Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
222089816
label
[03/26/1997-03/27/1997]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
222089816
contentType
document
title
[03/26/1997-03/27/1997]
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council (Clinton Administration)
Emails
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
222089816
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
otherTitles
42-t-24194021-20061363F-Seg3-013-003-2019
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
03f000694869b7fb
ocrText
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 1 of 48
MSMail
DATE-TIME
26 March 97 19:13
FROM
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
DAILY GUIDANCE UPDATE [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Branscum, Sean D.
Abdulmalik, April B.
Akers, Dale W.
Albert, Ronda A.
Alijanil, Leyla
Amiri, Rukhsana N.
Andreasen, Steven P.
Antholis, William J.
Appel, Edward J.
Armstrong, Fulton T.
Atlas, Edwin L.
Baker, Jane E.
Baker, James E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Bass, Peter E.
Battenfield, Pat
Beers, Rand R.
Behring, Deanna M.
Bellamy, Ralph C.
Bell, Robert G.
Bemisderfer, Dwight D.
Bendick, Gordon L.
Benjamin, Daniel
Birkland, Andrea L.
Black, Todd F.
Blinken, Antony J.
Bolinski, Charlene C.
Bouchard, Joseph F.
Boynton, Peter J.
Brennan, Steven A.
Bresnahan, Gary E.
Brooks, Jennifer
Brown, Nancy E.
Bryan, Lloyd D.
Burrell, Christina L.
Busick, Paul E.
Caravelli, John M.
Carter, Michael E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 2 of 48
Clark, Bronya
Clarke, Richard A.
Cooper, Kathleen H.
Danvers, William C.
Darnes, Victoria J.
Davies, Glyn T.
Davis, William K.
DeSouza, Patrick J.
Dimel, Marsha L.
Dobbins, James F.
Dohse, Fred J.
Dowling, J. Nicholas
Dupuy, Shawn L.
Durham, Robert J.
Edwards, Joan
Eggert, Tamara E.
Epstein, Gerald L.
Feeley, John F.
Ficklin, John W.
Flessas, Dan
Florio, Elaine
Flynn, Stephen E.
Fort, Jane B.
Fried, Daniel
Friedrich, M. K.
Fuhrman, Thomas A.
George, Christopher
Gerstner, Christina L.
Gibney, James S.
Gladbach, Damon J.
Glinski, David L.
Gorsuch, Robert P.
Gray, Wendy
Grummon, Stephen R.
Haines, Mary A.
Hale, John E.
Hall, James A.
Hall, Wilma G.
Hamilton, Roy A.
Harding, Bruce D.
Harmon, Joyce
Harris, Elisa D.
Harris, Karen
Harrison, Lyle M.
Hasman, Thomas M.
Hawes, David J.
Hawkins, Ardenia R.
Helweg, M. Diana
Higgins, David B.
Hilliard, Brenda I.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 3 of 48
Hill, Roseanne M.
Hofmann, Stephan D.
Huggins, Peter
Hunerwadel, Joan S.
Johnson, David T.
Johnson, Natalie A.
Jones, Kerri-Ann D.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kale, Dora A.
Kelly, Sandra L.
Kerrick, Donald L.
Kessinger, Jodi
Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.
Koehler, Marc
Kreczko, Alan J.
Kristoff, Sandra J.
Kyle, Robert D.
LaFleur, Vinca A.
Langley, Janice M.
Lawrence, Cynthia
Leary, William H.
LeBaron, Richard B.
Lee, Malcolm R.
Letts, Kelly J.
Lindsay, James M.
Lindsey, Christine J.
Lorin, Matthew E.
Lowry, Jay E.
Luzzatto, Anne R.
MacDonald, Bruce W.
Malley, Robert
Marshall, Betty A.
Marsh, Thomas S.
Martinez, Alejandro
Matera, Michael A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
McCarthy, Mary O.
McCormick, Shawn H.
McIntyre, Stuart H.
Merchant, Brian
Mercier, Henry J.
Millison, Cathy L.
Mitsler, Elaine M.
Miyaoka, Lester H.
Motherway, Daniel J.
Mueller, William (Doug) D.
Murray, Lori E.
Naplan, Steven J.
Natoli, Kim M.
Neil, M. Elise
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 4 of 48
O'loughlin, Kathrine
Orr, Robert C.
O'Shaughnessy, Patrick
Panerali, Kristen E.
Papadimitriou, Marianna
Gwyn M. Parker
Parris, Mark R.
Pascual, Carlos E.
Peggins, John W.
Peters, Mary A.
Piccone, Theodore J.
Pifer, Steven K.
Porter, Gidell
Prendergast, John P.
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L.
Pyatt, Geoffrey R.
Quinn, Mary E.
Ragan, Richard F.
Rajan, Nahla B.
Rice, Susan E.
Rice, Sean P.
Rim, Julie J.
Roach, Darren S.
Robinson, Wylma
Rosa, Frederick M.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Rubin, Eric S.
Rumer, Eugene B.
Salvetti, Lisa M.
Samore, Gary S.
Sanborn, Daniel R. K.
David B. Sandalow
Schmelz, Angela
Schmidt, John R.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sculimbrene, Thomas A.
Seaton, James B.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Sigler, Ralph
Simonalle, Eugene A.
Simon, Steven N.
Simons, James R.
Smith, Michael P.
Snyder, Julie A.
Sonenshine, Tara D.
Sparks, John E.
Suettinger, Robert L.
Sulser, Jack A.
Tucker, Maureen E.
Uriu, Robert M.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 5 of 48
Van Tassel, David S.
Veit, Katherine M.
Vershbow, Alexander R.
Verville, Elizabeth G.
Wadsworth, Valon J.
Walsh, Helen C.
Ward, JoAnn X.
Weber, Paul A.
Wechsler, William F.
Whitworth, Frank D.
Willis, Robin M.
Witkowsky, Anne A.
Wozniak, Natalie S.
Wright, Allison M.
Wright, Jay
Yokum, Jeffrey G.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
Please review and forward your updates IN BOLD to @PRESS by 10:00 a.m.
Thursday, March 27. Thank you.
[[ MAR26GUI.DOC 4943 in MAR26GUI.DOC ]]
ATTACHMENT
26 March 97 17:4
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME
MAR26GUI.DOC
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
March 26, 1997
Berger Speech/CSIS
Middle East
Khobar
Iraq
Russia/NIS
Bosnia
China
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 6 of 48
Trips and Visitors
Helsinki Summit Results
Summary of Helsinki Joint Statements
START/ABM
Zaire
Albania
Mexico
Northern Ireland
Gulf War Illnesses
CWC
Nazi Assets
Cuba
Peru
Indonesia
BERGER SPEECH AT CSIS
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release March 21, 1997
MEDIA ADVISORY
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National
Security
Affairs, will deliver On-the-Record remarks, "Strategic
Objectives:
President Clinton's Second Term Foreign Policy Agenda," on
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 7 of 48
Thursday,
March 27, 1997, at 11:00 a.m. before the Center for Strategic &
International Studies' Statesmen's Forum, on the B-1 Conference
Level, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. This event is open
to
the press.
Media planning to cover this event should contact Nancy Nugent,
CSIS Public Affairs, 202-775-3176 or Steven Naplan, National
Security
Council Communications Office, 202-456-9371.
###
MIDDLE EAST
Ross Trip to the Middle East
Q: Why did the President send Dennis Ross to the region?
A: The President decided to send Ross because he wants him to meet
with the regional
leaders, assess the situation and report back to him and the
Secretary by the weekend.
Q: Did the President dispatch Dennis because you were unable to
make any progress in
defusing the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians from
Washington?
A: As I said, the President wants Dennis to provide him an
assessment of the situation.
Q: What is Ross' schedule? Who will he meet?
A: Dennis will make a short trip to the region. He will be
meeting with Chairman Arafat
and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Q: Is it true that you had great difficulty trying to reach
Chairman Arafat because he was
avoiding you?
A: Chairman Arafat was traveling, but Secretary Albright spoke to
him by telephone on
Tuesday.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 8 of 48
Q: Is Dennis carrying letters/messages from the President to the
regional leaders?
A: Obviously Dennis will carry messages to the two leaders, but I
am not going to get into
the details of those messages.
Q: What do you expect to achieve from this mission?
A: As I said, the purpose of Dennis' trip is to talk to the
leaders and make an assessment of
the situation for the President.
Q: Will Dennis tell Arafat to issue a "red light" to terror and
violence? Will Dennis tell
Netanyahu what he needs to do to end the present crisis?
A: I am not going to get into the substance of the messages.
Dennis will assess the
situation and report back to the President and the Secretary by
the weekend.
Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza
and the West Bank?
A: The situation on the ground remains tense.
We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to
avoid violent confrontations,
and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to
work together to defuse
tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.
RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH
Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?
A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a
warrant for Muqademah's
arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.
We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA
to do everything
possible to re-apprehend him.
PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS
Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian
authority must comply with all
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 9 of 48
its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in
order for negotiations to
resume?
A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to
do everything it can to
prevent further terror and violence.
There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian
authority must make
certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process
understand that violence and
terror are unacceptable.
This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is
to be restored and
negotiations resumed.
Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and
terrorism? Shouldn't he be
arresting more members of extremist organizations?
A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all
it can to prevent violence
and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that
those associated with
violence and terror are brought to justice.
Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem
through its moving
ahead with the Har Homa development?
A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har
Homa decision, nothing
can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be
tolerated.
Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must
stop giving extremists a
green light and give them a red light?
A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is
absolutely essential for the
Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very
clearly in both words and
deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will
not be tolerated.
U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 10 of 48
Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians
to solve this crisis?
A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.
(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister
Netanyahu on Friday and the
Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also
been in contact with
the Palestinians.
KHOBAR BOMBING
Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing
investigation?
A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do
not comment on
investigations in progress.
Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our
diplomatic exchanges with
other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under
investigation.
Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect
detained by Canada?
A: As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the
Saudis and we've been
assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more
cooperation will be
forthcoming.
As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may
have information
about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.
IRAQ
Background: The Los Angeles Times apparently will be running a
story on the arrival of a group
of Iraqis currently in Guam to California. Out of the 6,630
persons initially evacuated from
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 11 of 48
Northern Iraq by the United States, roughly 2,000 remain on Guam
pending their resettlement in
the United States. All Iraqis are expected to have departed Guam
by April 14, 1997. The INS
has determined that 25 of the evacuees were ineligible for
asylum. On March 27, they will be
transferred to California where they will be detained at either a
facility in Lancaster or near
Bakersfield pending the outcome of their exclusion proceedings.
They will appear before an
immigration judge.
Thirty-four accompanying family members also will be transferred
with them and housed at an
INS facility in Lancaster, pending completion of their processing
and placement with appropriate
sponsors.
Points [If Asked]
Evacuation of Iraqi nationals from Northern Iraq was a
humanitarian gesture in keeping with
U.S. tradition.
Persons evacuated were determined to be at risk based on their
association with the United
States.
Roughly 8,000 evacuees will be resettled in the U.S. and placed
with private sponsors.
Background security checks were undertaken both before the
evacuation and during
processing on Guam.
INS will deal with the 25 Iraqis found to be excludable
according to usual immigration
procedures.
QUESTIONS RELATED TO STATUS OF THOSE FOUND EXCLUDABLE
SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO INS
RUSSIA/NIS
Current Items
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 12 of 48
Russian-Iraqi Oil Deal Signed by Russian Energy Minister Rodionov
Seen reports outlining agreement between Russia and Iraq to
develop Iraq's Qurana oil field;
understand Minister Rodionov stated large-scale implementation of
$3.7 billion project
possible only after UN sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted.
UN sanctions remain in place; expect Russia will continue to
honor UN sanctions regime.
But concerned Iraq tries to interpret every international
contract as proof it can have
sanctions lifted without first complying fully with UN
obligations. That is not true.
U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus
Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's detention,
subsequent expulsion from
Belarus of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function
of observing opposition
rally.
Already decided to recall our ambassador for consultations; take
actions to cut off most aid
and redirect remaining funds (about $5 million) to NGOs, business
groups, humanitarian
purposes.
Today have taken two other measures:
advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul,
Vladimir Gramyka,
declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna
Convention and has been
requested to leave country;
have requested Government of Belarus not to send their
Ambassador-designate to
U.S., previously scheduled to arrive today.
Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by
Lukashenko regime and
government's rejection of internationally recognized human
rights, as shown in last
November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of
legitimacy."
(If asked -- why Gramyka?)
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 13 of 48
Action taken to underscore our strong objection to expulsion of
American diplomat; also note
expulsion last week of American citizen who headed Soros
Foundation in Minsk; Belarusian
we identified of similar rank and status to our diplomat.
(If Asked -- How long will you hold Yalowitz in U.S., delay new
Belarusian ambassador?)
As long as it takes for us to be assured that it's in our
interest to return our ambassador,
allow theirs to come.
(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)
As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of
officials; officer was carrying
out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.
BOSNIA
Izetbegovic visit
President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of
Bosnia, will meet with
President Clinton Wednesday. They are expected to discuss a
broad range of issues relating
to the Bosnia peace process.
If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace
Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous
Bosnia that will be part of a
greater Europe and play an important role in the international
community of democratic
nations.
At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in
Partnership for Peace. However,
further progress must first be made in several areas, including
further strengthening of
fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic
and societal infrastructures.
The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 14 of 48
groups, will be responsible for this
work.
If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and
equipping of the Bosnian military
We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation
self-defense capability through
the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a
key part of building a
stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting
peace in the region.
The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S.
contracted trainers, funded by
international donations, and additional offers of training
assistance from our allies in Europe
and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery
of U.S. equipment from our
$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is
receiving substantial additional
security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic
states.
The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the
formation of joint
Federation defense structures that will be critical to
strengthening the Bosniak-Croat
Federation.
Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent
editorials)
As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in
Bosnia, we must not forget
the enormous progress we have made.
In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since
World War II continued to
rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic
initiative, few believed peace
was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose
in the post-Cold War
era.
Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a
peace that provides the
backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political
reconciliation and economic
reconstruction.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 15 of 48
Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The
military aspects of Dayton
were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections
were successfully held in
September and joint national institutions have been created and
are starting to operate. The
international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable
military balance in Bosnia and
facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures
that will be critical to
strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000
refugees have returned.
There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction
of Bosnia, especially in
the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is
perhaps most dramatic. Cut off
and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and
mortar fire just to get some
dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather
some humanitarian rations.
Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and
hundreds of cafes, shops,
restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened
their doors. Overall, the
Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment
went from 90% to 50%.
Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor
and much remains to be
done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal
infrastructures. We need
greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and
the return of refugees and
displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the
fledgling political
institutions.
The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian
groups, will be responsible for this
work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will
provide the stability and
confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make
progress toward these
goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give
sufficient extra time needed on
these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 16 of 48
Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia
The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Bosnia
endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was
signed at Dayton.
Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World
War II continued to rage in
Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace
that provides a secure
environment for the difficult long term challenges of political
reconciliation and economic
reconstruction.
Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S.
troops could lead to a resumption
of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and
an abdication of U.S.
credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This
bill throws into question
Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and
leadership in NATO -- sending a
very troubling message all involved.
To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence
in the Dayton process, gives
them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume
preparations for conflict that
would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a
Congressional threat to
walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question
U.S. credibility and
commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our
troops on the ground and
those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly
questions the purpose and value of
their service and sacrifice.
For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation be
withdrawn. We recognize and
share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in
Bosnia. If we remain engaged
and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe
that 18 months should give
sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.
FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement
The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 17 of 48
agreement with the Serb Republic
is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with
the Constitutions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that
clearly belong to the individual
states, including culture and education to foreign policy and
immigration. It also creates a
basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the
sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to
happen without the expressed
consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the
Bosnia-Herzogovina Assembly.
SFOR Mission Duration
We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months
should give sufficient
extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic
reconstruction, refugee
return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining
peace.
If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:
We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are
focused on the important
work we have to do between now and June 1998.
War Criminals
The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War
Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is
an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring
peace.
We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on
war crimes front in
Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal
to bring indicted war
criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist
the Tribunal. We are
reviewing many different options.
If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to
arrest war criminals:
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 18 of 48
We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the
ability of the Tribunal to
bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to
establish some sort of
capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are
studying the feasibility of these
options but have made no decisions yet.
CHINA
GORE TRIP
Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the
Administration's policy toward
China would not change as a result of the current investigation
into alleged illegal
campaign contributions by Chinese officials?
A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in
Beijing with Premier Li
Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.
The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations
very seriously. Were the
FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal
acts, the potential consequences
for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China
relations could be
jeopardized.
The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not
speculate on its
outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our
objectives with China,
including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for
improvements in
human rights practices and holding China to international
standards on nonproliferation
issues.
Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo.
Also, what issues will
he raise in Beijing?
A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minster Hashimoto
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 19 of 48
and Foreign Minister
Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice
President affirmed the
centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would
maintain American force levels
at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President
urged Japan to implement
fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework
talks.
As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise
a series of strategic
issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and
regional concerns, such as the
Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be
discussed. We do not
believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to
enable us to forego a
UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.
(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign
contributions will be part of
the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our
practices for investigating
such allegations.
UNHRC
Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's
efforts to line up support for its
position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and
Western "hypocrisy" on the
issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has
sought to "buy" off votes of
several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at
members of the Commission. At
the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the
US and EU to prevail on the
resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this
year as compared to last. -- which
itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.
In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade
(and other forms of economic
support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing
out that this was in fact the very
type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we
have made clear that we would
not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 20 of 48
resolution. As for our approach to
the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a
resolution, barring significant
improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of
the vote (around April 14-18).
We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the
Chinese on steps to improve
their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a
proposed resolution, coupled with
demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit
to support a "no-action"
motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to
oppose a resolution (which
we would co-sponsor).
Points
Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe
members of the Commission
should make decision based on human rights situation in China,
not other factors.
Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation
warrants a resolution on China's
human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have
decided in principle to
co-sponsor a resolution.
We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights
progress we would see no
reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.
If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year
At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to
convey our views and are
working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the
past, and, more importantly, our
approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote,
based on the human rights
situation in China.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 21 of 48
TRIPS AND VISITORS
President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King
Hussein of Jordan has
been rescheduled for April 1.
POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will
travel to Denmark in July in
conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.
Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and
working lunch April 3. Do
not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.
Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official
visit to Washington on April 8.
President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional
summit meetings in Bridgetown,
Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled
during the week of May
6-10.
President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela
rescheduled to October 12-17.
Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and
working lunch.
President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and
Marshall Plan
commemoration event. No details yet.
Denver Summit June 20-22.
If asked about Hashimoto Visit
Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to
a leaked story in Tokyo
about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The
Japanese are saying, "The Prime
Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two
governments have begun
consultations."
We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM
Hashimoto visit to Washington
this spring.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 22 of 48
HELSINKI SUMMIT RESULTS
Overview
Very successful summit. President and Yeltsin continued
excellent working relationship;
tackled tough issues and produced decisions that take account of
both sides' interests.
Presidents' decisions reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship, lay
firm basis for relations into
21st century, and contribute to development of more stable,
secure and undivided Europe.
Joint statements issued by President and Yeltsin mean we:
have turned corner with Russia on developing NATO-Russia
relationship, despite
disagreement over NATO enlargement;
resolved ABM/TMD demarcation issue;
have formula that will allow Russia to ratify START II, so that
we can bring Treaty into
force and launch START III negotiations to achieve further
nuclear reductions;
have agreed path to complete Russia's transition to market
economy, further integration
into global economic system.
European Security
Presidents discussed Europe, NATO-Russia. Disagree over NATO
enlargement, but did not
expect to change Yeltsin's mind.
President made clear enlargement to proceed on schedule.
Key thing is Yeltsin committed to work with President and NATO
to develop cooperative
NATO-Russia relationship. This will contribute to European
security, avoid isolating Russia.
Further, as Russia works more closely with NATO, believe Russia
can come to see that
enlarged NATO poses no threat.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 23 of 48
In joint statement on Europe, President and Yeltsin:
reaffirm commitment to stable, secure, integrated, undivided and
democratic Europe;
agree that European security structures should evolve in
accordance with OSCE
principles;
note that, despite disagreement on NATO enlargement, they will
work with NATO on
document to establish cooperative relationship between NATO and
Russia;
support conclusion of a framework agreement on elements of
adaptation of CFE Treaty
by mid-year;
note President's assurance that NATO contemplates nothing that
would lead to potentially
threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces
nearer Russia; and
refer to NATO's policy of no intention, plan or reason to deploy
nuclear weapons on
territory of new member states.
Nuclear Arms Control
ABM/TMD. President and Yeltsin worked hard to come up with
mutually acceptable
formulation for dealing with ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically
higher-velocity TMD
systems.
Joint statement on ABM Treaty records resolution of all
outstanding issues to clarify
demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by ABM
Treaty and theater missile
defenses not covered by ABM Treaty. Basic elements:
limit on velocity (five kilometers/second) and range (3500
kilometers) of target missiles
used in TMD testing;
ban on space-based TMD interceptors; and
information exchange on TMD programs,
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 24 of 48
Sides stated they have no plans to flight test "higher velocity"
TMD systems through April
1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain
velocities. Consistent with
all planned U.S. TMD programs.
Sides also committed to exploring cooperation on early warning
support for TMDs,
technology cooperation related to TMD, and expansion of ongoing
program of cooperation
in TMD exercises.
Nuclear Arms Reductions. President and Yeltsin laid out path to
bring START II into force,
following prompt Duma ratification of START II, and launch START
III negotiations that
will provide for further nuclear arms reductions.
Joint statement on nuclear arms reductions issued by President
and Yeltsin:
outlines basic elements for START III Treaty, including ceiling
of 2000-2500 strategic
nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II);
records commitment to extend time Russia has to destroy bombers,
missile silos and
submarines under START II by five years, to 2007, although
warheads must be removed
from these systems no later than 2003 (will need Senate approval
-- but only once Duma
has ratified START II).
commits to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead
destruction in
START III (a first in strategic arms control); and
agrees to explore possible measures related to other,
short-range nuclear forces (where
Russia has clear, numerical advantage over United States).
Economic Initiative
President and Yeltsin defined path forward to stimulate
investment and growth in Russia,
advance Russia's integration into international economic
institutions.
This good for Russian economic growth and prosperity and for
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 25 of 48
America, as will mean more
jobs and opportunities for American business to tap into Russia's
rich economic potential.
In their joint statement on economic interaction:
Presidents underscore importance of creating climate attractive
to investment to complete
Russia's historic transformation to market economy:
Yeltsin commits to work toward comprehensive tax reform,
enacting energy development
and tough anti-crime laws, and ratification of U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Investment Treaty --
and to substantially complete this agenda in 1997;
President commits to make available financing (OPIC, EXIM
support) for U.S.
investment in Russia and notes high priority he attaches to
greater assistance for Russia
and other NIS; and
Both Presidents agree to set target and make best efforts for
Russia to join Paris Club in
1997 and WTO in 1998, provided it can meet commercial terms, and
make progress
toward joining OECD.
Other
Chemical Weapons. President and Yeltsin issued joint statement
stressing commitment to
eliminate chemical weapons, to expedite ratification of CWC, and
to continue cooperation in
bilateral chemical disarmament efforts.
G-7/Eight. President announced will substantially increase
Russia's role at Denver Summit of
the Eight.
SUMMARY OF HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENTS
At the March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin signed five joint
statements on U.S.-Russian relations.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 26 of 48
European Security: The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to
a stable, secure, integrated,
undivided and democratic Europe. They agreed that European
security structures should evolve
in accordance with OSCE principles, including respect for the
sovereignty of all states. Despite
their disagreement on the issue of NATO enlargement, the
Presidents will work together with
NATO on a document to establish a cooperative relationship
between NATO and Russia, as part
of the European security system. This document, as an enduring,
high-level political
commitment reflecting both the transformation of NATO and the new
realities in Russia, would
define the terms of the relationship.
Both leaders agreed that a framework agreement on elements of CFE
adaptation should be
concluded by mid-year. President Clinton reiterated NATO's March
14 policy statement that it
did not contemplate "additional permanent stationing of
substantial combat forces" nearer
Russia. He also recalled NATO policy of "no intention, no plan
and no reason" to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, now or in
future.
Economic Initiative: The Presidents' initiative will encourage
investment and growth in Russia,
deepen bilateral economic ties and accelerate Russia's
integration into international economic
organizations. President Yeltsin committed to work toward
comprehensive tax reform,
promotion of foreign investment, particularly in the energy
sector, anti-crime laws, and
ratification of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty.
President Clinton stressed enhanced OPIC and EXIM support for
American investment in Russia.
Also for 1998, he seeks $900 million in U.S. assistance for
Russia and the NIS, up from the
current $625 million, with the new funds destined for
facilitating trade and investment,
stimulating growth and doubling exchange programs between the two
countries.
The Presidents agreed that Russia should join the Paris Club in
1997 and the World Trade
Organization in 1998, provided it can meet the commercial terms
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 27 of 48
commonly applied to new
members, and should make progress toward joining the Organization
for Economic Cooperation
and Development.
Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces: The
statement outlines the basic elements
for a future START III Treaty, including a ceiling of 2,000-2,500
strategic nuclear warheads
(30-45 percent below START II) and a commitment to extend the
time Russia has to destroy
bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five
years, to 2007 (although warheads
must be removed from these systems no later than 2003).
Together, these provisions directly
address the Duma's concerns about costs of implementing the START
II Treaty, thus providing
the basis for President Yeltsin to seek prompt ratification of
START II. There is also a
commitment to include measures on warhead transparency and
warhead destruction in START III
(a first in strategic arms control), as well as to explore
possible measures related to other,
short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has a clear, numerical
advantage over the United
States).
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: The statement on the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty resolves
all outstanding issues in the three-year negotiation to clarify
the demarcation between strategic
missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty and theater missile
defenses (TMD) not covered by
the Treaty. Basic elements include a limit on the velocity (5
km/sec) and range (3500 km) of
target missiles used in TMD testing, a ban on space-based TMD
interceptors, an information
exchange on TMD programs and a commitment to continued
consultations on the ABM Treaty.
The sides also state they have no plans to flight test a "higher
velocity" TMD system through
April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding
certain velocities. The
agreement is consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs. The
sides also commit to
exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs,
technology cooperation in areas
related to TMD and expansion of the ongoing program of
cooperation in TMD exercises.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 28 of 48
Chemical Weapons Convention: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
stressed their commitment to the
elimination from national arsenals of this class of weapons of
mass destruction, and their
determination to expedite ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) by both the
United States and Russia. The CWC will make the production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer
and use of chemical weapons illegal. Parties that possess
chemical weapons will be required to
destroy their stockpiles and destroy or convert under
international safeguards their chemical
weapons production facilities. Parties will also be required not
to assist or encourage any other
country's chemical weapons program. Compliance will be monitored
through on-site
inspections.
The Convention, already signed by 161 countries and ratified by
seventy, will enter into force on
April 29, 1997.
START/ABM HELSINKI
START
Q: Does not extending the START II reductions period in effect
slow down the
disarmament process? How can you extend the period by which
Russian missiles will be
pointed at America? Why would you think the Senate would approve
such an accord?
A: We have agreed to extend the START II reductions period by five
years -- to 2007 -- so
as to ease the economic burden on Russia.
Important also to note that START I was signed over four years
ago -- some
adjustment in timelines was appropriate given the long,
unanticipated delay in entry into
force.
At the same time, we have agreed to deactivate systems that are
to be eliminated under
START II by the end of 2003 -- only one year after the original
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 29 of 48
destruction timelines
under START II -- by taking warheads off of missiles or through
other agreed measures.
Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to
2,000-2,500 by 2007
in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national
security interests.
As to Senate approval, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a
vote of 87-4 to
approve this treaty just over a year ago. Expect there will be a
debate, but confident the
Senate will approve this extension, as the treaty is in America's
interests.
Q: A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both
countries with a
substantial nuclear force. How does this square with the recent
call by military leaders
from around the globe for the U.S. and Russia to eliminate their
nuclear arsenals?
A: As the President said at the United Nations, the United States
looks forward to a new
century where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced,
and ultimately,
eliminated.
President Clinton and President Yeltsin have made substantial
progress in reducing the
nuclear threat during the past four years. Detargeting, the
entry into force of START I
and the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan,
indefinite extension of the
NPT and signature of the CTBT.
All these steps have made our people safer. The joint statement
issued in Helsinki
represents a significant step in the direction of reducing the
nuclear danger. Will
substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and work
to control warheads and
fissile material.
As to the call by retired Generals and Admirals to work towards
nuclear elimination, the
joint statement today is consistent with a number of their
recommendations, although we
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 30 of 48
certainly don't agree on every point. That's not surprising.
But we share their goals, and
we are working hard on this.
Q: Would the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs be carried over into
START III?
A: Yes.
Q: You have included a reference to making the current START
Treaties unlimited in
duration. Why is this necessary?
A: The existing START Treaties have a 15 year duration. Our
commitment to indefinitely
extend the START Treaties sends a strong message that the United
States and Russia are
committed to a permanent reduction in the nuclear threat.
Q: You also refer to measures relating to nuclear long-range
sea-launched cruise missiles
and tactical nuclear systems. Do you have in mind numerical and
geographic limits, in
particular in Europe, or something else?
A: The purpose of this element is to underscore our joint
commitment to discuss concerns
with respect to theater nuclear forces on both sides.
This could include, for example, with a discussion of the status
of our unilateral
initiatives relating to non-strategic forces, and various
transparency initiatives already
underway.
Any specific measures would have to be discussed and agreed. We
are not now
proposing limits on numbers or geography.
Q: Are you prepared to consider a "zero option" -- that is, a
nuclear-free zone in Western
and Central Europe?
A: No.
ABM ISSUES
Q: You've agreed to ban space-based TMDs in this joint statement.
Doesn't that run
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 31 of 48
directly counter to missile defense programs favored by the
Congress?
A: Neither side has plans for space-based TMD interceptors.
Banning space-based TMD interceptors is a logical corollary to
the ABM Treaty's ban
on space-based ABMs, as experts agree that any such interceptor
would have ABM
capabilities.
With respect to Congress, current legislation is focused on
mandating the deployment of
defenses by a date certain that would be compliant with the ABM
Treaty.
Thus, our disagreements are more related to IF and WHEN defenses
should be
deployed, not over whether we should return to a "Star Wars"
system in space.
Believe Congress will recognize the agreement we have reached
today is a good
agreement that protects both the ABM Treaty and our ability to
deploy effective theater
missile defense systems.
Q: It appears you have agreed to limit the interceptor velocity of
TMD systems.
A: No. We have agreed neither side has plans for TMD interceptors
with velocities greater
than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based TMD systems, or 4.5
km/sec for sea-based
TMD systems. This is not a ban.
Q: It appears you have agreed to a moratorium on flight tests of
higher velocity TMD
systems through 1999.
A: No. We have agreed we have no plans now, through April 1999,
to flight test a
higher-velocity TMD against a target. This is not a moratorium,
but a statement of
plans.
ZAIRE
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 32 of 48
MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS
Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?
A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a
national consensus on
how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a
seven-person committee of
negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We
are waiting to get more
details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.
We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee
designated immediately
and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the
rebel alliance, within the
context of the UN five-point plan.
Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?
A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire.
Obviously, during this
time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political
figures to work together
towards a peaceful settlement.
Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the
U.S.?
A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special
Envoy Howard Wolpe is
attending as an informal observer.
Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?
A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult
dependents and eight
temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of
temporary duty (TDY)
personnel continues to fluctuate.
Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to
Central Africa?
A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several
hundred American forces
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 33 of 48
under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency
planning for a possible
evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has
been made.
The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We
remain concerned, however,
that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of
American citizens and
some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in
the region is simply a
prudent, precautionary step.
American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in
Zaire.
The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to
ensure the security of
U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a
commitment by the U.S. to any
particular course of action.
The deployment includes command and support elements for a
forward Joint Task
Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin
P. Smith,
Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task
Force Commander.
U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville,
Gabon. The come from
elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the
Southern European Task
Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements
are from U.S. based
units.
Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between
the government and rebel
leaders?
A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated
settlement to the crisis in
Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire,
representatives of the rebel
leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador
Mohammed Sahnoun,
the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South
Africa to bring about a
cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 34 of 48
(IF ASKED)
Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?
A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units
will deploy with
communications gear, airport control, support equipment and
several fixed wing aircraft
and helicopters.
Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?
A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in
Kinshasa.
Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking
similar measures. Are these
efforts coordinated?
A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our
European allies, some of
whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.
We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the
Congolese and
Gabonese governments in this effort.
Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?
A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and
throughout the day on
Saturday.
ALBANIA
What is the situation in Albania?
There have been no new developments in the situation on the
ground in Albania. Tirana
remains quiet but tense, with reports of sporadic gunfire being
heard.
Commercial flights have partially resumed--several flights
arrived and departed from the
airport in Tirana in the last 24 hours.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 35 of 48
There have been some limited commercial shipments into the port
at Durres as well.
Prime Minister Fino and members of his cabinet are in Rome today
in consultations with the
Foreign Ministers of the European Union.
What Happened at the EU meeting yesterday?
The General Affairs Council of the European Union met in Brussels
yesterday, and released a set
of conclusions. Among them:
Agreement that the EU should play the major role in helping
Albania return to political
stability, restore internal security, and provide humanitarian
assistance.
Agreement that these EU activities should be conducted "within
the coordinating
framework of the OSCE."
A plan to send an advance team to Tirana this week for a
feasibility study on further
assistance--which will include an assessment of the security
environment.
MEXICO
SENATE RESOLUTION
Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation
with Mexico and other
nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common
goal of increasing cooperation
to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.
Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by
President Zedillo and acknowledges
that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of
border. Working through the
U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are
ready to continue our active
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 36 of 48
collaboration.
NORTHERN IRELAND
ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS
Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like
British and Irish governments, have
accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his
colleagues, which suggested
decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.
MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST
If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in
Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:
WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest
terms.
Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
[If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were
involved, but are watching
closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.
BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS
In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in
touch with British and
Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in
Northern Ireland, exchange
views on how to move process forward.
If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged
in process; not going to
comment further on details of who/when.
GULF WAR ILLNESSES
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 37 of 48
What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging
that GWI is contagious and that the
Blood Supply may be unsafe?
We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive
evidence that the undiagnosed
illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is
contagious.
Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD,
HHS and VA) for any
additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing
research, etc.
With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross
have stated they believe the
blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to
the FDA.
What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you
announced during the roll-out of the
PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January
1997?
We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its
report.
Leading examples:
Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have
accepted [?] -- to
initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period
for Gulf War veterans
with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure
has been strongly
supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the
60-day period I
requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC
recommendations from
its final report.
Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a
Presidential Review Directive
(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of
Veterans and Their
Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective
piece which will
ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard
the health of soldiers in
future deployments.
What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?
Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there
seems little doubt we'll learn of
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 38 of 48
additional information which should have been made public sooner.
However, such developments should be understood in a broader
context:
Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to
change our fundamental
assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely
impacted the health
of our veterans.
This new information is coming out precisely because of the
"openness" process I
directed and remain fully committed to.
All of the information being developed will be used to improve
policies so as to be
better prepared for future deployments.
Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway,
we are concurrently
working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical
care and research
programs.
Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover"
material needed to get to the
bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a
cover-up? If not, how can your PAC
lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?
The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine
the facts. Last year, DOD
acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor
needed, and significantly increased
its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that
effort. And to my knowledge, there
is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the
missing chemical warfare
logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are
disturbing -- the public
should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do
this in an open manner, and I
believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I
previously extended the PAC to
provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more
recently I asked the PAC to
review the recently-released information in assessing the
adequacy of the ongoing
investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA
IG, and DOD
Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same
questions.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 39 of 48
Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that
our Gulf War veterans must
receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We
shouldn't lose sight of
what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+
compensation claims approved,
90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including
research into low level
chemical exposure.
What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning"
messages?
First, the message content does not change the substance of our
understanding of
Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there
conducted demolitions
without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may
have been exposed to
chemical agents.
DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the
public in June 1996.
The message content also does not change our health care and
research postures. Gulf War
veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're
not sure why they're sick,
and the research required to further investigate possible causes
-- including low-level
chemical exposure -- is in progress.
As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered
documents, we'll have to await
the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.
Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?
I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to
await the outcome of pending
investigations.
Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to
light earlier.
Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part
of DOD's and CIA's
commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough
investigations to do so.
Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information
involved. One recent estimate is
that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information
that may have some relevance
to the various matters under investigation.
What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 40 of 48
Case Narrative?
This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most
comprehensive account of
everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the
demolitions conducted there.
Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other
topics to follow -- is not the
end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is
publishing them as part of its
commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information
that Gulf War veterans or
others may have on these topics.
Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?
We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD
last November and December
cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have
been affected And all
Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health
effects of service in the Gulf
theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take
full advantage of free medical
exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility
has been widely communicated
by public service announcements and many other means
We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no
documented cases of soldiers
reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut
evidence of a link between
low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that
research continues, however.
Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data
and most appropriate modeling
approach.
No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah
incident believes that the "worst
case" scenarios are very credible
Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the
possibility of low-level chemical
exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no
evidence at the time of more
significant acute symptoms.
What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:
President asked them to take a careful look
Obviously doing so
Haven't seen preliminary findings
Wouldn't comment on them anyway
Look forward to getting PAC findings in April
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 41 of 48
Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about
Khamisiyah?
President committed t getting out all the facts
As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our
effort to leave no stone unturned
Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC
oversight we will await the
results of those investigations
What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the
CIA briefed the NSC staff in
January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?
My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified
brief from CIA in January 1996
as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses
issue.
During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's
declassification initiative -- the staffer was
told that information had come to light about the possible
presence of chemical munitions at
Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with
the understanding that this
possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with
DOD.
Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf
War?
The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no
Iraqi use of CBW.
Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it
unlikely that exposure to
CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.
Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even
with independent oversight?
Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997
in extending the PAC to
provide independent oversight.
DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a
thorough & open process.
Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered
intelligence reports and the publication
of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's
commitment.
DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation
of a new Special Assistant for
Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative
resources (including more than 100
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 42 of 48
additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than
20,000 Gulf War veterans
who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical
demolitions occurred.
Why are Gulf War veterans sick?
I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the
many experts -- at DOD, HHS and
VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf
War illnesses.
The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors
and concluded that current
scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides;
chemical warfare agents;
biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB);
infectious diseases;
depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum
products. The Committee also
found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf
War illnesses.
Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed
the federal research portfolio
and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending
increased emphasis in certain
areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical
exposure and stress.
Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War
illnesses is required and is now in
progress.
What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are
sick?
Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans
are receiving the care they
need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free
medical exams; (3) 26,000+
compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying
disability for Gulf veterans with
undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and
(6) 90+ federally-sponsored
research projects underway.
Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future
deployments?
DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning
future deployments.
Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance
System for Deployments is near
completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 43 of 48
Southwest Asia.
We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review
Directive (PRD) process to address
many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the
veterans and their families who
make experience future deployments.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Helms and CWC
Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday,
Senator Helms indicated
that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a
vote on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?
A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects
for Senate action on
this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked
closely with Senator Helms
and other members of the Steering Committee established by the
Majority Leader to try to
address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We
look forward to a Senate
vote by mid-April -- in time for the U.S. to be an original party
to the treaty.
Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the
Administration has delayed
responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over
the CWC?
A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work
together to try to address the
concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the
Chemical Weapons
Convention.
We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser
Berger has led the
Administration team which has met four times with the Majority
Leader's task force.
These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive
senior staff sessions.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 44 of 48
Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed
about 30 conditions
and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a
compromise formulation
that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable
alternative, leaving it to the
Senate to decide between the two.
Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the
members of his CWC
task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the
Convention prior to April 29,
when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's
statement on Thursday
that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and
that it is not his intention
to stonewall on this.
Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies
his key concerns over the
Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the
Administration needs to address his
broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN
reform, and the handling
of other arms control treaties in the Senate.
A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do
nothing to reduce the dangers of
poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms
and his staff, we have
identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with
Senator Helms' proposed
conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed
alternative conditions
should be debated and voted upon.
While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the
broader issues Senator
Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription
for inaction, which we
cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this
agreement.
Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little"
deadline with no meaning and
that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.
A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If
Congress fails to act positively, we
will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 45 of 48
states and terrorists who
seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the
ability to require other
states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of
our chemical
weapons.
Without ratification the credibility of American leadership
across the full range of
proliferation issues will be undermined. The Untied States will
also lose its seat on the
governing body implementing the treaty.
American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their
overseas competitors,
as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.
NAZI ASSETS
CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press
guidance on the decision
to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the
historians' report on the postwar USG
role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main
Administration spokesman on this issue is
U/S Stu Eizenstat.
The team of historians and others who have been working to
assess a huge amount of
historical material discovered they needed a little more time
than originally anticipated.
This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best
possible understanding at this point
of the events in question.
If asked about the President's role:
The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians'
report is being prepared at his
behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.
If pressed:
The President will of course see the report when it is
completed.
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 46 of 48
CUBA
Diplomatic Pouch Opened
Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic
pouch destined for the
U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?
A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several
of the Interests
Section's unclassified pouches.
The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and
protested that its contents
were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently
were referring to
copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a
Democratic Transition in
Cuba."
USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents
were inspected.
Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the
Washington Times
reported?
A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to
the Cuban government
clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch
and rejecting any effort
to regulate the contents of the pouch.
The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of
its obligations under
international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. It
also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of
Interests Sections.
The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official
communications between
the USG and USINT.
The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies
and disregard for
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 47 of 48
long-established international law and diplomatic practice.
PERU
Lima Hostage Crisis
Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis
in Lima?
A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to
find a peaceful solution,
which we support.
Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The
disagreement
has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow
MRTA members in prison.
Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to
accept the MRTA
hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican
Republic has also expressed
willingness to take them.
Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.
Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?
A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse
without rewarding terrorists.
Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at
this time.
Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to
pardon some Cuban debt
in return for cooperation?
A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.
INDONESIA: SALE OF PAKISTANI F-16S
Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia
F-16s?
3339BDB3.FIN
Page 48 of 48
A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains
committed to the sale, but
the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the
transfer at this time. Our
decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations,
including regional and
bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.
We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter
evolves.
:333A8252.FIN
Page 1 of 6
MSMail
DATE-TIME
27 March 97 09:12
FROM
Murray, Lori E.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
CWC gameplan[UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Bell, Robert G.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[ CWCGP.DOC 2356 in CWCGP.DOC ]]
Bob attached is a CWC gameplan for the last three weeks. I have not fully
incorporated the public diploamcy elements, but just put in items I thought
were central to a leg strategy. I am doing amember by member strategy to
accompany this plan but hoped that you could take a look at this and advise
as to whether it was ball park.
Also, I did talk last night to a freshment Senator's staffer who said that
when his boss arrived in January he was a blank slate on CWC and now he was
leaning against. He believed the reason why was because there were some
"holes" in our efforts.
He explained that members who were opponents were working this aggressively
on the member to member level. Kyl has already met twice with his boss and
pigeonholed hiom on th floor once. Senator Helms is also aggressively
working against the CWC and has been setting up member briefings with his
staff.
He stated that contact from members who are proponents of the CWC is mssing
and suggested we energize members who are proponents to work with freshmen.
He also said the opposition had organized mid-level former military against
the CWC who are also briefing on the Hill. He said what was missing were
proponent former military and also there that there has not been enough
heard from industry. He suggested that CMA engage on a senior level sooner
rather than later.
Regarding the Kyl alternative, he said that it had come right before the
recess and so far there has not been mcuh attention paid to it.
He also thought it was absolutely criticial we get Cabinet level reps to
SFRC hearings, because many of the freshmen wanted hearings, although they
would have appreciated them in January.
He also said his boss has been advising Helms that it is a losing strategy
:333A8252.FIN
Page 2 of 6
to bottle the CWC up in SFRC. It was just too big an issue.
ATTACHMENT
27 March 97 8:39
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME
CWCGP.DOC
LEGISLATIVE GAMEPLAN
Getting to the final vote on CWC will require a dedicated,
focused
and coordinated effort between now and a final vote the week of
April
14.
We continue to face a determined and energized opposition in the
Senate whose strategy includes personal member to member contact.
Senator Kyl and Senator Helms are aggressively working this issue
and
Senator Helms' staff are also meeting with Republican members to
keep them informed on the negotiations with the Administration.
At
least one freshmen member who came in as a blank slate on this
issue
is now considered leaning against, mainly due to the personal
efforts
of Senator Kyl.
The opponents, led by Senator Kyl, have introduced an alternative
piece of legislation. Since this was dropped in just before the
recess, we have an opportunity to help frame opinion on this
issue.
We must act aggressively over the next three weeks in order to
ensure a successful vote for this agreement. While we should
continue to press our main themes, including military
support/advantages, throughout the remaining weeks, two themes
that we
should emphasize in an effort to undercut the alternative are
industry support and the long-term, sustained, bipartisan US
leadership which resulted in the successful conclusion of this
international agreement.
Key components to a legislative strategy include the following:
concluding, before the end of the recess, a package of
conditions
with Senator Helms;
negotiating a UC the week of April 7;
*333A8252.FIN
Page 3 of 6
Republican Senators actively seeking support for the package of
conditions;
Administration principals actively seeking support for
conditions
package; and
coordinating closely with Bush Administration officials,
industry
and the NGOs;
daily morning coordination meetings should begin at NSC
(including
White House leg) week of April 7 (POTUS drop by first one chaired
by SRB to emphasize importance of mission to staff).
Week of March 24
blast fax on Kyl alternative;
Bell writes Kirkpatrick/Cheney letter signatories about
concerned
addressed in negotiations (especially those invited to White
House
event, (Haig, Wolfowitz)
Week of March 31
complete negotiation on conditions package;
Berger to McCain/Stevens/Lugar ask them to work individual
members
to explain how far the condition package goes to address concerns;
complete point papers on conditions that will be debated;
prepare draft, and POTUS works all President's letter for Ford
library event (April 7);
Cohen op-ed April 4, Washington Post;
April 4 White House event; secure signatures on
Scowcroft/Kassebaum-Baker-Boren letter;
Two blast faxes: verifiability--White House event;
Hold principals meeting to give out assignments on Senators and
:333A8252.FIN
Page 4 of 6
points;
Bell/Murray meet with Webber/McInerny to discuss business/former
military efforts;
Bell/Murray meet with NGOs to debrief on Hill negotiations and
discuss weeks of April 7-14;
Debriefs for all supporters not attending White House event on
Hill negotiations(could include Adelman, Lehman etc., by phone
calls Bell, Murray);
April 6 Sunday shows principals;
Week of April 7
POTUS secures all Presidents letter April 7;
All Democratic letter to Lott asking for UC;
April 8 Plan floor statements on urgency of CWC;
Secure UC agreement--debate begins April 14-vote April 19;
Daily blast faxes begin--debunking myths/positive message;
POTUS calls Bush and debriefs as to where we are after UC
concluded;
POTUS calls Dole and tells him of negotiated conditions; hopes
concerns addressed and asks support;
POTUS meets with Lugar/Biden;
Brown/Laird/ Carlucci op-ed April 9;
SFRC hearing April 9--Cohen, Albright, Shali (may be out if
town);
Berger briefs Frosh Senators;
Bell/Murray selectively brief Republican staff supporters and
swing votes;
Bell briefs Democratic staff;
Bell/Murray begin briefings of Republican members (supporters
333A8252.FIN
Page 5 of 6
and
swings) on condition package;
White House leg affairs calls all Dems and asks support;
Berger/Cohen/Albright begin member calls about conditions agreed
to and why CWC needs support/why alternative is not an
alternative;
Targeted business visits;
Targeted former military/veteran group visits;
Calls coordinated with Powell, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Laird,
Baker;
POTUS radio address April 12;
Lugar hosts Scowcroft lunch for small group of swing Republican
Senators.
Week of April 14
Nightline April 14;
Daily blast faxes continue;
Vice President does targeted rounds/calls on Hill based on
feedback Cohen/Albright;
President does targeted calls on Hill based on feedback
Cohen/Albright;
Other principals continue targeted calls based on individual
concerns of key Senators (Reno, Shali, Daley);
Bush calls;
Powell, Scowcroft, Eagleburger targeted calls continue;
Eagleburger op-ed April 14;
Former Chiefs op-ed Powell, Crowe, Jones (or letter).
333A8252.FIN
Page 6 of 6
333A94FC.FIN
Page 1 of 44
MSMail
DATE-TIME
27 March 97 10:31
FROM
Wozniak, Natalie S.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT
1 of 2 Print for David, Please [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO
Veit, Katherine M.
CARBON_COPY
NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
[[ MAR26GUI.DOC 2600 in MAR26GUI.DOC ]]
ATTACHMENT
26 March 97 20:11
FILE DATE
ATTACHMENT
MAR26GUI.DOC
FILE NAME
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE
March 26, 1997
Berger Speech/CSIS
Middle East
Khobar
Iraq
Russia/NIS
Bosnia
China
Trips and Visitors
Helsinki Summit Results
Summary of Helsinki Joint Statements
START/ABM
Zaire
333A94FC.FIN
Page 2 of 44
Albania
Mexico
Northern Ireland
Gulf War Illnesses
CWC
Nazi Assets
Cuba
Peru
Indonesia
BERGER SPEECH AT CSIS
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release March 21, 1997
MEDIA ADVISORY
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National
Security
Affairs, will deliver On-the-Record remarks, "Strategic
Objectives:
President Clinton's Second Term Foreign Policy Agenda," on
Thursday,
March 27, 1997, at 11:00 a.m. before the Center for Strategic &
International Studies' Statesmen's Forum, on the B-1 Conference
Level, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. This event is open
to
the press.
Media planning to cover this event should contact Nancy Nugent,
CSIS Public Affairs, 202-775-3176 or Steven Naplan, National
333A94FC.FIN
Page 3 of 44
Security
Council Communications Office, 202-456-9371.
###
MIDDLE EAST
Ross Trip to the Middle East
Q: Why did the President send Dennis Ross to the region?
A: The President decided to send Ross because he wants him to meet
with the regional
leaders, assess the situation and report back to him and the
Secretary by the weekend.
Q: Did the President dispatch Dennis because you were unable to
make any progress in
defusing the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians from
Washington?
A: As I said, the President wants Dennis to provide him an
assessment of the situation.
Q: What is Ross' schedule? Who will he meet?
A: Dennis will make a short trip to the region. He will be
meeting with Chairman Arafat
and Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Q: Is it true that you had great difficulty trying to reach
Chairman Arafat because he was
avoiding you?
A: Chairman Arafat was traveling, but Secretary Albright spoke to
him by telephone on
Tuesday.
Q: Is Dennis carrying letters/messages from the President to the
regional leaders?
A: Obviously Dennis will carry messages to the two leaders, but I
am not going to get into
the details of those messages.
Q: What do you expect to achieve from this mission?
333A94FC.FIN
Page 4 of 44
A: As I said, the purpose of Dennis' trip is to talk to the
leaders and make an assessment of
the situation for the President.
Q: Will Dennis tell Arafat to issue a "red light" to terror and
violence? Will Dennis tell
Netanyahu what he needs to do to end the present crisis?
A: I am not going to get into the substance of the messages.
Dennis will assess the
situation and report back to the President and the Secretary by
the weekend.
Q: How would you characterize the situation on the ground in Gaza
and the West Bank?
A: The situation on the ground remains tense.
We continue to urge all parties to do everything possible to
avoid violent confrontations,
and for the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government to
work together to defuse
tensions and lay the basis for moving forward in the talks.
RE-ARREST OF MUQADEMAH
Q: Has Hamas leader Ibrahim Muqademah been re-arrested?
A: We understand that the Palestinian Authority (PA) issued a
warrant for Muqademah's
arrest after the Friday bombing, but that he remains at large.
We remain extremely concerned about the situation and urge the PA
to do everything
possible to re-apprehend him.
PEACE PROCESS: STATUS OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN TALKS
Q: Do you agree with the Israeli cabinet that the Palestinian
authority must comply with all
its commitments, including those on terrorism and violence, in
order for negotiations to
resume?
A: What is important now is that the Palestinian authority has to
do everything it can to
prevent further terror and violence.
There must be no doubts on this commitment, and the Palestinian
333A94FC.FIN
Page 5 of 44
authority must make
certain that both friends and enemies of the peace process
understand that violence and
terror are unacceptable.
This is essential if a climate of trust between the partners is
to be restored and
negotiations resumed.
Q: Is Arafat doing everything he can to stop violence and
terrorism? Shouldn't he be
arresting more members of extremist organizations?
A: We have made clear that the Palestinian Authority must do all
it can to prevent violence
and terrorism. It must do everything it can to make sure that
those associated with
violence and terror are brought to justice.
Q: But didn't the Netanyahu government really create this problem
through its moving
ahead with the Har Homa development?
A: Regardless of how strongly the Palestinians feel about the Har
Homa decision, nothing
can justify or excuse terror or violence. Terror should never be
tolerated.
Q: Do you agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Arafat must
stop giving extremists a
green light and give them a red light?
A: To the extent that groups believe there is a green light, it is
absolutely essential for the
Palestinian authority to do everything it can to demonstrate very
clearly in both words and
deeds that there is no such green light and that terrorism will
not be tolerated.
U.S. CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES
Q: Has the U.S. been in contact with the Israelis and Palestinians
to solve this crisis?
A: We are in continuous contact with both parties now.
(If pressed): President Clinton spoke to Prime Minister
Netanyahu on Friday and the
Secretary spoke to President Weizman on Saturday. We have also
been in contact with
333A94FC.FIN
Page 6 of 44
the Palestinians.
KHOBAR BOMBING
Q: Are we getting cooperation from Syria on the Khobar bombing
investigation?
A: The investigation into the Khobar bombing is ongoing. We do
not comment on
investigations in progress.
Regarding Syria, I'm not going to discuss the details of our
diplomatic exchanges with
other governments, particularly when they involve a matter under
investigation.
Q: Are the Saudis helping? What have we learned from the suspect
detained by Canada?
A: As I've said before, we have gotten some cooperation from the
Saudis and we've been
assured at the highest levels of the Saudi Government that more
cooperation will be
forthcoming.
As has been reported, Canada has detained an individual who may
have information
about Khobar. I'd refer you to the FBI for any comment on that.
IRAQ
Background: The Los Angeles Times apparently will be running a
story on the arrival of a group
of Iraqis currently in Guam to California. Out of the 6,630
persons initially evacuated from
Northern Iraq by the United States, roughly 2,000 remain on Guam
pending their resettlement in
the United States. All Iraqis are expected to have departed Guam
by April 14, 1997. The INS
has determined that 25 of the evacuees were ineligible for
asylum. On March 27, they will be
transferred to California where they will be detained at either a
facility in Lancaster or near
Bakersfield pending the outcome of their exclusion proceedings.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 7 of 44
They will appear before an
immigration judge.
Thirty-four accompanying family members also will be transferred
with them and housed at an
INS facility in Lancaster, pending completion of their processing
and placement with appropriate
sponsors.
Points [If Asked]
Evacuation of Iraqi nationals from Northern Iraq was a
humanitarian gesture in keeping with
U.S. tradition.
Persons evacuated were determined to be at risk based on their
association with the United
States.
Roughly 8,000 evacuees will be resettled in the U.S. and placed
with private sponsors.
Background security checks were undertaken both before the
evacuation and during
processing on Guam.
INS will deal with the 25 Iraqis found to be excludable
according to usual immigration
procedures.
QUESTIONS RELATED TO STATUS OF THOSE FOUND EXCLUDABLE
SHOULD BE
REFERRED TO INS
RUSSIA/NIS
Current Items
Russian-Iraqi Oil Deal Signed by Russian Energy Minister Rodionov
Seen reports outlining agreement between Russia and Iraq to
develop Iraq's Qurana oil field;
understand Minister Rodionov stated large-scale implementation of
$3.7 billion project
possible only after UN sanctions imposed on Iraq are lifted.
UN sanctions remain in place; expect Russia will continue to
333A94FC.FIN
Page 8 of 44
honor UN sanctions regime.
But concerned Iraq tries to interpret every international
contract as proof it can have
sanctions lifted without first complying fully with UN
obligations. That is not true.
U.S. Diplomat Detained in Belarus
Condemn in strongest terms Belarus Government's detention,
subsequent expulsion from
Belarus of U.S. diplomat carrying out normal diplomatic function
of observing opposition
rally.
Already decided to recall our ambassador for consultations; take
actions to cut off most aid
and redirect remaining funds (about $5 million) to NGOs, business
groups, humanitarian
purposes.
Today have taken two other measures:
advised Belarusian Embassy that first secretary and consul,
Vladimir Gramyka,
declared Persona Non-Grata in accordance with the Vienna
Convention and has been
requested to leave country;
have requested Government of Belarus not to send their
Ambassador-designate to
U.S., previously scheduled to arrive today.
Actions by GOB another sign of increased authoritarianism by
Lukashenko regime and
government's rejection of internationally recognized human
rights, as shown in last
November's referendum -- which OSCE called "deprived of
legitimacy."
(If asked -- why Gramyka?)
Action taken to underscore our strong objection to expulsion of
American diplomat; also note
expulsion last week of American citizen who headed Soros
Foundation in Minsk; Belarusian
we identified of similar rank and status to our diplomat.
(If Asked -- How long will you hold Yalowitz in U.S., delay new
333A94FC.FIN
Page 9 of 44
Belarusian ambassador?)
As long as it takes for us to be assured that it's in our
interest to return our ambassador,
allow theirs to come.
(If Raised -- Was this a CIA officer caught spying?)
As a matter of policy do not comment on diplomatic status of
officials; officer was carrying
out normal diplomatic function of observing opposition rally.
BOSNIA
Izetbegovic visit
President Alija Izetbegovic, Chairman of the Joint-Presidency of
Bosnia, will meet with
President Clinton Wednesday. They are expected to discuss a
broad range of issues relating
to the Bosnia peace process.
If asked about Bosnian Membership in Partnership for Peace
Our long term goal is to help establish a stable and prosperous
Bosnia that will be part of a
greater Europe and play an important role in the international
community of democratic
nations.
At some point, this should include Bosnian membership in
Partnership for Peace. However,
further progress must first be made in several areas, including
further strengthening of
fledgling political institutions and the rebuilding of economic
and societal infrastructures.
The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian
groups, will be responsible for this
work.
If asked whether the U.S. has failed to fulfill the training and
equipping of the Bosnian military
We are fully committed to developing an effective Federation
self-defense capability through
the international Train and Equip program. The T&E program is a
333A94FC.FIN
Page 10 of 44
key part of building a
stable military balance in Bosnia and establishing a lasting
peace in the region.
The program's extensive training effort involves 170 U.S.
contracted trainers, funded by
international donations, and additional offers of training
assistance from our allies in Europe
and moderate Islamic states. The Federation has taken delivery
of U.S. equipment from our
$100 million drawdown for Bosnia under the program and is
receiving substantial additional
security assistance and equipment donations from moderate Islamic
states.
The T&E program continues to facilitate concrete progress in the
formation of joint
Federation defense structures that will be critical to
strengthening the Bosniak-Croat
Federation.
Progress in Bosnia/Is Dayton Implementation Working? (recent
editorials)
As we continue to work on the difficult long term challenges in
Bosnia, we must not forget
the enormous progress we have made.
In the Summer of 1995, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since
World War II continued to
rage in Bosnia. Even as the President directed a new diplomatic
initiative, few believed peace
was possible and many openly questioned NATO's value or purpose
in the post-Cold War
era.
Eighteen months later, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a
peace that provides the
backdrop for the difficult long term challenges of political
reconciliation and economic
reconstruction.
Our efforts in Bosnia have exceeded many expectations. The
military aspects of Dayton
were implemented with no combat casualties. National elections
were successfully held in
September and joint national institutions have been created and
are starting to operate. The
international Train and Equip program is helping build a stable
military balance in Bosnia and
333A94FC.FIN
Page 11 of 44
facilitating the formation of joint Federation defense structures
that will be critical to
strengthening the Bosniak-Croat Federation. More than 200,000
refugees have returned.
There has also been much progress on the economic reconstruction
of Bosnia, especially in
the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The rebuilding of Sarajevo is
perhaps most dramatic. Cut off
and under siege for most of the war, Sarajevans risked sniper and
mortar fire just to get some
dirty water from the river running through the city or to gather
some humanitarian rations.
Today, Sarajevo is bustling with reconstruction activities and
hundreds of cafes, shops,
restaurants, banks, and other commercial endeavors have opened
their doors. Overall, the
Federation economy grew by about 35% in 1996 and unemployment
went from 90% to 50%.
Of course, the process of reconciliation is a long term endeavor
and much remains to be
done. We must do more to rebuild the economic and societal
infrastructures. We need
greater cooperation from the parties on freedom of movement and
the return of refugees and
displaced persons. And we need greater political support for the
fledgling political
institutions.
The Bosnian people, with the help of international civilian
groups, will be responsible for this
work. However, for the duration of its mission, SFOR will
provide the stability and
confidence necessary for the Bosnian people to continue to make
progress toward these
goals. We continue to believe that 18 months should give
sufficient extra time needed on
these issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.
Kasich Legislation/Premature Withdrawal from Bosnia
The proposed legislation requiring the premature withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Bosnia
endangers all the progress we have made since the peace was
signed at Dayton.
Only 18 months ago, the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World
War II continued to rage in
333A94FC.FIN
Page 12 of 44
Bosnia. Today, a revitalized NATO has helped establish a peace
that provides a secure
environment for the difficult long term challenges of political
reconciliation and economic
reconstruction.
Passage of this legislation and unilateral withdrawal of U.S.
troops could lead to a resumption
of the war in Bosnia, a serious crisis in the NATO alliance, and
an abdication of U.S.
credibility and leadership in Europe and around the world. This
bill throws into question
Congressional support for U.S. engagement in Bosnia and
leadership in NATO -- sending a
very troubling message all involved.
To the parties in Bosnia, this bill endangers their confidence
in the Dayton process, gives
them less incentive to cooperate, and may cause them to resume
preparations for conflict that
would surely follow a U.S. and NATO withdrawal. To our allies, a
Congressional threat to
walk out on an agreed NATO-led operation throws into question
U.S. credibility and
commitment to the Alliance and the security in Europe. To our
troops on the ground and
those who have served in Bosnia, this legislation unjustly
questions the purpose and value of
their service and sacrifice.
For these reasons, we strongly urge that this legislation be
withdrawn. We recognize and
share the continuing concerns about the difficult challenges in
Bosnia. If we remain engaged
and continue to lead in support of the Dayton process, we believe
that 18 months should give
sufficient extra time needed to ensure a self-sustaining peace.
FRY/Republika Srpska Agreement
The decision of the FRY Assembly to ratify a cooperation
agreement with the Serb Republic
is a violation of the Dayton Agreement and is inconsistent with
the Constitutions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.
The agreement provides for harmonizing actions in areas that
clearly belong to the individual
states, including culture and education to foreign policy and
immigration. It also creates a
333A94FC.FIN
Page 13 of 44
basis for military cooperation which could be in violation of the
sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina if such assistance were to
happen without the expressed
consent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The agreement cannot take effect until it is ratified by the
Bosnia-Herzogovina Assembly.
SFOR Mission Duration
We expect the mission can be completed in 18 months. 18 months
should give sufficient
extra time needed for civilian implementation efforts on economic
reconstruction, refugee
return, and related issues needed to ensure a self-sustaining
peace.
If asked about an all-European Force after 18 months:
We believe the mission can be completed in 18 months. We are
focused on the important
work we have to do between now and June 1998.
War Criminals
The trial of four indicted war criminals by International War
Crimes Tribunal at the Hague is
an encouraging step toward achieving justice and an enduring
peace.
We continue to remain deeply concerned with the slow progress on
war crimes front in
Bosnia. We're examining variety of ways we can help the Tribunal
to bring indicted war
criminals to justice. We have made no decisions on how to assist
the Tribunal. We are
reviewing many different options.
If pressed about sending teams of special police or commandos to
arrest war criminals:
We have been examining several options to assist and enhance the
ability of the Tribunal to
bring indicted war criminals into custody. One option may be to
establish some sort of
capability to execute the court's arrest warrants. We are
studying the feasibility of these
options but have made no decisions yet.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 14 of 44
CHINA
GORE TRIP
Q: On what basis did the Vice President assert that the
Administration's policy toward
China would not change as a result of the current investigation
into alleged illegal
campaign contributions by Chinese officials?
A: The Vice President discussed this issue during his meeting in
Beijing with Premier Li
Peng; he also will raise it with President Jiang Zemin.
The Vice President explained that we regard these allegations
very seriously. Were the
FBI investigation to establish that China engaged in illegal
acts, the potential consequences
for sustaining the current positive momentum in U.S.-China
relations could be
jeopardized.
The FBI investigation is still ongoing, however, and we will not
speculate on its
outcome or allow it to deter the Administration's pursuit of our
objectives with China,
including improving market access for U.S. products, pressing for
improvements in
human rights practices and holding China to international
standards on nonproliferation
issues.
Q: Please comment on the Vice President's discussions in Tokyo.
Also, what issues will
he raise in Beijing?
A: The Vice President's conversations with Prime Minster Hashimoto
and Foreign Minister
Ikeda focused on security and economic matters. The Vice
President affirmed the
centrality of our bilateral alliance and pledged we would
maintain American force levels
at or about 100,000. On economic issues, the Vice President
urged Japan to implement
fully the trade agreements we negotiated under the Framework
talks.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 15 of 44
As the Vice President said when he departed Tokyo, he will raise
a series of strategic
issues with Chinese leaders, including nonproliferation and
regional concerns, such as the
Korean peninsula. U.S. concerns about human rights also will be
discussed. We do not
believe China has made sufficient progress on human rights to
enable us to forego a
UNHRC resolution in Geneva next month.
(IF NEEDED): The question of alleged Chinese campaign
contributions will be part of
the discussions in Beijing. The Vice President will explain our
practices for investigating
such allegations.
UNHRC
Background: Human Rights Watch issued a report on China's
efforts to line up support for its
position on the Geneva human rights resolution -- and on U.S. and
Western "hypocrisy" on the
issue. The report details, region by region, how the PRC has
sought to "buy" off votes of
several key countries through contracts, visits, etc. targeted at
members of the Commission. At
the same time, it documents decreasingly vigorous efforts by the
US and EU to prevail on the
resolution, noting that we are far behind in our efforts this
year as compared to last. -- which
itself witnessed a less active approach than in 1995.
In the past, we have criticized the PRC's attempts to link trade
(and other forms of economic
support) to third countries to their position in Geneva, pointing
out that this was in fact the very
type of linkage they had urged us to abandon. For our part, we
have made clear that we would
not offer anything in return for third countries' support of the
resolution. As for our approach to
the resolution, the US has decided in principle to co-sponsor a
resolution, barring significant
improvement in the human rights situation in China by the time of
the vote (around April 14-18).
We are engaged in a two-track approach: (1) discussions with the
Chinese on steps to improve
333A94FC.FIN
Page 16 of 44
their human rights record; (2) discussions with the EU on a
proposed resolution, coupled with
demarches to members of the Commission asking them not to commit
to support a "no-action"
motion (which would be introduced by China) and not to commit to
oppose a resolution (which
we would co-sponsor).
Points
Aware of vigorous Chinese efforts to defeat resolution. Believe
members of the Commission
should make decision based on human rights situation in China,
not other factors.
Our own judgment at this point is that the current situation
warrants a resolution on China's
human rights record. As stated in the past, we therefore have
decided in principle to
co-sponsor a resolution.
We have made clear to China that in the absence of human rights
progress we would see no
reason not to proceed with a resolution at the UNHRC.
If asked whether our efforts were "downgraded" from last year
At this point, we have demarched members of the Commission to
convey our views and are
working with Europeans partners on a proposed resolution.
Our efforts this year are commensurate to our efforts in the
past, and, more importantly, our
approach remains the same: We will vote, and ask others to vote,
based on the human rights
situation in China.
TRIPS AND VISITORS
President met with President Mubarak of Egypt on March 10; King
Hussein of Jordan has
been rescheduled for April 1.
POTUS and Yeltsin met in Helsinki March 20-21. POTUS will
travel to Denmark in July in
333A94FC.FIN
Page 17 of 44
conjunction with the NATO Summit in Madrid.
Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres will be here for meeting and
working lunch April 3. Do
not yet know what other events will be included in his visit.
Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada will make an official
visit to Washington on April 8.
President's visit to Mexico postponed to May 6-7. Regional
summit meetings in Bridgetown,
Barbados and San Jose, Costa Rica will go forward as scheduled
during the week of May
6-10.
President's visits to Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela
rescheduled to October 12-17.
Spanish President Aznar will be here April 30 for meeting and
working lunch.
President will travel to Netherlands May 28 for US-EU Summit and
Marshall Plan
commemoration event. No details yet.
Denver Summit June 20-22.
If asked about Hashimoto Visit
Background: The Japanese Embassy received guidance in reaction to
a leaked story in Tokyo
about a possible Hashimoto visit to Washington in April. The
Japanese are saying, "The Prime
Minister intends to visit Washington in late April and the two
governments have begun
consultations."
We are consulting with Japanese officials about a possible PM
Hashimoto visit to Washington
this spring.
HELSINKI SUMMIT RESULTS
Overview
Very successful summit. President and Yeltsin continued
excellent working relationship;
333A94FC.FIN
Page 18 of 44
tackled tough issues and produced decisions that take account of
both sides' interests.
Presidents' decisions reenergize U.S.-Russian relationship, lay
firm basis for relations into
21st century, and contribute to development of more stable,
secure and undivided Europe.
Joint statements issued by President and Yeltsin mean we:
have turned corner with Russia on developing NATO-Russia
relationship, despite
disagreement over NATO enlargement;
resolved ABM/TMD demarcation issue;
have formula that will allow Russia to ratify START II, so that
we can bring Treaty into
force and launch START III negotiations to achieve further
nuclear reductions;
have agreed path to complete Russia's transition to market
economy, further integration
into global economic system.
European Security
Presidents discussed Europe, NATO-Russia. Disagree over NATO
enlargement, but did not
expect to change Yeltsin's mind.
President made clear enlargement to proceed on schedule.
Key thing is Yeltsin committed to work with President and NATO
to develop cooperative
NATO-Russia relationship. This will contribute to European
security, avoid isolating Russia.
Further, as Russia works more closely with NATO, believe Russia
can come to see that
enlarged NATO poses no threat.
In joint statement on Europe, President and Yeltsin:
reaffirm commitment to stable, secure, integrated, undivided and
democratic Europe;
agree that European security structures should evolve in
accordance with OSCE
principles;
333A94FC.FIN
Page 19 of 44
note that, despite disagreement on NATO enlargement, they will
work with NATO on
document to establish cooperative relationship between NATO and
Russia;
support conclusion of a framework agreement on elements of
adaptation of CFE Treaty
by mid-year;
note President's assurance that NATO contemplates nothing that
would lead to potentially
threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces
nearer Russia; and
refer to NATO's policy of no intention, plan or reason to deploy
nuclear weapons on
territory of new member states.
Nuclear Arms Control
ABM/TMD. President and Yeltsin worked hard to come up with
mutually acceptable
formulation for dealing with ABM/TMD demarcation, specifically
higher-velocity TMD
systems.
Joint statement on ABM Treaty records resolution of all
outstanding issues to clarify
demarcation between strategic missile defenses covered by ABM
Treaty and theater missile
defenses not covered by ABM Treaty. Basic elements:
limit on velocity (five kilometers/second) and range (3500
kilometers) of target missiles
used in TMD testing;
ban on space-based TMD interceptors; and
information exchange on TMD programs,
Sides stated they have no plans to flight test "higher velocity"
TMD systems through April
1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding certain
velocities. Consistent with
all planned U.S. TMD programs.
Sides also committed to exploring cooperation on early warning
support for TMDs,
technology cooperation related to TMD, and expansion of ongoing
333A94FC.FIN
Page 20 of 44
program of cooperation
in TMD exercises.
Nuclear Arms Reductions. President and Yeltsin laid out path to
bring START II into force,
following prompt Duma ratification of START II, and launch START
III negotiations that
will provide for further nuclear arms reductions.
Joint statement on nuclear arms reductions issued by President
and Yeltsin:
outlines basic elements for START III Treaty, including ceiling
of 2000-2500 strategic
nuclear warheads (30-45 percent below START II);
records commitment to extend time Russia has to destroy bombers,
missile silos and
submarines under START II by five years, to 2007, although
warheads must be removed
from these systems no later than 2003 (will need Senate approval
-- but only once Duma
has ratified START II).
commits to include measures on warhead transparency and warhead
destruction in
START III (a first in strategic arms control); and
agrees to explore possible measures related to other,
short-range nuclear forces (where
Russia has clear, numerical advantage over United States).
Economic Initiative
President and Yeltsin defined path forward to stimulate
investment and growth in Russia,
advance Russia's integration into international economic
institutions.
This good for Russian economic growth and prosperity and for
America, as will mean more
jobs and opportunities for American business to tap into Russia's
rich economic potential.
In their joint statement on economic interaction:
Presidents underscore importance of creating climate attractive
to investment to complete
Russia's historic transformation to market economy:
333A94FC.FIN
Page 21 of 44
Yeltsin commits to work toward comprehensive tax reform,
enacting energy development
and tough anti-crime laws, and ratification of U.S.-Russia
Bilateral Investment Treaty --
and to substantially complete this agenda in 1997;
President commits to make available financing (OPIC, EXIM
support) for U.S.
investment in Russia and notes high priority he attaches to
greater assistance for Russia
and other NIS; and
Both Presidents agree to set target and make best efforts for
Russia to join Paris Club in
1997 and WTO in 1998, provided it can meet commercial terms, and
make progress
toward joining OECD.
Other
Chemical Weapons. President and Yeltsin issued joint statement
stressing commitment to
eliminate chemical weapons, to expedite ratification of CWC, and
to continue cooperation in
bilateral chemical disarmament efforts.
G-7/Eight. President announced will substantially increase
Russia's role at Denver Summit of
the Eight.
SUMMARY OF HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENTS
At the March 20-21 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin signed five joint
statements on U.S.-Russian relations.
European Security: The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to
a stable, secure, integrated,
undivided and democratic Europe. They agreed that European
security structures should evolve
in accordance with OSCE principles, including respect for the
sovereignty of all states. Despite
their disagreement on the issue of NATO enlargement, the
Presidents will work together with
333A94FC:FIN
Page 22 of 44
NATO on a document to establish a cooperative relationship
between NATO and Russia, as part
of the European security system. This document, as an enduring,
high-level political
commitment reflecting both the transformation of NATO and the new
realities in Russia, would
define the terms of the relationship.
Both leaders agreed that a framework agreement on elements of CFE
adaptation should be
concluded by mid-year. President Clinton reiterated NATO's March
14 policy statement that it
did not contemplate "additional permanent stationing of
substantial combat forces" nearer
Russia. He also recalled NATO policy of "no intention, no plan
and no reason" to deploy
nuclear weapons on the territory of new member states, now or in
future.
Economic Initiative: The Presidents' initiative will encourage
investment and growth in Russia,
deepen bilateral economic ties and accelerate Russia's
integration into international economic
organizations. President Yeltsin committed to work toward
comprehensive tax reform,
promotion of foreign investment, particularly in the energy
sector, anti-crime laws, and
ratification of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty.
President Clinton stressed enhanced OPIC and EXIM support for
American investment in Russia.
Also for 1998, he seeks $900 million in U.S. assistance for
Russia and the NIS, up from the
current $625 million, with the new funds destined for
facilitating trade and investment,
stimulating growth and doubling exchange programs between the two
countries.
The Presidents agreed that Russia should join the Paris Club in
1997 and the World Trade
Organization in 1998, provided it can meet the commercial terms
commonly applied to new
members, and should make progress toward joining the Organization
for Economic Cooperation
and Development.
Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces: The
statement outlines the basic elements
for a future START III Treaty, including a ceiling of 2,000-2,500
strategic nuclear warheads
333A94FC.FIN
Page 23 of 44
(30-45 percent below START II) and a commitment to extend the
time Russia has to destroy
bombers, missile silos and submarines under START II by five
years, to 2007 (although warheads
must be removed from these systems no later than 2003).
Together, these provisions directly
address the Duma's concerns about costs of implementing the START
II Treaty, thus providing
the basis for President Yeltsin to seek prompt ratification of
START II. There is also a
commitment to include measures on warhead transparency and
warhead destruction in START III
(a first in strategic arms control), as well as to explore
possible measures related to other,
short-range nuclear forces (where Russia has a clear, numerical
advantage over the United
States).
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: The statement on the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty resolves
all outstanding issues in the three-year negotiation to clarify
the demarcation between strategic
missile defenses covered by the ABM Treaty and theater missile
defenses (TMD) not covered by
the Treaty. Basic elements include a limit on the velocity (5
km/sec) and range (3500 km) of
target missiles used in TMD testing, a ban on space-based TMD
interceptors, an information
exchange on TMD programs and a commitment to continued
consultations on the ABM Treaty.
The sides also state they have no plans to flight test a "higher
velocity" TMD system through
April 1999 or to develop TMD systems with speeds exceeding
certain velocities. The
agreement is consistent with all planned U.S. TMD programs. The
sides also commit to
exploring cooperation on early warning support for TMDs,
technology cooperation in areas
related to TMD and expansion of the ongoing program of
cooperation in TMD exercises.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
stressed their commitment to the
elimination from national arsenals of this class of weapons of
mass destruction, and their
determination to expedite ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) by both the
United States and Russia. The CWC will make the production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer
333A94FC.FIN
Page 24 of 44
and use of chemical weapons illegal. Parties that possess
chemical weapons will be required to
destroy their stockpiles and destroy or convert under
international safeguards their chemical
weapons production facilities. Parties will also be required not
to assist or encourage any other
country's chemical weapons program. Compliance will be monitored
through on-site
inspections.
The Convention, already signed by 161 countries and ratified by
seventy, will enter into force on
April 29, 1997.
START/ABM HELSINKI
START
Q: Does not extending the START II reductions period in effect
slow down the
disarmament process? How can you extend the period by which
Russian missiles will be
pointed at America? Why would you think the Senate would approve
such an accord?
A: We have agreed to extend the START II reductions period by five
years -- to 2007 -- so
as to ease the economic burden on Russia.
Important also to note that START I was signed over four years
ago -- some
adjustment in timelines was appropriate given the long,
unanticipated delay in entry into
force.
At the same time, we have agreed to deactivate systems that are
to be eliminated under
START II by the end of 2003 -- only one year after the original
destruction timelines
under START II -- by taking warheads off of missiles or through
other agreed measures.
Have also agreed to further reduce strategic nuclear warheads to
2,000-2,500 by 2007
in a START III. Believe this package is in America's national
security interests.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 25 of 44
As to Senate approval, the U.S. Senate voted overwhelmingly by a
vote of 87-4 to
approve this treaty just over a year ago. Expect there will be a
debate, but confident the
Senate will approve this extension, as the treaty is in America's
interests.
Q: A START III target of 2,000-2,500 weapons still leaves both
countries with a
substantial nuclear force. How does this square with the recent
call by military leaders
from around the globe for the U.S. and Russia to eliminate their
nuclear arsenals?
A: As the President said at the United Nations, the United States
looks forward to a new
century where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced,
and ultimately,
eliminated.
President Clinton and President Yeltsin have made substantial
progress in reducing the
nuclear threat during the past four years. Detargeting, the
entry into force of START I
and the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan,
indefinite extension of the
NPT and signature of the CTBT.
All these steps have made our people safer. The joint statement
issued in Helsinki
represents a significant step in the direction of reducing the
nuclear danger. Will
substantially reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and work
to control warheads and
fissile material.
As to the call by retired Generals and Admirals to work towards
nuclear elimination, the
joint statement today is consistent with a number of their
recommendations, although we
certainly don't agree on every point. That's not surprising.
But we share their goals, and
we are working hard on this.
Q: Would the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs be carried over into
START III?
A: Yes.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 26 of 44
Q: You have included a reference to making the current START
Treaties unlimited in
duration. Why is this necessary?
A: The existing START Treaties have a 15 year duration. Our
commitment to indefinitely
extend the START Treaties sends a strong message that the United
States and Russia are
committed to a permanent reduction in the nuclear threat.
Q: You also refer to measures relating to nuclear long-range
sea-launched cruise missiles
and tactical nuclear systems. Do you have in mind numerical and
geographic limits, in
particular in Europe, or something else?
A: The purpose of this element is to underscore our joint
commitment to discuss concerns
with respect to theater nuclear forces on both sides.
This could include, for example, with a discussion of the status
of our unilateral
initiatives relating to non-strategic forces, and various
transparency initiatives already
underway.
Any specific measures would have to be discussed and agreed. We
are not now
proposing limits on numbers or geography.
Q: Are you prepared to consider a "zero option" -- that is, a
nuclear-free zone in Western
and Central Europe?
A: No.
ABM ISSUES
Q: You've agreed to ban space-based TMDs in this joint statement.
Doesn't that run
directly counter to missile defense programs favored by the
Congress?
A: Neither side has plans for space-based TMD interceptors.
Banning space-based TMD interceptors is a logical corollary to
the ABM Treaty's ban
on space-based ABMs, as experts agree that any such interceptor
would have ABM
333A94FC.FIN
Page 27 of 44
capabilities.
With respect to Congress, current legislation is focused on
mandating the deployment of
defenses by a date certain that would be compliant with the ABM
Treaty.
Thus, our disagreements are more related to IF and WHEN defenses
should be
deployed, not over whether we should return to a "Star Wars"
system in space.
Believe Congress will recognize the agreement we have reached
today is a good
agreement that protects both the ABM Treaty and our ability to
deploy effective theater
missile defense systems.
Q: It appears you have agreed to limit the interceptor velocity of
TMD systems.
A: No. We have agreed neither side has plans for TMD interceptors
with velocities greater
than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based TMD systems, or 4.5
km/sec for sea-based
TMD systems. This is not a ban.
Q: It appears you have agreed to a moratorium on flight tests of
higher velocity TMD
systems through 1999.
A: No. We have agreed we have no plans now, through April 1999,
to flight test a
higher-velocity TMD against a target. This is not a moratorium,
but a statement of
plans.
ZAIRE
MOBUTU PROPOSALS/USG PERSONNEL IN ZAIRE/ELECTIONS
Q: What is your reaction to the confusing proposals from Mobutu?
Do we endorse them?
A: The announcement of two proposed bodies -- a Council to seek a
national consensus on
333A94FC.FIN
Page 28 of 44
how to settle the current crisis in Zaire peacefully and a
seven-person committee of
negotiators -- appears on the surface to be a positive step. We
are waiting to get more
details on these proposed bodies before making further comment.
We would like to see the members of the negotiating committee
designated immediately
and announce their readiness to enter into negotiations with the
rebel alliance, within the
context of the UN five-point plan.
Q: (If asked) Has Mobutu lost control of his government?
A: President Mobutu is still recognized as head of state of Zaire.
Obviously, during this
time of national crisis it is important for all Zairian political
figures to work together
towards a peaceful settlement.
Q: Is the U.S. included in the Lome talks? Who will represent the
U.S.?
A: The summit in Lome is an OAU central organ meeting. Special
Envoy Howard Wolpe is
attending as an informal observer.
Q: How many official Americans remain in Zaire?
A: There are thirty-six U.S. Government employees, seven adult
dependents and eight
temporary duty personnel at post as of March 26. The number of
temporary duty (TDY)
personnel continues to fluctuate.
Q: What can you tell us about the deployment of American forces to
Central Africa?
A: The President authorized on Friday the deployment of several
hundred American forces
under Operation Guardian Retrieval as part of contingency
planning for a possible
evacuation from Zaire. No decision to conduct an evacuation has
been made.
The situation in the Zairian capital of Kinshasa is calm. We
remain concerned, however,
that the climate could degenerate warranting the evacuation of
American citizens and
333A94FC.FIN
Page 29 of 44
some third country nationals. The posture of American forces in
the region is simply a
prudent, precautionary step.
American forces will not intervene in the ongoing fighting in
Zaire.
The deployment of these forces enhances the military's ability to
ensure the security of
U.S. citizens living in Zaire, but does not represent a
commitment by the U.S. to any
particular course of action.
The deployment includes command and support elements for a
forward Joint Task
Force and other enabling elements. U.S. Army Major General Edwin
P. Smith,
Commander of the Southern European Task Force is the Joint Task
Force Commander.
U.S. forces have deployed to Brazzaville, Congo and Libreville,
Gabon. The come from
elements of the U.S. European Command, primarily from the
Southern European Task
Force based in Vicenza, Italy. Some additional support elements
are from U.S. based
units.
Q: What does the U.S. think about possible negotiations between
the government and rebel
leaders?
A: The United States continues to strongly support a negotiated
settlement to the crisis in
Zaire. We have been working with the Government of Zaire,
representatives of the rebel
leadership, regional governments, UN Special Envoy Ambassador
Mohammed Sahnoun,
the group of African "Wise Men" and the government of South
Africa to bring about a
cessation of hostilities and negotiated solution to the war.
(IF ASKED)
Q: What type of equipment is being deployed?
A: The Joint Task Force will have a range of equipment. Units
will deploy with
communications gear, airport control, support equipment and
several fixed wing aircraft
333A94FC.FIN.
Page 30 of 44
and helicopters.
Q: How many American citizens are in Zaire?
A: Roughly 550. There are approximately 300 Americans in
Kinshasa.
Q: The French and Belgian governments are reportedly taking
similar measures. Are these
efforts coordinated?
A: Yes, our military actions have been fully coordinated with our
European allies, some of
whom have decided to deploy forces to the region as well.
We are also very pleased with coordination and cooperation of the
Congolese and
Gabonese governments in this effort.
Q: Were Congressional leaders notified?
A: Yes, Congressional leaders were notified Friday evening and
throughout the day on
Saturday.
ALBANIA
What is the situation in Albania?
There have been no new developments in the situation on the
ground in Albania. Tirana
remains quiet but tense, with reports of sporadic gunfire being
heard.
Commercial flights have partially resumed--several flights
arrived and departed from the
airport in Tirana in the last 24 hours.
There have been some limited commercial shipments into the port
at Durres as well.
Prime Minister Fino and members of his cabinet are in Rome today
in consultations with the
Foreign Ministers of the European Union.
What Happened at the EU meeting yesterday?
333A94FC.FIN
Page 31 of 44
The General Affairs Council of the European Union met in Brussels
yesterday, and released a set
of conclusions. Among them:
Agreement that the EU should play the major role in helping
Albania return to political
stability, restore internal security, and provide humanitarian
assistance.
Agreement that these EU activities should be conducted "within
the coordinating
framework of the OSCE."
A plan to send an advance team to Tirana this week for a
feasibility study on further
assistance--which will include an assessment of the security
environment.
MEXICO
SENATE RESOLUTION
Welcome Senate action endorsing greater counterdrug cooperation
with Mexico and other
nations in the Americas. Bipartisan effort to support common
goal of increasing cooperation
to keep drugs out of our neighborhoods.
Senate action recognizes ongoing progress being made by
President Zedillo and acknowledges
that the problems are serious and require work on both sides of
border. Working through the
U.S.-Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control, we are
ready to continue our active
collaboration.
NORTHERN IRELAND
ON WHETHER IRA NEEDS TO DISARM BEFORE JOINING TALKS
333A94FC.FIN
Page 32 of 44
Vice President did not address this point, but U.S., like
British and Irish governments, have
accepted the report issued last year by Senator Mitchell and his
colleagues, which suggested
decommissioning of arms in parallel with talks.
MURDER OF CATHOLIC FATHER OF NINE IN BELFAST
If asked about the murder of a Catholic father of nine in
Belfast, possibly by loyalist gunmen:
WH horrified by this brutal slaying, condemns it in strongest
terms.
Do not know who was responsible; police are investigating.
[If pressed]: Have no way of knowing yet whether loyalists were
involved, but are watching
closely. Condemn it utterly, whoever did it.
BERGER/STEINBERG PHONE CALLS
In last several days NSA Berger and DNSA Steinberg have been in
touch with British and
Irish officials and with party leaders to discuss situation in
Northern Ireland, exchange
views on how to move process forward.
If asked whether one of them spoke with Adams: Remain engaged
in process; not going to
comment further on details of who/when.
GULF WAR ILLNESSES
What is your reaction to the recent LA Times article alleging
that GWI is contagious and that the
Blood Supply may be unsafe?
We've been assured that there is no scientifically supportive
evidence that the undiagnosed
illnesses that some Gulf War veterans have been suffering from is
contagious.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 33 of 44
Beyond that, I would refer you to the Departments involved (DOD,
HHS and VA) for any
additional particulars relating to precautions taken, ongoing
research, etc.
With regards to the blood supply, both FDA and the Red Cross
have stated they believe the
blood supply remains safe. I would refer specific questions to
the FDA.
What action has been taken in response to the initiatives you
announced during the roll-out of the
PAC (Presidential Advisory Committee) report in early January
1997?
We've accomplished a great deal since the PAC submitted its
report.
Leading examples:
Secretary Brown has prepared a recommendation -- which I have
accepted [?] -- to
initiate rulemaking to extend the compensation eligibility period
for Gulf War veterans
with undiagnosed illnesses to December 31, 2001. This measure
has been strongly
supported by Gulf War veterans and members of Congress.
The Secretaries of DOD, HHS and VA have developed -- within the
60-day period I
requested -- an integrated Action Plan to implement the PAC
recommendations from
its final report.
Finally, as the PAC recommended, we have initiated a
Presidential Review Directive
(PRD) to address "Health Preparedness for and Readjustment of
Veterans and Their
Families After Future Deployments." This is the key prospective
piece which will
ensure that we act on the "lessons learned" to better safeguard
the health of soldiers in
future deployments.
What do you see as the way forward on GWI issues?
Given the scope of the investigative efforts underway, there
seems little doubt we'll learn of
additional information which should have been made public sooner.
However, such developments should be understood in a broader
context:
Most, if not all, of the new information appears unlikely to
change our fundamental
assessment of what happened out there that might have adversely
impacted the health
of our veterans.
This new information is coming out precisely because of the
333A94FC.FIN
Page 34 of 44
"openness" process I
directed and remain fully committed to.
All of the information being developed will be used to improve
policies so as to be
better prepared for future deployments.
Finally, while all of this investigative activity is underway,
we are concurrently
working very hard to further improve the quality of our medical
care and research
programs.
Why do the Pentagon and CIA continue to "lose and then discover"
material needed to get to the
bottom of what happened during the Gulf War? Is there a
cover-up? If not, how can your PAC
lend credibility to institutions that seem hopelessly inept?
The PAC has been key to reinvigorated DOD efforts to determine
the facts. Last year, DOD
acknowledged that its prior investigations lacked the vigor
needed, and significantly increased
its effort. We are now beginning to see the fruits of that
effort. And to my knowledge, there
is currently no evidence of a cover-up.
We all wish that this information relating to Khamisiyah and the
missing chemical warfare
logs had come out sooner. The documents released recently are
disturbing -- the public
should have known about them long ago. I directed that we do
this in an open manner, and I
believe that is exactly what DOD is doing.
Consistent with my strong resolve to get out the truth, I
previously extended the PAC to
provide independent oversight of DOD's investigation, and more
recently I asked the PAC to
review the recently-released information in assessing the
adequacy of the ongoing
investigation. I am also mindful of the continuing Army IG, CIA
IG, and DOD
Intelligence Oversight investigations into many of these same
questions.
Finally, it is important to remember through all of this that
our Gulf War veterans must
receive the medical care they need -- and that's happening. We
shouldn't lose sight of
what's been done -- 80,000+ free medical exams, 26,000+
compensation claims approved,
90+ federally-sponsored research projects now underway, including
research into low level
chemical exposure.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 35 of 44
What about the recently-declassified NOV 91 CIA "warning"
messages?
First, the message content does not change the substance of our
understanding of
Khamisiyah. We've known for some time that U.S. forces there
conducted demolitions
without knowing they were destroying chemical munitions, and may
have been exposed to
chemical agents.
DOD announced this information to Gulf War veterans and the
public in June 1996.
The message content also does not change our health care and
research postures. Gulf War
veterans are being cared for even in those instances where we're
not sure why they're sick,
and the research required to further investigate possible causes
-- including low-level
chemical exposure -- is in progress.
As to any further significance of these newly-rediscovered
documents, we'll have to await
the outcomes of the pending CIA and DOD IG investigations.
Why didn't these messages come to light earlier?
I don't know, and here again this is an area where we need to
await the outcome of pending
investigations.
Clearly everyone regrets this information not having come to
light earlier.
Note, however, that these messages have resurfaced now as part
of DOD's and CIA's
commitment to getting out all the facts and conducting thorough
investigations to do so.
Another point to consider is the sheer volume of information
involved. One recent estimate is
that there are some 50 million pages of intelligence information
that may have some relevance
to the various matters under investigation.
What is the significance of DOD's recently-released Khamisiyah
Case Narrative?
This was the first in a series of interim progress reports.
The Khamisiyah progress report provides the single most
comprehensive account of
everything that is known -- and not yet known -- about the
demolitions conducted there.
Note that the Khamisiyah case narrative -- and those on other
topics to follow -- is not the
end of the story, but rather a work in progress; DOD is
333A94FC.FIN
Page 36 of 44
publishing them as part of its
commitment to openness and to solicit any additional information
that Gulf War veterans or
others may have on these topics.
Why haven't you warned more veterans about Khamisiyah?
We believe that the notification letters already sent by the DOD
last November and December
cover the overwhelming majority of those veterans who might have
been affected And all
Gulf War veterans concerned about the possible adverse health
effects of service in the Gulf
theater are eligible for and have been strongly urged to take
full advantage of free medical
exams and subsequent health care, if needed -- this eligibility
has been widely communicated
by public service announcements and many other means
We should not lose sight of the fact that there remain no
documented cases of soldiers
reporting acute symptoms at the time, nor is there any clear-cut
evidence of a link between
low-level exposures and the undiagnosed illnesses -- that
research continues, however.
Significant uncertainties remain in terms of both source data
and most appropriate modeling
approach.
No one who has been involved in researching the Khamisiyah
incident believes that the "worst
case" scenarios are very credible
Finally, even the "worst case" scenarios focus on the
possibility of low-level chemical
exposures, and it is important to remember that there was no
evidence at the time of more
significant acute symptoms.
What does White House think about PAC draft preliminary findings:
President asked them to take a careful look
Obviously doing so
Haven't seen preliminary findings
Wouldn't comment on them anyway
Look forward to getting PAC findings in April
Were there misrepresentation about what CIA knew about
Khamisiyah?
President committed t getting out all the facts
As new information comes out, see it as consistent with our
effort to leave no stone unturned
Question falls under purview of IG investigations and/or PAC
oversight we will await the
results of those investigations
333A94FC.FIN
Page 37 of 44
What about the statement (in the Khamisiyah narrative) that the
CIA briefed the NSC staff in
January 1996 on the possibility of U.S. troop exposure?
My understanding is that an NSC staffer received a classified
brief from CIA in January 1996
as part of its ongoing monitoring of the Gulf War illnesses
issue.
During the briefing -- which focused on the CIA's
declassification initiative -- the staffer was
told that information had come to light about the possible
presence of chemical munitions at
Khamisiyah. This was briefed as preliminary information, with
the understanding that this
possibility would be further investigated in cooperation with
DOD.
Were Chemical or Biological Warfare Agents used during the Gulf
War?
The CIA's thorough August 1996 report on this issue concluded no
Iraqi use of CBW.
Moreover, based on current scientific evidence, the PAC found it
unlikely that exposure to
CBW explains undiagnosed Gulf War illnesses.
Is DOD the right choice to continue the investigation -- even
with independent oversight?
Yes, and that's the decision The President took in January 1997
in extending the PAC to
provide independent oversight.
DOD has unique resources for this task and is committed to a
thorough & open process.
Recent swift action to declassify recently-rediscovered
intelligence reports and the publication
of the Khamisiyah case narrative strongly attest to DOD's
commitment.
DOD's recent expansion of effort has included: (1) designation
of a new Special Assistant for
Gulf War Illnesses; (2) a ten-fold increase in investigative
resources (including more than 100
additional staff); and (3) an outreach program to the more than
20,000 Gulf War veterans
who may have been in the vicinity of Khamisiyah when chemical
demolitions occurred.
Why are Gulf War veterans sick?
I'll leave addressing the merits of specific theories to the
many experts -- at DOD, HHS and
VA, as well as outside government -- currently focused on Gulf
333A94FC.FIN
Page 38 of 44
War illnesses.
The PAC carefully evaluated 9 leading environmental risk factors
and concluded that current
scientific evidence does not support a causal link -- pesticides;
chemical warfare agents;
biological warfare agents; vaccines; pyridostigmine bromide (PB);
infectious diseases;
depleted uranium; oil-well fires and smoke; and petroleum
products. The Committee also
found that stress is a likely contributing factor in some Gulf
War illnesses.
Having evaluated potential causes, the Committee also reviewed
the federal research portfolio
and concluded that it was generally appropriate, recommending
increased emphasis in certain
areas like research into the effects of low-level chemical
exposure and stress.
Bottom-line: further research on the causes of Gulf War
illnesses is required and is now in
progress.
What has the Administration done for Gulf War veterans who are
sick?
Through the dedicated efforts of DOD and VA personnel, veterans
are receiving the care they
need for Gulf War illnesses, whether diagnosed or undiagnosed.
To date -- (1) DOD & VA toll-free help lines; (2) 80,000+ free
medical exams; (3) 26,000+
compensation claims approved; (4) special legislation paying
disability for Gulf veterans with
undiagnosed illnesses; (5) thousands of pages declassified; and
(6) 90+ federally-sponsored
research projects underway.
Is there a "lessons learned" process in place for future
deployments?
DOD has begun to incorporate "lessons learned" in planning
future deployments.
Example: a new policy directive for a Medical Surveillance
System for Deployments is near
completion, with key elements having been tested in Bosnia and
Southwest Asia.
We've also initiated a multi-agency Presidential Review
Directive (PRD) process to address
many aspects of health preparedness and readjustment for the
veterans and their families who
make experience future deployments.
333A94FC.FIN
Page 39 of 44
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Helms and CWC
Q: During Secretary Albright's visit to North Carolina yesterday,
Senator Helms indicated
that he would probably allow the Senate to move forward with a
vote on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. What is your reaction?
A: We are encouraged by the Senator's comments about the prospects
for Senate action on
this vital treaty. Over the past two months, we have worked
closely with Senator Helms
and other members of the Steering Committee established by the
Majority Leader to try to
address the concerns that have been raised about the treaty. We
look forward to a Senate
vote by mid-April in time for the U.S. to be an original party
to the treaty.
Q: What is your reaction to Senator Helms statement that the
Administration has delayed
responding to his request for negotiations with his staff over
the CWC?
A: In early January, the Majority Leader and I agreed to work
together to try to address the
concerns of members of the Republican caucus regarding the
Chemical Weapons
Convention.
We have been negotiating in good faith. National Security Adviser
Berger has led the
Administration team which has met four times with the Majority
Leader's task force.
These principal meetings have been followed by four extensive
senior staff sessions.
Senator Helms, who is a member of the Lott group, has proposed
about 30 conditions
and in nearly every case we have either reached agreement on a
compromise formulation
that can be accepted by the Senate or identified a reasonable
alternative, leaving it to the
Senate to decide between the two.
Our objective has been to work with the Majority Leader and the
333A94FC.FIN
Page 40 of 44
members of his CWC
task force to facilitate a timely debate in the Senate on the
Convention prior to April 29,
when the Convention comes into force. I welcome Senator Lott's
statement on Thursday
that he is working a process to get the CWC done in April and
that it is not his intention
to stonewall on this.
Q: Senator Helms claims that unless the Administration satisfies
his key concerns over the
Treaty it will never reach the Senate floor and that the
Administration needs to address his
broader concerns regarding State Department reorganization, UN
reform, and the handling
of other arms control treaties in the Senate.
A: We disagree with Senator Helms that this treaty will do
nothing to reduce the dangers of
poison gas. During our extensive negotiations with Senator Helms
and his staff, we have
identified a list of key issues where we cannot agree with
Senator Helms' proposed
conditions. We believe these outstanding issues and our proposed
alternative conditions
should be debated and voted upon.
While the Administration is prepared to continue to address the
broader issues Senator
Helms has raised, direct linkage with the CWC is a prescription
for inaction, which we
cannot afford as the clock ticks on entry into force of this
agreement.
Q: Senator Helms claims the April 29 date is a "chicken little"
deadline with no meaning and
that the Administration is trying to blackmail the Senate.
A: April 29 is a real deadline with real consequences. If
Congress fails to act positively, we
will deny ourselves access to the treaty's tools against rogue
states and terrorists who
seek to acquire chemical weapons. We will deny ourselves the
ability to require other
states to do what we are doing already on our own--getting rid of
our chemical
weapons.
Without ratification the credibility of American leadership
across the full range of
333A94FC.FIN
Page 41 of 44
proliferation issues will be undermined. The Untied States will
also lose its seat on the
governing body implementing the treaty.
American chemical companies will also begin losing sales to their
overseas competitors,
as mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties phase in.
NAZI ASSETS
CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE: Following is contingency press
guidance on the decision
to delay by 1-2 weeks the target date for release of the
historians' report on the postwar USG
role in distributing Nazi gold and assets. The main
Administration spokesman on this issue is
U/S Stu Eizenstat.
The team of historians and others who have been working to
assess a huge amount of
historical material discovered they needed a little more time
than originally anticipated.
This short delay will ensure that we can provide our best
possible understanding at this point
of the events in question.
If asked about the President's role:
The President cares deeply about this issue. The historians'
report is being prepared at his
behest, under the direction of U/S Eizenstat.
If pressed:
The President will of course see the report when it is
completed.
CUBA
Diplomatic Pouch Opened
Q: Is it true that the Cuban government opened a U.S. diplomatic
333A94FC.FIN
Page 42 of 44
pouch destined for the
U.S. Interests Section (USINT) in Havana?
A: The Cuban government recently delayed the delivery of several
of the Interests
Section's unclassified pouches.
The Cubans claimed that one of the pouches arrived open and
protested that its contents
were "aggressive" and objectionable to the GOC. They apparently
were referring to
copies of the President's report to Congress on "Support for a
Democratic Transition in
Cuba."
USINT has confirmed that one pouch was opened and its contents
were inspected.
Q: Did the USG apologize for the contents of the pouch, as the
Washington Times
reported?
A: Absolutely not. USINT earlier this week delivered a note to
the Cuban government
clearly and emphatically protesting the tampering with the pouch
and rejecting any effort
to regulate the contents of the pouch.
The GOC's interference with our pouches is a blatant violation of
its obligations under
international law in accordance with the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. It
also violates the 1977 Agreement on the Establishment of
Interests Sections.
The GOC has no authority to regulate the content of official
communications between
the USG and USINT.
The GOC's action is further evidence of its repressive policies
and disregard for
long-established international law and diplomatic practice.
PERU
Lima Hostage Crisis
Q: Has a deal been struck to resolve the 98-day-old hostage crisis
333A94FC.FIN
Page 43 of 44
in Lima?
A: The governments of Peru and Japan are continuing efforts to
find a peaceful solution,
which we support.
Talks between the Peruvian government and the MRTA continue. The
disagreement
has been over the terrorists' demand for the release of fellow
MRTA members in prison.
Understand that, at Peru and Japan's request, Cuba has agreed to
accept the MRTA
hostage-takers as part of a broader resolution. Dominican
Republic has also expressed
willingness to take them.
Cannot confirm, however, that resolution is imminent.
Q: Would the United States oppose a deal involving Cuba?
A: USG supports a peaceful resolution to this 98-day impasse
without rewarding terrorists.
Do not want to comment on particular elements of a solution at
this time.
Q: [If asked] Is there any truth to rumors that Japan offered to
pardon some Cuban debt
in return for cooperation?
A: Would refer you to the Japanese government.
INDONESIA: SALE OF PAKISTANI F-16S
Q: Is it true that the U.S. has dropped plans to sell Indonesia
F-16s?
A: There is no change in the U.S. position. The U.S. remains
committed to the sale, but
the Administration does not plan to notify Congress of the
transfer at this time. Our
decisions on arms sales are based on a number of considerations,
including regional and
bilateral factors, as well as congressional views.
We will continue to consult closely with Congress as this matter
333A94FC.FIN
Page 44 of 44
evolves.