NSDD 36 United States Approach to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations II
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OCR Page 1 of 4THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
URCLASSIFIED
May 25 , 1982
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 36
U.S. APPROACH TO START NEGOTIATIONS - II
This Decision Directive supplements NSDD-33 and provides addi-
tional guidance on the U.S. approach to START.
Interim Restraints
United States will not depart from current policy with respect
The existing arms control agreements at this time. At the same
to must recognize that continuing current policy prompts
time, argument we that we are complying with SALT II and should, addition, there-
the fore, ratify it, even though it is seriously flawed. In present
we problems must for certain U.S. force modernization options, particu-
keep in mind that continuing our current policy may
larly for M-X basing.
The following amplification of policy is provided to deal with
the above considerations:
seek to achieve a more stable nuclear balance at
--
As reduced we levels of force, the United States will continue
ing agreements as long as the Soviet Union shows equal
its policy of taking no actions that would undercut exist-
restraint.
--
This policy, however, consciously recognizes the fact that
SALT II is not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal,
and verifiable arms reduction agreement between ourselves occasions
and the Soviet Union. For reasons cited on many mistake
in numerous fora, we believe it would be a major to
attempt to formalize the SALT II agreement's high ceilings
and serious inequalities.
At the same time, increased nuclear stability at reduced
force levels is the most basic U.S. objective. In particu-
essential prerequisite to maintaining our security at reduced
lar, protecting the survivability of our ICBM force is an
levels of forces and has consistently been a goal in previous
negotiations. We believe that actions necessary to ensure
the survivability of our ICBM force are fully consistent with
existing agreements.
Roview May 25 , 2002
Declassified/Released on 8/10/92
Classified and Extended by William P. erark
under provisiens of E.O. 12356
Reason for Extension. NSC 1.
by S. Tilley, National Security Council
DECCASSIPY IN. OADH
UNCLASSIFIED
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