NSDD 98 United States Approach to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Negotiations VI

Our current START position includes an associated constraint which limits each side to no more than 850 deployed ballistic missiles. This measure was never viewed as being as useful a constraint as the limit on total ballistic missile warheads. The Scowcroft Commission report suggested specifically that it should be reassessed since the Commission felt it not to be compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single warhead ICBMs. However, there are other considerations which argue for a retention of some limit on deployed missiles. The Soviets are in a better position to deploy large numbers of additional small missiles than we. Elimination of such limits would also impact upon our ability to constrain Soviet refire capability and may make the pursuit of a greater emphasis on the contribution of strategic defense more difficult. Additionally, having limits only on missile warheads, and not on the missiles carrying those warheads, would establish certain precedents that may not be in the U.S. interest with respect to the treatment of bombers and bomber armament. Also, the Soviet Union continues to show an interest in deployed missiles as a unit of account. Acting upon the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation, the U.S will adjust our position with respect to limits on deployed ballistic missiles by relaxing its current proposal for an 850 deployed ballistic missile limit. The U.S. will propose, during the next round, a new limit on deployed ballistic missiles at a higher equal level (up to 1250). and will indicate to the Soviets that the U.S. has some flexibility with respect to agreement on the specific level. THROWWEIGHT It remains the firm U.S. position that the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads must be addressed in START. Constraints on ballistic missile throwweight provide an appropriate mechanism for limiting this destructive capability and potential. Our current position includes a network of collateral constraints immediately applied to address this issue, leading later to the application of direct limits on throwweight. Some have complained that this network of collateral constraints (including the limits on ICBM warheads at 2500, on heavy ICBMs at 110, and on the total of heavy and medium ICBMs at 210) is designed to dictate Soviet force structure according to U.S. standards. This is not the case. I believe, as does the Scowcroft Commission, that stability can be increased by limitations on heavy ICBMs. However, the purpose of the network of collateral constraints that we have proposed is to find an appropriate way to reduce the large asymmetry in ballistic missile throwweight, and thus in the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missile warheads, that now exists between the ballistic missile forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I intend this to later lead to direct and equal limits on ballistic missile throwweight. UNCLASSIFIED