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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Blackwell, Morton: Files
Folder Title: Defense Policy - 1983
Box: 6
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 23, 1983
ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
The Oval Office
8:02 P.M. EST
THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, thank you for
sharing your time with me tonight.
The subject I want to discuss with you, peace and
national security, is both timely and important. Timely, because
I've reached a decision which offers a new hope for our children
in the Twenty-First Century, a decision I'll tell you about in a
few minutes. And important because there's a very big decision
that you must make for yourselves.
This subject involves the most basic duty that any
President and any people share, the duty to protect and strengthen
the peace.
At the beginning of this year, I submitted to the
Congress a defense budget which reflects my best judgment of the
best understanding of the experts and specialists who advised me
about what we and our allies must do to protect our people in the
years ahead. That budget is much more than a long list of numbers.
For behind all the numbers lies America's ability to prevent the
greatest of human tragedies and preserve our free way of life in
a sometimes dangerous world. It is part of a careful, long-term
plan to make America strong again after too many years of neglect
and mistakes.
Our efforts to rebuild America's defenses and strengthen
the peace began two years ago when we requested a major increase in
the defense program. Since then, the amount of those increases we
first proposed has been reduced by half, through improvements in
management and procurement and other savings.
The budget request that is now before the Congress
has been trimmed to the limits of safety. Further deep cuts cannot
be made without seriously endangering the security of the nation.
The choice is up to the men and women you have elected to the Congress
and that means the choice is up to you.
Tonight, I want to explain to you what this defense
debate is all about and why I'm convinced that the budget now before
the Congress is necessary, responsible and deserving of your support.
And I want to offer hope for the future.
But first, let me say what the defense debate is not
about. It is not about spending arithmetic. I know that in the
last few weeks you have been bombarded with numbers and percentages.
Some say we need only a five percent increase in defense spending.
The so-called alternate budget backed by liberals in the House of
Representatives would lower the figure to two to three percent, cutting
our defense spending by $163 billion over the next five years.
The trouble with all these numbers is that they tell
us little about the kind of defense program America needs or the
benefits and security and freedom that our defense effort buys for
us.
What seems to have been lost in all this debate is
the simple truth of how a defense budget is arrived at. It isn't
done by deciding to spend a certain number of dollars. Those loud
voices that are occasionally heard charging that the government is
trying to solve a security problem by throwing money at it are nothing
more than noise based on ignorance. We start by considering what must
be done to maintain peace and review all the possible threats against
our security. Then, a strategy for strengthening peace and defending
against those threats must be agreed upon. And, finally, our defense
establishment
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- 2 -
must be evaluated to see what is necessary to protect against
any or all of the potential threats. The cost of achieving these
ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense.
There is no logical way that you can say, let's spend
X billion dollars less. You can only say, which part of our
defense measures do we believe we can do without and still have
security against all contingencies? Anyone in the Congress who
advocates a percentage or a specific dollar cut in defense spending
should be made to say what part of our defenses he would eliminate,
and he should be candid enough to acknowledge that his cuts mean
cutting our commitments to allies or inviting greater risk or both.
The defense policy of the United States is based on a
simple premise: The United States does not start fights. We will
never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter
and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace.
Since the dawn of the atomic age, we've sought to
reduce the risk of war by maintaining a strong deterrent and by
seeking genuine arms control. "Deterrence" means simply this:
Making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United
States, or our allies, or our vital interests, concludes that the
risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands
that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace through our strength;
weakness only invites aggression.
This strategy of deterrence has not changed. It still
works. But what it takes to maintain deterrence has changed. It
took one kind of military force to deter an attack when we had
far more nuclear weapons than any other power; it takes another
kind now that the Soviets, for example, have enough accurate and
powerful nuclear weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles
on the ground. Now this is not to say that the Soviet Union is
planning to make war on us. Nor do I believe a war is inevitable --
quite the contrary. But what must be recognized is that our
security is based on being prepared to meet all threats.
There was a time when we depended on coastal forts and
artillery batteries because, with the weaponry of that day, any
attack would have had to come by sea. Well, this is a different
world and our defenses must be based on recognition and awareness
of the weaponry possessed by other nations in the nuclear age.
We can't afford to believe that we will never be
threatened. There have been two world wars in my lifetime. We
didn't start them and, indeed, did everything we could to avoid being
drawn into them. But we were ill-prepared for both -- had we been
better prepared, peace might have been preserved.
For 20 years the Soviet Union has been accumulating
enormous military might. They didn't stop when their forces
exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability. And
they haven't stopped now. During the past decade and a half, the
Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear
weapons weapons that can strike directly at the United States.
As an example, the United States introduced its last
new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Minute Man III, in 1969,
and we're now dismantling our even older
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- 3 -
Titan missiles. But what has the Soviet Union done in these
intervening years? Well, since 1969, the Soviet Union has
built five new classes of ICBMs, and upgraded these eight times.
As a result, their missiles are much more powerful and accurate than
they were several years ago and they continue to develop more, while
ours are increasingly obsolete.
The same thing has happened in other areas. Over the
same period, the Soviet Union built four new classes of submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and over sixty new missile submarines.
We built two new types of submarine missiles and actually withdrew
ten submarines from strategic missions. The Soviet Union built
over two hundred new Backfire bombers, and their brand new
Blackjack bomber is now under development. We haven't built a
new long-range bomber since our B-52's were deployed about a quarter
of a century ago, and we've already retired several hundred of those
because of old age. Indeed, despite what many people think, our
strategic forces only cost about 15 percent of the defense budget.
Another example of what's happened: In 1978, the
Soviets had 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles based on land
and were beginning to add the SS-20 -- a new, highly accurate mobile
missile, with three warheads. We had none. Since then the Soviets
have strengthened their lead. By the end of 1979, when Soviet
leader Brezhnev declared "a balance now exists, the Soviets had
over 800 warheads. We still had none. A year ago this month,
Mr. Brezhnev pledged a moratorium, or freeze, on SS-20 deployment.
But by last August, their 800 warheads had become more than 1200.
We still had none. Some freeze. At this time Soviet Defense
Minister Ustinov announced "approximate parity of forces continues
to exist." But the Soviets are still adding an average of three
new warheads a week, and now have 1, 300. These warheads can reach
their targets in a matter of a few minutes. We still have none.
So far, it seems that the Soviet definition of parity is a box
score of 1,300 to nothing, in their favor.
So, together with our NATO allies, we decided in 1979
to deploy new weapons, beginning this year, as a deterrent to their
SS-20's and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet us in serious
arms control negotiations. We will begin that deployment late
this year. At the same time, however, we're willing to cancel
our program if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we've
called a zero-zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating
table -- and I think it's fair to say that without our planned
deployments, they wouldn't be there.
Now, let's consider conventional forces. Since
1974, the United States has produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft.
By contrast, the Soviet Union has produced twice as many.
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When we look at attack submarines, the United States has produced
27 while the Soviet Union has produced 61. For armored vehicles,
including tanks, we have produced 1,200. The Soviet Union has
produced 54,000 -- nearly 5 to 1 in their favor. Finally, with
artillery, we have produced 950 artillery and rocket launchers
while the Soviets have produced more than 13,000 -- a staggering
14 to 1 ratio.
There was a time when we were able to offset
superior Soviet numbers with higher quality. But today, they are
building weapons as sophisticated and modern as our own. As the
Soviets have increased their military power, they have been
emboldened to extend that power. They are spreading their
military influence in ways that can directly challenge our vital
interests and those of our allies.
The following aerial photographs, most of them
secret until now, illustrate this point in a crucial area very close
to home: Central America and the Caribbean Basin. They are not
dramatic photographs. But I think they help give you a better
understanding of what I am talking about.
This Soviet, intelligence collection facility less
than 100 miles from our coast is the largest of its kind in the
world. The acres and acres of antennae fields and intelligence
monitors are targeted on key, U.S. military installations and
sensitive activities. The installation in Lourdes, Cuba is
manned by 1500 Soviet technicians. And the satellite ground
station allows instant communications with Moscow. This
28-square-mile facility has grown by more than 60 percent in size
and capability during the past decade.
In western Cuba, we see this military airfield and
its compliment of modern, Soviet-built MIG-23 aircraft. The Soviet
Union uses this Cuban airfield for its own long-range
reconnaisance missions. And earlier this month, two modern Soviet
anti-submarine warfare aircraft began operating from it. During
the past two years, the level of Soviet arms exports to Cuba can
only be compared to the levels reached during the Cuban Missile
Crisis 20 years ago.
This third photo, which is the only one in this
series that has been previously made public, shows Soviet
military hardware that has made its way to Central America. This
airfield with its MI-8 helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, and
protected fighter sites is one of number of military facilities
in Nicaragua which has received Soviet equipment funneled
through Cuba, and reflects the massive military buildup going on
in that country.
On the small island of Grenada, at the southern end
of the Caribbean chain, the Cubans with Soviet finanacing and
backing are in the process of building an airfield with a 10,000-
foot runway. Grenada doesn't even have an air force. Who is
it intended for? The Caribbean is a very important passage way
for our international commerce and military lines of communication.
More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the
Caribbean. The rapid buildup of Grenada's military potential
- 5 -
is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this island country of
under 110,000 people and totally at odds with the pattern of
other eastern Caribbean states, most of which are unarmed.
The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in short,
can only be seen as power projection into the region. And it is
in this important economic and strategic area that we're trying
to help the governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and
others in their struggles for democracy against guerrillas supported
through Cuba and Nicaragua.
These pictures only tell a small part of the story. I
wish I could show you more without compromising our most sensitive
intelligence sources and methods. But the Soviet Union is also
supporting Cuban military forces in Angola and Ethiopia. They
have bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, near the Persian Gulf oil
fields. They have taken over the port that we built at Cam Ranh Bay
in Vietnam. And now for the first time in history, the Soviet
Navy is a force to be reckoned with in the South Pacific.
Some people may still ask: Would the Soviets ever use
their formidable military power? Well, again, can we afford to
believe they won't? There is Afghanistan. And in Poland, the
Soviets denied the will of the people and in so doing demonstrated
to the world how their military power could also be used to intimidate.
The final fact is that the Soviet Union is acquiring what
can only be considered an offensive military force. They have
continued to build far more intercontinental ballistic missiles
than they could possibly need simply to deter an attack. Their
conventional forces are trained and equipped not so much to defend
against an attack as they are to permit sudden surprise offenses
of their own.
Our NATO allies have assumed a great defense burden, in-
cluding the military draft in most countries. We're working with
them and our other friends around the world to do more. Our defensive
strategy means we need military forces that can move very quickly,
forces that are trained and ready to respond to any emergency.
Every item in our defense program, our ships, our tanks,
our planes, our funds for training and spare parts is intended for
one all-important purpose, to keep the peace. Unfortunately, a
decade of neglecting our military forces had called into question
our ability to do that.
When I took office in January 1981, I was appalled by
what I found: American planes that couldn't fly and American ships
that couldn't sail for lack of spare parts and trained personnel
and insufficient fuel and ammunition for essential training. The
inevitable result of all this was poor morale in our armed forces,
difficulty in recruiting the brightest young Americans to wear the
uniform and difficulty in convincing our most experienced military
personnel to stay on.
There was a real question then about how well we could
meet a crisis. And it was obvious that we had to begin a major
modernization program to ensure we could deter aggression and pre-
serve the peace in the years ahead.
We had to move immediately to improve the basic readiness
and staying power of our conventional
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- 6 -
forces, so they could meet -- and therefore help deter -- a crisis.
We had to make up for lost years of investment by moving forward
with a long-term plan to prepare our forces to counter the military
capabilities our adversaries were developing for the future.
I know that all of you want peace and so do I. I
know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would
further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not
more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war. It would
be largely unverifiable and would seriously undercut our negotiations
on arms reduction. It would reward the Soviets for their massive
military buildup while preventing us from modernizing our aging
and increasingly vulnerable forces. With their present margin of
superiority, why should they agree to arms reductions knowing that
we were prohibited from catching up?
Believe me, it wasn't pleasant for someone who had come
to Washington determined to reduce government spending, but we had
to move forward with the task of repairing our defenses or we would
lose our ability to deter conflict now and in the future. We had
to demonstrate to any adversary that aggression could not succeed,
and that the only real solution was substantial, equitable, and
effectively verifiable arms reduction -- the kind we're working
for right now in Geneva.
Thanks to your strong support, and bipartisan support
from the Congress, we began to turn things around. Already, we're
seeing some very encouraging results. Quality recruitment and
retention are up, dramatically -- more high school graduates are
choosing military careers and more experienced career personnel
are choosing to stay. Our men and women in uniform at last are
getting the tools and training they need to do their jobs.
Ask around today, especially among our young people,
and I think you will find a whole new attitude toward serving their
country. This reflects more than just better pay, equipment, and
leadership. You the American people have sent a signal to these
young people that it is once again an honor to wear the uniform.
That's not something you measure in a budget, but it's a very real
part of our nation's strength.
It'll take us longer to build the kind of equipment we
need to keep peace in the future, but we've made a good start.
We haven't built a new long-range bomber for 21 years.
Now we're building the B-1. We hadn't launched one new strategic
submarine for 17 years. Now we're building one Trident submarine
a year. Our land-based missiles are increasingly threatened by
the many huge, new Soviet ICBMs. We're determining how to solve
that problem. At the same time, we're working in the START and INF
negotiations with the goal of achieving deep reductions in the
strategic and intermediate nuclear arsenals of both sides.
We have also begun the long-needed modernization of
our conventional forces. The Army is getting its first new tank
in 20 years. The Air Force is modernizing. We're rebuilding our
Navy which shrank from about 1000 ships in the late 1960's to 453
during the 1970's. Our nation needs a superior Navy to support our
military
MORE
- 7 -
forces and vital interests overseas. We're now on the road to
achieving a 600-ship Navy and increasing the amphibious capabilities
of our Marines who are now serving the cause of peace in Lebanon.
And we're building a real capability to assist our friends in the
vitally-important Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region.
This adds up to a major effort, and it isn't cheap.
It comes at a time when there are many other pressures on our
budget, and when the American people have already had to make
major sacrifices during the recession. But we must not be misled
by those who would make defense once again the scapegoat of the
federal budget.
The fact is that in the past few decades we have seen
a dramatic shift in how we spend the taxpayer's dollar. Back in
1955, payments to individuals took up only about 20 percent of the
federal budget. For nearly three decades, these payments steadily
increased and this year will account for 49 percent of the budget.
By contrast, in 1955, defense took up more than half of the federal
budget. By 1980, this spending had fallen to a low of 23 percent.
Even with the increase that I am requesting this year, defense
will still amount to only 28 percent of the budget.
The calls for cutting back the defense budget come
in nice simple arithmetic. They're the same kind of talk that led
the democracies to neglect their defenses in the 1930's and
invited the tragedy of World War II. We must not let that grim
chapter of history repeat itself through apathy or neglect.
This is why I'm speaking to you tonight -- to urge
you to tell your Senators and Congressmen that you know we must
continue to restore our military strength. If we stop in midstream,
we will send a signal of decline, of lessened will, to friends
and adversaries alike. Free people must voluntarily, through
open debate and democratic means, meet the challenge that
totalitarians pose by compulsion. It's up to us, in our time,
to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task
of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore
our duty and blindly hope for the best while the enemies of freedom
grow stonger day by day.
The solution is well within our grasp. But to
reach it, there is simply no alternative but to continue this
year, in this budget, to provide the resources we need to preserve
the peace and guarantee our freedom.
Now, thus far tonight I have shared with you my
thoughts on the problems of national security we must face together.
My predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before you
on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and
have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent
of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed
toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation.
This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked.
We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for
more than three decades. In recent months, however, my advisors,
including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored
the necessity to break out
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of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our
security. Over the course of these discussions, I have become
more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be
capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings
by threatening their existence. Feeling this way, I believe we
must thoroughly examine every opportunity for reducing tensions,
and for introducing greater stability into the strategic calculus
on both sides.
One of the most important contributions we can make
is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly
nuclear arms. We are engaged right now in several negotiations
with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of
weapons.
I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts
on that score. But let me just say, I am totally committed to
this course. If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort
to achieve major reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing
the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary
to rely on the spectre of retaliation, on mutual threat. And
that is a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it
be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable
of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our
abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting
stability.
I think we are. Indeed, we must. After careful
consultation with my advisors including the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the
future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to
counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are
defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology
that spawned our great industrial base, and that have given us
the quality of life we enjoy today.
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge
that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S.
retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our
own soil or that of our allies?
I know this is a formidable, technical task, one
that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet,
current technology has attained a level of sophistication where
it is reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years,
probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures
and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs.
And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the
nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for
flexible response.
But isn't it worth every investment necessary to
free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.
In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in
nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can
be assured only by modernizing our strategic forces.
At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the
risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear
war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.
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America does possess -- now -- the technologies to attain very
significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional,
non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies,
we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may
have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.
As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we
recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power
to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are
inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change
in techonology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall
continue to honor our commitments.
I clearly recognize that defensive systems have
limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired
with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive
policy, and no one wants that.
But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call
upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear
weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and
world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete.
Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM
Treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies,
I'm taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive
and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development
program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the
threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way
for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We
seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only
purpose -- one all people share -- is to search for ways to reduce
the danger of nuclear war.
My fellow Americans, tonight we're launching an effort
which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There
will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it.
As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.
Thank you. Good night. And God bless you.
END
8:29 P.M. EST
MICHIGAN CITIZENS SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENCY
An Affiliate of the National Foundation
Chairman Emeritus: Robert J. Huber
409 Top of Troy Building
Director:
William D. McMaster
Troy, Michigan 48084
Vice Chairs:
Richard H. Headlee
(313) 362-2750
Alice L. Schoenholtz
Senator Ed Fredricks
MEMO
Jack Welborn
1983 Advisory Board: Listed in alphabetical
order on reverse side of
To:
Advisory Board Members
this page.
From:
Alice L. Schoenholtz
October 26, 1983
Subject:
President Reagan's Defense Program
What has happened in Lebanon and Grenada this week points to the need of
the United States to have a strong and viable defense that is flexible to protect the
PEACE of the world.
The enclosed briefing book on President Reagan's defense programs and
policies could not have come at a more appropriate time. It highlights the priority
the President places on defense to protect our Country and Democracy throughout the world.
Please share "Rebuilding Our Defenses: The Reagan Administration's Record
on Defense Issues" with friends so they will become more informed and understand what
President Reagan describes as "the most difficult job in the world." He needs your
support, at this time, more than ever.
From:
Bill McMaster
Subject:
Chairmanship of Michigan Committee to Re-elect President Reagan
The Chairperson of the Michigan Committee to Re-elect President Reagan should
be named very soon. Frankly, delayed action in Washington has caused a rumor mill to
develop. All that is certain today is that John Gnau will not be Chairman.
Dick Headlee, who we believe would do the best job of organizing the grassroots
for the President, is not a shoo-in. During two visits and numerous letters to Washington
in the last two weeks, I've conveyed the results of the poll of Michigan Citizens Supporting
the Presidency and of Republican State Central Committee. An impressive 68% of you want
Dick Headlee to be Chairman.
That corresponds with a 60% approval rating among Republicans of Dick Headlee
"as a person active in politics" recorded in a recent 800-person survey by Market Opinion
Research. Headlee also had a 43% approval rating among ticketsplitters and 31% among
Democrats. (Gov. Blanchard's approval rating in the total sample was 29% compared to
Dick Headlee's 44%.)
We've been pushing Dick Headlee for Chairman with Alice Schoenholtz as Co-Chair.
Others mentioned as being considered for the Chairmanship include Ronna Romney,
Bob Huber, Jackie McGregor, Alice Schoenholtz, Congressman William Broomfield, Dick
Chrysler, Palmer Heenan and Mary Coleman.
Feel free to express your opinion directly to: Mr. Ed Rollins
Reagan/Bush "84"
440 First St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
#######
1983 Advisory Board
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Rebuilding
Our
Defenses:
The Reagan Administration's
Record
on
Defense Issues
September 1983
OF
TOENT THE UNITED 3H1 STATES STATES ST OF SEAL SE
&
A special report prepared by the Communications Division Research Department
Republican National Committee,
310 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Chairman
William I. Greener, III, Director, Communications Division
Philip Kawior, Director of Research
Vivianne Schneider, Policy Analyst
Rebuilding
Our
Defenses:
The Reagan Administration's
Record
on
Defense Issues
September 1983
OF
STATEMENT THE OF Visa IS STATES THE UNITED
V
September, 1983
Few issues are so critical to our nation as the maintenance of our national security and
the keeping of the peace. President Reagan is standing firmly behind his pledge to
strengthen the nation's defenses while pursuing a responsible policy toward arms control.
The Reagan Administration is pledged to restoring our "margin of safety," rebuilding
our defenses after almost a decade of neglect, and pursuing effective and verifiable arms
control agreements. The Reagan Administration is determined to negotiate agreements that
will make a positive contribution to reducing the risk of war; that is, that are equal in all
respects, that are verifiable, and that involve actual reductions in the threat we face. That
threat is real and growing and wishful thinking or simplistic and irresponsible proposals,
such as the nuclear freeze, will not enhance our security or serve the cause of peace. The
President will continue to oppose any proposal that involves the acceptance of Soviet
superiority, unverifiable arms control agreements, or the termination of those vital U.S.
programs that are required to rebuild our defenses and restore our deterrence.
The enclosed materials highlight the President's defense program. The materials
contain an outline of the main points in the debate, a more detailed text to expand upon
the arguments, and a series of questions and answers.
The purpose of this defense issues package is to enable you to state President
Reagan's position clearly and simply. The goal is to generate broad support for the
President's efforts to restore our "margin of safety" and to negotiate responsible arms
control agreements.
Use the information we have provided. Let the media in your area hear from you.
Write or call your Congressman.
The fate of a free America is in the balance. Our future and that of our children will
be determined by the outcome of this great national debate. We must convince Congress
and the American people that the President's policies and programs are critical to our
national security and to the preservation of the lives and safety of all Americans. Your
effort on this behalf is vitally important.
Very truly yours,
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman
Republican National Committee
Table of Contents
Defense Budget/Strategic Modernization
Key Points
4
Overview
5
The Reagan Strategic Modernization Program
7
Conventional Forces
11
The Soviet Threat and the Need for a Strong Defense
11
Questions and Answers
13
The Soviet Threat
Key Points
16
U.S.-Soviet Defense Spending: Trends
17
U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (Strategic Forces): An Overview
18
Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)
18
Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)
19
Strategic Bombers
20
NATO-Warsaw Pact Comparison
21
Questions and Answers
24
Arms Control
Key Points
29
The Reagan Administration's Arms Control Principles
30
Reagan Administration Arms Control Proposals
31
Confidence-Building Measures
32
Soviet Response to U.S. Arms Control Proposals
33
Previous Arms Control Efforts (SALT I & II)
34
U.S. and Soviet Compliance with Existing Agreements
35
From MAD to MAS.
36
Questions and Answers
38
Nuclear Freeze
Key Points
40
The Freeze Approach
41
Overkill and the Nuclear Freeze
43
The Reagan Administration and the Nuclear Freeze
44
The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control
and the Nuclear Freeze
45
Questions and Answers
46
Glossary
50
*When text contains an asterisk, refer to glossary.
Defense Budget/
Strategic
Modernization-
Key Points
President Reagan's five-year defense
To redress the strategic imbalance
budget is an affordable program
caused by a two-decade-long Soviet
designed to correct the deficiencies
buildup, President Reagan announced
in our current defense posture
a comprehensive five-part strategic
caused by years of neglect of our
modernization program on October
military forces.
31, 1981. The program calls for:
Defense spending as a percentage of
1. ICBM* modernization
Gross National Product (GNP) and
2. SLBM* modernization
as a percentage of total budget
expenditures has declined steadily in
3. Modernization of strategic bombers
the last two decades, except for the
4. Improvement in command, control,
Vietnam years, while spending on
and communications systems *
federally-funded social programs has
skyrocketed.
5. Improvement in strategic defenses.
The Reagan FY 1984 defense budget
U.S. ICBM forces are old and
proposes $238.6 billion in outlays.
obsolete. The Soviet ICBM force is
This represents 6.8 percent of GNP
more modern and powerful than
and 29 percent of total federal
our own. As a result, the Soviets
expenditures.
can threaten the survivability of U.S.
The largest share of the FY 1984
ICBMs by using only a fraction of
their own ICBM force. The current
defense budget, 42.2 percent, is
U.S. ICBM force cannot now inflict
taken up by manpower costs, com-
pared to 10 percent for strategic
similar damage on the Soviet Union,
forces.
even using our entire force.
To ensure the U.S. has the
ability to destroy Soviet military
targets if we are attacked, President
Reagan has called for the deployment
of 100 MX Peacekeeper missiles*
and a new, smaller, mobile ICBM,
called the Midgetman*.
4
Overview
The MX Peacekeeper missile faces
President Reagan's defense budget is
survivability problems in the short
an affordable, multi-year program designed
run, but, in the longer run, the
to correct the deficiencies in our current
development of Midgetman and
defense posture caused by years of
research and development into new
declining funding for our military forces.
techniques to harden silos and
By contrast, funding for social programs
shelters, for example, will ensure the
during those years mushroomed.
effectiveness of our land-based inter-
1.
continental ballistic missile force.
Defense budget trends. In 1962,
defense comprised 45.9 percent of
The Reagan defense program also
federal budget expenditures; by fiscal
seeks to correct deficiencies in our
year 1978 it had declined to 22.9
conventional force structure through
percent of the budget.
improvements in the readiness* and
The President has asked Con-
sustainability* of our armed forces.
gress for $238.6 billion in
President Reagan's defense budget is
outlays for fiscal year 1984, only
a minimal budget to protect our
29 percent of total federal
country's vital interests and to meet
expenditures.
our commitments.
2.
Defense budget by category. The
largest share of the FY 1984 defense
budget goes for manpower costs; it
does not go for procurement of new
weapons systems.
12.5 percent of defense spending
in the 1984 budget will be
available for new programs
compared to an estimated 42.2
percent for manpower costs.
5
Despite the great attention they
3.
Non-defense spending. More money
receive, strategic nuclear forces-
was spent on social programs in the
our intercontinental ballistic mis-
last decade than on defense.
siles, submarine-launched ballistic
Non-defense spending mush-
missiles, and bombers-do not
roomed during the 1970s while
consume most of the budget.
defense spending did not even
Spending on strategic forces will
keep up with inflation. Today,
comprise 10 percent of the 1984
direct payments to individuals
defense budget. At no point in
represent 42 percent of total
the Reagan five-year plan are
budget outlays.
expenditures on strategic forces
to exceed 15 percent.
This Administration spends more
than ever on human needs.
HHS spends more than two-
The Federal Budget,
thirds of a billion dollars every
National Defense,
day on social programs. The
and Strategic Forces
HHS budget is the third largest
1950-1983
budget in the world; only the
United States and the Soviet
800
Federal Budget
Union have larger budgets.
700
600
Billions of $ FY 83
Percent of Budget
500
50
400
National Defense
Defense
300
Social
200
Spending
35
100
Strategic Forces
0
1950
54
58
62
66
70
74
75
1982
Strategic forces represent a small proportion of the
20
defense budget and a very tiny fraction of total
1960
1970
1980
federal expenditures.
This graph illustrates the dramatic increase in social
spending since the late 1950s and the concomitant
6
decrease in defense spending.
The Reagan Strategic
Modernization
Program
4.
U.S.-Soviet budget trends. Soviet mili-
U.S. ICBMs are currently obsolete
tary expenditures grew during the
and vulnerable to nuclear attack. They
1960s and 1970s while U.S. expen-
lack the necessary accuracy and power to
ditures declined after accounting for
attack the most important Soviet military
inflation.
targets, which have been hardened or
strengthened to withstand nuclear attack.
Today, the Soviet Union spends
15 percent of its GNP on
To redress the imbalance created by
the unprecedented Soviet buildup of the
defense compared to 6.5 percent
1970s and to correct the deficiencies of
for the U.S.
our forces, President Reagan announced a
While the Reagan five-year de-
comprehensive five-part strategic modern-
fense program envisions spending
ization program on October 31, 1981. The
under 8 percent of GNP by
program calls for:
1988, the Soviet defense allot-
1.
ICBM modemization. This modern-
ment could reach 20 percent in
the not-too-distant future.
ization will entail the development
and deployment of 100 MX
Peacemaker missiles and the develop-
ment of the Midgetman ICBM.
The Need for ICBM
Modernization: MX and
Midgetman
The Soviet ICBM force grew enor-
mously in numbers and destructive power
in the past two decades. As a result, the
bipartisan Presidential Commission on
Strategic Forces (also known as the
Scowcroft Commission) noted, "The
Soviets. now probably possess the neces-
sary combination of ICBM numbers,
reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to
destroy almost all. U.S. ICBM silos, using
only a portion of their own ICBM force.
7
The U.S. ICBM force now deployed cannot
C.
Problem of survivability. In the near
inflict similar damage, even using the
term, survivability of the MX Peace-
entire force." (Emphasis added)
keeper will depend on its interaction
with the other components of the
a.
Restoring retaliatory effectiveness. Ef-
Triad-the submarine-launched bal-
fective deterrence requires the U.S.
listic missiles and the strategic
to have the ability to destroy
bombers.
Soviet military targets if we are
attacked.
In the longer run, ICBM mod-
ernization will be achieved
To solve the problem of retali-
through the development (in the
atory effectiveness President
early 1990s) of a new small
Reagan called for a limited
ICBM called the Midgetman, as
deployment of 100 MX Peace-
well as through research and
keeper missiles in Minuteman III
development on new techniques
silos.
to harden silos and shelters or
The MX missile will reestablish
underground basing.
our hard-target capability; i.e.,
d.
Midgetman. As Secretary of Defense
the MX will restore our ability
Caspar Weinberger pointed out,
to destroy hardened or strength-
"...The deployment of a new small
ened Soviet military targets.
missile will add to the flexibility and
b.
Decreasing the risk of attack. The
overall capability of the ICBM
deployment of MX will make it
force."
more difficult for the Soviets to
The Midgetman will be designed
attack, and, by threatening their
so that it can be made mobile or
remaining ICBM force, decrease
placed in super-hardened or
Soviet confidence that an attack
strengthened underground facili-
might succeed.
ties which can survive a Soviet
As the President's Commission
attack. Because of its small size,
notes: "Soviet planners would
the Midgetman can be deployed
have to account for the possibility
in a variety of ways. This is
that Peacekeeper missiles would
stabilizing because it makes it
be available for use and thus
they would help deter such an
8
attack."
more difficult for the Soviets to
As a result of SLBM moderni-
destroy the missile and hence
zation, the U.S. will have a
increases the risk to the Soviets
survivable force that can attack
of attacking the U.S.
the things the Soviets value
2.
SLBM* modemization. Trident* sub-
most: their strategic nuclear
missiles, their fortified military
marine construction will continue,
facilities and their civilian and
and a larger, more accurate sea-
military leadership. This capability
launched ballistic missile- known
will serve as a major deterrent to
as Trident will be developed
a Soviet nuclear attack on the
and deployed on Trident submarines
U.S.
in 1989.
3.
Modemization of strategic bombers. A
The need for SLBM modemization.
variant of the B-1B,* will be
The current fleet of U.S. missile
developed and 100 aircraft will be
submarines is old. Except for the
operational by 1988. Research and
first two Trident missile submar-
development will continue on the
ines that have just recently
advanced technology bomber (ATB)
become operational, all other
or "Stealth"* aircraft.
U.S. ballistic missile submarines
were built before 1967. These
The need for bomber modemization.
submarines will have to be
All U.S. heavy strategic bombers
retired in the 1990s due to age
are already more than 20 years old.
if nothing else.
They face a vast and sophisticated
array of Soviet defenses that are
The Trident II and the submarine-
continually being improved. If
launched cruise missile will im-
not replaced soon, our B-52
prove our ability to destroy
bombers will not be able to
hardened or strengthened Soviet
penetrate Soviet air defenses and
military targets. The existing
attack their targets. Additionally,
submarine-launched missiles do
the B-52 bomber is vulnerable
not have this capability.
to Soviet attack on its air bases.
9
The B-1B bomber and the
munications network has many
Stealth aircraft are designed to
deficiencies. There are real doubts
remedy these defects. Both aircraft
that some elements of it can
will have a dramatically improved
perform under enemy attack.
capability to penetrate Soviet air
5.
Improvement in strategic defenses. The
defenses and to survive a Soviet
attack on their air bases.
President's program involves the
construction of radar to detect
4.
Improvement in command, control and
bomber attack, the procurement of
communications systems. The U.S.
airborne warning and control aircraft
will deploy improved radar and
(AWACs), and five squadrons of F-
satellite systems to enhance early
15 fighter interceptors. The President
warning capabilities and to assess
has also authorized a very substantial
more accurately and reliably the size
increase in anti-ballstic missile (ABM)
and scope of a Soviet missile attack.
research and development.
Development of a new satellite
communications system to ensure
that Presidential orders can be
The need for strategic defenses.
passed from command centers to
Strategic defenses are defenses
commanders in the field will also
against bomber or missile attack.
These consist of anti-missile
take place.
defenses of various types, of
which the U.S. has none; surface-
The need for improved command,
to-air missiles, of which the U.S.
control and communications systems.
has none; and interceptor aircraft
An absolutely vital element of
of which the U.S. has a small
our deterrent is our ability to
force of old, obsolete aircraft. By
communicate with our forces.
comparison, the Soviets have 64
We take extensive measures that
anti-ballistic missiles, 10,000
make it impossible to launch an
surface-to-air missiles, and 2,500
attack without authorization from
interceptor aircraft.
the President. Today, our
command, control and com-
10
Conventional Forces
The Soviet Threat and the
Need for a Strong Defense
The Reagan Administration has also
President Reagan's defense program is
moved to correct deficiencies in our
a measured response to the threat we face.
conventional forces. When President Reagan
The threat is real and growing. Disparities
took office, many American planes couldn't
in military strength do matter. As President
fly and some American ships couldn't sail
Reagan noted, military strength must be
because we lacked spare parts and trained
preserved "in order to deter and defend
personnel and had insufficient fuel and
against aggression-to preserve our freedom
ammunition for essential training. To
and peace."
improve the readiness and sustainability of
Two decades of underfunding of our
our conventional forces, the Administra-
military forces has resulted in:
tion's five-year program proposes to:
1.
the loss of U.S. strategic superiority;
provide our ground forces with
2.
additional quantities of both weapons
a threat to the survivability of our
systems and support equipment;
ICBM force;
3.
modernize Air Force and Navy/Marine
substantial Soviet superiority in
theater nuclear forces over those of
Corps tactical aircraft;
the U.S. and NATO;
increase the naval construction pro-
4.
an inadequately-sized, ill-equipped
gram;
army that lacked the requisite
replenish stocks of supplies and
combat readiness and sustainability;
ammunition.
5.
a serious threat to U.S. command of
the seas, and hence our ability to
maintain supply lines to Europe and
the rest of the world; and,
11
6.
a substantial Soviet leap in techno-
The Soviet Union poses a formidable
logical sophistication. Not only are
military threat to the United States, its
the Soviets outproducing us but
allies, and its vital interests. If we permit
much of their equipment is better
the disparity between Soviet and U.S. arms
than our own. Even in areas where
buildup to continue, the threat against us
we had a major lead in technology,
will continue to grow and the risk of war
the Soviets have closed much of the
will increase. Weakness, not strength, will
gap.
invite aggression.
Weapons Production
Weapons Production
1974-1982
1974-1982
13,350
54,000
11,200
950
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
Artillery
Armor
Weapons Production
1974-1982
61
27
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
Submarines
12
Questions and Answers
ANSWER: The President's strategic
weapons program was designed to
QUESTION: Critics of the President's
be affordable. It is not costly in
defense budget argue that we cannot
relation to the total defense budget.
afford such an expensive military
The strategic weapons program
buildup. How do you respond to
President Reagan has approved will
such criticism?
be only 10 to 15 percent of the
defense budget over the next five
ANSWER: We cannot afford not to
years. These are not great sums to
respond to threats that constitute
pay for forces that are most directly
clear and present dangers to our
involved in the deterrence of attack
security, our freedom and to the
on the United States and the
peace. Providing protection and
limitation of damage if such an
security against external attack is the
attack occurs.
most basic responsibility of the
For almost two decades, the United
government.
States has underfunded strategic
Defense spending must be placed in
programs. During the 1970s, the
the proper perspective. Defense
Soviet Union spent three times as
spending must be measured not in
much for strategic forces as did the
dollars but in terms of our needs.
United States. This included both a
The threat our country faces is real
massive research and development
and growing, and wishful thinking
program, and the deployment of
will not make it disappear. National
new and far more capable missile
defense must be our highest priority.
systems.
Our military strength preserves and
defends our liberty and the American
The Reagan Administration has
way of life.
approved a comprehensive moderni-
zation program to eliminate the
disparities that currently exist, and
QUESTION: Why is the President
restore an effective strategic deterrent
spending so much money on costly
to the United States.
strategic programs?
13
UESTION: We often read in the
There are cost-overruns in defense
newspaper that many military weapons
programs just as there are cost-
do not work as they are supposed to
overruns in domestic programs.
and suffer from enormous cost-
Weapons system development often
overruns. How do you account for
requires the development of new
this and what can be done to
technology, the cost of which is
correct the problem?
difficult to estimate in advance of
the development. In addition, during
ANSWER: The defense budget is subject
the 1970s, there was massive unanti-
to more scrutiny than perhaps any
cipated inflation. The annual cuts in
other government budget. Attacks
the defense program, during the
on supposed waste and inefficiency
1970s, often forced the procurement
are quite often little more than
of weapons systems at rates of
disguised attacks on the defense
production that were simply not
program by people who would
economical; such procurement often
weaken defense to spend more on
resulted in large increases in unit
their pet social programs. Generally
costs.
speaking, the Pentagon is better run
The Reagan Administration is now
than any other government agency.
taking action to improve manage-
The Reagan Administration is cur-
ment and reduce future cost-
rently taking action to further
overruns. These changes have already
improve management efficiency.
saved billions of dollars. We are
now engaging increasingly in multi-
year procurement and producing
weapons systems at more econo-
mical rates.
UESTION: There has been so much
controversy surrounding the MX
missile. Why is the MX necessary?
14
ANSWER: Land-based ICBMs offer a
Unfortunately, large, accurate new
number of unique characteristics
missiles developed by the Soviet
that are essential to the maintenance
Union have threatened the surviv-
of a strong and reliable deterrent.
ability and retaliatory effectiveness of
They are accurate, responsive, enjoy
our current ICBM force. The
reliable rapid communications with
Soviets have developed and widely
command authorities, have short
deployed numerous and highly ac-
time-to-target capability (ICBMs take
curate ICBMs that are capable of
30 to 35 minutes to reach their
destroying most of our ICBM force
target), and offer alert rates ap-
in a first strike.
proaching 100 percent. (By alert
The MX is the only improvement in
rates, we mean availability for use.)
our ICBM force that can take
They are based on U.S. sovereign
place this decade. Our ICBM force
territory, thus raising the stakes
is much less powerful than that of
greatly for any attacker. Their
the Soviet Union; it currently has
engineering and survivability char-
less than one-third the number of
acteristics make them fully indepen-
warheads. Moreover, Soviet warheads
dent of submarine-launched ballistic
are two to four times more powerful
missiles (SLBMs) and bombers. This
than those of U.S. ICBMs. This
combination, known as the Triad,
factor, combined with the lower
presents an impossible targeting
accuracy of U.S. ICBMs, means the
problem to an attacker intent on
Soviet Union is capable of attacking
avoiding our retaliation.
the full range of U.S. targets while
the U.S. cannot effectively attack all
types of Soviet targets, particularly
the most important military targets.
MX would partially remedy that.
15
The Soviet Threat-
Key Points
The 1970s witnessed the most
Because of the massive buildup of
massive Soviet military buildup in
Soviet ICBM forces, the Soviet
history.
Union has the capability to destroy
virtually all U.S. land-based ICBMs.
Soviet defense spending increased
by 40 percent, while the U.S.
The U.S. has no comparable capability.
defense spending did not even
This inability is not the result of
keep up with inflation.
accident. It has resulted from the
fact that the Soviet Union has
U.S. expenditures decreased to
rapidly and extensively mod-
five percent of national output;
ernized its missile forces over the
Soviet military expenditures in-
last decade while the U.S. has
creased to 12 to 14 percent of
not.
their national output.
While the current U.S. bomber
Under President Reagan's five-year
force consists of 300 vintage 1950s
defense program, the U.S. would
B-52s, the Soviet not only produced
still be spending under eight percent
heavy* and medium bombers* in
of its national output for defense
the 1960s, they also introduced a
(by 1988). The Soviet defense
new type of intercontinental bomber,
allotment will continue to grow
the Backfire,* and are developing a
despite a slowing economy. The
second new type-the larger Black-
Defense Department estimates that
jack.
the Soviets could spend 20 percent
of their national output on defense
The Soviet bomber threat can
in the not-too-distant future.
be expected to increase signifi-
During the 1970s, the Soviets
cantly over the next decade.
moved from strategic parity to a
The Soviet threat to Europe continues
position where they are ahead of the
to grow with the increasing Soviet
U.S. in most measures of military
deployment of intermediate-range
capability; i.e., numbers of missiles,
nuclear missiles, particularly the
destructive power (yield and pay-
SS-20 missile.*
load), * ability to destroy military
Not only do the Soviets have an
targets (hard target capability),
overall advantage in conventional
number of missile submarines, and
forces facing NATO, they have
16
strategic defenses.
achieved as much as a six-to-one
U.S.-Soviet Defense
advantage in theater nuclear
Spending: Trends
missiles and aircraft.
Recognizing the considerable advan-
As President Reagan has said, "The
tage held by the Soviet Union in
decade of so-called detente witnessed the
intermediate-range nuclear missiles
most massive Soviet buildup of military
and the growing Soviet military
power in history." U.S. defense spending,
threat, NATO decided in 1979 to
by contrast, grew in the 1960s because of
deploy 108 Pershing II missiles' and
Vietnam, but fell continuously through the
464 ground-launched cruise missiles.*
1970s.
The Pershing IIs and the ground-
During the decade of the 1970s, the
launched cruise missiles, scheduled
Soviets increased their defense
for installation in late 1983, will
spending by 40 percent, outspending
allow NATO to respond in-kind
the U.S. by more than $400 billion.
to an attack by Soviet inter-
mediate-range missiles-a capa-
Comparison of U.S-Soviet
bility NATO does not now
Defense Spending
possess.
Billions of $ FY 83
The Soviets have a large advantage
275
in chemical weapons. They are
250
currently using chemicals and bio-
225
US (with Viet Nam
logical weapons in Southeast Asia
War spending)
and Afghanistan. The U.S. and its
200
allies have a grossly inadequate
175
chemical deterrent capability.
150
USSR
Current U.S. chemical weapons
125
are obsolete and in many cases
100
their delivery systems have been
1955
58
61
64
67
70
73
78
79
1982
retired due to age.
Since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has outspent
The U.S. ceased production of
the U.S. on defense. Soviet expenditures in the 1970s
all chemical weapons in 1969
increased by 4 to 5 percent each year, while U.S.
and destroyed all its biological
expenditures declined.
weapons as well.
17
By 1980, the Soviet Union was
U.S.-Soviet Military Balance
spending 50 percent more for
(Strategic Forces): An
military forces than the U.S.
Overview
In terms of budget percentages, U.S.
expenditures declined to about five
During the 1970s the Soviets moved
percent of the U.S. Gross National
from strategic parity to a position where
Product (GNP) while Soviet military
they were well ahead of the United States
expenditures increased to 12 to 14
in most measures of military capability
percent of their national output. At
(i.e., numbers of missiles, destructive
present, the Soviet Union is spending
power, ability to destroy protected or
15 percent of its national output on
fortified military targets, numbers of missile
defense and the trend is continuing
submarines, and strategic defenses).
up.
1.
Over the last decade, the Soviet
Even if the five-year Reagan defense
Union has spent three times as
program were fully funded, the U.S.
much on strategic nuclear forces as
would be spending somewhat less
has the U.S.
than eight percent of its GNP in
2.
1988. Year by year projections are:
The Soviets now have 2,778 strategic
missiles and bombers; the U.S. has
1983: 6.5 percent
1,890.
1984: 6.8 percent
1985: 7.3 percent
Soviet Union
United States
1,398 ICBMs
1,046 ICBMs
1986: 7.6 percent
950 SLBMs
544 SLBMs
1987: 7.7 percent
430 bombers
300 bombers
1988: 7.7 percent
Land-Based Missiles
(ICBMs)
The Soviet Union has a monopoly on
the largest and most powerful missiles-
the so-called heavy missiles,* such as the
SS-18.*
18
1.
Of the 1,398 Soviet ICBMs, 308 are
4.
The 308 SS-18s alone carry more
heavy missiles.
destructive power than all U.S.
2.
Each Soviet SS-18 has twice the
strategic missiles combined.
payload or destructive potential as
Because of the massive buildup
the projected U.S. MX Peacekeeper
of the Soviet ICBM forces, the
ICBM.
Soviet Union is capable of destroying
3.
Each Soviet SS-18 missile can deliver
virtually all of our land-based
10 warheads, each with the destructive
ICBMs. The U.S. has no comparable
potential of a million tons of TNT.
capability, because our missiles lack
the destructive power and the
accuracy.
Size Comparison
1.
This inability is not the result of
of U.S. Minuteman III and Existing
accident. It has resulted from the
Soviet Intercontinental Missiles
fact that the Soviet Union has
modernized its missiles over the last
decade while the U.S. has not.
2.
To meet the threat to our land-
based ICBM force, President Reagan
has ordered the deployment of 100
MX Peacekeeper missiles and the
development of a smaller, mobile,
single-warhead missile, the so-called
Midgetman.*
U.S.
SS-13
SS-16
SS-19
SS-17
SS-18
Sea-Based Missiles (SLBMs)
Minute-
man III
The Soviet Union has built up a very
The United States has one modern intercontinental
large force of ballistic missile submarines
ballistic missile (ICBM), the Minuteman III, deployed
that exceeds that of the United States in
in 1970. Modem Soviet missiles, particularly the SS-
every characteristic except number of
18 and SS-19 are much larger and more powerful and
warheads (the number of bombs missiles
more accurate than the Minuteman III. These large
carry).
Soviet missiles are the primary cause for the strategic
imbalance that now exists.
19
1.
Between 1967 and 1982 the United
5.
To meet the expanding Soviet
States did not build a single ballistic
threat, the Reagan Administraton
missile submarine. The Soviets built
has ordered the production of the
more than 60.
submarine-launched cruise missile.
The submarine-launched cruise
2.
The Soviet Union now has more
than twice the number of nuclear-
missiles (SLCMs)* will be deployed
in 1984.
powered ballistic missile submarines,
carrying almost twice the number of
6.
While the survivability of the U.S.
missiles, as we do:
sea-based force is currently not
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
threatened by the Soviet Union,
current trends show that such a
68 submarines
33 submarines
950 missiles
544 missiles
threat could soon develop unless we
keep upgrading our forces.
3.
The Soviets are about to introduce
the Typhoon, a new missile sub-
Strategic Bombers
marine, which is about 50 percent
larger than our new Trident sub-
The current U.S. bomber force
marine, with larger and more
consists of 300 B52s. The B52s were
powerful missiles.
designed in the late 1940s to meet the
The missile carried by the
threat of the 1950s. While some of the
Typhoon is roughly comparable
equipment on the B52s has been upgraded,
to the U.S. Trident II missile,
the aircraft is still basically a 1950s vintage
which will not become opera-
aircraft. Today, our entire heavy bomber
tional until 1989.
force consists of these aging and increasingly
vulnerable B52s.
4.
The Typhoon missile may be the
first submarine-launched missile
The United States terminated pro-
capable of destroying protected or
duction of heavy and medium strategic
fortified military targets, a capability
bombers in 1961. The Soviet Union has
that we do not presently have.
continued producing both types, and has
developed two new intercontinental
bombers, the Backfire and the Blackjack.
20
1.
The Backfire was introduced in the
NATO-Warsaw Pact
mid-1970s and is being produced at
Comparison
a rate of more than 30 per year.
The Blackjack will be introduced in
A secure Western Europe is of vital
1986.
importance to the United States. The
2.
The Soviets now have 430 heavy
security of Western Europe rests on the
bombers compared to 300 for the
ability of the U.S. and its allies to maintain
United States. Since the number is
conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear
increasing steadily, the threat to the
forces sufficient to deter aggression and
United States can be expected to
defend itself if attacked. The Soviet threat
increase significantly over the next
to Western security and political indepen-
decade.
dence is real and serious.
3.
To meet the Soviet bomber threat,
1.
Conventional Forces. Conventional
President Reagan has ordered the
forces are land armies, their equip-
development and deployment of
ment, fighter aircraft, and helicopters.
100 B-1B bombers and the devel-
NATO has 84 Army divisions;
opment of the Stealth aircraft, an
the Warsaw Pact has 173.
advanced technology bomber.
Soviet-Warsaw Pact nations have
The B-1B is an advanced,
a six-to-one advantage in tactical
multipurpose heavy bomber
interceptor aircraft; a three-to-
capable of delivering a wide
one advantage in anti-tank guided
variety of nuclear and conven-
weapon launchers; a two-and-a-
tional munitions and long-range
half-to-one advantage in armored
cruise missiles. The first B-1B
personnel carriers and infantry
squadron will be operational in
fighting vehicles; a three-to-one
1986, with all 100 operational
advantage in tanks.
by 1988.
The Stealth aircraft is an advanced
bomber designed primarily for
nuclear strike missions against
very advanced enemy air defenses.
Stealth aircraft will be operational
in the early 1990s.
21
NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Comparison
(in place in Europe)
24,300
NATO Countries
42,500
Warsaw Pact Countries
31,500
78,800
173
4.0 Mil
1,000
2.6 Mil
84
13,000
8,100
10,750
30,000
1,800
Transport/
Support
700
400
Attack
Total
Divisions
Main Battle
Anti-tank
Artillery/
Armoured
Helicopters
Military
Tanks
Guided Weapon
Mortars
Personnel
(Main armament
Launchers
(Tubes 100 mm
Carriers &
90 mm and
(Crew served
and above
Infantry
above)
and/or mounted)
including Rocket
Fighting
Launchers)
Vehicles
Warsaw Pact
NATO
Military Manpower:
(men under arms)
4,000,000
2,600,000
(divisions)
173
84
Tactical Interceptor Aircraft
4,370
740
Anti-Tank Guided Weapon Launchers
24,300
8,100
Armored Personnel Carriers
and Infantry Fighting Vehicles
78,800
30,000
Artillery and Mortars
31,500
10,750
22
Tanks
42,500
13,000
2.
Theater Nuclear Forces. Theater
To meet the threat posed to
nuclear forces are battlefield and
Europe by the massive Soviet
short- and intermediate-range nuclear
buildup of intermediate-range
missiles and aircraft which can be
nuclear missiles, NATO requested
utilized to support ground forces in
in 1979 that the United States
combat.
deploy 108 Pershing II missiles
The Warsaw Pact has a three-to-
and 464 ground-launched cruise
one advantage in overall theater
missiles in Europe. Deployment
is scheduled to begin in late
nuclear forces, with a Soviet
1983.
monopoly on intermediate-range
missiles.
The Pershing IIs and the ground-
launched cruise missiles will
Intermediate Range
allow NATO to respond in-kind
Nuclear Missiles
to an attack by Soviet interme-
diate-range missiles-a capability
USSR
NATO does not now possess.
3.
Investment. U.S. and NATO military
investment (research and develop-
U.S.
ment, construction, and procurement)
has lagged alarmingly behind the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.
Effective Soviet and Warsaw
Pact investment is 35 to 40
percent greater than that of the
SS-4
SS-5
SS-20
Pershing
GLCM
II
NATO Alliance plus Japan. It
Warheads
1
1
3 MIRV
1
1
has been greater since 1973, so
Range (km)
2,000
4,100
5,000
1,500
2,500
the Warsaw Pact has been
Numbers
Deployed
232
16
360
0
o
steadily accumulating more mili-
tary assets than the NATO
The Soviets have 600 intermediate-range nuclear
Alliance.
missiles. The U.S. has zero.
23
4.
Chemical Weapons. The Soviets have
The United States ceased pro-
a large advantage in chemical
duction of chemical weapons in
weapons. Their forces are better
1969 and destroyed all its
equipped in both offensive and
biological weapons. U.S. chemical
defensive equipment than any
weapons are obsolete.
Western army. Our deterrent to
chemical attack rests mainly on the
Questions and Answers
threat of escalation to nuclear
weapons.
UESTION: Which nation has military
superiority over the other-the
The Soviet Union currently has
USSR or the U.S.?
advantages in chemical weapons
and associated equipment that
ANSWER: As President Reagan has
range from 10-to-1 to 100-to-1.
stated, "The Soviet Union does
have a definite margin of superiority,
Chemical/Biological Warfare
enough so that there is risk..."
Comparison
There is no dispute concerning the
basic numbers that make up the
military balance. The Soviets have
about 50 percent more strategic
bombers and missiles than does the
United States. Some Soviet land-based
missiles are eight times as powerful
as those of the U.S. and are more
Decontamination
Training
Chemical
accurate. The Soviets have some
Vehicles
Facilities
Personnel
defenses against missile attack and
USSR
U.S.
we do not. Soviet defenses against
Non-Soviet
USSR and
bomber attack literally dwarf those
Warsaw Pact
NSWP Combined
of the United States. In the area of
Enormous disparities exist between the chemical
intermediate-range nuclear missiles
warfare capability of the United States and the
the balance is even more one-
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact allies. This
sided-the Soviets have 1,300
disparity is all the more disturbing by Soviet use of
warheads; the U.S. has zero.
these weapons in Afghanistan and Indochina in
violation of existing agreements and international
24
law.
Those who argue that this constitutes
ANSWER: The United States is not
"parity" depart from the usual
attempting to achieve strategic
meaning of the word. They are
superiority nor is its current strategic
really arguing that the military
weapons program any serious threat
imbalances that favor the Soviet
to the Soviet Union. Our objective
Union are not important. These
is to develop a reliable deterrent to
people frequently embrace the con-
prevent attack on ourselves and our
cept of "overkill" which conceives
allies. In the words of Secretary of
of cities as the only targets for
Defense Caspar Weinberger in early
nuclear weapons and argues both
1982, "While this modernization
sides have more than enough
program is not designed to achieve
weapons to destroy each other many
nuclear 'superiority' for the United
times over.
States, by the same token, we will
President Reagan is concerned about
make every necessary effort to
the vulnerability of our nuclear
prevent the Soviet Union from
deterrent forces to Pearl Harbor-
acquiring such superiority and to
type surprise attacks and the inability
insure the margin of safety necessary
of our forces to effectively destroy
for our security."
many legitimate Soviet military targets.
Our policy does not demand parity
He recognizes that today the Soviets
in the classic sense of equal
"could absorb our retaliatory blow
numbers; we are not attempting to
and hit us again." He is concerned
match the Soviets plane for plane or
over the fact that we have no
missile for missile. According to
meaningful ability to protect our
Secretary Weinberger, "Nuclear
people from nuclear attack. This is
weapons systems will not be funded
why he is concerned about the
merely to make our forces mirror
imbalance of power that now exists.
Soviet forces according to some
superficial tally of missiles or aircraft
UESTION: Is the U.S. attempting to
deployed in peacetime Instead, our
achieve strategic superiority?
goal will be to gain and maintain a
nuclear deterrent force which pro-
vides us an adequate margin of
safety with emphasis on enduring
survivability."
25
UESTION: What are the consequences
In the 1970s, the Soviets utilized
of Soviet military superiority to the
Cuban mercenaries throughout Africa
West?
to establish pro-Soviet regimes. In
1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan
ANSWER: Military power continues to be
and overthrew its government. They
a key determinate of the balance of
are still in the process of attempting
power, the way states relate to one
to suppress the Afghan people.
another, and the prospect for
Their brutal attacks have resulted in
maintaining the peace. When the
at least two million refugees. More
military balance shifts towards states
recently, they have used the threat
that seek to expand their influence
of military force to intimidate the
and power by all means, including
people of Poland.
the use of force and violence, the
world moves closer to war. The
UESTION: Can't we cut defense
Soviet Union is such a state.
spending by getting our troops out
The Soviet Union utilized the
of Europe? Why not let the
Second World War to annex
Europeans defend themselves?
territory and to impose satellite
regimes on Eastern Europe. In the
ANSWER: The United States does not
early postwar period they attempted
maintain troops in Europe to defend
further military expansion in Greece
the Europeans but to defend the
and Korea. In the 1960s, the Soviets
United States. Europe represents an
began to support so-called wars of
enormous concentration of economic
national liberation. They established
and hence potential military power.
a satellite regime in Castro's Cuba
If the Soviet Union controlled
and supported North Vietnam's war
Europe, that economic power would
of aggression against South Vietnam.
be converted into military power
that would be used against us. Our
ability to survive in a hostile world as
a free nation would be dramatically
impaired.
26
We maintain troops in Europe to
ANSWER: The objective of our deterrence
deter a Soviet attack on Europe that
and arms control policies should not
could easily result in a Third World
be to make the world safe for
War. Without the American troops
conventional warfare. Not only is
and nuclear weapons we have there,
conventional warfare enormously
there would be no possibility for the
destructive (more than 40 million
nations of Europe to defend them-
people died in World War II) but
selves against the Soviet threat. Even
such no-first-use pledges aside, there
with the American presence the
would always be substantial risk of
Soviet Union and its satellite states
nuclear escalation in a European
clearly have military superiority on
war. Our goal must be to deter all
the ground.
types of war. The threat of nuclear
It is not true that the Europeans are
retaliation is an effective deterrent
making no efforts for their defense.
to war and it should not be
Some 90 percent of all the ground
discarded.
forces in Europe are provided by
As a practical matter the Soviet
our NATO allies. While the United
Union and its satellite states have a
States cut its defense budgets almost
substantial superiority over NATO
every year during the 1970s, our
in non-nuclear forces. The Soviet
European allies increased theirs.
Union and its Warsaw Pact allies are
superior to NATO to a substantial
QUESTION: Why not have NATO
degree in manpower, divisions, tanks,
declare that it will never use nuclear
tactical aircraft and artillery. NATO
weapons first as the Soviets have
reserves of ammunition and combat
done?
equipment are at dangerously low
levels.
It is one thing to talk in the abstract
of the desirability of eliminating these
deficiencies. It is another thing to
actually pay for them. There exist
substantial pressures in the United
States and other NATO nations to
27
cut military expenditures. If this
The deployment of the Pershing II
situation were combined with an
and cruise missiles in Europe is
announcement of a no-first-use
stabilizing. These weapons are being
policy, the degree of deterrence we
deployed in response to a massive
have to prevent Soviet attack would
buildup of Soviet intermediate-range
be substantially reduced.
missiles. The Soviets already have
about 600 such missiles deployed in
NATO is a defensive alliance. It will
Europe, with more than 1,300
only use nuclear arms if it is
warheads. The Soviets have 360 SS-
attacked on a scale in which it
20 missile launchers, each with three
cannot successfully defend itself with
very accurate warheads. The missile
conventional arms. Its nuclear arms
are not an offensive threat to the
launchers began to be deployed in
the mid-1970s. To date, there are
Soviet Union.
no comparable U.S. missiles in
Europe. The Soviet SS-20 threat to
QUESTION: Why are we deploying the
Europe is growing at the rate of
Pershing IIs and ground-launched
about one missile launcher a week.
cruise missiles in Europe? Won't our
In addition, the SS-20 missile
actions provoke the Soviet Union
launcher can be reloaded after the
and make a lasting peace more
first set of missiles is launched. We
difficult to achieve?
believe the Soviets now have two
SS-20 missiles per launcher.
ANSWER: The purpose of U.S. missile
deployment in Europe is to give
The United States is now attempting
NATO a deterrent against Soviet
to convince the Soviets to agree to
SS-20 attack. The proposed de-
the abolition or at least reduction of
ployment of the Pershing IIs and
intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
ground-launched cruise missiles does
If we do not deploy the Pershing IIs
not match the scale of even current
and the cruise missiles, the Soviets
Soviet capabilities. Only 572 warheads
will not negotiate. Indeed, the
will be deployed. The Soviets
Soviets refused to begin negotiating
already have more than that targeted
until the governments of NATO
against Europe and this force is
decided to deploy the Pershing II
expanding. Without such a deploy-
and cruise missiles.
ment, the balance of power will
28
increasingly favor the Soviet Union.
Arms Control-Key
Points
Arms control efforts should support
The Reagan Administration has
national security objectives but cannot
begun a broad range of arms control
substitute for the necessary moderni-
negotiations to reduce strategic
zation of our forces.
nuclear weapons (Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks), intermediate-range
Arms control must be a component
nuclear forces (INF negotiations)
of, not a replacement for, a coherent
and the number of NATO and
national security policy.
Warsaw Pact troops in Europe
President Reagan's approach to arms
(Mutual Balanced Force Reductions).
control is realistic. It takes into
The U.S. is seeking a complete ban
account our past experience in
dealing with the Soviet Union and
on chemical and biological weapons,
our national security requirements.
such as poisonous gases and other
deadly agents.
The Reagan Administration is
proposing arms control agreements
The Soviet response to U.S. arms
based on the principles of equality
control proposals has not been
and verifiability and the need for
serious. Soviet proposals are blatantly
real reductions.
one-sided in their own favor.
Previous arms control agreements
The U.S. has complied strictly with
did not prevent the Soviet Union
existing arms control agreements.
from engaging in the largest military
There is conclusive evidence
buildup in history. Since SALT I
that the Soviet Union has
and SALT II were negotiated, the
violated the chemical and bio-
Soviet military threat to the U.S. has
logical weapons treaties.
increased significantly.
There is evidence that the
Soviets have violated the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and
the SALT II Treaty. The issue is
under review.
29
President Reagan has proposed that
military superiority which could lead
the U.S. move from a doctrine of
them to test our resolve with the
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
inherent risks of war and escalation.
to a posture of Mutual Assured
2.
Survival (MAS).
That are verifiable. The Reagan
Administration is placing a clear and
To replace MAD with MAS, the
consistent emphasis on verification
President has proposed that we
and compliance in view of the
develop systems such as a space-
history of Soviet treaty violations
based system to defend us
and recent evidence of their violation
against nuclear attack.
of arms control treaties. Without
adequate verification, we create only
The Reagan
the illusion of arms control.
Administration's Arms
3.
That will lead to real reductions. The
Control Principles
Reagan Administration rejects "cos-
metic" arms control agreements like
After a careful reassessment of our
SALT II that allow substantial
experience with arms control during the
increases in the military forces of
1970s, President Reagan has initiated a
both sides. It has proposed agree-
wide range of arms control negotiations
ments involving real reductions. For
with the Soviet Union aimed at achieving
example, it has proposed the abolition
substantial reductions in force levels to
of land-based intermediate-range
equal and verifiable levels.
missiles and very substantial re-
President Reagan has announced an
ductions in land- and sea-based
approach to arms control that is realistic. It
strategic missile systems.
takes into account our experience in
dealing with the Soviet Union and our
national security requirements.
The U.S. is proposing arms control
agreements:
1.
That are equal. The American
people will accept no less than
equality because it is dangerous to
allow the Soviet Union to achieve
30
4.
That will reduce the risk of war. The
Reagan has ordered the adoption of
Reagan Administration has put
a more flexible position on the
emphasis on the reduction or
number of deployed missiles.
elimination of land-based missile
forces that are most suitable for
2.
INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear
surprise nuclear attacks. This approach
Forces). The United States has
is designed to increase the security
proposed the complete abolition of
of both sides by emphasizing those
intermediate-range nuclear forces in
systems that have the best retaliatory
Europe, and certain limits on
capability but the least ability to
shorter-range forces that could sub-
launch a surprise nuclear attack.
stitute for them. Namely, the United
States has proposed, with procedures
Reagan Administration
for verification, the dismantling of
the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic
Arms Control Proposals
missiles in exchange for U.S. cancel-
lation of its plans to deploy Pershing
The Reagan Administration has begun
II ballistic missiles and ground-
arms control negotiations with the USSR
launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)
on a wide range of issues. These include
in Europe to counter these Soviet
both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear
missiles. This proposal is designed to
weapons systems, and conventional and
eliminate first-strike weapons.
chemical weapons. The major Administra-
tion arms control proposals are:
Interim Proposal-In an effor to
speed the INF negotiations
1.
START (Strategic Arms Reduction
toward a successful conclusion,
Talks). The United States has
and in view of Soviet rejection
proposed the reduction of the
of our initial proposal, President
number of strategic missile warheads
on both sides from the current
number of about 7,500 to 5,000.
No more than half of these
proposed that both sides would be
limited to about 850 nuclear missile
systems-about half the current U.S.
level. In response to the Scowcroft
Commission Report, President
31
Reagan has proposed an interim
Biological Weapons. The United
agreement in which U.S. and
States seeks to terminate Soviet
Soviet INF missiles would be
use and supply of biological
limited to an equal number of
weapons against the peoples of
warheads, preferably at the lowest
Afghanistan and Indochina. We
possible level. This proposal was
also seek the negotiation of
also rejected by the Russians.
verification procedures for the
Biological Warfare Convention
3.
that will assure Soviet compliance.
Other Proposals
MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force
Nuclear Testing. The United
Reductions). The United States
States will seek to negotiate
has proposed that both sides
procedures to assure Soviet
compliance with the Threshold
reduce military manpower in
Europe to a common ceiling of
Test Ban Treaty limit of 150
900,000 of which no more than
kilotons on underground
700,000 would be in ground
nuclear testing.
forces. This proposal is designed
to stabilize the European military
Confidence-Building
balance and prevent either side
Measures
from maintaining sufficient forces
for a successful invasion of the
President Reagan has proposed that
other's territory.
both the United States and the Soviet
Chemical Weapons. The United
Union agree to a series of confidence-
States seeks to abolish lethal
building measures as part of our overall
chemical weapons.
arms control policy. These measures are
designed to build mutual trust and reduce
the risk of conflict.
These proposals include:
1.
Advance notification of all U.S. and
Soviet test launches of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles. This would
32
remove surprise and uncertainty that
can result from the sudden appear-
counting British and French
ance of such missiles on the warning
missiles as belonging to the
screens of both nations.
United States. These missiles not
only do not belong to us, but
2.
Advance notification of major military
they are of a different type from
training exercises. The objective is to
the ones under discussion at the
reduce the uncertainty and surprise
negotiations;
surrounding sudden military moves
by both sides.
excluding the Asian part of the
Soviet Union from the limita-
3.
Exchange of information on nuclear
tions, even though intermediate-
forces to reduce mutual ignorance
range Soviet missiles launched
and suspicion.
from Asia can easily reach
4.
Possible improvements to the "Hot
Western Europe;
Line" communications network
counting U.S. but not Soviet
between the United States and the
fighter bombers.
Soviet government.
2.
If the U.S. were to accept the
proposal, the Soviets
Soviet Response to U.S.
Arms Control Proposals
would have 162 missiles in
Europe, compared to none for
the U.S.
The Soviet Union has yet to make
serious proposals at either the INF or
There would be no limit on
START negotiations.
Soviet missiles outside of Europe,
1.
despite the fact that these
At the INF talks, the Soviets have
proposed an agreement that is so
missiles could attack Europe.
blatantly one-sided that it cannot be
considered to be anything but
propaganda. The Soviets have pro-
posed:
33
All U.S. fighter bombers would
SALT I:
have to be withdrawn from
failed to put any effective
Europe, but there would be no
limit on Soviet fighter bombers
restraint on Soviet military cap-
abilities. Within seven years of
in Europe.
the signing, the Soviet threat
3.
At the START negotiations, the
had tripled. In 1972, the Soviet
Soviets have proposed a series of
Union had under 2,500 nuclear
limitations that would terminate
bombs for all strategic forces; by
critical U.S. programs such as the
1981 it had 8,000.
Trident submarine and the Trident
by 1980, the Soviets were
II missile while allowing most
threatening U.S. ICBM surviv-
Soviet programs to continue without
ability.
effective limitations.
SALT II:
Previous Arms Control
is unequal in the Soviets' favor. It
Efforts (SALT I & II)
has serious flaws and dangerous,
destabilizing asymmetries including
The Reagan Administration recognizes
a Soviet monopoly on modern
that past efforts to achieve strategic arms
heavy missiles M-308 SS-18
control agreements have not prevented the
ICBMs.
Soviet Union from engaging in the largest
The SALT II Treaty excludes
military buildup in history. This buildup
the Soviet Backfire bomber,
occurred despite the existence of arms
which is capable of striking the
control agreements, including SALT I and
U.S. homeland, from effective
SALT II, because of loopholes and
limitation.
ambiguities in the agreements.
The SALT II Treaty contains
many ambiguities, particularly
related to provisions for verifi-
cation. For example, there is no
definition in the Treaty of its
basic units of limitation-missile
launchers and heavy bombers.
34
There is no agreement on the
precise limits on missile size and
Convention. These treaties ban the
power.
use of poison gases or other toxic
SALT II would allow a doubling
agents.
in the number of Soviet nuclear
2.
The President has pointed out that
warheads or bombs targeted
"there have been numerous vio-
against the U.S. Since SALT II
lations" of the 1974 treaty limiting
was signed in mid-1979, the
underground nuclear testing (Thresh-
Soviet force of nuclear bombs
old Test Ban Treaty), although
targeted on the U.S. has increased
verification difficulties preclude us
by 70 percent.
from proving it conclusively.
The Senate Armed Services Committee
3.
Additionally, President Reagan has
concluded in 1979 that SALT II was "not
noted that the Soviet test of a
in the national security interest of the
second new ICBM possibly violates
United States of America." The Reagan
the SALT II Treaty, although the
Administration has endorsed this conclusion.
issue is still being reviewed.
Because of the ambiguities and lack
U.S. and Soviet
of definitions in existing arms control
Compliance with Existing
treaties, it is very difficult to prove
Agreements
conclusively that there are violations. It is
for these reasons that President Reagan
The U.S. has complied with existing
insists that any agreement we sign be
arms control agreements. Indeed, we have
verifiable.
even avoided actions that could give the
appearance of noncompliance.
The Soviet compliance record is
clearly not good.
1.
The United States has officially
charged the Soviet Union with
violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and the 1972 Biological Weapons
35
From MAD to MAS
the physical existence of their
military and political leadership,
President Reagan has proposed that
their strategic nuclear forces, and
the United States move from a doctrine of
other key elements of their military
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to a
power.
posture of Mutual Assured Survival
President Reagan has proposed replacing
(MAS).
MAD with Mutual Assured Survival.
1.
The doctrine of Mutual Assured
1.
MAS is a theory that holds that the
Destruction holds that the Soviet
most fundamental duty of a govern-
Union and the U.S. must hold each
ment is to protect people from
other's population hostage as a
attack and that this can be best
means of preventing war. The idea
accomplished by physically defending
is that the prevention of war
them against nuclear attack. Emphasis
depends on a mutual ability to
is placed on saving Americans rather
devastate each other's societies.
than on killing Russians.
Efforts to prevent damage to one's
society are regarded as destabilizing
2.
To replace MAD with MAS, the
under this theory.
President has proposed that we
The President believes that this
develop defensive systems, including
"balance of terror" is far too
space-based systems, that would
allow the U.S. to defend itself from
dangerous because the protection
nuclear attack by ballistic missiles
of the American people from
and bombers. Under such defenses,
foreign attack is a basic respons-
enemy missiles would be destroyed
ibility of our government.
in space before they could reach
2.
The doctrine of MAD has not
American soil.
reduced the arms race, as its
proponents argued a decade and a
half ago. Indeed, it has contributed
to the decline of our deterrent
capability. Because of the MAD
doctrine, we did not modernize our
wea.pons in a manner that would
give us the capability to threaten the
36
things that the Soviets value most-
3.
A nationwide telephone poll by the
1.
Supporters of space-based systems
Heritage Foundation released in
argue that such a defense would not
August, 1982, revealed that:
be destabilizing. Deterrence depends
sixty-six percent of the respon-
critically upon preventing the enemy
dents were unaware that the
from achieving any military advantage
U.S. has no anti-ballistic missile
from attacking, which can be achieved
defense;
as well by building defenses.
2.
Will not initiate the militarization of
eighty percent said this vulner-
space. Space has been militarized by
ability concerned them a great
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union
deal;
for offensive purposes for more than
eighty-six percent supported
a generation.
deployment of an anti-ballistic
3.
missile system; and,
The Soviet Union is already devel-
oping space-based defensive systems.
seventy-three percent held that
The Soviets are not newcomers to
the cost of such a system should
the exploration of outer space for
not be the primary factor by
military purposes.
which to judge whether such a
system should or should not be
On any given day, 70 to 110
deployed.
Soviet satellites are in orbit,
more than half of which serve
Critics of President Reagan's efforts to
military purposes solely.
build effective defenses against nuclear
attack maintain that such programs will be
Some 85 percent of all Soviet
destabilizing, will provoke the Soviet
space launches are exclusively
Union, will militarize space and fuel the
military or joint military/civilian
missions.
arms race by forcing the Soviets to
develop an anti-ballistic missile capability
One direction of the Soviet
of their own.
Union's space weapons program
is toward the development and
deployment of a space-based
laser system. A prototype could
be launched by the late 1980s.
37
An operational system capable of
Questions and Answers
attacking other satellites, within
a few thousand kilometers range
QUESTION: Why has the U.S. been so
could be established in the early
resistant to negotiate a strategic arms
1990s.
limitation agreement with the Soviet
Space-based anti-ballistic missile
Union? Isn't arms control the key to
systems could be tested in the
a peaceful future?
1990s.
ANSWER: The United States has not
The Soviets have also developed
been resistant to negotiating strategic
and deployed an anti-satellite
arms limitation agreements with the
system* and a fractional orbital
U.S.S.R. When the Reagan Admin-
bombardment system,* which
istration assumed office it was
the U.S. does not possess.
obvious that previous approaches to
strategic arms limitation had failed.
Mutual Assured Survival
Both the SALT I and II Treaties
had placed no significant restraint
(MAS) and Arms Control
upon the growth of Soviet strategic
nuclear capability. Despite 12 years
of negotiation and two agreements,
Those who argue that the development
there was an enormous increase in
of space-based defenses will merely stimulate
the number of Soviet nuclear
the development of improved offensive
warheads aimed at the United
forces ignore the substantial problem
States. By 1980, the U.S. ICBM
involved in hardening or protecting
force was already vulnerable to a
missiles against these types of defensive
Soviet surprise attack. In addition,
weapons. They also ignore the fact that the
the United States faced significant
President has proposed adopting these
compliance problems by the
defenses as part of an arms control
Soviets. The Reagan Administration
program that would substantially limit or
was forced to engage in a compre-
completely eliminate the offensive forces
hensive reassessment of our ap-
the critics are talking about. One cannot
proaches to arms control. As a result
penetrate defenses with non-existent offen-
sive forces.
38
of this, the United States has
UESTION: Would the introduction of
proposed, for the first time, agree-
space-based defense systems be de-
ments that would be equal and
stabilizing and provoke the Soviet
verifiable and would involve signifi-
Union?
cant reductions of nuclear weapons.
ANSWER: Defensive systems are in no
QUESTION: Has the Soviet Union
way destabilizing unless one accepts
violated arms control agreements?
the strange logic of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD), which maintains
ANSWER: In June, 1982, speaking before
that only the ability to wipe each
the United Nations, President Reagan
other out can guarantee that the
accused the Soviets of violating the
two superpowers will not attack
1925 and 1972 treaties banning the
each other. However, if one rejects
use of chemical and biological
this notion of deterrence, then
weapons. "There is conclusive
defense ceases to become destabilizing
evidence," he said, "that the Soviet
and mutual defensive capabilities
government has provided toxins for
become desirable and stabilizing.
use in Laos and Kampuchea, and
Moreover, why should the Soviet
are themselves using chemical
Union be provoked by our desire to
weapons against freedom fighters in
prepare an adequate defense for our
Afghanistan." President Reagan noted
population, when it is obviously
in March, 1983, that there "have
trying to do the same for its own?
been increasingly serious grounds for
Their national security agenda is
questioning their compliance with
based on their own goals, not what
the arms control agreements that
we do or do not do. It is
have been already signed and that
convenient to claim provocation as
we have both pledged to uphold."
an excuse for their own actions.
President Reagan has indicated we
have evidence, although not con-
clusive, that the Soviet Union has
violated the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty, which limits testing of
nuclear weapons yields, and the
1979 SALT II Treaty. These issues
are now under study.
39
Nuclear Freeze-Key
Points
UESTION: Isn't it impossible to build
The nuclear freeze is a simplistic,
an effective defense against missile
utopian and irresponsible approach
attack?
to arms control that has no chance
of being negotiated with the Soviet
ANSWER: While results will not be
Union.
achieved overnight, we have faith in
the ability of the American scientific
Freeze proposals are too broad and
community to solve the problems
ill-defined. Freeze advocates disagree
that are associated with an effective
as to the meaning of the nuclear
defense against missile attack. Even
freeze. They disagree as to whether a
today, lasers are being developed
military build up and/or moderniza-
that have potential for ballistic
tion of our forces would be allowed.
missile defense. There is no reason
Freeze advocates have an unrealistic
to believe that concerted effort will
and naive view of the Soviet Union.
not be able to develop effective
They fail to recognize that the
weapons against missile attack.
Soviets consider nuclear weapons as
instruments of coercion and arms
control negotiations as another arena
of political conflict.
The Soviet Union has not accepted
arms control proposals that signifi-
cantly constrain its military expansion,
resisting cooperative measures of
verification such as mutual inspection
of military facilities.
The Soviets have circumvented or
violated treaties they have signed
with us in the past.
The Soviets have rejected freeze
proposals offered by Presidents Nixon
and Carter.
40
Freeze proponents subscribe to the
The Reagan Administration shares
"overkill theory," a simplistic approach
the concern of all Americans that
that ignores the requirements of a
something be done to control
credible deterrent.
nuclear weapons, but it rejects
President Reagan opposes the freeze
proposals that are unequal and
unverifiable. The Administration,
for the following reasons:
like the American people, rejects
It would leave the U.S. not only
unilateral disarmament.
with nuclear forces that are
inferior to those of the Soviet
The Freeze Approach
Union but with forces which are
also old and vulnerable to a
The nuclear freeze is a simplistic,
Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack.
utopian and irresponsible approach to
It would preserve a dangerous
arms control that has no chance of being
imbalance in nuclear forces, an
successfully negotiated with the Soviet
imbalance which currently favors
Union. Even advocates of a nuclear freeze
the Soviet Union.
cannot agree upon precisely what they
want. A nuclear freeze could not possibly
Key elements of the freeze are
improve the security of the American
not verifiable. By contrast, the
people even if it could be negotiated,
types of limitations and reductions
because it would leave the United States
proposed by the Reagan Admin-
with nuclear forces that are not only
istration (such as in deployed
inferior to the Soviet Union's but are also
ballistic missiles) were chosen
old and vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor-type
because they would be easier to
surprise attack. The advocates of the
verify.
"freeze":
A freeze would violate an
important commitment to NATO
to deploy intermediate-range
nuclear missiles to meet the
threat posed to Europe by 360
Soviet SS-20 missiles.
41
1.
Refuse to look realistically at Soviet
5.
Resort to emotional and pseudo-
objectives or recognize Soviet re-
moralistic arguments concerning
sponsibility for the arms race.
nuclear weapons. Many of their
statements are blatant attempts to
2.
Are willing to accept substantial
scare the American people into
Soviet superiority and ignore its
doing irresponsible things about our
military and political consequences.
defenses. Freeze advocates would
Advocates of the simplistic freeze
have the U.S. ignore the requirement
approach do not care whether the
to maintain our deterrent while, at
Soviet Union is ahead of the United
the same time, have the U.S.
States or whether the nuclear
embrace arms control proposals that
freeze increases the margin of
could not conceivably enhance our
Soviet superiority, since they assert
national security.
that nuclear weapons make the
concept of "superiority" meaningless.
Freeze proponents seek to portray
freeze opponents as "warmongers"
3.
Oppose vital U.S. military programs
while portraying themselves as the
like the MX missile, the B-1 bomber
advocates of peace. They consider
or the Trident missile submarine
themselves to be the only ones
system. Many freeze advocates have
geniunely concerned about the dan-
a long record of opposing U.S.
gers and horrors of nuclear war,
military programs.
implying that those who oppose
4.
Do not care about verification and
them are uncaring, unconcerned,
Soviet compliance. Many freeze
and leading us ever closer to nuclear
advocates have a naive faith in the
apocalypse. This is absolute nonsense.
Soviet Union. They ignore evidence
of Soviet violations of existing
treaties and oppose efforts to obtain
Soviet compliance with these treaties.
42
6.
Reject the necessity of maintaining
political and military reasons, the United
effective nuclear deterrent forces.
States does not target civilian populations
This is often based upon the
as such. We have no reason to believe
acceptance of the simplistic idea of
that the intentional and systematic destruc-
nuclear "overkill." Overkill presumes
tion of civilians is necessary to a deterrent
that deterrence is somehow auto-
strategy, or would even enhance our
matic and does not depend on the
deterrent.
military balance or the ability of our
"Overkill" is a myth, a simplistic idea
forces to survive an attack and
that overlooks key elements of a credible
effectively retaliate after enemy
deterrence.
attack.
1.
Deterrence depends on the ability of
our forces to survive a surprise missile
Overkill and
attack.
the Nuclear Freeze
2.
Deterrence depends on the ability of
our forces to penetrate Soviet defenses.
The often repeated argument that the
The Soviets have already threat-
Soviet Union and the United States both
ened the survivability of our
have the ability to destroy many times
land-based missiles (ICBMs) and
over the population of the other, or even
of our strategic bombers.
of the entire world, is untrue and
misleading. There can be no denying the
Soviet civil and military defense
enormous destructive potential of nuclear
programs have already down-
weapons, but the "overkill" argument is of
graded the effectiveness of our
no more relevance than the assertion,
weapons against a wide range of
undoubtedly true, that the armies of the
Soviet targets.
world have enough bullets to kill the
earth's population many times over. This
hardly assures deterrence or an adequate
defense capability.
The fact of the matter is that nuclear
weapons are not targeted primarily against
civilian populations, either by the United
States or, to judge from all available
evidence, by the Soviet Union. For moral,
43
The Reagan
2.
U.S. nuclear deterrent forces are old
Administration and the
and vulnerable to a Soviet attack.
For example, the U.S. B-52 bombers
Nuclear Freeze
were all built prior to 1961, and the
U.S. missile submarines were built
The Reagan Administration strongly
prior to 1967. Soviet forces, on the
opposes the nuclear freeze. It believes that
other hand, are modern-mainly
a nuclear freeze is both dangerous to our
built within the last decade. A freeze
security and will reduce the chances for
on modernization would mean that
the successful negotiation of meaningful
U.S. forces would wear out much
arms control agreements. Its reasons
sooner than Soviet forces.
include:
Moreover, the U.S. land-based mis-
1.
A nuclear freeze will preserve the
siles, ICBMs, are highly vulnerable
dangerous imbalance between U.S.
to Soviet missile attack. Old U.S.
and Soviet military forces. A few
bombers are also potentially vul-
illustrative numbers highlight the
nerable to Soviet missile attack. This
problem:
is why we are building the B-1
bomber as soon as possible and are
U.S.
U.S.S.R.
developing the MX Peacekeeper
Land-based missiles
1,046
1,398
ICBM.
Sea-based missiles
544
950
3.
Key elements of the nuclear freeze
Nuclear missile submarines
33
68
proposal are simply not verifiable:
Heavy missiles
0
308
verification is not possible, using
photo satellites and other means of
Missile warheads
7,200
7,500
intelligence collection to determine
ABM missiles
0
64
accurately what is being produced
Surface-to-air missiles
0
10,000
inside factory buildings. The key
Strategic bombers
300
430
defect of the nuclear freeze is that it
Strategic missile throw-weight*
1.9 mkg 5.6 mkg
seeks to limit a very wide range of
systems without serious consideration
as to whether these limitations can
be effectively verified.
44
4.
While proposing unrealistically broad
The Soviet approach to arms control
objectives, the freeze advocates reject
is very different from our own. They
realistic goals concerning the signifi-
regard arms control negotiations as another
cant reduction in the most dangerous
arena of political power. They have:
types of nuclear arms, such as
1.
ballistic missiles. The types of
Sought to negotiate agreements that
limitations and reductions that have
guarantee them superior force levels
been proposed by the Reagan
and have strongly resisted equal
force levels;
Administration were picked in part
because they are easier to verify
than the indiscriminate freeze ap-
proach.
Longer Range INF
Missile Warheads
5.
The nuclear freeze would entail a
No. of Nuclear Warheads+
breach of faith between the United
1,400
August 1982
States and our NATO allies. It
Defense Minister Ustinov:
would prevent us from deploying
1,300
"Approximate parity of
forces continues to
intermediate-range nuclear missiles
1,200
exist today
"
in Europe to counter the enormous
February 1981
Soviet threat posed by existing SS-
President Brezhnev:
1,100
20 missiles, as we have promised
"There is approximate
equality now
our NATO allies.
1,000
October 1980
Soviet negotiators:
The Soviet Approach to
900
"A balance now exists."
Nuclear Weapons, Arms
October 1979
800
President Brezhnev:
Control, and the Nuclear
"A balance now exists
.
700
Freeze
600
U.S.S.R.
December 1979
End of
The Soviet Union believes that
NATO INF dual-track decision
Year
nuclear weapons are instruments of coer-
0
cion and are building nuclear forces that
1977
78
79
80
81
82
1983
are far beyond the legitimate requirements
t Includes Soviet SS-20s and older SS-4s and SS-5s.
of self-defense. Soviet nuclear forces are
designed to wage nuclear warfare and to
defeat potential adversaries.
45
2.
Sought to ban the most promising
concentrated enormous efforts on the
U.S. weapons, while placing little or
development and modernization of nuclear
no restraint upon Soviet weapons
weapons, obviously seeking what they
programs;
regard as important advantages in certain
areas of nuclear weaponry."
3.
Sought to avoid significant reductions
in force levels while allowing loop-
Questions and Answers
holes that could allow for significant
force expansion, particularly in
QUESTION: Why does the Reagan
weapons suitable for waging war;
Administration oppose the proposal
4.
Sought to resist cooperative verification
for an immediate freeze on testing,
or effective means of verification
production and deployment of
(such as on-site inspection or mutual
nuclear weapons?
inspection of military facilities).
ANSWER: President Reagan had de-
Well over a decade of arms control
nounced the nuclear freeze as "a
negotiations with the Soviet Union has
very dangerous fraud" which would
illustrated time and again that the Soviets
create "merely the illusion of peace."
reject comprehensive limitations on their
A freeze would perpetuate Soviet
armaments.
military superiority and leave the
1.
They rejected a nuclear freeze
United States with old and vulnerable
proposal that was made by the
systems, many of which could be
Carter Administration.
destroyed by a Pearl Harbor-type
surprise attack. A freeze would
2.
They rejected a proposal by the
contain key elements which could
Nixon Administration that would
not possibly be verified, particularly
have frozen the number of weapons
with respect to production. A freeze
on strategic missiles.
on production of nuclear weapons,
As the bipartisan Presidential Com-
bombers, and missiles cannot possibly
mission on Strategic Forces reported
be verified because it is impossible
recently, "In the Soviet strategic view,
to see what is being produced inside
nuclear weapons are closely related to, and
factories.
are integrated with, their other military
A freeze on nuclear weapons testing,
and political instruments as a means of
production, and deployment would
46
advancing their interests. The Soviets have
be nearly impossible to negotiate
UESTION: Why do you think so many
with the Soviet Union because the
people across the country support a
Soviets have always resisted significant
freeze?
arms limitations and necessary coop-
erative means to verify the limita-
ANSWER: The American people support
tions. The Soviets have always
a freeze in the sense that they
opposed mutual inspection of the
support responsible arms control.
military facilities of each party as a
Support for a freeze reflects the
means of ensuring that terms of
genuine concern of millions of
arms control agreements are met.
Americans that something be done
to control nuclear weapons. That
A nuclear freeze would reward the
concern is also shared by the Reagan
Soviet Union for a decade of
Administration. However, surveys
military expansion and prevent the
have shown that the American
United States from taking the
people, like the Administration, do
necessary means to assure our
not support a freeze that would give
security in an increasingly dangerous
the Soviet Union any military
world. As President Reagan stated
advantages or a freeze that could
on March 8, 1983, "I would agree
not be verified-a freeze in which
to a freeze if only we could freeze
we could not determine whether or
the Soviets' global desires." A freeze
not the Soviet Union was abiding by
now at unequal force levels that
the terms of the agreement. The
preserves current Soviet advantages
American people do not advocate
would severely hamper our efforts
any form of unilateral disarmament
to preserve the peace.
by the United States. They recognize
the serious military threats we face
from the Soviet Union.
47
UESTION: Isn't an immediate freeze
UESTION: Since we already have
necessary as a first step towards
thousands of nuclear weapons, why
achieving real arms reduction?
do we need more?
ANSWER: A freeze would not halt the
ANSWER: The size of our military forces,
arms race. The Soviet Union will
both nuclear and conventional, must
not accept an equal and verifiable
be related to the threats we face.
freeze. Despite what freeze proponents
Since the 1960s there has been a
choose to believe, the Soviet Union
vast expansion of the Soviet nuclear
has never really accepted significant
threat to the United States and our
constraints on its military capabilities.
allies while the number of U.S.
Even though the Soviet Union has
nuclear weapons has declined by a
signed arms control agreements in
third and their destructive potential
the past, the number of Soviet
by 75 percent.
weapons has continued to grow
Many of our current nuclear weapons
significantly. Indeed, most existing
are rapidly aging and some of them
arms control agreements have allowed
are more than 20 years old, close to
the Soviets to continue their military
the limit of their useful lives. U.S.
buildup.
nuclear missiles and bombers are
also very old. Our B-52 bombers
were all produced before 1961, and
our Poseidon missile submarines
were all produced before 1967.
In the final analysis, it is not merely
a question of numbers. U.S. nuclear
deterrent forces must be able to
deter the Soviet Union and other
potential enemies by being able to
retaliate effectively against a wide
range of relevant military targets. To
do this, they must be able to survive
a Soviet attack and penetrate Soviet
48
defenses, and destroy increasingly
fortified Soviet military targets. The
enormous Soviet buildup has severely
eroded our ability to accomplish
these objectives while the Soviet
military buildup has given them the
ability to attack nearly all comparable
U.S. targets.
Many elements of the U.S. deterrent,
our land-based ICBMs and to a
lesser extent our bombers, are
vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.
The objective of the President's
strategic weapons modernization
program is not to increase the
number of our weapons, but to
replace aging systems with modern
weapons with the ability to survive
Soviet attack and effectively accom-
plish their missions. This will sub-
stantially enhance our ability to
deter war, which is, of course, our
ultimate objective.
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Glossary
anti-satellite system (ASAT)-systems
ground-launched cruise missile-
designed to destroy or incapacitate satellites
small, jet propelled pilotless vehicle launched
in orbit. Soviet anti-satellite systems can
from a mobile truck launcher that carries a
destroy low-altitude military and civilian
200-kiloton warhead. The ground-launched
satellites.
cruise missile has a range of 1,550 miles.
Backfire bomber-a modern supersonic
Although it would require at least 4 to 5
bomber similar in design to the U.S. B-1A,
hours to reach its target, it has a unique
which was cancelled by President Carter.
advantage-its guidance system allows it to
follow the contour of the land. It can thus
The Backfire bomber is capable of striking
targets in Europe, the Middle East, Asia,
evade enemy radar by flying below the
"radar floor" at a minimum altitude of
and the United States.
only 50 feet.
B-1B bomber-an advanced, supersonic
low-altitude bomber designed to penetrate
heavy missile-the largest, most des-
tructive missile that now exists. Each
advanced air defenses.
Soviet SS18 heavy missile has twice the
command, control and communi-
payload or destructive potential as the
cations systems-a intricate web of
projected U.S. MX ICBM. Each SS-18 can
satellites, sensors, communications gear,
deliver 10 warheads with the destructive
computers, etc., that enable our strategic
potential of a million tons of TNT.
forces to carry out their assigned missions
in peacetime or in case of war.
heavy strategic bomber-a bomber
aircraft with a range over 4,000 miles.
cruise missile-a small, jet propelled
intercontinental ballistic missile
pilotless vehicle with an advanced guidance
system that gives it high accuracy. Cruise
(ICBM)-a ballistic missile capable of
missiles can be launched from ships,
propelling a nuclear warhead to ranges
submarines, aircraft, or ground vehicles.
beyond 3,000 miles. Quite literally, an
ICBM can be launched from one continent
fractional orbit bombardment system
to another.
(FOB)-a system that injects a nuclear
warhead into a low earth orbit, allowing it
to attack any target in the world within an
hour with little warning. The Soviets had
developed this capability by 1970.
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medium strategic bomber-a bomber
SS-20-a very powerful intermediate-range
aircraft with a range less than 4,000 miles.
nuclear missile capable of delivering three
nuclear warheads up to a 5,000 kilometer
Midgetman-small, mobile interconti-
nental ballistic missile that carries one 300-
range with great accuracy. The SS-20 has a
reload capability. In other words, the
kiloton warhead.
Soviets have two missiles for each of the
MX Peacekeeper missile-a large
360 SS-20 missile launchers.
intercontinental ballistic missile which can
Stealth bomber-an advanced bomber
deliver ten 300-kiloton warheads. It will
designed to incorporate advanced technology
be the first new ICBM since 1970.
(even more advanced technology than that
payload-the weight a missile can deliver
incorporated into the B-1B) that will be
to a given distance.
able to penetrate the most advanced air
defense systems. The Stealth aircraft will
Pershing II missile-an intermediate
be operational in the early 1990s. The
range nuclear mssile. It has a range of
Stealth bomber is an advanced technology
1,000 miles; it carries a single 100-kiloton
bomber (ATB).
warhead and its speed enables it to reach
Soviet targets within 15 minutes from
submarine-launched ballistic missile
launch time.
(SLBM)-a ballistic missile launched from
a submarine. This missile is capable of
readiness-the ability of forces, units,
performing the same missions as an ICBM
weapons systems, or equipment to deliver
even with missiles of much shorter range
the output for which they were designed.
because of a submarine's mobility.
It depends on having the required
quantities of equipment in the hands of
the units on a day-to-day basis, and on
having the required number of adequately
trained people assigned to ensure that
people and machines can work together.
SS-18-the largest, most destructive missile
in the world. Each missile has twice the
destructive potential of any missile that
was allowed the U.S. under the SALT II
agreement (see heavy missile).
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sustainability-groups together items
needed by forces to sustain combat in the
event of war. It includes replacement
equipment, spare parts and ammunition,
and other essential consumables. Sustain-
ability also includes the manpower required
to maintain combat strength-to rotate,
replace, and reinforce as the course of
battle demands.
throw-weight-the total weight of nuclear
explosives a missile can deliver to either
the U.S. or the Soviet Union.
Trident missile submarine-a large,
long-range missile-carrying submarine de-
signed to replace missile submarines built
in the 1960s. It carries 24 nuclear missiles.
Trident II missile-a larger, more
accurate missile able to attack all types of
Soviet targets, including hardened or
fortified military targets.
yield-roughly speaking, the amount of
energy or destructive potential of a nuclear
weapon. It would be roughly proportional
to the payload or throw-weight. In other
words, the heavier the weapon, the more
powerful it tends to be.
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