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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Agency File: Records
Folder Title: State INR Morning Summary
(12/13/1983-12/15/1983)
Box: RAC Box 8
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE
Withdrawer
SMF 10/10/2008
File Folder
STATE INR MORINING SUMMARY VOL. I 11/22-12/31/83
FOIA
[12/13/83-12/15/83]
M2008-098/6
Box Number
8
STOCKER
1
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
56156 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS (PARTIAL)
3 12/15/1983 B1
(PARTIAL)
P
10/14/2008
M2008-098/6
56166 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/15/1983 B1
R
10/14/2008
M2008-098/6
56167 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/14/1983 B1 B3
PAR 5/6/2010
M098/6
56168 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
3 12/14/1983 B1
R
10/14/2008
M2008-098/6
56169 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS
4 12/13/1983 B1
B3
PAR 1/14/2013
M098/6
56170 REPORT
CURRENT REPORTS (PARTIAL)
4 12/13/1983 B1 B3
PAR 5/6/2010
M098/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:
Archivist: kdb
Agency File
File Folder: State INR Morning Summary Vol. I 11/22-12/31/83
Date: 3/11/99
[12/13/83-12/15/83] Box 913758 91375
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
r. list
re 12/15/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/15/83
P1, F1
R1/17/01 F97-0441, 23
2. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/15/83
P1, F1
Part. n
u
24 P 10/15/08
M2008-098/6 # 56165
3. report
re analysis, 3p
12/15/83
P1, F1
R 10/15/08 M2008-098/4 * 5616C
4. list
re 12/14/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/14/83
P1, F1
R 1/17/01 F97-044/1 #76
5. report
Current Reports, 3p
12/14/83
P1, F1, B3
D n
3
#27 PAR
M08-098/6
5/6/10
#
56167
6. report
re analysis, 3p
12/14/83
P1, F1
R 10/15/08 M2008-098/6 # 56168
7. list
re 12/13/83 documents (w/notations), 1p
12/13/83
P1, F1
R F97-044/, 29
8. report
Current Reports, 4p
12/13/83
P1, F1
B3
PAR M08-098/6 5/6/10 # 56170
9. report
re analysis, 4p
12/13/83
P1, F1
Part. 1/17/01 F97-044/1 $31
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute ((a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information {(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors ((a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 15, 1983
Current Reports
1. Kuwait
A. Bomb Truck Driver Identified
B. Foreign Ministry on the Bombing
PR
2. Lebanon
A. INR Military Update
B. Outlook Dim for Expanded UN Role in Beirut
3. El Salvador: Army Reacts Quickly
4. USSR
A. Soviet Diplomat on Andropov, CDE, START
B. Renewed High-Level Contact with Sweden
5. Iran-Iraq War: Persian Gulf Desalinization Facilities
6. Argentina: Junta Leaders Charged
7. Canada: Reagan-Trudeau Meeting
8. Cuba: Prepared To Fire on Unidentified Aircraft
9. Greece/Syria: Ruling Parties Agree To Strengthen Ties
Analysis
1. US-Syrian Confrontation in Lebanon: Time Is on Syria's Side
2. China: Deng and Hu Rebound
3. Chad: Trying To Put Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-044/, #23 Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
Hugh Montgomery
BY CAs NARA, DATE 1/17/01 Declassify on: Originating Agency's
Determination Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
CURRENT REPORTS
December 15, 1983
1. KUWAIT
A. Bomb Truck Driver Identified
An Iraqi national drove the truck that exploded in the US Embassy
compound, and owned seven of the vehicles involved in the Kuwait
bombings December 12, Embassy Kuwait reports. He was allegedly a
member of "Hizb al-Dawa," an Islamic fundamentalist group affiliated
with the "Islamic Jihad" and possibly controlled directly from Iran.
Police have arrested another suspect who admitted membership in the
same group, and there are indications the Iranians may have abandoned
their embassy in Kuwait. (SECRET)
B. Foreign Ministry on the Bombing
A Kuwaiti diplomat told Charge Griffin December 14 that the bombings
were directed against Kuwait as well as the US, and claimed the
government does not expect additional attacks soon. The official
said that no one employed at the US Embassy is under suspicion. He
asserted that security for the embassy and its personnel would be
increased further, and that the deportation of several thousand
illegal Iranian residents was being accelerated. (SECRET).
2. LEBANON
B. Outlook Dim for Expanded UN Role in Beirut
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar doubts that UN forces now can take
on a new mandate for protecting the Beirut area due to Soviet and
Syrian opposition, the Italian UN mission recently told USUN New
York. The Soviets reportedly have said they might agree if Syria
does, but they maintain the UN should have no role in the "internal"
Lebanon conflict, and argue that any UN presence should not shield
the MNF. The Syrians have said they oppose any increase in the size
of the observer group. (SECRET/EXDIS)
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M2008-098/6*56165
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
BY smf NARA DATE 10/15/08
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
- 2 -
3. EL SALVADOR: ARMY REACTS QUICKLY
A guerrilla force attacked a newly-trained Salvadoran battalion in
northern Morazan province on December 13, according to DAO San
Salvador. One company may have been overrun and another one
retreated, but a third company put up a stiff resistance before
withdrawing. The general staff quickly sent reinforcements, and the
air force flew close support missions.
INR Comment: The guerrillas recently routed two other green
battalions. Although we do not yet know the outcome, this time the
general staff reacted quickly and may have been able to avoid a
serious defeat. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4. USSR
A. Soviet Diplomat on Andropov, CDE, START
A Soviet diplomat in Belgrade recently said Andropov is weak, and
that his attendance at the upcoming Supreme Soviet and Central
Committee meetings is uncertain, Embassy Belgrade reports. He said
that Andropov may have to resign some or all of his duties and that
in his absence the Politburo is acting as a collective leadership
body. The diplomat said Gromyko might attend the Stockholm CDE, but
would probably not agree to meet Secretary Shultz unless the US
indicates willingness to halt or slow down INF deployment. Finally,
he claimed that the START talks will resume in several months without
preconditions. (CONFIDENTIAL)
B. Renewed High-Level Contact with Sweden
The Swedes reportedly intend to resume ministerial-level contacts,
after a two-and-a-half year hiatus, by inviting the Soviet minister
of agriculture to visit Sweden. Swedish plans are contingent upon
little or no evidence of continued Soviet intrusions appearing in
next week's report on submarine activity.
INR Comment: On the eve of the CDE opening in Stockholm, Moscow is
likely to welcome the opportunity to demonstrate that despite the
friction created by its submarine intrusions, Soviet-Swedish
relations are normalizing. (SECRET/EXDIS)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
- 3 -
6. ARGENTINA: JUNTA LEADERS CHARGED
President Alfonsin has ordered the nine top leaders of the 1976-82
military government to stand trial in military court for their
involvement in human rights abuses committed during the counter-
terrorist operations of the mid-1970s.
INR Comment: Alfonsin has done precisely what he promised to
do--targeted those who established counter-terrorist policy and left
all others to their fate in the civilian courts. A strongly negative
military response will be inhibited by Alfonsin's popular mandate and
the belief among many middle- and lower-grade officers that their
erstwhile commanders are receiving their due. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7. CANADA: REAGAN-TRUDEAU MEETING
Trudeau probably will present President Reagan December 15 with an
outline of his recent East-West initiative, and with suggestions for
reducing tension between the US and USSR, Embassy Ottawa reports.
Trudeau will stress revitalized contact between Western and Soviet
bloc leaders to reduce the isolation of Soviet leadership, and may
suggest that senior Soviet leaders be invited to the US. Trudeau
will propose increased emphasis on MBFR, and may again suggest that
President Reagan offer to go to Stockholm in the next few months.
Trudeau believes such a Stockholm visit could give impetus to a CDE
heads of government meeting, and provide a setting for an informal
meeting with the Soviet leadership. (SECRET/EXDIS)
9. GREECE/SYRIA: RULING PARTIES AGREE TO STRENGTHEN TIES
The ruling parties of Greece and Syria have signed a draft agreement
pledging increased cooperation on Cyprus and Arab-Israeli issues and
in the struggle against foreign bases in Greece. The agreement,
confirmed to Embassy Athens by a PASOK official, was signed in
Damascus in October by the Greek deputy foreign minister, who is also
chief of PASOK's international relations committee.
INR Comment: Despite the inflamatory rhétoric, this party-to-party
agreement probably has little substantive policy significance. While
Papandreou prides himself on warm ties with the Arabs, Athens and
Damascus already generally support one another in international
fora. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
56164
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 15, 1983
1. US-SYRIAN CONFRONTATION IN LEBANON: TIME IS ON SYRIA'S SIDE
Damascus regards US strategy as based on a false premise--that
the US can and will outlast Syria in a political and military
confrontation over Lebanon. Syria is confident that the US, like
Israel, will eventually seek to cut its losses and leave Lebanon.
Thus Assad feels compulsion to compromise with Gemayel or
give the US an easy "out" from Lebanon.
*
*
Repeated firing at US aircraft has demonstrated Syria's
determination to resist the application of the US "stick."
Damascus' military confidence stems from the assumption that the
US is either unable or unwilling to take the military measures,
including the deployment of ground forces, which would be needed
to oblige Syria to leave Lebanon and relinquish control over its
allied militias. Damascus also judges that the US has failed to
enlist the IDF to act on behalf of the US. In the Syrian
assessment, the US is now acting as an ally of the Maronites,
willing to become engaged in an interminable sequence of attacks
and counterattacks against their Syrian foes.
Syria has made pointed reference, in recent exchanges, to its
restraining influence on the Druze militia. If the US chooses to
act as yet another armed force in Lebanon, the Syrians are clearly
hinting, this restraint is likely to end, with increased targeting
of US forces.
At the same time Gemayel's apparent rejection of a
Syrian-brokered resolution to Lebanon's political problems at
Geneva has made extrication of US forces more difficult. Had
Gemayel adhered to the commitments he appears to have given to
Damascus after the conclusion of Geneva I and reached agreement
with Syria on the formation of a national unity government based
on Syrian interests, the US would have had the opportunity to
withdraw its MNF contingent. The ostensible goals of a "reformed"
Lebanese government and a cessation of militia hostilities would
have been attained. Gemayel's reversal and US use of military
force have indefinitely closed this possible "out."
Damascus believes that the US has decided it can outlast Syria
in Lebanon. Even so, the Syrians are convinced that US interest
in Lebanon is inherently transitory--while Syrian interest is
permanent--and that they need not seek an exit for their forces.
Damascus expects the US to tire of the Lebanese political swamp as
did Israel--sooner rather than later. Assad is counting on US
domestic factors, personnel losses, and disenchantment with
Gemayel's schemes for drawing Washington into ever deeper
association with Maronite policies to combine to bring about US
disengagement from Lebanon. Thus the Syrians calculate that they
have nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by simply waiting
for this process to mature.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
NLRR M2008-098/64
56164
DV
NADA
DATE
SECRET/EXDIS
-2-
2. CHINA: DENG AND HU REBOUND
Deng Xiaoping and his supporters seem to have regained some of
the political initiative lost earlier to more orthodox leadership
elements. The campaign to eliminate "spiritual pollution" has
suddenly been diluted and for the time being attention has
returned to Deng's original October agenda--the overhaul of party
personnel. This situation may have facilitated Beijing's recent
moves to put the Sino-US leadership exchange and Hong Kong
negotiations back on track.
*
*
*
Chinese media, focused since late October on criticism of
"liberal" thinking and decadent lifestyles, has begun to shift
back to cleansing the party and to publicizing punishment of
Cultural Revolution activists and corrupt central officials.
Official comments and the media have also reined in the campaign
against spiritual pollution calling for leniency for those found
guilty of wayward thinking. Domestic and foreign concern over the
course of the campaign may have helped Deng turn the tide.
In a striking reversal that underscores recent high-level
disagreements, a central directive has ordered that the spiritual
pollution campaign not be extended to the rural areas. This
aborts an effort to criticize "capitalist" peasant attitudes
announced just one month earlier in a People's Daily editorial.
In another about-face, at the just-concluded round of Sino-British
talks Beijing resumed constructive dialogue on the post-1997
administration of Hong Kong, having last month unexpectedly
retreated to an unproductive exchange on the highly sensitive
sovereignty issue.
There still seem to be differences within the leadership on
how to proceed with party reform and criticism of spiritual
pollution. So far, there has been no People's Daily editorial or
authoritative comment from Deng himself to clarify matters. The
available evidence suggests that Deng's speech addressing both
issues at the plenum in early October was ambiguous and has been
interpreted variously to suit conflicting interests.
In the weeks ahead, Deng and Hu will probably work to reduce
spiritual pollution to a slogan and exploit the lack of coherence
and strength among the disparate elements of the opposition. The
key question is whether the Dengists will be able to push ahead
with a meaningful rectification campaign or whether it too will be
muted. The Dengists face a considerable challenge in regaining
lost momentum, since many who would have spoken against party
abuses may still hesitate.
SECRET/EXDIS
CONF IDENTIAL
-3-
3. CHAD: TRYING TO PUT HUMPTY DUMPTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN
Four months of intense diplomatic activity have wrung
agreement from President Habre and his Libyan-backed rival,
Goukouni Weddeye, to meet in Addis Ababa on January 9 for
OAU-sponsored discussions. Even if the meeting does not founder
over Goukouni's objections to Habre's being invited as head of the
Chadian government, it is doubtful that a new political settlement
is feasible. None of Chad's warlords who are to meet in Addis
Ababa can rally both Arabs in the north and blacks in the south to
support a national government in N'Djamena. Even Habre's
reputation as a national leader is being put to the test in
negotiations with a sizeable well-armed force of unaffiliated
southerners demanding an end to northern abuses in the area.
*
*
*
Nigerian support for Habre has largely evaporated since
Libya's invasion and occupation of northern Chad last summer.
While the Nigerians do not want a Libyan-dominated regime at their
doorstep, they feel that Habre's overaggressiveness against the
insurgents in the first half of 1983 brought this danger closer.
Also, many OAU members have concluded that Habre has failed to
instill confidence in his government among southerners or to stem
violence there by his forces.
Southern soldiers of Chad's national army who went into hiding
when Habre seized power in June 1982 have recently resurfaced as
well-organized and well-armed forces rivaling Habre's troop
strength in the south. While they owe their resurgence to
Libyan-supplied arms, they claim to want an accommodation with
Habre's government. Negotiations with leaders of this force have
bogged down over their demand that Habre withdraw his troops from
the south and Habre's intention to reassign and integrate the
rebel force with his own army. A breakdown of these talks could
lead to a serious uprising in the south. Should Habre prevail, he
would gain stature as a national leader.
Goukouni is also having his problems. The Libyans have made
no secret of their willingness to dump Goukouni if this would pave
the way to remove Habre. Much of the diplomatic activity,
particularly by the French, has consisted of casting about for
acceptable figures to participate in an effective government.
However, it is difficult to envisage Habre voluntarily
surrendering any real power to his present enemies.
Reconciliation prospects remain dim.
CONF IDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 14, 1983
Current Reports
1. Lebanon
pl
A. INR Military Update
B. Syria Claims Rumsfeld Talks Threatened
2. Iran-Iraq
A. Iraq Ready To Attack Kharg Island
B. Further Iraqi Attacks in the Gulf
C. Soviet Arms Delivery
3. Palestinians Suggest Two-Stage Peace Process
4. USSR
A. Gromyko Confirms Soviet Intention To Attend CDE
B. Soviet Official on INF Policy
5. Nicaragua
A. Cuba Sending Civilian "Brigades"
B. Borge Says Regime Ready To Improve Relations
6. Angola: French Perspective
Analysis
1. Canada: Why the Trudeau Initiative?
2. Lebanon: Can the LAF Take the Shuf?
3. Thailand: Sitthi and Thai Foreign Policy
DECLASSIFIED F97-044/126
Classified
by:
M.
Charles
Hill
and
Hugh Montgomery
BY GS NLS NARA, DATE 1/11/0 i
Declassify on:
Originating Agency's
Determination Required
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M08-098/6 56167
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
56167
BY LOJ NARA DATE 5/6/10
CURRENT REPORTS
December 14, 1983
1. LEBANON
A. INR Military Update
Antiaircraft gunners in Syrian-held territory fired at US recon-
naissance aircraft December 13, and US ships returned fire on three
preselected antiaircraft positions in accordance with what the US
Navy has described as new rules of engagement. Meanwhile, Israeli
naval units bombarded Arafat's positions in the Tripoli area in an
apparent effort to delay the evacuation. Elsewhere, artillery
exchanges broke out along the Alayh ridgeline and in the Ash
Shuwayfat suburb of Beirut. (SECRET
E.O. 12958
As Amended
(See Item 2, Analysis, for related information.)
Sec. 1.4.(c)
B. Syria Claims Rumsfeld Talks Threatened
Foreign Minister Khaddam told Ambassador Paganelli that US recon-
naissance flights and naval gunfire directed at Syrian positions
December 13 could make it difficult to hold discussions with Ambas-
sador Rumsfeld. Khaddam said the US actions were a "premeditated
provocation," and claimed Syria will respond to "the source" of the
US shelling. Khaddam argued that the Lebanese government had not
approved the overflights, but that such approval would be insuffi-
cient in any case. He said the US seems intent on provoking a mil-
itary exchange that the Syrians do not want and that will turn Arab
public opinion against the US. (SECRET/EXDIS)
2. IRAN/IRAQ
A. Iraq Ready To Attack Kharg Island
The long-anticipated attack on Kharg Island appears to be imminent,
USINT Baghdad reports. Indications of an attack include intensified
Iraqi air and naval activity, press and official statements, and
Baghdad's perception of increasingly sympathetic world opinion and
superpower understanding. Iraq is prepared to make a massive strike,
and the December 12 terrorist attacks in Kuwait--apparently backed by
Iran--may provide a receptive public atmosphere for such action.
USINT Comment: Iraq knows that failure to change the course of the
war could be fatal, and this factor overrides all other Iraqi con-
siderations. Although Baghdad genuinely wants improved relations
with the US, it cannot be restrained from escalation in the absence
of a diplomatic breakthrough on the war. (SECRET/EXDIS)
B. Further Iraqi Attacks in the Gulf
In a public communique issued December 13, Baghdad held Iran
responsible for the bombing in Kuwait and promised retaliation on
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
E.O. 12958
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
As Amended
Sec. 1.4.(c)
- 2 -
behalf of the Arab world by attacking "selected Iranian targets. =
Meanwhile, a December 11
Other
show that Iraq
is moving a large number of aircraft to its southern airfields.
INR Comment: Iraq increasingly is shifting to an offensive military
posture in the Gulf and is looking for any pretext to strike "Iranian
naval targets" (i.e., commercial shipping). (TOP SECRET
C. Soviet Arms Delivery to Iran
Eighteen Soviet BM-21 multiple rocket launchers were seen on flat
railroad cars at Jolfa on the Soviet-Iranian border in December 12
imagery. Jolfa is the only rail-to-rail transshipment point between
the two countries that changes from Soviet to Iranian railway gauge.
INR Comment: This is the first time we have detected a direct
delivery of major military equipment from the USSR to Iran since the
Shah's fall. However, Libya and Syria have delivered Soviet-origin
hardware to Iran, presumably with Soviet consent. (SECRET/NOFORN)
3. PALESTINIANS SUGGEST TWO-STAGE PEACE PROCESS
West Bank leaders and senior PLO officials believe it is possible to
handle negotiations with Jordan and Israel in stages, the first of
which would not include the PLO, Consulate General Jerusalem
reports. Palestinians claim that Arafat and the PLO will never agree
to give King Hussein and the Palestinians the mandate to resolve the
Palestinian problem in its entirety. The Palestinians say, however,
they may be able to "borrow" the PLO's mandate and join Hussein in a
first-stage negotiation with Israel for the end of the occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza. The issues of final peace and Palestinian
rights would be left for a later phase in which the PLO would
participate. Senior Fatah officials are said to be agreeable,
provided the PLO could maintain its role and claim to speak for the
broader Palestinian community. (SECRET/EXDIS)
4. USSR
A. Gromyko Confirms Soviet Intention To Attend CDE
In a speech for visiting Finnish Foreign Minister Vayrynen on
December 13, Gromyko said that he hoped all delegations would arrive
in Stockholm with "good intentions."
INR Comment: Gromyko's comments assume the USSR will not boycott
CDE, but do not answer the question of whether Gromyko himself will
attend. (CONFIDENTIAL)
B. Soviet Official on INF Policy
According to a clandestine report, the Soviet permanent
representative to the UN in Geneva stated in late November that
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
- 3 -
Moscow had decided to adopt a policy of toughness, but would attempt
not to appear more bellicose than the US. Soviet propaganda on arms
control would be stepped up in order to provide more ammunition to
pacifist and anti-nuclear movements in the West.
INR Comment: This recent report dovetails with what we have seen the
last several weeks: Soviet commentary is stressing the limited
nature of Moscow's countermeasures. At the same time, spokesmen such
as Ustinov are charging the US with making "direct preparations for
war." (SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS)
5. NICARAGUA
A. Cuba Sending Civilian
E.O. 12968
Havana will send to Nicaragua an unknown number of civilian
As Amended
made up of agricultural workers and health care
Sec. 1.4.(c)
professionals,
The
agricultural
will remain one month while the others will
stay for three to six months.
INR Comment: Other intelligence indicates that Cuba recently may
have withdrawn some dependents and non-essential civilian personnel
from Nicaragua. But this report indicates that Havana has not
decided to recall all its civilian advisors. (SECRET
B. Borge Says Regime Ready to Improve Relations
Interior Minister Borge told Senator Moynihan December 9 that
Nicaragua is fully prepared to improve relations with the US, and
reiterated the regime's desire for a serious dialogue, Embassy
Managua reports. Borge stressed that recent conciliatory gestures
were not the result of US pressure or military actions, asserting
that Managua did not feel threatened by the contras or the CIA. He
asserted that the USSR and the Sandinistas had never discussed Soviet
bases in Nicaragua, and denied foreign military bases would ever be
allowed there. Borge remarked that an agreement to limit the size of
Central American armies is needed, and that Nicaragua wants an end to
arms shipments. (CONFIDENTIAL)
6. ANGOLA: FRENCH PERSPECTIVE
Guy Penne recently said that Angolan officials denied ever having
discussed dealing with UNITA within their own councils, and that
France had not offered to play a role in any reconciliation, Embassy
Paris reports. The Angolans said it was impossible to consider
dealing with UNITA and claimed to be reorganizing their war effort.
They said they were willing to resume talks with South Africa in
secret, but warned that increased South African support for UNITA
would result in internationalization of the conflict.
Embassy Comment: Despite Penne's denial, the French probably pro-
posed a role for themselves in a reconciliation effort. The Angolans
clearly were threatening a more direct Soviet role in their reference
to an expanded conflict. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
54168
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 14, 1983
1. CANADA: WHY THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE?
Prime Minister Trudeau's new peace effort apparently was
triggered by his concern over the arms race, his perception of a
role for Canada in "energizing" arms talks, and his hope that his
campaign could boost his sagging Liberal party. Despite faint
international praise for his proposals, Trudeau believes there is
support for Canada to articulate world concern over nuclear
weapons and that now--prior to the Stockholm CDE--is the time to
strengthen this support.
*
*
*
Trudeau reportedly decided on his initiative after the KAL
incident highlighted the risk of overreaction by a nuclear power.
His plan was conceived vaguely and has been kept flexible. His
soundings have elicited only token support, but he apparently
felt reassured by Commonwealth leaders in New Delhi on the need
to "inject political energy" into nuclear disarmament discussions.
Domestically the initiative can do Trudeau no harm, and the
Liberals will use it to try to overcome a two-to-one Conservative
lead in opinion polls. However, foreign policy is not a vote
getter in Canada, and Trudeau may have trouble marketing his ini-
tiative effectively. His support of cruise missile testing in
Canada gives him credibility as a spokesman for a balanced
approach to arms control, but it detracts from his plan's appeal
to the Canadian peace constituency.
Trudeau nonetheless may be able to strengthen the tradi-
tional Canadian nonpartisanship on foreign policy which supported
Lester Pearson's Nobel-winning efforts in the fifties. The
Conservatives' appointment of former Prime Minister Joe Clark as
their disarmament spokesman adds emphasis to Canada's special
credentials in this area. Clark has invoked the nonpartisan
theme and has refrained from criticizing Trudeau's proposals.
Trudeau's next step is not clear. He probably hopes Canada
will be a rallying point for the non-nuclear nations at
Stockholm, as it was at Delhi, despite his failure to bring about
summit-level participation at the CDE. Shortly he must redirect
his efforts to domestic concerns and the probable mid-1984 elec-
tion. Still, with chances of succeeding himself obviously slim,
Trudeau may persevere with his initiative--which attests to his
long interest in peace efforts--since this will be his last
opportunity to do so as a world leader. Neither influence nor
Nobel prizes accrue as readily to retired statesmen.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M2008-098/G456168
BY smp NARA DATE 10/15/08
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
SECRET/NOPORN
- 2 -
2. LEBANON: CAN THE LAF TAKE THE SHUF?
The LAF is not capable at present of taking control of the
Shuf. A political accommodation recognizing Druze supremacy in
the Shuf could resolve the conflict for now, but probably would
preclude deployment of the LAF into the area.
*
*
*
The LAF could not defeat the Druze in the Shuf, who have a
6,000-man militia and 35,000 part-time fighters. LAF troops
would face a system of flexible village defense and tenacious
mountain fighters familiar with the terrain.
The main Druze military weaknesses are their limited popula-
tion base--180,000 people--and their dependence on Syria for
support. The LAF, however, is incapable of undertaking a sus-
tained campaign on the ground that would inflict heavy losses on
the Druze, and Syria doubtless would provide the Druze with all
the materiel they require.
If the LAF were to initiate a major infantry campaign, it
probably would suffer significant losses. Weak leadership at the
mid-levels and the lack of a cohesive national spirit would lead
to further confessional defections. In the fighting last Septem-
ber, for instance, many Druze fighters in the LAF defected. Some
Muslim soldiers deserted as well.
In addition to stepping up supplies to the Druze, Syria also
might respond to an LAF offensive by providing artillery support
from positions in the Metn, by giving more SA-7's and anti-
aircraft guns to the Druze, and by encouraging Palestinians and
Lebanese militias to attack the central government.
Despite Walid Jumblatt's present relationship with Damascus,
he deeply distrusts the Syrians and believes they killed his
father. As a consequence, he probably hopes for an accommodation
with President Gemayel that will give the Druze a larger voice in
the central government and permit them a predominant role in the
Shuf. Reaching such an accommodation would be very difficult,
but not so difficult as trying to impose a military solution.
SECRET/NOFORN
CONFIDENTIAL/NOPORN
- 3 -
3. THAILAND: SITTHI AND THAI FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign Minister Sitthi's visit to Washington comes at a
time when both his domestic position and Thai-US relations are
strong. His intelligent, energetic stewardship of Thai foreign
policy has enhanced Thailand's international prestige and
afforded him a secure notch within the Thai leadership. Sitthi's
close association with all major foreign policy positions, how-
ever, makes him vulnerable if his controversial policies on
Kampuchea and China suffer significant setbacks.
*
*
*
During Sitthi's nearly four years as foreign minister,
Thailand's principal foreign policy concern has been the
Kampuchean situation. Thailand's Sitthi-devised policy
consistently has stressed a combination of military, political,
and economic pressure on Hanoi to withdraw its forces from
Kampuchea. Sitthi has worked ceaselessly to garner and coordi-
nate international support while appearing receptive to any
genuine Vietnamese desire to negotiate a reasonable settlement.
The relative success so far of Sitthi's Kampuchean policy,
support from Prem, widespread respect for the foreign minister's
expertise, and Thai nationalism have enabled Sitthi to persevere
and have enhanced his prestige. His current popularity was
reflected in his landslide election to parliament last April and
subsequent leading role in one of Thailand's prominent political
parties.
Sitthi's advocacy of a confrontational posture toward Hanoi
has exposed him to domestic criticism, however--and to dismissal
if the policy should be seen as failing. A minority in the Thai
leadership is disconcerted particularly by Bangkok's close coop-
eration with China and increasingly active support for the
anti-Vietnamese Khmer resistance. These elements fear that this
approach could lead to military confrontation with Vietnam or, in
the long term, Chinese dominance of the region. A major
Vietnamese incursion into Thailand that caused a significant loss
of Thai life and property could create a political crisis for
Sitthi and Prime Minister Prem. A loss of support from ASEAN
also would cause serious dilemmas for Thailand.
Sitthi is a close friend of the US and has endeavored to
strengthen ties. He is careful to maintain a measure of inde-
pendence from Washington, however, both for domestic political
reasons and Third World credibility.
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
MORNING SUMMARY
December 13, 1983
Current Reports
1. Syria: Assad's Health
PR
2. USSR
A. Gromyko May Not Meet the Secretary in Stockholm
B. Shutting Down Dialogue with US?
C. MBFR Walkout Possible
3. Nicaragua
A. Military Exercise near Honduran Border
B. Arms Delivery Update
4. USSR: Pravda on US-Israeli Agreement
5. Angola/Namibia: South African Buildup Continues
6. Iraq/France: New Iraqi F-1 To Be Exocet Equipped
7. Israel: Discouraging Palestinian Contacts with Egypt, Jordan?
8. Chad/Libya: Libya Strengthens Defenses
Analysis
1. Kuwait: A Message from the Ayatollah
2. USSR: Badger Aircraft Deploy to Cam Ranh
3. Venezuela: New Government Will Push for Debt Rescheduling
Classified by: M. Charles Hill and
DECLASSIFIED
Hugh Montgomery
NLS F97-044/, #29 Declassify on: Originating Agency's
Determination Required
BY Cts NARA, DATE 1/17/01 TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
13526
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
56169
E.O.42053
CURRENT REPORTS
Sec. 3.3b(i)
1.4c
December 13, 1983
2.
USSR
A. Gromyko May Not Meet the Secretary in Stockholm
First Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko recently told the Turkish am-
bassador that the "bare minimum of understanding" for a Shultz-
Gromyko meeting does not now exist, Embassy Moscow reports. He also
indicated that Moscow has made an "almost final" decision not to
agree to such a meeting. Kornienko hinted that, after completing a
review of NATO deployment, the USSR may be willing to resume START
talks, but will not return to a separate INF forum. (SECRET/EXDIS)
B. Shutting Down Dialogue with US?
There is mounting evidence that the Soviets, after a major reassess-
ment of US-Soviet relations, have decided to create the impression
that dialogue with the US has broken down and that relations are
worsening, Embassy Moscow reports. The November reassessment dealt
with policy options through the US presidential election, the outcome
of which may now be the primary determinant of Soviet policy.
Embassy Comment: Recent Soviet moves in arms control talks and com-
plaints about US inflexibility suggest Moscow believes President Rea-
gan is politically vulnerable on US-USSR relations. The Soviets,
determined to create problems for the President, appear ready to
exploit US and European fears about the relationship by closing some
bilateral channels. (SECRET/EXDIS)
C. MBFR Walkout Possible
Recent Soviet actions on the START and INF talks, and the East's
failure so far to respond to the Western proposal to begin the next
round of MBFR negotiations on January 26 substantially increase the
TOP SECRET/EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED N PART
NLRR MD8-098/4+56169
BY RW NARA DATE 1/14/13
TOP SECRET/EXDIS
- 2 -
possiblity that Moscow may suspend MBFR talks after the current round
ends December 15, USDEL MBFR Vienna reports.
USDEL Comment: The Soviets may decline to set a date for the begin-
ning of the next MBFR round, as they did with START. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4. USSR: PRAVDA ON US-ISRAELI AGREEMENT
An authoritative December 10 Pravda editorial described the recent
US-Israeli agreement as a major new threat to Arab interests, and at-
tempted to drive a wedge between the US and the Gemayel regime, Em-
bassy Moscow reports. The article went further than earlier Pravda
pieces in portraying Gemayel as a victim of the "aggressive US-
Israeli axis," and charged the US with undermining the reconciliation
process. Pravda encouraged the Arabs to cooperate in opposing the
new US-Israeli "threat," and limited any Soviet commitment to an
offer of "solidarity" with "Lebanese, Syrians, and other Arab
peoples."
Embassy Comment: The stridency of Pravda's attack indicates serious
Soviet concern that Syria's willingness to see Ambassador Rumsfeld
means Damascus could be maneuvered into cooperating with the US in
Lebanon. (CONFIDENTIAL)
TOP SECRET EXDIS
Luanda
ZAIRE
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
ANGOLA
Menongue
Lubango
ZAMBIA
Namibe
Mulondo
Chibemba
Cuvelai
Cahama
Mupa
Area Occupied
Cunene
Ngiva
by South Africa
Rio
.
Ondangwa
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
o
100
200 kllometers
0
100
200 miles
- 3 -
INR Comment: The editorial referred to an international conference
on the Middle East, an element missing from recent Soviet state-
ments. At a recent meeting with US academics in Moscow, Soviet
"unofficial" spokesmen described at length what form such a confer-
ence might take, suggesting that Moscow is still interested in the
idea. (SECRET/EXDIS)
7. ISRAEL: DISCOURAGING PALESTINIAN CONTACTS WITH EGYPT, JORDAN?
A Jordanian diplomat told Embassy Amman December 12 that Israel re-
cently changed its policy regarding contacts by West Bank and Gaza
Palestinians. The official claimed to have received reports that
Israeli officials told Gazans to stop attempts to contact Egypt and
discouraged Palestinians from holding talks with Jordan. The
official claimed the Israeli actions represent a definite change in
Tel Aviv's policy. (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS)
TOP SECRET/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
56170
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 13, 1983
1. KUWAIT: A MESSAGE FROM THE AYATOLLAH
The bombings in Kuwait for which the "Islamic Jihad" organi-
zation has claimed credit, appear designed to demonstrate that
Kuwait--and by extension, the other Gulf states--are vulnerable
to the forces of Islamic fundamentalism. Bombings elsewhere in
the Gulf may follow, as Islamic fanatics attempt to drive home
their message.
*
*
*
The bombings show that, despite heightened concern about
fundamentalist subversion, Kuwait's internal monitoring capabili-
ties remain inadequate. By striking targets such as embassies
and government installations, the perpetrators mean to convey the
regime's incompetence and vulnerability. There may be other
political messages: Iran can and will respond on several levels
to continuing Iraqi attacks on its Gulf naval targets; Kuwaiti
(and other Gulf states) support for Iraq will not go unpunished;
the Gulf states should draw no closer to the US since the US
cannot guarantee their internal security; and Iraqi dissidents
should note that Iraq's foreign supporters are weak and unable to
see Saddam Hussein through his political ordeal.
Other Gulf governments cannot fail to realize that they are
mostly as vulnerable as Kuwait. Cooperation on internal secur-
ity, including intelligence exchanges, has increased recently.
However, the Gulf states have large expatriate populations,
imperfectly integrated minorities, and coastlines that cannot
effectively be sealed against infiltration.
Oman aside, the Gulf states have been unwilling until very
recently to contemplate close security cooperation with the US.
The regional perception of new US-Israeli collaboration rein-
forces this reticence. However, Iran's threats have forced the
Gulf states to recognize their dependence on the US for a
credible deterrent or response to an Iranian military action.
The bombings in Kuwait emphasize the Gulf states' need for
protection against Iran, but do so in an area--internal secur-
ity--in which US help is less able to be effective. Moreover,
greater overt cooperation with the US could provide the fanatics
with additional incentives. Kuwait's experience will nonetheless
force the Gulf states to recognize they are already threatened.
In response, they will most likely strengthen their desire to
enlist US help against Iran, while trying not to be seen as doing
so.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
CONF IDENTIAL
NLRR M08-098/6#56170
BY LOJ NARA DATE 5/6/10
Hanoi
SECRET
China
Burma
Laos
Philippine
Sea
Thailand
Vietnam
South
0
Philippines
Guam
Kampuchea
0
China
(U.S.)
Cam Ranh
Sea
0
Ho Chi Minh City
Do
Caroline Islands
Trust Territory of the
Brunei
Pacific Islands
(U.K.) OU
Malaysia
(U.S.)
Pacific
Malaysia
Un-refueled
Badger Range
Ocean
$
Indonesia
Indonesia,
1
?
Papua
+
New Guinea
Jakarta
a
Indian
0
0
Ocean
International boundary
=
+
National capital
0
500 Kilometers
Australia
0
500 Miles
SECRET
NOF ORN
- 2 -
2. USSR: BADGER AIRCRAFT DEPLOY TO CAM RANH
The Soviets have for years tried to get accepted as a power
in southeast Asia. The use of the Cam Ranh Bay airfield seems to
be expanding--nine Soviet navy TU-16/BADGERs recently deployed
there--giving the Soviets a beginning toward that long-sought
objective. Soviet air assets in Vietnam previously had amounted
to only four BEAR reconnaissance planes. The BADGERS may be used
in part for reconnaissance, but five of them have the potential
to conduct anti-shipping missile attacks.
*
*
*
Between November 15 and December 2 the Soviets deployed five
BADGER C strike aircraft, two BADGER A tankers, one BADGER E
reconnaissance aircraft, and one BADGER J electronic-warfare
aircraft to Vietnam. None of the strike aircraft carried
missiles en route, and no indications of missiles have been seen
.O. 12958
Amended
at the airfield. Nevertheless, they could rapidly be brought in
by air if they are not already there.
The Soviets have prepared for this deployment probably for
over a year. Construction began on at least 12 support buildings
in Cam Ranh in November 1982, according to imagery.
A five-fold
increase in aircraft support vehicles was observed last summer.
We are likely to see a continuous BADGER presence at Cam
Ranh from now on. Indeed, there is sufficient space, fuel
storage, and ground equipment present to support a BADGER strike
regiment (about 36 aircraft). But the absence of hangars and of
a regimental maintenance unit suggests that a deployment of this
magnitude is not planned in the immediate future. More likely, a
composite squadron of 10 to 15 BADGERS will be maintained at the
base, at least for the time being.
Although the BADGERS' mission is not yet clear, we suspect
the main purpose of the deployment is to demonstrate that the
USSR is a power in southeast Asia. The nine BADGERs now at Cam
Ranh are sufficient to deliver this message to states in the
region. These aircraft will probably conduct training, familiar-
ization, and reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea
during the next few months (see map).
SECRET
NOFORN
- 3 -
3. VENEZUELA: NEW GOVERNMENT WILL PUSH FOR DEBT RESCHEDULING
President-elect Lusinchi has stated that rescheduling
Venezuela's $25.3 billion public external debt will be his top
priority. He also has pledged to facilitate the repayment of
private debt and to push for a settlement of old oil nationali-
zation claims. Although Lusinchi won by a large majority, he may
have trouble garnering support to carry out economic reform due
to disagreements among his economic advisers and within his party.
*
*
*
Lusinchi would prefer to complete the rescheduling of public
sector debt without having to submit to an IMF stabilization
program. Venezuela's creditors are likely to acquiesce if
Lusinchi can devise and enforce his own austerity plan. This
would have to include unifying the exchange rate, cutting the
fiscal deficit, streamlining the public sector, and relaxing
price controls. Rescheduling discussions with creditors have
been at a stalemate since last spring, when the Herrera govern-
ment refused to accept IMF conditionality and was uncooperative
with bankers.
Lusinchi has already begun to talk with bankers in an effort
to improve Venezuela's image. With $12 billion in reserves
(about half of which is liquid) and a steady, albeit reduced,
income from petroleum, Venezuela is under far less pressure than
many of its Latin neighbors. Of the $25.3 billion public debt,
over $18 billion falls due in 1983 and 1984. If Venezuela can
restructure the debt so that payments are stretched over seven or
eight years, it should be able to meet the payments without addi-
tional borrowing.
Caracas has thus far avoided default on its official debt
by rolling over maturing obligations. No principal and little
interest have been paid on the $14 billion private debt since
exchange restrictions were imposed last February. Private
arrearages now exceed $700 million. Importers were promised
foreign exchange at the rate of 4.3 bolivars per dollar to honor
debt incurred before February, but bureaucratic infighting has
prevented the release of funds. Lusinchi has renewed the
promise, and qualified debtors hope to receive dollars shortly
after the February 1 presidential inauguration.
Lusinchi has also promised to unify the exchange rate and
will probably set it around 12 bolivars to the dollar. This
would increase the cost of agricultural imports and make his
attempts to decontrol prices even more unpopular. Because his
predecessor delayed taking unpopular decisions, Lusinchi may have
trouble mobilizing public support for the overdue austerity
measures.
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/EXDIS
CONFIDENTIAL
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - DECEMBER 13, 1983
1. KUWAIT: A MESSAGE FROM THE AYATOLLAH
The bombings in Kuwait for which the "Islamic Jihad" organi-
zation has claimed credit, appear designed to demonstrate that
Kuwait--and by extension, the other Gulf states--are vulnerable
to the forces of Islamic fundamentalism. Bombings elsewhere in
the Gulf may follow, as Islamic fanatics attempt to drive home
their message.
*
*
*
The bombings show that, despite heightened concern about
fundamentalist subversion, Kuwait's internal monitoring capabili-
ties remain inadequate. By striking targets such as embassies
and government installations, the perpetrators mean to convey the
regime's incompetence and vulnerability. There may be other
political messages: Iran can and will respond on several levels
to continuing Iraqi attacks on its Gulf naval targets; Kuwaiti
(and other Gulf states) support for Iraq will not go unpunished;
the Gulf states should draw no closer to the US since the US
cannot guarantee their internal security; and Iraqi dissidents
should note that Iraq's foreign supporters are weak and unable to
see Saddam Hussein through his political ordeal.
Other Gulf governments cannot fail to realize that they are
mostly as vulnerable as Kuwait. Cooperation on internal secur-
ity, including intelligence exchanges, has increased recently.
However, the Gulf states have large expatriate populations,
imperfectly integrated minorities, and coastlines that cannot
effectively be sealed against infiltration.
Oman aside, the Gulf states have been unwilling until very
recently to contemplate close security cooperation with the US.
The regional perception of new US-Israeli collaboration rein-
forces this reticence. However, Iran's threats have forced the
Gulf states to recognize their dependence on the US for a
credible deterrent or response to an Iranian military action.
The bombings in Kuwait emphasize the Gulf states' need for
protection against Iran, but do so in an area--internal secur-
ity--in which US help is less able to be effective. Moreover,
greater overt cooperation with the US could provide the fanatics
with additional incentives. Kuwait's experience will nonetheless
force the Gulf states to recognize they are already threatened.
In response, they will most likely strengthen their desire to
enlist US help against Iran, while trying not to be seen as doing
so.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-044 #31
By
GS
NARA, Date 1/17/01
CONEIDENTIAL
Hanoi
SECRET
China
Burma
Laos
Philippine
Sea
Thailand
Vietnam
South
0
Philippines
Guam
Kampuchea
0
China
(U.S.)
Cam Ranh
Sea
0
Ho Chi Minh City
:
Caroline Islands
Trust Territory of the
Brunei
(U.K.)
Pacific Islands
10
Malaysia
(U.S.)
Pacific
Malaysia
Un-refueled
Badger Range
Ocean
:
Indonesia
Indonesia
0
BD
?
Papua
New Guinea
Jakarta
Indian
Ocean
International boundary
"
National capital
0
500 Kilometers
Australia
0
500 Miles
SECRET
NOFORN
- 2 -
2. USSR: BADGER AIRCRAFT DEPLOY TO CAM RANH
The Soviets have for years tried to get accepted as a power
in southeast Asia. The use of the Cam Ranh Bay airfield seems to
be expanding--nine Soviet navy TU-16/BADGERs recently deployed
there--giving the Soviets a beginning toward that long-sought
objective. Soviet air assets in Vietnam previously had amounted
to only four BEAR reconnaissance planes. The BADGERS may be used
in part for reconnaissance, but five of them have the potential
to conduct anti-shipping missile attacks.
*
*
*
Between November 15 and December 2 the Soviets deployed five
BADGER C strike aircraft, two BADGER A tankers, one BADGER E
reconnaissance aircraft, and one BADGER J electronic-warfare
aircraft to Vietnam. None of the strike aircraft carried
missiles en route, and no indications of missiles have been seen
at the airfield. Nevertheless, they could rapidly be brought in
by air if they are not already there.
We are likely to see a continuous BADGER presence at Cam
Ranh from now on. Indeed, there is sufficient space, fuel
storage, and ground equipment present to support a BADGER strike
regiment (about 36 aircraft). But the absence of hangars and of
a regimental maintenance unit suggests that a deployment of this
magnitude is not planned in the immediate future. More likely, a
composite squadron of 10 to 15 BADGERS will be maintained at the
base, at least for the time being.
Although the BADGERs' mission is not yet clear, we suspect
the main purpose of the deployment is to demonstrate that the
USSR is a power in southeast Asia. The nine BADGERS now at Cam
Ranh are sufficient to deliver this message to states in the
region. These aircraft will probably conduct training, familiar-
ization, and reconnaissance flights over the South China Sea
during the next few months (see map).
SECRET
NOFORN
CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/EXDIS
- 3 -
3. VENEZUELA: NEW GOVERNMENT WILL PUSH FOR DEBT RESCHEDULING
President-elect Lusinchi has stated that rescheduling
Venezuela's $25.3 billion public external debt will be his top
priority. He also has pledged to facilitate the repayment of
private debt and to push for a settlement of old oil nationali-
zation claims. Although Lusinchi won by a large majority, he may
have trouble garnering support to carry out economic reform due
to disagreements among his economic advisers and within his party.
*
*
*
Lusinchi would prefer to complete the rescheduling of public
sector debt without having to submit to an IMF stabilization
program. Venezuela's creditors are likely to acquiesce if
Lusinchi can devise and enforce his own austerity plan. This
would have to include unifying the exchange rate, cutting the
fiscal deficit, streamlining the public sector, and relaxing
price controls. Rescheduling discussions with creditors have
been at a stalemate since last spring, when the Herrera govern-
ment refused to accept IMF conditionality and was uncooperative
with bankers.
Lusinchi has already begun to talk with bankers in an effort
to improve Venezuela's image. With $12 billion in reserves
(about half of which is liquid) and a steady, albeit reduced,
income from petroleum, Venezuela is under far less pressure than
many of its Latin neighbors. Of the $25.3 billion public debt,
over $18 billion falls due in 1983 and 1984. If Venezuela can
restructure the debt so that payments are stretched over seven or
eight years, it should be able to meet the payments without addi-
tional borrowing.
Caracas has thus far avoided default on its official debt
by rolling over maturing obligations. No principal and little
interest have been paid on the $14 billion private debt since
exchange restrictions were imposed last February. Private
arrearages now exceed $700 million. Importers were promised
foreign exchange at the rate of 4.3 bolivars per dollar to honor
debt incurred before February, but bureaucratic infighting has
prevented the release of funds. Lusinchi has renewed the
promise, and qualified debtors hope to receive dollars shortly
after the February 1 presidential inauguration.
Lusinchi has also promised to unify the exchange rate and
will probably set it around 12 bolivars to the dollar. This
would increase the cost of agricultural imports and make his
attempts to decontrol prices even more unpopular. Because his
predecessor delayed taking unpopular decisions, Lusinchi may have
trouble mobilizing public support for the overdue austerity
measures.
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN/EXDIS