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No Gun Ri 2000 [Korea] [1]
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Case Number: 2009-0528-F-2
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
No Gun Ri 2000 [Korea] [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Defense Policy-Binnendijk, Hans
Original OA/ID Number:
3482
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
32
1
1
1
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. email
Hans Binnendijk to @APNSA re Update on No Gun Ri (3 pages)
12/14/2000
P1/b(1)
002. notes
handwritten, re meeting with "outside experts" on No Gun Ri (2 pages)
c 12/2000
Pl/b(1)
003. paper
Interagency Discussion on No Gun Ri (6 pages)
12/13/2000
P1/b(1)
004. email
Hans Binnendijk to @RUDMAN re No Gun Ri (1 page)
12/12/2000
P1/b(1)
005. cable
re No Gun Ri, Building on the SMU (3 pages)
12/12/2000
P1/b(1)
006. notes
handwritten, re No Gun Ri Q&As (2 pages)
c 12/2000
P1/b(1)
007. paper
Interagency Discussion on No Gun Ri [duplicate of 003] [page 6
12/13/2000
Pl/b(1)
only] (1 page)
008. email
Mara Rudman to Justin Siberell et al, re No Gun Ri Update/Decision
12/04/2000
P1/b(1)
(3 pages)
009. report
re No Gun Ri (1 page)
12/05/2000
P1/b(1)
010. cable
re No Gun Ri: Preparing for the Conclusion (3 pages)
11/29/2000
P1/b(1)
011. notes
handwritten, re meeting on No Gun Ri (2 pages)
c 11/2000
P1/b(1)
012. email
Jonathan Scharfen to Hans Binnendijk re No Gun Ri (4 pages)
10/10/2000
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
013. email
Justin Siberell to Hans Binnendijk re No Gun Ri Update/Decision (2
12/18/2000
P1/b(1)
pages)
014. cable
re No Gun Ri: PM's Office Readout (5 pages)
01/02/2001
P1/b(1)
015. cable
re No Gun Ri (1 page)
01/02/2001
P1/b(1)
016. email
Randy Beardsworth to Hans Binnendijk re No Gun Ri (6 pages)
01/04/2001
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - (44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA|
h(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA|
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
h(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
ROK OUTSIDE EXPERT VISIT TO WASHINGTON PROVES TIMELY
Today, senior officials of the Department of Defense and the Nogun-Ri "Outside
Experts" from the Republic of Korea held serious and constructive talks on the
status of the Nogun-Ri review. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Franklin D. Kramer led the US delegation that included
Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness Charles Cragin and Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs. Retired General Paik Sun-yup led the Korean delegation that included
four additional "Outside Experts" from Korea and representatives from the
Office of the Prime Minister. In addition, the Korean group met with the Deputy
Secretary of Defense Rudy deLeon and Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera.
The "Outside Experts" are advisors appointed by the Korean government to
provide counsel on the Nogun-Ri investigation.
During these meetings, both countries discussed progress on determining the
facts of what happened at Nogun-Ri. The two sides agreed that the close
bilateral cooperation on this issue reflects the trust and friendship built in over
fifty years of partnership. The two sides pledged to continue their close
cooperation to ensure that the ROK-US relationship remains as strong as ever.
Commenting on the numerous media reports on the Nogun-Ri investigation, the
US and ROK delegations agreed it was important to continue close cooperation.
They agreed that since portions of the Nogun-Ri report are still being completed,
the meetings held today were timely and helpful in bringing the investigation to
closure. The US and ROK delegations emphasized that the dignity and sacrifices
made by the Korean villagers and US veterans should not be diminished. Lastly,
while both sides desire to conclude the Nogun-Ri review by the end of the
month, they recognized there are still details that need to be discussed.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. email
Hans Binnendijk to @APNSA re Update on No Gun Ri (3 pages)
12/14/2000
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRAJ
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
DEC. 14. 2000 10:47AM
ASIAN AFFAIRS
TO: DEFENSE
NO. 461
P.1
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
WENT
Office of the Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Room 4C839, The Pentagon
ALF
Washington, DC 20301-2400
(7)
A
(703) 695-7005, (703) 695-4175;
FAX: (703) 695-8222
Number of Pages (Including Cover)
Date
12-14
From
Jodi Kessan
Office Telephone
Office Telephone May 7ighe
To
Office
Fax Number
for the rollact
Draft a's-A's - there are
a couple that may be useful
for your mtg this moning
John
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It is inappropriate, at this point in the review process, to speculate
about how the Information may be used after completion of our
review and preparation of the report.
Normally, most witnesses are not suspected of having committed
any criminal offenses. If, during the course of the review, the facts
raise a reasonable suspicion that a witness may have committed a
criminal offense, the witness will be advised of his legal rights prior
to being interviewed regarding information that could potentially be
used in a criminal proceeding.
Witnesses will also be provided the opportunity to consult with
counsel of his own choice or military counsel provided by the
witness's former Military Service.
Q's and A's:
Q. What are your comments on the ROK-US statement of mutual
understanding. Will this be the review's final conclusion?
A. The objective of the Army's review is to determine the facts and to
provide a report for public release that reflects a full and
comprehensive account of what occurred at No Gun Ri. Until our
review is complete, it would be inappropriate to comment on working
draft documents that do not constitute the final product of the review.
Q. Member of the "Outside Experts" recently made some
comments In The Korea Society Quarterly and the Harvard
Crimson that go beyond what the Army has said to date. What is
the Army's position on these comments?
A. Each of the "outside experts" was invited by the SECDEF because of their
individual backgrounds, professional expertise and insight. They have
provided, and we expect will continue to provide, valuable advice. While they
are certainly free to express their personal opinions in public forums, this
review is still ongoing and the opinions of the "outside experts", as they relate
to the review, will be provided within the context of that review and not in
other forums.
Q. An Air Force document in the National Archives states that US
Army forces sought, essentially, indiscriminate aerial strafing of
groups of Korean civilians. What was the Army's official policy
concerning the strafing of civilians?
A. To date, the Army has been unable to find any Army document
espousing or supporting an Army policy as described in the Air Force
memorandum or any verbal testimony hinting that such a policy
existed.
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Q. How did the Army's policy stack up against international law at
that time?
A. We can't address this question until we are able to determine
whether there ever was such a policy and its context.
Q. If US soldiers violated the official policy, was this tantamount
to a war crime?
A. The review Is still ongoing and speculation at this point is
irresponsible. It is premature to discuss our findings until the review is
complete.
Q. Did the policy evolve over the course of the Korean War?
A. We can't address this question until we are able to determine what,
if any, policy existed.
Q. Has the Army discovered other documentation that confirms
the statements made in the Air Force document?
A. To date, the Army has not discovered any Army document
espousing an official Army policy as described in the Air Force
memorandum or any verbal testimony hinting that such a policy
existed.
Q. The Air Force document seems to recognize that
indiscriminate strafing of civilians was wrong. Why did the Army
not also recognize this?
A. It is premature to draw any conclusions from this document. We
can't address this question further until we are able to determine that
any such policy existed as described in the Air Force document.
Q. Has the Army shared this document with the Korean review
team.
A, Yes. The Army has provided copies of the document as part of our
on-going commitment to share information with our Korean
counterparts.
Q. If there was such a policy during the Korean War, how would
the Army view it today?
A. Pending completion of the review, is inappropriate to speculate.
Q. Why did the Army put a gag order on MAJ Bateman (The
history professor at West Point)?
A. As part of the review, the Office of the Inspector General
interviewed many Korean War veterans. Major Bateman, a history
instructor at the United States Military Academy, in conducting
research for his work on the history of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, was
also interviewing some of the same Korean War veterans. Major
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ASIAN AFFAIRS
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Bateman's work is totally unrelated to the Army's No Gun Ri review,
yet many veterans were confusing Bateman's work with that of the IG.
Bateman's interviews were also causing the veterans to discuss events
among themselves, perhaps affecting information that may be of value
to the No Gun Rf review. In an effort to maintain the integrity of the
veterans' testimony, the Army asked Bateman to stop interviewing 7th
Cavalry vets until the Army has completed its review of the No Gun Ri
incident.
Q. Numerous publications are saying Edward Dally is a fake. Is
this the official conclusion of the review team and how long has
the Army known about it?
A. In order to maintain the integrity of the No Gun Ri Review, we will
not address the accuracy of any press reports. As part of the review,
the IG reviewed the records of many Korean War veterans, to include
Edward Daily's, It is premature to discuss our findings until the review
is completed.
Q. Several recent press reports have quoted an unidentified DOD
source as saying the No Gun Ri investigation has confirmed that
US Troops intentionally fired on refugees, resulting in the deaths
of civilians. Has the investigation come to this conclusion?
A. We are conducting a comprehensive review of the facts, and it is
premature to discuss our findings until the review is complete.
Q. Is the Army going to formally charge anyone?
A. At this point in the review process, it would be inappropriate to
speculate about how information may be used after completion of our
review and preparation of the report.
Q. If a witness is charged, will he be brought back on active duty
for courts-martial? What will be the procedure to do that?
A. The objective of this review is to determine the full scope of the
facts and to provide a report that reflects a full and comprehensive
account at what occurred at No Gun Ri. It is inappropriate, at this point
in the review process, to speculate about how the information may be
used after completion of our review and preparation of the report. Any
questions on the issues of prosecution, whether substantive or
procedural, would be premature at this point.
Q. Will the Army or federal government pay for the cost of the
witnesses' legal counsel?
A. To facilitate the review process, find all facts, and to ensure our
Korean veterans fully understand their rights, military counsel may be
made available to certain witnesses who request counsel, on a case-
by-case basis.
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DRAFT
TALKING POINTS AND Q'S AND A'S FOR
NO GUN RI ANNOUNCEMENT
Talking Points:
We went into this review committed to finding the facts of what happened at No Gun
Ri, no matter where they took us.
Our research methodology was predicated on an in-depth, scholarly approach to the
task.
The report is an accurate and objective portrayal of the facts based on 13 months of
work.
Conditions in and around No Gun Ri were chaotic; civilians were killed, but the facts
do not support allegations of an indiscriminate or premeditated effort to kill civilians.
The close bi-lateral cooperation on this important endeavor is indicative of the strong
ROK-US relationship.
Nothing can diminish the shared sacrifices of the Korean and American people.
Questions and Answers:
Q1. Did American soldiers knowingly kill civilians at No Gun Ri? If so, how did it
happen?
Al. Civilians were killed and the loss of civilian life is always regrettable, but the facts
of what happened at No Gun Ri do not support allegations of a premeditated effort to kill
civilians.
Q2. Your report doesn't endorse the survivors' account. How much stock did the
US put in the credibility of the survivors' testimony?
A2. The U.S. Review Team placed a great deal of credence on the Witness Testimony
but only used a common view of the incident as seen through the witnesses' eyes,
Obvious discrepancies and inconsistencies rendered some of the details as inconclusive,
but we took this common view - minus the problematic details - at face value and as the
truth. In effect, we believed that the witnesses were telling the truth and assumed that
their common view was in fact the truth.
I
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DRAFT
Q3. Did the Associated Press get this story wrong?
A3, It would be inappropriate for us to comment on the AP's work. The charter of this
review was to find the facts of what happened at No Gun Ri. no matter where they might
lead. We are confident that our report is an accurate and objective portrayal of the facts
based on 13 months of work.
Q4. How many civilians were killed at No Gun Ri? What does "substantially less"
than the survivors' estimate mean? Why can't you just accept the figures cited by
the survivors and the Korean government?
A4. Based on the available évidence, the U.S. Team is unable to estimate the numbers
killed or injured at No Gun Ri. However, the U.S. Team concluded that it is unlikely that
hundreds of dead bodies were present in the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the last week
of July 1950, based on testimony of U.S. veterans and the examination of the August 6,
1950 aerial photograph by Anmed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) and National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The U.S. Team concluded that some Koreans
were killed and injured in the vicinity of No Gun Ri in the last week of July 1950 but that
the precise number may never be determined for many reasons. The reasons include
Korean burial customs, farming practices, lack of reliable information, wartime
disruptions of the countryside, and the passage of time.
Q5. Did US soldiers have orders to shoot civilians? If so, who gave the orders and
under what conditions were they given? What was the review's determination on
the standing order to "fire everyone trying to cross front lines?"
AS. No official record exists of any order given by any U.S. commander, orally or in
writing, to kill Korean civilians. No U.S. veteran that the U.S. Review Team interviewed,
and who was proven to be in the No Gun Ri area at the time, has stated that he received any
order to fire on civilians. The U.S. leadership repeatedly warned the troops that North
Korean soldiers would routinely wear civilian clothing over their uniforms to infiltrate the
U.S. positions. The soldiers were also told that North Korean soldiers would hide within
refugee columns. The U.S. soldiers fired at refugees in the No Gun Ri area, but this action
was not indiscriminate in nature or a premeditated effort to kill Korean civilians. The U.S.
Review Team concludes that U.S. commanders did not issue oral or written orders to shoot
Korean civilians between July 25 and 29, 1950.
"Fire everyone trying to cross front lines" was taken out of context. For example, the 25th
ID War Diary for 27 July 1950 records that MG Kean ordered commanders at all levels to
take drastic action to prevent the movement of any Korean civilians into their areas within
the combat zone. Persons in civilian clothes moving within the combat zone were to be
considered as enemy. Also on the 27th, the Associated Press reported that: "All Korean
civilians have been ordered out of the fighting zone southeast of Taejon. In an area once
cleared of civilians, anyone in civilian clothing may be shot."
2
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DRAFT
Q6, Would these actions have been considered a war crime in 1950?
A6. Tasked out.
Q7. Will the US charge anyone? If so, what will be the procedure to do that? Will
the Army provide legal council?
A7. Tasked out.
Q8. Will the US apologize and pay compensation?
A8. Tasked OUL
Q9. On what grounds would the US refuse to pay compensation?
A9. Tasked out.
Q10. We've heard that the US may erect a monument to the victims, is that true?
A10. Tasked out.
Q11. Thirty-three thousand Americans died to save South Korea. How do you think
US veterans will react to a monument?
All. Tasked out.
Q12. When did you brief President Clinton and what were his comments on the
report?
A12. Tasked out.
Q13. Does the US believe that the truth of No Gun Ri has now been told? Is this
report the final action on No Gun Ri?
A13. We went into this review committed to finding the facts of what happened at No
Gun Ri, no matter where they took us. Our research methodology was predicated on an
in-depth, scholarly approach to the task. We feel that this report is an accurate and
objective portrayal of the facts based on 13 months of detailed, probing work. No one is
denying that civilians were injured or killed. Conditions in and around No Gun Ri were
chaotic; and like all wars, civilians were killed, but the facts do not support allegations of
an indiscriminate or premeditated effort to kill civilians.
Q14. What will the US do about allegations of other incidents?
A14. Other incidents were noted during the review. Decision addressing the disposition
of those incidents will be made at a later date.
Q15. What was the review's methodology and why did It take 13 months to
complete?
A15. Screening numerous databases, interviewing veterans, reading imagery and doing
research is a time consuming process. For example, from an initial list of over 7,375
names, the Interview Team developed a contact list of 3,213 names. The Interview Team
crosschecked all identified names on the contact list against official record sources to
3
20:01
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DRAFT
authenticate the list. Next, the Interview Team conducted exhaustive research to locate
all authenticated individuals and then interviewed these veterans. The Air Force
researchers assisted in locating Fifth Air Force officer rosters and other records with the
names of pilots and staff officers. An experienced Air Force interviewer contacted and
interviewed as many of these veterans as possible. While every effort was made to make
this a comprehensive sample, the U.S. Review Team had no power to compel testimony
and no authority to issue subpoenas or to grant immunity.
The Research Team consisted of Department of the Army military and civilian members
augmented by a United States Air Force research team, an imagery analyst, a Korean
linguist, and trained research assistants from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. An
Army historian led this effort. The researchers focused most of their effort at the
National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland. They also
used the resources of the National Personnel Records Center, Federal Records Centers,
the MacArthur Library, the Harry S. Truman Library, and the Military History Institute.
Searching records over a wide range of units and levels of command (from regiment to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff), the researchers examined over one million documents and
approximately 45,000 containers of United States Air Force reconnaissance film.
Q16. What role did forensics play in your analysis of evidence? Did the forensics
evidence support or contradict the survivors' account?
A16: As a result of consultations between the U.S. Team and the ROK Team, The
Inspector General agreed that the ROK Team would be responsible for recovery of
ballistics evidence and firearm examinations. (Hence, the U.S. did not have an on-the-
ground review of the forensics process.)
The U.S. Team received a forensics test results report and a six-piece material sample
from the ROK Team. The ROK's Defense Investigative Command (DIC) No Gun Ri
Investigation Team conducted a forensic assessment of the No Gun Ri incident site and
tested materials recovered at the site. The ROK Team reported the results of the DIC
assessment and testing to the U.S. Team. Based upon interactions with the Korean
counterparts, the U.S. Team believes the DIC Team retained all remaining items found at
the site.
The U.S. Team asked for technical assistance from two agencies. the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Laboratory and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
Laboratory. Again, no firearms examiners were detailed to the U.S. Team. The U.S.
Team relied upon the technological and forensic expertise of the CID and the FBI to
review the DIC's conclusions and assessment. Specifically, the U.S. Team asked the
laboratories to review the DIC Team's assessment of the site and the items recovered at
the site, to review and comment on the methodology, and to assess the Korean
conclusions. After the U.S. Team received the CID evaluation of the DIC Report, the
U.S. Team requested additional information from the ROK Team. The U.S. Team
provided copies of the DIC response on the methods that the DIC Team used to reach
4
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TOTOI
DRAFT
four of their conclusions to CID and the FBI who provided additional comments. CID
and the FBI concurred you could use the Korean methods to determine the difference
between 7,62 millimeter (mm) Soviet and .30 caliber U.S. bullets, to determine that the
extracted and unextracted bullets were identical, to determine that the marks were bullet
marks and to determine the firing directions. However the methods used by the DIC
Team are not the methods used by CID and the FBI. FBI examiner noted from a purely
forensic science perspective, any conclusions drawn from an unprotected area where
weapons were discharged fifty years ago should be viewed with extreme caution.
Q17. How has the Korean government reacted to your report? How does the US
report differ from the Korean report?
A17. There is no Korean report.
Q18. Did the Korean government try to pressure the US into coming to a conclusion
that was favorable to the survivors?
A18. No. Our charter has always been to go where the facts take us, no matter where they
might lead. This effort has been marked by close cooperation with the Korean review
team and we were never pressured into doing anything other than to find the facts of what
happened at No Gun Ri.
Q19. The survivors believe the US coerced Edward Daily into changing his story.
What is your response to this accusation?
A19. This is not true. From the very beginning, we pledged that we would go where the
facts take us, no matter where they might lead. The review team conducted a two-day
interview with Edward Daily in April 2000. At no time did members of the review team
indicate to Daily that they were aware of discrepancies in his record or in any way
attempt to change the information that Daily provided during this partial interview. Since
that interview, Daily has refused to meet again with members of the review team.
Q20. When did the Army determine that Edward Daily was a fake, and why did it
knowingly allow media to continue to use him as a credible source?
A20. We were aware that the official records did not conform to Mr. Daily's story of his
service. We did not announce that there were discrepancies in Mr. Daily's statements
about his service because he is entitled to the protection of the Privacy Act the same as
any other service member or veteran. We also had to verify all of the facts from multiple
sources to make sure we had not overlooked any possibility that part of his story was
correct.
Q21. During the course of the review, did you uncover any other witnesses that were
deemed not credible? If so, who are they and why was their information determined
to be not credible?
A21. No.
5
db/BSI/QSO
DEC-14-2000 10:04
60'd
2228 S69 E0L
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c 12/2000
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA|
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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Interagency Discussion on No Gun Ri (6 pages)
12/13/2000
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
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concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
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Hans Binnendijk to @RUDMAN re No Gun Ri (1 page)
12/12/2000
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Hans
12/12
Cable from
Seault Text [
NO EWN RI
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re No Gun Ri, Building on the SMU (3 pages)
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
MRI Henry
202 456-9190
Steering Group Meeting
clatt
1.
Dt. 122 N218 TO 1999 9% 29 E AP OHO 25 TH 01 for 21.01 go or
CHECK UHO X/A/OH INTI RT at 012451 tot
1221 or 22 @? CH ? THE RU of RO Rr
on 23 1501 HOLL DILE 11 RS 011 2019 of
INI 200 allo 278190.
1. Review Process
a. The No Gun Ri Incident Review was initiated at the
direction of the presidents of the Republic of Korea and the
United States following the release of the Associated Press
report concerning the matter on September 29, 1999. This
story brought to the forefront the earlier efforts of Korean
citizens to gain an inquiry into their claims surrounding
certain events that occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri,
including the firing upon Korean refugees at the double
railroad overpass and an air strike on the railroad track.
P.01
8339 269 202
SECDEF
62:50 6661-62-Nnr
4. 21.01 %? INED of 420 21.01 YOU KH
DCI. 012121 22 ENDI Ell 2 OF& INE
THE 015 SC. 51.01 KH
NEW N21 INJE NO 45
SQ. 2000 2018. X1, EH OR #0 Eg ol OH 20.
b. The efforts of the Korean and US No Gun Ri Review Teams
exemplify the highest levels of ROK-US bilateral cooperation.
Throughout the duration of this important and sensitive endeavor,
both Teams established and steadfastly sustained an environment
of mutual cooperation and trust. The Korean and American
Officials associated with this effort consistently demonstrated
their commitment to examine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the events. Both teams have candidly shared facts,
statements and documents.
Cl. 50 101 1801 HO 02 2E NN alo = UE It
01 or AD 1520, 12, OH on 0121 If
TI 0150 1.01 100 of 021 uch.
C. The passage of 50 years reduces the possibility that
all of the facts will ever be known and a large number of
factors, including but not limited to trauma, age, and
media influence the recollection of Korean and US
witnesses.
20 ° d
SECDEF
62:50 6661-62-NNI
8339 269 200
21. 7711 ENDEE 81.01 OH PH XII too
UNITED NO FloH 494 00 4%
20 %? 2011 100 KHU 2010. 212101
EST ! %= 11 OH and 2 2010. 213
of 2012 20150 1950 01 011 19 2402 g 01 0121
(§) 21210 NE 0101 ED. NE 7011 015 IN
E ME USE 012H011 CHE! 2019 I RE 2010.
d. Nevertheless, this process will add to a strengthened
ROK-US alliance and honor the many of both nations who
sacrificed so much for the freedom of the Republic of Korea,
Civilian casualties are, without exception, the most tragic of
the unintended consequences of conflict. South Korean
citizens and soldiers of both nations bore heavy burdens in
the summer months of 1950 as a result of North Korean
aggression. This review process, characterized by diligent
fact-finding, will provide closure for the past and bring hope
for the future.
2. 21-01 25 INUS
Dr. 1121 02 OK
(1) JH Pal # et $ ПО 40121 GID, EED HIGH
72 2E 01852 5 AI I
21 ar 211 USE CH TO 1001 F AO PT
- USC. 188 279 el 22
IUD et of 01 CHES NE SHIJI
810.
2. ROK-US Mutual Understandings
a. Background of the Incident and Combat Situation.
(1) In the early period of the conflict, many of the US soldiers
deployed to Korea were young, under-trained, under-equipped
and new to combat. Units operating in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
were under the command and control of leaders with limited
proven experience in combat. They were unprepared for the
weapons and tactics of the North Korea forces that they would
face and the speed of the North Korean advance.
8339 269 202
SECDEF
62:50 6661-62-NNI
P.03
(2) 0122 201 212101
01 22 $ 011 01221 18
25% nine 8 or OK $2189.
(2) US soldiers were legitimately fearful of the possible
infiltration of North Korean soldiers who routinely
entered American lines in groups disguised as civilians
in refugee columns and then attacked American
positions from the rear.
(3) 80 01201 241 201 01 220 $, DI XI 1 DI
2019 & of OF ar
7279 212 TOTAL 222 202 2221 X
OF HD
(3) Following the withdrawal of US forces, and entry of
the North Korean army into Yongdong, the North
Koreans continued to maintain contact with the US
ground forces east of Yongdong by means of
intermittent patrols and indirect fire as the 1st Cavalry
Division continued its rearward movement to Naktong
River.
8339 269 203
SECDEF
62:50 6661-62-NNI
P.04
(4) 1950 7% DIXIX ₹ 011 05 OHO the 4th 76 EH ^ gh
221 1811 ийа. 01258 nam no 01 Я OF gh == 01 CH KJ
7121 2101 11 201 of I 01
Ct.
(4) North Korean tanks were on what is now Highway 4
east of Yongdong during the last week of July 1950. US
soldiers believed that some of the US anti-tank
weaponry available to them was ineffective against the
North Korean armor.
(5) 01 BI 05 18 95011 E 1950 7% 25/26
212 122 THE RUS 8120. OR et
= MT 1003 2'8101 2171 ! 12 @E. RT 2021 t
a ]21] 2229 01201 11% 20121= 014 UPO 0121 I 2
11 YEHOU LE 40 90152 TO 26% of
122 or ₹2011 7% 27% PENI 420 ₹2011 7018
of HII PI 8120.
(5) The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, shortly after arriving in the
Yongdong area, conducted a disorganized and undisciplined retreat
toward the vicinity of No Gun Ri during the night of July 25/26 1950. The
retreat occurred as a result of several factors including : a mistaken
belief of an Imminent enemy breakthrough due to the emergence of the
enemy, the possibility of encountering North Korean tanks, and the
awareness of North Korean Infiltration tactics. The organization,
disoriented and in disarray, reorganized in the vicinity of No Gun RI
throughout the day on the 26th. The unit completed its consolidation
and reorganization in the vicinity of No Gun RI by the early morning of
the 27th of July, when it reported its position.
SECDEF
02:50 666I-62-NNI
P.05
703 697 8339
4.
(1) HE, @2 2017 20 or oh RO 24 ou ]=
o! oH 149 0150 OHI 1 ET 80 ПО 221 2 OH a ORO one 21 of
90.
b. Refugee Control
(1) At the outset of the war, the lack of ROK government
refugee control measures resulted in significant
confusion and difficulties in controling refugee
movement
(2) 1950 7% 20% add 01 015 OH EEE
2221 01391 70 UN THEY 920. 1950 7%
01822 2122 UTE OH
222 % 0120 101, 525 015 P
2011 OXE 022 1221 HH IIIY!
(2) By July 20, 1950, after the Taejon Battle, refugee
control was a major concem of the US and ROK forces.
In late July 1950, the ROK government and Eighth US
Army, in close coordination, began to disseminate
refugee control policies to protect the US and South
Korean forces as well as refugees and reduce the impact
of road-bond refugees on military operations.
SECDEF
02:50 6661-62-NNI
90'd 8339 269 203
a. 22 5% 015
(1) 0111101 2121 office @? 01210152 01
E1.01 IIIY! 1201 KO 1950 7% 1
Cl. % 01 HO 01201 OI E RO USE
1101014 01 UNI 2014 200 0100 2'SH 01
old 2999.
C. Assembly and Movement of Villagers at Im Ke Ri and Joo
Gok Ri
(1) With certain exceptions, US and ROK policy restricting
movement of refugees was established in late July 1950.
However, some US veterans testified that, at some point, they
escorted Koreans from their villages, in an effort to get them
out of harm's way or to clear them away from US ground
positions.
(2) !!!! DJ @ 1950 7% 25% 0121011 01201 ≥
07 22 01% 21012101 LE = KH
20 1010 4th 02
I UCH. 01 XI RO 01 3011 A1 TUES **
SE 10 XSI VIII ON CHEHE ≡ DI of Il of
I LLCh.
(2) Some Korean witnesses asserted in their testimony
that US soldiers escorted an unspecified number of
refugees from Im Ke Ri, a safe village in the mountains
on or about the night of 25 July, toward the No Gun Ri
area, via Joo Gok Ri along what is now Highway 4. US
veterans do remember escorting refugees from villages,
but they cannot recall the names of places or dates.
SECDEF
JUN-29-1999 05:30
20'd
703 697 8339
(3) on = @ 19 use no 7% 25% KP 1.5 Km 813121
22 MIXIM 0129 2012 OH 12 OH Y BI At to of E FK
THE or 24801 AT KRO TO 092 gi KJO 21 D aln 00 SIN UL !! CH THE OII A
gas 01% II 022 =8 SENSE RI 1 - 49 RO S It At
SECOND 21817 21Cl. 2214 01011 013014 01 % OF It to AI
NET ЦЕ 12 CH 81 E DIO I = air
21% ^ 220
(3) Some Korean witnesses stated that they saw refugees killed on
July 25th when refugees were directed by US forces to stay in an
open area near Ha Ga Ri, 1.5km from the village of Joo Gok Ri.
Various Korean witnesses state that one to four persons were shot
when they either strayed from the group, tried to leave the group or
did not move fast enough. The review could not confirm what
soldiers were involved, nor whether this action was a reaction to a
violation of refugee control measures in effect at the time.
(4) ON DF III 88 X g 01 RO 50 of K|O 21 011 @29, 22 III y
It 0138 25 10 E ETC RO 011 At HE of 900. 01
011 OHO 2002 10 018 of THOISE oo M 2002 201 AH HI 01 015
SIC. of DF OI STATE RI 212 ПО 01 201 Y el Rto #
202 01 ^ 01 Med %5 0171 Dr 91 % DIE U 041 or 11 X 01
AMV SH 242 8901 1181812 J LLCh. 2214 QE 01 &
818 218 NO 2811 I 01
a.
(4) Some US and Korean witness statements say that Korean
refugees came in contact with US forces in the vicinity of No Gun
Ri as they both moved east. As they moved from Yongdong
toward Hwanggan, the refugees passed from the road to the
railroad tracks. Some US veterans and Korean witnesses
recalled that US forces directed refugees to the railroad tracks,
conducted searches for infiltrators, weapons and other
contraband. Other veterans and Korean witnesses had no
recollection of searches being conducted.
8339 269 203
SECDEF
02:50 6661-62-NNI
80'd
2.2824 NO
(1) 04 of 1950 72 262 01 P4 of g 7 DI Ш У 01
N IE 428 81201 19 of 20. 1950 ou Rr
Ar 10 R or KK RO 80
228900 82811 212. ] R OF 81 N/A/
U= 31 ar of I 20. U7 DI 82052 II 1950LM 723 IC 01 It at DU 21
#011 go It do RO ESED. 01 RI II et WE III IF or
111 gi E 120H Ar 2 E 51 Ar of 91
32890.
d. Air Strikes
(1) According to their statements in the testimony, many Korean witnesses
indicate that they were strafed or bombed by US airplanes around noon on
July 26, 1950. Some U.S. veterans stated that they saw U.S. planes strafing
targets in late July 1950 and some of these veterans saw them when
deployed in the No Gun Ri area, but they could not recall when or identify
what the targets were. Some veterans saw planes strafe tanks with refugees
on or near them in July 1950. One veteran stated that on an unknown date
he saw refugees on a dirt road and an old railroad being strafed.
(JH) INDI21 RD E 01/ RT 2! 01 @? F/O DI JHJ 01 IN
1001 SHE 7% 26% 422 KH THE T ar OII 2101 RT of
07 492 ^ 2115 2018 4 200. 01 HIST 2 2222 to Flo R$
or HI 029 and ar ] ME 22 25
02 util, 01011 371101 811 CHE! 0F AN R
AIE re = It 20.
(a) Official US Air Force records and pilot interviews
found during research do not reflect any mission flown
on the 26th July in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The 5th Air
Force Summary of Air Operations indicated that some
missions were flown over the Yongdong area on that day
, but mission reports for three of these missions could
not be found.
8339 269 202
SECDEF
JUN-29-1999 05:30
60'd
(L) 1950 8% 6 ° N 142 II,
21 22 NE W nin FIF 81
4, 212 a UE 30 THE 111
At #212 = IC.
(b) Additionally, analysis of the August 6, 1950
reconnaissance photograph shows an area of probable
strafing on the railroad tracks in the area indicated by
the Korean witnesses. There is no way of determining
the exact date of the probable strafing.
(CI) 1950 7% 27% 0121 4221 Kr 01 OR
CH THICHCH THE ar SE
(21) OPH, 01 INE 1221 HOLDER 1950 € 7% 26
of 2222 12 + ach.
(c) Early in the morning on July 27, 1950, an air strike
did, in fact, take place in the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry
Regiment area in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.
(d) The Review could, therefore, not exclude the
possibility of an air strike occurring on July 26th in the
vicinity of No Gun Ri.
SECDEF
JUN-29-1999 05:30
Plid
8339 269 E02
(2) 01 710 ₹ 21 are 022, Al 01 @? E = Et 400 Kg 2 of Il 05 & 0 4
II Hu a & PO DI = 200 2220. RO & all 00 sh KJO 18 U THE e g FIO 1 It III IL al
If X Flo RS of of 0 KIO 21 22, OZ KB 18 U ПО & X ur et OKO It 2 @ At
OF Ш 29, 211 use BEI !! or gl 0 18 01 IC. 24
1 OHI of of [ 1950 78 278 Dr 29 of JJJ XI I 21 II 3r 011 AT 01 E It *@2 y
OF PH 04 of AS 9 N ar 01 Y 1 D. 80 of 01 FD E V use TO OIE, ss $ E El À
AI R$ 422 01 2 OII H DJ 11 4 I of UC.
(2) Air Force records show that US Air Force jet aircraft flying at the time
did not carry bombs whereas propeller-driven aircraft did. While some
Korean witnesses stated that the aircraft directly attacked refugees, others
have stated that they only recall explosions and machine gun fire and
other munitions effects, Including shrapnel, flames and heat. Official
records Indicate that US and North Korean Army forces did exchange
artillery and mortar fire In the vicinity of No Gun Ri between July 27 and
July 29 1950. Eight U.S veterans remember either artillery, mortar or tank
fire in the vicinity of No Gun RI.
(3) 2/7 BI 21 TH OU 01 T z 2 01 AI H OF of I 04 U " N ôt 01
Ill IL gi 011 CHE! 80 RO RT R 50 81 11 a OK TO 81 IICh. of N of 1950
26% Al 01 HE FOR BD N 00 R CH 07 El PH OF @ 0 HU MH 01 70
to X # KI N of 01 R KKO A/ Q # 81 KK I or 0 At
2/ 011 81 9 01 ONN 70 88% Φ 2 9 II 2t 01 as et 2 % TO
et RO RJJ 5 or El OH OF ED. 0121 2 # 00 H 21 Al
2' RT gi OI 01 " OF MM 21
(3) Some Korean witnesses stated that US soldiers called in air strikes
on the refugees by use of a radio available to US ground forces at the
time. Both Review Teams agree that, on July 26, 1950, the ordinary US
ground soldier was equipped only with a portable radio and was
incapable of talking directly to an Airborne Tactical Air Controller and
requesting an air strike. Army units could submit a request for an air
strike but had to pass it through channels to the Joint Operations
Center. The processing time for such a request could not have resulted
in a prompt response.
IT'd 8339 269 200
SECDEF
02:50 6661-62-NNI
(4) 1950 7% 25HD D 53 & of UHI Turner C. Rogers ON 94 OH 11 us
II 28 LA 040 01 El 220. 3 OH IXH Rr El H U or gl 3 011 of OH 50 BI
SI a E 68 gi 2 2! 01 8219 of NE USADE LH 040 01 H II SI 2 on. 078
012 202 & 81 U= 98 01 12 III Y el & $ " $ = A mg AS I 12
of 12 B. E TH JA N @?@ our ₹ of 01 21 eld R & 011 ONO of
2214 01 RO ₹ Kf At e of *** 21 X TO Dall at 188 31 or 81 J * of I ilcs.
(4) In a memo dated 25 July 1950, Colonel Turner C. Rogers of 5th Air
Force Headquarter stated that: "It is reported that large groups of civilians,
either composed of or controlled by North Korean soldlers, are infiltrating
U.S. positions. The Army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee
parties that are noted approaching our positions. To date, we have
compiled with the Army request in this respect"
None of the pilots interviewed, however, remembers such a policy.
OF. HI OK At AT as ONE OF Pr
(1) 01 NAME 01 THO 422 KT 111 ES UL 040 sto OH
At Rr out
e. Ground Fire and Issuance of Orders
(1) US ground forces fired toward refugees in the
vicinity of No Gun Ri during this period.
P.12
8339 269 202
SECDEF
02:50 6661-62-NNI
()H) 1950 7% 26% 29 E 1010 OHE A121011 ET DH 0122 #34
75 98101 it goH 0125
no 1499 0150 11 Holl IE LE 2020 or 1
21 RT I 2201 III 011 NO AMO LC. ] RN It 401%
of &U THE 2121 SSC.
(a) At some time between July 26th and 29th, 1950, some US
soldiers fired toward the refugees who were at various locations
Including inside the double overpass. They did so either to
control the refugees' movements or because they believed that
they had received small arms fire from those locations. As a
result, an unknown number of refugees were killed or injured.
(4) 2000 7% @ gw RU Br 049 0121
@ ok @@@ 22% 0121 01 BI & YES EI, E+D,
11 on 2890.
(b) In July 2000, a ROK forensic team found various U.S. bullets and
the bullet marks on the walls of the double railroad overpass tunnel
and the culvert. Moreover, the team found both U.S. and Soviet bullets,
empty cartridges, and other fragments in the vicinity of the double
overpass.
Eld
8339 269 200
SECDEF
15:31 6661-62-NNI
(C) 27 OH ₹ 01
THE % 1181 22121 P ar 01 Dr 01
0191 EUD STATE ICI. & RUS no to Al 525
of 21 I 42213 0151 UHO 02 CHECK 14 At 20 21 220
(c) Some korean witnesses state that most refugees were
from Im Ke Ri and Joo Gok Ri and some other people came
from outside Im Ke Ri to the village. Some Korean witnesses
state that they knew most of them in the group that went
down the road to No Gun Ri.
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NEW 22 OF 2UC. 01 UPU et as 11 et
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01 USE gu I is En 25 Rio Rr of K10 TO
(d) Some Korean witnesses stated that U.S. soldiers
either gave them first aid or evacuated them to a
hospital. The ROK Review Team indicates that 17 people
received medical aid. One U.S. veteran saw medical aid
being given to individuals in civilian clothing under the
double railroad overpass when he carried a child back
down under the bridge.
703 697 8339 P.14
SECDEF
JUN-29-1999 05:31
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IN 2201 214 01 EN
201212 2201 2190. 22 NEIN % 19 Rd
$ 2019 4 204, At of
X 00 2'= as 121, 12, 445
015 N201 of 0 01 CHE!
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(2) All the veterans interviewed by the U.S. Army who fired at
refugees stated that they did not receive any order to fire. Some
other veterans, however, stated that they believed that such an
order must have been given. While a comprehensive search of
records and these veterans' interviews did not disclose any
evidence of the issuance of such an order, some other veterans,
who themselves did not fire at refugees, assumed that there must
have been an order to fire on refugees because they observed small
arms, machine guns, mortar and artillery fire at refugees.
(3) 1950 7% 24% OI on IIY!
of USED X OHO HE JISON a! SCH 2221
of 10 18901 UCH. DE 21 CH OH 252 DU
28 4 220, 22 2019 212 210101
go <H 19% 2019 It
(3) The message log of the 8th Cavalry Regiment
contains an entry of message from an regimental liaison
officer on 24 July 1950 about guidelines on shooting
refugees to prevent them passing through US front lines.
But, whether an order to fire was made could not be
determined because records of other regiments do not
show such guidelines and thus discrepancy among
interview accounts exists.
P.15
8339 269 200
SECDEF
15:30 6661-62-NNI
TOTAL P.16
(1) 112101 RD 222 215 2'8" 21 D It 01 R
01 KH 282 NAIN 218H 214,
TO II #0171 ILCt. STATE
QUIP NO, of IE 22 248 01 21 30 THO 2 #0 NIE
KIO 01 140 Rf ПО 21814 RJ of UCH.
(1) Because of the passage of 50 years and the effects of the conflict,
the statements of Korean witnesses and U.S veterans about the
number of refugees killed, injured or missing as the result of the
events in the vicinity of No Gun Ri vary widely. The Koreans have
reported to the Office of Yong Dong County an unverified number of
248 Korean civilians killed, injured or missing while the testimony
PM
of U.S. veterans supports lower numbers.
groblem
3. K N == 2.01 KI INCE manes seria 2 0100 082 NOS 00
01 51 21 C):
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% = 03M, 10 202 gh spece 20 2D@ PEND ANE == e! SN
at e! $ right we 82 us 019 Z IDIDI и a NOS 20
3. Conclusion of the Review Bearing in mind the enduring suffering of the victims, the
Korean and American Review Teams mutually understand that
in the desperate opening weeks of defensive combat In the Korean War, U.S. soldiers
killed or Injured an unconfirmed number of Korean refugees In the met week of July 1950
during a withdrawal under pressure In the vicinity of No Gun RL The diligent and
conscientious bilateral efforts of both countries in this review represent a significant
contribution to the maintenance of the viol and long-standing ROK-US alliance. Bearing in
mind the long-lasting sorrow of victims as well as the eacrifice of US soldiers during the
Korean war, the ROK and us teams firmly believe that this Investigation on an Incident that
occurred during the Korean war will not only help maintain a more stable ROK-US alliance
but also is an example of two nations working Logether to realize the value of democracy
and recognize the Importance of human rights.
P.19
8339 269 E0L
SECDER
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2009-0528-F
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NOGUN-RI
Interagency Working Group
December 13, 2000
Agenda
Summary/status of Statement of Mutual Understanding
Issues relating to final package:
- Nature of Presidential Statement
- Compensation
- Memorial (to whom, who pays)
- Scholarship (progress with Korea Society, USG role)
- Achieving finality
- Legal considerations
Issues relating to Rollout:
- Date (before New Year?)
- Public affairs strategy
- Congressional strategy
- Veteran's strategy
- Press strategy/ AP response
- Use of US advisors to OSD
Game plan for meeting with ROK outside experts later this week
Coordinating with ROK
- LTG Kim's visit on Dec 20
- Coordinating with Embassy
- Status of ROK investigation/report
5,000 miles, took place in the
education budget faster than
North Korea, a Stalinist
mission offices in London and
spring and was never an-
it's increasing its military
regime, is a major seller of
Pyongyang.
nounced by the Chinese gov-
budget, to the best of our abil-
missile technology and a key
British Foreign Secretary
arnment.
ity to monitor that."
reason why the United States is
Robin Cook said the decision
The first flight test took
considering building
a
"was taken in recognition of
place in August 1999, he said.
multibillion dollar missile de-
the significant progress" in the
The Nov. 4 test was first
Philadelphia Inquirer
fense system. In recent meet-
dialogue between the two Ko-
reported in yesterday's editions
December 13, 2000
ings with Secretary of State
reas, particularly a June sum-
of The Washington Times and
Madeleine K. Albright and
mit between their leaders, Kim
defense analysts said its timing
15. U.S. Studies North
other U.S. officials, North Ko-
Jong Il of the North and Kim
was intended as a political sig-
Korea Missile Talks
rea has indicated a willingness
Dae Jung of the South.
nal from Beijing.
Mr. Bacon said the single-
Officials think a deal is at
to end exports of ballistic mis-
Associated Press
siles. It has also said it would
warhead DF-31 has an esti-
hand to curb the sale of bal-
be willing to give up develop-
mated range of about 5,000
listic technology. Asia experts
ment, production and testing of
miles, but the test flight was
are skeptical.
longer-range missiles, officials
Washington Post
limited to areas inside China
By Carol Giacomo, Reuters
said.
December 13, 2000
and was shorter than its maxi-
WASHINGTON - The
A key issue is what North
Pg. 36
mum range.
Clinton administration believes
Korea gains in return for lost
17. S. Koreans Dispute
"This is a program that's
it is on the verge of a deal to
missile exports. Washington
been ongoing, the DF-31 pro-
curb North Korea's missile
rejected a bid by Pyongyang
U.S. Findings On No
gram, since the late 1980s, and
program and is likely to un-
for cash payments of over $1
Gun Ri
the test was pretty much as ex-
dertake talks that could lead to
billion, and a senior official
By Doug Struck, Washington
pected in terms of timing and
a visit to Pyongyang by Presi-
said any talk now of cash com-
in terms of results," he said.
pensation is "not correct."
Post Foreign Service
dent Clinton, U.S. officials said
As for the timing during
Another element being
SEOUL, Dec. 12 - South
yesterday.
Gen Shelton's visit, Mr. Bacon
Clinton has been consid-
discussed is a U.S. commit-
Korea is balking at the Penta-
said he did not believe there
gon's preliminary finding that
ering a trip to the North Ko-
ment to have North Korean ci-
was a connection. He said the
vilian satellites launched free
American soldiers fired in
rean capital before he leaves
timing may have had more to
office Jan. 20 despite concerns
of charge each year by the
panic - not under orders - at
do with a typhoon in the region
United States, Russia or China.
Korean civilians in the village
voiced by some Asia experts.
that would make it more diffi-
of No Gun Ri at the start of the
No decision has been
cult for the United States to
Korean War.
made on Clinton's trip or on
Survivors of the incident
monitor the test, than with the
sending State Department
Washington Post
four-star general's visit.
met with government officials
counselor Wendy Sherman,
Gen. Shelton visited China
December 13, 2000
today to discuss their plans for
chief coordinator of U.S. pol-
Nov. 3-5 and watched military
Pg. 38
opposing the finding, and a
icy toward North Korea, for a
exercises near the southern city
new round of talks, officials
16. Britain, N. Korea
Korean civilian advisory group
of Nanjing.
was planning to fly to the
said. But such talks were
Despite the succession of
Open Diplomatic Ties
United States Wednesday to
likely, they said.
missile tests, Mr. Bacon sought
LONDON--Britain
and
try to change the conclusions
They said an agreement
to downplay the threat from the
North Korea formally agreed
before the Americans final.re-
curbing North Korea's missile
DF-31. "I don't think it's fair
yesterday to establish diplo-
port.
program was closer than gen-
to say that this building or this
matic relations, in what Britain
The Koreans are pushing
erally believed and they feared
government is worried about
called recognition of the
for an American acknowledg-
it could slip away if left for the
what they see in China, but
Communist nation's warming
ment that there were orders to
next president. "We think
clearly we watch any country
relationship with South Korea
shoot the civilians, as some
we've got the makings of a
that is developing its military,
and its decision to suspend
American veterans recall, and
deal," one official said, al-
missile launches.
modernizing its military.
they want an apology and
though he cautioned that snags
"China has been working
In a sign of its improving
compensation for injured sur-
could still develop.
on modernizing its long-range
ties with the outside world,
vivors and victims' relatives.
Many nongovernmental
missile program, which is very
North Korea has this year es-
The dispute threatens to
Asia experts fear that too many
modest compared to ours, very
tablished diplomatic links with
result in exactly the problem
crucial details have not been
modest compared to the Rus-
Canada, Italy and Australia.
South Korea had wanted to
pinned down.
Britain said in October that it
avoid: a U.S. conclusion that
sians, very modest compared to
Administration planning
the French and the British. But
was ready to follow suit, and
propels this 50-year-old inci-
has been complicated by the
they've been working to mod-
yesterday's
announcement
dent into a new rift between
presidential election. U.S. offi-
ernize this program for some
came after five days of talks in
Seoul and Washington. South
cials said they would like to
time."
London between government
Korea had proposed a joint in-
consult with the next president
Asked about China's
officials.
vestigation, but the United
and his team because the pro-
military buildup, which in-
The two countries have
States rejected that.
posed accord is controversial
cludes development of two dif-
had no relations since the
"There's only one truth,
and would depend on the next
ferent ground-based mobile
Democratic People's Republic
but through these separate in-
administration carrying it out.
missiles and a new class of
of Korea was created in 1948,
vestigations, they're making
"Although there is reason
ballistic missile submarines,
following the division of the
two 'truths,' said Chung Koo
to believe a serious agreement
the spokesman said China has
Korean peninsula after World
Do, a spokesman for the survi-
could be reached with North
"focused more resources on
War II. In a joint statement, the
vors of the shootings at No
Korea, it has to be fully im-
military modernization" in the
two governments said they
Gun Ri, who say that as many
plemented in the next admini-
last several years.
would appoint ambassadors
as 300 or 400 persons were
stration," an official said.
However, he noted that
after arranging for permanent
killed by American fire July
China is "still increasing its
26-28, 1950.
page 12 of 22
The Washington Post re-
September 1999 article that
South Korean officials
seemed all but finished two
ported tast week that the Pen-
won a Pulitzer Prize.
have acknowledged privately
months ago. At first he refused
tagon's draft report concluded
According to South Ko-
what historians - and many ci-
to acknowledge that he had lost
that panicked soldiers, in the
rean reports, the United States
vilians who lived through the
the Sept. 24 presidential elec-
chaotic first days of the war,
has balked at labeling the kill-
brutal war - have long as-
tion and was preparing for a
had fired at Korean civilians
ings a "massacre."
serted: There were many cases
second round of voting against
hiding under a railroad trestle,
"It's obviously, and very
of questionable killings by all
Mr. Kostunica. But after the
fearing that North Korean in-
clearly, a massacre," said
sides in the war. And South
popular uprising of Oct. 5, he
filtrators were among them.
Chung, the survivors' spokes-
Korea is not eager to begin ex-
conceded defeat and resigned.
But the report reached no
man. "If the United States
amining the actions of its
Mr. Milosevic is under in-
finding about the number of
starts to deny that, then the
troops.
dictment by the United Nations
civilians killed and said there
trust and faith that other coun-
Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks
war crimes tribunal at The
was no evidence of orders to
tries have in the U.S. will be
contributed to this report from
Hague for the atrocities Yugo-
fire on civilians, despite the
broken."
accounts of some veterans who
"The United States has
Washington.
slav forces committed against
Kosovo Albanians last year.
said they acted under orders.
admitted a small part of the
Although Mr. Kostunica has
Indeed, when asked about
truth" in acknowledging that
said that handing over Mr.
the Korean reaction, a Penta-
American soldiers killed civil-
New York Times
Milosevic is not a priority of
gon official said even more
ians, which it had long denied.
December 13, 2000
the new Yugoslav government,
emphatically than has been
"But they have refused to ad-
18. Denying All,
Mr. Kostunica has pledged to
said in the past that the Penta-
mit the very core of the truth,"
cooperate with the tribunal.
gon has not found conclusive
Chung said.
Milosevic Opens Cam-
Opponents of Mr. Milosevic in
evidence of orders to shoot ci-
"The United States likes to
paign For Political
Serbia have also filed com-
vilians. "We can't trace the or-
talk about and dictate to other
der down the chain of com-
countries on human rights.
Comeback
plaints against him, although
no court has yet indicted him.
mand to people with rifles in
They probably think if they
By Carlotta Gall
A Belgrade prosecutor
their hands," he said. "We can't
admit this, their pride and
PRISTINA, Kosovo, Dec.
filed charges today against four
find one soldier who said,
prestige can be hurt."
12 - Slobodan Milosevic, in
members of the electoral com-
'Yeah, I received an order to
Chung said the survivors'
his first television interview
mission, contending that they
fire.'y"
group may invite third coun-
since he was forced to give up
had abused their power in con-
But when American offi-
tries or international bodies to
the presidency of Yugoslavia
nection with the presidential
cials came to Seoul last week
investigate the No Gun Ri
two months ago, denies accu-
election, but the prosecutor
to get South Korean officials to
claims if the Pentagon does not
sations of misrule and of falsi-
said he did not have the evi-
sign on to a joint "statement of
change its findings.
fying election results.
dence to bring charges against
mutual understanding" before
Although the South Ko-
"I can sleep peacefully and
Mr. Milosevic himself, the
the final report, the govern-
rean government said it con-
my conscience is completely
Tanjug news agency reported.
ment here refused.
ducted a separate investigation
clear," he told the interviewer,
In the two-hour television
A five-person advisory
of the claims, it has not issued
a well-known supporter of Mr.
interview, Mr. Milosevic,
group to the Korean govern-
any findings. The government
Milosevic and the owner of
looking dapper in a dark suit
ment was to go to Washington
asserts that the crucial testi-
Palma Television, which
and red tie, seemed on the de-
Wednesday. They hope to meet
mony, from American veter-
broadcast the interview today.
fensive though he was in a rea-
with Pentagon and State De-
ans, is in the United States and
Mr. Milosevic is trying to
sonably supportive setting. He
partment officials this week to
the key military documents are
make a political comeback, and
defended 13 years as the effec-
lobby for stronger findings in
in American archives.
the interview marked the start
tive leader of Yugoslavia,
the final report, which is sup-
Chung said that despite the
of the campaign for his So-
during which the nation split
posed to be finished within six
South Korean government's
cialist Party in the Serbian
apart and the country was
weeks.
show of support for the survi-
Parliament elections on Dec.
dragged through three wars.
And the Korean National
vors' position, "I have the im-
23. Mr. Milosevic was re-
"I see it as a ceaseless bat-
Assembly is urging both coun-
pression the government wants
elected as the leader of the So-
tle - I can even say freely a
tries to take the issue out of the
to wrap this up as soon as pos-
cialist Party of Serbia last
lion's struggle for the protec-
hands of the military, and come
sible."
month. He is not running for a
tion of state and national inter-
to an acceptable compromise.
He said both governments
seat, but because he is party
ests of our country," he said.
"It's time for the top levels
are trying to avoid investigat-
leader his name heads the
And he predicted that the rising
of the two governments to
ing 61 other complaints that
ticket.
prices and economic difficul-
make some political deci-
have been filed alleging kill-
Serbia is the larger of the
ties the Serbian people face
sions," said Min Kee, the chief
ings of civilians by U.S.
two republics that make up the
would swing voters back to
aide to Kim Min Seok of the
troops. "If they investigate
current Yugoslavia.
support his party. He described
assembly's National Policy
those other incidents, the fact
The 18-party alliance be-
the popular revolt against him
Committee. "We don't need to
that there were orders from
hind the Yugoslav president,
as a "coup" and The Hague tri-
get everything we want. There
above will be revealed," Chung
Vojislav Kostunica, who de-
bunal as an "illegal" institution.
are some things the United
contended.
feated Mr. Milosevic in the re-
He dismissed accusations
States doesn't want to say, and
"Our principle is that we
cent presidential election, is
that he and his entourage stole
we understand. So, politically,
will deal with No Gun Ri first,
expected to win a clear major-
or embezzled billions of dol-
for example, if President
and after that is solved, we will
ity in the Serbian Parliament.
lars as "nonsense."
Clinton would promise the
review if we should treat the
But the Socialist Party is ex-
He also praised the notori-
victims compensation, they
other cases," said Oh Young
pected to hold onto 10 to 15
ous paramilitary leader and in-
would accept that as enough."
Ho, director general for na-
percent of the vote, to be the
dicted war criminal known as
Defense Secretary William
tional security and foreign af-
largest opposition party.
Arkan.
S. Cohen ordered the investi-
fairs in the prime minister's of-
The Socialist Party offers
The paramilitary leader
gation after the Associated
fice.
Mr. Milosevic a way to save
was assassinated last January
Press reported the killings in a
his political career, which had
page 13 of 22
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Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 1 of 3
Defense Intelligence Agency
UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO
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Fort Worth Star-Telegram
December 2, 2000
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
By Sang-Hun Choe, Associated Press
SEOUL, South Korea -- U.S. and South Korean officials disagree about whether American troops
were ordered to open fire on refugees at the hamlet of No Gun Ri in the early days of the Korean
War, according to an adviser to the Korean inquiry.
Yi Manh-yol, a member of a blue-ribbon panel monitoring the military investigation, said a rift exists
over a number of issues, including whether there were shoot-to-kill orders and the number killed. The
split was affirmed by five other sources close to the Korean inquiry.
"The Pentagon is trying to deny that American troops attacked the refugees under orders from
commanders," Yi told The Associated Press in an interview Thursday. "This is an argument we can
never accept," the history professor said.
Yi and a second source close to the Korean investigation told AP the two sides also are at odds over
survivors' demands for a U.S. apology and compensation claims of more than $170 million by
survivors and victims' families.
The dispute could threaten a plan to release a joint statement later this month about the bloodletting
in July 1950.
Maj. Tom Collins, a Pentagon spokesman, said the U.S. and South Korean investigative teams are
working on a Statement of Mutual Understanding detailing points of agreement.
Asked about the rift referred to by Yi, Collins said he could not comment on "press reports."
Korean officials have warned that a failure to satisfy Korean public opinion could damage U.S.-South
Korean ties and trigger anti-American sentiment in the country where 37,000 U.S. troops remain on
duty.
The two sides launched investigations after AP, citing dozens of U.S. veterans and South Korean
survivors, reported last fall that a large number of refugees were strafed or shot at a railroad trestle.
The Korean government lists 175 people allegedly killed at No Gun Ri. Survivors estimate 400
civilians perished, including about 100 killed by strafing U.S. warplanes. Former U.S. soldiers
variously estimate 100, 200 or hundreds died.
Korea's seven-member advisory panel, which includes a retired diplomat, a lawyer, a former general,
an editor and three academics, was briefed this week after the South Korean investigators returned
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 2 of 3
from Washington in early November.
A Pentagon delegation led by Assistant Secretary of the Army Patrick T. Henry is due in Seoul on
Wednesday.
Collins, the Army spokesman, said the Pentagon hoped to release its report in mid-December, but
that depended on further discussions with the Koreans.
Yi said the Pentagon had attempted to define the incident as an unintentional killing of refugees by
panicked Gls. He said U.S. investigators told their South Korean counterparts in early November they
could not find any written shoot-to-kill order from higher headquarters to the line companies at No
Gun Ri.
"The attack on the refugees -- most of them children, women and old people pinned down in the
railway trestle -- continued for three days. How are you going to characterize it? The alleged panic
cannot explain it all," Yi said.
Earlier, Harvard University professor Ernest May, a member of an advisory panel to the Pentagon's
inquiry, said investigators believed the No Gun Ri shootings were the actions of troops who were
"not well led" in a chaotic situation and "not a deliberate atrocity."
"Whatever was done was incidental to a panicked retreat," May told the Harvard Crimson newspaper
in October.
AP found wartime documents showing that at least three high-level Army headquarters and an Air
Force command ordered civilians approaching U.S. positions to be treated as hostile. On July 24,
1950, two days before No Gun Ri, 1st Cavalry division units were instructed: "No refugees to cross
the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."
Two ex-Gls who handled radio and message traffic at No Gun Ri told Pentagon investigators, and
later AP, that orders to fire on civilians at No Gun Ri came down the chain of command from
division or above and were relayed to front-line troops.
The sworn statements by Lawrence Levine, who headed the battalion radio team, and message center
chief James Crume, are the first from a higher command level to publicly support accounts by other
veterans of being ordered to shoot civilians for fear North Korean infiltrators were among them.
Crume, 72, of Kennewick, Wash., said combat orders in Korea were rarely written. "Most of it was
voice command, came over the radio
there was very little paperwork due to the limitations of the
system," Crume said.
At No Gun Ri, he said, "I do know it was a standing order -- there wasn't anybody going through."
Crume said he didn't recall handling that order and may have heard it from officers following a
meeting of battalion commanders at 7th Cavalry regiment headquarters.
Among others interviewed earlier by AP, about 20 ex-Gls recalled orders to shoot; a dozen said they
either shot at refugees or were witnesses. Some said they didn't remember, or declined to discuss No
Gun Ri. One said he didn't recall orders but had fired on his own.
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 3 of 3
Yi said he spoke out despite official urgings not to discuss the case because he felt Americans needed
to understand the depth of Korean feelings and the potential damage to bilateral relations.
He said several members of the Korean advisory panel want to meet with congressional leaders and
other officials in the United States before the reports are made public.
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 1 of 3
Defense Intelligence Agency
UNCLASSIFIED - FOUO
DIA Home What's New Products by Type Products by Region Feedback Help
Fort Worth Star-Telegram
December 2, 2000
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
By Sang-Hun Choe, Associated Press
SEOUL, South Korea -- U.S. and South Korean officials disagree about whether American troops
were ordered to open fire on refugees at the hamlet of No Gun Ri in the early days of the Korean
War, according to an adviser to the Korean inquiry.
Yi Manh-yol, a member of a blue-ribbon panel monitoring the military investigation, said a rift exists
over a number of issues, including whether there were shoot-to-kill orders and the number killed. The
split was affirmed by five other sources close to the Korean inquiry.
"The Pentagon is trying to deny that American troops attacked the refugees under orders from
commanders," Yi told The Associated Press in an interview Thursday. "This is an argument we can
never accept," the history professor said.
Yi and a second source close to the Korean investigation told AP the two sides also are at odds over
survivors' demands for a U.S. apology and compensation claims of more than $170 million by
survivors and victims' families.
The dispute could threaten a plan to release a joint statement later this month about the bloodletting
in July 1950.
Maj. Tom Collins, a Pentagon spokesman, said the U.S. and South Korean investigative teams are
working on a Statement of Mutual Understanding detailing points of agreement.
Asked about the rift referred to by Yi, Collins said he could not comment on "press reports."
Korean officials have warned that a failure to satisfy Korean public opinion could damage U.S.-South
Korean ties and trigger anti-American sentiment in the country where 37,000 U.S. troops remain on
duty.
The two sides launched investigations after AP, citing dozens of U.S. veterans and South Korean
survivors, reported last fall that a large number of refugees were strafed or shot at a railroad trestle.
The Korean government lists 175 people allegedly killed at No Gun Ri. Survivors estimate 400
civilians perished, including about 100 killed by strafing U.S. warplanes. Former U.S. soldiers
variously estimate 100, 200 or hundreds died.
Korea's seven-member advisory panel, which includes a retired diplomat, a lawyer, a former general,
an editor and three academics, was briefed this week after the South Korean investigators returned
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 2 of 3
from Washington in early November.
A Pentagon delegation led by Assistant Secretary of the Army Patrick T. Henry is due in Seoul on
Wednesday.
Collins, the Army spokesman, said the Pentagon hoped to release its report in mid-December, but
that depended on further discussions with the Koreans.
Yi said the Pentagon had attempted to define the incident as an unintentional killing of refugees by
panicked Gls. He said U.S. investigators told their South Korean counterparts in early November they
could not find any written shoot-to-kill order from higher headquarters to the line companies at No
Gun Ri.
"The attack on the refugees -- most of them children, women and old people pinned down in the
railway trestle -- continued for three days. How are you going to characterize it? The alleged panic
cannot explain it all," Yi said.
Earlier, Harvard University professor Ernest May, a member of an advisory panel to the Pentagon's
inquiry, said investigators believed the No Gun Ri shootings were the actions of troops who were
"not well led" in a chaotic situation and "not a deliberate atrocity."
"Whatever was done was incidental to a panicked retreat," May told the Harvard Crimson newspaper
in October.
AP found wartime documents showing that at least three high-level Army headquarters and an Air
Force command ordered civilians approaching U.S. positions to be treated as hostile. On July 24,
1950, two days before No Gun Ri, 1st Cavalry division units were instructed: "No refugees to cross
the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children."
Two ex-GIs who handled radio and message traffic at No Gun Ri told Pentagon investigators, and
later AP, that orders to fire on civilians at No Gun Ri came down the chain of command from
division or above and were relayed to front-line troops.
The sworn statements by Lawrence Levine, who headed the battalion radio team, and message center
chief James Crume, are the first from a higher command level to publicly support accounts by other
veterans of being ordered to shoot civilians for fear North Korean infiltrators were among them.
Crume, 72, of Kennewick, Wash., said combat orders in Korea were rarely written. "Most of it was
voice command, came over the radio
there was very little paperwork due to the limitations of the
system," Crume said.
At No Gun Ri, he said, "I do know it was a standing order -- there wasn't anybody going through."
Crume said he didn't recall handling that order and may have heard it from officers following a
meeting of battalion commanders at 7th Cavalry regiment headquarters.
Among others interviewed earlier by AP, about 20 ex-Gls recalled orders to shoot; a dozen said they
either shot at refugees or were witnesses. Some said they didn't remember, or declined to discuss No
Gun Ri. One said he didn't recall orders but had fired on his own.
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War
Page 3 of 3
Yi said he spoke out despite official urgings not to discuss the case because he felt Americans needed
to understand the depth of Korean feelings and the potential damage to bilateral relations.
He said several members of the Korean advisory panel want to meet with congressional leaders and
other officials in the United States before the reports are made public.
file://C:\TEMP\U.S. Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings In Korean War.htm
12/4/00
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
009. report
re No Gun Ri (1 page)
12/05/2000
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
h(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA|
h(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29' 00 10:02/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P
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CLASSIFICATION:
29NOV'00 10:10
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Cover Sheet
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CLASSIFICATION:
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:02/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 2
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
1. Review Process
1. Review Process
a. The No Gun Ri Incident
a. Agreed.
Review was initiated at the direction
of the presidents of the Republic of
Korea and The United States
following the release of the
Associated Press report concerning
the matter on September 29, 1999.
This story brought to the forefront the
earlier efforts of Korean citizens to
gain an inquiry into their claims
surrounding certain events that
occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri,
including the firing upon Korean
refugees at the double railroad
overpass and an air strike on the
railroad track.
b. The efforts of the Korean and
b. Agreed.
US No Gun Ri Review Teams
exemplify the highest levels of ROK-
US bilateral cooperation.
Throughout the duration of this
important and sensitive endeavor,
both Teams established and
steadfastly sustained an
environment of mutual cooperation
and trust. The Korean and American
officials associated with this effort
consistently demonstrated their
commitment to examine the facts
and circumstances surrounding the
events. Both teams have candidly
shared facts, statements and
documents.
1
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P
3
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
1c. The passage of 50 years reduces
1c. Agreed.
the possibility that all of the facts will
ever be known and a large number
of factors including but not limited to
trauma, age and media influence the
recollections of Korean and US
witnesses.
d. Nevertheless, this process will
d. Agreed.
add to a strengthened ROK-US
alliance and honor the many of both
nations who sacrificed so much for
the freedom of the Republic of
Korea. Civilian casualties are,
without exception, the most tragic of
the unintended consequences of
conflict. South Korean citizens and
soldiers of both nations bore heavy
burdens in the summer months of
1950 as a result of North Korean
aggression. This review process,
characterized by diligent fact-finding,
will provide closure for the past and
bring hope for the future.
2
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 4
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
2. ROK-US Mutual Understandings
2. ROK-US Mutual Understandings
a. Background of the Incident
a. Background of the Incident and
and Combat Situation
Combat Situation
(1) In the early period of the
(1) Agreed.
conflict, many of the US soldiers
deployed to Korea were young,
under-trained, under-equipped and
new to combat. Units operating in
the vicinity of No Gun Ri were under
the command and control of leaders
with limited proven experience in
combat. They were unprepared for
the weapons and tactics of the North
Korean forces that they would face
and the speed of the North Korean
advance.
(2) US soldiers were
(2) Agreed.
legitimately fearful of the possible
infiltration of North Korean soldiers
who routinely entered American lines
in groups disguised as civilians in
refugee columns and then attacked
American positions from the rear.
(3) Following the withdrawal
(3) Agreed.
of US forces, and entry of the North
Korean army into Yongdong, the
North Koreans continued to maintain
contact with US ground forces east
of Yongdong by means of
intermittent patrols and indirect fire
as the 1st Cavalry Division continued
3
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 5
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
its rearward movement to the
Naktong River.
(4) North Korean tanks were
(4) Agreed.
on what is now Highway 4 east of
Yongdong during the last week of
July 1950. US soldiers believed that
some of the US anti-tank weaponry
that was available to them was
ineffective against the North Korean
armor.
(5) The 2ⁿᵈ Battalion, 7th
(5) The 2nd Battalion, 7th
Cavalry Regiment, shortly after
Cavalry Regiment, shortly after
arriving in the Yongdong area,
arriving in the Yongdong area,
conducted a disorganized and
conducted a disorganized and
undisciplined retreat toward the
undisciplined retreat toward the
vicinity of No Gun Ri during the night
vicinity of No Gun Ri during the night
of July 25/26, 1950. The retreat
of July 25/26 1950. The retreat
occurred as a result of several
occurred as the result of several
factors including: a mistaken belief of
factors including: a mistaken belief of
an imminent enemy breakthrough***
an imminent enemy breakthrough
the possibility of encountering North
due to the infiltration by the enemy in
Korean tanks, and the awareness of
the vicinity of 7th Regiment
North Korean infiltration tactics. The
positions, the possibility of
organization, disoriented and in
encountering North Korean tanks,
disarray, reorganized in the vicinity
and the awareness of North Korean
of No Gun Ri throughout the day on
infiltration tactics. The organization,
the 26th. The unit completed its
disoriented and in disarray,
consolidation and reorganization in
reorganized in the vicinity of No Gun
the vicinity of No Gun Ri by the early
Ri throughout the day on the 26th.
morning of the 27th of July, when it
The unit completed its consolidation
reported its position.
and reorganization in the vicinity of
No Gun Ri by the early morning of
the 27th of July, when it reported its
position.
4
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 6
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
b. Refugee Control
b. Refugee Control
(1) At the outset of the war,
(1) At the outset of the war,
the absence of ROK government
the absence lack of ROK
refugee control measures resulted in
government refugee control
significant confusion and difficulties
measures resulted in significant
in controlling refugee movement.
confusion and difficulties in
controlling refugee movement.
(2) By July 20, 1950, after the
(2) By July 20, 1950, after the
Taejon Battle, refugee control was a
Taejon Battle, refugee control was a
major concern of the US and ROK
major concern of the US and ROK
forces. In late July 1950, the ROK
forces. In late July 1950, the ROK
government and Eighth US Army, in
government and Eighth US Army, in
close coordination, began to
close coordination, began to
disseminate refugee control policies
disseminate refugee control policies
to protect US and South Korean
guidelines concerning refugee
forces and reduce the impact of
control to protect US and South
road-bound refugees on military
Korean forces as well as refugees
operations.
and reduce the impact of road-bound
refugees on military operations.
5
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 7
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
C. Assembly and Movement of
C. Assembly and Movement of
Villagers at Im Ke Ri and Joo Gok Ri
Villagers at Im Ke Ri and Joo Gok Ri
(1) With certain exceptions, it
(1) With certain exceptions, it
was established US and ROK policy
was established US and ROK policy
restricting movement of refugees
in July 1950 that Korean civilians
was established in late July 1950.
should not evacuate their villages.
that Korean civilians should not
However, some US veterans testified
evacuate their villages. However,
that, at some point, they escorted
some US veterans testified that, at
Koreans from their villages in an
some point, they escorted Koreans
effort to get them out of harm's way
from their villages in an effort to get
or to clear them away from US
them out of harm's way or to clear
ground positions.
them away from US ground
positions.
(2) Some Korean witnesses
(2) Agreed.
asserted in their testimony that US
soldiers escorted an unspecified
number of refugees from Im Ke Ri, a
safe village in the mountains on or
about the night of 25 July, toward the
No Gun Ri area, via Joo Gok Ri
along what is now Highway 4. US
veterans do remember escorting
refugees from villages, but they
cannot recall the names of places or
dates.
6
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 8
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
(3) Some Korean witnesses
(3) Some Korean witnesses
testified that they saw 7 refugees
testified that they saw-had seen 7
killed on July 25th when refugees
refugees, who were incompliant with
were directed by US forces to stay in
the US control, be killed on July 25th
an open area near Ha Ga Ri, 1.5km
when refugees were directed by US
from the village of Joo Gok Ri. The
forces to stay in an open area near
Review could not confirm whose
Ha Ga Ri, 1.5km from the village of
soldiers were involved, nor whether
Joo Gok Ri. The Review could not
this action was a reaction to a
confirm whose soldiers were
violation of refugee control measures
involved, nor whether this action was
in effect at the time.
a reaction to a violation of refugee
control measures in effect at the
time.
(4) Some US and Korean
(4) Agreed.
witness statements say that Korean
refugees came in contact with US
forces in the vicinity of No Gun Ri as
they both moved east. As they
moved from Yongdong toward
Hwanggan, the refugees passed
from the road to the railroad tracks.
Some US veterans and Korean
witnesses recalled that US forces
directed refugees to the railroad
tracks, conducted searches for
infiltrators, weapons and other
contraband. Other veterans and
Korean witnesses had no
recollection of searches being
conducted.
7
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29' 00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 9
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
d. Air Strikes
d. Air Strikes
(1) According to their statements,
(1) According to their statements in
many Korean witnesses indicate that
the testimony, many Korean
they were strafed or bombed by US
witnesses and some US veterans
airplanes around noon on July 26,
indicate that the refugees near No
1950.
Gun Ri were strafed or bombed by
US aircraft around noon on July 26,
1950.
(a) Official US Air Force
(a) Official US Air Force
records and pilot interviews found
records and pilot interviews found
during research do not reflect
during research do not reflect air
missions flown on the 26th in the
strike missions flown on the 26th in
vicinity of No Gun Ri. There were,
the vicinity of No Gun Ri. There
however, some missions flown on
were, however, Some missions flown
the 26th of July for which no mission
over the Yongdong area on the 26th
reports could be found.
of July, however, did the 5th Air
Force summary of air operation
show, for which no mission reports
could be found.
(b) Additionally, analysis of
(b) Agreed.
the August 6, 1950 reconnaissance
photograph shows an area of
probable strafing on the railroad
tracks in the area indicated by the
Korean witnesses. There is no way
of determining the exact date of the
probable strafing.
8
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29' 00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 10
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
(c) Early in the morning on
(c) Agreed.
July 27, 1950, an air strike did, in
fact, take place in the 1st Battalion,
7th Cavalry Regiment area in the
vicinity of No Gun Ri.
(d) The Review could,
(d) Agreed.
therefore, not exclude the possibility
of an air strike occurring on July 26th
in the vicinity of No Gun Ri.
(2) Air Force records show that US
(2) Air Force records show that US
Air Force jet aircraft flying at that
Air Force jet aircraft flying at that
time did not carry bombs whereas
time did not carry bombs whereas
propeller driven aircraft did. While
propeller driven aircraft did. While
some Korean witnesses stated that
some Korean witnesses stated that
the aircraft directly attacked them,
the aircraft directly attacked them
others have stated that they only
refugees, others have stated that
recall explosions and machine gun
they only recalled explosions and
fire and other munitions effects,
machine gun fire and other munitions
including shrapnel, flames and heat.
effects, including shrapnel, flames
Official records indicate that US and
and heat. Official records indicate
North Korean Army forces did
that US and North Korean Army
exchange artillery and mortar fire in
forces did exchange artillery and
the vicinity of No Gun Ri between
mortar fire in the vicinity of No Gun
July 26 and July 29 1950.
Ri between July 26 and July 29
1950. Some US veterans witnessed
that refugees were killed or injured
by US artillery and mortar fire.
9
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 11
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
(3) Some Korean witnesses
ROK Proposal
stated that US soldiers called in air
strikes on the refugees by use of a
(3) Some Korean witnesses
radio available to US ground forces
stated that US soldiers called in air
at the time. Both Review Teams
strikes on the refugees by use of a
agree that, on July 26, 1950, the
radio available to US ground forces
ordinary US ground soldier was
at the time. Both Review Teams
equipped only with a portable radio
agree that, on July 26, 1950, the
and was incapable of talking directly
ordinary US ground soldier was
to an Airborne Tactical Air Controller
equipped only with a portable radio
and requesting an air strike. Army
and was incapable of talking directly
units could submit a request for an
to an Airborne Tactical Air Controller
air strike but had to pass it through
and requesting an air strike. Army
channels to the Joint Operations
units could submit a request for an
Center. The processing time for such
air strike but had to pass it through
a request could not have resulted in
channels to the Joint Operations
a prompt response. As a result, any
Center. The processing time for such
air strike which hit refugees, whether
a request could not have resulted in
it occurred on the 26th or 27th, was
a prompt response. As a result, any
not in response to a call for fire from
air strike which hit refugees, whether
US soldiers in the No Gun Ri vicinity.
it occurred on the 26th or 27th, was
not in response to a call for fire from
The US does not agree withins
US soldiers in the No Gun Ri vicinity.
proposalt
10
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC' OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 12
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
(4) The U Sidge, notragree withthis
(4) Victims witnessed that an air
proposal
strike was made on 26 July after a
reconnaissance aircraft flew over. In
addition, the US Air Force mission
reports for the sorties flown over the
Yongdong area on 26 July showed
that a liaison aircraft of the 1st
Cavarly Division actually guided and
controlled fighters. A request for an
air strike could have been made by
the ground forces through either the
liaison aircraft or TACP.
(5) As shown in the memo by Col
(5) The does.not agree with this
Turner C. Rogers, the US 5th Air
proposal
Force had complied with the army
request to strafe all civilian refugee
parties that are noted approaching
the US positions. This memo
assumes the possibility of air strikes
in No Gun Ri area, but not sufficient
to be accepted as an evidence
directly substantiating them.
(6) in addition, victims testified that
(6)
the US soldiers positioned near the
proposal.
double overpass fired at refugees
escaping into the culvert from the air
strike as well as shells of ground
forces.
11
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29 00 10:03/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 13
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
e. Ground Fire and Issuance of
e. Ground Fire and Issuance of
Orders
Orders
(1) US ground forces fired toward
(1) Agreed.
refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
during this period.
(a) ****At some time between July
(a) Based on analysis of the bullet
26th and 29th, 1950, some US
marks on the walls of both the
soldiers fired toward the refugees
double overpass and culvert as well
who were at various locations
as of the August 6, 1950
including inside the double overpass.
reconnaissance photograph
They did so either to control the
capturing No Gun Ri area, At at
refugees' movements or because
some time between July 26th and
they believed that they had received
29th, 1950, some US soldiers fired
small arms fire from those
toward the refugees who were at
locations. As a result, an
various locations including inside the
unknown number of refugees were
double overpass. They did so either
killed or injured. Soldiers fired
to control the refugees' movements
without orders.
or because they believed that they
had received small arms fire from
those locations. Korean victims
witnessed, however, that there were
no communist sympathizers among
those refugees killed or injured
because most of them were villagers
from Im Ke Ri or Joo Gok Ri. As a
result, an unknown number of
refugees were killed or injured.
Soldiers fired without orders.
However, some of Korean survivors
and US veterans testified that the US
soldiers either gave first aid to the
wounded or evacuated them to the
nearby hospital, and 17 people were
so far confirmed to have received
such treatments.
12
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC. OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29' 00 10:04/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 14
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
ROK Proposal
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
(b) The ROK and US Review
(b) The ROK and US Review
Teams understand that could not
Teams understand that this action
confirm whether or not this action
was not indiscriminate in nature or a
was not indiscriminate in nature or a
premeditated effort to kill Korean
premeditated effort to kill Korean
refugees.
refugees.
(2) Since some US veterans
(2) The Review Teams of both
witnessed that they fired by the order
countries understand that US
whereas others denied it, the Review
commanders did not issue oral or
Teams of both countries-understand
written orders to shoot Korean
that could not confirm whether or not
civilians between the 25th and 29th
US commanders did not issue oral or
of July 1950.
written orders to shoot Korean
civilians between the 25th and 29th
of July 1950.
(3) The Journal of the 8th Cavalry
Regiment, the 1st Cavalry Division
shows, though records of other
regiments do not, guidelines on
shooting refugees to prevent them
passing through US front lines.
13
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29 10:04/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 15
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
f. Number of Casualties
f. Number of Casualties
(1) Because of the passage of 50
(1) Agreed.
years and the effects of the Conflict,
the number of South Korean
refugees killed, injured or missing as
a result of the events in the vicinity of
No Gun Ri from July 26 to July 29
1950 cannot be determined.
(2) During their review, the Korean
Review Team reported an unverified
(2) Agreed.
number of 248 South Korean
civilians were killed, injured or
missing in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
between July 25 and July 29, 1950.
(3) The US Review could not verify
(3) The US Review could not verify
the number of casualties. The US
the number of casualties. The US
Team's research revealed no Korean
Team's research revealed no Korean
Conflict archival official records of
Conflict archival official records of
refugee deaths or injuries that
refugee deaths or injuries that
occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
occurred in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
between July 26 and July 29, 1950.
between July 26 and July 29, 1950.
However, based on US interviews,
However based on US interviews,
the US Team believes the number of
the US Team believes the number of
killed and injured was substantially
killed and injured was substantially
less than the number reported by the
less than the number reported by the
Korean Review Team.
Korean Review Team.
(4) The US doesnot agree withthis
(4) The exact number of casualties
proposal,
will be verified through a
comprehensive and precise
investigation.
14
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29' 00 10:04/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 P 16
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
3. Conclusion of the Review
3. Conclusion of the Review.
Bearing in mind the enduring
Bearing in mind the enduring
suffering of the victims, the Korean
suffering of the victims, the Korean
and American Review mutually
and American Review mutually
understand that:
understand that:
a. An undetermined number of
a. The No Gun Ri incident was an
Korean civilians were killed or injured
incident where an An undetermined
by US combat action in the vicinity of
number of Korean civilians refugees
No Gun Ri during the last week of
were killed or injured by US combat
July 1950.
action soldiers in withdrawal
operation in the vicinity of No Gun Ri
during the last week of July 1950.
(1) It could not be confirmed whether
(1) These Korean casualties did not
or not these These-Korean
occur as a result of a specific intent
casualties did not occur occurred as
by US personnel to kill Korean
a result of a specific intent by US
refugees.
personnel to kill Korean refugees.
(2) No American-soldier or airman
(2) No American soldier or airman
was ordered to kill Korean refugees.
was ordered to kill Korean refugees.
The Review Teams could not
confirm that oral or written orders to
shoot civilians were issued directly
by the chain of command.
b. The diligent and conscientious
b. The diligent and conscientious
bilateral efforts of both countries in
bilateral efforts of both countries in
this endeavor represent a significant
this endeavor represent a significant
contribution to the maintenance of
contribution to the maintenance of
the vital and long-standing ROK-US
the vital and long-standing ROK-US
alliance.
alliance. Bearing in mind the long
lasting sorrow of victims as well as
The US does notagree with this
the sacrifice of the US soldiers
proposal,
during the Korean War, the ROK and
15
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
FROM OFC OF SECDEF/EXECUTIVE SUPPORT CT
(WED) 11. 29'00 10:04/ST. 10:02/NO. 3760665760 F 17
DRAFT
27 Nov 2000 ROK Proposed Statement of Mutual Understandings
For Official Use Only
as of 28 November 2000
US Proposal (as of 7 Nov)
ROK Proposal
US Teams firmly believe that this
The US
investigation on an incident that
proposal,
occurred during the Korean War will
not only help maintain a more stable
ROK-US alliance but also serve as a
significant opportunity to realize the
value of democracy and recognize
the importance of human rights.
16
Both sides understand that the respective working groups have agreed only that we will take the
agreed upon changes to our senior leaders for their review and approval. That each group will
discuss the points proposed by the other side on which we were unable to reach agreement with
our senior leaders.
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010. cable
re No Gun Ri: Preparing for the Conclusion (3 pages)
11/29/2000
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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011. notes
handwritten, re meeting on No Gun Ri (2 pages)
c 11/2000
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COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
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2009-0528-F
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2 wears
Charlie Kragin
Act Lee Peach
after
P.T. Henry -
-
Asst See Any
Alangower - -
Go
Gl KIM
Next weed
Arizone
Gregy 0 budreyes,
May, Riscas, Mc Class
NO GUN RI
Agenda
1. Status of IG report and ROK report.
2. Status of US-ROK - efforts to draft "core statement"
of common conclusions.
3. Role and composition of Advisory Group.
4. Efforts to minimize bilateral impact.
5. Press issues, outreach efforts; rollout strategy to
include timing.
See
PMO - How fets have
School of
Briefs
Interogray troup -
Aremo to
State not working
Sandy
Press, Cong, Dipl, Preo there / Cohn lead ?
NGR rollout
dialeg.
Dragging feet
Allight there
1
Process all in tanch
Stuff for her
trip-
Roll outs trategy
Def Isle Pull together - not cument
but - integrated Def 15th Pub offorms Start egg
Roll ant plan
- Vets group
Small Group
S Fan Roth
>01der
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Jonathan Scharfen to Hans Binnendijk re No Gun Ri (4 pages)
10/10/2000
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National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
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12/18/2000
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COLLECTION:
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014. cable
re No Gun Ri: PM's Office Readout (5 pages)
01/02/2001
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COLLECTION:
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Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
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Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
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Presidential Statement on Nogun-ri Incident
On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that
Korean civilians lost their lives at Nogun-ri in late July,
1950. The intensive, year-long investigation into this incident
has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the
scars they leave behind on people and on nations.
Although we have been unable to determine precisely the exact
events that occurred at Nogun-ri, it is clear that innocent
Koreans were killed. To those Koreans who lost loved ones at
Nogun-ri, I offer my condolences. Many Americans have
experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war. We
understand and sympathize with the sense of loss and sorrow that
remains even after a half a century has passed. I know that
nothing can ever remove your sadness, but I sincerely hope that
the memorial to these and all other innocent Korean victims of
the Korean War the United States will construct will bring you a
measure of solace and closure. The educational fund that we
will launch will serve as a living tribute to their memory.
As we honor those civilians who fell victim to this conflict,
let us not forget that pain is not the only legacy of the Korean
War. American and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder
in the harshest of conditions for the cause of freedom, and they
prevailed. The vibrancy of democracy in the Republic of Korea,
the strong alliance between our two countries, and the closeness
of our two peoples today is a testament to the sacrifices and
made by both of our nations fifty years ago.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
016. email
Randy Beardsworth to Hans Binnendijk re No Gun Ri (6 pages)
01/04/2001
P1/b(1)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Hans Binnendijk (Defense Policy and Arms Control)
OA/Box Number: 3482
FOLDER TITLE:
No Gun Ri [Korea] [1]
2009-0528-F
kc1405
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