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Assassination Report (3)
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Assassination Report (3)
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Records of the Office of the Counsellor to the President (Reagan Administration)
Edwin Meese's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Meese, Edwin III: Files
Folder Title: Assassination Report [3 of 4]
Box: CFOA 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MEESE, EDWIN
Archivist: kdb/srj
FOIA ID: 97-098/3 Phelan
File Folder: Assassination Report (3) CFOA 28
Date: 03/02/00
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. & TYPE
1. analysis
of resources. Change in responsibilities. 1p.
n.d.
2. analysis
of resources. Change in responsibilities. 1p.
n.d.
3. memo
to Director Dept. of Treas. from Deputy Director re: Head quarters
5/20/80
87
Emergency Situation Response. (partial, p 3,4)
12/5/00
RESTRICTIONS
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
-82-
C. United States Customs Service
LEGAL AUTHORITY
The United States Customs Service assesses, collects, and
protects the levying of, import duties and taxes; collects
import and export statistics; enforces customs and related laws
against contraband smuggling; controls carriers, persons, and
articles entering or departing the United States by enforcing
the Tariff Act of 1930 and other statutes and regulations
governing international traffic and trade; and enforces the
reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act by investigating
financially motivated crime involving currency reporting vio-
lations.
COOPERATION WITH SECRET SERVICE
Customs does not have any written agreement with the U.S.
Secret Service concerning cooperation or the exchange of infor-
mation. The Office of Border Operations has a Liaison Group
which works with the Secret Service and other law enforcement
agencies. For example, Customs has in the past established
"look-outs" for certain suspects at the request of the Secret
Service. This involves placing the individual's name in the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) 6/ and re-
questing that Customs personnel notify the appropriate author-
ities if that person passes through Customs.
Customs agents also, at the request of the Secret Service
and pursuant to Public Law 90-331, as amended, augment Secret
Service protective details. For example, approximately 400
Customs agents were actively involved in the protection of the
Presidential candidates during the 1980 campaign.
6/ The Treasury Enforcement Communications Systems (TECS) is a
system of telecommunications terminals located in various law
enforcement facilities and connected to a computer in San
Diego, California. Participants within the Department of the
Treasury are the Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms and the Internal Revenue Service.
-83-
EMERGENCY PERFORMANCE
Procedures
The Customs Service does not have any formalized plans or
procedures in place in case of an assassination or attempted
assassination of the President, although it does have contin-
gency plans set up for events such as nuclear war or terrorist
attack. If an emergency situation were to arise, Customs has
duty officers in its headquarters Office of Investigations
until about 8:00 p.m. In addition, the Sector Communications
Center maintains a 24 hour, 7 day a week, communications oper-
ation; in the event of a late night or early morning emergency,
the Center would contact the Assistant Commissioner who is then
"on-call."
In some emergency situations, Customs may have authority
for limited periods of time to seal the country's borders or
close ports of entry or egress. Although there are no consti-
tutional or statutory provisions which specifically authorize
such action, there are several statutes and executive orders,
such as Executive Order 11490, as amended, which give the
Secretary of the Treasury (and by delegation, Customs) varying
degrees of control over border movements of conveyances, per-
sons and goods. When these statutes are read in conjunction
with the various laws and executive orders granting the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State authority to con-
trol the movement of persons across the borders, it seems clear
that the three Departments can coordinate efforts at least to
order the sealing of borders for limited times.
The ability physically to seal a border would depend on
the scope of the action (geographic and time factors) and on
the availability of personnel not only from Customs but also
from other Federal, state and local agencies.
Execution on March 30, 1981
The only involvement of the Customs Service in the inves-
tigation of the attempted assassination of the President arose
out of requests by the FBI and the Secret Service for searches
of the "Archive System," a part of TECS which is used primarily
by Customs Special Agents to verify that a particular vehicle
or person has entered the United States.
-84-
Archive records are created when a person (or vehicle)
passes through Customs and the Customs Inspector, as part of
the routine inspection, queries TECS. All primary queries are
logged and stored showing the date, time, and place that the
query was made.
Normally, the Customs Inspector will query TECS for each
incoming person by entering the person's date of birth and
name. Often, however, Customs Inspectors are rushed (Customs
cleared more than 297 million persons entering the United
States in fiscal 1980) and do not follow this procedure.
Particularly in some of the larger ports, queries for many of
the passengers will not be entered, or, if the name is entered,
will not include the passenger's date of birth.
When an archives search was run on John Hinckley and two
aliases, there were several "hits" showing that a person with
that name had passed through Customs coming into the United
States. Unfortunately, no date of birth was entered for any of
the names so it was not immediately apparent whether any of the
hits might be the John W. Hinckley, Jr., who was the suspect in
the attempted assassination of the President.
In certain instances, Customs is able to go to the ports
of entry indicated on the hits and pull the written baggage
declarations for those hits for which no date of birth is
given. However, the hits for Hinckley were at preclearance
facilities in Canada where the declarations would have been
oral. None of these hits were for dates in proximity to
President Reagan's trip to Canada on March 10 and 11, 1981.
Conclusions
1. Because of the nature of the assassination attempt on
March 30, there was relatively little that Customs could do,
either to warn the Secret Service in advance or to participate
in the follow-up investigation. While the Archive System might
be useful in establishing the international travel patterns of
a suspect or suspects, it does not appear to have been of much
assistance in the current investigation.
2. Current law may permit the Secretary of the Treasury
to coordinate efforts with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General to order the sealing of the country's borders
for limited times. No current procedures exist for imple-
menting such a program following an assassination or attempted
assassination.
-85-
Recommendation
Executive Order 11490, as amended, should be further
amended specifically to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury
to develop plans and procedures, in coordination with the
Department of State and the Department of Justice, for control-
ling conveyances arriving at or departing from ports of entry,
airports having international arrivals and departures, and the
land and sea borders during emergencies. Such plans should be
updated and attention given to developing procedures to deal
with the particular problems arising out of attempted
assassinations of the President.
-86-
D. Office of the Secretary
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Departmental Notification Procedures
The attempt on the President's life on March 30, 1981,
occurred during regular business hours in the presence of the
news media. As a consequence, notification of the Treasury
Secretary and other members of the Department was accomplished
in large part through the normal dissemination of news. In
this respect, as in others, the events of March 30 did not test
the adequacy of existing procedures.
The Secret Service Intelligence Division duty desk, which
functions as the Secret Service Headquarters Command/Control
Center in the event of an assassination attempt, has written
procedures for notifying the protective detail assigned to the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Special Agent assigned to the
Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and Operations) if an attempt
on the President's life should occur.
There is also a notification system available for alerting
some cabinet agencies. That system is the Central Locator
System which is established by the White House and operated by
the White House Communications Agency through the White House
Signal Switchboard. The Central Locator System, which is
maintained by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
provides information to the White House on the location of
legal successors to the Presidency -- the Vice President,
Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, and
cabinet officers in order of the establishment of their depart-
ments.
Under emergency conditions, the White House Communications
Agency may instruct FEMA to ask the successors to keep the
White House Communications Agency informed of their whereabouts
at all times.
Execution of Departmental Notification Procedures
The Secretary's Secret Service detail was notified by the
Intelligence Division duty desk that the assassination attempt
had occurred and immediately alerted the Secretary, who went to
-87-
the White House. The Secretary's immediate office notified the
Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, the Secretary's Executive
Assistant and his Special Assistant.
The White House did not tell FEMA to amplify the routine
use of the Central Locator System in order to require notifi-
cation to the White House in the event of any change in loca-
tion by the successors. It is not entirely clear what happened
at FEMA on the afternoon of March 30 because different people
have different recollections of events. However, it appears
that between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., FEMA, acting on its own,
contacted the office of each successor to determine whether the
staff there knew where the successor was, and whether he would
notify his office of any change in location. Each office
answered both questions in the affirmative. This was not an
attempt to find out where the successors were, but merely an
effort to determine how much effort would be required if the
White House were to order emergency use of the Central Locator
System.
Office of the Secretary
Notification Procedures
Within the Treasury Department, the Office of the
Secretary consists of the Department's top officials, including
the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries, and the General Counsel; the term "Office of the
Secretary" should be taken to refer to all these officials as a
group, together with their supporting staff of 1,500, unless
the context otherwise requires.
Despite a lack of formal rules, notification within the
Office of the Secretary is handled by the Treasury switchboard,
located within the Telecommunications Center, and the Watch
Office, a part of the Executive Secretariat. The switchboard
operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Generally, the
switchboard gives notice of emergency situations to the Watch
Office and individuals in the Office of Administration. The
Watch Office then determines which top officials should be
notified; the switchboard locates those officials upon request.
The Watch Office screens all incoming traffic, including
State Department cables, press, Defense, CIA and NSA reports,
and alerts Treasury officials who have a need to know about
unusual events or emergency conditions. There are no written
procedures describing how these functions are carried out.
Generally, the duty officer determines what events are signi-
-88-
ficant enough to warrant notification, and which officials
should be notified, based on his or her individual judgment and
experience. When in doubt, the duty officer can consult with
the senior briefing officer or counterparts at the White House,
CIA, State Department, or the Pentagon.
In the event of an assassination attempt, notification
would go to the Secretary (either directly or through his
immediate staff), to the Assistant Secretary (Enforcement and
Operations), and to the Office of Intelligence Support.
Depending on the circumstances, other officials would also be
notified, but there is no written list which is required to be
followed.
When both the switchboard and the Watch Office function
around the clock, emergencies developing after hours present no
particular difficulty. The Watch Office has recently limited
its coverage on weekends, however; this will create blind spots
during the periods when the Watch Office is closed.
Implementation of Notification Procedures
by the Office of the Secretary
On March 30, a Treasury operator in the Telecommunications
Center learned of the assassination attempt from a friend and,
on her own initiative, immediately notified the individuals
named on the list contained in the Facility Self-Protection
Plan (this Plan is primarily concerned with situations posing
threats to the Treasury Building). The Assistant Secretary for
Adminstration was notified by the Director of the Office of
Administrative Programs, whose name appears on the list and who
had been notified by the switchboard. The Assistant Secretary
for Administration immediately called the Secretary and both
Under Secretaries, and found that all three had already been
informed.
The officer on duty in the Watch Office, who learned of
the attempted assassination when the news appeared on the Watch
Office wire, immediately notified the Office of Enforcement and
Operations, and had copies of the wire stories delivered to the
Secretary's Executive Assistant and the Office of Intelligence
Support. The Executive Secretariat was also notified. The
Watch Office continued to monitor the situation so that any
changes in the President's condition could be relayed to the
same offices; of course, extensive television coverage obviated
the need for this activity.
-89-
Bureau Notification Procedures
-
and Execution
There are no existing procedures pursuant to which Main
Treasury notifies the various Treasury bureaus of emergency
situations.
There is no indication that any Treasury bureau received
notification of the March 30 incident through formal Treasury
channels.
Office of the Secretary
Crisis Management Procedures
The only emergency plan in place for the Treasury
Department, short of one requiring evacuation of principal
officials from the immediate Washington, D. C. area, is the
Facility Self-Protection Plan. This plan is not designed to
deal with crises other than physical threats to the security of
Treasury facilities. It does not contain procedures which
should be followed in the event of an attempt on the life of
the President. In addition, the Plan is not well-known outside
the Office of Administration, which was responsible for its
preparation.
Office of the Secretary
Crisis Management Execution
The Secretary was informed of the incident within two or
three minutes by one of the Secret Service Special Agents
assigned to his protective detail. Despite the absence of
formal procedures, attempts to notify the Secretary were also
undertaken by several other offices, including the Acting
Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Operations, the
Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Watch Office, and
the Treasury Security Force.
Within five minutes of his notification, the Secretary was
en route to the White House, where he remained until about 8:00
p.m. He maintained telephone contact with his immediate staff
from the Situation Room. The Deputy Secretary and the
Assistant Secretary-Designate for Enforcement and Operations,
both of whom were in California, were informed promptly and
were contacted again after the President's injuries were known
(at about 3:15 p.m.) in order to make arrangements for their
respective returns to Washington that evening.
-90-
Conclusions
1. There are no adequate procedures for insuring that top
officials of the Treasury Department are promptly notified in
the event of a crisis such as an assassination attempt.
Although media coverage during a normal working day obviated
this problem on March 30, the unstructured way in which the
notification process occurred within Treasury raises concerns
about the ability to insure prompt notification under less
favorable conditions.
2. There are no procedures in place for the notification
of necessary officials throughout the government in the event
of an attempted assassination or similar crisis. This should
prompt concern about the ability of top Federal officials to be
able to respond quickly when a crisis occurs under less favor-
able conditions than prevailed on March 30.
3. There was no focal point for crisis management activi-
ties at the Treasury Department on March 30. There were no
established channels of communication to direct the flow of
information into, out of, and within the Treasury Department.
Because of the favorable outcome and fortuitous circumstance of
this crisis, no harm was done, but there is a question whether
the Treasury's procedures are equal to a more sustained crisis.
4. These deficiencies could have been reduced or elimin-
ated if an adequate crisis management plan, including the
establishment of a central point for communications and
direction, had been in place.
Recommendations
1. (a) The Office of the Secretary should establish an
orderly procedure for providing top policy officials with
prompt notification whenever a crisis such as an assassination
attempt occurs. This procedure should include a regularly
updated list of individuals to be contacted. The decision on
which officers to notify should not be left to the discretion
of the switchboard or the Watch Office, although these offices
should be assigned the task of notification. The procedures
should also provide for notice to be given to top officials
within the various Treasury bureaus.
The responsibility for developing these procedures should
be assigned to the Office of Enforcement and Operations, in
coordination with the Office of Administration and the Office
-91-
of the Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs.
-
(b) Consideration should be given to the creation of
procedures to ensure notification of all Federal cabinet level
agencies in the event of a crisis with the potential signifi-
cance of an attempted assassination of the President. The
development and administration of this system should be under
the direct control of the White House; there is no apparent
need for the introduction of the cumbersome additional layer of
activity associated with White House use of the Central Locator
System through the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
2. The Office of the Secretary should develop a crisis
management plan which can be implemented in the event of an
attempted assassination of the President. The plan should
provide for the establishment of a crisis management center in
the Office of the Deputy Secretary, to maintain contact with
the Secretary and coordinate all Treasury Department activi-
ties. The Office of Enforcement and Operations should be
responsible for developing this plan.
-92-
RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO
CAPITAL AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Domestic Financial and Securities Markets
Procedures
There are no procedures for actions to be taken with
respect to domestic financial or securities markets in an
emergency. The Treasury Department has no direct regulatory or
supervisory authority over the operations of domestic finan-
cial, securities, or commodities markets, but its lead role in
the formulation and execution of economic policy requires it to
concern itself, at least in crisis situations, with the smooth
and orderly functioning of these markets. Moreover, the gov-
ernment financing and debt management responsibilities of the
Treasury Department require it maintain a direct interest in
the smooth and orderly functioning of the Government securities
markets.
Treasury Department Order 103-1 (April 30, 1981), places
the prime staff responsibility for reflecting these market-
based concerns with the Office of the Assistant Secretary
(Domestic Finance). Pursuant to this authority, the Domestic
Finance office monitors conditions in the financial markets
each business day and prepares regular market reports and
updates for senior Treasury officials.
The Treasury Department has no legal authority to deal
directly with disorderliness in the domestic financial or
securities markets. Most officials believe that in the event
of an emergency such as an attempted assassination of the
President trading will stop in the government securities market
(which is an over-the-counter market) and will be halted by the
exchanges on which corporate securities are traded.
If this does not occur regulatory intervention to close
securities exchanges is authorized by section 12 (k) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Such a mandatory closing by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires approval
by the President and has never been exercised.
-93-
-
Events on March 30
At the time of the attack on the President, the key
Treasury domestic finance officials, Assistant Secretary-
Designate Roger W. Mehle and Acting Assistant Secretary John E.
Schmidt, were attending a meeting with, and in the office of,
Dr. Beryl Sprinkel, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs-
Designate. The Secretary's office called Dr. Sprinkel with the
news at approximately 2:40 p.m., and the meeting was immediate-
ly adjourned. Mehle and Schmidt went to the Treasury market
room outside Schmidt's office to observe the reaction of finan-
cial markets and to follow news reports coming across the wire.
The conclusion of initial news reports was that the President
had not been shot, and while the stock market moved downward
(the Dow-Jones average of industrials fell from 998 at 2:30
p.m. to 992 at 3:00 p.m.), the market reaction was not partic-
ularly sharp.
Shortly thereafter word came that the President had in
fact been injured. Schmidt returned to the market room.
Within minutes he was called by Douglas Scarff, Director of
Market Regulation at the SEC, who said that the various stock
exchanges had decided to close voluntarily. All of the ex-
changes closed between 3:17 and 3:23 p.m. EST.
Press accounts and subsequent interviews make it clear
that upon the first reports of the incident the governors of
the various stock exchanges had prepared themselves for a rapid
shutdown. NYSE officials had been observing the build-up in
selling pressure (the Dow-Jones fell an additional two points
after 3:00 p.m.) and when the wire services reported the wound-
ing of the President at 3:16 p.m., immediately decided to close
the exchange. This action avoided a sharp reaction such as
those which followed the Kennedy assassination (a fall in the
Dow-Jones from 732 to 711 in less than thirty minutes with an
estimated paper loss of $11 billion) and the Eisenhower heart
attack in 1955 (a fall in the New York Times index of 24
points, to 309.3, with an estimated paper loss of $14 billion).
At the time of the shooting, the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York was in the process of executing an order for $500
million in Treasury bills for a foreign customer. Since init-
ial reports were that the President was unharmed, the New York
Fed, after consulting with some of the dealers, decided to
execute the order routinely -- in part to signal stability and
calm. Although word that the President had been hit came
before completion of this transaction, it was executed without
-94-
any noticeable anomaly in yields; otherwise, trading came to a
halt.
Later in the afternoon, after the closings, Schmidt fur-
ther discussed the market situation with officials from the SEC
and the New York Fed. It was agreed that in light of the
favorable preliminary reports on the President's condition,
there appeared to be no reason to postpone the Treasury auction
of seven year notes scheduled for the next day, or to close the
stock markets.
Commodity futures markets were not significantly affected.
Commodity futures exchanges had closed, on their usual sched-
ules, prior to news that the President had been hit.
After word that the President was out of surgery with a
favorable prognosis, Secretary Regan asked Mehle to advise the
SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission that he hoped
that the markets under their jurisdiction would open at the
usual time the following day. On Tuesday, March 31, Secretary
Regan appeared on morning television to report on the
President's condition. The markets opened that day with an
improved tone, relieved at the outcome, and no further actions
were
taken.
International Financial Markets
Procedures
Section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as amended, 31
U.S.C. Sec. 822a, establishes the Exchange Stabilization Fund
(ESF) and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to utilize
the fund to deal in gold and foreign exchange, and such other
instruments of credit and securities as he may deem necessary
"consistent with the United States['] obligations in the
International Monetary Fund regarding orderly exchange arrange-
ments a and stable system of exchange rates". On April 27,
1978, the United States notified the IMF, in accordance with
Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, that as part of
the exchange arrangements of the United States, "the author-
ities [will] intervene when necessary to counter disorderly
conditions in the exchange markets." 7/
7/ Letter of April 27, 1978 from Under Secretary (Monetary
Affairs) Anthony M. Solomon to J. Witteveen, Managing Director,
IMF.
-95-
Exchange market operations of the ESF are conducted, at
the instruction of the Treasury, by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, as fiscal agent.
Authority over operations of the ESF is specifically
delegated by the Secretary to the Under Secretary (Monetary
Affairs), Dr. Beryl Sprinkel. The Assistant Secretary
(International Affairs), Marc Leland, is the principal advisor
to the Under Secretary on international monetary matters,
including
use of the ESF. Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary
(International Affairs), it is the Deputy Assistant Secretary
( International Monetary Affairs), Thomas B.C. Leddy, and
specifically Director of the Office of Foreign Exchange
Operations, Frederick L. Springborn, who has principal respon-
sibility for policy formulation and implementation regarding
U.S. exchange market intervention.
There are no written procedures governing exchange market
operations for the account of the ESF. Guidelines on partic-
ular exchange market intervention are set by the responsible
Treasury officials as frequently as necessary, conveyed to
subordinate officials (who are within close physical prox-
imity), and telephoned to the New York Fed for execution.
Similarly, there are no written or otherwise articulated
standards within the Treasury Department on currency stabil-
ization actions to be taken in an emergency, or procedures for
reacting to an emergency that occurs outside the normal busi-
ness hours of the Treasury.
Federal Reserve System Authority
To Buy and Sell Foreign Exchange
The Treasury Department is not the only instrumentality of
the United States that engages in foreign exchange markets
intervention. The Federal Reserve System purchases and sells
foreign exchange on the authority of Sec. 14 of the Federal
Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 355. This authority has been
implemented, as a technical matter, by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which is created by 12 U.S.C. Section 263.
The FOMC has issued a Foreign Currency Directive requiring
that Federal Reserve System operations in foreign currencies
shall generally be directed at countering disorderly market
conditions, provided that market exchange rates for the U.S.
dollar reflect actions and behavior consistent with Article IV
-96-
of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. The Federal Reserve Bank
of New York conducts the authorized foreign exchange operations
through the Manager of the System Open Market Account.
Thus, both the Treasury (through the ESF) and the Federal
Reserve System intervene in foreign exchange markets in furth-
erance of the U.S. policy to counter disorderly foreign ex-
change markets. Both entities conduct their operations through
instructions to the same individual, the New York Fed's Manager
of Operations, System Open Market Account, and his operational
arm, the Foreign Trading Desk.
Operational Arrangements Between
the Treasury Department and
the Federal Reserve System
Historically, there has been a pattern of cooperation
between the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury Department
in U.S. exchange market intervention policy and implementation.
By March of 1981, operational personnel of the Federal Reserve
Board, the New York Fed, and the Treasury Department were in
the habit of coordinating their activities closely. They would
consult frequently throughout the day on any U.S. intervention
that seemed appropriate, and hold a wrap-up conference call
each day. Since the Treasury Department's decision in late
March 1981 to take a less active role in currency stabiliza-
tion, there has necessarily been less coordination between
Treasury and the Federal Reserve on such matters, but on March
30, 1981, both organizations had procedures in place to act
jointly.
Execution on March 30, 1981
By coincidence, the attempt on President Reagan occurred
within three minutes of the scheduled daily 2:30 p.m. confer-
ence call among Mr. Springborn, Ted Truman (Federal Reserve
Board, Director, International Division), and the New York
Federal Reserve Bank personnel operating the Foreign Trading
Desk. Word of the attempt was passed from the New York Fed's
domestic trading desk during the call.
Measured against the German mark, the dollar had opened at
DM 2.1243 in New York, and had declined to DM 2.0755 prior to
2:30. The dollar quickly dropped on virtually no trading to
around DM 2.0650 shortly after broadcast reports of the inci-
dent. By around 2:43 p.m. Reuters carried a story on the
-97-
attempt in which it -- like all other news sources at the time
-- stated that the President had not been hit. Shortly there-
after, some commercial banks indicated quotes for the dollar
around DM 2.0675.
Between 2:45 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., the news reports remained
unclear, but pressure began to build in the exchange markets as
belief grew that the President had been shot. Trading was not
active and the dollar remained around DM 2.0650, but the
Treasury officials watching the market decided that official
intervention would be helpful to steady market conditions and
prevent speculative selling of dollars. After conferring with
Springborn, Leddy went to then Undersecretary-Designate
Sprinkel who concurred that intervention should be authorized.
In the meantime, the Federal Reserve Board had been act-
ive. The Manager of the Foreign Department, New York Federal
Reserve Bank, happened to be visiting at the Federal Reserve
Board in Washington at the time of the attempt. Acting on his
own authority, he arranged for the Federal Reserve Board to
provide to the New York Fed authorization for intervention
comparable to that provided by Treasury. It was assumed
throughout this process that intervention would be undertaken
equally for the System Open Market Account and the Exchange
Stabilization Fund.
The wire services reported the wounding of the President
at 3:16 p.m.; the New York and American stock exchanges had
closed within a minute of that announcement. At 3:30 p.m., the
New York Fed commenced foreign exchange operations, undertaking
them primarily through New York brokers. This approach was
intended to circulate word, through the activity of the brok-
ers, that the Fed was buying dollars without providing any
exact information on the extent of the intervention. Inter-
vention continued until 5:00 p.m., when the market effectively
stopped trading for the day. A total of $74.4 million equiv-
alent of German marks had been sold by the Fed by that time,
and the dollar had been supported at around DM 2.0650.
By prior agreement, the New York Fed trading desk remained
operational throughout the night, ready to intervene in the
Hong Kong and Singapore markets. No further activity was
necessary, however, as the dollar rose from DM 2.0735 in early
Hong Kong trading to DM 2.0973 at the opening in Frankfurt.
Treasury officials attribute this trend to the combination of
the favorable medical news about the President that developed
during the evening of March 30 and the knowledge that the
United States had operated in support of the dollar.
-98-
Banking Regulation:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Procedures
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is charged
with regulating and supervising approximately 4,500 national
banks. It has no formal procedures for dealing with emer-
gencies similar to an attempted Presidential assassination. In
any such emergency the Office regards its responsibilities as
including the monitoring of the money markets for signs of
activity which might threaten the stability of the banking
system, and, in extreme conditions, taking action under 12
U.S.C. Sec. 95 (b) (1), which permits the Comptroller of the
Currency to close national banks by declaring legal banking
holidays.
Actions on March 30
On March 30, although there was some turbulence in finan-
cial markets following the first reports of the attempted
assassination of the President, market disorder did not
approach a level which would warrant action by the Comptroller
of the Currency, and no action was taken.
Conclusions
1. There were no procedures in place to guide Treasury
Department activities with respect to monitoring domestic
financial, securities, and commodities markets and in consult-
ing with officials of the New York Fed, the SEC, and the CFTC.
Officials in Treasury's Office of Domestic Finance nonetheless
acted appropriately in discharging their consultative responsi-
bilities on March 30.
2. There were no procedures in place to guide Treasury
Department intervention in the foreign exchange markets on
March 30. Without pre-arrangement, Treasury officials acted in
concert with the Federal Reserve System to intervene in support
of the dollar; that intervention appeared to be effective.
Because the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have no
standing arrangements as to intervention, it is not possible to
conclude that a similar joint intervention in the future will
be handled the same way.
-99-
Recommendations
1. After obtaining the permission of the individuals
involved, Treasury's Office of Domestic Finance should compile
a telephone list (office and home) of senior officials and
senior staff at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Securities
Exchange Commission, and Commodities Futures Trade Commission,
who would be concerned at times of emergency with domestic
financial, securities, and commodities markets. Treasury
should take responsibility for distributing this list and
updating it at least semi-annually (more frequently at times of
transition).
2. Treasury should seek to have the Presidential approval
authority for the mandatory closing of stock exchanges (and
suspension of all other trading), under Section 12 (k) of the
Securities Exchange Act, delegated to the Secretary of the
Treasury. In light of the possible circumstances in which this
power might be exercised, it seems prudent to provide for an
officer of the United States other than the President to exer-
cise what is, in effect, a veto autority over Securities and
Exchange Commission action. Given Treasury's role in financial
and economic matters, the Secretary of the Treasury seems the
appropriate official for this purpose.
3. Without a greater indication that the existence of
procedures for intervening in the currency markets would mater-
ially improve Treasury's actions in a crisis arising out of an
attempt to assassinate the President, we do not recommend the
establishment of such procedures at this time.
-100-
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
BUILDING AND PERSONNEL SECURITY
Procedures
Primary responsibility for the physical protection and
security of the Main Treasury and Annex buildings and grounds
resides with the Treasury Security Force, which is part of the
Secret Service. In exercising this responsibility, the
Security Force has the authority to prevent or limit access to
these buildings, to search packages and otherwise act to pro-
tect Treasury personnel when the circumstances warrant such
action. In other buildings occupied by Treasury agencies,
these functions are under the control of the primary occupant
of the building and are completely independent of the Treasury
Security Force and Secret Service.
The Security Force reports to and takes direction from the
Special Investigations and Security Division within the Office
of Investigations at Secret Service. The Security Force has no
written or other specific procedures to be implemented in the
event of an attempted assassination of the President, and which
Treasury officials would have the authority to direct the
Security Force in such a situation is unclear.
Regulations which currently govern conduct in the Main
Treasury and Annex buildings provide that these buildings may
be closed to the public "when, in the opinion of the Assistant
Secretary for Administration, or his delegate, an emergency
situation exists." (31 CFR 407.3). Secret Service officials
agree that there are circumstances -- such as a bomb threat
requiring evacuation, or a fire -- in which it would be approp-
riate for the Assistant Secretary for Administration to act to
close the building. They are concerned, however, that an
attempted assassination of the President is of a different
character. In such a case, the directions and priorities of
the Secret Service, and of the Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement and Operations to whom the Service reports, should
be paramount. If procedures are developed to deal with future
assassination attempts, the question of which agency or officer
has the authority to direct the Security Force under those
circumstances must be resolved.
-101-
w
Actions on March 30
On March 30, the Treasury Security Force initially learned
of the attempted assassination through routine monitoring of
Secret Service radio frequencies, followed by broadcast news
reports. The Security Force did not receive any special in-
structions from Secret Service or from the Assistant Secretary
for Administration, and carried out its duties in a routine
manner.
Conclusion
The provisions of 31 CFR 407.3 require further clari-
fication, since it is unclear whether the Assistant Secretary
for Enforcement and Operations (through the Secret Service) or
the Assistant Secretary for Administration has the authority to
direct the Treasury Security Force in the event of an emergency
such as an attempted assassination of the President.
Recommendation
The Treasury Security Force should have a clear line of
authority from which it receives directions in crisis situ-
ations. P. crisis such as an assassination attempt would appear
to require that the reporting responsibilities of the Treasury
Security Force should be to the Assistant Secretary for
Enforcement and Operations, an authority with supervisory
responsibility over the Secret Service. For this purpose, the
definition of "emergency" as used at 31 CFR 407.3 should be
appropriately refined.
A
01
THE 1759 TREATURY
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON 20220
April 28, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Investigation of March 30 Attempt on the Life of
President Reagan.
On March 30, 1981, the President and three other persons
were shot in an apparent assassination attempt at the
Washington Hilton Hotel.
This incident tested the adequacy of the procedures,
facilities and personnel, many of them at the Treasury
Department, for protection of the President and dealing
with the consequences of events such as that on March 30.
In particular, the U.S. Secret Service, a bureau of the
Department, is responsible for protecting the President;
the Secret Service and another Treasury unit, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, have responsibility for law
enforcement investigations; and the offices of Domestic
Finance and International Monetary Affairs, among others,
have responsibilities for such matters as ensuring stable
domestic and foreign financial markets.
I am directing you to investigate the way in which the
Department handled this matter, and to report your findings
and recommendations to me by June 1, 1981. The investigation
and report should cover all aspects of the incident, including
the adequacy of procedures, facilities and personnel for
(i) ascertaining the existence and assessing the seriousness
of threats to the President, (ii) protecting the President
in his public activities, and (iii) responding promptly and
effectively to this and similar incidents. On March 30, 1981,
this nation narrowly avoided a tragedy; your report should
focus not only on the event itself, but also on its lessons
for the future.
In the conduct of your investigation and preparation
of your report to me, you are to have the full cooperation
of all persons and agencies within the Department, including
unlimited access to all persons, files, and ADP storage and
the use of any staff or other resources you deem necessary.
Danned Donald T. Regan
B
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE
WASHINGTON
WILL
April 28, 1981
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
As a result of the tragic events associated with the
attempted assassination of the President on March 30, 1981,
this Department is undertaking a Departmental review of its
own preparedness for, and responses to, incidents of this
character. The inquiry will encompass the activities of
the Secret Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, and those Departmental functions that have
responsibility for assuring stable domestic and foreign
financial markets.
To the limited extent that the activities of the Secret
Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms were
in response to, or in some way interacted with, the actions
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, information under
the control of the FBI may be material to our inquiry.
Accordingly, we would appreciate the cooperation of the
Department of Justice in permitting Treasury officials
charged with responsibility for the inquiry to have access,
under whatever safeguards you require, to those persons,
documents, and rules and agreements that may be relevant or
material. In order to facilitate such an arrangement, it
would also be helpful if you would designate a ranking
Department and/or Bureau official to act as liaison with
our inquiry group.
The review is to be headed by the General Counsel of
the Treasury Department. Until the nomination and confirma-
tion of that official, contacts with this Department should
be made through Mr. Jordan Luke, Assistant General Counsel
(Enforcement and Operations). We will be grateful for what-
ever cooperation you can provide.
Sincerely,
Donald T. Regan
The Honorable
William French Smith
Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530
0
81-7453
OF
Office of the Attorney General
TRO
SEQUITUR
Washington, B.C. 20530
JUSTITIA
is
May 15, 1981
The Honorable Donald T. Regan
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am writing in response to your letter of April 28, 1981,
requesting the cooperation of the Department of Justice and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in your Department's review of
its preparedness for, and responses to, incidents such as the
attempted assassination of the President on March 30, 1981.
I have asked Rudolph W. Giuliani, the Associate Attorney
General, to oversee the Department's response to your request.
The Department of Justice has designated Robert Ricks to serve
as a liaison to your inquiry group. Mr. Ricks is a Special
Assistant to the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Criminal Investigation Division. He can be
reached at 324-3120.
This Department is pleased to assist you in your inquiry.
Please do not hesitate to call or write if we may be of any
further assistance.
Sincerely yours,
William French Smith
Attorney General
D
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1+2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
U. S. Secret Service
Analysis of Resources
&
Vis-a-Vis
nge in Responsibilities
Responsibilities (Positions) Absorbed Since FY 1977
-
al
SA
UD
TSF
Other
Total
Administrative
1) --
--
--
3
3
Financial Management - Transportation Section, January 1978.
2) --
--
--
1
1
Financial Management - Accounts Receivable, November 1979.
3) --
--
:
4
4
Financial Management - - TPPIS Payroll, June 1977.
4) --
:
--
2
2
Personnel Division - Employee Assistance Program, January 1979
5) --
--
--
2
2
Administrative Operations Division - Safety Program, Aug. 1977.
6) --
--
--
2
2
Administrative Operations Division - Check Copying. Jan. 1980.
sorbed
increased
Responsibilities
--
--
--
14
14
Inflationary and Extraordinary Costs
Absorbed by the
Secret Service
Formulation of the Service's annual budget request begins nearly
20 months in advance of the fiscal year. Over this long span of
time, inflation increases the cost of items which may not have
been considered during the formulation period. Individually the
items are not significant and are therefore rarely approved for
inclusion in supplemental requests, but together over a number of
years reflect a significant drain on fiscal resources. Examples
include; increased cost of replacement vehicles, payment of
insurance claims and indemnities, increases in penalty mail,
increased costs of health benefits, and more recently, significant
increases in the cost of gasoline.
In addition, the Service has been required to absorb some
extraordinary protective, investigative and administrative cost
items which were unprogrammed including but not limited to:
Uniformed Division Costs during the Iranian Crisis (FY 1980)
Unanticipated expenses of the Democratic Mini-convention,
Memphis (FY 1979)
Implementation of the TPPIS payroll system (FY 1979)
Uniformed Division Costs-New York Detail (Periodic)
Uniformed Division Costs-Somoza Detail, Miami (FY 1977)
Fair Labor Standards Act
Comparison of Requests
by Object Class
FY 1977
FY 1981
11.0
Salaries
$ 78,091
$109,404
12.0
Benefits
6,924
10,945
-21.0
Travel
10,280
17,416
22.0
Transportation of Things
618
1,276
23.1
Standard Level User Charge
4,493
6,250
23.2
Communications, Utilities and
Other Rents
4,900
7,472
24.0
Printing
356
543
25.0
Other Services
6,047
11,748
26.0
Supplies
3,484
4,173
31.0
Equipment
2,837
5,783
Total
$118,030
$175,010
E
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20223
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
660.0
May 20, 1980
MEMORANDUM TO:
Director
AD Protective Operations
AD Protective Research
AD Investigations
AD Inspection
AD Administration
ATD Public Affairs
ATD Training
Special Assistant to the Secretary
Legal Counsel
Intelligence Division
Communications Division
Liaison Division
Technical Security Division
Washington Field Office
FROM
: Deputy Director
SUBJECT
: Headquarters Emergency Situation Response
This memorandum updates and supersedes the memorandum of
then Deputy Director Boggs, dated May 19, 1975.
The following concerns the establishment of a top level
command and/or control facility where emergency situations
can be coordinated. It does not preclude the use of EOB 10
when necessary.
An Incident is defined as a situation having occurred,
ongoing, or anticipated which will require notification to
certain Headquarters offices or divisions and/or other
Service components.
An Emergency Situation is defined as an incident requiring
the notification, response and coordinated command at the
Assistant Director or higher level.
2.
660.0
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES
All notifications within an office or division should con-
tinue to be made by that respective office or division based
on its known needs. Those notifications outside the Service
that are made routinely by various Headquarters components
should continue to be made.
The Operations Desk of the Intelligence Division is the
Secret Service notification center and that division will be
utilized as the Headquarters Command and/or Control Center.
The following reflects the list of offices that may need
notifications. The list is not necessarily arranged accord-
ing to priority, and in some situations it may not be com-
plete. The order and extent of notification will be dictated
by the situation and so ordered by the Operations Desk
Supervisor.
Director's Office
AD Protective Research
AD Protective Operations
AD Investigations
AD Inspection
AD Administration
ATD Public Affairs
Special Assistant to the Secretary
DAD Uniformed Division
UD/White House Branch
UD/Foreign Missions Branch
Presidential Protective Division
Vice Presidential Protective Division
Dignitary Protective Division
Candidate Nominee Protective Division
Foreign Dignitary Details
Secretary of the Treasury Detail
Washington Field Office
Technical Security Division
Liaison Division
SAIC Intelligence Division
DSAIC Intelligence Division
ASAIC, Operations Branch, ID
ASAIC, Foreign Intelligence Branch, ID
State Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Other (Advance Teams)
3.
660.0
RESPONSE/COMMAND
When an Assistant Director's office representative has been
reached, it will be that individual's responsibility to
notify the Assistant Director and other members of that
office, as appropriate.
Whenever a situation is of the priority to warrant the
activation of the Headquarters Command/Control Center, it
will be so ordered by the appropriate Assistant Director (s).
A representative from each Assistant Director's office
involved with the situation and a representative of the
Office of Public Affairs, depending on the situation, may
also need to respond. In the event more than one Assistant
Director is directly involved, the Director or Deputy
Director will designate the Assistant Director "In Charge".
It is the latter's responsibility to make certain that all
incoming and outgoing.information/communicatio concerning
the emergency situation is channeled through the Command/
Control Center.
The Command/Control Center will terminate when the Assistant
Director "In Charge" determines that the situation is suffi-
ciently resolved that it can be handled through normal
organizational channels.
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thyron I Weenstin
Myron I. Weinstein