NSDD 298 National Operations Security Program

- 4 - -- As requested, consult with, and provide advice and recom- mendations to, the various departments and agencies concern- ing OPSEC vulnerabilities and corrective measures; On an ad hoc basis, chair meetings of representatives of two or more Executive departments or agencies having competing interests or responsibilities with OPSEC implications that affect national security interests. Analyze the issues may and prepare advisory memoranda and recommendations for the competing agencies. In the event NOAC fails to resolve differences, it shall submit the issue, together with its recommendation, to the SIG-I for resolution, which may recommend a meeting of the Policy Review Group (PRG) to consider the issue; -- Bring to the attention of the SIG-I unsolved OPSEC vulner- abilities and deficiencies that may arise within designated programs and activities of the Executive branch; and -- Specify national-level requirements for intelligence and counterintelligence OPSEC support to the SIG-I. Director, National Security Agency. The Director, National Security Agency, is designated Executive Agent for interagency OPSEC training. In this capacity, he has responsibility to assist Executive departments and agencies, as needed, to establish OPSEC programs; develop and provide inter- agency OPSEC training courses; and establish and maintain an Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), whose membership shall include, at a minimum, a representative of the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the General Services Administration. The IOSS will: -- Carry out interagency, national-level OPSEC training for executives, program and project managers, and OPSEC specialists; -- Act as consultant to Executive departments and agencies in connection with the establishment of OPSEC programs and OPSEC surveys and analyses; and Provide an OPSEC technical staff for the SIG-I. Nothing in this directive: -- Is intended to infringe on the authorities and responsibili- - ties of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods, nor those of any member of the Intelligence Community as specified in Executive Order No. 12333; or