- Part of Numbered National Security Policy Papers, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs)
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Although this has been a fundamental part of U.S. policy
since the inception of my Strategic Defense Initiative, and U.S.
statements have been consistent on this point, we will continue to
consult closely with our allies and to be sensitive to the manner
in which we present and defend the SDI program before allied
audiences. We have made a serious commitment to consult, and such
consultations will precede any steps taken relative to the SDI
research program which may affect our allies.
(U)
8. If and when our research criteria are met, and following
close consultation with our allies, we intend to consult and
negotiate, as appropriate, with the Soviets pursuant to the terms
of the ABM Treaty, which provide for such consultations, on how
deterrence could be enhanced through a greater reliance by both
sides on new defensive systems. This commitment should in no way
be interpreted as according the Soviets a veto over possible
future defensive deployments. And, in fact, we have already been
trying to initiate a discussion of the offense-defense
relationship and stability in the Defense and Space Talks underway
in Geneva to lay the foundation to support such future possible
consultations. (U)
If, at some future time, the U.S., in close consultation with
its allies, decides to proceed with deployment of defensive
systems, we intend to utilize mechanisms for .S./Soviet
consultations provided for in the ABM Treaty. Through such
mechanisms, and taking full account of the Soviet Union's own
expansive defensive systems research program, we will seek to
proceed in a stable fashion with the Soviet Union. (U)
9. It is our intention and our hope that, if new defensive
technologies prove feasible, we (in close and continuing
consultation with our allies) and the Soviets will jointly manage
a transition to a more defense-reliant balance.
(U)
Soviet propagandists have accused the U.S. of reneging on
commitments to prevent an arms race in space. This is clearly not
true. What we envision is not an arms race; rather, it is just
the opposite -- a cooperative approach designed to maintain, at
all times, control over the mix of offensive and defensive systems
of both sides, and thereby increase the confidence of all nations
in the effectiveness and stability of the evolving strategic
balance. (U)
10. SDI represents no change in our commitment to deterring
war and enhancing stability. (U)
Successful SDI research and development of defense options
would not lead to abandonment of deterrence, but rather to an
enhancement of deterrence and an evolution in the weapons of
deterrence through the contribution of defensive systems that
threaten no one. We would deter a potential aggressor by making
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