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Folder #5 [Feb. 3, 1998 – Statements by Senator Helms and General Powell Offer Opportunity for Editorials on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from the National Security News Service
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Folder #5 [Feb. 3, 1998 - Statements by Senator Helms and General Powell Offer Opportunity for
Editorials on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from the National Security News Service]
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National Security News Service
Suite 1310
1100 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
202-466-4310
202-466-4344 Fax
February 3, 1998
STATEMENTS BY SEN. HELMS AND GEN. POWELL OFFER OPPORTUNITY FOR
EDITORIALS ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
On January 21, 1998, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms sent a letter to
President Clinton outlining his priorities for the committee for the second session of the 105th
Congress and stating his intentions regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
which would ban all nuclear weapon test explosions. In the letter, Sen. Helms explicitly states:
"Mr. President, let me be clear: I will be prepared to schedule Committee
consideration of the CTBT only after the Senate has had the opportunity to
consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol [on global warming] and the amend-
ments to the ABM Treaty. When the Administration has submitted these
treaties, and when the Senate has completed its consideration of them, then,
and only then, will the Foreign Relations Committee consider the CTBT." (1)
Seven days later, during the State of the Union address, President Clinton announced the release
of a statement by four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Gen. John Shalikashvili,
Gen. Colin Powell, Adm. William Crowe and Gen. David Jones -- endorsing Senate ratification
of the CTBT. These military leaders together have served under the last four presidents.
As the Senate reconvenes and makes pivotal decisions about the congressional schedule for
1998, editorial opinion on this historic treaty will be listened to attentively in Washington.
Called "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control" by
President Clinton, the Comprehensive Test Ban will not be ratified by the United States in
1998 unless Chairman Helms permits it to pass through his committee.
Since President Clinton became the first world leader to sign it in September 1996, the CTBT has
been signed by 148 countries. To enter into force, it must be ratified by the 44 "nuclear-capable"
countries, all of whom have signed it except for India, Pakistan and North Korea. If this is not
accomplished by March, 1999 -- little more than a year away -- a special conference of nations
that have ratified may be convened to consider how to expedite entry into force. Any nation, the
United States included, which has not ratified by then would not be a party to those negotiations.
This advisory is an update and supplement to materials on the CTBT that we distributed last
October after the President submitted the treaty to the Senate, which included a synopsis of pro
and con arguments and a summary of last October's Senate hearings on the Stockpile
Stewardship program and the CTBT. If you would like copies of these materials, or have any
questions, please call Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310.
MILITARY ENDORSEMENTS
The statement of the four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of a number of
recent endorsements of the CTBT by military figures. On December 2, NATO's Defense
Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group issued a formal statement that they "fully
support the goal that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as soon as
possible and, to this end, encourage all states to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay."
On February 2, Gen. Lee Butler, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Strategic
Command (in which capacity he was commander of all American nuclear forces) and former
Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) held a press conference to release a letter signed by nearly 100
international civilian and national security leaders, including former Presidents Jimmy Carter and
Mikhail Gorbachev, calling for immediate action toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Coming a year after the Butler-organized statement on abolition signed by 61 international
generals and admirals that made world headlines, this letter endorses more specific actions,
including "[e]nding nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty." Gen. Butler and Sen. Cranston each strongly endorsed ratification of the CTBT at the
event.
THE NON-PROLIFERATION BARGAIN
The 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prohibiting nuclear weapons states from tranferring
nuclear weapons to any recipient, and non-nuclear states from building or receiving nuclear
weapons, was indefinitely extended by its 180 signatories in April 1995. Many of the nations
that had foregone nuclear weapons acquisition under the NPT argued that the declared nuclear
powers had not lived up to their obligation under Article VI of the treaty to "pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race " The nuclear
weapons states promised completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order to assure
these countries that "effective measures" were being taken, and thereby win worldwide support
for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Arms control experts fear that prolonged failure by the
U.S. and other nuclear powers to ratify the CTBT could undermine worldwide commitment to
the NPT, which has been the centerpiece of the non-proliferation strategies of both Republican
and Democratic administrations since 1970.
PUBLIC OPINION
Public support for ratification of the CTBT remains very high. The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers of Washington, D.C. recently commissioned a statewide public opinion survey on the
CTBT in Colorado. In this major western state represented by two Republican senators, 77% of
those polled said that the United States Senate should approve the CTBT, including 70% of
Republicans and 65% of self-identified "conservatives." These numbers mirror the national
results of the Coalition's poll of September, 1997, which showed 70.3% supporting Senate
ratification of the CTBT, including 66.7% of "strong republicans." (2) National polls conducted
since 1957, when President Eisenhower first sought a test ban, indicate that from 61 to 85 percent
of the American public consistently has favored a nuclear test ban. (3)
STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP
The Senate debate over the CTBT will be closely tied to debates over the Science-Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program of the Department of Energy, the stated purpose of which is to
"maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile in the absence of
underground nuclear testing." (The U.S. Congress adopted a temporary testing moratorium in
1992 and the Clinton Administration extended it in 1993). Secretary of Energy Federico Pena
testified in Senate hearings last October 29 that "there is a strong consensus [among the weapons
lab directors and within DOE] that Stockpile Stewardship is the right program to address the
challenges of maintaining our nuclear deterrent without underground testing."(4) In August, 1995
the JASON panel of senior defense consultants to the government concluded that "the weapons
types in the enduring stockpile are safe and reliable in the context of explicit military
requirements." (5) The Department of Energy's Stockpile Evaluation Program has been
monitoring the nuclear arsenal through non-explosive analysis since 1958 and has discovered
virtually no age-related defects in the nuclear components of warheads up to 30 years of age. (6)
In contrast, Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a leading CTBT opponent, has argued that "testing has been
essential as a vehicle for detecting possible weaknesses in weapon safety" and therefore that "as
long as the United States has nuclear weapons, the need for testing will continue." (7) Similarly,
a January 23 article in the Washington Times quoted a Helms spokesperson as saying that
"Chairman Helms has been supportive of the need for nuclear testing... (8)
Other critics point to evidence that has mounted in the last year that the DOE labs, in addition to
"maintaining safety and reliability," are engaged in research on new nuclear weapons capabilities
under the Stockpile Stewardship program. The B-61-11 bomb, for example, which consists of
the explosive core of the B-61 gravity bomb given a new casing and fusing mechanism enabling
it to penetrate the earth to reach deeply-buried targets, was constructed in the absence of testing.
Many weapons scientists and senators have argued that such new applications do not contradict
U.S. policy, set forth in the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, that there be "no new design warhead
production." Critics of these new applications, however, argue that such improvements undercut
the CTBT's recognition that "the cessation of all nuclear weapons test explosions, by
constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons constitutes an
effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. (9)
Sen. Pete Domenici (R-NM), whose state contains two of the three nuclear weapons labs, is in a
powerful position to influence the fate of both the CTBT and Stockpile Stewardship. As an
influential moderate Republican who is "leaning strongly in support of [the CTBT]," (10) he
likely would bring many other Republican votes if he formalized that support. As chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, he has
worked to increase funding for Stockpile Stewardship to $4.5 billion per year (from roughly $4
billion in FY 1997), telling an audience at Sandia National Lab last November that he is
"expecting gigantic debates in Congress as we try to protect that figure... Indeed, Congress-
woman Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) is sending a letter to President Clinton on February 3 calling for
cuts in the Stockpile Stewardship budget on the grounds that it will "spend enormous sums of
money developing facilities that could be used to research and design new warheads rather than
just for the purposes of stewarding the current arsenal."
With the political battle lines forming in Washington, editorials on the Comprehensive Test
Ban will be read attentively by the Administration and members of the Senate. If you
would like the text of Sen. Helms' letter, recent poll data, the statement on nuclear elimination
released by Gen. Butler, or Rep. Woolsey's letter, please call Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310.
If you do address the CTBT on your editorial page, no matter what your opinion, please mail or
fax us a copy at (202) 466-4344 to ensure that it will be distributed widely in Washington.
ENDNOTES
1) President Clinton has said that he will not submit the Kyoto Protocol on global warming to the Senate until an
additional multilateral summit next November has resolved the issue of whether developing nations, including
China and India, will be subject to limitations on greenhouse gas emissions. Senate Republicans have argued that
the treaty would damage the American economy by encouraging industries to locate in countries that are not bound
by emissions limits.
On September 26, 1997, the United States and Russia signed agreements "demarcating" the distinctions between
theater and national missile defense systems under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and extending the ABM
Treaty to the successor states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) of the former Soviet Union. Sen. Helms
introduced into the Senate in 1996 a bill to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty. Legislation
mandating a national ballistic missile defense system is a top Republican priority for 1998.
2) Both surveys were conducted by The Mellman Group of Washington, D.C. The Colorado poll surveyed 400
registered voters in Colorado on December 15-17, 1997, and has a statistical margin of error of 4.9% at the 95%
level of confidence, according to standard polling practice. The national poll surveyed 800 adults on September 11-
15, 1997, and has a margin of error of 3.5% at the 95% level of confidence.
3) Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Backgrounder, "Public Support for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Remains
High," September 26, 1997.
4) Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Energy and Water Development Subcommittee, October
29, 1997.
5) Nuclear Testing: Summary and Conclusions, Sidney Drell et al, JASON, the MITRE Corp., August 3, 1995.
6) Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives, DRAFT February 1996, U.S. Department of Energy.
7) Letter from Sen. Jon Kyl to Margaret Grannis, August 25, 1997
8) Washington Times, January 23, 1997.
9) Preamble to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed September 24, 1996. For an extensive
discussion of Stockpile Stewardship and the CTBT, see Christopher Paine and Matthew McKinzie, "End Run: The
U.S. Government's Plan for Designing Nuclear Weapons and Simulating Nuclear Explosions under the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington D.C., August 1997.
10) Congressional Record, July 15, 1997.
A10
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1998
LOS ANGELES TIMES EDITORIALS
MARK H. WILLES, Publisher
DONALD F. WRIGHT, President and Chief Executive Officer
MICHAEL PARKS, Editor and Senior Vice President
JANET CLAYTON, Editor of the Editorial Pages and Vice President
Test Ban Treaty Held Hostage
In 1996 President Clinton became the first
treaty signed with Moscow to allow a national
world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test
ballistic missile defense system to be built. The
Ban Treaty, which prohibits all nuclear weapon
case for such an expensive and dubiously effec-
tests and other nuclear explosions. But the
tive system has by no means been made, and
long-sought pact, which has since been signed
the political costs of unilaterally insisting on
by 147 other countries, still awaits U.S. Senate
reinterpreting a major treaty have. been all but
consideration. Responsibility for the holdup
ignored by its proponents. In any case, both the
falls on Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), chairman
ballistic missile defense system issue und the
of the Foreign Relations Committee, who has
global warming problem are utterly unrelated
yet to schedule hearings on the treaty. His
to the aims of the test ban treaty.
inaction threatens to prevent the United States
Presidents of both parties have always rec-
from having a seat at the table next year when a
ognized the urgency of limiting access to
special conference of nations that have ratified
nuclear weapon technology; the 1970 Non-
the treaty meets to consider how the accord can
Proliferation Treaty is among the chief accom-
be more quickly put into force. The possibility
plishments of that effort. It makes no sense now
that the world's leading nuclear power will be
to deny the United States and the rest of the
without a voice at that important meeting is as
world the chance to further control the spread
embarrassing as it is absurd.
of nuclear arms.
Helms in effect is holding the test ban treaty
A few weeks ago four former chairmen of the
hostage until, as he put it in a recent letter to
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who together have served
Clinton, "the Senate has had the opportunity to
Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton,
consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol and
endorsed Senate ratification of the test ban
the amendments to the ABM [Anti-Ballistic
treaty. They recognize that its implementation
Missile] Treaty. The Kyoto Protocol deals
would not diminish national security or the
with global warming and includes a U.S. prom-
integrity of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Surely
ise to reduce its emissions of hydrocarbon gas-
their expertise ought to count for more in the
es, which some conservatives oppose. Helms
Senate than the transparently ideological
and other Republicans want to amend the ABM
agenda of Jesse Helms.
National Security News Service
Suite 1310
1100 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
202-466-4310
202-466-4344 Fax
EDITORIAL ADVISORY
OPPORTUNITIES FOR EDITORIALS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The next two weeks are a good time for editorial writers to address the critical issue of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which President Clinton submitted to the U.S. Senate
for ratification on September 22, calling it "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the
history of arms control." Despite the fact that a recent nationwide poll shows that 70.3 percent
of Americans "think the U.S. Senate should approve a treaty with 140 other countries that would
prohibit underground nuclear weapons explosions worldwide," (1) Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and several conservative Republicans are expected
to vigorously oppose ratification, just as they attempted unsuccessfully to block ratification
earlier this year of the Chemical Weapons Convention. (2)
CURRENT NEWS PEGS
Now is the last good opportunity before Senate debate begins in earnest next March to
editorialize on this issue. There are several news pegs in late October for editorials on the
nuclear test ban treaty:
Two sets of Senate hearings set to begin the week of October 27 and chaired by
Sens. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) and Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) on important test ban-
related issues.
On October 27, the Senate Governmental Affairs International Security, Proliferation and
Federal Services Subcommittee chaired by Sen. Cochran is expected to hold hearings on the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, which the Clinton administration initiated in
1995 to "maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile in the absence of
underground nuclear testing." (3) Then on October 29, the Senate Appropriations Energy and
Water Development Subcommittee chaired by Sen. Domenici is slated to hold hearings on
several treaty issues, including verification.
The recent public opinion poll, mentioned above, demonstrating overwhelming
public support for ratification. Nine of 10 such polls conducted since 1957 -- when
President Eisenhower first sought a test ban -- indicate that from 61 percent to 85 percent
of the American public consistently has favored a nuclear test ban.
The October 1 Senate hearing held by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) on the National
Cancer Institute's long-awaited study summarizing the human health effects from
atmospheric nuclear testing fallout in the 1950s and 1960s (testimony available
upon request).
By running editorials this month on this monumentally important issue you can perform a vital
public service by beginning to educate your readers in preparation for the Senate debate and vote
next spring.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
The test ban treaty is widely regarded as the linchpin of 40 years of global efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and end the nuclear arms race. All U.S. presidents since Dwight
Eisenhower, except Ronald Reagan and George Bush, have strongly supported a test ban treaty.
In 1992, Congress passed legislation creating a moratorium on nuclear testing, which was
reluctantly signed by President Bush and led to President Clinton's 1993 decision to extend the
moratorium and pursue a new round of comprehensive test ban talks.
On September 24, 1996, negotiations on the treaty were completed and opened for signature.
Although the treaty has been signed by the leaders of 146 nations, including President Clinton
who was the first world leader to sign -- it will not go into effect until it is ratified by the 44
"nuclear-capable" nations designated in the treaty. The Russian Duma has not yet ratified the
treaty. Only eight countries have ratified to date, although many are expected to do so in 1998.
(4) International attention is now focused on whether the U.S. Senate will ratify the treaty after it
debates the matter next spring.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS AND COUNTER ARGUMENTS
Please see the attached summary of arguments and counter arguments. In brief:
Treaty proponents say the test ban treaty would:
Help end the arms race by impeding the development of new nuclear weapons designs;
Curb nuclear weapons proliferation by preventing states from carrying out the tests
required to field a modern nuclear arsenal;
Protect the environment by ending underground tests, which have vented radioactive
gases into the atmosphere; and
Save U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars needed to test nuclear weapons.
Treaty opponents say the test ban would:
Not be verifiable at low-yields;
Undermine the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal;
Not stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and
Be of limited utility in view of the refusal of "rogue states" to sign the treaty.
If you do run an editorial, please fax (202-466-4344) or mail us a copy. If you need any other
additional information, please call Elliott Negin or Bill Eisenstein at (202) 466-4310. Attached is
an overview of the anticipated arguments against the treaty and the anticipated responses to those
arguments.
ENDNOTES
1. The poll -- released on September 26 and conducted September 11-15 by the Mellman Group
for the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers -- surveyed 800 adults throughout the United
States. Only 12.5 percent indicated they disapproved of Senate ratification, while 17.2 percent
indicated they "don't know." The poll indicates strong support for the CTBT among all
demographic and political groups, including persons identifying themselves as "strong
Republicans" (66.7 percent) and people with a member of the military in their household (71
percent). The survey's margin of error is plus or minus 3.5 percent.
2. Despite strong public support and a long history of bipartisan leadership calling for a test ban,
the Republican Party opposed it in its August 1996 convention platform. The GOP platform
maintained that deterring "rogue states" from using weapons of mass destruction "will require
the continuing maintenance and development of nuclear weapons and their periodic testing."
3. Many arms control advocates believe the $4.5 billion-per-year program is unnecessarily
costly and may provide a "back door" method for perpetuating the nuclear arms race. Many key
Senate Republicans (including Domenici) consider it to be necessary for the maintenance of the
nuclear arsenal. Two of three U.S. nuclear research laboratories participating in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program, Los Alamos and Sandia, are located in New Mexico,
Domenici's home state.
4. Israel, Mexico, Estonia, Ukraine, Croatia, Peru, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia have
ratified the treaty thus far. Three of the 44 countries with nuclear weapons or reactors -- India,
Pakistan and North Korea -- have not yet signed the treaty. Until the treaty enters into force, all
signatory nations are legally bound under international law to abide by the intent and purpose of
the treaty not to conduct nuclear test explosions. However, the verification and on-site
inspections systems will not become operative until the treaty enters into force.
ATTACHMENT TO NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY EDITORIAL ADVISORY
(ANTICIPATED PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS)
The following is a brief summary of arguments presented by opponents of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty and the responses. of treaty advocates:
1. Verification: President Clinton's letter dated September 22, 1997, transmitting the treaty to
the Senate noted that "our National Intelligence Means, together with the treaty's verification
regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the United States with the means to make the CTBT
effectively verifiable."
Opponents of the test ban treaty maintain that a complete ban cannot be adequately verified for
low yield tests. Treaty advocates note that without the treaty, the United States would be far less
capable of detecting and deterring nuclear test ban violations. They emphasize that the ban
would establish a far-reaching verification regime that includes a global network of seismic,
hydro-acoustic, infra-sound and radio-nuclide monitoring stations and procedures for on-site
inspection of test sites to deter and detect violations. This system would be augmented by
various nations' intelligence-gathering technologies. They also note that the prototype treaty
monitoring and verification system now in place was able to detect and analyze the recent
reports of a suspected Russian nuclear test.
While nuclear explosions at very low yields are difficult to detect by seismic measures alone,
treaty advocates note that the purpose of verification systems is to deter countries from testing.
They point to estimates by experts that even low level nuclear tests would be verifiable at least
90 percent to 95 percent of the time, meaning that a violator would run approximately a 90
percent to 95 percent risk of detection by other means, including satellite imagery, which would
then lead to on-site inspections. In any event, they note that low-yield clandestine tests would
contribute negligible technical knowledge that would not threaten American or international
security.
2. Reliability of nuclear stockpile: Opponents say a ban will undermine the safety and
reliability of the U.S. arsenal. Proponents of the treaty point out that there is now broad
agreement among nuclear scientists that the United States can maintain the safety and reliability
of its nuclear stockpile under a "zero-yield" test ban. A 1995 report by a panel of independent
nuclear weapons experts from JASON, an organization of university-based scientists, endorsed
this view.
Past nuclear tests were used primarily to develop and "certify" new warhead designs. Currently
there are no orders for new kinds of warheads. The Department of Energy has conducted a small
number of "stockpile confidence" tests on each of the warhead designs in the U.S. arsenal to
check their performance. The high success rate of these tests indicates that once a warhead has
undergone sufficient pre-deployment testing, nuclear tests are no longer needed to ensure its
performance. Additionally, stockpiled weapons are subjected to rigorous nonexplosive tests to
check for problems that could result from aging. Finally, all warheads remaining in the U.S.
arsenal after the year 2000 have modern safety features that prevent inadvertent detonation.
3. Nuclear proliferation: Opponents maintain the test ban will not stop proliferation. Arms
control advocates argue that it will at the least make it much more difficult for new and aspiring
nuclear nations to create sophisticated weapons that can be delivered by ballistic missiles.
Furthermore, the declared nuclear weapons states' promise to uphold a test ban was a crucial
factor in winning worldwide support for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in April 1995.1
4. Reluctant signatories: Finally, opponents worry that some nations, such as India and
Pakistan, will not sign the test ban treaty. The treaty will not go into effect until it is ratified by
the 44 nuclear-capable states specified in the treaty. Proponents of the treaty argue that if
countries such as the United States do not take the lead in the international community by
ratifying early on, countries such as India will never feel pressure to sign and other countries will
not ratify.
Furthermore, treaty supporters note that if the United States does not ratify the treaty in 1998, it
will be unable to participate in the conference authorized by the treaty to take place in 1999 to
explore ways to expedite entering the treaty into force. They also say that even if India does not
sign, it would find it difficult to conduct nuclear tests, given the nearly universal international
support for a test ban. Moreover, even if the test ban does not enter into force for several years,
there already is a de facto ban on testing. For the countries that have signed, there is a de jure
ban on testing under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires each
signatory to respect the treaty requirements even though it has not entered into force.
D2
THE HARTFORD COURANT
Sunday, October 5, 1997
The Hartford Courant.
MARTY PETTY
Publisher
JOHN J. ZAKARIAN
Editorial Page Editor
OUNDED
IN
THE OLDEST CONTINUOUSLY
CLIFFORD L. TEUTSCH
ELISSA PAPIRNO
PUBLISHED NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA
Managing Editor
Reader Representative
EDITORIALS
Ban All Nuclear Tests
anning all nuclear tests should not be
the treaty would make it much more difficult for
B
controversial. After all, polls show over-
governments aspiring to develop nuclear capabili-
whelming public support for ratification
ty to do so. They would be faced with a formidable
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
task of building, undetected, sophisticated weapons
which President Clinton signed last year and sent
that can be delivered by ballistic missiles.
to the Senate last month.
Verification of small, "low-yield" nuclear ex-
But the Republican-dominated Senate is
plosions would be difficult but not impossible. Ex-
marching to a different drummer. When Senate
perts estimate that those tests are verifiable 95
debate on the treaty begins later this month, count
percent of the time, meaning that violators would
on Jesse Helms of North Carolina, chairman of the
run a great risk of being caught and punished. As
Foreign Relations Committee, and many of his
for the 5 percent or so of tests that might escape
colleagues to fight vigorously against ratification.
detection, they would contribute little to technical
These senators rarely see an international treaty
knowledge. Mr. Clinton is convinced that America
they like. They would rather have America con-
has the means to make the comprehensive nuclear
nected with the world mostly through its military
test ban effectively verifiable.
prowess.
Reliability and safety of existing nuclear
All presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower,
stockpiles can be maintained under the treaty,
with the exception of Ronald Reagan and George W.
according to a wide spectrum of scientists. Tests on
Bush, have supported a comprehensive test ban
warheads and missiles are already being conducted
teaty. Even Mr. Bush signed legislation approving a
successfully - without nuclear detonations.
moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing.
Scarcely anyone would argue that discourag-
The treaty before the Senate has been signed by
ing the development of new nuclear weapons and
the leaders of 146 nations. Mr. Clinton was the first
curbing nuclear proliferation would be harmful to
head of government to do so. But it will go into
peace and stability. Underground tests have cost
effect only after ratification by 44 "nuclear-capa-
U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars and have vented
ble" nations.
radiocative gases into the atmosphere.
One thing is certain: The world will not be a
The proposed comprehensive test ban would
safer place if the Senate rejects the treaty.
complement existing treaties banning testing in
Opponents of ratification claim that the treaty
the air, on the ground and over water. All that
would not stop the nuclear proliferation. It would
remains is to ban the tests underground. A de facto
be impossible to verify a total ban of testing, they
international ban on underground testing has been
also contend. And, they assert, the reliability of
in force for several years without harm to U.S.
nuclear stockpiles could not be assured without
security. The treaty would make the ban perma-
testing. Their concerns are legitimate, but also
nent.
refutable.
There is little to lose and much to gain from
Proliferation may be impossible to stop, but
ratifying the treaty.