Images (17)
Document
| id |
id
6879749
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 17for
15 UNCLASSIFIEE
show considerable flexibility with respect to formulation and
trade-offs. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through
which equal warhead levels could be reached through equal
percentage reductions on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from
its planned levels of deployment -- 224 GLCM and Pershing II
launchers carrying 572 lissiles/warheads)
In introducing the equal percentage reductions example, the
delegation should take care not to indicate to the Soviets any
acceptance of the principle of equal reductions or equal
percentage reductions per se. When used in situations where there
is not a beginning balance, or where there is not agreement that
the reductions will ultimately lead to equal levels of forces (as
is the case in the U.S. START build-down proposal) equal
percentage reductions do not lead to equal force levels. If
applied in different contexts, the principle of equal reductions
or equal percentage reductions could damage U.S. interests.
If
pressed for an endorsement of the general principle of equal
reductions or equal percentage reductions, the delegation should
note that while the U.S. cannot endorse the general principle, the
LRINF missile issue has some unique features that, in the interest
of making progress on this important issue, may make the use of
the certain specific equal percentage reduction approaches
acceptable to the United States and its Allies within the limited
context of the LRINF missile agreement under discussion.
C. Space Arms Control. In response to initiatives from the
Soviet Union involving space arms control, the U.S. delegation
should remind the Soviet delegation that an extensive body of
international law and treaties exists with respect to space,
including the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Further, the
delegation should point out that it is the Soviet Union which has
the largest number of warheads which would transit space; it is
the Soviet Union which has an existing ASAT system, and it is the
Soviet Union which has a deployed ABM system which can attack
objects in space. The delegation should explain that the United
States is prepared to consider Soviet proposals related to space
during the course of formal negotiations. However, because issues
involving space cannot logically be separated from the major areas
to which they relate, we are only prepared to deal with these
proposals in the context of nuclear offensive and defensive
negotiations as appropriate to each.
d. ASAT Limitations. The U.S. will not propose substantive
ASAT initiatives at this time. If pressed by the Soviet Union for
agreement to an immediate ASAT moratorium, the delegation should
point out that, as the U.S. has consistently made clear, while the
U.S. will not agree to such a proposal as a precondition for
negotiations, in formal negotiations on the full range of nuclear
arms control issues, the United States is prepared to consider
areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context
of a broader range of agreements which would provide for
stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms.
SUNSLASSIFIED
SECRE
Relations
belongs_to