NSDD 236 Interim Restraint Policy

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED UNCEASSIFIED 3 2. In addition to these numerical limits, what supporting definitions, counting rules, notifications, and procedures (to include dismantlement and destruction procedures) should the U.S. consider? 3. Should the U.S. consider other qualitative limits and restrictions on new types of system in the context of an arrangement that the U.S. views as intended to be of very limited duration, i.e. until we can, in the near future, implement a START agreement, from which it should not divert the two sides. 4. If such elements were considered appropriate and if agreement, in principle, on any of these elements were reached with the Soviet Union, would the U.S. prefer documenting such agreement in the form of a treaty, an executive agreement, or by parallel political commitments (such as were made regarding SALT in 1982) ? In answering the above questions, the study should also include the following: 1. An assessment of the answers to each of the above questions in terms of their precedential implications both on our ability quickly to conclude a START agreement and on our ability to obtain the terms we seek in such an agreement; 2. An assessment, led by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the answers in terms of their impact on U.S. and Allied security and military sufficiency; 3. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of the problems of verification posed by Soviet noncompliance; and 4. An assessment, led by the Director, Central Intelligence, of the answers in terms of their impact on our ability to assess the level and quality of Soviet forces under such arrangements. The study, to be conducted under the direction of National the Arms Control Support Group, should be submitted [X to the Security Council by September 17. SERNELASSIFIED SEGRET UNCLASSIFIED