of Soviet power and Western helplessness to react.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also was the first phase of
an ultimate thrust toward the Indian Ocean which would then swing
both west and east. Soviet forces moved 500 miles closer to the Indian
Ocean, thus extending the encirclement of Middle East oil. Soviet
bases in Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Yemen already
had contributed to that objective. Soviet invading forces also moved
across Afghanistan to the Pakistan border. The presence of these forces
has made Moscow's subversive operations more effective inside Pakistan.
When Moscow brings a Marxist puppet to power there, the Kremlin will
have its long-coveted warm-water port from which to swing west to
close the ring around Arabian and Iranian oil. (Chaos in Iran may
bring that country's oil under Moscow's control earlier.)
Soviet control of Pakistani bases will permit forces to swing
east as well, thereby bringing pressure against India to shift from
pro-Soviet neutrality to submissive cooperation with Moscow.
In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam
resulted in Moscow's support of Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia, which
deposed Pol Pot, destroying Beijing's client regime. In exchange,
Moscow won the right to station forces at former U.S. bases in Vietnam.
Initially, these forces were concentrated at the airfields and naval
bases at Danang, in the northern part of conquered South Vietnam.
In recent weeks, some of these forces have begun to deploy southward.
to the airfields and naval bases at Camranh Bay, one of the world's
best harbors. This location makes it possible for Soviet forces to
control the South China Sea and the critical Straits of Malacca, which
provide access between the South Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Soviet fleets operating out of Camranh Bay, protected by aircraft
operating from southern Vietnam, can deploy with security through
the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. These forces will encircle
Thailand from the ocean just as Soviet fleets have closed the ring
on Scandinavia, eroding the resistance of those northern nations.
In a similar fashion, Soviet fleets projected eastward from Pakistan's
ports and westward from the Malacca Straits will ring the Indian continent
to accelerate India's accommodation.
Thus Moscow will have completed its strategic encirclement of
Middle East oil and China.
It is clear to us that China is prepared to do its part to defeat
the Soviet southern strategy. Beijing is providing covert aid to the
Afghani loyalists to slow the Soviet timetable there. It has provided
support to Pakistan. Chinese forces in Tibet, poised against the Indian
subcontinent, slow the rate of Prime Minister Gandhi's slide toward
Moscow. Chinese divisions along Vietna border engage in probes
to restrain Vietnam's ambitions vis a vis Thailand.,
To date, the U.S. has not contributed equally robust deterrence
to Moscow's designs. Covert aid is being provided to Afghanistan.
But we are withholding the hand-held surface-to-air missiles that
could devastate the Soviet helicopter fleet.
Beijing's view. is that the U.S. and China are potentially two
tigers which, working together, can restrain the Soviet bear. But
they are beginning to fear that one of the two tigers is made of paper
(c) 1980, Los Angeles Times Syndicate
2
Memorandum of Conversation among Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wen Gin, Dr.
Robert V. West, and Admiral Zumwalt 27 October 1980
1. Amenities
2. DFM: He is pleased with the progress of US/PRC relationship. It has
enormous significance for the non-Soviet world after such a long separation.
It represents a heavy weight in favor of stability.
3. DFM: Judges that we are continuing to make satisfactory progress.
Events have proved the value of the relationship: Cambodia, Afghanistan, Middle
East tensions. Events are moving very fast in these areas and have proved the
merit of the relationship.
4. DFM: The people of both countries realize the importance of the relation-
ship and want to see it develop. Anything tending to stop progress is not welcome;
no force can impede us in improving this relationship. He is optimistic about the
future of the relationship.
5. DFM: In the last stages of Vietnam we had our differences,
6. DFM: PRC is no longer afraid of US domination. It now has its own
power base and it understands how the US/PRC relationship can contribute to
stability.
7. DFM: Sometimes the US, speaking frankly, comes on like a bulldozer.
8. DFM: There are problems between us; each country has its own outlook;
but there are common interests. China needs US equipment. US needs China's
market.
9. DFM: Of course there is one underlying principle; China is restricted
by its capabilities; the US has some restrictions, too. After such a long
separation we still have much to learn about each other. The US still has suspicions
of China because it is run by a communist party. China still has suspicions of the
US as a result of our long domination by the big powers. We want to be our own
masters. We know we must depend on the outside.
10. DFM: We have a colossus of a neighbor which menaces us; USSR worries
about having to deal with two fronts.
11. DFM: Sometimes people overestimate PRC's capabilities; we have lots
of time; we are not a third superpower. We are part of the Third World in a
DECLASSIFIED/Re/045@)
NLRR F06-114/10 1140404
BY Cts NARADATE 1/2/08
3
multi-polar world. We know that the PRC cannot benefit from seeking to become
a third superpower; we have seen empires pass and we have learned from that; our
philosophy is against further expansion of China.
12. DFM: The Taiwan issue remains unsolved and continues to cause friction
between us from time to time. The US has accepted conditions of the Shanghai
Communique. We hope that you will continue to accept them. The Taiwanese people
are the same ethnic background and culture as we. We are not in a hurry. A
two-China solution will not work and will be forever unacceptable to us. The
Taiwan issue will be settled in time. It worries us that from time to time we
hear views from the US suggesting that the Taiwan issue can be solved differently
than the Shanghai Communique.
13. Z: His view on Taiwan.
14. DFM: There is general agreement that we need to continue to move
forward in our cooperation. Since Admiral Zumwalt's last visit, where he urged
us to move forward with joint development of oil, we have begun to do so. We
have now authorized drilling and seismic surveys, both on land and in the ocean,
In 1977 when we began our economic expansion, we did not make a full appraisal of
the difficulties. We thought we could move quickly with our development schemes.
We have learned that those quick schemes were not realistic. We have had to make
readjustments. We have, therefore, lowered our sights. We have learned that our
oil requirements are increasing faster than our production. We must have more oil
production if we are to stay ahead of demand and be able to export. For the time
being, oil production will remain at the present level, although we hope to
expand in the future.
15. W: Outlined his concept for working together on oil development.
16. DFM: Normalization of relations has moved the PRC views closer to
those of Admiral Zumwalt of three years ago. However, we are not sure of US
policy. It waivers. The world is more dangerous now and we are not sure how
the US will react in the coming years. Whoever is president. we hope the US
will maintain its responsibility as the most powerful adversary to the Soviet
Union to maintain the peace. You have to work with other countries. No nation,
however strong, can do it alone. You must use your allies and China. We hope
the US realizes the danger now, but there is much to be done.
2
4
17. Z: Don't pay too much attention to what presidential candidates are
saying, etc.
18. DFM: We know we must watch your deeds, not your words. One has to
face the world as it is. We know that Governor Reagan has good advisors, and we
believe that we will be friends in his presidency.
19. Z & W: Comments on the political process and general agreement with
DFM's point.
20: Z: Concerning China's punishment of Vietnam, I was able to predict,
based on what your leaders told me three years ago, that you would take this
action because you assured me that China would stand up and be counted when put
to the challenge that you believed the US had failed.
21. DFM: Thanks. Our action was controversial. I am glad to hear you
approved. We attained our purpose. Vietnam understands that it will have to
reckon with China in any future clashes in Southeast Asia. Vietnam knows that
they have to count on China moving against them if they become aggressive. We
took an action which was clearly limited.
22. Z: What probability did you place on the Soviet Union reacting against
you at the time you made the decision to go into Vietnam?
23. DFM: The Soviets had to evaluate the whole picture. They knew that
they could cause China serious losses by taking action against us, but they knew
that China could take it. We concluded that they would take limited action, if
any, and we came out better than we expected.
24. Z: Asked DFM what he thought about Japan's recent decision to expand
their defenses.
25. DFM: Generally favorable in view of the Soviet threat. The whole line
has to be strengthened (US, China, Japan, Europe, and the Third World). With all
five working together, the balance of power is restored to a certain extent. We
do worry that there is some increase in the martial spirit in Japan. We
certainly don't want another greater East Asia co-property spirit and we don't
rule out that that could happen. However, in the main, we think the Japanese
development is helpful and adds some weight to the power balance.
26. Z: Asked what the Minister thought about Indian policy.
3
5
27. DFM: India is a difficult question. We don't know how to evaluate
India. We know that she got assistance from the US. We don't agree with your
decision there. India has been harmful to two countries we support -- Pakistan
and Bangladesh -- so we are watching her with great concern. We don't consider
that she followed her non-aligned policy, but is tilting toward Moscow. We are
distressed with her recognition of the junta in Cambodia.
28. Z: Asked the Minister about Afghanistan.
29. DFM: The event is a watershed event. It is important that we both
help Pakistan to become stable and firm enough to withstand Soviet pressure.
We will help Afghanistan. The resistance in Afghanistan will survive. It will
be a long war. The Soviets will be bogged in a quagmire. It is sad for the
Afghanis, but they will make it tough for Moscow. Moscow didn't understand this.
We can never restore the status quo ante, but we can work toward a non-aligned
Afghanistan. We must support these efforts. The US should do more than it is
now doing to get anti-tank and anti-air missiles to the Afghanis. We will help.
The Afghanis will survive even mass killing. These mass killings will cause
hatred to such an extreme that the Soviets can never set up a puppet government.
They will not be able to do in Afghanistan what they have done in Eastern Europe.
4
Memorandum of Conversation among Vice Premier Geng Biao, Admiral Zumwalt,
and Dr. West - October 28, 1980, 4 to 6 p.m.
1. Exchange amenities. VP said he had tried for years to coexist with a
bad gall bladder - -- three months ago he had to have it removed. This was his
first meeting since surgery. Admiral Zumwalt said he was not surprised to learn
that VP had been no more successful at coexistence with a gall bladder than the
U.S. had been at coexistence with the USSR. VP laughed and said that in both
cases surgery was the answer.
2. VP commented that he knew Zumwalt was in PRC to have defense and energy
discussions. He was concerned about the Soviet threat. He knew. that Zumwalt
was a naval expert. He would give his views and ask for Zumwalt's. USSR had
made much progress. He had had the chance to exchange views with Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown on his recent visit to the U.S. They both concluded that
the Soviet's are not a match for the U.S. Navy. He knows the Soviet Union is
outspending the U.S. Navy. But there are circumstances of position and weather
that make a difference.
3. Murmansk is the only Soviet ocean port that is ice free year round.
The North Sea and Pacific ports are frozen with thick ice for as much as six months
of the year. This requires many ice breakers, whereas the U.S. needs none.
4. The Soviets have a problem of access to the open ocean. They must pass
through narrows and straits where U.S. or allies can prevent passage.
5. The Soviets have had over ten episodes of serious problems with their
nuclear submarines. They obviously have much to learn about nuclear propulsion.
6. We visited the carrier Ranger. Your carriers are much better than
theirs. Theirs are primarily for helos, with much shorter range than your
aircraft.
7. When one gives consideration to all these factors, it is important not
to overestimate Soviet naval power.
8. Yet the Soviets are clearly outspending the U.S. Navy. Moreover, their
personnel costs are much lower. They pay their people very little, Their draft
system makes it possible to put a much larger fraction of their budget into
weapons programs. The AVF of the U.S. makes it possible to get career people
who are therefore better trained.
DECLASSIFIED /RELEASE)
tl 11405
NLRR F06-114/10
BY Gs NARA DATE 1/2/08
7
9. The Soviets have the advantage of being able to use instant force. They
have a weakness with regard to sustaining war. They must win quickly. They made
a major miscalculation in Afghanistan. Every Afghan has a gun -- many they make
themselves. Their history is one of many tribes and tribal sheiks who are fiercely
independent. Their resistance causes a heavy financial burden on the Soviets,
which they can't afford. They are paying $10 million per day to sustain the
Vietnamese. Costs for Cuba are $3.6 billion per year. It all adds up,
10. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia has not been a complete blessing for
Moscow. USSR estimated they would have a quick success. Instead Vietnam is bogged
down in Cambodia. Moreover, Vietnam and USSR are isolated in the world community
on the Cambodia and Afghan invasions.
11. We have had experience with what the Soviets are facing -- the anti-
Japanese war. We were much weaker than the Kuomantang forces, but Chiang Kai Shek's
policy was to retreat rather than resist the Japanese forces. We communists, with
little equipment, surrounded the Japanese occupied cities by operating in the
country side. When it was over, we had the people and Chiang had to retreat to
Taiwan.
12. I understand that in addition to your discussions on defense issues, you
are interested in talking about helping us to develop our oil. This is good. We
have large deposits. We need to cut down the time to get into production.
13. We are aware of the immense strategic significance of the oil of the
Middle East. We know that the Soviets covet it. They may get it. But this
outcome is uncertain. It depends on the performance of the five centers of
resistance: PRC, U.S., Japan, Europe, and the Third World. Sometimes events
unfold independent of men's will. We need to watch the Soviets, evaluate their
intentions, appraise their performance, and act,
15. With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we were not aware
from our intelligence that the invasion was coming. We do not believe the U.S.
was, either. Neither were either of us prepared to see the Shah fall so soon.
16. Iran is now in chaos. Soon this will impact on the whole Middle East.
Therefore, the oil resources of China are critical. It will be very difficult
for us if we fall short of oil. We used to have an excess. But our population
is increasing and our industrialization also adds to consumption. We will soon
2
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lack enough oil and must stop exporting. We therefore must exploit our new oil
fields. Oil fields now producing are beginning to fall in production.
17. We must also develop other sources of energy. Hydro-electric power
can be developed in many suitable sites. We have large deposits of coal. In
Shan Shi Province we have large deposits. Sinkiang Province has a huge coal
seam in its south and west, which is currently hard to exploit because of
transportation problems. Shantung Province is as well supplied as Shan Shi,
Altogether, PRC has an estimated 6 hundred billion tons of coal which, at
presently projected requirments of 2 billion tons per year, is a 300 year supply.
18. We have invited our foreign friends to participate in joint development
of energy. We can give compensatory trade for our oil. For coal this is
difficult. For example, if we invited the Germans into a joint venture with our
coal, they wouldn't want to take our coal as compensation. We have other precious
metals which can be used as trade-offs, however.
19. PRC wants peace in order to survive. The Soviets call us bellicose.
This is not true. We desire peace. But we must face reality. We cannot sit and
watch with folded arms as Moscow moves. When they helped Vietnam invade Cambodia,
could we sit idle? No. We made the decision to invade Vietnam to teach them a
lesson, and this paid off,
20. When I exchanged views with your Secretary of Defense in Washington,
D. C., he had identical views. I told him that I had no illusion that the
Soviets or the Vietnamese would be peaceful of their own volition or would ever
leave Cambodia and Afghanistan. He agreed.
21. Zumwalt then dealt with the world in three frames of reference --
strategic, conventional, sublimited. After a 30 minute description of Soviet
strategy, Zumwalt made a plea for expedited development of PRC energy sources,
which Dr. West backed up with specifics.
22. Zumwalt then asked the Vice Premier why PRC, with missiles already
deployed which can hit any Soviet target, was putting such priority on still
longer range missiles instead of devoting those resources to conventional
improvements to deal with the Soviet threat.
23. The Vice Premier replied that it was a necessary continuation of missile
development programs. France is developing long range missiles but no one believes
3
9
that they will be aimed at the U.S. The U.S. has done so and we accept your word
that they are not aimed at us. Our scientists cannot stop at medium range missiles.
They must develop the full range in pursuit of science. To show our intentions,
with each missile test we have announced that we will never use ours first.
26. Vice Premier then complimented Dr. West on his interest in developing
a relationship with PRC. He stressed PRC decision to improve its friendly ties
with the U.S. in this way to build mutual confidence. He said, "Frankly, in some
aspects we still do not have sufficient confidence in the U.S., and I am sure
that the referse is also true."
27. Vice Premier said that he had asked Harold Brown of the reservations
he had about China. Vice Premier said he told Harold Brown, I know the first
concern is whether we will restore our relationship with Moscow. He had assured
Harold Brown that there was no way that this could happen. We cannot return to
30 years ago. Soviet objectives require them to try to subjugate China. China
and USSR come up against each other in almost every issue. They force us to be
hostile by their actions.
28. Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, we believe
friendly relations will continue. But with respect to these friendly relationships,
we hope that the U.S. understands the intensity of our feelings on the Taiwan
issue. There can be no reneging on the Shanghai communique.
29. Zumwalt then gave his Taiwan position, with which Vice Premier did not
argue.
4
ZUMWALT/BAGLEY REPORT
BONUS COLUMN FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Distributed 11/18/80)
10
CHINA'S VIEW OF THE WORLD
by Elmo R. Zumwalt and Worth H. Bagley
c) 1980, Los Angeles Times Syndicate
PEKING -- The Chinese general staff invited us here to discuss
Soviet strategy. These and subsequent discussions with top foreign
ministry and defense officials were much more relaxed and friendly
than when we were here three years ago. At that time, Teng Hsiao-p'ing
was just being returned to power; Chinese officials, still shattered.
by a generation of policy and leadership upheavals, were guarded in
their comments. Today, with China under the pragmatic leadership of
Teng, officials are open and frank.
China's leaders view the world as facing greater danger today
from an avaricious Soviet empire than it has at any time since the
rampages of Hitler and Tojo in Europe and Asia. Realizing that they
cannot redress their own weaknesses in the near future, their short-term
strategy is to join with other threatened regions of the world to
generate collective strength. Their long-term aim is the capability
of surviving independently.
Let us examine first the Chinese view of the Soviets and then
the elements of both their short- and long-term strategy.
MOSCOW AS SEEN FROM PEKING
Chinese officials know that the superbly equipped 45 Soviet divisions
along their northern border, backed up by a modern air force, can
seize Chinese territory. We gave our estimate that the U.S.S.R. is
capable of seizing Manchuria in about a month and all of China north
of the Yangtze in about two months. Chinese leaders disagreed with
our estimate of how long it would take and of how far the Soviets
could go. The Chinese leaders believe their policy of "scorching the
earth" during retreat and of subsequent protracted insurgency -- "People's
War" -- would make any Soviet conquests even more difficult than Afghanistan
to hold. They believe that Moscow has enough respect for that Chinese
capability and would judge the rewards of conquest to be so little
that Europe would seem a much more tempting target for Moscow.
Peking believes that in Europe Moscow's forces could reach the
Rhine in two days and the British Channel in two weeks. (They concede
that this Soviet capability against the NATO forces makes more believable
our estimate of Soviet capability against the less sophisticated Chinese
forces.) They believe that the fruits of victory in Europe would be
so juicy -- linkage to Moscow of a European industrial capacity as
great as that of the U.S. and control of the Mediterranean and eastern
Northern Atlantic -- that Europe has a much higher priority in Moscow's
strategy.
Nevertheless, because of Moscow's desire to avoid losses in a
nuclear war, even though the U.S.S.R. could win such an exchange,
Peking judges that the Kremlin will seek first to Finlandize NATO
Europe. Finlandization would be pursued by use of both carrot and
stick. The stick would be applied by ever-increasing Soviet tactical
nuclear superiority in Europe as Soviet SS-20 missiles -- with warheads
as large as U.S. ICBMs -- were deployed at the rate of one each week.
The stick also would be applied by threatening the loss of Europe's
Mideast oil. The seizure of Afghanistan and current Soviet efforts
to help both Iran and Iraq in their war are increasing Soviet penetration
of the Mideast. Soviet encirclement of that oil by forces located
in Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Yemen and Afghanistan is being further
tightened. The Treaty of Friendship just signed with Syria, the fanning
of the Iran-Iraq war to gain influence and position within each country,
Soviet pressures on Pakistan, increasing rapprochment with India,
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the recent movement of Soviet
forces into Vietnam all contribute to the tighter encirclement. The
carrot would be the promise to guarantee oil deliveries if European
ZUMWALT/BAGLEY special 11/
PAGE 02
NATO nations weaken their ties to Washington and strengthen their
ties with Moscow.
CHINA'S SHORT-TERM STRATEGY
PRC leaders are prepared to be patient on the Taiwan issue in
order to implement their short-term strategy for survival against
"Soviet hegemonism" -- but they insist that the U.S. must recognize
the Taiwan issue as an internal affair, in accordance with the Shanghai
Communique. On the assumption that the U.S. continues to support a
"patient internal solution," China favors the following short-term
political-military measures:
--Greater U.S./PRC cooperation to stabilize Pakistan in the face
of Soviet pressures. This would require: covert assistance to the
Afghanistan rebels with the aim of keeping Soviet forces fully preoccupied
to Pakistan's north; assistance for the million Afghan refugees in
Pakistan, and modernization of Pakistan's armed forces.
--Continued Chinese deterrence of Vietnam's aggressive intentions.
China has already "taught Vietnam a lesson": (1) by its limited invasion
after Hanoi attacked Cambodia, thus forcing Hanoi to move forces from
Cambodia to Vietnam's northern border; and (2) by supplying Pol Pot's
resistance movement in Cambodia against Hanoi's puppet regime. Peking
has made it clear to Hanoi that China will not stand by if Thailand
is invaded. Thai leaders conclude that for the present their survival
rests on China's deterrence of Hanoi. Increasing U.S. military strength
under Reagan should gradually bring the U.S. into an effective triangular
relationship with Thailand and China.
--Use the momentum of the U.S. election outcome to galvanize NATO
to increase its defense budgets (although cuts are now being made).
--Extending NATO's defensive zone to include the Persian Gulf
oil zone and to provide a collective approach to checkmating the Soviet
strategy of capitalizing on the Iran-Iraq war.
--Increasing PRC and U.S. efforts to establish friendly positions
that offset Soviet/Cuban/East German clientization of African states.
Peking is prepared to use its special influence with African leaders
Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Nyere in Tanzania in this effort. The Chinese
leaders feel the U.S. should use its political influence with many
African states and accelerate its establishment of bases in Egypt,
Kenya, Somalia, and Oman in the Arabian peninsula.
-- rompt moves by the U.S. to reverse the Soviet/Cuban strategy
to cut off North America from South America. The Marxist government
of Grenada is providing bases for Soviet forces. Moscow and Havana
are sending equipment and advisers to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
for the future invasion of other Central American nations listed in
Castro's strategic plan.
--Japan must increase its defensive budgets. Deputy Foreign Minister
Zhang Wen Gin worries about a return of the martial spirit there:
"We don't want to see a resurgence of a 'greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere in Tokyo. But on balance, an increase in Japan's forces --
especially air and naval forces -- is welcomed.
CHINA'S VIEW OF LONG-TERM STRATEGY
First and foremost, the non-Soviet strategic nuclear forces must
regain parity with the Soviet Union. Peking expects the U.S. to do
more under President-elect Reagan. Peking is already doing all it
can afford to do. (We asked Vice Premier Geng Biao, China's de facto
defense minister, why China, which already has deployed missiles with
enough range to hit any Soviet target, continues to spend treasure
on acquiring a still longer range missile instead of deploying more
of its present missiles against Soviet targets. He cleverly replied:
"Our scientists want to go all the way -- it's a requirement of science.
France is developing its own long-range missiles and you don't worry
that they will aim them at you. We accept your assurance that you
are not targeting yours against us. Similarly, you can be sure we
ZUMWALT/BAGLEY special 11/
PAGE 03
will never use ours first." (The Reagan administration should keep
"in mind that Peking might be persuaded to deploy its longer range
+- potentially anti-U.S. missiles -- in trade-off for help in resisting
Soviet strategy.)
The U.S., U.K. and France must collectively regain in Europe parity
with Moscow in tactical nuclear weapons.
The five major world blocs that are the targets of "Soviet hegemonism"
-- PRC, U.S., Europe, Japan and the Third World -- must concert their
policies, their defense and their intelligence, if they are to survive
the period of Soviet military superiority in the '80s.
The modernization of NATO non-nuclear forces in Europe must continue
until realistic deterrence of conventional war is restored.
China is prepared, when conditions are ripe, to consider permitting
U.S. forces to operate from PRC bases in the common defense.
The U.S. should join in Europe's current effort to provide conventional
lethal weapons to permit China to reduce the Soviet advantage along
its border. Present U.S. policy permits only non-lethal equipment
to be provided. The theory has been that giving such equipment would
demonstrate to Moscow that its aggression has forced the U.S. to retaliate.
By withholding the more important lethal weapons, we would supposedly
deter Moscow from still further aggression for fear that we would
then provide such weapons. As a consequence, we have deprived ourselves
of the optimum deterrent which China could provide against the Soviet
Union if it had our lethal weapons.
China recognizes that its oil production can provide a critical
contribution. According to Oil Minister Yea Den Sher, China's oil
production presently is increasing slowly while its consumption is
increasing rapidly with industrialization. Soon China will cease to
be an exporting nation. It realizes that it can only achieve rapid
increases in production by making full use of Western oil companies
and their technology. Some service contracts have been given to permit
such companies to assist in the development of China's land reserves,
and a number of companies have gathered seismic data in China's territorial
seas, but in both cases progress has been very slow. Deputy Foreign
Minister Zhang candidly provides an important reason for this: "Frankly,
you Americans generally come on like bulldozers and we are not ready
to move without careful reflection." Nevertheless, China's leaders
at all levels unanimously agree that cooperation must develop more
quickly. Such cooperation could provide great increases in the oil
available to the non-Soviet world, a strategic alternative to Middle
East oil, and could provide a source of dollars for China to go forward
with its "Four Modernizations" -- industry, agriculture, defense and
science/technology.
All of the foregoing elements of long-term strategy -- strengthening
nations around the Soviet perimeter -- are designed to make China,
by the year 2000, capable of surviving independently of the West.
THE IMPACT OF A REAGAN ADMINSTRATION
Although our meetings were completed on Oct. 31, we discussed
the consequences of the re-election of President Carter or the election
of Governor Reagan. While the Chinese leaders were concerned about
Reagan's statements regarding Taiwan, it was quite clear that they
believed that the non-Soviet world will have a better prospect of
deterring and surviving Soviet objectives with the military capability
and the will for peace with honor that a Reagan administration will
generate.
(c) 1980, Los Angeles Times Syndicate
ITEM RETURNED
To NSC
SECRETARIAT
IN APRIL 1987
Log# NSC Pub Cy No 104
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SUBJECT: PRC MEDIA COMMENTARY ON THE RECENT BREZHNEV PROPOSALS
1. SUMMARY: PRC MEDIA'S FIRST COMMENT ON THE SOVIET
LEADER'S PROPOSALS FOR "CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
(CBMS) PRESENTS A SWEEPING REJECTION OF ALL BREZHNEV
INITIATIVES. THE MARCH 14 XINHUA COMMENTARY DERIDES
BREZHNEV SUGGESTIONS/PROPOSALS FOR CMBS IN THE FAR
EAST AS PLAIN "HYPROCRISY." THE COMMENTARY PAINTS
THE SOVIETS AS ON THE DEFENSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTEDLY
ISOLATED OWING TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS, A TOUGHER
WESTERN STANCE, AND RAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICIES
VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. THE COMMENTARY, HOWEVER,
EXPRESSES CONCERN LEST SOME WESTERN EUROPEANS FALL
FOR THE SOVIET DANGLED "BAIT." END SUMMARY.
2. A XINUA COMMENTARY OF MARCH 14 DERISIVELY REJECTS
THE KREMLIN'S RECENT PEACE INITIATIVES AS "BAIT FOR
THE WEST. MOSCOW'S CURENT DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE,
IN PARTICULAR BREZHNEV'S ALLEGED "LIP SERVICE" TO
DETENTE, PEACE AND COOPERATION, ETC., AND HIS ADOPTION
OF A SEEMINGLY LESS-CONFRONATIONAL POSTURE, IS VIEWED
AS A SOVIET EFFORT TO BLAME OTHERS FOR MOSCOW'S
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PLIGHT, AND TO JUSTIFY SOVIET
ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE
AGGRESSION AGAINST KAMPUCHEA, AND ITS STANCE VIS-A-VIS
POLAND.
3. FINDING LITTLE POSITIVE IN THE BREZHNEV PROOPOSALS
FOR_ CBMS, XINHUA ASSERTS THAT THE MEAING OF SUCH PROPOSALS
IS "OPEN TO DOUBT IN VIEW OF THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY OF
RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES. THE COMMENTARY ALSO CONTAINS
AN EXPLICIT REJECTION OF BREZHNEV'S CALL FOR SIMILAR
CBMS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, APROPOSAL XINHUA TERMS
"PURE HYPOCRISY. IT NOTES THAT THE BREZHNEV ENVISIONED
CM S NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FAR EAST WOULD IMPLICITLY INCLUDE
CHINA AS A PARTY. CHIDING THE SOVIETS, XINHUA MAINTAINS
THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SEEK TO BUILD CONFIDENCE THROUGH
ACTS RATHER THAN MERE WORDS.
4. IN A SIMILAR FASHION, XINHUA DISMISSES THE SOVIET
LEADER'S PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF NEW
MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE AND CITES THE
DISPARITY BETWEEN WESTERN AND SOVIET MISSILE LEVELS. THE
SOVIETS' EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN NEGOTIATIONS
ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF ARE CHARACTERIZED AS
ATTEMPTS TO LEGALIZE THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN
AND DOMINATION OF THE PERSIAN GULF. OTHER BREZHNEV PRO-
POSALS ARE DERIDED AS MERE PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO RESTRICT
THE ADVERSARY, SAFEGUARD THE SOVIET POSITION AND SOW
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A LOW-POSTURE, HIS DROPPING OF SOVIET PRECONDITIONS (RE
U.S.-SOVIET TALKS AND TALKS ON LIMITING INTERMEDIATE RANGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE) AND HIS EMPHASIS ON DIALOGUE
ARE PROMPTED BY SOVIET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS
AND MOSCOW'S UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION IN THE WORLD. ACCORDING
1
0 XINHUA THIS ISOLATION STEMS FROM MOSCOW'S ACTIONS AND
POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN, VIETNAM AND POLAND. IT
POINTEDLY NOTES THAT THE WEST THOUGHENED UP ITS ATTITUDE
TOWARD MOSCOW FOLLOWING THE AFGHAN INCIDENT AND APPROVINGLY
STATES THAT THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIETS HAS BECOME
FIRMER SINCE THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE.
THESE FACTORS ARE SAID TO EXPLAIN BREZHNEV'S LESS ARROGANT
ATTITUDE AND ABSENCE OF BAOSTING OF SOVIET ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS IN HIS CPSU SPEECH.
6. THE SEEMINGLY NEW BREZHENEV ATTITUDE AND PEACE PROPOSALS,
ACCORDING TO XHINHA, REPRESENT ONLY A TACTICAL RATHER THAN
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET STRATEGY AND POLICY AND
ARE DESIGNED AS "BAIT" FOR WESTERN EUROPE IN PARTICULAR.
THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES BY NOTING THAT A SIMILAR BREZHNEV
LETTER CAMPAIGN TWO YEARS AGO ON THE PROBLEM OF THE U.S.
NEUTRON BOMB WAS NOT WITHOUT SOME SUCCESS AND ADDS THAT
ONE CAN ONLY "WAIT AND SEE" WHETHER THIS BAIT WILL BE
SWALLOWED.
7. COMMENT: THIS COMMENTARY CONSTITUES THE FIRST PRC
COMMENTARY ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS AND INCLUDES A
STRONG REBUFF TO MOSCOW'S PROPOSED NEGOTIATIONS ON CBMS
IN THE EAST ASIA. ITS EXPRESSION OF CONCERN LEST SOME
WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS TAKE HOLD OF THE SOVIET "BAIT"
INDICATES BEIJING'S CONCERN WITH THE DURABILITY F. THE
CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN HARD LINE STANCE. THE COMMENTARY,
I
ON THE OTHER HAND, PRAISES CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND
SUGGESTS NO CONCERN THAT THE TOUGH STANCE MAY SLIP.
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TAGS: PINT. PEPR, CH
SUBJECT: REPORTED DEBATE ON FOREIGN POLICY
REF: STATE 65337
1.
- 0 ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: MEDIA ARTICLES WHICH PROVIDE THE BASIS
FOR A RECENT FBIS ANAYLYSIS OFFER NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE
THAT CHINA'S CURRENT PLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND USSR
IS THE SUBJECT OF A. SENIOR LEVEL POLICY DEBATE. IT IS
POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE BEING MORE
ACTIVELY DISCUSSED BY INFORMED CHINESE WHO PLAY NO
DIRECT ROLE IN THE PRC'S POLICY PROCESS. THE DISCUSSION,
WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY UNCERTAINTY OVER U.S.
POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN, SEEMS TO REVOLVE AROUND HOW HARD
LINE CHINA SHOULD BE IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS AND
TO WHAT EXTENT BEIJING SHOULD COMPROMISE WITH THE U.S.
OVER TAIWAN. POLITICALLY ATTUNED CHINESE OFFICIALS
AND DIPLOMATS WE HAVE TALKED TO OVER THE PAST SEVERAL
DAYS SEEM TO BE UNAWARE OF INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE
ISSUE. END SUMMARY.
3. WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE FULL TEXT OF THE
ANALYSIS REFERRED TO IN REFTEL BUT OFFER SOME PRELIMIN-
ARY COMMENTS ON THE MEDIA ARTICLES THAT PROVIDE THE BASIS
FOR THE FBIS JUDGMENTS.
4. WE SEE NO PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT INDICATES CHINA'S
CURRENT POLICY TOWARD THE U.S. AND THE USSR IS THE SUBJECT
SIT:
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OF A SENIOR LEVEL POLICY DEBATE. THE SPORADIC APPEARANCES
OF SIMILAR ARTICLES OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS SUGGESTS
THAT THIS ISSUE IS THE SUBJECT OF CONTINUING EXAMINATION
BY CHINESE SCHOLARS AND SPECIALISTS WHO ARE SEVERAL STEPS
REMOVED FROM ANY DIRECT ROLE IN FORMULATING PRC FOREIGN
POLICIES. THE DEBATE MAY WAX AND WANE AS DEVELOPMENTS
OCCUR THAT PROVIDE FUEL FOR THE ARGUMENT. THE PUBLICA-
/1/01
TION OF SUCH MEDIA ITEMS AT THIS TIME MAY WELL
REFLECT INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECT OCCASIONED BY
THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE DECISION OF THE
DUTCH TO SELL SUBMARINES TO TAIWAN. PERSUASIVE
EVIDENCE THAT THIS DISCUSSION HAS PENETRATED POLICY
CIRCLES, HOWEVER, IS LACKING.
5. THE TWO MOST INTRIGUING ARTICLES ARE THE PEOPLE'S
DAILY COMMENTARY ON ZHOU ENLAI'S 1927 LETTER AND THE
GUANGMING DAILY ITEM ON QING DYNASTY BORDER DEFENSE.
BOTH DO LITTLE TO CONCEAL THAT THEIR MESSAGES HAVE
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION AND SEEM TO REFLECT DIFFERENCES
OVER HOW HARD LINE CHINA SHOULD BE IN DEALING WITH THE
SOVIETS AND OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH BEIJING SHOULD
COMPROMISE WITH THE U.S. OVER THE TAIWAN ISSUE.
6. ON THE OTHER HAND, DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE STATURE
OF ITS AUTHORS, THE FEBRUARY ARTICLE ON WANG JIAXIANG
SEEMS TO BE PART OF AN ONGOING EFFORT TO EDUCATE CADRE
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMILITY, SELFLESSNESS AND PARTY
DISCIPLINE, REGARDLESS OF THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF A
PARTICULAR VIEWPOINT. WANG IS AN OBJECT LESSON IN
CORRECT PARTY STYLE. HIS POSITIONS ON FOREIGN PLICY
ISSUES APPEAR TO BE INCIDENTAL TO THIS CENTRAL POINT,
ALTHOUGH IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ARTICLE'S ELABORATION
AT SOME LENGTH ON WANG'S MODERATE FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS
HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. IN ANY
CASE, ON THE BASIS OF ALIMITED AND HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE IN THE CHINESE MEDIA, IT WOULD
SEEM PREMATURE TO CONCLUDE THAT A FULL-SCALE LEADERSHIP
DEBATE HAS MATERIALIZED.
7. MOREOVER, THE PRESENT WOULD SEEM TO BE A PARTICULARLY
UNPROPITIOUS TIME FOR A MAJOR DEBATE ON THE SINO-SOVIET-U.S.
TRIANGLE. MOSCOW'S AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR IN AFGHANISTAN
AND ITS SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM IN INDOCHINA WOULD SEEM TO
DISCOURAGE OPEN ADVOCACY OF CONCILIATORY GESTURES AT THIS
TIME. A HARD PRC LINE AGAINST THE SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND PRC SUPPORT FOR THE TOUGHENED
U.S. STANCE, INCLUDING THAT IN EL SALVADOR, CONTINUES
UNABATED.
8. OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE
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RAISED THESE ARTICLES SEPARATELY WITH TWO POLITICALLY
ATTUNED SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC
STUDIES. BOTH SEEMED UNAWARE OF THEM BUT DISMISSED THE
IDEA THAT THERE WAS ANY SERIOUS POLICY LEVEL DISCUSSION
OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS UNDERWAY. WHILE THESE
OBSERVERS COULD BE DISSEMBLING, THEY APPEARED GENUINELY
NOT TO HAVE FOCUSED ON THE ARTICLES.
9. OTHER DIPLOMATS HERE HAVE NOT ATTACHED ANY
SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARTICLES. ON MARCH 18,
AN EMBASSY OFFICER DISCUSSED THESE MEIDA ITEMS WITH A
RANKONG SOVIET DIPLOMAT WHO SPECIALIZES IN SINO-SOVIET
RELATIONS. COMMENTING ON THE GUANGMING ARTICLE, THE
DIPLOMAT SAID IT APPEARED TO REPRESENT A DEBATE OVER
WHETHER CHINA'S DEFENSE PRIORITY SHOULD BE LOPSIDEDLY
ORIENTED TOWARD THE USSR. HE WAS INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN APPROVED AT HIGH LEVELS. ALTHOUGH
A CHINESE MEDIA OFFICIAL HE RECENTLY QUERIED ON THIS
SCORE SAID HE WAS UNSURE WHETHER THIS PARTICULAR ARTICLE
WOULD RQUIRE SENIOR CLEARANCE OR NOT. SURPRISNGLY,
THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT HAD NOT NOTICED THE ARICLE ON
WANG XIAXING. NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT OFFICIAL
CHINESE DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET EMBASSY REMAINED AS
CHILLY AS BEFORE AND HE ANTICIPATED NO SIGNIFICANT
CHANGE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
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I. ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE ON U.S.-PRC RELATIONS
CHINA
TAKE 1--ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE
28
LD262220 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 2114 GMT
26 JUN 81
("FULL TEXT" OF I. ALEKSANDROV ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW PRAVDA
27 JUNE: "ESCALATION OF RECKLESSNESS")
(TEXT) MOSCOW, 27 JUN (TASS) THE WORLD PUBLIC IS
FOLLOWING WITH ALARM THE BUILD-UP OF DANGEROUS TRENDS IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS--A FACTOR WHICH
IS EXERTING AN INCREASING NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE TALKS WHICH RECENTLY TOOK PLACE
IN BEIJING BETWEEN U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE A. HAIG AND THE
LEADERS OF THE PRC HAVE SHOWN THAT WASHINGTON AND BEIJING ARE
COORDINATING A POLICY AIMED AT EXACERBATING TENSION,
DESTABILIZING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, INTENSIFYING
CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST
COMMUNITY AND JOINTLY WAGING AN UNDECLARED WAR ON AFGHANISTAN AND
KAMPUCHEA.
THE HALLMARK OF THE TALKS, JUDGING BY WHAT HAS BEEN
PUBLISHED, WAS HOSTILITY ON THE PART OF BEIJING AND WASHINGTON
TO THE USSR AND TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE. THE VIEWS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION,
A. HAIG SAID AFTER THE TALKS, "HAVE NEVER BEEN SO CLOSE
AS AT THE PRESENT TIME." ZWE HAVE MANY IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR
VIEWSN" PRC FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA SAID, ECHOING HIS WORDS.
THE CHINESE SIDE, ACCORDING TO HAIG, EVALUATED HIGHLY THE
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO INCREASE
U.S. MILITARY POWER AND STRENGTHEN AMERICA'S TIES WITH ITS
ALLIES IN THE MILITARY BLOCS. THIS AROUSED THAT VIOLENT
OPPONENTS OF DETENTE, SENATOR G. JACKSON, TO SUCH ECSTASY
THAT HE DECLARED: "NO COUNTRY IN THE WORLD IS SO STAUNCH
A SUPPORTER OF NATO AS CHINA!"
WHAT WE ARE CLEARLY CONFRONTED WITH IS A NEW AND HIGHLY
DANGEROUS STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE-AMERICAN
PARTNERSHIP. THIS IS EXPRESSED ABOVE ALL IN SUBSTANTIAL
EXPANSION OF ITS MILITARY ASPECTS.
THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION HAS ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION
TO REMOVE CHINA FROM THE LIST OF "UNFRIENDLY COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES" AND TO PLACE IT IN THE CATEGORY OF "FRIENDLY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES." APPROPRIATE AMENDMENTS ARE TO BE INSERTED
INTO AMERICAN LEGISLATION. THIS STEP WILL NOT ONLY ALLOW CHINA
TO ACQUIRE FROM THE UNITED STATES MILITARY HARDWARE AND
TECHNOLOGY WHOSE EXPORT, ACCORDING TO SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS,
IS BANNED TO "UNFRIENDLY COUNTRIES," BUT WILL ALSO PROVIDE
IT WITH ACCESS TO CREDITS ON FAVORABLE TERMS. IT SEEMS THAT
HOPES ARE BEING ENTERTAINED IN BEIJING THAT THIS WILL HELP TO
OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES LINKED WIT THE SEVERE LACK OF
DECLASSIFIED
NLRRF06-114/10#11408
BY RW DATE3/28/11
NARA
FOREIGN CURRENCY.
EXPRESSING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE BEIJING WITH THE
MEANS FOR CONDUCTING A MODERN WAR, INCLUDING OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS, THE PRESENT WASHINGTON LEADERS HAVE GONE MUCH FURTHER
IN THEIR DANGEROUS INSTIGATION THAN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION,
WHICH THEY CRITICIZED BEFORE THE ELECTION FOR ITS EXCESSIVE
ITNG TIIT.
29
THE COORDINATION OF "PARALLEL ACTIONS" BY THE TWO STATES
ON THE BASIS OF "COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS" WAS INITIATED
DURING THE VISIT BY BROWN, THE ERSTWHILE U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY,
TO BEIJING IN JANUARY 1980. AT THE TIME, BROWN
HINTED AI THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SALE TO CHINA OF "DUAL
PURPOSE" HARDWARE, THAT IS, HARDWARE WHICH COULD BE USED
BOTH FOR CIVIL AND MILITARY NEEDS. WHEN 6 MONTHS LATER GENG
BIAO, THE PRESENT CHINESE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARRIVED
IN WASHINGTON TO RETURN THE VISIT, THIS POSSIBILITY WAS
MADE REALITY. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROVED AROUND 500 LICENSES
FOR THE SALE OF DUAL-PURPOSE TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA (HELICOPTERS,
TRANSPORT PLANESN TRUCKS AND RADAR). HOWEVER, IT WAS
EMPHASIZED THAT WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS MERELY SHIPMENTS OF
MILITARY EQUIPMENT, NOT LETHAL WEAPONRY.
HENCEFORTH CHINA HAS OPEN ACCESS NOT ONLY TO RESTRICTED AND
HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS A SYSTEM FOR THE
GUIDANCE OF STRATEGIC MISSILES OR MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES, BUT ALSO TO VARIOUS TYPES OF MILITARY HARDWARE,
FROM ANTITANK MISSILES TO FIGHTER-BOMBERS. NEVERTHELESS, THE
STATE DEPARTMENT AVOIDS CALLING THINGS BY THEIR PROPER NAMEN
MAINTAINING THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EXPORTING OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS AI ALL SINCE, ACCORDING TO AMERICAN LAW, THEY SHOULD
NOT, SUPPOSEDLY, BE USED FOR PURPOSES OF AGGRESSSIONM BUT
THE PENTAGON'S CLIENTS HAVE SHOWN MORE THAN ONCE IN PRACTICE
OF WHAT LITTLE VALUE SUCH RESERVATIONS ARE. HAND THE LATEST
EXAMPLE OF THAT IS THE ISRAELI RAID ON BAGHDAD.
ONE MAY SAY THAT HAIG CARRIED OUT HIS MISSION IN BEIJING
LIKE A GENERAL IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. HIS MEETING WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER GENG BIAO WAS DEVOTED TO THE SALE OF ARMS AND ALSO TO
THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE DATA. (ZHANG ZHUNTSE), DEPUTY
CHIEF OF CHINESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PARTICIPATED IN THESE
TALKS.
KMORE)
26 JUN 2336Z GMS/RSC
30
T
FBIS 01
TAKE 2--73 OF 26 JUN CALEKSANDROV ARTICLE)
/// IN THESE TALKS.
LD262240
(TEXT) NEWS HAS JUST REACHED THE PRESS THAT THE UNION BETWEEN
THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAS HAPPENED
EVEN BEFORE "FULL NORMALIZATION" OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
TWO STATES. AN ADDITIONAL INCENTIVE FOR THIS WAS THE OVERTHROW
OF THE ANTI-PEOPLE'S, MONARCHIST REGIME IN IRAN, AS A RESULT OF
WHICH THE CIA WAS DEPRIVED OF ITS ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE
STATIONS ON THE BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. ON THE BASIS OF A
SECRET UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BEIJINGN TWO
TRACKING STATIONS WERE BUILT IN NORTH WEST CHINA WITH AMERICAN
EQUIPMENT, WHICH WAS RUN BY CHINESE PERSONNEL UNDER THE SUPERVISION
OF INSTRUCTORS FROM THE CIA. THE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT
THE SOVIET UNION RECEIVED FROM THEM, THE NEW YORK TIMES WRITES,
IS BEING USED JOINTLY BY THE ESPIONAGE CENTERS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA.
AS A RESULT OF HIS PRESENT TRIP, HAIGN ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENT,
REACHED AGREEMENT ON "EXTENDING ACTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES." A CHINESE MILITARY
DELEGATION WILL VISIT WASHINGTON IN AUGUST TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC
QUESTIONS OF SUCH COOPERATION.
THOSE WHO ARE PLACING CONTEMPORARY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF
THE CHINESE HEGEMONISTS OBVIOUSLY SUPPOSE THAT THEY ARE ACQUIRING
AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE BEIJING'S POLICY AND TO GUIDE ITS
EXPANSIONISM BASICALLY IN A NORTHERLY DIRECTION. A PROFOUND
DELUSION! THE DANGER OF CHINA'S MILITARIZATION -- AND THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOW EMBARKED ON THIS ROAD -- LIES IN THE
FACT THAT THE AMERICAN WEAPONS NOW IN CHINESE HANDS WILL BE
TURNED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL NEIGHBORING
STATES, AMONG WHOM, INCIDENTALLY, ARE AMERICA'S ALLIES. THEY
ARE, AS IT WEREN NUDGING CHINA TOWARD IMPLEMENTING ITS TERRITORIAL
CLAIMS IN SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH ASIA.
EVEN IN COUNTRIES NUMBERED AMONG THE FRIENDS OF THE UNITED
STATES APPREHENSION IS BEING EXPRESSED OVER THE RESULTS
OF HAIG'S VISIT TO BEIJING, WHICH ARE ALIEN TO THE INTERESTS
OF PEACE. IN JAPANN FOR INSTANCE, SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE BEING
EXPRESSED NOT ONLY BY THE PUBLICN BUT EVEN BY OFFICIAL CIRCLES.
IN AN EDITORIAL, "THE DANGEROUS NATURE OF AMERICAN-CHINESE
MILITARY COOPERATION," THE NEWSPAPER MAINICHI WRITES: "A MILITARILY
STRONG CHINA POSES A THREAT TO ALL THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES OF
SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH WEST ASIA." THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY
HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER DELIVERIES OF U.S. ARMS TO CHINA.
WASHINGTON'S PERSISTENT BLACKMAILING OF THE COUNTRY OF HIROSHIMA
AND NAGASAKI TO RID ITSELF OF ITS NUCLEAR ALLERGY AND EMBARK ON
THE PATH OF BECOMING A MILITARY POWER IS BEING MORE AND MORE
ACTIVELY SUPPORTED BY BEIJING. THERE IS REASON TO EXPECT
THAT THE PARTIES TO THE AMERICAN-CHINESE DEAL WILL NOW TRY STILL
HARDER TO PUSH JAPAN ONTO THE PATH OF MILITARISM.
31
FOREIGN OBSERVERS NOTE THAT THE DECISION TO SELL OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
TO CHINA IS IN KEEPING WITH THE SHARP TOUGHENING OF U.SM POLICY
IN ASIA. THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THIS THREAT POLICY ARE THE EXPANSION
OF MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN, WITH THE OBJECT OF TURNING IT INTO A
REGIONAL GENDARME AND, IN PARTICULAR, INTO A BASE FOR CONTINUING
AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN; THE SETTING UP OF "RAPID DEPLOYMENT
FORCES" IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD; AND THE
KNOCKING TOGETHER OF A NEW MILITARY GROUP IN SOUTH EAST ASIA,
HOSTILE TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA. THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP
DECLARES IT SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN
THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE FAR EAST AND WELCOMES THE WIDENING
OF THE NETWORK OF U.S. MILITARY BASES AND STRONGPOINTS IN THOSE
REGIONS.
NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR CHINA CONCEAL THE FACT THAT THEIR
AIM IS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA AND THEIR
NEIGHBORS, THE STATES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA; TO SURROUND VIETNAM WITH
SOMETHING IN THE NATURE OF A "CORDON SANITAIRE"; AND TO
ATTEMPT ONCE AGAIN TO BRING THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO THEIR KNEESM
D. HOLDRIDGE, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, IS NOW CYNICALLY ARGUING THE NEED "JOINTLY
WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO FIND WAYS OF INTENSIFYING THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND, IF NECESSARY, MILITARY PRESSURE ON VIETNAM."
ANOTHER POINT IN THE BEIJING TALKS WAS THE SO-CALLED
KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM. THE STATEMENT CHIEF PUBLICLY STATED THAT,
BUT FOR MINOR DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE IN THE UMS. AND CHINESE
APPROACHES TO THIS ISSUE, THE SIDES WERE AGREED THAT A
"UNITED FRONT" SHOULD BE SET UP IN KAMPUCHEA TO FIGHT VIETNAM.
ITS FRAMEWORK IS TO BE PROVIDED BY THE POL POT GANGS, WHICH RECEIVE
CHINESE AND AMERICAN WEAPONS VIA THE TERRITORY OF THAILANDM ALL
THIS MEANS THAT THE ENEMIES OF PEOPLE'S KAMPUCHEA ARE CREATING A
HOTBED OF MILITARY DANGER IN THE AREA OF THE THAIAKAMPUCHEAN
BORDER AND ARE CONDUCTING ACCELERATED PREPARATIONS FOR ARMED
CONFLICT. PLANS ARE BEIING HATCHED IN AMERICAN-CHINESE CIRCLES
TO SEIZE PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA
AND TO SET UP SOME KIND OF "LIBERATED ZONE" THERE, INTO WHICH A
PUPPET "GOVERNMENT" WOULD IMMEDIATELY BE TRANSFERRED.
KMORE)
27 JUN 0029Z JA/CH
OVERINKOW
32
FBIS 04
TAKE 3 OF 3--73 OF 26 JUN CALEKSANDROV ARTICLE)
/// IMMEDIATELY BE TRANSFERRED.
LD262322
(TEXT) THE RESULTS OF THE AMERICAN-CHINESE TALKS IN BEIJING
SHOW THAT THE CHINESE LINE TOWARD A MILITARY SETTLEMENT OF THE
"KAMPUCHEA QUESTION" HAS RECEIVED WASHINGTON'S APPROVAL. THE ASEAN
COUNTRIES AND SOME OTHER STATES ARE NOW BEING DRAWN INTO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT COURSE WITH THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE
PLANS TO USE THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A COVER FOR
INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF KAMPUCHEA. FOR THIS
PURPOSE, HAIG AND HUANG HUA DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF HOW THE
SO-CALLED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA WHICH IS BEING
CONVENED NEXT MONTH IN NEW YORK COULD UNDERTAKE "SANCTIONS"
AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA AND THE SRV.
THE DANGEROUS MILITARY-POLITICAL MANE UVER INGS SET IN MOTION
BY SHORTSIGHTED ADVENTURISTS ARE FRAUGHT WITH A SERIOUS THREAT
TO THE ENTIRE WORLD. IF WASHINGTON EXPECTS TO EXPLOIT THE BLATANT
ANTI-SOVIETISM OF THE PRESENT CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO THE ADVANTAGE
OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS GLOBAL ANTI-SOVIET STRATEGY, BEIJING HAS
ITS OWN AX TO GRIND: TO CAUSE A CLASH BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND THE USSR, SO AS TO DOMINATE THE WORLD AFTER A NUCLEAR CONFLICT
WHICH, ACCORDING TO ITS CALCULATIONS, WOULD REDUCE AMERICA AND
EUROPE TO ASHES WHILE SPARING, PERHAPS, A FEW DOZEN--OR A COUPLE
OF HUNDRED -- MILLIONS OF CHINESE. AFTER ALL, THERE ARE ALREADY
TWICE AS MANY OF THEM AS THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE PUT TOGETHER.
NO, THE ARCHITECTS OF U.S. AND CHINESE POLICY, WHO SEE EYE TO
EYE WHEN IT COMES TO THEIR MILITANT ANTI-COMMUNISM AND ANTI-
SOVIETISM, ARE FAR FROM BEING OF THE SAME MIND IN THEIR GLOBAL
CLAIMS. EACH OF THE SIDES STRIVES TO TIE DOWN THE OTHER, TO
TETHER IT MORE FIRMLY TO ITS POLICY, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO LEAVE
ITSELF FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE FACTS SHOW THAT UNTIL NOW THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TACTICS. IT
DETERMINES THE PACE AND CONTENT OF THE COLLUSION.
IN TAKING A COURSE TOWARD A MILITARY AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCE
WITH IMPERIALISM, THE BEIJING RULING CLIQUE HAS IN ESSENCE
RESORTED TO CONCESSIONS ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION. AS A. HAIG
DECLARED AT A BEIJING PRESS CONFERENCE, THE CHINESE SIDE
"RECEIVED WITH UNDERSTANDING" THE U.SM INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH TAIPEI. FOR ALL ITS VERBAL "THUNDER
AND LIGHTNING," THE PRC LEADERSHIP HAS EFFECTIVELY ASSENTED TO A
SITUATION OF "TWO CHINAS," WHICH IS AN INSULT TO THE PRESTIGE AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF A GREAT POWER.
THUS, CHINA IS PLAYING THE SHAMEFUL ROLE OF JUNIOR PARTNER AND
ASSISTANT TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS, A ROLE WHICH THE PRESENT
BEIJING LEADERS HAVE READILY ASSUMED. ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT
NO SERIOUS THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN IN BEIJING TO THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THIS DANGEROUS GAMBLE WITH THE FATE OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE.
33
APART FROM THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF HAIG'S VISIT TO
CHINA, MANY OBSERVERS NOTE ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR DENG ZIAOPING AND
HIS ADHERENTS ON THE PLANE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. THE TIMING OF THE
TRIP IS REMARKABLE IN ITSELF. THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ARRIVED
IN BEIJING ON THE EVE OF THE SIXTH PLENUM OF THE CCP CENTRAL
COMMITTEE, AT WHICH IMPORTANT ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL DECISIONS
ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN. THE U.SM ADMINISTRATION HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY
SHOWN ITS INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF DENG XIAOPING
IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP AND THEREBY CONSOLIDATING BEIJING'S
PRESENT FOREIGN POLICYM
TKAEN AS A WHOLE, THE RESULTS OF HAIG'S TALKS WITH THE BEIJING
LEADERS CAN BE VIEWED AS AN ESCALATION OF AN IMPRUDENT POLICYM
THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE DANGEROUS NEW
TURN TAKEN BY SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PLANS
FOR PROVIDING CHINA WITH MODERN AMERICAN ARMS, MILITARY EQUIPMENT
AND TECHNOLOGY. THESE ACTIONS BY WASHINGTON AND BEIJING CANNOT
BE SEEN AS OTHER THAN HOST ILE TO OUR COUNTRY.
THE RULING CIRCLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SHOULD REALIZE
THAT THE AMERICAN-CHINESE ASSOCIATION ON AN ANTI-SOVIET BASIS WILL
BE DUTY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE USSR IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF
SOVIET-AMERICAN AND SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION
WILL TAKE SUCH MEASURES AS WILL BE DICTATED BY THE SITUATION AS
IT EVOLVES. NO ONE SHOULD ENTERTAIN ANY DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET
PEOPLE, POSSESSED OF STRONG NERVES AND POWERFUL MEANS FOR CURBING
AGGRESSION, WILL NOT SUBMIT TO PROVOCATIONS AND WILL BE ABLE TO
STAND UP FOR ITSELF AND DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF ITS FRIENDS AND
ALLIES.
WASHINGTON AND BEIJING HAVE STARTED A DANGEROUS GAME. IT
DEMANDS NOT ONLY CONDEMNATION BUT ALSO VIGILANCE AND A RESOLUTE
REBUFF FROM ALL PEOPLES, FROM ALL RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL FORCES
WHO VALUE PEACE, SECURITY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.
KENDALL)
27 JUN 035 4Z DWK/RSC