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Personnel Security Miscellaneous: Senate QFRs [Questions for the Records] Drafts and Date [1]
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Personnel Security Miscellaneous: Senate QFRs [Questions for the Records] Drafts and Date [1]
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FOIA Number: 2006-1066-F
FOIA
MARKER
This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the William J. Clinton
Presidential Library Staff.
Collection/Record Group:
Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin:
Counsel Office
Series/Staff Member:
Chris Cerf
Subseries:
OA/ID Number:
6975
FolderID:
Folder Title:
Personnel Security Miscellaneous : Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and Date [1]
Stack:
Row:
Section:
Shelf:
Position:
S
107
2
11
2
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. list
re: Personnel (4 pages)
04/29/1994
b(6)
002. list
re: Personnel (11 pages)
05/02/1994
b(6)
003. list
re: Personnel (21 pages)
05/02/1994
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975
FOLDER TITLE:
Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]
2006-1066-F
jm 369
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information |(a)(1) of the PRAJ
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRAJ
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy |(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Personnell Security
Cousp
Senate QTR
Sean R Draft
Dr.
PROFS
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
03 May 94
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CRAIG DID NOT PRO
PDATED
SECURITY CLEARANCE / PASS STATISTICS
#'s ON ALL HIS
So
03-May-94
17:32
THESE COULD BE BETTER. Matt
Number
Adjudicated
Adjudicated
Pending
No. New
of Staff
No. of Perm.
Backgrounds
Backgrounds
Background
Awaiting
Staff Last
AGENCY
incl. detailees
Passes Issued
Awaiting
Pending
Investigations
Paperwork
30 Days
5.5.
Counsel
White House Office
427
311
167
16
67
14
Office of Policy Development
52
26
4
10
5
Council on Environmental Quality
6
5
0
1
0
Executive Residence
89
89
0
0
0
0
Office of the Vice President
26
12 +31+1 7 +1
to
3
0
1
National Security Council
144
112
3
8
21
0
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy
23
18
1
4
0
Office of Science & Tech Policy
41
26
9
6
0
Council of Economic Advisers
34
28
3
3
0
Office of Administration
186
177179
5
4
0
TOTAL
1028
804 815
36
52
116
20
78.2% 80079. 4.5%
5.1%
11.3%
1.9%
Various Totals of Statistics
Total Perm+BI+
Total Pending
No. of Staff Await BI + No Paper
or Await. Paper
White House:Office:
427
427
81
Office of Policy Development
52
52
15
Council on Environmental Quality
6
6
1
Executive Residence
89
89
26
National Security Council
144
3SP
0
Office of the Vice President
26
1
144
21
Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy
23
23
4
Office of Science & Tech Policy
41
41
6
Council of Economic Advisers
34
34
3
Office of Administration
186
186
4
TOTAL
1028
1028
136
13.2%
- 505
20
485
DeCONCINI
1.
What type of security or ethics training is given to White
House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary
position or permanent position?
Every employee in the Executive Office of the President,
whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual
ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to
the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the
White House ethics training sessions.
The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the
conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of
conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are
given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with
written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of
White House ethics officials.
In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House
has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government
Ethics.
Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees
(and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the
appropriate handling of classified information. Under current
procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days
of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in
written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every
individual who is cleared for access to compartmented information
receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.
2
Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of
classified documents at the White House?
The NSC staff does not "oversee" any aspect of the White
House, including practices and procedures for the protection of
classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise
and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC
staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the
safeguarding of national security information applicable to all
government employees, including special restrictions on the
handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with
permanent or temporary White House passes hold a TOP SECRET
L
Call
clearance with SCI access.
Therest
U.C.
V.C.
3. with reference to the number of background investigations
not yet completed on White House, Vice Presidential and
Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:
(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?
MAY
3
37
As, of April 26, 1994, there were 68 employees of the White
House Office, Office of the Vice President and Office of Policy
Development whose FBI background investigations have been
completed but who have not yet received their permanent passes.
(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the
Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long
have they been there.
As of may April 26, 1994, there were employees of the White
3
26
House Office, Office of Vice President and Office of Policy
Development whose FBI background investigation is complete, but
whose file has not yet been forwarded to the Secret Service.
(c) HOW many background investigations have not yet been
initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?
may
3
20
As of April 26, 1994, 29 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD
had not submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI
background investigation. All such individuals began work
within the previous 30 days and are, therefore, in compliance
with the Chief of Staff's directive that all security related
paperwork be completed within 30 days of employment.
(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?
As of may April 26, 1994, there were 77 employees of the WHO,
3
OVP and OPD whose FBI investigations have been initiated by the
FBI, but are not yet complete.
(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White
House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?
As of may April 26, 1994, there were 23 individuals employed by
]
the White House Office whose background investigation has been
pending at the FBI for more than 45 days. There are three such
individuals employed by the OPD and none employed by OVP.
(f) What is the status of these investigations?
These investigations are pending.
(g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is
vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees
versus the previous Administrations?
The White House does not maintain records that would permit
a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present,
the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion
of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous
administrations.
(h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees
who have temporary passes?
As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White
House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially
359
reduced. At present 289 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or
detailees) have received a permanent pass. of those still
holding a temporary pass, a substantial number began work since
8190
January 1, 1994. If such new arrivals are factored out, over 76%
of all such employees and detailees have their permanent pass.
As these figures reflect, the current procedures have
addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had
contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent
pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While
precise data are not available, issuing passes in that time frame
compares favorably with the record of past administrations.
4.
with reference to access to top-secret security information,
it is my understanding that at the White House, once a
favorable full-field background investigation has been
completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to
top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is
determined by the White House Chief of Staff.
(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff
makes a determination as to whether or not an
individual has a "need-to-know" for access to
classified information?
This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff.
It
is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share
classified information with another individual to ascertain
whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and
(2) truly has a "need to know.' All White House employees are
advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House
Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given
individual's security clearance.
(b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews
these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual
being given access to classified information?
White House employees with Top Secret security clearances
are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where
an employee has a specific need to know the relevant
compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has
considered the employee's background investigation and approved
such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the
White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been
approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance
to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI
access at the White House.
5.
It seems to me that many people within the White House may
have access to classified documents and briefings, which go
well beyond the "top secret" classification.
(a) Do any individuals at the White House have security
clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify
those individuals for me?
Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would
not be appropriate to identify such individuals.
(b) What process ensures that others who do not possess
security clearances do not have access to classified
information above the top secret level?
A number of procedures and policies guard against the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most
significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes
to share classified information with another individual to
ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security
clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know.' That fundamental
principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all
White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in
written materials distributed to the entire staff. (Individuals
with clearance to review compartmented information are given an
additional one-on-one briefing on security precautions.) In
addition, all White House employees are advised that disclosure
of classified information to unauthorized persons may result in
criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt about a potential
recipient of classified information, they should contact the
White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of his
or her security clearance.
(c) Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White
House have access to classified information?
Some individuals detailed from other federal agencies (e.g.
the Department of Defense) have access to classified information
on a need to know basis. (All such individuals have an
appropriate security clearance.) In addition, a limited number
of contractors have been granted security clearances. All such
individuals have (1) been the subject of a full field FBI
background check and (2) received a security briefing.
(d) What system of controls do you have in place at the
White House that ensures that sensitive classified
information is secure?
Please see response to Subpart (b) above.
D'AMATO
6.
How many detailees are in positions that would require
security clearances? How many detailees have security
clearances? Do any members of the First Lady's staff
require security clearances?
A number of detailees come to the White House with a
security clearance. Even if they already have a clearance,
however, detailees who are at the White House for more than 90
days are subject to a full field FBI background investigation.
Detailees are covered by the same rules governing access to
classified information as are other employees.
Members
of
the
First Lady's staff, like other White House employees, are
authorized to have access to Top Secret information on a "need to
know basis" only upon favorable adjudication of their background
investigations. While such situations do arise, members of the
First Lady's staff do not routinely have a "need" for access to
classified information.
7.
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to "non-
governmental persons who render regular services to the
Administration" that work in the White House. Please define
a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of how
many there are, or have been since the Administration has
taken office. How many of these "non-governmental persons"
require security clearances, and how many have obtained
them?
The term "nongovernmental persons,¹ when used to refer to
people with access to the White House, includes contractors and
political advisors. A limited number contractors 7 have been Acass
Fifty Four
codeys Th sam LACK/Nown I an republe
art earph an, or That frege Roul would have Acces to CI
if They had a new to seel axcur As a
facarol moth Two new of seen own 17 for
13 balagual,
to classified information ON a new to know bask All received such individuals Such Access have 13
granted only AfRI
granted security clearances after satisfactory adjudication of
their background investigations. Political advisors with
regular access to the White House undergo full field background
investigations, but no political advisor presently has access to
classified information.
INSERT: SENATOR DECONCINI
What is the average number of individuals in the "pipeline" for
security clearances?
Under present procedures, it takes, on average, 120 days
from an employee's start date to the day he or she is issued a
permanent pass. The number of individuals in the "pipeline"
depends on the number of new hires and detailees during the
period in question. As a working estimate, the White House
Personnel Security Office projects that, at any given time,
approximately 15% of all EOP employees will be in the pipeline.
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
001. list
re: Personnel (4 pages)
04/29/1994
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975
FOLDER TITLE:
Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]
2006-1066-F
jm1369
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - 15 U.S.C. 552(b)|
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA)
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute |(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRAJ
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes |(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
For Official Use Only
OGES
16+1+3 Our
packed
1044
This document has been compiled by the Personnel Management
+OMBTR + of
Division, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the
President, and contains both private and personal information
on employees within the White House Office and/or associated
offices. Its contents are under control of the White House
Office, Executive Office of the President, and is provided
for YOUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. It must be properly safeguarded
and appropriately disposed of when superseded or no longer
needed. Reproduction and/or distribution of this document,
or dissemination of its contents is unauthorized without prior
approval of the Director, Office of Administration, as agent
for the White House Office and the Executive Office of the
President.
(20)
For Official Use Only
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
002. list
re: Personnel (11 pages)
05/02/1994
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975
FOLDER TITLE:
Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]
2006-1066-F
jm1369
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOLA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRAJ
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors |a)(5) of the PRA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA|
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells |(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR D'AMATO
Question. Please provide this subcommittee, in writing, with the name, title
and job description for each member of the First Lady's staff along with a
biography. Please also provide this subcommittee with a list of any detailees or
assignees, and their positions, currently working on the First Lady's staff.
Answer. [Matt Moore?]
Question. Please provide this subcommittee with the budget figures for the
First Lady's staff for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.
Answer. [FMD/WHO]
Question. How many persons have been hired in the Office of
Administration on a full-time basis since January 20, 1993? How many persens
have been hired as "Temporary" appointments?
Answer. [FMD/PMD]
Question. Ms. Thomasson, in your testimony you note that "currently you
are below the staffing level goals that you agreed to last year in the
Administration's plan to reduce staffing levels by 25%." You go on to say that
"..as the work ebbs and flows, you may exceed the agreed to limit..." How often
to you exceed that limit? Where do those employees come from when you exceed
that limit?
Answer. [FMD/PMD]
Question. Is it true that in order to reduce the size of the Office of
Administration staff, some persons were transferred to other agencies for payroll
purposes, when in fact they are currently performing the same duties, and
occupying the same offices as they did before the staff reduction? Please
elaborate.
Answer. The facilities management and historical preservation services
were located in GSA prior to being shifted to the Office of Administration during
prior Administrations. Upon analysis of their functions, it was the view of this
Administration that those services rightly belonged in the GSA and were thus
transferred back to the GSA on October 1, 1993, the end of the first fiscal year of
this Administration. This transfer involved two Facilities Management Specialists,
one Historical Preservation Research Specialist, and one Preservation Officer.
Facilities management and historical preservation of government buildings were
functions that were already being performed by GSA. It was in the best interest of
the government to incorporate these functions into GSA to promote the efficiency
of the service. GSA already provided similar services from its offices in the
Executive Office Building.
Question. Please provide a month-by-month breakdown identifying the
persons who have service as volunteers in each EOP agency since January 10,
1993. Include a description of the assigned duties for each volunteer.
Answer. Those agencies of the EOP with authority to accept the services of
volunteers, regularly do so without centralized coordination. We have no statistical
basis or records to account for all EOP volunteers by agency, or to provide a
description of the duties assigned each volunteer. (For example, a tenth grade
class may come for one day to help answer children's correspondence.) If the
services of a volunteer are of a substantive or policy nature, our policy is to treat
the individual as a government employee, with the attendant paperwork and ethics
checks performed.
Question. How many detailees are in positions that would require security
clearances? How many detailees have security clearances? Do any members of
the First Lady's staff require security clearances?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to non-governmental
persons who render regular services to the Administration" that work in the White
House. Please define a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of
how many there are, or have been since the Administration has taken office. How
many of these "non-governmental persons" require security clearances, and how
many have obtained them?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
1
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOND
As I look at the budget request, I am intrigued by the request for additional
money to pay GSA for rent. We have been advised by OMB's most recent budget
amendment that rents will be frozen and adjusted. It may be that this budget does
not include that reduction. However, I am interested why the Executive Office
needs more office space after they have supposedly cut the staff by 25%.
Question. Could you tell me why the Executive Office needs more space?
Answer: [FMD]
I would like to review the personnel cuts over the last year. In you
statement you indicate the Executive Office is currently under the 1,044 self-
imposed FTE level.
Question. How many people are working in the Executive Office? How
many of these people are full-time? How many are part-time? How many
detailees are currently being utilized at the White House?
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
When Dr. Brown testified before this subcommittee I asked him why the
name of José Cerda appeared in the White House phone directory as his executive
assistant and also as a senior policy analyst at the Office of Policy Development. I
also asked whose payroll Mr. Cerda appeared on. He indicated that Mr. Cerda
worked for him and was paid by ONDCP, but worked at OPD. I don't want to
question the President as to how people are used in the White House, but I am
most interested in truth in budgeting.
Question. Are there other detail situations like this in the Executive Office?
Answer. [PMD]
In your effort to reach the 25% personnel reduction you returned a number
of detailees to their agencies and riffed several career employees.
Question. How many detailees were returned to their agencies?
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
Question. How many career employees were placed with other government
agencies?
2
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
Question. How many career employees were riffed?
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
Question. Were any of these given outplacement assistance?
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
You are also asking to increase the number of higher paid employees at the
White House. You note in the justification that there is a need for top quality
advisors who require a higher level of compensation, within the White House
Office imposed salary caps established at the beginning of the Administration.
Question. What is that cap?
Answer: [FMD/PMD]
Question. What would these individuals be earning if there was no cap?
Answer. [FMD]
Question. Would you provide the subcommittee with a listing of what
employees in the White House Office are paid?
Answer. The following table shows the current salary of the senior
White House staff which are 6-10 percent less than those of the previous
Administration.
Title
Pay Range
Approximate
Average
Assistants to the President
$110,000-$125,000
$123,050
Deputy Assistants to the President
$ 85,000-$110,000
$ 97,907
Special Assistants to the President
$ 65,000-$ 85,000
$ 73,301
Last year there was considerable consternation expressed about the number
of phone calls and the amount of mail the White House was receiving. You were
utilizing volunteers to handle these roles.
3
Question. Are you still utilizing volunteers? How many? What are they
doing?
Answer: [Could be extracted from House responses, although this question
is general and could be answered in the same manner]
You are requesting 3 additional FTE to comply with Armstrong V. the
Executive Office. We provided supplemental funding earlier this year for costs
associated with this case.
Question. How is that money being used?
Answer: [FMD]
Question. Why will additional funding and personnel be necessary?
Answer: [FMD/IST]
Funds are being requested to start up the remote mail delivery site.
Question. What will this request give us? What will be the annualized cost
of this facility?
Answer: [FMD/OGS]
Answer. These positions were OA positions whose costs were reimbursed
by the serviced agencies, primarily the Office of Management and Budget and the
White House.
Question. If so, how many and from what agencies?
Answer. As previously stated, these were OA positions whose costs were
reimbursed.
Question. Why is their average grade so high, when GS14s and above are
targeted for reduction?
Answer. The former reimbursable staff members were computer specialists
with high levels of technical expertise, justifying the high average grade. There are
no longer any reimbursable positions within the OA.
The Office of Administration is requesting a $351,000 increase to upgrade
personal computers. How many computers will be purchased with these funds
and will this request complete the upgrades required to meet the technological
advancements? If not, how much will be required in future years?
Answer. The Office of Administration (OA) is requesting $351,000 to
upgrade personal computers. Of this amount, $10,000 will be used by the
Publishing Branch to upgrade its specialized graphics equipment to enable it to
produce greater levels of design/composition/layout work for Executive Office of
the President publications. This will allow more work to be performed in-house
and avoid contracting out to commercial firms at significantly higher cost.
The additional $341,000 will upgrade approximately 150 workstations. This
includes improvements to individual stations as well as network servers and
components. This upgrade will not fully satisfy the technological requirements that
are continuously evolving. A complete changeout of equipment should be planned
for every 3 to 4 years to maintain the technological environment necessary to meet
user demand. Future years should allow for at least the amount specified for fiscal
year 1995 and may reach $500,000, depending upon the intensity of other
enhancements demanded by the users.
SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT
Director, the Special Assistance to the President account is yet another
which has requested an increase in funding over last year's appropriation. You are
requesting an increase of $44,000. Part of this 1.3% increase request is for an
additional $96,000 in travel funds for the Vice-President, or a 35 percent increase.
7
Question. Why is the existing travel budget of $275,000 for the Vice-
President insufficient to meet his travel requirements?
Answer. In fiscal year 1993, the Office of the Vice President (OVP)
obligated approximately $349,000 of the $360,000 of the amount available for
travel. This consisted of an original budget of $275,000 and $85,000
reprogrammed from the personnel object classes. It is anticipated that travel
requirements and costs for fiscal year 1995 will meet or exceed those of fiscal
year 1993.
Question. How much has been expended for the Vice-President's travel so
far this year?
Answer. As of March 31, $160,000 has been obligated to cover travel
costs.
Question. What steps are you taking to seek reimbursement from other
Federal agencies when the Vice President travels on their behalf?
Answer. When legally permissible, other federal agencies are asked to pay
OVP travel costs.
Question. Can you identify for us the number of political, official, or mixed
trips taken by the Vice President in 1993?
Answer. Thirty-six trips were taken in fiscal year 1993. Of this number, 23
were official and 13 were mixed political/official.
Question. What would be the impact if the increase of $96,000 for travel
was not provided.
Answer. The Vice President would be hampered in his ability to perform the
duties of his office.
UNANTICIPATED NEEDS
In FY 1993, no allocations were made from the $1 million Unanticipated
Needs account.
Question. Have any of these funds been obligated so far this year? If so,
for what purposes?
8
Answer. During the current fiscal year, $250,000 has been allocated to the
JFK Assassination Records Review Board.
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Thomasson, regarding the National Economic Council (NEC), which is a
"pod" of the Office of Policy Development, and the Council of Economic Advisers
(CEA), which is separate from this office, can you please tell me:
Question. What is the fundamental difference in the mission of the two
Economic offices?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. What kind of results are the two offices getting?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. Are NEC personnel pulled from CEA staff, or vice versa?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. Do the two offices ever work in concert on a project?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. Is there any duplication of effort?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. Who many of the total staff of the Office of Policy Development
(OPD) are slated for the NEC?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. What is the ratio of professional to administrative staff in each of
the "pods" of the OPD?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
Question. What is the ratio for the CEA?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
9
Question. Could the NEC and CEA be merged? If not, why not?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
In fiscal year 1995 you are requesting an increase of $57,000 in the
"Rent" object class stating that this amount reflects the increase in the temporary
use of additional short-term policy projects based on the rates charged by GSA.
Question. Can you tell us where you are getting the additional space for this
temporary use and what temporary use projects is it used for?
Answer. [FMD/OPD]
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The National Security Council is requesting an increase of $25,000 for
travel. This would bring the travel budget for the NSC up to $350,000.
Question. Can you please explain in detail why this travel increase is
necessary and what additional travel you expect NSC staff to undertake that
cannot be accommodated in your existing budget?
Answer. The NSC staff has been very active during fiscal year 1994
establishing contacts with their foreign counterparts and accompanying the
Secretaries of State and Defense on overseas trips. this has involved extensive
traveling and we anticipate that this same level of travel will be sustained in FY
1995. We consider this travel essential to support the President's aggressive
foreign policy agenda.
As in FY 1994 where we have had unanticipated travel expenditures for
visits such as APE in Seattle, the Russia/Prague/Kiev/Mink/Geneva visits we will
also have travel requirements that are difficult to identify at this early stage of the
budgetary process.
Question. Is the travel of the National Security Advisor also included in the
NSC budget?
Answer. No, the travel of the National Security Advisor is not included in
the NSC budget.
Staffing Levels
10
What amount is budget in fiscal year 1995 to reimburse other agencies for
the costs of detailees? Can you provide this amount by EOP agency.
Answer. [FMD]
Armstrong V. Executive Office of the President
In the fiscal year 1994 supplemental appropriations act, the Congress
established a separate account, the "Armstrong Resolution Account" and provided
an-additional $13,125,000 for activities related to this court case/ The Congress
also directed that you separately identify in this account, any funds which have
been in the past, or will be requested in the future for the Armstrong activities.
Question. What amount in your fiscal year 1995 budget is related to the
Armstrong case? Can you identify these amounts by EOP agency?
Answer. [FMD]
Question. How much has ben appropriated to date and how much has been
obligated?
Answer. [FMD]
White House Security Passes
Question. What type of security or ethics training is given to White House
employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary position or permanent
position?
Answer. [C.Cerf]
Question. Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of
classified documents at the White House?
Answer. {C. Cerf]
Question. With reference to the number of background investigations not
year completed on White House, Vice Presidential and Office of Policy
Development employees, can you tell us?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?
11
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. How many are at the White House pending transfer to the Secret
Service for permanent pass requests? How long have they been there?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. How many background investigations have not yet ben initiated
due to the paperwork not being complete?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. How many are not year back from the FBI?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. How many backgrounds have been requested by the White House
which have been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. What is the status of these investigations?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is vis-a-
vis the background investigations on its employees versus the previous
Administrations?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees who
have temporary passes?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
With reference to access to top secret security information, it is my
understanding that at the White House, once a favorable full-field background
investigation has been completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to
top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is determined by the
White House Chief of Staff.
12
Question. Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff makes a
determination as to whether or not an individual has a "need-to-know" for access
to classified information?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
It seems to me that many people within the White House may have access
to classified documents and briefings, which go well beyond the "top secret"
classification.
Question. Do any individuals at the White House have security clearances
which exceed top secret? Can you identify those individuals for me?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. What process ensures that others who do not possess security
clearances do not have access to classified information above the top secret level?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White House,
have access to classified information?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
Question. What system of controls do you have in place at the White House
that ensures that sensitive classified information is secure?
Answer. [C. Cerf]
13
For Official Use Only
all
OGE'S
plusec
This document has been compiled by the Personnel Management
Division, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the
Res
President, and contains both private and personal information
on employees within the White House Office and/or associated
offices. Its contents are under control of the White House
Office, Executive Office of the President, and is provided
for YOUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. It must be properly safeguarded
and appropriately disposed of when superseded or no longer
needed. Reproduction and/or distribution of this document,
or dissemination of its contents is unauthorized without prior
approval of the Director, Office of Administration, as agent
for the White House Office and the Executive Office of the
President.
For Official Use Only
Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
AND TYPE
003. list
re: Personnel (21 pages)
05/02/1994
b(6)
COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
Counsel Office
Chris Cerf
OA/Box Number: 6975
FOLDER TITLE:
Personnel Security Miscellaneous - Senate QFRs [Question for the Record] Drafts and
Date [1]
2006-1066-F
jm1369
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - |44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - |5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
b(1) National security classified information |(b)(1) of the FOIA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
an agency |(b)(2) of the FOIA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute |(b)(3) of the FOIA]
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information |(b)(4) of the FOIA]
and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRAJ
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA)
personal privacy |(a)(6) of the PRA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
of gift.
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
2201(3).
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
ONDCP
24 soost
21 have Pen PASSE
3 Ane Pendy B.I.
[8015 in HJO
27 Perm PASTeD
temp
8 FBI Doze, in Coeard of
6 Pendy TSN
/
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
2 THE UNITED OFFICE OF STATES
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION
Washington, D.C. 20503
MEMORANDUM FOR
FROM:
PATSY DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL L. ASSISTANT THOMASSON TO THE PRESIDENT FOR MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION AND DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATION
SUBJECT: Senate QFRs
Attached are draft responses to the Senate QFRs. I would be
grateful for any suggestions you may have on them. Because of
the impending deadline, I would appreciate hearing back from you
by noon on Friday. Please forward your comments to Chris Cerf
(x5-2273) by that time.
Distribution: David Dreyer
Joel Klein
Phil Lader
John Podesta
Doug Sosnik
Paul Toback
MAY = 2 1994
- factually okay
Beth has not reviewed
- - Last Q, she will upply
DeCONCINI
1. What type of security or ethics training is given to White
House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary
position or permanent position?
Every employee in the Executive Office of the President,
whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual
ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to
the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the
White House ethics training sessions.
The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the
conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of
conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are
given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with
written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of
White House ethics officials.
In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House
has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government
Ethics.
Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees
(and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the
appropriate handling of classified information. Under current
procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days
of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in
written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every
individual who is cleared for access to compartmented information
receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.
2.
Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of
classified documents at the White House?
The NSC does not "oversee" any aspect of the White House,
including practices and procedures for the protection of
classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise
and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC
staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the
safeguarding of national security information applicable to all
government employees, including special restrictions on the
handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with
permanent or temporary White House passes hold a TOP SECRET
clearance with SCI access.
3.
with reference to the number of background investigations
not yet completed on White House, Vice Presidential and
Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:
(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?
There are 68 employees of the White House Office, Office of
the Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI
background investigations have been completed but who have not
yet received their permanent passes.
(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the
Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long
have they been there.
There are 36 employees of the White House Office, Office of
Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI
background investigation is complete, but whose file has not yet
been forwarded to the Secret Service.
(c) How many background investigations have not yet been
initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?
Twenty nine employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD have not
submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI background
investigation. All such individuals began work within the last
30 days and are, therefore, in compliance with the Chief of
Staff's directive that all security related paperwork be
completed within 30 days of employment.
(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?
There are 77 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD whose FBI
investigations have been initiated by the FBI, but are not yet
complete.
(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White
House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?
There are 23 individuals employed by the White House Office whose
background investigation has been pending at the FBI for more
than 45 days. There are three such individuals employed by the
OPD and none employed by OVP.
(f) What is the status of these investigations?
These investigations are pending.
(g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is
vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees
versus the previous Administrations?
The White House does not maintain records that would permit
a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present,
the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion
of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous
administrations.
(h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees
who have temporary passes?
As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White
House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially
reduced. At present, 338 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or
detailees) have received a permanent pass. of those still
holding a temporary pass, a substantial number [43 plus
detailees] began work within the last 120 days. If such new
arrivals are factored out, over 80% of all such employees and
detailees have their permanent pass.
As these figures reflect, the current procedures have
addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had
contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent
pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While
precise data are not available, issuing passes in that time frame
compares favorably with the record of past administrations.
4.
with reference to access to top-secret security information,
it is my understanding that at the White House, once a
favorable full-field background investigation has been
completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to
top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is
determined by the White House Chief of Staff.
(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff
makes a determination as to whether or not an
individual has a "need-to-know" for access to
classified information?
This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It
is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share
classified information with another individual to ascertain
whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and
(2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are
advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House
Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given
individual's security clearance.
(b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews
these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual
being given access to classified information?
White House employees with Top Secret security clearances
are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where
an employee has a specific need to know the relevant
compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has
reviewed the employee's background investigation and approved
such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the
White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been
approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance
to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI
access at the White House.
5.
It seems to me that many people within the White House may
have access to classified documents and briefings, which go
well beyond the "top secret" classification.
(a) Do any individuals at the White House have security
clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify
those individuals for me?
Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would
not be appropriate to identify such individuals.
(b) What process ensures that others who do not possess
security clearances do not have access to classified
information above the top secret level?
A number of procedures and policies guard against the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most
significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes
to share classified information with another individual to
ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security
clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know." That fundamental
principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all
White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in
written materials distributed to the entire staff. In addition,
all White House employees are advised that disclosure of
classified information to unauthorized persons may result in
criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt, they should contact
the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of
any given individual's security clearance.
add special one
one
briefing su bacass
(c) Do any individuals, who are not employed by the White
House have access to classified information?
Some individuals detailed from other federal agencies (e.g.
the Department of Defense) have access to classified information
on a need to know basis. (All such individuals have an
appropriate security clearance.) In addition, a limited number
of contractors have been granted security clearances. All such
individuals have (1) been the subject of a full field FBI
background check and (2) received a security briefing.
(d) What system of controls do you have in place at the
White House that ensures that sensitive classified
information is secure?
Please see response to Subpart (b) above.
D'AMATO
6.
How many detailees are in positions that would require
security clearances? How many detailees have security
clearances? Do any members of the First Lady's staff
require security clearances?
A number of detailees come to the White House with a
security clearance. Even if they already have a clearance,
however, detailees who are at the White House for more than 90
days are subject to a full field FBI background investigation.
Detailees are covered by the same rules governing access to
classified information as are other employees. Members
of
the
First Lady's staff, like other White House employees, are
authorized to have access to Top Secret information on a "need to
know basis" only upon favorable adjudication of their background
investigations.
While such situations do occasionally arise,
as a general rule, members of the First Lady's staff do not
routinely have a "need" for access to classified information.
7.
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty has referred to "non-
governmental persons who render regular services to the
Administration" that work in the White House. Please define
a "non-governmental person" and provide a breakdown of how
many there are, or have been since the Administration has
taken office. How many of these "non-governmental persons"
require security clearances, and how many have obtained
them?
[Beth Nolan to provide]
INSERT: SENATOR DECONCINI
What is the average number of individuals in the "pipeline" for
security clearances.
Under present procedures, it takes, on average, 120 days from an
employee's start date to the day he or she is issued a permanent
pass. The number of individuals in the "pipeline" depends on the
number of new hires and detailees during the period in question.
As a working estimate, the White House Personnel Security office
projects that, at any given time, approximately [20%7?] of all
White House FTE's will be in the pipeline.
0/51
FOP
DeCONCINI
1. What type of security or ethics training is given to White
House employees? Is this done when they are in a temporary
position or permanent position?
Every employee in the Executive Office of the President,
whether permanent or temporary, is required to receive annual
ethics training. Additionally, individuals who are detailed to
the White House from other agencies are encouraged to attend the
White House ethics training sessions.
The ethics briefings are one hour in length and cover the
conflict of interest statutes, the Executive Branch standards of
conduct regulations, and White House policies. Employees are
given the opportunity to ask questions and are provided with
written materials, including the names and telephone numbers of
White House ethics officials.
In accordance with a regulatory requirement, the White House
has an ethics training plan on file with the Office of Government
Ethics.
Prior to the issuance of a permanent pass, all EOP employees
(and detailees) are briefed on security procedures and the
appropriate handling of classified information. Under current
procedures, all EOP employees receive the briefing within 60 days
of their start date. The same principles are reiterated in
written materials distributed to all White House staff. Every
indidvidual who is cleared for access to compartmented
information receives an additional one-on-one security briefing.
2. Is the NSC at all involved in overseeing the protection of
classified documents at the White House?
smitt
The NSC does not "oversee" any aspect of the White House,
including practices and procedures for the protection of
classified information. Pursuant to its responsibility to advise
and assist the President in the area of national security, NSC
staff are subject to, and observe, those rules pertaining to the
safeguarding of national security information applicable to all
government employees, including special restrictions on the
handling of compartmented information. All NSC employees with
permanent or temporary White House passes hold a TOP SECRET
clearance with SCI access.
The term "nongovernmental persons, " when used to refer to people
with access to the White House, includes contractors and
political advisers. A limited number of contractors have been
granted security clearances after satisfactory adjudication of
their background investigatations. Political advisers with
regular access to the White House undergo full field background
investigations, but no political adviser presently has access to
classified information.
1
3.
with reference to the number of background investigations
not yet completed on White House, vice Presidential and
Office of Policy Development employees, can you tell us:
(a) How many have been fully investigated by the FBI?
I,
s
^ There are 68 employees of the White House Office, Office of
the Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI
background investigations have been completed but who have not
yet received their permanent passes.
(b) How many are at the White House pending transfer to the
Secret Service for permanent past requests? How long
have they been there.
There are 36 employees of the White House Office, Office of
Vice President and Office of Policy Development whose FBI
background investigation is complete, but whose file has not yet
been forwarded to the Secret Service.
(c) How many background investigations have not yet been
initiated due to the paperwork not being complete?
Twenty nine employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD have not
submitted the paperwork necessary to initiate the FBI background
investigation. All such individuals began work within the last
30 days and are, therefore, in compliance with the Chief of
Staff's directive that all security related paperwork be
completed within 30 days of employment.
(d) How many are not yet back from the FBI?
There are 77 employees of the WHO, OVP and OPD whose FBI
investigations have been initiated by the FBI, but are not yet
complete.
(e) How many backgrounds have been requested by the White
House which been at the FBI for longer than 45 days?
There are 23 individuals employed by the White House Office whose
background investigation has been pending at the FBI for more
than 45 days. There are three such individuals employed by the
OPD and none employed by OVP.
(f) What is the status of these investigations?
These investigations are pending.
(g) Could you tell the Committee where this Administration is
vis-a-vis the background investigations on its employees
versus the previous Administrations?
The White House does not maintain records that would permit
a precise comparison. It is our understanding that, at present,
the time frame for issuing permanent passes (including completion
of background investigations) is comparable to that of previous
administrations.
(h) What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees
who have temporary passes?
As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White
House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially
reduced. At present, 338 WHO, OVP, and OPD employees (or
detailees) have received a permanent pass. of those still
holding a temporary pass, a substantial number [43 plus
detailees] began work within the last 120 days. If such new
arrivals are factored out, over 80% of all such employees and
detailees have their permanent pass.
As these figures reflect, the current procedures have
addressed certain operational inefficiencies, which had
contributed to a backlog. Employees now receive a permanent
pass, on average, within 120 days of their start date. While
precise data is not available, issuing passes in that time frame
compares favorably with the the record of past administrations.
4.
with reference to access to top-secret security information,
it is my understanding that at the White House, once a
favorable full-field background investigation has been
completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to
top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is
determined by the White House Chief of Staff.
(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff
makes a determination as to whether or not an
individual has a "need-to-know" for access to
classified information?
This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It
is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share
classified information with another individual to ascertain
whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and
(2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are
advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House
Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given
individual's security clearance.
(b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews
these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual
being given access to classified information?
White House employees with Top Secret security clearances
are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where
an employee has a specific need to know the relevant
compartmented information and the CIA (on behalf of the DCI) has
reviewed the employee's background investigation and approved
such access. In the case of government employees detailed to the
White House (including the NSC), SCI access may already have been
approved by the detailing agency, which certifies such clearance
to the White House or NSC before that employee is given SCI
access at the White House.
5.
It seems to me that many people within the White House may
have access to classified documents and briefings, which go
well beyond the "top secret" classification.
(a) Do any individuals at the White House have security
clearances which exceed top secret? Can you identify
those individuals for me?
Some White House employees hold Top Secret clearances with
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It would
not be appropriate to identify such individuals.
(b) What process ensures that others who do not possess
security clearances do not have access to classified
information above the top secret level?
A number of procedures and policies guard against the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Most
significantly, it is the responsibility of the person who wishes
to share classified information with another individual to
ascertain whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security
clearance and (2) truly has a "need to know. That fundamental
principle is explained in detail in the security briefing all
White House staff are required to attend and reiterated in
written materials distributed to the entire staff. In addition,
all White House employees are advised that disclosure of
classified information to unauthorized persons may result in
criminal prosecution and that, when in doubt, they should contact
the White House Personnel Security Office to verify the level of
any given individual's security clearance.
DRAFT
-- What is your plan to eliminate the backlog of employees
who have temporary passes?
As the result of a comprehensive review undertaken by White
House Counsel's Office, the backlog has been substantially
reduced.
At
present,
(or
%) of WHO, OVP, and OPD
employees have received a permanent pass. of these,
began
work within the last 120 days. Under current procededures,
which have eliminated certain operational inefficiencies,
employees are expected to receive a permanent pass, on average,
within 120 days of employment. While precise data is not
available, issuing passes in that time frame compares favorably
with the the record of past administrations.
4.
With reference to access to top-secret security information,
it is my understanding that at the White House, once a
favorable full-field background investigation has been
completed by the FBI, that an individual has access to up to
top-secret information on a "need-to-know" basis, which is
determined by the White House Chief of Staff.
(a) Ms. Thomasson, can you tell us how the Chief of Staff
makes a determination as to whether or not an
individual has a "need-to-know" for access to
classified information?
This determination is not made by the Chief of Staff. It
is the responsibility of the person who wishes to share
classified information with another individual to ascertain
whether he or she (1) has the appropriate security clearance and
(2) truly has a "need to know." All White House employees are
advised that, when in doubt, they should contact the White House
Personnel Security Office to verify the level of any given
individual's security clearance.
(b) Which intelligence community agency, if any, reviews
these full-field backgrounds prior to any individual
being given access to classified information?
White House employees with Top Secret security clearances
are eligible for SCI access. This access is only provided where
an employee has a specific need to know the relevant
compartmented information and the CIA has revieved the employee's
background investigation and approved such access. In the case
of government employees detailed to the White House (including
the NSC), SCI access may already have been approved by the
detailing agency, which certifies such clearance to the White
House or NSC before that employee is given SCI access at the
White House.
5.
It seems to me that many people within the White House may