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POTUS [President of the United States] - Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-18, 1997) [4]
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Case Number: 2009-1155-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential
Library Staff.
Folder Title:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October 13-
18, 1997) [4]
Staff Office-Individual:
Inter-American Affairs
Original OA/ID Number:
1361
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
Stack:
37
5
9
3
V
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. memo
Samuel Berger and Mack McLarty to the President, re: Proposed
ca.
09/1997
P1/b(1)
Communications Plan For Your Trip to South American Trip (8
pages)
002. memo
Peter Allgeier to Jim Dobbins and Lael Brainard, re: Possible
08/08/1997
P1/b(1)
Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip (1 page)
003. memo
Antony Blinken and David Leavy to Samuel Berger, Mack McLarty,
08/13/1997
P1/b(1)
Jim Steinberg, and Anne Lewis, re: Preliminary Communications Plan
for the President's Trip to South America (8 pages)
004. memo
James Dobbins to Samuel Berger, re: Planning for the October Trip to
07/11/1997
Pl/b(1)
South America (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361
FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]
2009-1155-F
ke2443
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
CONFIDENTIAL
5699
DEC
F.O. 13526
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
read
Male House Guidelines,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
September 11, 2006
September 5, 1997
By KDE
NARA, Date 5/09/14
2009-1155-F
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER/MACK MCLARTY
FROM:
ANTONY BLINKEN is DAVE LEAVY
SUBJECT:
Preliminary Communications Plan for POTUS Trip to
South America
On August 19 WE submitted to you the original version of this
document. The memo to the President at Tab I has been revised
to reflect your edits and comments.
Concurrence by:
James Dobbins, Bob Kyle
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo at Tab I.
Attachment
Tab I
Communications Plan for POTUS Trip to South America
CONFIDENTIAL
Classified by: Antony Blinken
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 9/5/2007
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. memo
Samuel Berger and Mack McLarty to the President, re: Proposed
ca.
09/1997
P1/b(1)
Communications Plan For Your Trip to South American Trip (8
pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361
FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]
2009-1155-F
ke2443
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRA|
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA|
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA|
h(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA|
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA|
b(6) Release would constitute Я clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy ((a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions |(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
-
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9706489
NSC/RMO PROFILE
RECEIVED: 24 SEP 97 18
TO: BERGER
&
FROM: NAPLAN
DOC DATE: 25 SEP 97
BLINKEN
SOURCE REF:
KEYWORDS: ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
VENEZUELA
ANSA
PUBLIC STATEMENTS
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND INFO FOR BERGER BREAKFAST W/ SOUTH AMER INFLUENTIALS 29
SEP
ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER
DUE DATE: 30 SEP 97 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: NAPLAN
LOGREF: 9706494
FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:
DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
BLINKEN
DESOUZA
DOBBINS
NAPLAN
NSC CHRON
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSTSM
CLOSED BY: NSSWD
DOC 1 OF 1
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
RECORD ID: 9706489
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED
001 BERGER
Z 97092620 FOR INFORMATION
001
X 97092915 NOTED BY BERGER
UNCLASSIFIED
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 6489
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED ww DESK:
DOCLOG Tmb A/O
SEQUENCE TO
INITIAL/DATE
DISPOSITION
Cosgriff
/
100 9/26
Rice
Davies
Kerrick
Steinberg
2
Nott Sec Advise
howeven
Berger
3
Situation Room
West Wing Desk
4
TMA 9.29
N
Records Mgt.
5
N
A = Action
I = Information
D = Dispatch
R = Retain
N = No Further Action
CC:
COMMENTS:
'97 SEP 26 PM 3:58
Exec Sec Office has diskette no
6489
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504
September 25, 1997
INFORMATION
Natl Seo Advisor
has seen
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
ANTONY J. BLINKEN AJB
NOTED
FROM:
STEVEN J. NAPLAN
)
SUBJECT:
South America Influentials Breakfast
On Monday, September 29 you will be meeting with 10 South
America experts for a conversation in anticipation of the
President's trip to Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina next month.
This breakfast is, in part, an opportunity for you to deliver
the Administration's South America and Fast Track message to
these influentials, and to answer their questions about specific
policy matters. Additionally, the breakfast provides you with
an opportunity to probe the views of these outside experts and
to benefit from their varying perspectives on the region.
Attachment
Tab A
Guest List
Tab B
InterAm Meeting Outline and Suggested Questions
Tab C Fast Track Talking Points
Tab D Materials Authored by Attending Guests
9/29/97 South America Influentials Breakfast:
Al Fishlow
Paul A. Volker Senior Fellow for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations.
Served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 1975-76. Recent
publications include "Future Sustainable Latin American Growth" summer, 1996. Met last
month with Chilean President Frei and visited Brazil. Fishlow has been studying social security
reform in South America and considering the prospects for implementing the Chilean model
elsewhere in the region. Favors Administration's approach on Fast Track and would like to see
USG take a leadership role in promoting education reform and higher ed in the region.
(Recent Fishlow speech on U.S.-Latin America relations attached).
Michael May
Director, MERCOSUR-South America Project at CSIS. Director of CSIS U.S.-Argentine
Caucus. Long time consultant to American businesses with interests in the region (including
Upjohn) and manager of Latin American Affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. May argues
that it is imperative that the USG regain a leadership role in the region, with an awareness that
Brazilian self-interest will inevitably lead to conflict with the U.S. and that Argentina can serve
as a moderating influence on Brazil. Concerned that South America has felt forgotten by the
Administration and is thrilled that POTUS is 'finally getting focused" on the region.
(Recently submitted op/ed to Brazilian publication re POTUS visit to Brazil attached).
Richard Feinberg
Professor of International Relations and Special Assistant to the Chancellor for Pacific Rim
Affairs, University of California, San Diego. Former Senior Director Inter-American Affairs,
NSC. His book, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report, was released last April by the
Institute for International Economics. Feinberg reports that while the Brazilian Ambassador to
the U.S. objected to his book's characterization of Brazil's foreign policy, that the Mexican and
Argentinean governments were pleased with the book's conclusions. (Argentina's Foreign
Minister penned the preface to the Spanish-language edition of the book.) Feinberg traveled to
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay this summer as a participant in the World Bank's annual
conference on Latin American economies. After the breakfast, Feinberg will remain in
Washington to co-host an OAS conference on implementing the Summit of the Americas.
(5/4/97 San Diego Union Tribune Op/Ed "An Historic Opportunity for Clinton" attached).
2
Sue Schwab
Dean, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland. Served as an executive for corporate
strategy at Motorola, 1993-95. Served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General
of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service in the Bush Administration. Served as former Sen.
Danforth's chief international trade aide. Schwab is predominantly an authority on trade and has
insights on the approaching congressional debate over Fast Track.
Jose Miguel Vivanco
Executive Director, Human Rights Watch/Americas. Served as legal advisor for the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS. Vivanco met recently with President
Cardoso and is pleased with his national human rights plan for Brazil. Would like to see POTUS
promote Cardoso's plan. Beyond his extensive interest in human rights, Vivanco is also focused
on the increasing levels of criminality (common violence, gang-related and organized crime) in
the region and public frustration with the lack of effective judicial systems. Has twice raised
concerns over police brutality and prison conditions in Venezuela with President Caldera. Offers
very high praise for the accuracy of State's annual human rights report. Would like to see
American ambassadors in the region adopt the more "aggressive" stances of their EU
counterparts re human rights. Vivanco is a Chilean national.
Thomas Quigley
Policy Adviser on Latin America and Caribbean Affairs, Office of International Justice and
Peace of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Visited Peru recently to meet with the Bishops Council
on Human Rights and visited Colombia last year re drugs. Favors Clinton Administration's
approach toward the region over past Administration efforts. Presently focused as much on
regional economic issues as on human rights. Quigley is personally ambivalent on Fast Track
(the U.S. Catholic Conference "straddles" on NAFTA and free trade matters) and he is strongly
opposed to the lifting of the weapons sales ban. Quigley opposes F-16 sales to Chile.
(Remarks to Latin American Conference on the Pastoral Work for Human Rights, delivered in
Lima, Peru attached).
Peter Hakim (Inter-American Dialogue)
President, Inter-American Dialogue. Member of External Advisory Committee of the Latin
America Program of the World Bank. Hakim recently met with President Cardoso in Brazil and
with most of the Brazilian cabinet. Hakim is basically supportive of the general direction of
Administration policy towards the region, but believes USG efforts need to be "reenergized." He
is a strong proponent of Fast Track, would like to see a more multilateral approach on
counternarcotics and Cuba and believes that the Summit of the Americas can serve as the
pinnacle of hemispheric cooperation.
(9/14/97 Oxford Analytica essay "U.S.-Latin America Relations" attached).
3
Bernard Aronson
Chairman, ACON Investments. Served as International Advisor to Goldman, Sachs for Latin
America. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Has argued in the past
that the U.S. generally ignores Latin America except during times of crisis.
(12/12/96 Washington Post Op/Ed "Strengthen Democracies, Not Armies" attached).
Robert Weiner
Senior Coordinator, Latin America and Caribbean Program, Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights. Has made recent trips to Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Bolivia. Visited Venezuela last
year. Focused on World Bank, IDB and DoJ efforts to promote rule of law and good governance
reforms in the region. Believes World Bank efforts are too narrow in scope, and not reflective of
the consensus among the NGO and legal communities in the region. Weiner considers
institutional reform a greater priority than trade, but also recognizes that the two issues can
complement each other. He is concerned about prosecutorial "overeagerness" in the region,
(particularly regarding the drug war) and the damage that he believes aggressive prosecutors
have done to due process and human rights.
(8/17/97 Washington Post Op/Ed "Colombia Emerges as the Bosnia of South America"
attached).
Joe Tulchin
Director, Latin American Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Tulchin attended the Williamsburg Defense Ministerials of the Americas, and served as an
official observer at the OAS Conference on Confidence Building Measures. Tulchin is
particularly focused on civil-military relations in the region and he offers that expansion of
investment in the region is an even greater priority than trade.
(7/11/97 "Memo to Mack" attached).
6494
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. DC. 20504
September 26, 1997
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER
THROUGH:
JAMES F. DOBBINS
PD
FROM:
PATRICK J. DESOUZA
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting With Latin American Influentials,
Monday, September 29, 1997 at 8am.
I. Purpose
Your meeting with these influentials provides an opportunity to
discuss the Administration's Latin America policy on the eve of
POTUS's trip. This second leg of three trips to the hemisphere
within a year comes against the backdrop of congressional
attention to sensitive issues such as fast track, arms sales,
climate change and counternarcotics. These influentials may be
helpful in providing feedback of how the themes and deliverables
of the trip will affect the debate at home and abroad on these
sensitive issues.
II. Background
Our communications strategy must now make the transition from
successfully dealing with difficult issues facing our nearest
neighbors and ourselves - drugs and immigration - to taking
advantage of the opportunities for cooperation with important
emerging markets in our hemisphere.
We will be highlighting a region that is embracing democracy,
free markets and international cooperation and that can be the
cornerstone for our own security and prosperity in the 21st
century. We will also be underscoring the mutuality of
interests in the hemisphere.
Shifting towards this positive message now will also be
important for setting-up the broader message of the Santiago
Summit: the emergence of a "new" hemisphere in which
democratically-elected leaders are working hard to prepare our
peoples for the 21 century. In fact, the principal
deliverables on this trip map the main baskets of hemispheric
2
initiatives for Santiago: education, democracy, economic
integration and poverty alleviation.
III. Key Issues
There are two central issues that you should discuss with the
group. First, how can the positive areas of cooperation during
the trip be reinforced over the long-run to change the negative
images of Latin America in the United States and to advance a
forward-looking development strategy. Second, how are these
efforts likely to shape the current debates on fast track, arms
sales, climate change and counternarcotics at home.
A. Areas of Cooperation and a Forward-Looking Development
Strategy. At each stop, we will highlight certain areas of
cooperation to advance mutual interests: energy and counter-
narcotics in Venezuela, education and information technology in
Brazil and security cooperation for international peacekeeping
in Argentina. Each of these areas show how there are important
opportunities to further long-run U.S. interests: reliable
energy supply, open markets for our shared prosperity and
security cooperation in the post-Cold War world.
Against this backdrop of cooperation, it will also be useful to
discuss how to make the environment a long-run area of
cooperation like these others.
B. Shaping the Debate At Home. There will be an interplay
between the messages communicated on the trip and the actions
currently before Congress and the American people.
Fast track authorization is critical, not only for a free trade
agreement with Chile but also for the success of the Santiago
Summit. The hemisphere has agreed to launch FTAA negotiations
at the Summit. The energy and education/technology messages
should make it clear for the fast track debate that there are
business opportunities that we will lose to others, such as the
EU, if we do not act. Education reform may help with concerns
in the U.S. regarding labor exploitation in Latin America.
Sales of advanced armaments may also cause some concern among
certain members of the U.S. Congress. The issue will be
discussed against the backdrop of the MNNA designation for
Argentina and the timing of our announcement on UN Security
Council reform. Given President Frei's concerns regarding how
the arms sales question will be managed in the U.S. Congress, it
will be important to our credibility that we are able to
3
effectively communicate back home the distinctions between
international peacekeeping designations such as MNNA and issues
of modernization.
Finally, the public debate in the U.S. on Latin environmental
regulation and increasing supplies of narcotics needs to be
shaped. The counter-drug alliance announced in Venezuela will
be helpful. On the other hand, basic disagreements with
developing countries over climate change may adversely affect
the prospects for Kyoto and may complicate the fast track
debate.
IV. The Meeting
You may wish to open with short remarks to frame the main
questions you would like addressed, and then begin the
discussion with an initial question.
Opening Remarks
This is the second leg of the President's three trips to the
hemisphere within a year and will illustrate for the American
people that a mutuality of interest in cooperation throughout
the hemisphere exists.
In Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, the President will be
presenting a 21st century agenda for the hemisphere:
strengthening democracy, balancing energy production with
environmental sensitivity, preparing citizens for the global
economy through education and technology and enhancing
security through multilateral approaches to counternarcotics
and international peacekeeping.
This leg will show the diversity of our hemisphere. Different
than our nearest neighbors that pose challenges in terms of
issues such as drugs and immigration, these nations represent
examples of the historic opportunities that we have for
cooperation in enhancing regional security and taking
advantage of emerging markets.
I would welcome your ideas about how to reinforce our long-run
commitment to cooperation in this part of our hemisphere.
These nations are fast growing markets and may offer a bulwark
for prosperity and security.
4
It is a challenge to communicate this sense of opportunity to
Americans. Currently in front of Congress we have issues such
as fast track, arms sales, climate change and
counternarcotics. The politics of these policy issues will be
affected by our efforts to promote cooperation throughout the
hemisphere.
You might at this point in the meeting draw on some of the
questions below:
[ ] contains name of influential you may ask question of if you
choose
How should we engage the American public and Congress in these
opportunities for cooperation? [Schwab]
- on an energy security initiative where Venezuela is our
largest supplier of oil; [Aronson]
- on a multilateral alliance against narcotics production and
trafficking which we will initiate in Venezuela;
- on an education and information technology initiative in
Brazil which will illustrate how we must prepare our citizens
for the global economy; [Fishlow, Feinberg]
- on security cooperation with Argentina and others for the
post-Cold War world; [Tulchin]
How do we get at areas such as the environment and corruption
in which cooperation is more difficult?
How do we reinforce the progress that we are making with these
emerging economies over the long-run? [Hakim]
The Summit of the Americas next April will illustrate some of
the major themes of this trip: education, democracy, economic
integration and poverty alleviation. How do we make a
successful transition from this trip to Santiago and beyond?
PD
for
Concurrences by:
Steve Naplan
FAST TRACK FACT SHEET
FAST TRACK: IN AMERICA'S NATIONAL INTEREST
FAST TRACK MEANS:
IMPROVING OUR STANDARD OF LIVING
Keeping the Economy on the Fast Track. The President will use Fast Track authority to continue
breaking down trade barriers and creating new jobs -- keeping America's economic expansion on
the global fast track.
The Economy Is Strong. The President's 3-part economic strategy of cutting the deficit, investing
in education and training, and opening markets abroad is working. America has enjoyed the
longest period of sustained growth in a generation- one-third from overseas trade. The result:
Nearly 13 million new jobs, unemployment below 5%, inflation the lowest in a generation.
Our Future Prosperity Depends on Trade. More than 95% of the world's consumers live outside
the US. Many emerging economies in Asia and Latin America will grow at three times the rate of
the US economy. America needs fast track to negotiate fair new trade agreements that will keep us
competitive, expand our exports, create more jobs, and raise our standard of living.
FAST TRACK MEANS:
CREATING MORE JOBS
Breaking Down Barriers. The President, in consultation with Congress, will keep breaking down
barriers to our products and services. That strategy is paying off for companies and workers.
America is once again the world's largest total exporter, the largest producer of semiconductors,
the largest producer of automobiles. Exports support over 11 million American jobs, including one
in five manufacturing jobs and over the last four years have created 1.7 million new jobs.
Sectoral Agreements. The President needs the flexibility to negotiate agreements and increase
exports in sectors where the United States is most competitive: such as agriculture, medical
equipment, telecommunications, and environmental technology.
Regional Free Trade Agreements. America will also benefit from opening markets in Asia, Latin
America, and Africa to US goods and services.
Free and Fair Trade. The President supports raising labor standards, protecting the environment
and expanding worker retraining and educational opportunities to ensure that no American is left
out of the global economy.
FAST TRACK MEANS:
MAINTAINING AMERICA'S GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
Compete or Retreat. As the American people prepare to meet the challenges of the 21st century,
we face a critical choice: Shape the global economy to America's advantage, or turn back and fail
to compete for new business, new contracts, and new jobs.
Credibility. Fast track gives the US credibility to negotiate tough trade deals. It preserves for
Congress the ultimate decision to vote an agreement up or down, but without reopening it
provision-by-provision and causing gridlock. That puts America in a strong position to negotiate
trade agreements and maintains a partnership between the President and Congress that has worked
for over 20 years.
Continued Bipartisanship. Every President since 1974--Republican and Democratic--has had fast
track authority. Congress has consistently recognized that the President must have the authority to
break down foreign trade barriers, and a bipartisan majority of the United States Congress has
consistently supported American leadership in opening markets and creating jobs.
FAST TRACK FACT SHEET
BASIC FACTS ABOUT FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY
What is Fast Track?
Expedited Procedure: Fast track is an expedited procedure for Congressional consideration of
trade agreements. The three essential features of any fast track authority are: (1) extensive
consultations and coordination with Congress throughout the process; (2) a vote on
implementing legislation within a fixed period of time, and (2) an up or down vote, with no
amendments. Congress is ensured a central role before, during and after negotiations.
Credibility to Negotiate Tough Trade Deals: Fast Track gives the President credibility to
negotiate tough trade deals. Congress is required to vote on an agreement without reopening
any of its provisions, while retaining the ultimate power of voting it up or down. Fast Track
puts America in a strong position to negotiate major trade agreements while maintaining a
partnership between the President and Congress that has worked for over 20 years.
How will the President Use Fast Track?
The President has identified three main areas in which new trade agreements would greatly
benefit the United States.
The WTO Agenda: The "built-in" agenda of the World Trade Organization calls for
negotiations on government procurement in 1997; intellectual property in 1998; agriculture
in 1999; and trade in services in 2000. In each of these areas, the United States is the most
competitive nation in the world and stands to benefit the most from writing the rules of trade.
Key Sectors of the Future: The President also wants to build on the success of the
Information Technology Agreement (ITA). This $5 billion tariff cut on products for which
the United States is the world's leading producer was achieved by the use of residual tariff
cutting authority. The Administration has identified 8 additional sectors for future
negotiations: ITA II, chemicals, automotive, oilseeds, energy equipment and services,
environmental technology and services, medical equipment and services, and wood and
paper products. Other APEC members have submitted their "wish lists" and there is
overlapping support for many of the US suggestions. Without fast track, it is very unlikely
that this process will go forward.
Emerging Economies: The President hopes to move forward in the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation Forum (APEC) toward the goal of open trade by the year 2010 and with a Free
Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) by the year 2005. In both regions, economic
growth rates are among the highest in the world and barriers to US exports remain high.
Tariff reductions and greater market access will have a very positive effect on our exports.
Without the active participation of the United States, both of these processes will slow
considerably.
09/23/97 TUE 11:41 FAX 1212 535 0527
C.F.R.
003
ALBERT FISHLOW
It is a great pleasure to be here today. I thank you sincerely for the invitation to attend
and to address this distinguished group. By now you have discovered one of my
fundamental defects: my prior and long experience with Brazil unfortunately condemns
me to an imperfect Portanol. 1 would hope that is the only negative reaction to my
presentation. But the question of US relations with Latin America usually has a way of
provoking wide response. I welcome your reactions and questions. And I emphasize that
my views are entirely my own private reactions.
1 wish to speak about a play in three acts: past, present and future. The relationship with
the United States enters importantly into all three. And that includes Chile. Whether one
speaks of the nineteenth century and substantial Chilean exports of wheat to California;
or of the failed promise of the Alliance for Progress; or of potential benefits from
expanded trade and investment from a Free Trade Area of the Americas and a new
engagement with the United States, one inevitably links the two halves of this
hemisphere.
I do not wish to focus extensively on the past. History, on the whole, has not dealt kindly
with Latin America. The United States evolved from colonial status to stable
independence and an extraordinary rate of material advance that placed its income per
capita higher than other countries by the beginning of the twentieth century. Latin
American independence, gained in the early 19th century, unfortunately produced no such
immediate and happy result. Instead of rapid advance and insertion into the new
technology of the Industrial Revolution, there was initially decline in trade and material
advance for most countries in the first half century after political autonomy had been
achieved. And then thereafter, the differences became so large -and static comparative
advantage so compelling- that it became almost impossible to catch up.
The tragedy of this unfortunate beginning lingers on even now virtually at the beginning
of the 21 st century. Look at the average level of income in the region and the high
degree of inequality in the income distributions found throughout the area. Recall the
debt crisis of the 1980s, and the negative effects broadcast widely throughout the region.
Income per capita in Latin America did not grow for something like 15 years, the longest
period of stagnation since the early part of the nineteenth century.
But now there is also the case of the "Asian Miracle." Following in the wake of Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore exhibited spectacular expansion from
the 1960s on, and have achieved higher levels of income and much greater income
equality than the Latin American countries. And there are still others in the sequence.
Despite the currency problems of Thailand and its Asean neighbors -and the consequent
adjustment that is necessary- it does not mean the end of Asian growth and emergence.
This obviously quickly brings me to the present and to the second act of my play. It has
had a much better beginning. The impressive results are visible already.
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In the last decade, Latin America has profoundly changed. Economically, it has
discovered the virtues of consistent and continuous macroeconomic policy. That has
translated into monetary and fiscal policies that have supported low rates of inflation in
the region. In many of these countries, costs have been limited. For virtually the first
time in the last 50 years, countries throughout the area have increases in prices at the one
digit level. And it has moved away from protectionist strategies that sought to limit
imports, but whose most profound and negative effects were to be found in constrained
exports and regular balance of payments crises. Politically, it has seen the restoration of
democratic principles and commitment to real popular participation virtually throughout
the hemisphere. Militaries have retreated to the barracks, and has been replaced by
capable civilian leaders committed to respect for constitutional guarantees. New
individuals have come forward to participate in the political process, and that novelty has
lead to new political groupings. And socially, there is now beginning in many countries
the necessary attention to profound inequality of opportunity that has severely hampered
past generations within the region. But this time, there is the shared understanding that
improvements in equity and higher rates of aggregate expansion can be compatible.
These changes are beginning to lead to new and higher rates of growth in the
hemisphere. Chile deserves special mention. Under Presidents Alwyn and Frei, income
per capita has gone up more consistently and rapidly than elsewhere in the region. Other
countries are beginning to achieve parallel results.
This new climate sees economic development emerging not from great national plans nor
exceptional inflow of foreign resources, but from a rise in domestic savings. This is
essential. Virtually all countries, except Chile, have yet to make this transition; they
remain at a ratio of something like 20 percent of GDP. But at a minimum, in order to
accomplish a growth rate of around 6 percent a year- which realistically should be the
goal given the number of unemployed and underemployed- they require 25 percent
investment. Foreign investment can regularly and dependably satisfy only 2 or 3 percent
of the total. Mexico in 1994 and the recent events in Southeast Asia eloquently testify to
that conclusion. The rest must come internally.
One place where savings can productively originate is the public sector. This turns
former Latin American governmental priorities on their head. The key public-sector
issue formerly was the application of resources through publicly owned and managed
facilties. Now it must be acquiring resources to dispense to the private sector to enable
them to invest productively. Inequality in the region is so great that acquiring savings
only from those individuals that can afford it would likely lead to more inequality in the
future; that is more the case with the high internal rates found in much of the region.
What of a revised Social Security system, as in Chile, as origin of those public resources?
I confess to remaining skeptical. Let me give only two reasons. First, the observed
Chilean increase in domestic savings came long after the new pension system started in
1980; indeed, it is part of the process of expansion associated with a return to civilian
rule, and is associated with increased business accumulation. Second, there appears to be
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a negative relationship between private savings and more recent increases in pension
assets.
Further research on the savings function will undoubtedly yield high results. But,
meanwhile, generating positive public accumulation is clearly a strategy that has worked,
and worked here where surpluses have been characteristic of the last decade. A casual
look at the successful Asian experience, cited earlier, likewise confirms the relevance of
government savings as a principal instrument. This places great weight on the new
governments. They have to be in a position not merely to raise taxes, but even more
importantly, to reduce bloated current expenses and to decentralize needed government
outlays to states and municipalities.
These changes in Latin America have proceeded almost wholly from an internal set of
priorities. That is what makes them both fundamental and enduring. The United States
government did play a role in three dimensions. First, it contributed through the Brady
bonds to an eventual end to the debt crisis. That write-off of liabilities assisted in the
recovery phase that followed. Second, it intervened decisively in the Mexican case in
early 1995 when a large package of assistance was necessary. And thirdly, it held out to
all countries of the region except Cuba, at the Miami Summit in December 1994, an
opportunity for closer association through a Free Trade Area of the Americas. That
summit is about to be repeated to define the future direction of the free trade initiative;
and the meeting will occur here in Santiago in April, 1998.
Free trade in the hemisphere from Alaska to Patagonia is clearly a central- but not
exclusive- part of United States' policy. It has evolved over the last decade from
agreeement with Canada to ratification of NAFTA, including Mexico, in 1993 to the
Miami meeting the following year. A whole process of joint activities and meetings has
gone along with this process since it took root in 1994. The IDB and ECLA, in addition
to the more than 30 countries that agreed to move ahead, have been actively engaged in
committees dealing with all aspects of potential regional trade. Indeed. the degree of
continuous travel involved in this work has made at least some ministerial assistants -who
end up going- grateful.
On this subject 1 appreciate that 1 am now speaking to a partially frustated audience.
Chile was initially promised a position in NAFTA back in 1994. It is now 1997 and
nothing has apparently happened. Or to put the case more accurately, there has not yet
been introduced legislation to obtain the needed "fast-track" authority from Congress;
without that provision, any trade agreement would be subject to impossibly complicating
amendment.
But a great deal has happened here. Chile has reached agreement with Mercosur to
become an active associate member of that pact. Chile has concluded agreement
independently with Canada to establish free trade with that country, while it had already
done so with Mexico. Chile has become a member of APEC. Chile is engaged in
negotiation with the European Union to examine what relationship may occur with those
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countries in the future. And Chilean barriers to trade, already low, are likely to move
lower in the future.
And in addition, I am, of course, aware of more recent events detracting from the bilateral
relationship. There is the lingering grapes episode from 1989. There is the California
court ruling in June barring, on sanitary grounds, imports of chips and logs from Chile,
New Zealand and Siberia. That led, erroneously, to banning of an import of processed
timber, a move which was shortly reversed. In reality, something like 97% of export
permits are still valid. Then, more recently, US salmon producers filed a complaint
against alleged 'dumping' by eight Chilean salmon exporters. Since United States
imports account for more than half of Chilean exports of salmon and trout, this is the
more serious case. And on the other side, there are barriers to import of US wheat that
have created a bit of a fuss.
I do not want to get into any of these specific issues. I do not know enough about them to
say anything that might be useful. I simply want to note that these kinds of problems
have become virtually a daily affair. With the European Community and Japan there is
an immense range of issues that constantly arise: note the recent question of the merger of
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas that almost led to severe difficulties involving the US
and Europe. In a world of expanded trade -and trade has been growing at a rate of twice
that of world gross product- such conflicts are inevitable where private interests have the
democratic right to assert an opportunity to present their view. That does not mean that
the private view is correct or ultimately prevails. But there is no alternative to giving it a
voice.
On the question of "fast-track" and the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Clinton
Administration has just made a commitment to introduce the needed legislation on
September 8. The next months should thus see a broad public debate on this issue in the
United States. I hazard the guess that the Administration will get what it needs in order
to move the process of freer trade in the hemisphere along. To come to Santiago without
such authorization is virtually a default to a Brazilian initiative in favor of a South
American Free Trade Area as a prelude to ultimate and eventual negotiation with
NAFTA. To come to Santiago with that authority is to give the United States an
opportunity to provide new leadership and sustained commitment to a broad and effective
Free Trade Area of the Americas that will take shape in future years.
But it is essential to note that regardless of the initial route taken, the ultimate destination
must be the same. The United States is too large and too important to ignore. A rapidly
growing and developing Latin America needs both the commercial opportunity as well as
the political alliance as an important source of support to the new development direction
the region is taking. Even if the United States cannot directly provide resources to bail
out Argentina, or Brazil, or Chile from financial problems, as it did Mexico, it can be of
great assistance nonetheless in making markets aware of the changes occurring in the
area.
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What is important about an eventual regional group is not the static gain to be achieved
from reduction in the levcls of protection. Tariff levels have already fallen substantially
throughout the area. The major benefit is the stimulus to new and expanded trade. Note
that exchange with Mexico proceeded at much higher annual rates of growth subsequent
to NAFTA than before. And the correlate of more rapid increase of trade and greater
foreign investment will reinforce domestic factors making this a period of return to the
developmental advance of past decades.
Therefore I diverge from those who argue that the most appropriate direction for Latin
America in the future is the multilateral route through the WTO rather than the regional
route with subsequent reduction of limitations to all trade. The United States is important
as market as well as source of imports, foreign investment and technological change. For
the countries of the region, newly committed to the importance of international trade,
there is advantage to a proximate and committed neighbor. By next April, at Santiago,
there will be an opportunity to judge whether the United States qualifies.
But the story of Latin American development will not end, even with the ultimate success
of the Free Trade Area. History continues after 2005 and much more will be needed. The
third and future act deals with the most important social problem facing the region, the
highly unequal distribution of income found there.
Because the countries of the region have now consciously moved to a more market
oriented strategy -as have the former Communist countries- this does not remove the state
obligation for assuring access to education, health, adequate housing, etc. Populism is
not the way to accomplish these objectives. Countries of the region have had adequate
experiment to learn that higher minimum wages, price controls, rationing, and even
highly differentiated tax rates, do not really work. Their first positive effects are replaced
by subsequent negative ones as rules are avoided and evaded.
Improvement in education yields real social returns. The World Bank finds rates in
excess of 25 percent for primary education, 15 to 18 percent for secondary and 13 to 16
percent for tertiary. East Asia stands as the classic case, with a higher increase in gross
product for additional investment than is found in other regions. In good measure that
reflects the advantage of assuring universal access. In Latin America, in many countries,
this is the rule, but not the practice. Grade repetition, lack of completion even of primary
school, and poor quality are the realities.
Education is also the factor that shows up repeatedly as the most important one in
explaining differences in income levels, holding all other factors such as age, sector of
work, occupation, ctc. constant. One recent study shows Latin Americans with no
schooling having a 56 percent probability of being in the lowest fifth of the income
distribution, while those with university training had only a 4 percent chance. The
proportions reverse at the top end. Undoubtedly education is partially serving as a proxy
for other factors such as school quality and family characteristics. But its repetitive
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008
importance makes abundantly clear that hopes for bettering the income distribution start
with this factor.
More active participation by government is necessary, particularly at the local level,
where efforts must be undertaken to promote attendance and to maintain school quality.
Curricular reform is urgently required in many countries. Beyond this, there is real need
to confront the misallocation of resources inherent in extensive state subsidization of
higher education that is repeatedly found in the region. The pattern of private secondary
training to enable students to pass entrance examinations to free public universities is
characteristic of the region. Those who can afford to pay at the earlier stage are those
who benefit later from access to expensive -but unpaid- training.
What is true for education also is characteristic of a whole range of ancillary activities
with similar effects in improving the quality of labor: improved nutrition, better health
and other social investments. Indeed, for some lower income countries, the effect of such
outlays may be greater than for education itself.
The great problem of such a strategy is that its effects are delayed by a generation, and
governments seem always pressed by more immediate priorities. Chile merits credit for
being an exception to this rule. But the lag in effect is real and must be compensated for.
Those of the previous generation will not benefit. For them, the principal hope remains
rapid economic advance, with provision for greater social services for those with
inadequate incomes.
In such a third act, the focus is inherently domestic. The United States can help in a
variety of ways, such as providing access to the new technology of the internet that is
expanding at an enormous rate. The resources of the World Bank and IDB will also
supplement. But the real political support necessarily must emerge locally and
continuously. Without such a change, in another twenty five years, the same problems
and deficiencies will remain - as has been true of the last twenty five.
But the mood of the region is shifting. There is now a new realism everywhere. That is
a cause for a new optimism. Perhaps the beginning of the 21st century will later be
known as the Latin American "miracle."
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Submission to Brazilian Publication "Amanha"
President Clinton's Visit to Brazil: a Prelude to Cooperation or Strife
by Michael May and Sidney Weintraub
Questions have arisen in Brazil regarding U.S. policy in the Americas, especially the effect
that the passage of fast-track negotiating authority will have on American involvement in the
region. Once formally requested by the president, the U.S. Congress will need to approve the
proposal. Fast-track negotiating authority is crucial in that it would allow the president to
negotiate trade agreements that would be voted on by the Congress without amendments. Fast-
track gives U.S. trade negotiators credibility in that potential partners in a free-trade negotiations
would know that the accord reached with the U.S. executive branch would not be substantially
changed by the Congress, although the agreement need not necessarily be approved. In fact, there
is a growing feeling in the region that the lack of fast-track authority has diminished the posture of
the U.S. abroad.
Despite scepticism that exists in some Brazilian circles, the granting of fast-track is
preferably before the hemispheric incgotiations start but surcly before they are concluded, the
necessary requirement that would permit the United States to fulfill the 1994 commitment that it
undertook, along with 33 other nations present at the Miami Summit, to reach a Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. Brazil affirmed this agreement and continues the support its
concept. Although there may be disagreement as to the timing. approach and scope of the FTAA,
most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean support U.S. involvement in the region
and would be disappointed if President Clinton arrived at the Santiago Summit in April 1998
without fast-track negotiating authority in hand.
The President Clinton's October, 1997 visits to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela will
provide an important opportunity to cement relations between the United States and these
countries and serve as a prelude to the Santiago Summit by providing a benchmark of U.S.
intentions in the arca. A successful Clinton journey could mirror the accomplishments resulting
from the earlier fruitful visit of President Cardoso to Washington. The stopover in Brazil will
clearly be the make or break element of the trip. This is particularly true in the area of trade. Both
countries need a catalyst that will encourage greater hemispheric cooperation. U.S. relations with
Argentina are the warmest they have been in years, particularly because virtually all of the
scriously contentious bilateral trade problems have been resolved. U.S. trade relations with
Venezuela are relatively noncontentious. This is less true for Brazil-U.S. trade relations.
President Clinton must show the Brazilian government and population that he recognizes
Brazil's stature in the region and the world. He must also support the many dynamic reforms
undertaken by President Cardoso. However, there are differences as to how free trade in the
Americas should be accomplished. Without fast-track, when the Santiago summit takes place,
Clinton would be seen by informed Latin Americans as coming with half empty hands.
Conversely, with fast-track approved, Clinton would be perceived as ready to engage the United
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States in serious trade bargaining. Future hemisphere integration and economic growth will
depend. to a large degree, on Brazil and the U.S. jointly adopting a mature position of mutual
cooperation. Inflexibility and short-sightedness on the part of either Brasilia or Washington would
be harmful to both countries and the hemisphere as a whole.
Michael May and Sidney Weintraub are Latin America scholars who specialize in trade, economic
and political issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC
Page 2
LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 3 STORIES
Copyright 1997 The San Diego Union-Tribune
The San Diego Union-Tribune
May 4, 1997, Sunday
SECTION: OPINION; Ed. 1,2; Pg. G-3
LENGTH: 1026 words
HEADLINE: An historic opportunity for Clinton
SERIES: WORLD VIEW
BYLINE:
Richard Feinberg,
Kevin Middlebrook and Peter Smith; FEINBERG,
MIDDLEBROOK and SMITH are faculty members at the University of California, San
Diego. Feinberg is dean of the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies. He is author of "Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report,
"
recently published by the Institute For International Economics.
BODY:
In this week's state visit to Mexico, President Clinton has an historic
opportunity to bridge the enormous chasm now existing between the U.S. and
Mexican governments, and the increasingly poisonous atmosphere surrounding
public debate in both countries. On this first official trip to Latin America,
he also has a chance to demonstrate U.S. concern about the region as a whole.
Presidents Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo have forged a friendship in the
crucible of crises. Zedillo owes a huge debt to Clinton for his unflinching
support for the North American Free Trade Agreement and for helping Mexico
stabilize the peso, for his refusal to engage in Mexico-bashing over immigration
during the 1996 presidential campaign and for his recent certification that
Mexico is "fully cooperating" in counter-narcotics efforts. For his part,
Clinton considers that Zedillo and his key advisers have acted with bravery and
intelligence in the face of very tough problems largely not of their own making.
The mutual respect between the two heads of state is shared among top
officials. Cabinet diplomacy between the two nations is broad and deep. A
myriad of issues, ranging from border crossings to capital market regulations to
agricultural trade to border environmental protection, makes up the most complex
agenda existing between an industrialized and a developing economy. While
progress is more rapid in some areas than in others, the overall direction of
change is toward greater cooperation and understanding in official bilateral
relations.
Yet this progress is now threatened by tumultuous popular debates over drugs
and migration. The U.S. public increasingly views Mexico with suspicion and
disdain, denouncing its government as riddled with narcotics-enriched
corruption, prone to stonewalling U.S. officials and defrauding its own
citizens. In reaction to these negative images, many Mexicans view the United
States as arrogant, hypocritical and threatening. These perceptions tend to be
reinforced by U.S. media silence on such issues as arms smuggling into Mexico,
drug-related corruption in the United States and contribution of migrant workers
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to the U.S. economy.
President Clinton can begin to alter these public perceptions by addressing
frankly and respectfully the key issues that bind the two neighbors:
democracy, economic prosperity, effective governance and inter-American
cooperation.
Clinton can fortify Mexico's progress toward democracy by meeting with
leaders from all three major political parties and by repeating assurances that
the U.S. government will work with whichever parties win open, transparent
elections. He should also meet with leaders from the private sector and civil
society, thereby signaling that democratization begins at the ballot box but
must also encompass a broad array of social forces. By these actions, Clinton
would demonstrate to the U.S. public that Mexico has traveled further down the
democratic path than many realize, while satisfying Mexican citizens that the
United States truly supports their quest for genuine democracy.
Clinton and Zedillo can rightfully congratulate each other on the courage
they demonstrated during the 1994-95 peso crisis and praise NAFTA for
attenuating some of the harshest effects of that crisis. They can compare their
priority programs to deliver better education to more people, programs which are
the centerpieces of their poverty alleviation efforts. Their economic message
will be clear: the NAFTA partners are working together to safeguard economic
stability and social progress throughout what is becoming the world's largest
single market.
The two leaders also need to lay out a plan for extending the vision of the
NAFTA southward, to negotiate the Free Trade Area of the Americas as endorsed at
the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami. Most important, both countries have
deep interests in constructing a strategic alliance centered on trade but
extending to a panoply of common concerns throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Effective governance remains the most difficult current challenge in
bilateral relations. President Zedillo recognizes the U.S. demand that Mexico
must do better in law enforcement, especially in regard to drugs. For his part,
President Clinton should acknowledge openly and publicly the fact that
international drug trafficking responds to the power and presence of demand in
the United States, the world's largest consumer market for illicit substances.
He should credit Zedillo and his team for their recent efforts. Privately,
perhaps, he might also acknowledge the problems posed for Mexico by the
contentious and controversial process of U.S. certification.
On an issue of special importance to Mexico, he should pledge increased
efforts to halt the flow of illegal arms into that country from the United
States. And, more broadly, the President should lay the groundwork for a
unilateral anti-drug campaign designed to reduce consumer demand, punish money
laundering and strengthen law enforcement throughout the hemisphere.
If Clinton can show that the United States is not the problem, but rather is
part of the solution, he can convince the Mexican public that the United States
is indeed a valued partner. If he can persuade citizens back home that most
Mexicans indeed want to work with the United States, he can begin to build a
broad public constituency in favor of deeper bilateral cooperation. This would
be a major step toward unifying perceptions among governing elite and common
citizens on both sides of our long, shared border.
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By improving our relationship with Mexico, Clinton can also strengthen our
ties with Latin America. These same basic issues -- democracy, prosperity,
effective governance -- will frame the agenda for the hemispheric summit
scheduled for Santiago, Chile, in March 1998. The president's visit to Mexico
provides an exceptional opportunity for the United States and Mexico to develop
common approaches toward key concerns, improve understanding, and thus enhance
the prospects for inter-American cooperation.
GRAPHIC: 1 DRAWINGGEOFFERY MOSS
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE: May 4, 1997
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TOM QUIGLEY
II Latin American Conference on the Pastoral Work for Human Rights
Lima-Perú, August 27-31, 1997
Presentation from the United States
INTRODUCTION
I would like, in the first place, to express my appreciation and gratitude to the organizers of
this II Encuentro for inviting me to participate in this very rich and important event. I want
especially to thank Fr. Leonidas and Laura Vargas, tireless workers for the defense and
promotion of the fundamental rights of every person, especially the most needy.
The theme of this meeting, education in human rights, offers an opportunity to reflect on the
various and different ways in which the defense and protection of human rights forms an
almost invisible backdrop to so much of the activity of the Church, even when--or especially
when--the concept of human rights as such is not adverted to. That is, a great deal of what
goes on in our programs of human promotion, community organizing, political advocacy and
the like-what we usually speak of as our Christian responsibility in and to the world, the
constant search to apply the principles of Catholic social teaching and Gospel values to our
everyday lives--is actually a participation in the pastoral action for human rights.
EVANGELIZATION INCLUDES HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION
"The pastoral of human rights," as CELAM's Social Pastoral Departmentl has stated, "is the
evangelizing mission that the Church, through its communities and institutions carries out in
the area of the defense and promotion of human life and dignity, as the extension of the
liberating mission of Jesus of Nazareth and with the participation of men and women of good
will."
In their brilliant presentations at the I Encuentro three years ago, both Bishop Irizar and Fr..
Leonidas explored the rich tapestry of Catholic teaching on human rights from the Sacred
Scriptures to the early Fathers to the latest encyclical of Pope John Paul II. While the term
"human rights" has come into vogue mainly in this century, the promotion of the dignity and
fundamental rights of the human person, imago Dei, has been our teaching and (with the well
known unfortunate exceptions) our practice since the very beginning.
HUMAN RIGHTS PASTORAL IN THE U.S.
Let me speak about the experience of the Church in the United States. While there has been a
presence of the Church in parts of what is today the United States since the 16th century, the
relevant timeframe for our discussion is the last century and a half, from roughly the 1840s to
the present. It is in this period that the Catholic community grew from being a small and
somewhat marginal part of the new republic to being today the largest religious community in
the country. During that time, there have been successive waves of immigrants, mostly poor,
fleeing famine, discrimination, even outright persecution, all seeking a better life. Many of
the immigrants were Catholics--first the Irish and Germans, then the Italians and Poles, later
the Cubans and Mexicans and Haitians, the Central and South Americans from many
countries of our hemisphere, as well as from Vietnam and the Philippines and from numerous
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other countries.
LABOR RIGHTS
In each period, the Church has been a source of assistance and welcome for the in-coming
poor and needy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Catholic social teaching on the
dignity and rights of workers, and the personal engagement of many "labor priests" and the
Jesuit-directed Labor Schools in several cities, offered outstanding examples of the pastoral of
human rights, understood primarily under the rubric of labor rights.
CIVIL RIGHTS
In the great moral drama of the last century, the struggle to end the evil of slavery and racial
discrimination, the Catholic community was not a particularly significant actor. But the
teachings of the Church on racial equality and the firm commitment of today's Catholics to
inter-racial harmony and justice for all peoples represent another and very important arena of
the pastoral of human rights. The term "civil rights" has been more often used, speaking to
the rights that many citizens of our country, because of their color, had been denied.
PRO-LIFE SEAMLESS GARMENT
The Church's emphasis, especially in recent years, on the inviolable right to life of every
human being, from the moment of conception to natural death, has put the Catholic Church
and its teachings in the forefront of parts of the human rights movement, most notably in the
very contentious debate in our country over the issues of abortion, of so-called "assisted
suicide," and of capital punishment. The "seamless garment" approach advocated most
notably by the late Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago makes the Church the outstanding organized
defender of human rights in the U.S., despite the denunciation and vilification of the Church
by many others who also claim the title of human rights advocates--namely, that of the so-
called "right" to abortion.
The child in the womb, the mentally and physically handicapped, the aged sick and the
condemned criminal have no stronger protectors in the U.S. than the leadership of the Church
and the great numbers of active Catholics who march, demonstrate, write letters to elected
officials--and pray-that the basic human rights of these most vulnerable of our society be
respected and protected.
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
Similarly with today's new waves of immigrants. Just as the Church defended the rights of the
famine-driven Irish a century and a half ago, it today seeks to change both the political
decisions recently enacted by state and federal governments that discriminate harshly against
undocumented immigrants, and--just as important as trying to reverse the laws-it seeks to
persuade, to move the hearts of people, to educate, so that the stranger will be welcomed,
given a little help, given a chance to become valued and productive members of the society.
As with the pro-life movement, the Church is the surest and strongest defender of immigrant
rights in the U.S.
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EDUCATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
How does the Church in the U.S. teach about human rights? How does it educate for human
rights? With regard to the human rights issues I have mentioned above--the rights of the pre-
born, the handicapped, workers and migrants, ethnic and racial minorities, etc.--the Church
sponsors a variety of national and local offices focused on the specific issue. There is a
National Catholic Office for the Deaf, a National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities;
the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, and so on.
Among groups with a conscious program of advocacy and education for human rights in more
general terms, one would have to cite especially the national conferences of religious men and
women, the Conference of Major Superiors of Men and the Leadership Conference of Women
Religious, both of which do excellent work both of informing and encouraging their members
in their own human rights work, and of engaging in direct programs of advocacy and action.
Individual religious congregations, the Jesuits, Franciscans, Maryknoll and the Columbans,
among others, have their own centers with programs of education and advocacy on human
rights issues. The publications of some of these groups are outstanding, as is their outreach to
specific segments of the population.
CARITAS AGENCIES
In the U.S., there are two affiliates of Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Charities-USA and
Catholic Relief Services. Catholic Charities, organized on a diocesan basis, is by far the
largest private sector provider of essential services to the poor in our country and engages in
political advocacy on welfare rights and other human rights issues. Catholic Relief Services,
which operates exclusively in other countries. is also the largest private U.S. voluntary agency
engaged in programs of emergency and disaster relief, international economic development,
and human rights advocacy.
Both Catholic Charities and CRS emphasize human rights, in the funding they provide for
local groups, whether in the U.S. or abroad, and in the educational materials they produce for
their support base at home. A few years ago, CRS began funding a local, diocesan human
rights agency, the office for human rights of theArchdiocese of Guatemala (OSSAG). Since
then, they have provided necessary start-up funding for other local human rights agencies of
the Church in Latin America, in Africa and in Asia. Increasingly, CRS has come to define its
mission in terms of advancing the cause of justice and peace in whatever country they work in.
Thus, pastoral action for human rights has become a central focus of the work of CRS.
THE EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE
Possibly the most direct and relevant aspect of the U.S. Church's education on human rights is
the work of the U.S. Catholic Conference. Let me say a bit about that. Just as there are two
Caritas agencies within the U.S. Church, one domestic, the other international in scope, so
there are two sides to the social policy and political advocacy offices of the U.S. Bishops'
Conference. Both offices, Domestic Social Development and International Justice and Peace,
form one Department of Social Development and World Peace.
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SDWP
It is this department that staffs the bishops' committees that have issued numerous statements
on human rights, both at home and abroad. Major letters, such as the pastoral on Catholic
Social Teaching and the U.S. economy, "Economic Justice for All," as well as the pastoral on
modern war, "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," and the statement
on "Relieving Third World Debt," all staffed by that department, are expressions of the
Church's social teachings, applied to specific situations. Thus, human rights documents.
Similarly, a number of other statements and practical resources for use in local parish study
groups have come from the department: "Communities of Salt and Light," a manual on the
social mission of the parish, another document commemorating the tenth anniversary of the
peace pastoral, "The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace," another anniversary reflection, "A
Decade after Economic Justice for All," a pastoral reflection on the environment and a call to
ecological justice, "Renewing the Earth," several documents and parish resources on health
care reform, welfare reform, global food policy, and other issues.
One of the most widely used teaching documents is one that addresses a range of domestic and
international justice issues. Every four years, in the year preceding our national elections, the
Conference publishes a booklet called "Political Responsibility" which lays out the positions
of the bishops on some two dozen issues, from abortion to welfare reform, all of which are in
some way a part of the political debate in the country. Its purpose is to educate the public on
the moral implications of the votes they will cast the following November.
OTHER INFORMATION/ADVOCACY OFFICES
In addition to the public education and advocacy work of this Department, many other offices
of the Conference are engaged in education on specific aspects of human rights issues: the
offices of Education, Pro-Life Affairs, Migration and Refugee Services, Hispanic Affairs,
African American Catholics, Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs, Communications and
Media Relations, and the Campaign for Human Development, a major domestic program
funding community organizing programs among the poor, all involved in education on some
aspects of human rights.
THE US CHURCH AND LATIN AMERICA
For many years, the Conference has addressed the human rights implications of U.S. foreign
policy. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, when U.S. foreign policy was so deeply
involved with the various crises in this hemisphere, the USCC carried on an extensive
program of what we could call "education on human rights." In those years, the Conference
issued literally dozens of policy statements, expressions of solidarity with the suffering Church
in various parts of Latin America, congressional testimonies dealing with Argentina, Brazil or
Chile, with El Salvador, Nicaragua or Guatemala, Mexico, Cuba or Haiti and other countries
where the policy of the U.S. government was heavily engaged. A number of official
delegations of bishops and staff to most of these and other countries added additional moral
weight and authority to the policy recommendations and gave visible expression to the
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ecclesial unity and solidarity between the local churches.
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES
In recent years, new attention has been directed to the religious freedom aspect of the human
rights picture. Much of it is focused on the few remaining communist regimes that either
directly persecute or severely limit expression of religious faith, especially the People's
Republic of China and Vietnam, as well as a number of largely Muslim countries with
particularly harsh restrictions on Christian life and practice, such as Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and
Pakistan. The Conference has also addressed these concerns more explicitly in recent times,
while noting that the great bulk of our activity on human rights in the past, the Latin American
issues, clearly involved the issues of religious liberty. Bishops, priests, religious, and many
hundreds of catechists and other committed lay people suffered attacks of every kind, from
verbal abuse to arrest, imprisonment, torture, exile and even death at the hands government
officials and para-military bands. Religious freedom and the rights of believers were just as
seriously violated then as anything that is happening today in other parts of the world.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.
Which brings me to my last point. The human rights movement globally, but especially in the
United States, owes a great debt to you, the pioneers in the field of the human rights pastoral.
It was precisely the violations of human rights in this part of the world, and the response of
the churches here, that gave birth to the human rights movement in the U.S.
The human rights policies of the Carter administration, the creation of new human rights
groups, the new vigor given to the Inter-American and United Nations commissions for human
rights, the enactment of legislation in our Congress prohibiting military aid to countries with
consistent patterns of gross violation of human rights, the outpouring of articles and books on
human rights-all of this was framed by the stories of torture coming out of Brazil, beginning
in the mid-1960s, then of other military coups and subsequent repressive policies in Bolivia,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Argentina in the '70s, followed by the Central American crises
in the later '70s and the '80s. The picture was framed by these issues, and was given flesh and
blood by the heroic and dedicated response of Christians in each of these countries to the
violence and abuse of their fundamental rights. Today's global human rights movement owes
far more than is generally known to the pioneer work of the pastoral engagement of the
Church in Latin America in its defense of the rights and dignity of the human person.
Peter Hakim
US-Latin American Relations
As President Clinton prepares for his second trip to Latin America this year--a week long
visit to Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, beginning October 12--US policy in the region badly
needs to be re-energized. US-Latin American relations, for the most part, remain cordial, but the
opportunities for building a genuinely cooperative and integrated hemisphere seem to be slipping
away. US policy and action in Latin America has been sharply constrained by domestic political
imperatives--no matter whether Washington is dealing with the major issues of trade and
economic integration, with the politics of appointing ambassadors to countries like Mexico and
Argentina, with controversial themes like drugs and immigration, or with troublesome countries
like Cuba and Haiti. Within the region, the United States is more and more perceived as a less
than fully reliable partner, insensitive to Latin American concerns, and preoccupied with its own
short-term interests.
The question is whether and how President Clinton and his advisors can reinvigorate US
policy in the coming months, in time for a successful meeting of Western Hemisphere leaders at
the second Summit of the Americas in mid-April in Santiago, Chile.
As it has been from the outset of Clinton's second term, the most critical uncertainty is
whether the Administration will secure fast track negotiating authority from Congress this year.
For most of Latin America, this is the acid test of the US commitment to building hemispheric
free trade arrangements and stronger economic cooperation overall. Without fast track, the
United States cannot make good on its promise to have Chile become part of NAFTA, nor will it
have much credibility to engage the other nations of the hemisphere in free trade discussions. It
will still be possible to launch negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) at
the Santiago Summit, but the excrcise will generate little enthusiasm in Latin America.
The prospects are still good that the White House will secure fast track this year--but they
are dimming as time passes. They suffered a major blow last week when the Administration,
once again, failed to present fast track legislation to Congress-after publicly assuring everyone
that it would definitely do so. The Administration's problem is not a new one. It has still not
found an acceptable formula for dealing with labor and environmental standards in the fast track
request.
The only solution that will get Congressional approval is for the Administration to accept
the Republican demand for a "clean" fast track bill (i.e., with very weak or no labor and
environmental conditions), and then use of the full weight of the presidency to press hard for the
60 to 70 Democratic votes needed for passage. Last week's delay hurt the prospect of fast track
approval in several ways: It revealed that the White House remains divided on the issue and
thereby further galvanized the opposition, and it reduced by another week the already short time
frame for gaining approval. Yet, if Clinton gives fast track his top priority and throws himself
personally into the campaign, he will probably win. He has got to do so within the next week or
two, however.
US trade problems with Latin America do not end with fast track. Largely because of the
influence of the US textile industry, Central American and Caribbean countries have been denied
NAFTA parity legislation-which would establish an interim trade arrangement to help protect
these nations' economies by stemming the NAFTA-induced diversion of trade and investment
toward Mexico. And the United States has not been willing to give a hearing to the Central
American governments' request for a full free trade pact with the region.
The United States and major Latin American countries (most prominently, Brazil) are at
odds over how the nations of the hemisphere should proceed toward the FTAA. There is broad
consensus that FTAA negotiations should be formally launched at the Santiago Summit--but
fundamental differences have emerged over the pace of the negotiations; whether efforts should
be made to reach and implement partial agreements prior to the 2005 target date; and the role that
subregional trading blocs like NAFTA and Mercosur should play in the negotiations once the
FTAA is in place. Compounding the frictions over multilateral trade issues are a range of
bilateral trade conflicts between the United States and most of its partners in Latin America and
the Caribbean. Intellectual property rights remains a contentious issue, as does the range of US
non-tariff barriers--anti-dumping actions, countervailing duties, and health and sanitary
restrictions, for example.
U.S.-Latin American relations are suffering from more than frustrations over trade issues.
This past month, the Clinton Administration announced plans for two security-related initiatives
in Latin America, both meant to underscore growing US confidence in the region's governments.
Washington lifted its twenty-year old ban on the transfer of high tech weapons to Latin America,
and proposed a special security relationship for Argentina, to designate that country a major non-
NATO ally (a category heretofore reserved for a handful of countries like Israel, Jordan, and
Korea that are close US partners in actively hostile situations). The reaction in Latin America--
particularly among the countries most affected--has been almost the opposite of what was
intended. Instead of good will, the announcements provoked suspicions about US aims and
rekindled some of the historic anxieties among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. The United States
needs to stop taking important decisions about Latin America in an ad-hoc fashion. In concert
with other governments, Washington needs to shape a coherent policy on security issues to guide
future decisions, and help to explain them. It should focus on promoting regional transparency on
all military initiatives, developing arms restraint regimes, resolving border conflicts, and
enhancing civilian control of the military.
Within the next week, the Administration is required to present a report to Congress,
giving an updated review of US-Mexican cooperation against drug trafficking. (The report was
mandated by Congress as a condition for agreeing, earlier this year, to certify Mexico as a
reliable US ally in the war against drugs.) The findings are not likely to present a very positive
assessment of Mexico's antidrug efforts--just the opposite, in fact. Coincidental with the
initiation of the fast track debate, the report could well open a new round of anti-Mexican and
anti-NAFTA criticism in the United States, and new calls for the decertification of Mexico
(although these will be resisted by the Administration).
US drug policy will remain a constant source of friction in US relations in the hemisphere
as long as Washington insists on unilaterally judging the counter-narcotics efforts of other
2
countries and penalizing those that do not meet its standards. Meanwhile, the one country that
has been decertified by the United States--Colombia--continues its downward spiral of political
and economic deterioration, mounting violence and human rights abuses, and loss of territorial
control to drug criminals, guerillas, and paramilitary forces. Most of this cannot be blamed on
decertification, although US policy has certainly not helped Colombia deal with any of its
problems.
Another issue increasingly dividing the United States and Latin America is immigration.
Although they mainly affect Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, the harsh US
immigration laws that took effect this year-and the record number of deportations they have
produced--are seen throughout the region as demeaning to Latin America. The fact they were
approved without concern about (or even consideration of) their effects on other countries
reinforces the Latin American view that the region is a low priority for the United States.
US policy toward a number of specific countries will also importantly influence the
broader US-Latin American relationship. Washington's Cuba policy, a source of continuing
friction with Latin America, will most probably become more intransigent in the coming period.
A constructive change in US policy would be welcomed throughout the region, but unless there
is a deep crisis in Cuba-resulting in another mass outflow of people and/or internal violence--
that is not in the cards. The Administration's efforts to stay usefully engaged in Haiti, manage a
graceful exit from Panama by the treaty date of 2000, and restore normal relations with Colombia
are being closely watched in the region.
Interestingly, only trade--of all these contentious issues in US-Latin American relations--
is now scheduled to be on the agenda for the Santiago Summit discussions of the hemisphere's
presidents and prime ministers next April. More than anything, that suggests that the other
issues--security and arms control, narcotrafficking, immigration, Cuba, and Haiti--are either too
difficult or too conflictive for the heads of state to deal with them productively. The good news is
that, if agreements can be reached on the trade front and the stage can be set for real progress
toward hemispheric economic integration, these other problems will become relatively less
important and probably easier to address. The bad news is that, if the trade discussions do not
produce satisfactory results, US-Latin American relations could take a turn for the worse-as
more antagonistic issues come to dominate the inter-American agenda. Nothing, in short, would
do more to revitalize US policy toward Latin America than an energetic White House campaign
for fast track legislation and its prompt approval by Congress.
Peter Hakim, for Oxford Analytica
September 14, 1997
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SEP.26.1997
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NO.423
P.2/2
Washington Post, 12 December 1996
Bernard Aronson
Strengthen Democracies,
Not Armies
With democracy ascendant in our hemi-
Apparently, the administration believes that
sphere, Latin America has a historic opportu-
nity to redefine the role of its military, tradi-
resuming U.S. arms sales will strengthen de-
tionally the greatest obstacle to democratic
mocracy-and implicitly civilian rule-by rec-
stability. Unfortunately. that opportunity will
ognizing and rewarding those Latin militaries
be endangered if the Clinton administration
that have accepted democratic governance, as
goes ahead with its plans to end a two-decade-
well as those that have supported recent
old ban and resume sales of sophisticated U.S.
negotiated settlements of disputed boundaries,
The U.S. administration argues that if this
weaponry to Latin American militaries.
Militaries still threatening hostilities, such as
country did not sell the high-tech weapons to
Peru and Ecuador, would continue to be ex-
Latin America, France. Russia or others would
Until recently, the military in Latin America
cluded, the administration stresses.
fill the vacuum. The weapons, then. would still
traditionally viewed itself as the self-appointed
This view would be more credible if civilian
flow, while the United States would lose influ-
guardian of the nation's order and sovereignty,
presidents and populations in Latin America
ence, revenues and jobs-and would exercise
separate from, and ultimately, above the state,
But the military dictatorships of right and left
were asking for new weaponry, but the oppo-
less control over the end use and transfer of
the arms.
that ruled through the 1970s and '80s left 8
site is true, Throughout the hemisphere, civil-
jan leaders are struggling to reduce bloated
Instead of acquiescing in this false choice
legacy of violence and economic mismanage-
state budgets and payrolls as part of far-
between foreign and U.S. arms sales, the
ment, and there is no popular nostalgia for
reaching structural economic reforms designed
administration should exercise real leadership
their return. The guerrilla insurgencies which,
to restrain inflation and attract foreign invest-
in the hemisphere by endorsing and vigorously
during the Cold War, provided a national
security rationale for military dominance have
ment. Civilian populations-whose real wages
supporting the growing civilian call for regional
still have not recovered from the lost decade of
arms control. The hemisphere is ripe for
in most cases ended. And burgeoning intra-
the 1980s-are pressing new democratic gov-
negotiations on agreed regional balances of
regional trade has begun to erode the border
emments for safe drinking water, sanitation,
conventional weapons, limits on acquisitions of
rivalries that once justified large defense estab-
health services, basic education and housing.
destabilizing new weaponry and confidence-
lishments.
To feed the appetites of Latin American
building measures among Latin militaries,
These historic changes, coupled with the
militaries for sophisticated weapons they do
To succeed. a new Latin American con-
pressures of shrinking public resources on
ventional arms control regime must not appear
military budgets, have offered Latin Americans
not need at a cost no Latin nation can afford—
to be imposed by Washington. But with presi-
a unique opportunity to transform the military
and to do so against the private wishes of
dential leadership, the United States could be
into a normal, civilian-dominated branch of
democratic leaders-would undermine civilian
far more energetic and creative, through the
government.
authority and heighten regional tensions.
OAS and other regional groupings, in support
The administration's impending arms sales
Chile, for example, faces no discernible mili-
of an arms control agenda emerging from Latin
presuppose that this important transformation
tary threat. Yet no Latin military is pressing
America. At Latin request, for example, NATO
has already taken place, In reality, the delicate
more aggressively for sophisticated arma-
and the Warsaw Pact could share their experi-
balance between civilian and military power in
ments, including advanced fighter aircraft. The
ence with conventional arms control in Europe.
Latin America has only barely begun to tilt
commander of the Chilean army, Gen. Augusto
The United States should support. also, a
toward the civilian side, and the administra-
Pinochet, holds that position not because the
long-standing Argentine proposal to establish a
tion's decision risks tilting it back in the other
elected Chilean president appointed him but
regional center under U.N. auspices where
direction.
because Pinochet installed himself through the
Latin militaries could train with Western mili-
While elected presidents hold office in every
year 1998 by constitutional amendments he
taries for international peacekeeping duties.
Latin American nation except Cuba, not one
imposed as a condition of relinquishing power
With arms control agreements in place and
exercises the authority over the military that
over the government Under other provisions
Latin militaries engaged in international peace-
every Western democratic leader assumes au-
imposed by the military, the elected president
keeping missions, the United States could
tomatically upon taking office. In most Latin
cannot remove an anned service chief, and the
respond legitimately to reasonable requests to
nations there is still no real civilian-military
Chilean armed forces have an automatic claim
upgrade Latin military forces, so long as those
dialogue, and at best only rudimentary over-
on 10 percent of the nation's copper export
requests were initiated by civilian leaders,
sight by elected legislatures.
revenues. This is hardly a model of civilian
sanctioned by regional agreements and consis-
The threat of military coup d'etats has
control worthy of reward.
tent with acceptable human rights practices.
diminished, especially since foreign ministers of
If Chile upgrades its military capabilities. the
Such a policy would be far more worthy of U.S.
the Organization of American States agreed in
military in neighboring Argentina, Chile's his-
leadership in the Americas and far more sup-
1991 to confront them collectively. Yet twice
toric rival, will demand new armaments to
partive of democracy.
in 1992, rebel Venezuelan military forces near-
ly overthrew the civilian president, and this
counter the perceived threat. Extreme Argen-
tine nationalists-no friends of democracy-
The writer was assistant secretary of state
past April, a Paraguayan general almost top-
will press the civilian government to buy them.
for Inter-American Affairs from June
pled that nation's first democratic government.
Though border tensions have lessened, Colom-
Argentina is just now emerging from a deep
1989 to July 1993.
bia and Venezuela periodically rattle sabers
self-imposed recession, engineered to stave off
over disputed island territories, and last year
capital flight following Mexico's peso crisis;
Peru and Ecuador fought a bloody border
unemployment stands at 17 percent. The sale
battle.
of jets to Chile, warns Jorge Dominguez, Ar-
gentina's civilian defense minister, "is neither
suitable nor necessary for the needs of the
region."
Page 2
LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 STORY
Copyright 1997 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
August 17, 1997, Sunday, Final Edition
SECTION: OUTLOOK; Pg. C05
LENGTH: 1734 words
HEADLINE: As Its Civil War Intensifies, Colombia Emerges as the Bosnia of South
America
BYLINE: Ana Carrigan;
Robert O. Weiner
BODY:
"Your time has come
we have come to clean up this region just as we are
doing in other provinces, and we will start with you. We know your movements
very well. We are following step by step
"
This threat was not issued by Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. It
came from paramilitaries in Colombia who slaughter civilians in that country's
growing civil war. The reality it reflects should cause Americans to recast the
common image of Colombia: the cocaine republic whose civilian "democracy" has
been corrupted, but whose military, committed to the rule of law, remains a
steadfast partner with Washington in the war on drugs and leftist guerrillas.
Colombia, in reality, is something different: a failing state where murderous
warlords, with the tacit cooperation of the military and narco-trafficking
organizations, have pushed the country toward de facto partition. In the process
they have marginalized many of Colombia's democratic institutions. Though
Washington's drug warriors have been slow to notice, the spread of this "dirty
war" not the country's drug cartels -- is the greatest threat to Colombia,
its neighbors and the interests of the United States.
Late last month, the Colombian government reluctantly agreed to the Clinton
administration's conditions for more than $ 100 million in police and military
aid. After months of resistance, the country's security forces agreed not to put
weapons and equipment into the hands of those implicated in serious human rights
violations. But it remains to be seen whether this agreement will have any real
effect in the face of opposition from military hard-liners who say the
conditions violate the Colombian constitution and U.S. congressional critics who
believe the administration is hindering the drug war.
Meanwhile, Colombia is tearing itself apart. It is fast becoming a Bosnia, or
the closest thing to it in this hemisphere. There are three parties to
Colombia's struggle:
Private paramilitary armies: Sponsored by wealthy landholders and protected
by the regular Colombian army, they now operate with murderous impunity across
half of the national territory.
Left-wing guerrilla organizations: Long the de facto authority wherever the
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state failed to establish its presence, they have expanded their reach to more
than half the nation's rural municipalities. They kidnap wealthy foes, extort
"war taxes" to fund their activities and mete out their own brand of justice.
The government: Increasingly irrelevant, it is struggling to regain its
authority over the military and its ability to protect the people.
As in Bosnia's ethnic cleansing, civilians are the main target in this
struggle, with the paramilitaries inflicting some 60 percent of the casualties.
Col. Carlos Alfonso Velasquez, the former number-two commander in northern
Colombia, was cashiered by the high command last December for reporting on
official failure to address the savagery of the paramilitaries. Velasquez says
the military has adopted a logic that regards civilians in contested zones as
part of the guerrillas' political structure. The paramilitaries massacre these
civilians, fulfilling the military's desire for high body counts and enabling
their sponsors to consolidate and expand their land holdings. There were an
estimated 3,000 political killings in 1996 in Colombia and the number is
expected to rise this year.
Recent fighting around the village of Mapiripan in a guerrilla-controlled
area of southeast Colombia was typical. Three weeks ago, a uniformed column of
paramilitaries kidnapped and executed 30 civilians over the course of five days,
according to the mayor and other survivors from the village. Five decapitated
bodies were recovered. A week later, leftist rebels took credit for killing 26
uniformed men whom they said were regular army soldiers disguised as a
paramilitaries who had carried out the first massacre. The government denies its
soldiers took part in the attack.
Such violence reflect both madness and method. The paramilitaries, armed with
sophisticated weapons, target people a schoolteacher, a shopkeeper, a bus
driver who, they say, put ideas into the heads of future guerrillas, food in
their stomachs and wheels under their feet. At least one group also openly totes
an electric saw for dismembering its victims.
The guerrillas have perfected kidnapping as a means of raising revenue and
many also profit by providing armed protection for coca growers. A State
Department report estimates that the rebels are also responsible for a third of
political killings in 1996.
Along the fault line between guerrilla and paramilitary territory, the
violence has displaced families on a scale never seen before south of the Panama
Canal. UNICEF reported earlier this year that 1 million Colombians about one
out of every 40 citizens have been forced from their homes.
Emerging from the war zones of rural Colombia are virtual rump republics
accountable only to paramilitary leaders such as cocaine millionaire and
landowner Carlos Castano. Described by Newsweek as "Latin America's most
notorious death squad leader" and by the State Department as a "known drug
trafficker, " Castano is the most powerful of a dozen or so paramilitary
chieftains who operate autonomously yet increasingly see the benefits of working
together to maximize their political clout.
Castano has murdered his way to control of a neo-feudal empire stretching
across half of Colombia. He has also overseen a perverse, personal version of
land reform. In addition to paying the 2,000 soldiers in his personal uniformed
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army a reported $ 400 monthly salary, he has donated thousands of acres to them
and their relatives land which he told one Colombian magazine he had
"liberated" from its previous occupants.
Castano's criminal career encapsulates Colombia's institutional collapse.
Colombian prosecutors say that he was a star pupil in the 1980s at hit-squad
training schools that were sponsored by the Colombian army, funded by the
Medellin cartel and run by Israeli and British mercenaries. Along with other
graduates of this mercenary school, the Castano brothers delivered protection
for the drug barons' properties and provided the army with cover for "dirty war"
practices.
In 1993, Castano switched allegiance to the Cali cartel. As The Washington
Post's Doug Farah reported last year, the Cali kingpins were collaborating with
the government to bring down their chief rival, fugitive Medellin drug boss
Pablo Escobar. Castano organized a terrorist force that liquidated Escobar's
organization and helped Colombian police hunt Escobar down and kill him.
Castano, despite several arrest warrants for murder, enjoys a spotless
criminal record. He has never been arrested. Last winter, when Minister of
Defense Juan Carlos Esguerra (currently Colombia's ambassador to Washington)
bowed to pressure from the U.S. embassy and offered a $ 1 million reward to
anyone who arranged for Castano's capture, most Colombians regarded the offer as
a bad joke. Castano's whereabouts, after all, are not exactly unknown to the
authorities. When reporters from the New York Times and Newsweek arranged to
visit and interview Castano this spring, he noted that the local army base was
"just over the hill" from his headquarters. To the chagrin of prosecutors,
Colombian law enforcement officials insist they do not know where he is.
Faced with all this, U.S. policymakers have long seemed alternately divorced
from reality and at war with themselves. Tethered to a military approach to the
drug problem, the Reagan, Bush and the first Clinton administrations gave the
Colombian armed forces largely uncritical support, enabling them to flout
civilian authority and legal prosecution.
At the same time, the State Department has produced increasingly detailed
human rights reports on the paramilitaries' role. Washington has also supported
endangered Colombian anti-corruption fighters and human rights defenders like
former prosecutor general Alfonso Valdivieso, now running for president.
Now that the State Department, under the direction of Secretary Albright, has
made human rights central to Colombia pclicy, the Clinton administration faces
two challenges. In Washington it will have to fend off a a vocal faction in
Congress that vigorously opposes such limitations on military anti-narcotics
aid. In Colombia it will have to enforce the agreement that U.S. support not go
to units commanded by known human rights abusers.
U.S. policy also is going to be challenged by Colombian politics. Last month,
Colombian President Ernesto Samper, facing domestic pressure for peace and
international scrutiny on human rights, fired the chief of the armed forces,
Gen. Harold Bedoya. A booster of the paramilitary, Bedoya had resisted
government overtures to the guerrillas and generally disdained civilian
authority. Now he is running for president in 1998. With Valdivieso and other
leading hopefuls talking about peace negotiations, Bedoya will be the leading
proponent of military solutions to the problems of narcotics and insurgency.
TM
TM
TM
LEXIS:-NEXIS'
LEXIS·NEXIS'
LEXIS·NEXIS'
A member of the Reed Elsever aroun
A member of the Reed Elsevier pk group
A member of the Reed Elsevier plc group
Page 5
The Washington Post, August 17, 1997
Colombia's electoral choices next year will be stark: cultivating slender
chances for peace or pursuing a war of annihilation against the guerrillas. The
United States must confront a hard reality: The twin Colombian catastrophes --
the drug trade and crisis in human rights are interconnected. Both are
promoted by the anarchic dynamics of the "dirty" internal war. Drugs, like
guerrillas and paramilitaries, flourish in the absence of democratic politics.
The United States has to give effective support to those civilians and military
officers who believe in moving toward, not away from, the rule of law.
The Clinton administration should know by now that it cannot continue this
effort alone. U.S. pressure is inevitably exploited by Colombian demagogues. A
collaborative strategy among a group of friendly nations is needed. This will
inevitably involve compromises with Latin and European allies who do not share
all of Washington's views about the drug war.
Ana Carrigan is a freelance writer and the author of "The Palace of Justice:
A Colombian Tragedy" (Four Walls Eight Windows) Robert Weiner coordinates the
Latin America and the Caribbean Program of the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights.
GRAPHIC: Illustration, janusz kapusta for The Washington Post
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
COUNTRY: COLOMBIA;
LOAD-DATE: August 17, 1997
TM
TM
TM
LEXIS:NEXIS'
LEXIS·NEXIS®
LEXIS:NEXIS'
A member of the Reed Elsevier plc group
A member of the Reed Elsever nic group
A member of the Reed Elsevier plc
Sep-25-97 11:42 WWICS LAP
202 357 4918
P.02
from J.S. Tulchin
July 11, 1997
MEMO TO MACK
The key to engagement in Latin America is a loud, clear message. The message should be
repeated often by a highly visible representative of the President and it should be linked closely to
the President's visits to the region, to the upcoming summit - and to future ministerials - and be
marked by specific concrete accomplishments.
As to substance, engagement in Latin America should focus on two subjects for action -
increasing economic exchange and consolidating democracy - and two subjects for hemispheric
goodwill - human capital formation and poverty alleviation. Each of these should be the focus of
discussion during the President's trip and during the summit.
1)Economic exchange: THIS IS MORE THAN TRADE.
The nations of Latin America are focused on fast track, but their economic growth depends
more on expanding investment and savings than on trade. Therefore, it is important to understand
that Argentina, Chile, Brazil and the others want US investment as much as or more than access to
US markets. Both are important.
ACTION: Fast track. This should be the President's #1 priority in the Fall.
With the expansion of NAFTA will come all the other advantages that pave the way for investment.
Pushing for fast track will be the clearest signal that the President cares about the region.
Everything else is just talk.
ACTION: Hemispheric talks to fix rules for private sector exchange This might include
stock market transactions, the protection of intellectual property, the adjudication of commercial
disputes. and the reduction of money laundering.
2) Consolidating Democracy: EXERCISING LEADERSHIP
Democracy in Latin America is still precarious in many countries. In none are there strong
institutions capable of withstanding powerful shocks. This is an area in which the US enjoys a
massive comparative advantage, an area in which all of Latin America looks to the US with
genuine admiration and respect. The stronger the democracies in the region, the stronger wc are.
Therefore, we should act to encourage the nations in the region to consolidate their democracies.
We should speak often and loudly on issues such as judicial reform. police reform, political party
organization, congressional proceedures, freedom of the press, reducing corruption.
ACTION: support regional standards of democratic reform, This can be done by
encouraging reliance on OAS conventions, by giving backbone to relevant IDB conditionalities,
and by initiating other regional efforts to strengthen democracy.
ACTION: declare unequivocal US support for democracy in the region.
3) Human Capital Formation: PROVIDING ENCOURAGEMENT
4)Poverty Alleviation: SETTING THE RIGHT MORAL STANDARDS
These are critical subjects for the leaders of Latin America. However, it is not possible for
any president of the US to intervene to good effect in these areas except as moral support.
ACTION: provide moral support. The President should support his colleagues in the
region and encourage them to devote their political energies and the economic resources of their
governments to these issues. The principal problem in Latin America is the legacy of centuries of
social injustice and the alarming lack of any sense of community solidarity.
ACTION: give visibility to Latin America. The President needs a high-level official to
speak on behalf of his administration about Latin America and he needs I atin American expertise in
the White House.
from J.S. Tulchin
July 11. 1997
Sep-25-97 11:42 WWICS LAP
202 357 4918
P.03
from J.S. Tulchin
July 11, 1997
Addendum
Since drafting the memo 10 Mr. McLarty, several issues have come into higher relief and should be
taken into consideration as plans are drawn for the president's trip to Latin America in October.
These issues affect the countries hc is to visit and are currently at the top of their lists of priorities.
As a consequence, if the president is not prepared to deal with these issues in his conversations.
his ability to deal with the issues which are, in my opinion more significant and have longer term
implications will be undermined.
Mercosul/Merosur versus NAFTA/FTAA
Brazil's aspirations to join the Security Council
this is tied in with the recent announcement of Argentina's special status and the
impending sale of military high technology 10 Chile
the Pentagon's announcement of a change in US policy on the sale of arms to Latin
America
from J.S. Tulchin
July 11. 1997
SEP-26-97 11:36 FROM:LASP SAIS
2026635737
TO:2023953972
PAGE: 02
JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY
SAIS
Latin American Studies Program
The Paul H Nitze School of Advanced Informational Studies
1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington DC 20036-1984
(202) 663-5728 : FAX (202) 663-5737
email jhuwash.jhu.edu
Riordan Roett
Sarita and Don Johnston Professor and
Director, Lahn American Studies Program
September 26, 1997
The Honorable Samuel R. Berger
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Berger:
I regret that my teaching schedule will preclude my attendance at your breakfast on Monday,
September 29. I thought I would forward a few ideas to you regarding the President's trip to
South America. Mack McLarty and I have discussed some of these themes on other occasions.
The issues in Venezuela I believe are few and rather clear. Petroleum is a very high priority for
the USA and the President will want to use that as a framework for discussions in Caracas.
Macro-economic reform continues to be the principal need in Venezuela - Teodoro Petkoff, the
Planning Minister, has made important strides but much remains to be done. A strong
endorsement of what has been accomplished, and a statement supporting continued reform, would
be appropriate. Venezuela is in a pre-election mood; a strong endorsement of the democratic
"tradition" in Venezuela would be welcome by those concerned over possible social unrest - and
even military discontent - in the immediate future.
The President's trip to Brazil and Argentina is far more complicated. Mack McLarty and I have
discussed the US-Brazil relationship frequently. There is no doubt that Brazil is the key player in
South America and, barring a serious economic crisis, will continue to be so well into the 21st
century. The US should recognize that fact. The day-to-day irritations with Brasilia are normal, I
think, at this point in the links between a super power and a rapidly rising regional leader. The
US needs to take a benign attitude towards Brazil. With regard to Mercosur, Brazil is and will be
its principal protagonist. The US should endorse Mercosur - as Mack did at our Mercosur
Economic Summit in Sao Paulo recently - and "de-link" it from the FTAA process.
SEP-26-97 11:36 PROM:LASP SAIS
Exizado
TO:2023353972
PAGE 03
[ had suggested earlier to Mack, that the President might consider asking Cardoso/Menem to
invite the presidents of Mercosur to a joint meeting while he is in the region. That would provide
a strong, positive endorsement of "open regionalism" and recognize the importance of the region
not just iu terms of trade and investment. The political/security dimension of Mercosur is too
little recognized in Washington, D. C.
Brazil, too, has entered an electoral year. While the US does not endorse candidates, 8 strong
statement praising the continued consolidation of democracy in Brazil would be very welcome.
And a statement with regard to social justice and equity would be tricky but useful given recent
progress in reducing poverty with the Real stabilization plan. But much remains to be done and
Brazil faces a long road in addressing decades of neglect in the social area. The President will
face questions regarding Argentina and NATO status as well as a permanent seat on the Security
Council but I am sure that you have worked out appropriate positions on those issues!
In Buenos Aires, I think it would be appropriate not to dwell on any privileged position that the
Argentine government may feel in occupies with the US. That would serve current, short-term
political interests in the Menem administration but be of far less use in crafting an American
position in the Southern Cone in general. A statement by the President regarding the need for a
ju
strong and independent media/press is very important as is a reference to the well known spread
also
of corruption. These are themes that can be woven into a general statement that supports the
impressive economic recovery of Argentina since Menem was first elected in 1989 but also
provides support for those groups in civil society struggling to deepen the democratic
J dney
commitment of the regime.,
(lob
The trip provides an important opportunity to recognize the dramatic economic recovery in both
countries but the visit should not overlook what yet remains to be accomplished in the social and
political fields. To appear to downplay Mercosur would be a mistake. The trade and investment
numbers in Brazil and the Southern Cone indicate 8 renewed interest on the part of the European
Union (which will hold a Summit with the Mercosur presidents in 1999) and the Presidents visit
allows the US to reaffirm its interest in the region and its importance to the US in the next
century.
Sincerely,
Rindau Roett
Riordan Roett
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 15, 1997
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Jim Steinberg
Jim Dobbins
Jeff Davidow
Dan Tarullo
Robert Kyle
Don Carrick
Don Baer
FROM:
Mack McLarty MW6
SUBJECT:
Presidential Travel to the Hemisphere
Given my new responsibilities as the President's Special Envoy
for the Americas, Sandy Berger has suggested that I coordinate
the planning process for upcoming Presidential travel to the
hemisphere. In keeping with my discussions with Jim Steinberg,
we both believe an initial, smaller group should be convened as
soon as possible to begin lining out the trips to Mexico and the
rest of the hemisphere, and, more broadly, to discuss the issues
and policies which will affect the success of the President's
proposed travel.
While there has already been discussion about scheduling and
possible structure of the visits, we want top ensure that
scheduling does not drive policy but rather that policy drives
the schedule. Therefore, we need to begin to put together what
we hope the President's travel will accomplish and how we intend
to get it done.
We need to begin the process now. We face an active period in
hemispheric affairs; the President is committed to the Summit
process and to creating a new partnership in the Americas.
My scheduler Molly Varney will be calling your office shortly to
find a mutually convenient time to meet among the eight of us
Wednesday or Thursday. I look forward to working closely with
each of you in the weeks and months ahead.
CC: S. Berger
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF TE PRES D INT
Office of National Drug Control Policy
A
Washington, DC 20503
T
Xx K
P
FACSIMILE MESSAGE
TO: Ambassabor Dobbins
FAX: 69130
DATE: 7/16 TIME: 9:15 PAGES: 2 + Cover
FROM: JANet crist
FAX NUMBER: 202/395-6708
OFFICE NO:
202/395-6732
COMMENTS:
PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
ARIVIS
Washington, D.C. 20503
July 16, 1997
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0702
Dear Senator Dodd:
Wanted to confirm that the Administration supports the Dodd-McCain legislation on
international drug cooperation. Believe your thinking supports U.S. drug policy by
recommending a mechanism that would allow us to make fundamental improvements in
the way we cooperate with major drug producing and transit countries. At a minimum,
your bill promises to remove a major cause of foreign policy friction, especially with Latin
American and Caribbean countries. Timing for consideration of new ideas is fortunate
because of the upcoming Summit of the Americas and heightened interest in multilateral
counter-drug cooperation following the President's travel to Mexico, Central America and
the Caribbean.
ONDCP is prepared to lead an interagency task force to develop a new strategy. We
must build on our National Drug Control Strategy. We can accomplish the requirement to
build a more effective concept for multi-national cooperation in the two years provided by
your bill.
Although we would want to explore a number of options, elements of a new strategy
might involve increased use of multilateral mechanisms and international organizations
such as the OAS. We might also consider expansion of ad hoc arrangements for in-depth
bilateral counter-drug cooperation with countries of particular interest such as Mexico.
The Department of State and ONDCP are already formulating plans for a fall conference to
develop new thinking along the lines of your proposal.
Thanks for your continued leadership on the drug issue.
Respectfully,
Barry R. McCaffrey
Director
SEM BY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
SECURITY
Washington, D.C. 20503
STATES
July 16, 1997
The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-0303
Dear Senator McCain:
Wanted to confirm that the Administration supports the Dodd-McCain legislation on
international drug cooperation. Believe your thinking supports U.S. drug policy by
recommending a mechanism that would allow us to make fundamental improvements in
the way we cooperate with major drug producing and transit countries. At a minimum,
your bill promises to remove a major cause of foreign policy friction, especially with Latin
American and Caribbean countries. Timing for consideration of new ideas is fortunate
because of the upcoming Summit of the Americas and heightened interest in multilateral
counter-drug cooperation following the President's travel to Mexico, Central America and
the Caribbean.
ONDCP is prepared to lead an interagency task force to develop a new strategy. We
must build on our National Drug Control Strategy. We can accomplish the requirement to
build a more effective concept for multi-national cooperation in the two years provided by
your bill.
Although we would want to explore a number of options, elements of a new strategy
might involve increased use of multilateral mechanisms and international organizations
such as the OAS. We might also consider expansion of ad hoc arrangements for in-depth
bilateral counter-drug cooperation with countries of particular interest such as Mexico.
The Department of State and ONDCP are already formulating plans for a fall conference to
develop new thinking along the lines of your proposal.
Thanks for your continued leadership on the drug issue.
Respectfully,
Barry R. McCaffrcy
Director
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July 18, 1997
Jim/Ted -
Please find attached a draft agenda for
the Monday meeting. (The first lady's
office has been invited to attend.)
I have also included a draft schedule
from Aviva Steinberg. Scheduling feels
strongly about going to Venezuela on
the front end if it is important to be
there on a week day.
Please call on Monday if there are
issues not on the agenda that should
be. Thank you
Nicole
wall
CC: Glyn
REVISEDA.WPD
Page 1
PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO SOUTH AMERICA
TRIP PLANNING MEETING
DRAFT
JULY 21, 1997
I.
Travel Itinerary
-
Countries, in order
-
Major events and cities/destinations (e.g. MERCOSUR event,
Peru/Ecuador mtg,
Speeches to Parliaments, crowd events)
II.
First Lady Itinerary
-
Panama meeting of First Ladies
-
Other recommended stops
III.
Dates of Travel
IV.
Update on Deliverables
-
Brazil/education
V.
Communications Strategy
-
Presidential involvement, including speeches and what venues
-
Press plan
VI.
Miscellaneous
-
Congressional/Cabinet involvement
-
Argentina elections
-
McLarty and advance team travel
VII.
Taskings
DrAft
PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO
VENEZUELA, BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
October 12 - 19, 1997
NOTE: None of the events listed below have received sign-off by the White House. These events
are the requests of the host government.
Sunday, October 12
TBD
DEPART Washington, DC en route Caracas. Venezuela
[flight time: 4 hours and 15 minutes]
Arrival Ceremony
RON
Caracas, Venezuela
Monday, October 13
Message Event Speech
Bi-lat w Caldera
Wreath Laying at El Panteon (Simon Bolivar's tomb)
State Reception Lunch
Embassy Event
4:00 pm
WHEELS UP en route Brasilia. Brazil
[flight time: + hours and 30 minutes]
[time change: +1]
9:30 pm
ARRIVE in Brasilia. Brazil
RON
Brasilia, Brazil
OPTION #1
OPTION #2
Tuesday, October 14
Tuesday, October 14
Arrival Ceremony
Arrival Ceremony
Speech to Brazilian Congress/
Speech to Brazilian Congress/
Speech to Public
Speech to Public
Bi-lat w/ Cardoso
Bi-lat w/ Cardoso
OTR Time
State Lunch
Embassy Event
Embassy Event
State Dinner/Reception
DEPART en route Sao Paulo
RON Brasilia, Brazil
RON Sao Paulo, Brazil
Wednesday, October, 15
Wednesday, October, 15
10:00 am Depart en route Sao Paulo
Speech/Business Event
Speech/Business Event
AmCham event
AmCham event
Depart en route Rio de Janero. Brazil
RON Sao Paulo. Brazil
Helo sightseeing tour
OTR crowd/OTR event
RON Rio de Janero, Brazil
Thursday, October 16
10:00 am
DEPART (Sao Paulo or Rio de Janero) en route Iguacu Falls
[flight time: ?]
TBD
Visit the Iguacu Falls
4:00 pm
DEPART en route Buenos Aires. Argentina
Arrival Ceremony
RON
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Friday, October 17
Speech to Congress/Public Event
Bi-lat with Menem
Press Conference with Menem
Wreath Laying at Plaza San Martin
Possible visit to Jewish Community Center
Embassy Event
State Dinner
RON
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Saturday, October 18
9:00 am
DEPART en route to Bariloche. Argentina
[flight time: 2 hours }
11:00 am
ARRIVE Bariloche
DOWN TIME
RON
Bariloche, Argentina
Sunday, October 19
DOWN TIME
TBD
Depart en route Washington. DC
Berger
COS
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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
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THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The Terrorist Question
THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
what do the suicide bombers in le
ly. the Israeli public sides with Mr.
rusalem and New York City tell us?
Neranyahu. Mr. Arafar loses all his
At Home Abroad
Many in the conference hall
leverage: peace talks halt. Even
suffered experiences that were PE
Something we already knew: There
though 11 was Arstal men who helped
ANTHONY LEWIS
ful even 9 hear described An Arg
are Palestinian extremist groups that
dos editor's 2-year-old - was k
are nourished by terrorism against
Israel uncover the Hamas Belt Sahur
Jews - and It doesn't marter who's In
suicide bomb factory. he opens him-
napped during that country's du
power in israel. how active the U.S. Is.
The Price
ver. and never found. Irma Flaque
self to charges of not doing enough on
Amdia. a Guatamalan Dewspar
or whether peace talks are moving or
security because of now he has turned
columnist. Vas kidnapped in IS
stalled.
If on and off. He 15. and should be.
Has sister, Anabella Flaquer, 1
The question IS how to deal with
paying a price for his Little games.
them. One option is permanent war
AS for Mr. Netanyahu. his leader.
Of
how the family had been warned
to investigate har disapgearance.
between the Israeli and Palestinian
ship has been incompetent Yes. he
have benie, condented,' the said
peoples. But both the Israell and Pal-
has floated the idea of a Palestinian
the torment of not knowing how in
estinian majorities know this 18 futile.
The architects of the Oslo peace had
Truth
died."
The focus was on cases from Me
another Idea: Build 8 peace barween
Israells and Palestinians that will 680-
The answer's in
a Gustsmale and Colombia I
others were mentioned, not only
GUATEMALA
isty the center of each community.
You do this not because If will eradi-
the middle.
Latte America DUE in Russia, Al.
The American press has its prob-
ria, India and elsewhere.
cace all terrorism. That's impossible.
lems. Junes award outlendish dam.
in mest cases the suspicion is the
There will be Palesunian and Israeli
ages In libel and other legal actions
government officials or milleary.
extremises who will never reconcile.
Government denies information
ments were behind the murders:
that should allable. The public
No. you do this because It creates a
minu-state in the West Bank and Gaza
victims had often spoken out agai:
does not love us.
better way to diminish terrorism
But while Mr. Netanyahu has leaked
official crimes and abuses. In CALC
True. But how minor those bur
having the Israell and Palestinian
those ideas LO the Israell press, he has
bis drug lards targeted the pre
moderates fighting (ogether against
dens seem - how petty in a world
never shared them wish the Palesting
and drug craffickers working
the Israell and Palestinian extremises.
where working as a journalist risks
lans or developed any realistic strat-
corrupt officials seem to be doung
we were 5 the process of testing
death. That, smong other places. is
egy for working with Palestinians co
same in Mexica. A Mexican edit
Laun America.
this strategy when Yitzhak Rabin was
achieve his ends. So Palestinians as
Benjamin Flores Gonzalez. was c
gurned down by an Israeli fanatic.
Over the last 10 years. 173 Latin
sume his Ideas are just a Iraud meant
chose gunned to death just th:
Ever since then. the Oslo experiment
reporters. photographers. calum-
for CNN. and that they are supposed to
verice ago.
has been slowly eroding. and If this
nises and editors have been mar-
provide Israel security while Mr. be
Table murder with impunity. To: 1
isn't reversed. we are heading back to
dered They were not covering wars
tanyahu diddles them. or tasses them
a wer of the Palestinian middle
or something else that might be com-
a concession only when it is politically
against the Israeli middle - only It
sidered hazardous dury. They were
cost free for him. When the Americans
will be much worse because now Pal-
just doing their ordinary job: uyung
asked Mr. Netanyabu B temporarily
to publish the truth
Unpunished
estinians have guns. We are heading
freeze building at Har Homa 10 peace
for Boshie on the Jordan.
The chilling thing about those mus
talks could be resurned. be offered to
The two men with the most power to
ders name of the have
crimes against
do so over a four-day holiday when
halt this slide are Yasir Arafat and
solved. DEFECT Exprim Ln-
there would be no construction any-
difference and threats have prevent-
Latin journalists
Benjamin Netanyahu, and what 15
way - an idea deemed too ridiculous
really depressing Is that neither
ed serious investigations.
to even pass to the Palesunians.
seems up to the task. Mr. Aratac's
That grim record was the subject
when Mr. Netanyahu wants to ad
Icadership has been foothardy and
of an EXTEROS dinary conference put
he can. He showed that in Hebron, and
self-defeating He has learned nothing
on here last week by the Inter-Amer-
that is to understand that more 15
Just 18.91 week he blocked a new pro-
Ican Press Association Hundreds of
stake than the lives of Journalis
from dealing with Israells. Look at the
vocative building project in Jerusa-
Hebron deal last year. Mr. Netanyahu
journalists. lawyers. political figures
Flasrain killing Char goes ump!
lem. But he usually debases what he
and others met to call for an end to
a lifelong advocate of keeping Hebron
Ahed rots a society, destroying
has done by placating the ideologues
under Israeh control. relinquished
unpunished crimes against journal-
people's feith in law.
5 his party with acts that drive me
ists.
most of it as part of the Oslo deal.
Pelestinians 10 despair. So the Ameri-
The purpose of the murders is
What made the conference
Why? Because 75 percent of Israchs
cans. Palestinians and his coalition
send a message to the press anc
about
the
wanted Oslo 10 proceed. And they be.
all citizens The message IS: Do
partners have all concluded that he IS
vicums. widows. colleagues and our
lieved then that Mr. Arafer was mak.
a man with no core and that the person
disagree with the powerful: do :
ers told about cheir lives and deaths.
ing a real security cilort. In other
who pute the latest greatest pressure
speak out against evil. Unchalleng
Jorge Carpio Nicolle. a leading
words. 3 weak Mr. Arafac was able 10
the result would be a silent sorte
on him gets the most
Guatemaian editor, died when 30
triumph over Likud ideology because
IC'S so revealing that, even with the
and that 13 a terrible price to C
hooded men amoushed his car on a
he had the leverage of the Israell
peace process frozen. the latest Gallup
Rosaline a May
remote country road on July 3. 1893.
public on his side of the table.
Poll in Israel showed 80 percent of
They asked If he was Jorge Car-
member of the Gustematen C
So what happens? Immediately af.
Israelia favoring a demilitarized Pal-
pio," his widow, Marta Arrivillago
gress, said: "A people withouthin
ter Hebron, Mr. Netanyahu. to restore
estinian state. and even some sharing
Carpio, said. "Then they shot him
mation is a dead people."
his right-wing credentials. starts a
of Jerusalem. The isrecil people have
My husband fell In my arros."
The spread of democracy 5 La
provocative building project at Har
3 core - they know there is no mill-
Mrs. Carpio. who has taken overlas
America has not ended the phane
Homa in Jerusalem, and Mr. Arafat.
tary solution, and that without the two
editor of the newspaper El Grálico.
enon of crimes against the 'pr
instead of finding other ways to ex-
centers finding a way to cooperate,
said those who ordered the kuling
without punishment intolerance
press his disgust. tries to hurt Mr.
there's only 8 future full of yester-
remain unknown The police official
Iree expression remains despite
Netanyshu by turning Palestinian se
days. It's a shame they have no lead-
in charge of the investigation was
fall of authoritarian regimes. and
curity cooperation on and off Natural-
ers to show them the way.
murdered, evidence destroyed
do corrupt or ineffective police :
and all this at a time when Jorge
natice systems.
Carpio's cousin was President of
Butthere 15 courage, too
Guatemula
age that THEREO chose coming "
The New York Times
Violeta Chamorro. the former
the safery of the United States. L
President of Nicaragua. spoke of the
journailsts are prepared to challe
1978 murder of her husband Pedro
the culture of silence and their to
MONDAY AUGUST 4, 1997
Joaquin Chamorro, an editor who
marters to more chan freedom of
opposed the Somoza dictatorship. He
press. Marta Carplo, whose huss
and the others who died. she said,
died for apeaking out said:
"could have had B sate life style. But
conference IS to bring back trus
they had a commitment to truth."
life."
US trade with Brazil and Argentina ($ billion)
14
12
EX to Brazil
$
10
B
IM from Brazil
I 8
L
L 6
EX to
I
o
4
Argentina
N
IM from
2
Argentina
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
US trade with Brazil and Argentina ($ billion)
14
12
EX to Brazil
10
IM from Brazil
8
$ billion
6
EX to
4
Argentina
IM from
2
Argentina
0
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR
form
common
goffect tariff lo
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 8, 1997
NOTE FOR JIM STEINBERG
Jim:
I just received the attached memo from
Allgeier conveying what purports to be
formal USTR opposition to a Mercosur
meeting. Nowhere does it state,
however, that Charlene agrees, nor does
it explain the inconsistency between
this position and Charlene's comments
to Sandy.
This issue clearly requires further
sorting out before anything is sent to
the President. Given that Allgeier,
Brainard and Barshefsky were all
positive about this idea when first
approached, I suspect that resistance
to it has originated with Tarullo and
spread out.
How do you want to proceed?
Join Jim Dobbins
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. memo
Peter Allgeier to Jim Dobbins and Lael Brainard, re: Possible
08/08/1997
P1/b(1)
Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip (1 page)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361
FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]
2009-1155-F
ke2443
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - 144 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA|
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
08/08/97
16:15
202 3959675
IAPL/USTR
5
001/002
FACSIMILE
Office of the United States Trade Representative
Executive Office of the President
Washington, DC
20508
Date: August 8, 1997
Page 1 of 2
Office of the Western Hemisphere
To: Name
Organization
Telephone
Fax
Jim Dobbins
NSC
6-9131
6-9130
Lael Brainard
NEC
5-5104
6-2223
CC:
Nelson Cunningham
McClarty's Office
6-2000
6-2464
Bryan Samuel
State/ARA
647-6754
647-0791
FROM: Peter Allgeier, (202) 395-6135, FAX (202) 395-9675
(Incomplete or problem faxes, call (202) 395-5190)
SUBJECT: USTR View on Mercosur Meeting during POTUS Trip
Please see attached.
URGENT
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. memo
Antony Blinken and David Leavy to Samuel Berger, Mack McLarty,
08/13/1997
P1/b(1)
Jim Steinberg, and Anne Lewis, re: Preliminary Communications Plan
for the President's Trip to South America (8 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361
FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]
2009-1155-F
ke2443
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PI National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA)
financial information |(a)(4) of the PRA|
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA|
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
TREIMENT
OF
STATES OF ENERY
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Washington, DC 20585
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
August 25, 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR CHRIS BALDERSTON
FROM:
ELGIE HOLSTEIN
CH
RE:
Presidential Trip to Latin America
I would like to recommend that Secretary Peña accompany President Clinton on his trip to
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela on October 12-17. This recommendation is based on the central
role that energy will play in Venezuela, and the major role that climate change and clean energy will
play in Brazil and Argentina. As we move toward the climate change conference in Kyoto and the
1998 Summit of the Americas in Santiago, our successful advancement of these issues will be
critical to meeting our economic, investment, and environmental goals in the region.
Specifically, we are working with the White House and State Department on the following messages
and events:
Venezuela:
Presidents Clinton and Caldera will join industry representatives (mainly energy companies)
to sign the Bilateral Investment and/or Bilateral Tax Treaties;
Not
Both Presidents deliver speeches, with President Clinton delivering a major energy address
focusing on energy cooperation in the Americas, energy security and sustainable
development. The Presidents can also announce that the Hemisphere's energy ministers will
Fith
11
gather in Caracas in January to further our progress on these issues;
up
The Presidents witness the signing, by Secretary Peña and his counterpart, Minister Arrieta,
of the U.S Venezuela energy agreement. This agreement builds on successful petroleum
R&D cooperation to date by expanding it to include renewable energy, energy efficiency,
and data/information exchange; and
25
1997
Finally, the Presidents participate in a photo opportunity with Venezuelan students about to
AUG
begin a Fulbright energy study program in the United States.
continuent nd someth musing
Brazil:
Presidents Clinton and Cardoso witness the signing by Secretary Peña and his counterpart,
Minister de Brito, of the U.S.-Brazil clean energy agreement, including cooperation on
energy efficiency, renewable energy, and advanced power systems. This agreement includes
the participation of the U.S. Agency for International Development. While Brazil has been
reluctant to move toward any agreement on addressing climate change, this agreement will
provide concrete actions we can take jointly, on a win-win basis;
The agreement can also be a hook for the President's climate change discussions with
President Cardoso; and
The energy secretaries can witness a private sector signing by a U.S. company selling clean
energy generated by fuel cell technology developed with DOE support.
Argentina:
Presidents Clinton and Menem witness the signing by Secretary Peña and his counterpart,
Secretary Mirkin, of a bilateral Statement of Intent on Activities Implemented Jointly, a
mechanism under the climate change treaty. The Statement of Intent will promote U.S.
industry investments in Argentine clean energy projects that reduce greenhouse gases;
This is followed by Secretaries Peña and Mirkin presiding over a U.S.-Argentina (perhaps
Southern Cone--i.e., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay) Business Roundtable,
where our private sectors recommend governmental steps to promote clean energy
opportunities in the vast Southern Cone market; and
The energy secretaries can witness a private sector signing of a clean energy fuel cell project
agreement.
I hope that you will agree with me that Secretary Peña's participation will help further these issues
by offering concrete actions and resources, and by working with his counterparts on the ground
during the visit. I look forward to working with you as we work toward finalizing arrangements for
the October trip.
CC:
Andrew Friendly, Office of the Special Envoy for the Americas
Ted Piccone, NSC/Latin America
David Sandalow, CEQ
FAX COVER SHEET TO CHRIS BALDERSTON, 456-2525
FROM:
ELGIE HOLSTEIN
RE:
PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA
CC:
ANDREW FRIENDLY, 456-2464
TED PICCONE, 456-9130
DAVID SANDALOW, 456-2710
Please call Aimée Christensen, 586-4576 with any questions.
aft XXX trip &
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9704754
NSC/RMO PROFILE
RECEIVED: 10 JUL 97 12
TO: .BERGER
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
FROM: DOBBINS
September 11, 2006
DOC DATE: 10 JUL 97
By KDE
NARA, Date 05/09/14
SOURCE REF:
2009-1155-F
KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL
PERSONS:
SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR OCT TRIP TO LATIN AMER
ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT
DUE DATE: 16 JUL 97 STATUS: C
STAFF OFFICER: DOBBINS
LOGREF:
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NSCP:
CODES:
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FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
DAVIES
DOBBINS
ELKON
KERRICK
NSC CHRON
STEINBERG
COMMENTS:
DISPATCHED BY
DATE
BY HAND W/ATTCH
OPENED BY: NSTMH
CLOSED BY: NSDRS
DOC 1 OF 1
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECORD ID: 9704754
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT
DOC ACTION OFFICER
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001
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CONFIDENTIAL
National Security Council
The White House
PROOFED BY:
LOG # 4754
URGENT NOT PROOFED:
SYSTEM RBQ NSC INT ARS
BYPASSED WW DESK:
DOCLOG A/O
SEQUENCE TO
INITIAL/DATE
DISPOSITION
Cosgriff
Haines
1
Rice
mah 1/12/2020
Davies
Kerrick
3 2/5 07/12 Seedsie
Steinberg
Berger
4
d
Situation Room
600
N
West Wing Desk
Records Mgt.
Am Action
1a
#
Information
Action
noc:
COMMENTS:
Exec Sec Office has diskette
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
004. memo
James Dobbins to Samuel Berger, re: Planning for the October Trip to
07/11/1997
P1/b(1)
South America (2 pages)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Inter-American Affairs
OA/Box Number: 1361
FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS [President of the United States]-Travel (Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, October
13-18, 1997) [4]
2009-1155-F
ke2443
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office |(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information ((a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.