NSDD 290 Instructions for Arms Reduction Discussions at Washington Summit (December 8-10, 1987)
Images (8)
Document
| id |
id
6879866
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 8UNGLASSIFIED
6.
The right to short nglicesitelnspections at
locatig wh re eithfr conhiders covert
deploment, roducti on, torage or #pair of START
systems oul be occarring.
7.
Provislo s F ohibiting the use de concealment or
other ad ivi ies whi h 1 pede verification by
national ted nical m ans would
include ba on tele etry fyption and would
allow fd
fu 1 access o all telemetric infor-
mation b
ast during issil flight.
8.
Measures designed to enhance observation of START-
related activities by national technical means.
These would include open displays of treaty-
limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and
submarine ports at locations and times chosen by
the inspecting party.
(S)
Ballistic Missile War) ad Sublimit
oting Rule Issue.
The Soviet Union has indie ed that i may be pr bared to
consider a sublimit on stic misfile varbeads However, it
has further indicated nat ather tian the imí on ballistic
missile warheads of 00 wh ch we s lek it woul d p1 fer to raise
that sublimit to 50 O 51 0. Bei >re e can onsi ler accepting
such a proposal, r is sse tial thit de have a clear
agreement with the t s de conce rning:
--
an acceptable def mition be appli a t air-launched
cruise missiles (A CMs in STAL (i that only nuclear-
armed ALCMs with a ran in exct S of 1500 Mometers would
be included in the Tre ty's limit
--
the counting rules applied to such ALCMs; and
--
the counting rules that will be applied to the warheads
on existing types of ballistic missiles covered by the START
Treaty. (S)
Should the Soviet Union be prepared to accept (1) a
definition of ALCMs to be vered by as ly nuclear-armed
ALCMs of a range greater n 1500 ki meters,
a counting
rule for such ALCMs genetal y along ne sped fied in item
(b) above, and (3) the coun ing rul for the w. rhe Is on existing
types of ballistic mi siles as speq fie in ite (c above, I am
prepared to conside additi hal fle ibinity wit rempect to the
U.S. position on th se ubl mits as tyet not agried. (TS)
With respect to the AL 1 count ng ule, if neeved, and in
the context of reaching agr ement of the gener 4 an Iroach
outlined in (b) above,
am prepared to the number of
ALCMs attributed to each bot per to 8 order to each agreement
on this critical point.
um
UNCEASSIPIED
TO
UNSEASSIFIED
Relations
belongs_to