NSDD 70 Nuclear Capable Missile Technology Transfer Policy

3 UNCLASSIRED UNCLASSIFIED contribution to the design, development, production, inspec- tion, testing or use of nuclear capable missile delivery sytems and related components. At a minimum this will in- - clude guidance sub-systems and related software, propellants, propulsion systems, rocket nozzles and related control sub- systems, re-entry sub-systems, missile structure, and unique support equipment. (st (u) The United States will, within the scope of current export authorities: -- Deny approval of export of technology and related knowledge on the design, development, production, inspection, and testing of missile systems and related components that can benefit a recipient's strategic military missile program. (8)(u) -- Generally approve, after case-by-case review, export of dual use equipment that can be judged clearly to be for a valid civil use or clearly to apply to a recipient's peaceful program and clearly is of no more than marginal benefit to a potential recipient's strategic missile program, when consis- tent with the applicable legislation and U.S. policy. (8) (u) The Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce shall ensure that adequate procedures are developed to identify critical export items falling under this directive. (U) In making case-by-case decisions, the agencies and departments will consider: 1. The strategic, technical, economic, qualitative, political and time-dependent nature of the item to a foreign nuclear capable program. 2. Alternative non-U.S. sources for the technology or end-item or comparable and adequate substitutes, with a view towards bilateral discussions with alternate sources to pre- clude foreign availability. 3. The end use of the item. (5) (a) An interagency group chaired by the Department of State, and including representatives from DOD, ACDA, NASA, NSC, OSTP, Commerce and CIA, shall be established to monitor transfer of strategic military missile technology. 1st (a) When, and if, any non-exempt nation is assessed by the inter- agency group as pursuing a nuclear weapon delivery capability, the interagency group shall determine whether exemption status is to be granted to it and shall make a recommendation to the NSC for a decision. An exemption shall be accorded to states such as the United Kingdom, in light of existing U.S. cooperation in the strategic and nuclear fields. (e)(u) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 133018 coptes DAD