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SECRET
-2-
are ready for can produce an altogether more·solid and durable
basis for conducting business and living together than the two
superpowers have ever had before.
Focus on Interventionism
I plan to deliver this message by hitting hard on Soviet
and proxy interventionism in crisis and potential crisis
areas: Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and
Central American/the Caribbean. I will also highlight Poland
and Iran as two countries where future Soviet intervention
would have disastrous effects. In this private meeting, the
main accent will be on the Cuban military build-up and Cuban
activities abroad. I intend to make clear to Gromyko that we
are prepared for improvement in US-Soviet relations, but that
progress depends on Soviet willingness to take our concerns
into account. To reinforce this argument, I plan to raise the
possibility of another round of talks with him some months
hence, implicitly conditional on Moscow's responsiveness to our
calls for restraint.
TNF Negotiations
The second main purpose of the meetings is to reach formal
agreement on the time and place for beginning TNF negotiations
later this year, in keeping with your commitment, and to
initiate substantive dialogue on TNF issues. I will be making
a strong pitch for Soviet cooperation in international efforts
to follow up on our evidence of toxin use in Southeast Asia,
and warn him of the impact on arms control prospects. But
getting TNF negotiations started is vital to us, and it is an
objective for the first meeting. The Soviets have been sticky
in discussions of the joint statement, and the topic may spill
over into the second. We should get the public statement we
want that talks will begin on November 30 in Geneva, but we
will also be in a position to explain to our friends that it is
the Soviets, rather than us, who have been holding back.
Possible Outcomes
I expect stiff rebuttals rather than explicit concessions
on geopoliticial issues from Gromyko. But it is important to
make our points again at the first Ministerial-level meeting
with the Soviets since you were elected, and to test Soviet
responsiveness at that level. The evidence will probably come
back to us only over the next several months.
It is also important to keep our dialogue before the
public. This is the main purpose of my suggesting another
meeting with Gromyko, and I plan to add one or two bilateral
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n-2-\nare ready for can produce an altogether more·solid and durable\nbasis for conducting business and living together than the two\nsuperpowers have ever had before.\nFocus on Interventionism\nI plan to deliver this message by hitting hard on Soviet\nand proxy interventionism in crisis and potential crisis\nareas: Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and\nCentral American/the Caribbean. I will also highlight Poland\nand Iran as two countries where future Soviet intervention\nwould have disastrous effects. In this private meeting, the\nmain accent will be on the Cuban military build-up and Cuban\nactivities abroad. I intend to make clear to Gromyko that we\nare prepared for improvement in US-Soviet relations, but that\nprogress depends on Soviet willingness to take our concerns\ninto account. To reinforce this argument, I plan to raise the\npossibility of another round of talks with him some months\nhence, implicitly conditional on Moscow's responsiveness to our\ncalls for restraint.\nTNF Negotiations\nThe second main purpose of the meetings is to reach formal\nagreement on the time and place for beginning TNF negotiations\nlater this year, in keeping with your commitment, and to\ninitiate substantive dialogue on TNF issues. I will be making\na strong pitch for Soviet cooperation in international efforts\nto follow up on our evidence of toxin use in Southeast Asia,\nand warn him of the impact on arms control prospects. But\ngetting TNF negotiations started is vital to us, and it is an\nobjective for the first meeting. The Soviets have been sticky\nin discussions of the joint statement, and the topic may spill\nover into the second. We should get the public statement we\nwant that talks will begin on November 30 in Geneva, but we\nwill also be in a position to explain to our friends that it is\nthe Soviets, rather than us, who have been holding back.\nPossible Outcomes\nI expect stiff rebuttals rather than explicit concessions\non geopoliticial issues from Gromyko. But it is important to\nmake our points again at the first Ministerial-level meeting\nwith the Soviets since you were elected, and to test Soviet\nresponsiveness at that level. The evidence will probably come\nback to us only over the next several months.\nIt is also important to keep our dialogue before the\npublic. This is the main purpose of my suggesting another\nmeeting with Gromyko, and I plan to add one or two bilateral\nSECRET"
}