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FOIA Number: 2006-1066-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
Counsel Office
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Chris Cerf
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6977
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GAO Personnel Security - Pass & Clearance Data for EOP
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107
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6
1
GAO
Report 1K0 Congressional Requesters
October 1995
PERSONNEL
SECU RITY
Pass and Security
Clearance Data to the
Executive Office of the
President
STATES ALEX EA
GAO/NSIAD-96-20
GAO
United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
National Security and
International Affairs Division
B-265771
October 19, 1995
The Honorable William F. Clinger, Jr.
Chairman, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
The Honorable Porter J. Goss
House of Representatives
You asked us to review the White House's procedures for access passes
and security clearances issued since January 20, 1993. Because of reported
delays of over a year in issuing passes, you expressed concerns about how
the White House was managing the access pass and security clearance
processes. As agreed with your offices, this report presents our
(1) analysis of the steps in the access pass approval process for 1993 and
1994 and (2) observations on internal controls over the access pass and
security clearance processes.
Background
One of the ways the Secret Service protects the President and other senior
officials is the use of a system of access passes to the White House
complex. According to the Secret Service, about 7,000 people have passes
allowing access to the White House complex, which includes the White
House, the Old Executive Office Building, and the New Executive Office
Building. The number varies daily and includes members of the press,
military personnel, Secret Service employees, as well as employees of the
Executive Office of the President, detailees from other government
agencies, volunteers, contractor employees, and residence staff. Our
review covers staff and contractors from selected offices of the Executive
Office of the President, totaling 638 individuals.
The various types of White House access passes¹ fall into two
categories-temporary passes, which are issued initially for 90 days and
can be extended beyond the initial period, and permanent passes. The
process, as first documented in March 1994, for obtaining a temporary
access pass requires employees to
'The Secret Service Identified 36 different types of access passes, including several for access to the
White House, several for access to the Old Executive Office Building, several for access to the New
Executive Office Building, and 3 for members of the press to gain access to limited parts of the White
House complex
Page 1
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
B-265771
complete and submit required paperwork, including the Questionnaire for
Sensitive Positions Form (Standard Form (sF)-86) and
undergo limited background checks by the Secret Service and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Et
dat
The process for obtaining a permanent access pass generally requires the
following:
The relevant Executive Office of the President security office reviews the
required paperwork and forwards it to the FBI.
The FBI conducts a background investigation.
The Executive Office of the President reviews the FBI report and other
information and determines whether to recommend approval of a
permanent pass.
The Secret Service issues the pass, if it has no objections relating to
protective interest issues.
See appendix II for a detailed discussion of the above processes.
The White House allows employees of the White House Office, the Office
of the Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development with
permanent White House passes and a need-to-know to have access to
information classified up to the top secret level. Staff from other offices
within the Executive Office of the President grant security clearances
under Executive Order 10450, as amended.2
To measure timeliness of the pass process, we analyzed dates in the
process for employees who entered on duty between January 20, 1993, and
September 16, 1994. These 638 individuals were paid from appropriations
available to 5 offices of the Executive Office of the President. As agreed
with your offices, the scope of our work was to determine the time it took
to obtain passes and analyze time intervals for selected steps in the
process. The White House explained the reasons for some of the
processing times and we incorporated these statements as appropriate.
However, we did not evaluate the reasons for time frame delays or the
Executive Order 10450 provides the basic security standards for agencies to follow. Executive
Order 12968, issued on August 4, 1995, updated and revised the government's personnel security
program, but did not supersede Executive Order 10450.
These included employees who were, according to White House officials, on track to receive a
permanent pass. The employees included current and former staff, contractors, and detailees who
worked for one of the following offices within the Executive Office of the President: the White House
Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Office of Policy Development, the Office of Administration,
and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Not included were unpaid volunteers and individuals
who were employed for short periods early in the administration.
Page 2
B-265771
the White House issued standards in March 1994 that required individuals
to submit the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty. Public Law 103-329
put this 30-day requirement in law. Prior to these actions, there were no
documented Executive Office of the President standards for this part of
the process. However, White House officials said that informal standards
existed. (See app. III)
Agency Timeliness
The times needed by the Executive Office of the President to (1) review
the SF-86 for completeness before submitting it to the FBI and (2) review
the FBI'S investigative report and other documentation and recommend to
the Secret Service that a permanent pass be issued declined from 1993 to
1994. The second step took 174 days in 1993 and 46 days in 1994.
The FBI was not always able to meet its goal for conducting background
investigations during either 1993 or 1994 and increased its goal from
45 days to 60 days in late 1994. FBI officials cited several reasons for not
meeting the goal, including an increased overall caseload and reduced
resources.
The average number of days it took the Secret Service to approve a
permanent pass after the Executive Office of the President recommended
that a pass be approved decreased from 29 days in 1993 to 7 days in 1994.
The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive
Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret
Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions
related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by
the Secret Service for 1994 that showed relatively short processing times
within the Service, but it was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons
for delay. Similar data for 1993 were not available. (See app. III.)
the
Observations on
White House and legislative actions have resulted in a number of process
changes and additional controls designed to improve the timeliness of the
Controls
access pass and security clearance processes. The data we analyzed show
that these changes, with few exceptions, are being adhered to. For
example, when it was discovered that a career employee had taken longer
than the 6 months allowed under Public Law 103-329 to be recommended
for a permanent pass, the Executive Office of the President initiated action
to suspend the employee. The issue causing the delay was resolved within
a month and a pass was issued. Also, most individuals have complied with
a March 14, 1994, Chief of Staff directive to complete the SF-86 within a
Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
B-265771
administration; thus our discussion of them is not based on the existence
of documented problems.
White House officials also suggested several technical corrections, which
we made as appropriate.
In oral comments on a draft of this report, Secret Service officials
generally agreed with our report. They suggested several technical
corrections, which we made as appropriate.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the FBI asked that we clarify
certain information. We revised the report to reflect the FBI'S comment.
(See app. V.)
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we
will send copies to appropriate congressional committees, the White
House Chief of Staff, the Assistant to the President for Management and
Administration, the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Secret
Service, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other
interested parties. We will make copies available to others on request. If
you have any questions concerning this report, please call me on
(202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
David R. Wanna
David R. Warren
Director, Defense Management
and NASA Issues
Page 9
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Contents
Letter
1
Appendix I
12
Scope and
Methodology
Appendix II
15
The Access Pass
Step 1: Initiating Pre-Employment Tasks
15
Step 2: Obtaining a Temporary Pass
16
Process
Step 3: Obtaining a Permanent Pass
16
Appendix III
19
Analysis of Key Event
Time Needed to Be Approved for a Permanent Pass
20
Completion of the SF-86
22
Time Intervals
Executive Office of the President Indicators
23
FBI Indicators
24
Secret Service Indicators
25
Drug Test Indicators
26
Appendix IV
28
Observations on
Temporary Pass Issuance Data
28
Data Related to Staff Separations
30
Controls
Access to Classified Security Information
33
Appendix V
35
Comments From the
Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Appendix VI
36
Major Contributors to
This Report
Tables
Table III. 1: Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for Specified
20
Intervals
Page 10
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Contents
Table III.2: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the
2)
Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret Service
Table III.3: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the
22
Date the SF-86 Was Signed
Table III.4: Average Days From the Date an Individual Signed an
24
SF-86 to the/Date the Executive Office of the President
Forwarded the SF-86 to the FBI
Table III.5: Average Days From the Date the FBI Concluded the
24
Background Investigation to the Date the Executive Office of the
President Recommended Approval of a Permanent Pass
Table III.6: Average Days From the Date the FBI Initiated a
25
Background Investigation to the Date the FBI Concluded the
Investigation
Table III.7: Average Days From the Date of Executive Office of
26
the President Recommendation to Secret Service Approval of a
Permanent Pass
Table III.8: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the
26
Date the Drug Test Was Taken
Table III.9: Average Days From the Date the Drug Test Was
27
Taken to the Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued
Table IV.1: Average Days From the Date Entered on Duty to the
28
Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued
Table IV.2: Average Days From the Date a Temporary Pass Was
29
Issued to the Date a Permanent Pass Was Approved by the Secret
Service
Figure
Figure 1: Average Time Required to Complete Selected Steps in
4
the Permanent Access Pass Process During 1993 and 1994
Abbreviations
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SF
Standard Form
Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Scope and Methodology
To assess timeliness of processing White House access passes and security
clearances, we examined the time intervals associated with each
processing step; reviewed the process and associated laws, regulations,
policies, and procedures; and interviewed officials from the Executive
Office of the President, Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Office of Government Ethics, and Defense Finance and Accounting
Service.
To calculate the processing time for passes and clearances, we collected
the following key event dates associated with processing steps for staff1
assigned to the White House Office, Special Assistance to the President
(Vice President's Office), Office of Policy Development, Office of
Administration, and Office of National Drug Control Policy, on or after
January 20, 1993, who were paid with Executive Office of the President
appropriated funds and needed a permanent pass.
1. Date the person entered on duty.
2. Date the Standard Form (sf)-50 was signed²
3. Date the person took a drug test.³
4. Date the person signed the SF-86.
5. Date the person was issued a temporary pass.
6. Date the FBI initiated a background investigation.
7. Date the FBI finished the investigation.
8. Date the permanent pass was approved.4
9. Date the permanent pass was issued.
10. Date the security clearance was granted.⁶
11. Date the person separated, if applicable.
For reasons of confidentiality, the White House provided a number and
office designation for individuals covered in our analysis.
Staff included long-term contractors, reimbursable detailees (terms of 6 months or more), and
consultants, as well as career and political appointment staff needing a permanent pass.
The SF-50 indicates that a personnel action has been completed; in this case, it relates to the date
entered on duty.
3As indicated in appendix III, this is not a formal part of the access pass process.
'For this interval, we used the date the Executive Office of the President recommended to the Secret
Service that a permanent pass be approved
For this interval, we used the date the Secret Service approved a permanent pass for issuance.
Secret Service officials said that this is not part of the access pass process.
Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
The White House compiled a database containing an identifier and the ke
dates, when available,⁷ for each of 638 individuals. Dates were provided
for (1) individuals entering on duty as of January 20, 1993, through
September 16, 1994, and (2) process steps completed by December 13,
1994. Dates associated with processing steps involving the Secret Service
and FBI were supplied to the White House by those agencies. We received
the database containing the key event dates from the White House in
January 1995 and worked with the White House to correct administrative
mistakes found in the database. We also verified a random sample of ever
dates using original personnel documents and other records.
We analyzed intervals between key event dates to determine average,
minimum, and maximum processing times as well as trends over time. We
discussed our analyses with White House, Secret Service, and FBI officials
to determine reasons for individual processing times and for overall
trends. We also discussed procedures and controls over granting access
passes and security clearances. In our analyses, we obtained White House
explanations of individual cases and overall trends, but we did not further
examine supporting documentation for these individual cases, as agreed
with the requesters' offices. The effects of the limited examinations are
noted in the report where appropriate.
After the database was finalized, White House officials proposed that date
for 54 individuals not be included since they reflected anomalies that skew
the analysis.⁸ We agree that these individuals followed a different pattern
than the majority of individuals in the database. However, they do
represent the actual pass approval process for these individuals;
consequently, we present both sets of data in our detailed analyses.
Excluding the 54 individuals, in most instances, increased the average
amount of time for an interval. Some individuals received a pass when
employed by an office that was not subject to this review. For example, a
person who was employed in January 1993 by the Office of Management
and Budget, an office not included in our analysis, could have received a
Dates were not always available for such reasons as staff separated before a date was met, contractor
staff did not receive an SF-50, drug testing dates were not provided for contractor staff because such
tests are administered by contractors and not the Executive Office of the President, and not all staff
needed security clearances.
"Of the 54, 45 transferred from a position within the Executive Office of the President or another
government agency to the position shown in the database, 2 transferred from their position as shown
in the database to another office within the Executive Office of the President, 5 were originally 90-day
hires that became permanent employees, and 2 had background investigations completed prior to
entering on duty. We were not able to determine whether these 54 represented all individuals in these
situations.
Page 13
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix I
Scope and Methodology
permanent pass and then transferred in 1994 to the White House Office. As
a result, the record would show a 1994 entered-on-duty date and earlier
times for all other key event dates. The effect of this in our analysis is that
when the entered-on-duty date is analyzed against the other key event
dates, the result is a negative number. In our overall analyses, we added
all the time differences, negative and positive, to calculate an average.
We conducted our review from May 1994 to August 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
'For example, if an individual entered on duty on January 20, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on January 17,
1994, the difference would be calculated as a -3. The average number of days in the unadjusted
database from entering on duty to signing the SF-86 was -52 days, whereas in the adjusted database,
the average was 3 days.
Page 14
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II
The Access Pass Process
This appendix describes the process typically followed by White Hou
complex employees for obtaining a White House access pass and/or
security clearance, according to agency procedures that were first iss
in March 1994 and the statements of agency officials. This process
involved activities related to three generally uniform steps: (1) initiati
pre-employment tasks, (2) obtaining a temporary pass, and (3) obtaini
permanent pass. Procedures for employees requiring access to classif
information vary by organization. (See app. IV.)
Step 1: Initiating
The following tasks must be completed concerning each applicant's
appointment:
Pre-Employment
Tasks
Applicants must undergo a security interview conducted by the releva
Executive Office of the President security office.
Applicants must submit to a drug test. It normally takes about 10 days
get the results, and if the test is positive, the person would be disqualif
from appointment.¹
Applicants must undergo an initial name check in which their name, da
of birth, place of birth, and Social Security number are checked throug
the Secret Service's Workers, Appointment, and Visitors Entrance Syst
This consists of checks through four computer databases: the FBI'S
National Crime Information Center database, a criminal history databa
a Secret Service database, and a Washington-area law enforcement
database. According to White House officials, the results are usually ba
within a day.
Applicants must undergo a more extensive FBI name check. The Execut
Office of the President forwards the person's name and date of birth to
FBI, which checks the name through the FBI Central Records System,
computer databases, and the Criminal Justice Information Services'
database to identify any derogatory information and prior arrest records
The FBI has 60 million names in its files. Almost 13,000 name checks wer
done for the Executive Office of the President and associated offices in
fiscal year 1993, and over 7,200 checks were done in fiscal year 1994. Th
processing time for this more extensive name check typically takes seve
days, according to White House and FBI officials.
"In addition to having a drug test as an applicant, a person is subject to random drug testing once
employed by the Executive Office of the President, in accordance with Executive Order 12564, issue
September 15, 1986, and the Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as amend
in December 1992.
Page 15
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Secur
Appendix II
The Access Pass Process
Step 2: Obtaining a
Each new employee who is expected to work 90 days or more has 30 days
from the date entered on duty to complete the SF-86, an FBI investigation
Temporary Pass
consent form, a tax check waiver, and a personal data statement
questionnaire (for employees of certain offices) and provide other
personal data as needed. This 30-day-standard was established by the
White House on March 14, 1994. Employees not meeting this standard are
to have their access to the White House revoked and are to be placed on
leave without pay until the paperwork is completed. Prior to March 1994,
there were no written standards for completing the SF-86.
If the person has completed the SF-86 and related paperwork, the results of
the initial name check are satisfactory, and the FBI name check has been
submitted, the person is placed on the White House access list. This means
the person must present positive identification each time he or she enters
the White House complex. Prior to this time, the person is allowed into the
complex only with an appointment and identification.
After a satisfactory FBI name check is returned, the relevant Executive
Office of the President security office recommends to the Secret Service
that a temporary pass be issued to the employee for a period not to exceed
90 days, although 30-day extensions are allowed. The person is
fingerprinted by the Secret Service, and the fingerprints are sent through
the national database. Each new employee is required to attend a security
briefing, and his or her attendance is documented. In the case of an
extension, the Executive Office of the President requests the Secret
Service to extend the temporary pass. After one extension, the Secret
Service contacts the requesting office to provide a rationale for an
additional extension, according to Service officials.
The SF-86 forms from White House Office, Office of the Vice President, and
Office of Policy Development staff go to the White House Counsel's office.
A security officer in the Office of Administration reviews the SF-86s of
individuals from the Office of Administration and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy. According to White House officials, each sF-86 is
reviewed to verify its correctness and completeness and to determine if
any immediate issues need to be addressed.
Step 3: Obtaining a
Before a permanent pass or a security clearance can be issued, the FBI, or
some other agency, must conduct a full-field background investigation.
Permanent Pass
The Executive Office of the President's request to the FBI for such an
investigation includes the SF-86 and related documents.
Page 16
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix II
The Access Pass Process
FBI officials told us that their goal for first-time full-field background
investigations was changed in late 1994 from 45 to 60 calendar days. An
updated investigation, which is done every 5 years, has a goal of 90 days
According to FBI officials, these goals were changed before 1993 due to
staff shortages and an increased demand for investigations. The goals h
been 35 calendar days for a first-time investigation and 75 days for a
reinvestigation. FBI officials explained that the difference in goals is due
the urgency of completing first-time investigations. The FBI estimates th
it conducts about 1,000 to 1,500 background investigations a year for the
Executive Office of the President-about 25 percent of the FBI total.
According to FBI officials, if the investigation reveals information that
warrants attention, the FBI notifies the White House Counsel's Office, th
White House Office of Personnel Security, or the Security Office of the
Executive Office of the President and might provide an interim report. A
the completion of its investigation, the FBI sends an investigation summa
to the appropriate reviewing office, which in turn forwards a copy to the
Secret Service. Depending on the case, the FBI may also send copies of
individual interview summaries but does not typically send the complete
investigative file.
According to White House officials, once the reviewing office receives t]
FBI background investigation summary, its review process may involve a
wide range of issues. Such issues may include prior arrests, credit
problems, inability to verify previous employment, mistakes in paperwo
or employment suitability. The reviewing office determines any needed
follow-up, such as contacting the subject for additional information or
having the FBI investigate further. White House officials said that they
rarely found it necessary to request a follow-up investigation.
White House officials stated they have several sources of information
available to them during the review process, such as the FBI'S backgroun
investigation report; the SF-86; the personal data statement provided by t
employee (if applicable); the tax check results; financial disclosure
information; and the National Crime Information Center check results. A
information is returned from the agencies and departments, White House
procedures, since March 1994, have required that it be reviewed within
5 days by the White House Counsel's office and the White House Person
Security office. The decision to grant a permanent pass involves not just
security concerns, but also suitability for continued employment, since ti
White House may decide, based on its review, not to permanently hire
certain individuals.
Page 17
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Secur
Appendix II
The Access Pass Process
After the reviewing office has resolved any questions, the relevant security
office in the Executive Office of the President sends a written request to
the Secret Service for a permanent access pass for the employee. The
Secret Service, if it agrees there is no danger to the President or other
Service protectees, issues the permanent pass. According to White House
and Secret Service officials, during the period of our review, the White
House never directed the Secret Service to issue a pass in circumstances
that it was otherwise reluctant to do.
According to White House officials, the process for obtaining a permanent
pass is the same for a volunteer as for an employee or contractor. These
officials said that most White House volunteers are citizens who perform
duties related to correspondence and do not have permanent passes, but
are allowed entry based on an access list and identification. However, they
also said that there are about 80 volunteers who work in areas in which a
temporary or permanent pass is more suitable for allowing them to carry
out their responsibilities. For example, the current and most recent White
House Counsel have accepted no salary.
Page 18
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
We analyzed time intervals using both the complete, unadjusted database
and an adjusted database that excluded the 54 individuals referred to in
appendix I. Most of these individuals transferred from one position to
another position within the Executive Office of the President.
11
White House, FBI, and Secret Service officials provided us with their
explanations regarding the results of our analyses presented in this
appendix and appendix IV. Our analyses did not include verifying the
accuracy of the explanations.
Not all records were applicable to include in averaging the interval
comparisons. Table III.1 shows the number of applicable and
nonapplicable records by category. Records considered to be
nonapplicable include those in which a person separated prior to one or
more key event dates, action was not completed and therefore pending as
of the closure date of the database, or action was taken in some other way
such as a person having a background investigation conducted by an
agency other than the FBI. (Dates were not provided in these cases.)
Page 19
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
sievice
Table III.1: Applicable and Nonapplicable Records for Specified Intervals
Unadjusted database
Adjusted database
Applicable
PTH
Applicable
Interval comparison
records
Nonapplicable records
records
Nonapplicable records
Date entered on duty to date
504
134
458
126
the permanent pass was
approved
- 112 separated
107 separated
- 22 pending
- 19 pending
- 0 other
- 0 other
Date entered on duty to the
613
25
559
25
date the SF-86 was signed
- 23 separated
- 23 separated
- 0 pending
- o pending
- 2 other
2 other
Date the SF-86 was signed to
600
38
546
38
the date the FBI initiated a
background investigation
- 35 separated
- 35 separated
- 0 pending
- 0 pending
- 3 other
- 3 other
Date the FBI finished a
522
116
473
111
background investigation to
the date the permanent pass
- 95 separated
- 93 separated
was recommended
- 18 pending
- 16 pending
- 3 other
- 2 other
Date the FBI initiated a
574
64
523
61
background Investigation to
the date the FBI finished the
- 50 separated
- 50 separated
investigation
- 11 pending
- 9 pending
- 3 other
- 2 other
Date a permanent pass was
504
134
458
126
recommended to the date the
pass was approved
-112 separated
107 separated
- 22 pending
- 19 pending
- 0 other
- 0 other
Time Needed to Be
The processing time needed for an individual to be approved for a
permanent White House access pass after entering on duty decreased from
Approved for a
1993 to 1994, as did most of the individual interval time frames leading up
Permanent Pass
to final approval of a pass. As shown by table III.2, the average number of
days it took to approve a permanent pass decreased from 1993 to 1994.
Page 20
GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III
DI
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervalsi tierty
Table III.2: Average Days From the
Date Entered on Duty to the Date a
Average number of
Average number
Permanent Pass Was Approved by the
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted de
Secret Service
1993
346
3
1994
98
1.
Overall average
RATIO
295
3
$160.03
the
Only 2 permanent passes received final approval prior to September 20,
1993, and of the 400 staff entering on duty during 1993, 250 took over
300 days to be approved for permanent passes. Only 1 of 104 staff enterin
on duty in 1994 took over 300 days. White House officials attributed the
longer processing times in 1993 to (1) operational and administrative
inefficiencies and (2) the large volume of staff entering on duty in 1993.
They said the time decreased in 1994 because (1) fewer people began
work, (2) the White House corrected some inefficiencies in the process,
(3) the White House Chief of Staff and Congress emphasized the pass
process and established standards for it, (4) the White House began using
computers to track the process, and (5) staff and officials became more
experienced in the process.
onlide
With the passage of Public Law 103-329, an employee of the Executive
Office of the President must be placed on leave without pay if the person
has not, within 6 months of commencing employment or by October 31,
1994, whichever is later, had a background investigation, if completed,
forwarded to the Secret Service for issuance of an access pass. Two
individuals did not have a permanent pass request made within the
required 6-month time period as of December 13, 1994-the last date
covered by our analysis.¹ Six contractors also did not meet the legal
deadline, but contractors were not considered to be subject to the law,
according to White House officials.
The following sections describe our analysis related to each time interval
between the date a person entered on duty and the date the person was
approved for a permanent pass. We also discuss key time intervals related
'According to White House officials, the first individual was a career employee with civil service
protection whose background investigation was completed on November 5, 1994 According to the
officials, proper administrative action was taken on November 18, 1994, to place the individual on
leave without pay. The officials added that a background issue was subsequently resolved and a pass
was issued to this person within 30 days of the administrative action. The second individual was a
person who was waiting for Senate confirmation for a position with the Office of National Drug
Control Policy and had requested that a permanent pass not be issued until confirmed by the Senate.
"According to White House officials, for purposes of administrative efficiency, contractors are now
treated as if they were subject to P.L. 103-329. According to the officials, this change was made at
some time after October 31, 1994, the effective date of the law.
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Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
to the drug test date. Although the White House does not consider the drug
test to be part of the access pass process, we include information about
the drug test date because our requesters asked that we analyze that data :298
Completion of the
The first step in obtaining a permanent pass is for the individual to
complete the SF-86 and related paperwork. Table III.3 shows that the
SF-86
average number of days needed to complete the SF-86 after entering on
duty decreased from 1993 to 1994.
Table III.3: Average Days From the
Date Entered on Duty to the Date the
Average number of
Average number of
SF-86 Was Signed
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
1993
100
107
1994
-52°
3
Overall average
66
86
"The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, signed their SF-86 52 days prior to
entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order,
resulting in negative numbers.)
For the period of our review, there were 190 individuals who took more
than 100 days to complete the SF-86, including 36 who took over 300 days.
All but 3 of the 190, and all of the 36, entered on duty during 1993.
The White House attributed the time reductions from 1993 to 1994 to staff
compliance with a directive issued by the Chief of Staff on March 14, 1994.
The directive required that (1) all staff who entered on duty prior to
March 1, 1994, complete their SF-86 by March 18, 1994; (2) all staff who
entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14, 1994, complete
their SF-86 by March 31, 1994; and (3) all staff who entered on duty after
March 14, 1994, complete their SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty.
The White House further issued guidelines on March 21, 1994, that gave
each new employee 30 days from the date the individual entered on duty
to complete the SF-86. Prior to these instructions, there were no written
standards for completing these documents. Employees who do not meet
this standard are to have their access to the White House revoked and are
to be placed on leave without pay until they complete the paperwork.
Eleven individuals (not counting 22 contractors) did not meet the deadline
required by the Chief of Staff's directive or White House guidelines. White
House officials said that in all of these cases, the situation was resolved
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Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
promptly after discovery and the SF-86 was then submitted in a timely
matter, with no one placed on leave without pay.
DUE
Three of 471 noncontractor employees who entered on duty prior to
March 1, 1994, did not complete the SE-86 by March 18, 1994, as required.
All 3 signed the SF-86 by March 30,1994, but took 434 days, 432 days, and
35 days to do so from the date they entered on duty. engle 1:6
evenuoze ent
Employees who entered on duty between March 1, 1994, and March 14,
1994, were required to complete the SF-86 by March 31, 1994. Two of six
employees did not meet this requirement. Both signed the SF-86 by
April 25, 1994. These two individuals took an average of 43 days from the
date they entered on duty to complete the SF-86.
Employees who entered on duty after March 14, 1994, were required to
complete the SF-86 within 30 days of the date entered on duty. Six of 73
employees did not meet this requirement.
Five of the six were from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and
according to White House officials, the five cases involved administrative
error. These five people signed their SF-86 an average of 60 days after
entering on duty.
Another entered on duty on May 16, 1994, and signed the SF-86 on June 28,
1994, an interval of 43 days. According to White House officials, it was
known at the time of entry that this person was leaving White House
employment. The person separated on October 2, 1994.
With the passage of Public Law 103-329 in September 1994, Congress
required that employees of the Executive Office of the President complete
the SF-86 within 30 days of entering on duty or by October 31, 1994,
whichever occurred later. None of the cases in our database are covered
by this provision of the law. White House officials told us that they have
complied with this provision.
Executive Office of
We analyzed two key event intervals that are the responsibility of the
Executive Office of the President: (1) the time between when an SF-86 is
the President
signed and the Executive Office of the President forwards it to the FBI for a
Indicators
background investigation and (2) the time between when the FBI ᵃ
completes a background investigation and the Executive Office of the
President recommends that a staff member receive a permanent pass.
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Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
Table III.4 shows that the average number of days needed for the
Executive Office of the President to review submitted SF-86s for
correctness and completeness before forwarding them to the FBI
decreased from 1993 to 1994.
Table III.4: Average Days From the
Date an Individual Signed an SF-86 to
Average number of
Average number of
the Date the Executive Office of the
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
President Forwarded the SF-86 to the
1993
38
37
FBI
1994
18
18
Overall average
33
32
In 1993, the Executive Office of the President's review of SF-86s took over
100 days in 34 of 434 cases, and in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 2 of
155 cases. White House officials stated that the unfamiliarity of staff and
reviewing officials with the information requirements of the SF-86 caused
reviewing officials to request additional data, thus delaying the requests
for FBI investigations.
Table III.5 shows that the average number of days for the Executive Office
of the President to recommend approval of a permanent pass after
receiving the FBI'S investigative report decreased from 1993 to 1994.
Table III.5: Average Days From the
Date the FBI Concluded the
Average number of
Average number of
Background Investigation to the Date
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
the Executive Office of the President
1993
174
175
Recommended Approval of a
1994
46
48
Permanent Pass
Overall average
127
125
During 1993, the Executive Office of the President took over 100 days to
recommend the approval of a permanent pass in 202 of 294 cases, whereas
in 1994, it took over 100 days in only 26 of 217 cases. According to White
House officials, the longer times were attributable to waiting for
information other than the background investigation, such as tax checks,
and the decrease from 1993 to 1994 resulted from correcting procedural
inefficiencies.
FBI Indicators
Table III.6 shows that the average number of days needed by the FBI to
conduct a background investigation increased from 1993 to 1994.
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GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix III
111 returns
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
Table III.6: Average Days From the
Date the FBI Initiated a Background
Average number of
Average number o
Investigation to the Date the FBI
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
Concluded the Investigation
1993
2901
1066
5
1994
70
7
Overall average
59
59
In 1993, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 17 (4 percent) of 402
investigations. In 1994, the FBI took over 100 days to complete 18
(11 pércent) of 159 investigations. The FBI'S goal of completing
investigations within 45 days of initiation was not met 66 percent of the
time in 1993 and 87 percent of the time in 1994. According to an FBI
official, the goal was changed in late 1994 to 60 days. We did not assess the
impact of the goal change because there were no records of investigations
started and completed during the last quarter of 1994.
An FBI official said background investigations exceeded the FBI'S goal for
the following reasons:
The FBI has a limited investigative and administrative staff in the
background investigative area, and their overall caseload in that area
increased.
FBI field personnel who conduct background investigations also have
numerous other investigative and administrative responsibilities.
Forms submitted early in the period of our review were sometimes
incomplete.
Individuals and documents were not always readily available.
Obtaining information from overseas sources slowed the collection of
information.
Issues and/or additional information was identified that needed to be
addressed.
Expediting some investigations slowed the progress of others.
Secret Service
Table III7 shows that the average number of days needed for the Secret
Service to approve a permanent pass after the Executive Office of the
Indicators
President recommended that a pass be issued decreased from 1993 to
1994.
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GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Securit:
Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
Table III.7: Average Days From the
Date of Executive Office of the
Average number of
Average number of
President Recommendation to Secret
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
Service Approval of a Permanent Pass
1993
29
31
1994
7
7
Overall Average
12
12
During 1993, the Secret Service took over 30 days to approve 34 of 115
passes, whereas in 1994, this occurred in 15 of 388 cases.
The Secret Service attributed the 1993 average in part to the Executive
Office of the President not promptly sending pass requests to the Secret
Service and the 1994 average to the time needed to address questions
related to protective interest issues. We analyzed information provided by
the Secret Service for 1994 showing that it took the Secret Service an
average of 3 days to approve a permanent pass after receiving the pass
recommendation from the Executive Office of the President. This
information was not sufficiently detailed to verify the reasons for delay,
and similar data for 1993 were not available.
Drug Test Indicators
All 572 noncontract employees included in the unadjusted database
reported for drug tests. Contractors are responsible for conducting their
employees' drug tests, and we did not separately request the dates for
these tests. Table III8 shows that the average number of days between
when the person entered on duty to when the drug test was taken
decreased from 1993 to 1994.
Table III.8: Average Days From the
Date Entered on Duty to the Date the
Average number of
Average number of
Drug Test Was Taken*
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
1993
24
29
1994
-49
-12
Overall average
10
23
A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, took the drug test prior to entering on
duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different order, resulting in
negative numbers.)
The Executive Office of the President Drug-Free Workplace Plan, as
amended in December 1992, states that due to the large number of new
employees at the beginning of a new administration, it is impractical to
test all of them prior to their appointments. According to White House
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Appendix III
Analysis of Key Event Time Intervals
IIO
officials, this meant that applicants were not required to take drug tests
prior to their appointments throughout much of 1993.
Table III.9 shows that in 1993, individuals typically were issued a
temporary pass prior to taking a drug test. The adjusted database shows
that individuals taking the drug test in 1994 on average did so prior to
obtaining a temporary pass.
Table III.9: Average Days From the
Date the Drug Test Was Taken to the
Average number of
Average number of
Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued*
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
1993
-5
-3
1994
-17
3
Overall average
-6
-1
"A negative number indicates that individuals, on average, were issued a temporary pass prior to
taking a drug test. (See above and app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different
order, resulting in negative numbers.)
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GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
White House and congressional actions have established process changes
and controls to improve the access pass and security clearance processes.
For the time intervals and offices we reviewed, with few exceptions, the
time intervals declined, and the procedures were adhered to. However, our
observations indicate a potential for strengthening controls in several
selected areas, particularly at the start of a new administration. The areas
related to renewing temporary passes, revoking passes after separation,
and granting security clearances. The scope of our work did not address
whether problems occurred as a result of the potential control
weaknesses. While we did not identify specific problems, we believe it is
appropriate to consider improving these controls.
Temporary Pass
Table IV.1 shows that the average number of days needed for an individual
to be issued a temporary pass after entering on duty decreased from 1993
Issuance Data
to 1994.
Table IV.1: Average Days From the
Date Entered on Duty to the Date a
Average number of
Average number of
Temporary Pass Was Issued
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted data
1993
19
26
1994
-26°
20
Overall average
10
25
"The individuals who entered on duty in 1994, on average, received a temporary pass 26 days
prior to entering on duty. (See app. I for an explanation of how steps can occur in a different
order, resulting in negative numbers.)
Temporary passes allow individuals access to the White House complex
while waiting for a permanent pass. Although, since March 14, 1994,
individuals should have completed the SF-86 (and other tasks) prior to
obtaining a temporary pass, some did not. Temporary passes are initially
issued for a period of 90 days and can be extended. A number of
extensions were granted. Individuals held these passes for an average of
341 days in 1993 and 110 days in 1994 before being approved for a
permanent pass.
SF-86 Often Not
Since March 14, 1994, an individual has been expected to have an SF-86
Completed Prior to
completed before receiving a temporary pass. Of the 439 individuals who
Temporary Pass Issuance
signed their SF-86 in 1993, 310 (71 percent) received a temporary pass prior
to signing the SF-86. White House officials told us that in the early days of
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GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
the administration individuals were not required to complete an SF-86
before receiving a temporary pass.
Our analysis of the database indicates that two noncontractors were
issued temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not
yet submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that these individuals
had both been interns and had a prior SF-86 on file, which had not been
reflected in the database. Ten contractor employees were also issued
temporary passes after March 14, 1994, even though they had not yet
submitted an SF-86. White House officials said that Office of
Administration policy at that time was to not process the SF-86 for
contractors until after they had concluded a probationary period. The
officials stated that this is no longer the policy.
Temporary Passes Were
Temporary passes are usually issued for 90 days but can be extended.
Often Extended
Table IV.2 shows the average time between issuance of the temporary pas:
and approval for the permanent pass.
Table IV.2: Average Days From the
Date a Temporary Pass Was Issued to
Average number of
Average number o
the Date a Permanent Pass Was
Year
days-unadjusted data
days-adjusted dat:
Approved by the Secret Service
1993
341
34:
1994
110
11
Overall average
293
29
In 1993, 361 of 398 individuals took 200 days or more to be approved for a
permanent pass, whereas in 1994, only 5 of 104 individuals receiving
temporary passes took 200 days or more to be approved for a permanent
pass. White House officials attributed the decrease from 1993 to 1994 to
changes in the processing procedures.
Our discussions with Secret Service officials and our analyses indicated
that during the longer processing times in 1993, the Service routinely
granted eight or more extensions to individuals for temporary passes as
requested by the Executive Office of the President. In commenting on a
draft of this report, Secret Service officials stated that during the Initial
transitions of administrations it was normal to have more frequent
extensions.
In addition, as of December 13, 1994, the cutoff date for our analysis,
22 individuals, including 10 contractors, were employed but had not been
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GAO/NSLAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
approved for a permanent pass. Two had not received a temporary pass,
and the other 20 held a temporary pass an average of 132 days, as of the
cutoff date. Of 15 who held temporary passes more than 90 days,
3 had permanent passes recommended by the Executive Office of the
President but not yet approved by the Secret Service and had waited
37 days on average since the Executive Office of the President
recommendation;
3 had background investigations completed for an average of 58 days since
the completion; and
9 were still undergoing their background investigations for an average of
57 days.
Given the potential for repeated temporary pass extensions, consideration
should be given to strengthening controls in this area.
Data Related to Staff
Out of the database of 638 records, 188 (29 percent) indicate that the
individuals have separated from the office or contractor position shown in
Separations
the database. The individuals left at various stages in the process of
obtaining a permanent pass or security clearance. Once an individual
leaves Executive Office of the President employment, according to White
House officials, there are procedures to ensure that the individual turns in
the pass. However, the Secret Service has no means of verifying an
individual's employment status and continued need for a permanent pass.
Attention to stengthening controls in this area would be appropriate. We
examined documents related to these procedures, but did not
independently verify whether permanent passes were voided or returned
in these cases.
Individuals Have Left at
Of the 188 records that indicate separation, 7 individuals moved from one
Various Stages of the
office within the Executive Office of the President to another office. Four
Access Pass and Security
additional records concern two individuals who moved from one office
Clearance Process
within the Executive Office of the President to another office, and then left
the second office. Thus, both individuals show two departure dates in the
database. The other 177 records are for people who left the Executive
Office of the President.
All seven individuals who are now with a second office within the
Executive Office of the President were approved for a permanent pass
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Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
either with the first office or the second office. All received a temporary
pass.
Of the two individuals who worked for and separated from two offices,
one was approved for a permanent pass while with the second office. The
other individual had a background investigation conducted while at the
second office and left this position 13 days after the background
investigation was completed. A permanent pass has not been
recommended or approved. Both individuals received a temporary pass.
Of the other 177 people who separated from the Executive Office of the
President,
67 were approved by the Secret Service for a permanent pass;
17 were recommended by the Executive Office of the President for a
permanent pass, which was never approved by the Secret Service;
43 had a completed background investigation, but were never
recommended for a permanent pass;
21 had a background investigation initiated, but never completed; and
29 separated without the FBI initiating a background investigation.
Concerning this data, White House officials said that in the overwhelming
majority of instances, the departure was unrelated to the pass process.
The officials also said that, for example, the fact that an individual left
after the background investigation was completed, but before a
recommendation for a pass was made does not suggest that something in
the background investigation precipitated the departure. The officials said
that similarly, the fact that an individual departed after the Executive
Office of the President recommended issuance of a pass, but before the
Secret Service approved the pass does not imply that the individual left
because the Secret Service declined to approve the pass. The officials.
concluded by saying that as a general proposition, a detailed exposition of
the relationship between departure dates and various steps in the pass
process suggests a correlation that bears no relationship with reality.
Sixty-seven people were approved for a permanent pass.
Seven were approved an average of 186 days after they had departed. In
five of these cases, according to White House officials, the person went to
another government agency but continued to need access to the White
House. Another case involves a person who came back to the White House
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GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
as a detailee from another agency. We do not have information on the
seventh person.
Sixty left an average of 125 days after a permanent pass had been
approved by the Secret Service. We do not have information on how many
returned the pass after departure.
here
Seventeen people had a permanent pass recommended but never
approved.
Six had a permanent pass recommended after they left. One person,
according to White House officials, left the Office of Policy Development
but was expected to return in some capacity. We do not have information
on the other five individuals. These six individuals separated an average of
44 days before the permanent pass was recommended.
Eleven left an average of 93 days after a permanent pass had been
recommended.
The FBI completed the background investigation for 43 people who never
had a permanent pass recommended.
Five had an FBI background investigation initiated and completed after
they departed. White House officials told us that the background
investigation was done in three cases because the individuals needed a
pass in some other capacity-one as a White House detailee, one as a
White House volunteer, and one as an employee of another government
agency. We do not have information on the other two individuals. These
five individuals left an average of 164 days before the background
investigation had been completed.
Thirty-three departed an average of 106 days after a background
investigation had been completed.
Five had a background investigation initiated before they departed and
completed after they departed. These individuals left an average of 23 days
before the completion of the background investigation.
Out of the 177 who separated, 171 had temporary passes at the time of
separation and had held the temporary pass for an average of 266 days
prior to departure. Four individuals received temporary passes an average
of 36 days after their separation, and two never received a temporary pass.
Permanent Pass
According to a Secret Service official, the agency depends on each office
Revocation Procedure
of the Executive Office of the President to notify the Service if an
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GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
individual is no longer employed and thus no longer needs a permanent
pass. Without this notification, the Secret Service has no way of knowing
who continues to need access.
White House officials stated that they maintain a checkout procedure for
employees who leave Executive Office of the President employment, and
unless the White House allows continued access, the employee must
surrender his or her access pass upon separation. The White House
provided us with a document supporting these procedures. According to a
White House official, this process is checked by regular reviews of
attrition and accession lists of White House pass holders. The official also
said that White House pass holder lists are frequently updated.
Access to Classified
The White House allows employees with permanent White House passes
and a need-to-know to have access to classified information up to the top
Security Information
secret level. Generally, executive branch agencies are required by
executive order to follow uniform governmentwide procedures and apply
specific criteria when granting security clearances to individuals.
Executive branch agencies grant security clearances under Executive
Order 10450, as amended, and at the time of our review, handled classified
data under Executive Order 12356, which was revoked and replaced by
Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995. According to White House
officials, the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, and the
Office of Policy Development are not subject to the requirements of
Executive Order 10450 but nevertheless use the same procedures and
criteria to issue the passes that give employees access to classified
information on a need-to-know basis.
As of December 1994, 381 of 638 records in the database indicate that the
person had been authorized access to classified information. These
included 359 staff assigned to the White House Office, the Office of the
Vice President, and the Office of Policy Development who have access to
classified information on a need-to-know basis by holding a permanent
White House pass. An additional 22 records indicate staff assigned to the
Office of Administration and the Office of National Drug Control Policy
who have security clearances granted under governmentwide procedures.
The first of the permanent White House passes was not approved until
September 30, 1993, and the first of the 22 Office of Administration and
These orders establish uniform requirements for personnel security programs in the federal
government. A security clearance is a certification that an individual who requires access to
information classified at a certain level has been found eligible and may be permitted access to
classified information.
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GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix IV
Observations on Controls
Office of National Drug Control Policy security clearances was not granted
until June 22, 1993.2 We requested data on how the offices conducted
business during these 8- and 5-month periods before security clearances
were granted. White House officials stated that interim clearances were
provided to about two dozen senior staff during this time. The officials
further stated that, for reasons of confidentiality, data on the specific
cases was not provided to us. They also said that the overwhelming
majority of the classified work done in the Executive Office of the
President is done by staff of the National Security Council, which is not
one of the offices represented in the data we analyzed.
Given that future administrations may face similar circumstances during
the first few months in office, consideration should be given to
strengthening controls in this area.
In addition, one individual had a clearance at the time entered on duty.
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Appendix V
Comments From the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Buress of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20135
September 1, 1995
Mr. R. Bruce Brown
National Security and International
Affairs Division
General Accounting office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Brown:
This is a follow-up to your August 31 conversation with
Mrs. Margaret Tremblay, of my staff, concerning Job Code 709077,
a review of procedures and practices regarding the issuance of
White House access passes and security clearances.
After consultation with appropriate FBI personnel, it
was determined that a correction was necessary to clarify a
portion of information appearing on page 31 of the draft report
prepared for this review. At your suggestion, Mrs. Tremblay
contacted your associate, Mr. David Hand, on August 31, and
communicated the requested change to him.
Now on p. 25.
Mr. Hand was asked to delete line 17 from page 31,
"Unfavorable information sometimes.. and to replace it with
"Issues and/or additional information was identified which needed
to be addressed." Additional information could include addresses,
jobs, associates, and/or training, not contained in the original
application, but which were identified during the course of the
background investigation. Thank you for the opportunity to
review the draft report.
Sincerely yours,
Swanson D. Carter
Acting Deputy Chief
Office of Public and
Congressional Affairs
1 - Ms. Vickie L. Sloan
ROOM 6513
Justice Management Division
Department of Justice
Page 35
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Security
Appendix VI
Major Contributors to This Repor
National Security and
James F. Wiggins, Associate Director
Uldis Adamsons, Assistant Director
International Affairs
David J. Hand, Evaluator-in-Charge
Division, Washington,
R. Bruce Brown, Senior Evaluator
D.C.
Elizabeth G. Mead, Senior Evaluator
Office of the General
Mark C. Speight, Senior Attorney
Counsel
(709077)
Page 36
GAO/NSIAD-96-20 Personnel Securi
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