NSDD 267 Review of United States Arms Reductions Negotiating Positions

SECRET 3 Defense and Space Our principal goal in Defense and Space remains the preservation of our option to deploy, if we chose to do so, advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible. I believe this represents our best hope for shifting the basis of deterrence in the direction of increased international stability and security. Because our past proposal was directly linked to a specific START reductions proposal which we have now altered, a revision of our Defense and Space proposal is also appropriate. I am, therefore, approving the following revision to our position, which the Secretary of State should convey to the Soviets in Moscow: a. Non-Withdrawal. Both parties would commit through 1994 not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational defensive systems whose unilateral deployment presently is not permitted under the ABM Treaty, provided certain other conditions are met (START reductions proceed to 50% as scheduled in accordance with the START Treaty) . b. Freedom to Deploy. After 1994, either side can deploy defensive systems of its choosing under the terms of this agreement and without further reference to the ABM Treaty, unless mutually agreed otherwise. C. ABM Treaty Restrictions. If either side exercises its rights under the conditions of this new agreement to deploy defensive systems of its choosing, any remaining restric- tions on both parties associated with the ABM Treaty will be considered terminated, unless mutually agreed otherwise. d. Nithdrawal/Termination. The U.S. rejects a blanket non-withdrawal commitment. Nothing above alters the sovereign rights of the sides under customary international law, including the right to withdraw were a side to decide that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side must maintain its rights to terminate (in case of a material breach) or to withdraw (in case a side decided its supreme interests were jeopardized) . e. Failure to Meet START Reductions. Any failure to meet the reductions schedule associated with the START Treaty would represent grounds for either side to terminate this agreement and all related commitments associated with the ABM Treaty. f. Entry into Force. This agreement will be documented in the form of a treaty which will not enter into force before the associated treaty covering 50% reductions in strategic offensive forces enters into force. 15th SECRET SECRET