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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. note
Handwritten note (partial, DOB, SSN) (1 page)
00/00/0000
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Domestic Policy Council
Irene Bueno
OA/Box Number: 17174
FOLDER TITLE:
Cabinet Weekly Reports: Immigration Removal Assistance: Vera Prog. [1]
2017-1120-S
ry2220
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
80 Broad St. Suite 1700
A project of the
New York, NY 10004
Vera Institute of Justice
Tel (212) 634-4330
in partnership with
Tel (800) 475-8695
the Immigration and
APPEARANCE
Fax (212) 634-4333
Naturalization Service
ASSISTANCE
E-mail [email protected]
PROGRAM
Oren Root
National Director
David Rosely - the BB Bath
Vera -6/21
John mally
Onen Root
Vera -non-probit
Early hos, gout, cumirel justice but broader
Bail system survesh
INS alud to help
(1) Defention spoce
(2) Better volunty caplin for those were
Feb lawn dano - 3yr. K.
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collated
The Appearance Assistance Program
Report to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
On the Second Operational Year
April 1, 1998 - March 31, 1999
Prepared under INS Contract #COW-6-C-0038
for an Appearance Assistance Program
The Appearance Assistance Program
80 Broad Street
Suite 1700
New York, NY 10004
A Project of the
Vera Institute of Justice
377 Broadway
New York, NY 10013
The Appearance Assistance Program
Report to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
On the Second Operational Year
April 1, 1998 - March 31, 1999
Prepared under INS Contract #COW-6-C-0038
for an Appearance Assistance Program
Oren Wart
Oren Root
Project Director
The Appearance Assistance Program
80 Broad Street
Suite 1700
New York, NY 10004
A Project of the
Vera Institute of Justice
377 Broadway
New York, NY 10013
ii
Table of Contents
Introduction
1
Status of Accomplishments
1
Preliminary Results of Impact Evaluation of
Intensive Supervision
3
Results By Intake Site
4
Immigration Court Outcomes
6
Compliance with Final Court Orders
7
Discussion
10
Operations: Screening
10
Wackenhut Detention Facility
10
Work-Site Enforcement Operations - 26 Federal Plaza
12
JFK Airport
14
Varick Street Service Processing Center
15
Operations: Supervision
16
Plan for Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Supervision
28
Recommendations
32
Appendix A: Research Methodology
35
iii
List of Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
4
Figure 2: Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: 26 Federal Plaza
5
Figure 3: Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: Varick Street
5
Figure 4: Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: Airports
6
Table 5: Outcomes of Cases Completed in Immigration Court:
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
7
Figure 6: Compliance with Final Court Orders Using AAP Data for AAP Participants:
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
8
Figure 7: Compliance with Final Court Orders:
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
9
Table 8: Wackenhut Intensive Supervision Intake
August 27, 1998-March 31, 1999
10
Table 9: 26 Federal Plaza Intensive Supervision Intake
October 30, 1997-March 31, 1999
13
Table 10: 26 Federal Plaza Regular Supervision Intake
May 1, 1997-March 31, 1999
13
Table 11: JFK Regular Supervision Intake
April 1, 1997-March 31, 1999
15
Table 12: Varick Intensive Supervision Intake
February 3, 1997-December 1, 1998
15
Table 13: Varick Intensive Screening: Noncitizens Potentially Eligible for AAP Participation
February 3, 1997-December 1, 1998
16
Table 14: Number of Regular and Intensive Participants by Intake Site
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
16
Table 15: Overall Appearance Rates for Intensive Participants by Number of Appearances
Required - February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
17
iv
Table 16: Overall Appearance Rates for Regular Participants by Number of Appearances
Required - February 3, 1.997-March 31, 1999
17
Table 17: Summary of Proceedings Completed at the IJ Level for AAP Participants
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
18
Table 18: Proceedings Completed at the IJ Level by Intake Site
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
18
Table 19: Intensive Supervision: Compliance Rates by Disposition,
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
19
Table 20: Regular Supervision: Compliance Rates by Disposition,
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
19
Figure 21: AAP Participant Appearances/Dispositions Through March 31, 1999 for
JFK
20
Figure 22: AAP Participant Appearances/Dispositions Through March 31, 1999 for
26 Federal Plaza
21
Figure 23: AAP Participant Appearances/Dispositions Through March 31, 1999 for
Newark, Varick and Wackenhut
22
V
Introduction
In September 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service contracted with the Vera
Institute of Justice to implement a three-year demonstration program - the Appearance
Assistance Program - to increase appearance in immigration court and compliance with the law
among aliens in removal proceedings. The program aims to address a combination of problems
facing the INS: the INS's detention facilities can hold only a fraction of individuals in removal
proceedings; yet those who are not detained often do not appear in court and rarely comply with
removal orders. The INS asked Vera to develop and validate with research a supervision
program that would increase compliance with the legal process among those not detained, while
ensuring efficient use of available detention space.
Vera is testing different levels of supervision in the New York District to determine
which groups are most amenable to supervision, and what levels and strategies of supervision
can attain compliance in a cost-effective way. The components of the supervision program have
been modified over the course of the demonstration as AAP staff have learned what works; the
populations included in the demonstration and the procedures for identifying them have also
evolved. Vera staff have visited INS districts around the country to determine whether and how
the innovation developed in New York can be used elsewhere and to develop a plan for using
supervision to get greater compliance with the law nationwide. A research team will assess the
impact of supervision on appearance rates and compliance and the program's cost effectiveness.
Promising research results will support implementation of supervision programs in other parts of
the country.
Status of Accomplishments
Two years into the demonstration, the AAP is showing that supervision can help the
government get nondetained aliens in removal proceedings to comply with their legal
obligations. AAP intensive participants are appearing in immigration court at significantly
higher rates than the comparison groups, which are comprised of aliens who were either paroled
or released on bond. Through the fifth immigration court hearing, 93 percent of AAP intensive
participants had appeared for all of their required hearings, compared to 70 percent for the
comparison groups. AAP intensive participants who completed their cases at the immigration
court level were more likely to receive voluntary departure and less likely to be ordered removed
in absentia than comparison groups. The AAP is having particular success supervising criminal
aliens who were released to the program prior to the expiration of the Transition Period Custody
Rules (TPCR). The high rate of appearance at immigration court hearings for this population
suggests that the mandatory detention of all criminal aliens is not required. The AAP's
experience supervising criminal aliens is discussed in greater detail below.
The AAP is also meeting its goal of increasing compliance with the ultimate outcomes of
its participants' immigration proceedings. Roughly two thirds (26 of 40) of AAP intensive
participants who have reached the conclusion of all of their legal obligations are in full
compliance with those obligations - including leaving the United States if ordered to do so. The
AAP continues to confirm and document departures from the United States using a variety of
1
verification methods, including in-person observations in cases where participants depart on
international flights.
Participants under regular supervision - drawn from JFK Airport and 26 Federal Plaza -
are slightly more likely than the comparison groups to attend their hearings and to receive
voluntary departure, and slightly less likely to be ordered removed in absentia. None of these
differences, however, is statistically significant.
There are some early indications, however, that regular supervision has different impacts
on specific subgroups of participants. Regular program participants from Federal Plaza do not
seem to benefit from the minimum intervention of regular supervision. They achieved only a 63
percent appearance rate, not significantly different from the rate achieved by the controls, but
much lower than the 91 percent rate the Federal Plaza group achieved in the intensive program.
Since we have been unable to find any differences between those apprehended in work-site
enforcement who are detained (and become intensive participants) and those who are ROR'd
(and become regular participants), this suggests that most of those apprehended at work sites
require an intensive program of supervision to achieve high compliance rates.
On the other hand, some groups seem to benefit from regular supervision. In particular,
those who already have strong reasons to comply, such as lawful permanent residents from the
JFK Airport, both criminal and noncriminal, seem to receive an additional incentive from
supervision and increase their compliance relative to the controls. Our participant interviews are
providing early indications that the simplest, least costly elements of the regular program are the
most valuable from the participants' point of view. When regular participants were asked what
they found helpful about the program, they mentioned providing information, explaining things,
and relieving anxiety. The AAP has developed and recently implemented new operational
strategies designed to increase the effectiveness of regular supervision. These strategies include
a variety of opportunities to increase contact with regular supervision participants, including
legal information sessions and the distribution of an AAP newsletter.
When the current operational year began on April 1, 1998, the INS was making limited
use of the AAP's intensive supervision capacity. Intake of arriving asylum seekers had been put
on hold when expedited removal procedures went into effect in April 1997. Furthermore, as of
one year ago, the INS had denied approximately 50 percent of the AAP's recommendations for
intensive supervision. Over the past year, these problems have been ameliorated. Most
significantly, in August, the INS decided to allow the AAP to screen asylum seekers detained at
the Wackenhut detention facility near JFK Airport. This was an important breakthrough after 17
months during which the AAP had been unable to test the suitability of new-arrived asylum
seekers for supervision in the community. Screening operations began at Wackenhut on August
27 and have generally progressed smoothly since. Asylum seekers released from the Wackenhut
detention center are now the AAP's largest current source of intensive participants. Moreover,
INS officials at the Wackenhut intake site have approved more than 90 percent of the AAP's
recommendations for intensive supervision. These positive, albeit long-in-coming, changes have
helped to ensure that the AAP will work with enough intensive participants to allow Vera
researchers to evaluate the effectiveness of this intervention.
2
The AAP has had success supervising criminal aliens, including lawful permanent
residents facing removal proceedings because of criminal convictions. With the expiration of the
TPCR on October 8, 1998, virtually all criminal aliens are now required to be detained
throughout their removal proceedings. Prior to October 9, the INS had discretion to release some
of these aliens and the AAP was thus able to supervise many criminal aliens - these include 11
intensive participants who were screened at the Varick Street Service Processing Center (SPC)
where they were being detained and 111 regular participants who were apprehended by the INS
at JFK Airport and subsequently released on recognizance. The overwhelming majority have
complied with their appearance requirements and the ultimate outcomes in immigration court.
The court appearance rate for the 11 intensive participants who were released to the program
from the Varick SPC intake site is 100 percent. Of the 111 criminal aliens who have entered the
regular program from the JFK intake site, 101 (91%) have appeared for all of their required
hearings thus far. Of the 42 participants who have reached the point of compliance, 35 (83%)
have fully complied with their legal obligations. These preliminary data show that criminal
aliens who do not pose a threat to public safety and who have a good history of compliance with
prior legal proceedings are particularly amenable to supervision.
Preliminary Results of Impact Evaluation of Intensive Supervision
Vera's Research Department analyzed data on court hearings and outcomes for the AAP
intensive supervision participants and comparison groups through the end of March 1999. Of a
total of 131 AAP participants, 94 met the criteria for analysis. They had one or more hearings,
with verifiable attendance, by the cut-off date. Of a total of 423 individuals in the comparison
groups, who had initially been detained by the INS and later released on bond or parole, 174 met
the criteria (see Appendix A).
The AAP participants come from three types of intake sites - 26 Federal Plaza, Varick
Street, and airports. Participants enrolled from 26 Federal Plaza, currently the largest group, are
primarily undocumented individuals apprehended at work-site enforcement actions. Individuals
from Varick Street are those placed in proceedings based on criminal convictions. The airport
group includes respondents from JFK and Newark airports and the Wackenhut detention facility.
This group has grown rapidly in the last two quarters since the INS agreed to release asylum
seekers detained at Wackenhut to the AAP.
3
Figure 1
Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
98%
96%
94%
93%
93%
100%
89%
75%
82%
75%
72%
Compliance rates
70%
50%
25%
0%
Through first
Through second
Through third
Through fourth
Through fifth
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
COMPARISON
AAP
N=95 AAP participants; 174 comparison group members
As Figure 1 demonstrates, 93 percent of the AAP participants complied with all their
hearing requirements. By contrast, 70 percent of individuals in the comparison groups attended
all their required hearings. After the fifth round of hearings, it is 99 percent certain that the 23-
percentage-point spread between the AAP and the comparison groups is not due to chance. The
differences through the first four rounds of hearings are also statistically significant.
The attendance rates for the comparison groups have improved from 65 percent since the
last reporting period. The change reflects the inclusion of a new comparison group for the AAP
airport participants. In the past, no such group was available but the INS has provided us with
data on asylum seekers released on parole from the detention facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey.
This group has a compliance rate at the fifth hearing of 81 percent, which accounts for the
overall increase in the compliance rates for the comparison groups.
Results by Intake Site
Each of the AAP participant groups has demonstrated a high rate of compliance with
hearing requirements. Through all hearings to-date, the rates of appearance are 100 percent for
Varick Street, 93 percent for the airports, and 91 percent for Federal Plaza.
These rates are higher than those achieved by the comparison groups at all three sites
(Figures 2, 3, and 4). The differences are greatest at Federal Plaza where they are statistically
significant at each hearing point.² Three different comparison groups are combined for the
analysis of Federal Plaza shown in Figure 2. The AAP participants complied at significantly
I Significance at the .01 level was determined using the Fisher's Exact right tail test.
2 Using the Fisher's Exact right tail test, differences are statistically significant at the .05 level for the first hearing
and at the .01 level for the second through the fifth hearing.
4
higher rates than each of the three groups.³ (See Appendix A for a description of the comparison
groups.)
Figure 2
Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: 26 Federal Plaza
96%
94%
100%
91%
91%
91%
75%
85%
Compliance rates
76%
50%
64%
60%
59%
25%
0%
Through first
Through second
Through third
Through fourth
Through fifth
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
COMPARISON
AAP
N=52 AAP participants; 95 comparison group members
The AAP participants from Varick Street and the airports also complied with hearing
requirements at higher rates than their comparison groups (Figures 3 and 4). At the fifth hearing,
the appearance rate for the airport comparison group drops to 81 percent. There is as yet no fifth
hearing for any of the AAP airport participants. The differences are not statistically significant
at either site.
Figure 3
Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: Varick Street
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
88%
88%
88%
88%
75%
88%
Compliance rates
50%
25%
0%
Through first
Through second
Through third
Through fourth
Through fifth
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
COMPARISON
AAP
N=14 AAP participants; 26 comparison group members
3 By the final hearing, the differences between AAP and each of the groups was significant at the .01 or .05 level,
using the Fisher's Exact right tail test.
5
Figure 4
Continuous Compliance with Hearing Requirements by 3/31/99
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups: Airport
100%
97%
97%
100%
93%
94%
89%
89%
75%
87%
81%
Compliance rates
50%
25%
0%
Through first
Through second
Through third
Through fourth
Through fifth
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
hearing
COMPARISON
AAP
N=29 AAP participants; 53 comparison group members
Immigration Court Outcomes
According to EOIR data, 57 AAP participants have completed their cases at the
immigration court level, as have 141 individuals in the comparison groups. The proportion of
individuals granted relief is higher for the comparison group (15%) than for AAP (8%) primarily
because relief is more likely among the airport cases than among cases from the other sites, and
the comparison group currently includes a higher proportion of completed cases from the
airports. The AAP participants were significantly more likely than the comparison individuals to
receive voluntary departure, and less likely to be ordered removed from the United States in
absentia.⁴ The differences in ordered removed in absentia were apparent for both the criminal
alien group at Varick Street and the work-site group at 26 Federal Plaza.
4 A test was conducted for all completions that require the person to leave the United States through voluntary
departure, orders of removal, and orders of removal in absentia. The proportion granted voluntary departure was
compared to the proportion of ordered removed combined with ordered removed in absentia. Differences in
proportions of voluntary departure between AAP and comparison groups were statistically significant at the .01
level according to the Fisher's Exact right tail test. The differences in orders of removal in absentia were not
statistically significant.
6
Table 5: Outcomes of Cases Completed in Immigration Court:
Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
IMMIGRATION COURT
AAP PARTICIPANTS
CONTROL/COMPARISON GROUPS
COMPLETIONS
26 Federal
26 Federal
Airport
Varick
Plaza
Total
Airport
Varick
Plaza
Total
(N=10)
(N=8)
(N=41)
(N=59)
(N=36)
(N=17)
(N=88)
(N=141)
Relief
2 (20%)
2 (25%)
1 (2%)
5 (8%)
20 (56%)
1 (6%)
0
21 (15%)
Other⁵
1 (10%)
1 (13%)
1 (2%)
3 (5%)
4 (11%)
2 (12%)
1 (1%)
(5%)
Voluntary Departure
0
1 (13%)
34 (83%)
35 (59%)
0
1 (6%)
48 (55%)
49 (35%)
Ordered Removed
5 (50%)
4 (50%)
0
9 (15%)
2 (6%)
9 (53%)
1 (1%)
12 (9%)
Ordered Removed
in Absentia
2 (20%)
0
5 (12%)
7 (12%)
10 (28%)
4 (24%)
38 (43%)
52 (37%)
Compliance with Final Court Orders
The Research Department analyzed data on compliance with final court orders for 27
AAP intensive program participants and 104 individuals in the comparison groups.⁶ We
included in the analysis individuals who were allowed to stay in the U.S. or were ordered to
leave the country if their cases were completed at the Immigration Judge or Board of
Immigration Appeals levels by December 31, 1998. The cut-off date for those granted voluntary
departure was November 30, 1998 because they are given 120 days to leave the U.S. For a more
detailed description of those eligible for the analysis, see Appendix A.
We considered individuals to be in compliance if they were allowed to stay in the U.S. or
actually departed when required to do so. We considered individuals to be absconders if they
were ordered removed in absentia or failed to comply with orders of voluntary departure or
removal. Finally, we considered compliance as unknown if we did not have evidence from INS
databases or files that individuals required to depart the country had actually departed or failed to
do so.
The problem we face in analyzing compliance is the difficulty of obtaining INS data.
The great majority of INS A-files on AAP participants and comparison groups members are in
the New York and Newark districts. Nevertheless, the INS has not been able to provide us with
about half the A-files we have requested and those we have received often lack critical
information. If we relied only on INS and EOIR sources for the analysis of compliance, the
5 The "Other" category includes termination, administrative closure, failure to prosecute, and other decisions that do
not require the respondent to leave the U.S.
6 30 AAP participants met the criteria for the analysis but three were excluded because they received assistance in
leaving the U.S. that was not available to comparison groups.
7
status of more than half the AAP participants and a fifth of the comparison groups would be
unknown at this point.⁷
Consequently, we have analyzed compliance with final orders in two ways. For both
methods we used EOIR data for the dispositions in the court process. The first method involved
the use of AAP data for its participants and INS data for comparison groups and assumed that
the proportions of comparison group members who complied and absconded among the
"unknowns" matches the proportions among the known.⁸
Figure 6 shows the results of this method.
Figure 6
Compliance with Final Court Orders Using AAP Data for AAP
Participants: Intensive AAP and Comparison Groups
100%
90%
80%
67%
57%
70%
60%
43%
50%
33%
AAP
Comparison
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Complied
Absconded
N=27 AAP Participants; 104 Comparison Groups
Data Sources: AAP for participants; INS for comparison groups, with redistribution of unknown outcomes
7 There are no gaps in the EOIR data concerning court completion information, but the EOIR data do not purport to
show whether a respondent has complied with a court order. The only Government tracking of such compliance is
done by the INS.
8 We used the proportion of compliers and absconders among those ordered removed and granted voluntary
departure. This assumption most likely overstates the compliance of the comparison group because the INS data
collection procedures on actual departure from the U.S. are more effective than on failures to depart. We expect
that as the data is recorded, a higher portion of the unknowns will be absconders.
8
AAP participants were over one and a half times more likely to comply with final court
orders than the comparison groups, and almost half as likely to abscond. Both differences are
statistically significant.⁹
The second method we employed uses only EOIR and INS data to determine the
compliance of both the AAP and the comparison groups. Figure 7 shows the results of this
method.
Figure 7
Compliance With Final Orders: AAP and Comparison Groups
100%
90%
29%
80%
37%
70%
60%
21%
Complied
Unknown
50%
Absconded
40%
52%
30%
50%
20%
10%
11%
0%
AAP
Comparison
N=27 AAP Participants; 104 Comparison Groups
Data Sources: INS and EOIR
AAP participants were slightly more likely than the comparison groups to comply with
final court orders and more than four times less likely to abscond. Differences in absconding
between AAP and the comparison groups were statistically significant.¹⁰ However, the
compliance status of 52 percent of the AAP participants and 21 percent of the comparison
groups remains unknown.
A higher proportion of the AAP participants is in the unknown category for two reasons.
Among those required to leave the country, participants are much less likely than the comparison
groups to be ordered removed in absentia - this means that we must rely on INS rather than
EOIR records to determine their status. In addition, AAP participants in general have completed
9 Differences between AAP and the comparison groups are statistically significant at the .01 level according to the
Fisher's Exact right tail test.
10 Differences between AAP and comparison groups were tested using only known outcomes and were found to be
statistically significant at the .01 level according to the Fisher's Exact right tail test.
9
their cases more recently than the comparison groups, which makes it less likely that the
compliance data will be complete because of INS data collection delays.
Discussion
Operations: Screening
Wackenhut Detention Facility
In August 1998, the INS asked the AAP to begin supervising arriving asylum seekers
detained at the Wackenhut detention facility near JFK Airport. The AAP's efforts to screen
asylum seekers arriving at JFK Airport had been on hold since April 1, 1997 when expedited
removal procedures were put into effect. Asylum seekers originally detained at Wackenhut
constitute the largest current source of AAP intensive participants.
Table 8: Wackenhut Intensive Supervision Intake
August 27, 1998-March 31, 1999
TOTAL
SCREENED
DECLINED
RECOMMENDED
RECOMMENDED
SCREENED
INELIGIBLE
PARTICIPATION
AND DENIED
AND APPROVED
8/27/98 - 3/31/99
168
118* (70%)
2 (1%)
3 (2%)
45 (27%)
* One of these individuals was disqualified after an asylum officer found that he had not established a credible fear
of persecution. The AAP withdrew its recommendation for release on the basis of the negative credible fear
finding.
Since the AAP began intake operations at the Wackenhut detention facility, 168
detainees have been eligible for AAP consideration and consented to screening. 11 Of the 168, 48
were recommended for AAP intensive supervision. The INS approved all but three of these
recommendations. Two aliens declined participation after having the program explained to them
by AAP intake screeners. The remaining 118 detainees were deemed ineligible for the program
primarily because they were unable to provide sufficient community contacts (including a place
to live) in the New York City area. However, almost 40 percent of these aliens (47) had
sufficient contacts elsewhere in the United States and would have thus been eligible for
supervision in a nationwide supervision program.
The proportion of recommendations made by intake staff has significantly increased
since the AAP began intake operations at the Wackenhut detention facility. As of September 30,
1998, the AAP had recommended just three of the 26 (12%) detainees it had screened at the
Wackenhut facility. This relatively low recommendation rate was attributed to the fact that at
that time, the AAP had been screening at the Wackenhut facility for a just over a month. The
AAP is now able to recommend approximately one third of the detainees it screens at the
facility. An additional 28 percent (47) would have been eligible for release, if a nationwide
supervision program existed, because these individuals had community contacts elsewhere in the
11 In addition to the 170 aliens who were screened by AAP intake staff, 32 detainees were deemed ineligible for
AAP consideration because they had either already withdrawn their applications for admission or were
expeditiously removed by the time the AAP attempted to interview them. Another 12 detainees asked not to be
considered for the program.
10
United States. Based on these figures, the AAP estimates that a nationwide supervision program
could expect to recommend at least 50 percent of the arriving asylum seekers it screened.
DISCUSSION:
The following discussion describes the basic procedures followed by intake screeners at
the Wackenhut detention facility.
Intake staff are informed of new arrivals via reports faxed by the INS on Wednesdays
and Fridays. These reports indicate the detainee's name, alien number, date of arrival at the
facility, date of the credible fear interview and the language the detainee speaks. Using this
information, intake staff secure interpreters in preparation for interviews that take place every
Monday and Thursday. Intake staff interview some detainees before and some after their
credible fear screens, with most interviews occurring before the asylum officer files the credible
fear determination report. To be recommended for AAP supervision a detainee must be found to
have a credible fear of persecution. When the AAP screened asylum seekers at JFK Airport
before the advent of expedited removal, intake staff routinely applied an "asylum screen," the
purpose of which was to make a cursory assessment of the alien's eligibility to apply for asylum.
Now that the INS has institutionalized expedited removal procedures, AAP screeners at
Wackenhut rely on the asylum officer's credible fear finding in making a determination of
eligibility to apply for relief.
During the interview, each detainee is asked about his/her community contacts in the
United States. If the candidate has no contacts in the U.S. or family only outside of the New
York City area, s/he is no longer considered for the program. Because we are aware that some
detainees come through JFK Airport en route to Canada, we inquire into the candidate's family
in Canada and his/her intention to join them upon release. If the detainee expresses an interest in
travel to Canada, s/he is not recommended for supervision because of the high risk of flight.
If the candidate supplies an address in the New York City area, intake staff complete the
interview. On the following day, intake staff conduct a phone verification of the address given
and secure an individual or agency guarantor. Once the phone verification is complete, intake
staff ask the potential guarantor and/or the person with whom the participant intends to live to
meet with an intake screener at the AAP. The staff ask each attendee to bring proof of
immigration status (e.g., green card or U.S. passport), proof of address (utility bills, copy of
lease) and, when possible, proof of relationship to the potential participant in the form of
photographs, correspondence, or telephone bills with documented calls to the potential
participant's phone number in his or her home country. Recognizing that proof of relationship is
the most difficult evidence for people to produce and is not necessarily conclusive, failure to
furnish such proof is not disqualifying in itself.
During the verification meeting, intake staff explain the roles and responsibilities of the
guarantor, the requirements that the potential participant will have to meet and discuss the
consequences of noncompliance. Intake staff also make inquiries about the living conditions of
the home where the potential participant will live, and how family members intend to support the
potential participant throughout the court process. Upon successful completion of these
11
verification requirements, intake staff submit a recommendation for supervision. The
recommendations are faxed to the Officer in Charge (OIC) at Wackenhut for review.
The OIC reviews only those cases for which an asylum officer's credible fear report has
been filed. It typically takes the INS a week to rule on the credible fear issue. We are then
notified of a decision, and if the recommendation is approved, intake staff inform the detainee's
family and make preparations to conduct an exit interview. During the exit interview, the new
participant is explained, in detail, the conditions of his/her release and is asked to sign the
Agreement To Participate. After the exit interview, the participant is released from the facility.
The following brief anecdote describes a typical Wackenhut intake:
Arsajmin arrived at JFK Airport with a fraudulent Slovenian passport. Upon being
referred to secondary inspection, he explained that the passport did not in fact
belong to him, but he had obtained it in the hopes of seeking asylum in the United
States from his homeland, the province of Kosovo. During questioning, Arsajmin
stated that because they are ethnic Albanians, he and his father were arrested three
times by the Serbian police. Further, he and his family were continually harassed in
public. After completing his statement, Arsajmin was put in a holding cell and, later
that evening, transported io the Wackenhut detention facility.
A few days after his arrival at the facility, he met with an asylum officer for a
credible fear interview. During this process, Arsajmin's case was referred to the
AAP Intake staff for screening. An intake screener reviewed his file and then
arranged to interview him with the help of an Albanian interpreter. Arsajmin
informed the screener that he has a brother who is a lawful permanent resident and
several cousins who are United States citizens, all of whom live in the Bronx. In the
days that followed, intake staff verified the address, secured Arsajmin's brother as
the guarantor and explained the rules and regulations of the program to the
prospective guarantor at an in-house verification held at the AAP main office.
Having satisfied the criteria for release, Arsajmin was recommended for
supervision. Two weeks later, the INS approved his release from the facility. To
date, Arsajmin continues to fulfill all of his reporting requirements. He and his
attorney are currently preparing for his upcoming master calendar hearing.
If Arsajmin is granted asylum, the AAP will have saved the government
significant costs that would have otherwise been incurred in detaining him for the
entire length of his proceedings (it costs the INS more than $100 per day to detain an
alien at the Wackenhut facility). If Arsajmin is denied asylum, he will be re-detained
in court immediately after the judge's decision has been rendered. If he loses his
claim and appeals, he will be subject to rescreening for possible supervised release
during his appeal.
Work-Site Enforcement Operations - 26 Federal Plaza
AAP intake staff continue to screen individuals arrested in work-site enforcement
actions. The AAP considers those whom the INS intends to detain for intensive supervision and
those the INS has decided to release for regular supervision.
12
During the first year of operations, work-site enforcement constituted the largest source
of AAP intensive participants (82% of the total number of participants under intensive
supervision). During this operational year, however, the intake volume at 26 Federal Plaza has
diminished greatly. Over the past year, the AAP has taken in only five intensive participants
compared to a total of 61 that were placed under intensive supervision in the first year. In early
1998, the peak of AAP screening operations at 26 Federal Plaza, Investigations in the New York
District was asking the AAP to screen at approximately two work-site enforcement actions a
week. In comparison, the AAP was notified of only two enforcement actions in the first three
months of 1999.
Several factors have contributed to the decrease in the number of screening opportunities
at 26 Federal Plaza. The INS has decreased its work-site enforcement efforts both in New York
and nationally. Moreover, when INS investigators do conduct a work-site action, the AAP is not
always notified - often because the Mexican consulate is being notified and sometimes for
another (or no apparent) reason. In cases where ten or more Mexican workers are apprehended
in a work-site enforcement action, the INS invites the New York Mexican consulate to counsel
the detainees. The AAP has been told that because of logistical concerns, it will not be allowed
to screen on days when the Mexican consulate is present. The AAP has spoken to
representatives of the Mexican consulate about this arrangement and they have indicated that
they are not opposed to the AAP screening at enforcement actions at which they are present. We
have asked the INS to reconsider its exclusion of the AAP when the Mexican consulate is
present, and are awaiting a response. Other reasons for the decline include an increase in the
number of work-site detainees who accept voluntary return in lieu of being placed in removal
proceedings and the detention of work-site arrestees in York, Pennsylvania. The AAP is only
permitted to screen those work-site detainees that are detained in Elizabeth, New Jersey. We
have also requested the INS for a change in this restriction. See the several recommendations
related to work-site intake procedures on page 32.
DATA:
Table 9: 26 Federal Plaza Intensive Supervision Intake
October 30, 1997-March 31, 1999
TOTAL
SCREENED
DECLINED
PLACED IN
RECOMMENDED
RECOMMENDED
SCREENED
INELIGIBLE
PARTICIPATION
CONTROL
AND DENIED
AND APPROVED
GROUP
4/1/98-
45
22 (49%)
3 (7%)
6 (13%)
9 (20%)
5 (11%)
3/31/99
1st year
150
26 (17%)
9 (6%)
16 (11%)
38 (25%)
61 (41%)
Total
195
48 (25%)
12 (6%)
22 (11%)
47 (24%)
66 (34%)
* Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.
Table 10: 26 Federal Plaza Regular Supervision Intake
May 1, 1997-March 31, 1999
TOTAL
SCREENED
DECLINED
PLACED IN
ACCEPTED
SCREENED
INELIGIBLE
PARTICIPATION
CONTROL GROUP
4/1/98-3/31/99
113
1 (1%)
35 (31%)
39 (35%)
38 (34%)
1st year
210
0 (0%)
13 (6%)
92 (44%)
105 (50%)
Total
323
1 (<1%)
48 (15%)
131 (41%)
143 (44%)
* Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.
13
Since April 1, 1998 the AAP has recommended fourteen individuals apprehended in
work-site enforcement for intensive supervision. The INS has approved only five and rejected
nine of these recommendations for supervision. The 36-percent rate of approval is substantially
lower than the 53-percent rate of approval of recommendations for work-site candidates during
the first year of operations. Intake staff continue to apply a randomization method to apportion
those who are found eligible into experimental and control groups during this year, six aliens
were assigned to the control group. Twenty-two detainees were deemed ineligible for
supervision, primarily because they failed to produce a verifiable address in the New York City
area or they because they failed the AAP's equities screen which is applied in cases where a
potential participant is ineligible for any legal remedy other than voluntary departure. An
additional three aliens declined participation after having the program explained to them. 12
One hundred thirteen aliens whom the INS had decided to release on recognizance were
screened for regular supervision. Of the 113, 38 eventually became AAP participants. Thirty-
five declined participation after having been interviewed by an AAP screener. 13 Thirty-nine
aliens were randomly assigned to the control group.
JFK Airport
Prior to April 1, 1997 when expedited removal procedures were put into effect, the AAP
screened arriving asylum seekers slated for detention. When the new laws went into effect,
intake screeners focused their efforts on those whom the INS released on recognizance.
Candidates included lawful permanent residents who were charged with low-level criminal
convictions or with abandoning their residency and other status offenders. Another significant
change occurred in October 1998 with the expiration of the Transition Period Custody Rules. As
of October 9, the law requires the INS to detain virtually all criminal aliens. The few exceptions
that do exist do not apply to those charged as criminal aliens upon their seeking admission to the
United States. As a result of these detention mandates, the AAP is unable to consider any
noncitizens arriving at JFK Airport who are charged as criminal aliens for program participation.
Although the pool of potential regular participants from JFK has been significantly
diminished, intake staff continue to screen those who are not subject to mandatory detention.
Intake staff complete the screening process by letter and by phone. Those who voluntarily agree
to participate in the program are placed under regular supervision.
12 Those apprehended in work-site enforcement actions who decline AAP participation usually do so because they
have sufficient resources to pay bond.
13 Fifteen of those who declined AAP participation were apprehended in the same work-site action. AAP intake
staff who were present observed that among this group, there was an individual who persuaded the 14 others to
decline the AAP's help.
14
DATA:
Table 11: JFK Regular Supervision Intake
April 1, 1997-March 31, 1999
TOTAL
DECLINED
NO
PLACED IN
PENDING
ACCEPTED
SCREENED FOR
PARTICIPATION
CONTACT
CONTROL
REGULAR
GROUP
PROGRAM
4/1/98-3/31/99
285
94 (33%)
56 (20%)
76 (27%)
13 (5%)
46 (16%)
1st year
405
81 (20%)
101 (25%)
59 (15%)
N/A
164 (40%)
Total
690
175 (25%)
157 (23%)
135 (20%)
13 (2%)
210 (30%)
Over the past year, the AAP has screened the A-files of 285 potential regular supervision
participants. Intake staff randomly selected 76 of these, whom they did not contact, to be
assigned to the control group. The AAP attempted to secure the participation of 196 aliens, 132
of whom either declined participation or could not be reached. Forty-six noncitizens were
accepted into the program.
Varick Street Service Processing Center
From February 3, 1997 to December 1, 1998 the AAP screened potential intensive
supervision candidates at the Varick Street Service Processing Center (SPC) which houses aliens
who have been convicted of crimes. Those who were subject to mandatory detention, had a final
order of removal, or who began their cases in the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) were
deemed ineligible for AAP consideration.
With the expiration of the TPCR on October 8, virtually all criminal aliens are now
required to be detained throughout the entirety of their removal proceedings. Prior to October 9,
the INS had discretion to release many of those charged as criminal aliens during the pendency
of their removal proceedings. From October 9 through December 1, 1998 intake screeners did
not find a single criminal case in which release was legally permitted. In fact, New York
Detention and Deportation officials have informed us that the INS will be using the Varick
Street facility to detain only those persons subject to mandatory detention. In light of the fact
that under the SPC's current admission policies, no detainees are legally eligible for release, the
AAP suspended its screening activities at the facility as of last December.
If the admission policies at Varick Street or the law change, the AAP is prepared to
resume screening. In the meantime, AAP staff continue to collect Varick Street inventory
reports for research purposes.
DATA:
Table 12: Varick Intensive Supervision Intake
February 3, 1997-December 1, 1998
TOTAL
SCREENED
DECLINED
RECOMMENDED
RECOMMENDED
COMPLETED
INELIGIBLE
PARTICIPATION
AND DENIED
AND APPROVED
SCREENS
4/1/98-12/1/98
261
243 (93%)
1 (<1%)
10 (4%)
7 (3%)
1st year
518
452 (87%)
37 (7%)
20 (4%)
9 (2%)
Total
779
695 (89%)
38 (5%)
30 (4%)
16 (2%)
15
Table 13: Varick Intensive Screening: Noncitizens Potentially Eligible for AAP Participation
February 3, 1997-December 1, 1998
TOTAL
NOT ELIGIBLE
DECLINED
SCREENING
COMPLETED
ARRIVALS AT
FOR
SCREENING
INCOMPLETE DUE
SCREENS
FACILITY
SCREENING
TO TRANSFER OR
RELEASE
4/1/98-
1458
870 (60%)
56 (4%)
271 (19%)
261 (18%)
12/1/98
1st year
2019
1201 (59%)
35 (2%)
265 (13%)
518 (26%)
Total
3477
2071 (60%)
91 (3%)
536 (15%)
779 (22%)
* Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.
Over the past year, the AAP recommended 17 persons detained at Varick Street for
intensive supervision. The INS approved seven and denied ten of those recommendations. A
large majority of those screened - 93 percent - were found to be ineligible for AAP supervision.
The principal reasons for their ineligibility - prior to the sunset of TPCR - were poor history of
compliance and insufficient community ties. An additional 870 detainees were not eligible for
AAP consideration for one or more of the following reasons: they were subject to mandatory
detention, their processing began while in the IRP, or because they had a final order of removal.
Two hundred seventy-one detainees were transferred or released on bond before the intake
process was completed and one alien asked not to be considered for the program.
Operations: Supervision
Since it began operations in February 1997, the AAP has supervised 514 noncitizens in
removal proceedings, 131 under intensive supervision and 353 under regular supervision. The
supervision/field staff includes a director, a resource coordinator, two field officers and two
supervision teams, each consisting of a supervision officer and an assistant. The supervision
teams monitor the progress of participants as they move through the removal process, and seek
to keep participants in compliance with their obligations to the INS, the immigration court and
the AAP.
Table 14: Number of Regular and Intensive Participants by Intake Site
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
SUPERVISION LEVEL
26 FEDERAL
JFK AIRPORT
NEWARK
VARICK
WACKENHUT
TOTAL
PLAZA
AIRPORT
Regular Supervision
143 (41%)
210 (59%)
0
0
0
353
Intensive Supervision
66 (50%)
3 (2%)
1 (1%)
16 (12%)
45 (34%)
131
Total
209 (41%)
213 (41%)
1 (<1%)
16 (3%)
45 (9%)
514
*
Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.
16
DATA:
The following tables and charts show what happened to each of the AAP's participants
from the beginning of the program through March 31, 1999.
Appearance Rates and Proceeding Completions by Intake Site
Table 15: Overall Appearance Rates for Intensive Participants by Number of Appearances Required
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
INTAKE SITE
APPEARANCES
APPEARED
FAILED TO APPEAR
APPEARANCE RATE
REQUIRED
26 Federal
161
156
5 *
97%
JFK
5
5
0
100%
Varick
65
65
0
100%
Newark
2
2
0
100%
Wackenhut
78
76
2
97%
TOTAL
311
304
7
98%
* Includes 2 participants who self-deported prior to the completion of their cases at the IJ level. The AAP verified
that both participants had left the United States. In one case, an AAP field officer verified the departure in person.
In the other case, the AAP has confirmed the participant's departure with airline personnel as well having contacted
the participant in his home country.
Table 16: Overall Appearance Rates for Regular Participants by Number of Appearances Required
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
INTAKE SITE
APPEARANCES
APPEARED
FAILED TO APPEAR
APPEARANCE RATE
REQUIRED
26 Federal
318
265
53
83%
JFK
673
647
26
96%
TOTAL
991
912
79
92%
17
Table 17: Summary of Proceedings Completed at the IJ Level for AAP Participants
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
SUPERVISION
TOTAL
PENDING IJ
IJ
ORDER OF
VOLUNTARY
WITHDRAWAL OF
FAILURE TO
RELIEF GRANTED
OTHER
LEVEL
PARTICIPANTS
PROCEEDINGS
PROCEEDINGS
REMOVAL
DEPARTURE
APPLICATION
PROSECUTE
OR CASE
COMPLETION
COMPLETED
GRANTED
TERMINATED
App.
In
App.
In
App.
In
App.
In
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Intensive
130 ***
62
59
7
9
7
36
0
6**
0
8
0
0
Regular
353
127
148
78
17
66
50
11
18
10
34
18
2
Total
483
189
207
85
26
73
86
11
24
10
42
18
2
* These completions are coded as either an "administrative closure," "other decision," or "other completion" in the ANSIR database.
** Five of these cases were closed by the INS prior to hearings due to lost A-files. The AAP terminated supervision of a sixth participant, whose case is
excluded this table, after the INS had informed us that her A-file had been lost. This participant's case was closed by the INS and subsequently reopened
without notification to the AAP. Unbeknownst to the AAP, this participant was granted voluntary departure several months after supervision was terminated.
*** Includes one intensive participant who began supervision while on appeal and another whose case was closed by the INS, prior to the commencement of
hearings, after the AAP verified his departure from the United States.
Table 18: Proceedings Completed at the IJ Level by Intake Site
February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
INTAKE SITE
TOTAL
PENDING IJ
IJ
ORDER OF
VOLUNTARY
WITHDRAWAL OF
FAILURE TO
RELIEF GRANTED
OTHER
AND
PARTICIPANTS
PROCEEDINGS
PROCEEDINGS
REMOVAL
DEPARTURE
APPLICATION
PROSECUTE
OR CASE
COMPLETION
SUPERVISION
COMPLETED
GRANTED
TERMINATED
LEVEL
App.
In
App.
In
App.
In
App.
In
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
Abs.
26 Federal -
65
17
43
3
0
5**
35
0
5*
0
2
0
0
Intensive
JFK -
3
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
Intensive
Varick -
16
7
8
0
4
0
1
0
0
0
3
0
0
Intensive
Newark -
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Intensive
Wackenhut -
45
38
5
2
3
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
Intensive
26 Federal -
143
30
61
52
2
48
47
0
7
4
2
3
0
Regular
JFK -
210
97
87
26
15
18
3
11
11
6
32
15
2
Regular
* These five cases were closed by the INS prior to hearings due to lost A-files.
** Two of these participants self-deported prior to the completion of their proceedings. The AAP has verified their departures and notified the INS.
*** Includes one intensive participant who began supervision while on appeal.
18
Final Compliance Data
Table 19: Intensive Supervision: Compliance Rates by Disposition, February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
RELIEF GRANTED
FAILURE TO
VOLUNTARY
INS CLOSED CASE -
ORDER OF
ORDERED
TOTAL
OR CASE
PROSECUTE
DEPARTURE
PARTICIPANT SELF-
REMOVAL -
REMOVED - IN
TERMINATED
DEPORTED
PRESENT
ABSENTIA
Number of Participants
6
6*
33
1
9
7
62
with Disposition
Number of Participants Who
6
6
19
1
1
7
40
Have Reached Point of
Compliance
Complied
6
6
10
1
1
2*
26
Failed To Comply
0
0
9
0
0
5
14
Percent Complied
100%
100%
53%
100%
100%
33%
65%
*
Five of these cases were closed by the INS prior to their hearings because the INS lost their A-files.
** An additional three participants complied with voluntary departure but are not included in this table because they were provided with assistance in travel costs unlikely to be
replicated by the government.
Both of these participants self-deported prior to the completion of their removal proceedings. The AAP verified their departures from the United States and notified the INS.
Table 20: Regular Supervision: Compliance Rates by Disposition, February 3, 1997-March 31, 1999
RELIEF
OTHER
FAILURE TO
WITHDREW
VOLUNTARY
ORDER OF
SUBTOTAL
ORDERED
TOTAL
GRANTED OR
COMPLETION
PROSECUTE
APPLICATION
DEPARTURE
REMOVAL -
REMOVED -
CASE
PRESENT
IN ABSENTIA
TERMINATED
Number of Participants
34
20
28
11
50
17
160
66
226
with Disposition
Number of Participants
34
20
28
10
46
0
138
66*
204
Who Have Reached
Point of Compliance
Complied
34
20
28
10
10
0
102
0
102
Failed To Comply
0
0
0
0
36**
0
36
66
102
Percent Complied
100%
100%
100%
100%
22%
N/A
74%
0%
50%
*
It is likely that most of these participants have not yet been directed to surrender. Nonetheless, for the purpose of calculating compliance rates, we are assuming that they have,
in fact, been issued a surrender notice and that they have failed to appear for removal.
The majority of these are participants with whom the AAP has lost contact. It is virtually impossible for the AAP to verify departure for participants who are no longer under
active supervision. For the purpose of calculating compliance rates, we are assuming that they have failed to depart the United States as required.
19
FIGURE 21: AAP PARTICIPANT APPEARANCES/DISPOSITIONS THROUGH MARCH 31, 1999
JFK Airport
3
210
Intensive
Regular
Level
Level
3
184
26
Appeared
Appeared
Failed To
Appear
97
1
1
1
Case
6
18
2
Failure To
Case Denied/
Relief
Pending
Failure To
Ordered
Case Closed
Prosecute
INS Failed To
Granted
Prosecute
Removed
"Other"
Re-detain
In Absentia
3
11
11
32
15
15
Program Violation
Granted
Withdrew
Failure To
Relief Granted
Other
Ordered
Termination/
Voluntary
Application
Prosecute
or Case
Completion
Removed
Pending Appeal
Departure
For Admission
Terminated
Decision
1
1
2
Pending
Departure
No
Departure
Confirmed
Confirmed
Deadline
Departure
10
Departure
Confirmed
20
FIGURE 22: AAP PARTICIPANT APPEARANCES/DISPOSITIONS THROUGH MARCH 31, 1999
26 Federal
Plaza
66
143
Intensive
Regular
Level
Level
3
53
6
4
91
Ordered
Appeared
Case Closed
52
Self -Deported
Appeared
Removed
Failed To
by INS
Prior To
In Absentia
Lost A-File
First Hearing
Appear
16
1
Case
Case Reopened
1
2
1
47
7
2
3
2
30
4
Case Closed
48
Pending
By INS Granted
Ordered
Awaiting
Granted
Failure To
Rebef Granted
Other
Ordered
Case
Failure To
Ordered
VD
By INS
Removed
1st Hearing
Voluntary
Prosecute
or Case
Completion
Removed
Pending
Prosecute
In Absentia
Removed
Departure
Terminated
In Absentia
35
2
4
Granted
Relief Granted
Pending
2
Voluntary
Or Case
Departure
Pending
Departure
Terminated
Deadline
Removal
14
Pending
34
9
Departure
No Confirmed
Departure
Deadline
Departure
Confirmed
9
9
3
No Confirmed
Departure
Received
Departure
Confirmed
Assistance In
Travel Costs
3
Departure
Confirmed
21
FIGURE 23: AAP PARTICIPANT APPEARANCES/DISPOSITIONS THROUGH MARCH 31, 1999
Newark
Wackenhut
Varick
1
45
Intensive
Intensive
16
Level
Level
Intensive
Level
40
2
3
Appeared or
Failed To
Re-detained
1
1
1
14
Awaiting 1st
Appear
On AAP
Self-Deported
Appeared
Entered Program
Appeared
Hearing
Recommendation
Prior To
On Appeal
1st Hearing
Awaiting Decision
36
2
2
2
1
1
2
3
Case Denied/
Case
Relief
Ordered
Case
Ordered
Awating
6
2
1st Hearing
Case
Case Denied/
Granted
Re-detained
Relief Granted
Re-detained
Pending
Granted
Removed
Pending
Removed
Pending
Re-detained
Voluntary
by INS
Or Case
Departure
Terminated
2
Appealed/
2
Departure
2
Appealed/
Re-released
Appealed/
Confirmed
Ordered
Re-released
Re-released
Removed
1
1
1
1
Appeal Denied/
Awaiting
Removed
Pending
Appeal
Pending
Appeal
From U.S
Removal
Denied/
Removal
Decision
Pending
Removal
22
DISCUSSION:
When participants are accepted into the program, their main contact with the AAP is
through communication with supervision and field staff. The supervision contacts and
interventions are structured to encourage compliance with participants' legal obligations as well
as the conditions of their supervision. The first contact participants have with supervision is the
orientation, which takes place soon after the individual is released from custody. During the
orientation, supervision staff review the rules of the program, gather additional information from
participants as to where they spend their time, and set a reporting schedule. Typically, intensive
participants have to report to the office once every two weeks and call twice every week. In
addition, participants are told that field staff will periodically make unannounced home visits to
confirm that that they do in fact live where they say they do. During the orientation, participants
are introduced to the removal process and given the opportunity to ask questions. If individual
guarantors are involved, they must also attend the orientation to ensure that they understand their
role and the participants obligations.
Once supervision staff have established a relationship with participants, routine
supervision meetings and call-ins serve to remind them of their obligations, including court
appointments and keeping the AAP informed of home addresses and telephone numbers, as well
as other places where the participant can be contacted. If the participant is required to leave the
United States as a result of a final court order, supervision staff rely on these contacts to
encourage participants to plan for their eventual departure. Because participants are monitored
so closely, supervision staff are able to know promptly if and when participants fall out of
compliance and can act accordingly. If the AAP's attempts to restore them to compliance are not
successful, supervision staff recommend re-detention.
Although it was originally thought that it would difficult to supervise aliens who are not
eligible to apply for a legal remedy, the AAP has had success supervising participants who are
apprehended in work-site enforcement actions. Virtually none of the work-site intakes is eligible
to apply for any kind of relief other than voluntary departure. However, AAP supervision staff
have developed techniques to facilitate participants' compliance with the voluntary departure
process. When a participant is granted voluntary departure by an Immigration Judge, the focus
of the supervision relationship shifts to planning for that participant's eventual departure from
the United States. Supervision staff set strict deadlines for the various requirements of the
process including purchase of a ticket and obtaining the consular letter for departure verification
purposes. Eventually, an AAP field or supervision staff member escorts the participant to the
airport to confirm their departure from the United States. The following is good example of a
work-site participant who, with the encouragement and assistance of supervision staff, is in full
compliance with his legal obligations and is prepared to voluntarily return to his home country.
Inder is an intensive participant from India who was apprehended by the INS at a
car wash where he was working without appropriate authorization. Inder entered
the United States without inspection and has been living here illegally for more than
nine years. His four children are living in India. Since Inder speaks very little
English, the AAP uses Punjabi interpreters at his supervision meetings. A friend
23
initially served as Inder's guarantor. Supervision staff soon determined, however,
that Inder's friend was not an ideal guarantor because he traveled often, at times
remaining in India for several months. Supervision staff were then able to find a
non-profit agency with a Punjabi speaker on staff to serve as guarantor.
Three weeks after Inder was released from detention he received a call-in letter from
INS Detention and Deportation. Rosie, Inder's supervision officer, accompanied
him to the INS for this appointment. However, they were told that the person who
was supposed to interview Inder was not in that day. Inder was given another
appointment - which took place as scheduled.
The AAP made several attempts to help Inder find a lawyer to represent him in
immigration court. Eventually, Zaire, another supervision officer, took Inder to the
Immigration Representation Project (IRP) to see if he could get an appointment with
an agency lawyer. The IRP, however, was unable to accommodate him. At this
point, Inder might have given up his search to find a lawyer had it not been for the
assistance of supervision staff. The AAP was able to get Inder an appointment to see
Father Kelly, a Catholic priest who as an accredited representative provides free
and low-cost assistance to many immigrants.
After meeting with Father Kelly, Inder decided that he wanted to pursue voluntary
departure. Inder was eventually granted voluntary departure by the Immigration
Judge and was given four months to leave the United States. At his next supervision
meeting, Rosie discussed the voluntary departure process and the importance of
obtaining a consular letter, which Inder needs to submit to an American consulate
when he arrives in India. Rosie and Inder also discussed his specific travel plans,
including his planned departure date and the costs of an airline ticket.
Inder has continued to comply with all of his obligations to the AAP, including
attending his supervision meetings and calling in several times a week. At one of
these supervision meetings, Inder brought in his airline ticket just as he had
promised supervision staff. Upon inspection of the ticket, Diana, a supervision
assistant, noticed that the ticket was dated five days after his voluntary departure
deadline. She explained to Inder that he would be in violation of his voluntary
departure order if he remained in the United States beyond his departure deadline.
Diana contacted the travel agency and was told that a $250 penalty would be
applied to the ticket if the travel date was changed. She then called Air India and
successfully requested a waiver of the penalty.
Inder is scheduled to leave in May and all indications are that he will comply with
his voluntary departure order. AAP supervision staff will closely monitor Inder until
he leaves and provide further assistance as his departure date approaches.
Supervision staff continue to provide a variety of resources to AAP participants. These
resources often take the form of educational materials that help participants navigate the legal
process, understand the legal consequences of noncompliance, and make informed decisions
about their legal situations. The AAP produced its second video, "Choosing a Lawyer", which is
24
shown to participants as part of their orientation to the program. The video provides AAP
participants basic advice about how to find legal representation. The video is designed to assist
participants in finding counsel not by simply describing and informing but by modeling behavior
and arming viewers to be prepared, assertive, and forceful in locating, interviewing and working
with legal representatives.
Participants continue to benefit from access to the AAP Resource Center, either through
doing their own research or by receiving referrals from supervision staff. Referrals are made to
food pantries, health clinics, English classes, and other social service agencies, all of which
address potential obstacles to compliance. Continued outreach to legal service providers has
increased participants' ability to obtain legal counsel. In addition, with an increasing number of
asylum seekers in the program, participants (on their own) are making greater use of the Center's
materials on country conditions, a resource that helps participants actively prepare for their
immigration cases. Access to resources has the added benefit of increasing participants'
connection to the AAP and their resulting desire to accommodate the program's requirements to
comply with all legal obligations.
One aspect of the program - re-detentions for serious program violations and absconding
- has largely failed to function because of the failure of the INS to authorize and implement the
necessary lines of authority and responsibility. As increasing numbers of intensive supervision
cases approach their conclusions - when the risk of absconding increases - the failure of the INS
to create effective procedures, agreed upon at the headquarters, regional and district levels, for
effectuating re-detentions is having increasingly deleterious effects. The failure to have a
credible re-detention capability not only undermines the ability of AAP staff to supervise
participants, with negative consequences on our appearance and compliance measures of
performance, but it also defeats a significant part of the purpose of this demonstration project -
i.e., to determine whether the techniques we are testing in fact work. From the planning stages of
more than three years ago until the present, Vera has consistently maintained that a credible,
functioning re-detention capability is essential to this, or any other, supervision program. At
earlier stages the representatives of the INS have agreed with our position and have assured Vera
staff that the INS would create the necessary mechanisms to accomplish re-detentions when they
become necessary. To date, those assurances have been honored more in the breach than in the
observance.
Since the AAP began operations, 23 recommendations for re-detention have been
forwarded to INS. Of these, only three have resulted in re-detention of the participant. In the
first case, INS re-detained the participant in court after his master calendar hearing. The re-
detention of the other two participants, brothers, occurred only after the AAP had initiated and
pursued conversations with INS officials at both the regional and headquarters levels. Such ad
hoc procedures are not a practical method for effecting future re-detentions.
Describing several recent cases in which our requests for re-detention have resulted in
ineffectual responses should illustrate the seriousness of this problem.
25
James, a middle-aged participant who had been released to the AAP from
Varick Street, was recommended for re-detention for persistent failure to
comply with program directives to obtain documentation showing his
eligibility for continued release on appeal. James lived in the same building
in the Bronx with his aged mother and brother. Even after he was
recommended for re-detention, the AAP kept in daily telephone contact with
James at his residence. During this time the AAP received information that
James was using drugs. The INS was informed of that fact and that James
was present most of every day at his residence in the Bronx.
Two months later, the assigned investigator received authorization from his
superiors to go to James' Bronx address to try to re-detain him, but was
subsequently asked to defer that effort because of a bedspace shortage. In
these two months the investigator had discovered what was believed to be an
active criminal warrant. The plan then became to request the New York City
police to arrest James on the warrant, after which the INS would lodge a
detainer. Another two weeks have passed and it is unknown to the AAP what,
if anything, the INS has done to try to apprehend this program violator, who
probably has spent most of the last several months at his known address.
*****
Vincent, who had been released to the AAP from Wackenhut, was
recommended for re-detention, based upon multiple program violations:
moving without permission or informing AAP staff, and missing both a call-in
and a supervision visit. The afternoon the recommendation was made,
Vincent failed to appear for his scheduled immigration court hearing and the
court ordered him removed in absentia. Later that day, AAP field staff
discovered the address to which Vincent had moved without permission. The
AAP then submitted an addendum to the recommendation for re-detention,
providing the name of the person Vincent was living with, her address and
telephone number.
Despite actual knowledge of Vincent's whereabouts and despite his having
absconded from the AAP and having been ordered removed in absentia, the
INS informed us that it had to follow lengthy call-in, warrant-drafting, and
case assignment procedures before any effort could be made to effect a re-
detention. It was explained that the removal order meant that pursuing these
procedures, which would take at least a few weeks, was mandatory. It did not
matter that the AAP knew exactly where Vincent was staying, nor that there
was a good chance that he would have moved again before anyone went to
look for him.
26
It is unknown a month later whether the INS has made any effort to apprehend
Vincent. But based on the explanation of the required "mandatory"
procedures, it seems quite unlikely that any such effort has been made.
*****
Jorge, who was released to AAP supervision after being apprehended in a
work-site enforcement action, was expected to receive a voluntary departure
order at his next master calendar hearing. The day before Jorge was due in
court the AAP discovered that he had moved without informing his
supervision officer and without permission from the AAP, serious program
violations. After unsuccessfully trying to locate Jorge, the AAP made a
recommendation for re-detention during the morning of the day when Jorge
was supposed to appear in court in the afternoon. The AAP urged his re-
detention if he appeared for court because it had concluded that Jorge
presented a high risk of absconding rather than leaving the country if he
received voluntary departure.
The INS, however, informed the AAP that it would not re-detain Jorge if he
appeared for court, principally because he was expected to receive voluntary
departure. The AAP's conclusion that Jorge was likely to abscond if he
received voluntary departure was of no consequence. Nor did there seem to
be any awareness that the facts presented by the AAP would support a strong
argument against the granting of voluntary departure.
In fact, Jorge did not appear for court, leading to his being ordered removed
in absentia. Had he appeared, we were told he would not have been re-
detained.
These three examples demonstrate how the failure to re-detain program violators and
absconders is undermining the AAP's effectiveness - - and not only with the participants directly
involved. We have anecdotal evidence that a number of participants have learned about the
AAP's lack of a credible re-detention sanction from their interaction with other participants and
the immigrant "grapevine." Some of these participants have become markedly less compliant as
a result.
James, after persistently refusing to comply with his program obligations and forcing the
AAP to invoke the ultimate sanction, has found that there are no consequences. He does not
even have to hide; he can simply remain living openly at his long-term address. For Vincent, the
ability of AAP field staff to track him down - one of the reasons to supervise a person in
proceedings rather than to release him without supervision - was nullified by the insistence on
pursuing lengthy procedures that precluded any attempts to find Vincent until the trail is cold,
assuming any attempts are made at all. And with Jorge, to argue against re-detention and to
insist on voluntary departure in the face of documented facts that he was in the process of
absconding serves solely to force failure upon the AAP.
27
It should be noted that some recommendations for re-detention present uncertainty
concerning the whereabouts of the participant. But even with such recommendations, the one
case on which we know investigators went into the field seeking an absconded participant
resulted in the participant re-establishing contact with the AAP. All of our recommendations
contain contact information. Experience shows that law enforcement status - a badge - elicits
some information that is not available to our non-law enforcement staff. There thus is every
reason to believe that, with the leads provided by the AAP, efforts to locate program violators
would lead to some positive results. It, therefore, is particularly frustrating to have no system in
place for the cases where the greenest investigator could locate the violator within an hour or
two. The reality is that even the easy cases, where the location of the participant is virtually
certain, currently involve a process that seems calculated to frustrate even a reasonable chance of
success.
The AAP can identify some persons who are about to abscond. We can seek to have
them re-detained to try to ensure their compliance with their legal obligations. As a program
involving voluntary compliance, however, we are powerless to stop a person who has decided to
abscond unless the INS acts on our request for re-detention. That has not been happening. With
increasing numbers of participants reaching the later stages of their cases, this problem has
become increasingly urgent.
Plan for the Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Supervision
Introduction
Vera's final report on the AAP demonstration will include an analysis of the cost
effectiveness of intensive supervision.¹⁴ The plan is to estimate what it would cost the INS to
establish a national supervision program and at the same time to estimate what that cost would
'buy' in achieving INS policy goals. The goals, or measures of supervision's effectiveness, are
rates of compliance with required court hearings and with final court orders. The analysis will
yield estimates of what INS supervision costs would be for each individual who attends all
hearings, and for each individual who complies with court orders.
The cost effectiveness of supervision on each measure will be compared with that of the
principal strategies currently used by the INS: detaining individuals throughout their
proceedings, and detaining them for a period and then releasing them on bond. The three
strategies will be compared for their cost effectiveness both overall and with reference to the
subgroups of individuals in removal proceedings - asylum seekers, criminal aliens, and
undocumented workers apprehended at work sites. The analysis will yield estimates of the
comparative cost of detention, release on bond, and supervision for each individual who attends
14
The literature on cost analysis distinguishes between cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis. The research
plan calls for an analysis of cost effectiveness because the benefit that the INS strategies are designed to achieve -
compliance with legal requirements - is difficult to quantify in monetary terms. Rather than assign a dollar value to
costs and benefits and arrive at a net figure for alternative strategies, cost effectiveness analysis compares strategies
on the basis of their costs and a single quantified benefit or effectiveness measure.
28
all hearings and for each individual who complies with court orders. It will yield the same
comparative estimates for each asylum seeker's or criminal alien's attendance and compliance.
Two effectiveness measures - attendance at hearings and compliance with court orders -
are used because each is relevant for a different INS policy. The INS may decide to fully detain
some respondents and release others who would be re-detained if the court decision required
their departure from the country. In this case, the comparative costs per individual complying
with all hearing requirements would be the appropriate measure of cost effectiveness. The
subsequent costs of re-detention and removal would be the same for all strategies. If, on the
other hand, the INS continues its current policy of detaining some respondents and releasing
most others without any provision for re-detention, then the cost per individual complying with
final court orders is the appropriate measure.
Data on the effectiveness of the three strategies will be developed from our impact
evaluation of AAP where we have analyzed compliance rates of program participants,
comparison groups released on bond, and individuals detained throughout their proceedings. In
estimating relative costs, we will include only those to the INS and exclude consideration of
costs to other levels and agencies of government, the taxpayers and the individuals in
proceedings. 15 We can, of course, only include INS costs to which a dollar value can be
assigned. For example, we cannot consider the cost of detaining individuals who are ultimately
granted relief, beyond the cost of the detention itself. Nor can we assign a monetary value to the
damage caused to INS and system credibility when a large proportion of aliens in removal
proceedings abscond either during proceedings or after they receive an order to leave the country.
The INS costs that can be assigned a dollar value - and that are described in more detail
below - are average costs of detention; average amounts recovered from breached bonds;
average costs to investigate, locate, detain and deport absconders; and estimated costs of
establishing a national intensive supervision program.
The basic cost effectiveness estimates will permit us to consider the cost implications of
current INS strategies and of the options for change that are available as the INS seeks to allocate
its scarce resources to advance its policy goals. For example:
What proportion of individuals detained throughout their proceedings are ultimately
granted relief and how much does their detention cost the INS?
How much does it cost the INS to detain or process individuals who ultimately fail to
comply with hearing or court order requirements?
Since the compliance rates achieved by detention exceed those of supervision, what is the
added cost to the INS of the compliance secured by full detention?
15 There is no consensus in the research on the net cost of illegal immigrants to the government and taxpayer. See
for example, Fiscal Impacts of Undocumented Aliens: Selected Estimates For Seven States, The Urban Institute,
1994.
29
The compliance rates of individuals released on bond are much lower than those of
individuals in supervision; even if the INS could reapprehend a significant proportion of
absconders, what would it cost to do so?
Do the savings from reduced detention or reapprehension costs offset the costs of
operating a supervision program?
The purpose of the analysis, then, is to develop comparative estimates of the cost
effectiveness of detention, release on bond, and supervision and to consider which strategy, or
which combination of strategies, would allow the INS to achieve the highest levels of
compliance with a given level of expenditure.
The sections that follow describe the population to be included in the study and the
methods of deriving costs for the detention, release on bond, and supervision strategies.
Population
The analysis will include all AAP intensive supervision participants who have had at least
one hearing (expected N= 140), and all who have completed their cases and reached the point of
compliance (expected N= 80). Participants include asylum seekers, criminal aliens and
undocumented workers.
One comparison group will consist of about 100 individuals who were detained
throughout their proceedings. We expect this group to be about 70 percent asylum seekers from
the airports, 25 percent from work-site enforcement actions, and 5 percent from the criminal
alien population.
The second comparison group will consist of individuals who were detained by the INS
and later released on bond. We have used this population in our impact evaluation and expect
over 300 of them to have had hearings and over 200 to have completed their cases. Their
composition, by site, will match that of the AAP participants.
Cost
Detention
Removing aliens who were detained and deported from detention involves three separate
costs: detention, transfer(s), and deportation. Estimates of the national average cost of detention
per person per day range fairly widely. For example, in an October 1998 report to the House of
Representatives, the U.S. General Accounting¹⁶ Office used an estimate of $66 a person a day;
16 Criminal Aliens: INS' Effort to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Needs Improvement.
30
the accounting firm KPMG estimated $88 a day. 17 We plan at this point to use the lower figure
although KPMG provided the more detailed explanation of the method used to reach the cost
estimate. The number of days spent in detention, as well as the costs of transfers and
deportation, can be retrieved from INS databases.
Release on Bond
The costs of initially detaining this group and of deporting those ordered removed will be
calculated in the same manner as for the fully detained group. The average bond amounts and the
proportion actually retrieved from absconders can be obtained from INS databases and
publications. However, this group has a much lower rate of compliance than the detention and
supervision options, which means that the net cost of this strategy includes INS costs to
investigate and re-apprehend absconders. The problem is that the INS does not publish or
provide direct estimates of the amount it spends on this function or on the proportion of
absconders it re-apprehends.
In the absence of official INS figures, we propose to obtain from the INS budget the
amount spent annually for the agency units that investigate and locate absconders. Since the
units are also responsible for other functions, we have to rely on INS officials to estimate the
proportion of the total that is spent locating absconders. From INS databases and publications,
we can estimate for a given year, the number of absconders, the number of absconders who are
re-detained and removed, and the average number of days they spend in detention. 18 This should
allow us to estimate the INS costs per reapprehended absconder, apply the proportions to the
absconders in the released-on-bond group, and include them in its cost per compliant individual.
If, however, we are not able to obtain the necessary information from the INS, we will not
include this cost in our estimates and we will consider that the costs of the release on bond and
supervision options are about equally affected by INS re-apprehension costs.
Since the INS has publicly declared its dissatisfaction with the compliance rates achieved
by the release on bond strategy, we will also estimate what the agency would have to spend in re-
apprehending and re-detaining absconders to approach the compliance rates of the other options.
Supervision
We will use the AAP experience to estimate what it would cost the INS to implement a
supervision program nationally. We will assume a given number of supervised participants
based on the average capacity of INS detention centers and on an estimate of the proportion of
detainees who can be released to supervision.
¹⁷Cost-Benefit Analysis of Detention Consolidation Options, Department of Justice Management and Planning Staff,
March 25, 1998.
18 See for example, Monthly Removals Report, FY 1998 and Third Report on Detention and Release of Criminal
and Other Aliens, 1998.
31
The cost of the supervision option includes some of the same costs as apply to the
comparison groups. Participants are initially detained before release to the program and some
abscond and would require re-apprehension. Using the amount of time that AAP participants
spent in detention and the proportions who have absconded, we will adopt the same
methodologies as outlined above to estimate the costs and any increased compliance that is
achieved. We would, however, make some downward adjustment in INS re-apprehension and
re-detention costs to account for the superior information that a supervision program would have
on the whereabouts of former participants.
The costs specific to supervision include staff, rent/utilities, equipment and other non-
personnel costs. Using AAP's current budget and interviews with its line staff, we will estimate
the amount of time they spend supervising for the intensive as opposed to the regular program.
On that basis we can estimate the number of line staff needed to supervise a given number of
participants. Again based on AAP's experience, an estimate can be developed of the number of
supervisors and managers that this line staff would need. Similarly, to estimate the costs of
facilities, utilities, equipment and other items, we will develop the AAP ratios between them and
the number and level of staff. Once the amounts of personnel and other items have been
developed, we can use cost of living adjustments published and used by the federal government
to estimate the national average costs.
Recommendations
The INS - at the Headquarters and Regional levels, in conjunction with the New York
District - should formulate effective procedures so that District personnel can re-detain AAP
participants who have fallen out of compliance. Clear lines of authority and responsibility
need to be established. These procedures adopted should permit swift action when required
and should be sufficiently flexible that re-detentions will be able to be accomplished when
and where appropriate. Two-way communication between the INS and the AAP on re-
detention efforts should be built in so as to increase the likelihood of locating absconders.
The need to forthrightly address this problem is compelling. The continuing failure to do so
is undermining the effectiveness of the AAP and the ability to determine the usefulness of the
community supervision model.
Inform the AAP of which newly-arrived asylum seekers at Wackenhut are being excluded
from the INS referrals to the AAP and the basis for such exclusions. Without such
information, Vera cannot know how the Wackenhut population eligible for the AAP is defined
and how the INS exclusions may skew the results of the demonstration. The AAP also cannot
know, and appropriately recommend, how asylum seekers should be selected for a future
alternative to detention program without acquiring profiles of those who were excluded from
this experiment and the rationales for such exclusions.
Notify the AAP of all work-site enforcement actions that occur within the New York District
so that the program may screen potential participants for AAP supervision, and modify
32
current procedures to allow screening of individuals whom the INS plans to detain at
facilities other than Elizabeth, New Jersey. We also request that the AAP be given notice the
day before a work-site action is scheduled to occur so that we can properly deploy our intake
staff for the following day.
Establish more efficient procedures at Detention and Deportation offices for serving
noncitizens who are granted voluntary departure. Although the previously discussed
problems encountered by AAP participants (see AAP October 1-December 31, 1998
quarterly report, pages 24-25) have been ameliorated by the intervention of the COTR, that
improved service benefits only AAP participants. These delays generally deter aliens from
complying with voluntary departure procedures. If noncitizens ordered to depart are unable
to obtain the proper verification paperwork, they are less likely to comply with the voluntary
departure order.
Establish procedures for officially recognizing the validity of confirmations by AAP staff of
departures from the United States of AAP participants.
Establish procedures for resolving the cases of participants who self-deport from the United
States and for whom the AAP has confirmed their departure. In general, the AAP
recommends that the INS develop and implement Service-wide procedures for documenting
the identities of aliens who depart the United States during the course of their removal
proceedings, but who fail to resolve those proceedings in immigration court prior to their
departure.
Create channels through which interested parties can access information about the
Appearance Assistance Program and its preliminary findings. In March, a representative of
the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children contacted the AAP and requested
information about court appearance rates of asylum seekers supervised by the program. The
Commission had a favorable impression of the AAP and had been citing it is an effective
alternative to detention for asylum seekers. In accordance with the procedures the INS has
asked us to follow when we are asked for information by an outside organization, we
contacted the public affairs department of the INS, which requested that the AAP not provide
this information. We believe that it is in the interest of the INS to allow the AAP to provide
interested parties with information about the program's results - particularly when they
demonstrate the ability to achieve voluntary compliance through community supervision of
noncitizens in removal proceedings.
To ensure that Vera's cost effectiveness analysis of intensive supervision in the final report is
as useful as possible to the INS, promptly communicate to the Research Department any
suggestions or concerns about, or any disagreements with, the plan for conducting the
analysis (see pages 28-32). Also, provide to the Research Department the budgetary and
operational information required to make the cost estimates as comprehensive as possible,
for example the data on the costs of locating and re-apprehending absconders outlined in the
plan.
33
To ensure that Vera's analysis of compliance with final orders to leave the United States is
as useful as possible to the INS, promptly communicate to the Research Department any
suggestions or concerns about, or disagreements with, the plan for measuring compliance
(see AAP July 1-September 30, 1998 quarterly report, pages 22-26). Also, promptly
communicate to the Research Department any suggestions or concerns about the analysis of
compliance included in the last quarterly report and in this annual report.
34
Appearance Assistance Program
Report to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
On the Second Operational Year
April 1, 1998 - March 31, 1999
APPENDIX A
Research Methodology
35
Rejected" sub-group is small and a better comparison group, since it consists of persons
screened, deemed eligible, and recommended for the AAP. The eligibility status of the "Not
Screened Possibly Eligible, Later Released" sub-group, on the other hand, is unknown.
To achieve the desired number of 16 from the "Not Screened Possibly Eligible, Later
Released" sub-group, we drew a stratified random sample based on the proportion of
Appeared/Failed to Appear in the full sub-group of 89 individuals.
Original sub-group:
Desired number:
Failed to Appear=17
3
TOTAL=89
16
The Elizabeth comparison group which originally contained 206 people meeting the
criteria for analysis, was reduced to reflect the same proportion between Airport and Federal
Plaza in the comparison groups as in the AAP. The total number of the AAP participants in
intensive supervision at the airports and at 26 Federal Plaza who met the criteria was 81. The
ratio of the airport AAP participants to the total is 29:81 or about 36 percent. The comparison
group from Federal Plaza had 95 individuals. To keep the same approximate ratio, the Elizabeth
group was reduced to 53. We drew a stratified random sample based on the proportion of
Appeared/Failed to Appear in the full sub-group of 206 individuals.
Original sub-group:
Desired number:
Failed to Appear= 39
10
TOTAL=206
53
Regular Supervision
AAP Participants
Of the 353 AAP participants, 321 were included in the analysis. The 32 participants excluded:
(a) did not have records in EOIR/ANSIR (11),
(b) did not yet have a first hearing (6), and
(c) did not have verifiable attendance in EOIR/ANSIR (15).
Comparison Groups
Of the 660 individuals from the comparison groups, 602 were included in the analysis and 58
were excluded. They:
(a) did not yet have a first hearing (22), and
(b) did not have verifiable attendance in EOIR/ANSIR (36).
37
Analysis of Immigration Court Completions
Intensive Supervision
AAP Participants
For the intensive AAP participants, 59 have records of completion in EOIR. One AAP
participant, who was excluded from the analysis of continuous compliance for non-verifiable
attendance at court hearings, was included here because the case was completed in court.
Comparison Groups
For the comparison groups, 141 individuals have completed cases recorded in EOIR.
One individual, excluded from the analysis of continuous compliance for non-verifiable
attendance at court hearings, was included here as a completed case.
Regular Supervision
AAP Participants
For the intensive AAP participants, 214 have records of completion in EOIR. Fifteen
AAP participants, who were excluded from the continuous compliance analysis because we
could not verify their attendance at court hearings, were included here as completed cases.
Regular Comparison Groups
For the comparison groups, 414 individuals have completed cases recorded in EOIR.
Thirty-six individuals who were excluded from the continuous compliance analysis for non-
verifiable attendance were included here as completed cases.
26 Federal Plaza Intensive Control and Comparison Groups
In virtually all sites at both levels of supervision, there is more than one control or
comparison group. (See previous annual report for a full description.) Here we refer specifically
to the three different groups used for comparison purposes at the 26 Federal Plaza site for AAP
intensive participants. For the "control" group, eligible individuals who have agreed to
participate are randomly assigned to the program and control group. In addition, alternatives -
called comparison groups were formed in response to the small numbers involved and the
possibility that some of the information and services that form the AAP "treatment" could be
shared between participants and their friends assigned to be controls. Undocumented workers are
apprehended in "clusters" all at one time from a particular workplace and are assigned to the
experimental or control groups. They are likely to have some group identity and communication
networks extending beyond the workplace. To measure, and hence allow for, this unwanted
influence, we formed an "unscreened" comparison group consisting of all persons apprehended
38
from selected enforcement actions that were not screened by the AAP. This group, which has
had no contact with the program, is expected to be free of "second-hand" influence of the AAP's
treatment. The second comparison group is a population of people whose recommendations for
release to the AAP were rejected by the INS.
Airport Intensive Comparison Group
Prior to this report, there was no comparison group available for AAP intensive
participants from the airport. Recently, the INS provided us with data on newly-arrived asylum
seekers detained after the commencement of expedited removal on April 1, 1999 and released on
parole from the detention facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey for use as a comparison group.
Analysis of Compliance with Final Court Orders
In evaluating the compliance of AAP participants and comparison groups with final court
orders, we considered individuals to be in compliance if they were allowed to stay in the U.S. or
actually departed when required to do so. The evidence that they were allowed to stay in the
U.S. was the record of their final court order in the EOIR database. The evidence of departure
consisted of an INS record of departure either in its databases or in the individual's A-file. In
our original plan for measuring compliance, included in the AAP July 1 - September 30 quarterly
report to the INS, we outlined sources of departure verification in addition to those available
from the INS; we included, for example, letters from airlines confirming that the alien was on
any of the specified flights on the specified dates. However, the INS has said that it does not
accept airline letters as adequate verification. To increase the usefulness of our analysis to the
agency, we are now using only INS data to verify the departure or failure to depart of those
granted voluntary departure and ordered removed.
We considered individuals to be absconders if they were ordered removed in absentia or
failed to comply with orders of voluntary departure or removal. The evidence that individuals
were ordered removed in absentia was the EOIR database; the evidence of failure to depart
consisted of notices of failure to surrender or breached bond or conversion of a voluntary
departure order to an order of removal in the INS A-files.
Finally, we considered compliance as unknown if we did not have evidence from INS
databases or files that individuals required to depart the country had actually departed or failed to
do so.
We are no longer relying on airline confirmations of departure, as originally stated in our
plan as well as on all the other confirmations outside INS and EOIR data. We received feedback
from the INS that it did not consider such confirmations valid. The change would classify many
who have left the country as absconders; nevertheless we have modified our methodology to
eliminate doubts by the INS as to the validity of the results.
39
Derivation of Numbers for the Analysis
AAP participants and comparison group members met the criteria for analysis if their
cases had been completed at the immigration court or appellate levels by December 31, 1998, or
by November 30, 1998 for voluntary departure cases, and they were:
permitted to stay in the U.S.,
ordered removed in absentia, or
required to leave the U.S. by orders of voluntary departure or removal for those
present in court.
Twenty-seven AAP participants and 217 individuals in the comparison groups met these
criteria. The AAP participants come from three sites: three asylum seekers from JFK and
Newark airports (11% of the total), four criminal aliens from the Varick Street SPC (15%), and
20 individuals apprehended during work-site enforcement actions from 26 Federal Plaza (74%).
The population eligible for the analysis in the comparison groups consists of 11 individuals from
Varick Street, 125 people released on parole from the Elizabeth detention center, and 81
individuals from 26 Federal Plaza. The Elizabeth detention center holds asylum seekers from
JFK and Newark airports who are comparable to the AAP airport group.
To ensure that the proportions from each site were the same in the participant and comparison
groups, we had to reduce the number of individuals released from the Elizabeth detention center
to 11 percent of the total population or 12 people. To obtain that number, we stratified the
sample based on the proportion of three outcomes: allowed to stay in the U.S., ordered removed,
and ordered removed in absentia.
Original Population
Sample
Total
125
12
Allowed to stay in the U.S.
70
7
Ordered removed
22
2
Ordered removed in absentia
33
3
Since the proportions of the comparison groups from Varick Street and 26 Federal Plaza
were similar to the proportions of AAP participants in the analysis, all of those eligible from
those two sites were included in the analysis.
40
Status of INS Contract with the Vera Institute
for an Appearance Assistance Program
April 21, 1997
Summary
The INS needs a capacity to supervise aliens in removal proceedings who are not
detained so that detention beds can be used more efficiently and effectively and so that
the removal process gains integrity. In September 1996, the INS contracted with Vera to
design and implement a pilot supervision program in the New York and Newark districts
and to assess its value to the Service as a national model. Persons subject to Vera
supervision should appear for hearings more often than those released without
supervision, more Vera supervisees ordered removed should actually be removed, more
of those entitled to relief from removal should win that relief, and the number ordered
removed who remain in the U.S. illegally should be reduced. Most important, the INS
will be able to demonstrate that it can operate a removal system with integrity without
having to build a detention space for every person in removal proceedings.
The INS contracted with Vera in part because of Vera's expertise in the
implementation of innovative programs in law enforcement agencies, but this kind of
innovation requires management by both Vera and the INS. Since January, the INS has
allowed management of this innovation within its own operations to slip. Although the
Commissioner told Vera in January that the role played by the Executive Associate
Commissioner for Programs would be continued by another senior official after the
departure of Mr. Aleinikoff, senior management of the innovation on the INS side has not
continued outside of the contracts office. The result is that the logistical and procedural
adjustments necessary in any innovation have lost their priority, and the reluctance of
busy staff to adopt new procedures has been allowed to stop progress on some parts of the
project.
Despite the lapse in national management, program implementation has moved
forward at a slow but steady pace, and the program is already yielding benefits. With the
good will and hard work of front line INS staff, the INS contracting officer, and the
COTR, the INS now has a community supervision capacity that it has lacked for decades.
The logistical obstacles to the intake operation at Varick Street SPC have been resolved.
The innovation has also won the support of, and continues to interest, several partners of
the INS, including the EOIR, the National Institute of Justice, and the Commission on
Immigration Reform.
The INS can realize the full benefit of this innovation if it now resolves the
logistical difficulties preventing Vera from providing supervision to the most promising
group covered by the project--aliens in removal proceedings who have been found by an
asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution-as well as to aliens apprehended in
work site enforcement actions. Without the Vera project, the INS must either detain these
persons throughout their proceedings or release them with little expectation that most will
comply with future proceedings and orders.
THE INS NEEDS A SUPERVISION CAPACITY SO IT CAN USE ITS LIMITED
DETENTION SPACE EFFICIENTLY AND ATTAIN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REMOVAL PROCESS
The INS asked the Vera Institute to create a supervision capacity because of a
series of problems that persist today:
INS front line staff continue to tell us that the people they don't detain do not
comply with the legal process. "We all know that an Immigration Judge's order of
deportation means nothing; nobody who's ordered deported who is not in detention
actually leaves the country.' (INS Trial Attorney, March 1997) "Eighty to 90% of
aliens apprehended in work site enforcement actions do not show up to immigration
court. (INS Investigations Agent, April 1997)
The vast majority of aliens in proceedings can not be detained and therefore do
not comply. Currently, the INS does not have the capacity to detain approximately
90% of aliens in proceedings. Of 25,036 aliens who completed proceedings on the
New York City, Varick SPC, Buffalo, and Newark EOIR dockets in 1996, 21,441
(86%) were never detained; 1,869 (7%) were detained, then released before the
completion of their proceedings; 1,726 (7%) were detained throughout their
proceedings. Although the number of detention beds is rising, the number of aliens in
proceedings is rising faster.
Getting compliance by detaining all aliens in proceedings is not a viable option.
Without a supervision option like the one Vera is creating, detention appears to be the
only way the INS can attain compliance. Indeed, the new immigration law requires
the Attorney General to report to Congress on the number of beds that would be
required to detain all aliens in proceedings. This number is likely to be well over
100,000-more than 10 times the size of the current INS detention system and larger
than the entire federal prison system.
Acquiescence in noncompliance under new laws could impact the federal courts
and the Justice Department. Even for groups that appear to be a low priority today
for detention, acquiescence in noncompliance under new immigration laws can create
bigger problems later for the Justice Department. New laws make failure to comply
with a removal order a federal crime, with penalties of up to 10 years of
imprisonment. In 4 New York area districts alone, about 17,500 aliens failed to
comply with removal orders in 1996 and therefore would be subject to federal
prosecution and imprisonment. The Vera project is designed to increase compliance
among this group.
2
Through its contract with Vera, the INS now has what it has never had before: a
community supervision capacity called the Appearance Assistance Program (AAP) that
can help the INS address these problems on a national scale. While the project is only in
its infancy, and its intake has been slowed by a series of logistical problems (see below),
at the most recent meeting of the project's national advisory board, there was consensus
that the program fills an important gap in the enforcement of immigration laws, its start-
up is in keeping with the implementation of innovations in other branches of the justice
system, and it appears to be of value to the INS from a national perspective.¹
The AAP helps the INS use limited detention space efficiently and justly.
Currently, INS detention decisions are based on available bed space. In contrast, the
AAP identifies aliens who are good candidates for supervision, allowing the INS to
reserve space for more urgent detention needs. To determine which aliens, if released
to supervision, are likely to comply with the process, the AAP evaluates community
ties (availability of a verifiable address and cooperation of a "guarantor"), eligibility
to apply for a legal remedy, history of compliance with the criminal justice system
and past supervision terms, and risk to public safety. With this information, the INS
can make more informed and consistent decisions about how to use valuable bed
space. Further, even when detention space is available, the AAP allows the INS to
use that space only when it is necessary to produce compliance by the alien. Before
April 1ˢᵗ, officials at Kennedy Airport used the information Vera screeners provided
about asylum seekers' verified ties to the New York area and the option of
supervision to decide whether specific aliens should be detained.
The AAP helps the INS improve the appearance rates of aliens not detained.
The INS now has its first community-based reporting center at 80 Broad Street in
downtown Manhattan. The purpose of this center is to ensure that aliens under
supervision comply with INS removal proceedings. AAP supervision staff monitor
participants' whereabouts and detect lapses in compliance before it's too late. When
participants report to the center, they get access to resources and referrals.
Supervision staff also provide information about the importance of compliance and
reminders of upcoming court dates.
Even in the first few weeks, there are already indications of the value of a
supervision program for those released. One concern has been that aliens released,
1
Vera forms a national advisory board for each of its demonstration projects. The AAP advisory board
consists of: Christopher Nuttall, Director of Research and Statistics, British Home Office; Kathleen
Roberts, Director of Professional Services, JAMS/Endispute; John Schoenberger, Chief Pretrial Services
Officer, U.S. District Court, SDNY; Paul Shechtman, Stillman & Friedman, P.C.; Peter Schuck, Yale Law
School; Daniel J. Freed, Yale Law School; Stephanie Marks, Assadi Rahmanan & Marks; Alan Henry,
Director, Pretrial Services Resources Center; Rebecca A. Maynard, University of Pennsylvania; Margaret
Taylor, Wake Forest School of Law; Walter Stafford, Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service, New
York University; Donald P. Lay, Senior Judge, Eighth Circuit United States Court of Appeals. Other
regular attendees include senior officials of the National Institute of Justice, the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, and the INS.
3
particularly asylum seekers, would move several times and the INS would lose track
of them. It is therefore encouraging that those released to the AAP have maintained
contact with their supervision officer, notifying him of several changes of address.
Supervision staff have made sure these participants fill out official change of address
forms. The AAP has also enlisted immigrant-serving organizations to encourage
participants to comply with the INS/EOIR process.
The AAP helps the INS plan to use detention space strategically to attain
compliance. Vera has also built a capacity to collect and analyze information about
individuals in proceedings from several sources--something else the INS has not had
before. Vera has integrated data from the INS's DACS database and EOIR's
database, enabling researchers to analyze the characteristics, behavior, and outcomes
of proceedings for detained and nondetained aliens. With these data, Vera could help
the INS predict detention needs, assess "bag and baggage" operations and improve
bond practices.
LAPSE OF MANAGEMENT OF THIS INNOVATION WITHIN THE INS
The INS contracted with Vera in part because of Vera's expertise in the
implementation of innovative programs in law enforcement agencies. Management of
innovation entails both strong working relationships with local operational staff and
leadership by officials responsible for local and national policy. The INS recognized the
need for such a management structure throughout the planning phase and during the start-
up period of this project, when Vera personnel met regularly with the Executive
Associate Commissioner for Programs and other officials at INS Headquarters, as well as
with the New York District Director. Though different from the management of a typical
INS contract for goods or services, such a management structure is legally permissible
and has worked with several other government agencies. Vera would be happy to work
with INS contract and legal officials to ensure a workable administration mechanism.
Since January, however, the INS has allowed its policy-level management of this
innovation to lapse. All innovations in large organizations meet logistical objections and
resistance, but this one has also been slowed by the fact that after Mr. Aleinikoff's
departure there is no one now responsible for the system-wide development of a coherent,
efficient process for assuring that aliens comply with removal proceedings. Fortunately,
the AAP produces other benefits to front line staff. Trial attorneys gain some confidence
that when they persuade a judge to order an alien removed, it will actually happen;
asylum officers gain some confidence that when they determine an alien has a credible
fear of persecution, the asylum seeker can be safely supervised rather than detained
throughout their proceedings.
For the local managers of detention facilities, however, the AAP appears
beneficial only when detention space is full. They do not see the importance of managing
detention space nationally. For example, if they can move detainees quickly to Oakdale,
Louisiana from New York before bond is set, those detainees become someone else's
4
problem. If these detainees then make bond in Oakdale and come back to New York,
they will likely fail to attend their hearings and add to the numbers of persons ordered
removed who failed to depart. The AAP can solve this problem for the INS, but only
with guidance from a national perspective.
DESPITE THE LAPSE IN NATIONAL MANAGEMENT, PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION HAS MOVED FORWARD AND INS AND VERA STAFF
TOGETHER HAVE DEVELOPED PROCEDURES THAT WORK SMOOTHLY AND
ARE USEFUL TO INS OFFICIALS
Despite the fact that the INS has not provided access to the full set of information
or facilities for screening required by the contract, Vera has tried to put the program into
operation and has succeeded in establishing a small caseload. Indeed, the program is
already yielding benefits for the INS.
With the good will and hard work of front line INS staff, the INS Contracting
Officer, and the COTR, program implementation has moved forward at a slow but steady
pace. For example, working with the Contracting Officer and our COTR, we have been
able to resolve virtually all of the operational issues at the Varick Street SPC. Although
the INS did not provide timely access to files or install the required phone and computer
lines during the first two months, we have worked through and around these problems,
making 3 recommendations for supervision in the last few weeks, 2 of which were
granted.
Although the JFK airport staff initially thought that Vera could not operate there
because there was no available space (sometimes there are several INS Inspectors to a
desk), Vera and INS staff were able to work out a way for Vera intake screeners to work
there with minimal disruption. Vera provided INS Inspectors with information they
would not otherwise have had about aliens' verified community ties and gave them an
additional option between detention and release: supervision. In its first 10 weeks, Vera
recommended 13 aliens-more than one third of those screened-for supervision.
As INS staff got used to having Vera staff at the airports and began to see what
assistance they could offer, Immigration officials saw that the Appearance Assistance
Program might help them keep track of aliens they release from the airports for
humanitarian reasons. They suggested that Vera put these aliens in its notification
program. Vera and INS staff developed procedures; after 2 weeks there are 5 notification
program participants.
The INS now has a supervision capacity that did not exist only 3 months ago. The
innovation has also won the support of, and continues to interest, several partners of the
INS, including the EOIR, the National Institute of Justice, and the Commission on
Immigration Reform. Vera and INS staff working together developed procedures and
overcame logistical obstacles to make the Appearance Assistance Program work at
Varick Street and at the airports; they can also make it work in the Wackenhut and CCA
facilities and at 26 Federal Plaza.
5
THE INS CAN REALIZE THE FULL BENEFIT OF THIS INNOVATION IF IT
RESOLVES THE LOGISTICAL DIFFICULTIES PREVENTING VERA FROM
SUPERVISING POLITICAL ASYLUM APPLICANTS WHO PASS THE CREDIBLE
FEAR SCREEN AND ALIENS APPREHENDED IN WORK SITE ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS
The AAP's continued screening of asylum seekers is important and feasible. The
INS continues to need a supervision capacity for asylum seekers under the expedited
removal procedures implemented April 1st. By releasing to supervision aliens who have
passed a credible fear screening and who thus have a good chance of winning their cases,
the INS will be able to use those beds for aliens in expedited removal with no claim to
relief. At the same time, it will be able to track those released and increase the likelihood
of their compliance with the legal process. Government treatment of asylum seekers is
also an area of great national and international scrutiny. Once someone has passed the
Credible Fear standard, release to a supervision program that can ensure attendance at
hearings is a better option than ongoing detention. Finally, the AAP's community ties
investigation can relieve Asylum Officers, whose expertise is in assessing asylum claims,
of responsibility for evaluating suitability for release.
Operating the AAP in the Wackenhut and CCA detention facilities will not pose a
substantial or unexpected burden on INS facilities or staff, despite the fact that some
district staff would prefer to proceed without the AAP. The original contract provided
that the AAP would conduct screening of asylum applicants in the Wackenhut and CCA
facilities; screening was to take place at JFK and Newark Airports as an interim measure
until those detention facilities were operational. Screening aliens either before or after
they pass the Credible Fear standard will require minimal AAP presence at the detention
facilities. An initial community ties interview will take approximately 15 minutes. In a
few morning session per week, we can interview all aliens who have passed the credible
fear screen. We will then verify the information and secure the cooperation of a
guarantor from our offices and be able to make recommendations within 24 hours of the
interview. At the next scheduled session we will come to the facility to do an exit
interview, and the person will be released at that time. We will not need any permanent
space at the facilities. We will only need storage space and a place to meet with the
detainees privately. We have seen at the Elizabeth facility attorney-client meeting rooms
which could easily serve as our interview space. We have also seen that there are
unoccupied offices near the asylum officers where we could at least make necessary
phone calls or wait between interviews. We estimate that our screeners will not be at the
facility more than six hours per week. Logistical concerns that have been raised are
easily overcome.
Continuing asylum screening after April 1st does not require any change in Vera's
contract with the INS. It will only require the following:
--The INS officials responsible for making release decisions in the CCA facility in
Elizabeth and in the Wackenhut facility should be identified and communicated to Vera
through the COTR. Those officials should be instructed to consider AAP
recommendations in his or her release decisions and to approve those recommended for
supervised release unless inappropriate for public safety or other reasons.
6
--Arrangements must be made for AAP screeners to enter the CCA and Wackenhut
detention facilities to conduct initial screening interviews and exit interviews for those
accepted into the supervision program.
--Contact with the Asylum Division in Washington must be authorized to coordinate the
screening process and the recommendation forms.
With the New York Assistant District Director for Investigations, we have
developed preliminary procedures for screening aliens apprehended in work site
enforcement actions. We are scheduled to observe work site enforcement processing this
coming Thursday and to begin screening shortly thereafter. However, screening for this
group has been postponed several times before. Identifying those among this group who
will comply with the legal process if supervised in their community could have a large
benefit for the INS, since their appearance and compliance rates are exceptionally low.
7
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