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{
    "localId": "12005142",
    "label": "Trident Conference",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142"
}

{
    "id": "12005142",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Trident Conference",
    "description": "The Trident Conference included six White House meetings of military officials, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, held May 12-25, 1943; and the 83d through 96th meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held from May 13 to 25, 1943, in Washington, D.C.  Items considered during these meetings included HUSKY, global strategy, India-Burma-China theater, U-boat warfare, conduct of the war in 1943-44, defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, and operations UPKEEP and QUEENS.  \n\nThe volume contains the minutes of the Algiers Conference which consisted of three meetings (May 27 and 31 and June 3, 1943)  at General Dwight D. Eisenhower's villa in Algiers.  Present at these meetings were U.S. and British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff plus Prime Minister Churchill and Anthony Eden.  These meetings centered on HOBOGOBLIN, Post-HUSKY, operation SOAPSUDS, and the situation in the Mediterranean.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff",
        "Conference Proceedings"
    ],
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{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "naId": 12005142,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-05-31",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-05-01",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "recordType": "description",
    "subtitle": "Papers and Minutes of Meetings",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0001_06.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "U. S. SECRET\n2.0\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nTZOM HEITURS\nall made the task one which must not be underrated Much, however,\nwould be learned from HUSKY. The question arose whether anything could\nbe done this year before the weather broke in August or September. A11\nthe British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to `HUSKY,\nand owing to priority having been rightly given to SICKLE, only one\nU. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Never-\ntheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air\nbattle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should\nthis by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear\nthat H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full- scale in-\nvasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible.\nThey certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable\nprospects of success could be made.\nThe fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca,\nField Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for operation\nANAKIM, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The diffi-\nculties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the\nuse of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of\nthe campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power\nto bear. Should, however, ANAKIM be successfully carried out, he was\nadvised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be\nreopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons\na month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of ANAKIM.\nHe attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the\nIndian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could\nbe helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved?\nThe British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and\nguard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed\nthat it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another\nmeans should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India.\nHe thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation\nagainst the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was\nmost anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making\nuse of those advantages which had been so valuable in TORCH. In that\noperation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had\n255"
}