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    "localId": "12005142",
    "label": "Trident Conference",
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{
    "id": "12005142",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Trident Conference",
    "description": "The Trident Conference included six White House meetings of military officials, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, held May 12-25, 1943; and the 83d through 96th meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held from May 13 to 25, 1943, in Washington, D.C.  Items considered during these meetings included HUSKY, global strategy, India-Burma-China theater, U-boat warfare, conduct of the war in 1943-44, defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, and operations UPKEEP and QUEENS.  \n\nThe volume contains the minutes of the Algiers Conference which consisted of three meetings (May 27 and 31 and June 3, 1943)  at General Dwight D. Eisenhower's villa in Algiers.  Present at these meetings were U.S. and British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff plus Prime Minister Churchill and Anthony Eden.  These meetings centered on HOBOGOBLIN, Post-HUSKY, operation SOAPSUDS, and the situation in the Mediterranean.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff",
        "Conference Proceedings"
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    "naId": 12005142,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-05-31",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
    },
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        "logicalDate": "1943-05-01",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
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    "recordType": "description",
    "subtitle": "Papers and Minutes of Meetings",
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    "seq": 4,
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    "ocrText": "U. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nTROM\nstudy. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize\nthere was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the\nbest. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated\nto the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of\nBulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the\nground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over\nthe German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even\nif not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out\nof the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always\nmeasured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would\ncome when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to\nTurkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb\nPloesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be\nsuccessful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen\nwhen Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another\ngreat effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans,\nwhere patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in\ncheck by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions.\nIf these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have\nto give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large\nforces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could\nrelief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year.\nThe third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This\nwould immediately release a considerable British squadron of battle-\nships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or\nthe Pacific to fight Japan.\nCertain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediter-\nrane an. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by\nair attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic\nburden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general\nconquest of Italy apply equally against a toe and heel operation to\nestablish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political\nquestion for the British and United States Governments. What sort of\nlife after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed\nherself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made\n253"
}