Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "12005142",
    "label": "Trident Conference",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142"
}

{
    "id": "12005142",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Trident Conference",
    "description": "The Trident Conference included six White House meetings of military officials, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, held May 12-25, 1943; and the 83d through 96th meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held from May 13 to 25, 1943, in Washington, D.C.  Items considered during these meetings included HUSKY, global strategy, India-Burma-China theater, U-boat warfare, conduct of the war in 1943-44, defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, and operations UPKEEP and QUEENS.  \n\nThe volume contains the minutes of the Algiers Conference which consisted of three meetings (May 27 and 31 and June 3, 1943)  at General Dwight D. Eisenhower's villa in Algiers.  Present at these meetings were U.S. and British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff plus Prime Minister Churchill and Anthony Eden.  These meetings centered on HOBOGOBLIN, Post-HUSKY, operation SOAPSUDS, and the situation in the Mediterranean.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff",
        "Conference Proceedings"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0001_01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0001_01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0001_01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 8,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/12005142",
    "naId": 12005142,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-05-31",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1943-05-01",
        "month": 5,
        "year": 1943
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "recordType": "description",
    "subtitle": "Papers and Minutes of Meetings",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 8,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/eisenhower/dde-1114/573439/573439_0001.pdf",
    "mediaId": "2a055f9a49daecb9",
    "ocrText": "PAPERS\nTRIDENT CONFERENCE\nRosber\nMAY 1943\nEuropeen\nPAPERS\nAND\nMINUTES OF MEETINGS\nDECLASSIFIED Authority fct Regrading Meno 52-73\nBy ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73\nof\nBurope\nEDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE\nOFFICE, U.S. SECRETARY,\nOFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF\na L.brary our\n1943\nU. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SEGRET\nDECLASSIFIED Authority get Regrading memo 52-73\nBy ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73\nCOMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF\nTRIDENT\nMINUTES\n1ST MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:30 P.M., 12 MAY 1943\nPRESENT\nBritish\nU. S.\nThe Prime Minister\nThe President\nField Marshal Sir John Dill\nAdmiral Wm. D. Leahy\nGeneral Sir Alan F. Brooke\nGeneral G. C. Marshall\nAdmiral of the Fleet\nAdmiral E. J. King\nSir Dudley Pound\nLt. Gen. J. T. McNarney\nAir Chief Marshal\nMr. Harry L. Hopkins\nSir Charles F. A. Portal\nLt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay\nSECRETARIES\nBrig. General J. R. Deane\nBrigadier E. I. C. Jacob\n251\nU. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nTHE PRESIDENT welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of\nStaff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had\nall met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up\nto TORCH. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just\nas that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting\nat Casablanca had set on foot operation HUSKY, and he hoped that this\nwould meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote\nof our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ\nevery resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that\ncould be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.\nHe then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.\nTHE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken\nplace in the situation since he had last sat by the President's desk,\nand had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget\nthe manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and\nthe Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their\nreputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering\nto the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made\nnecessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward\nview. TORCH was over, HUSKY was near, what should come next? He would\nput forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These\nwould not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the\ncommon stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce\na succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of\nthe war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our\nduty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success.\nThe only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions\nof emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by\nmutual agreement.\nHe did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial\nbombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these\nsubjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared\nup between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for considera-\ntion a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent\n252\nU. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nstudy. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize\nthere was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the\nbest. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated\nto the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of\nBulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the\nground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over\nthe German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even\nif not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out\nof the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always\nmeasured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would\ncome when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to\nTurkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb\nPloesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be\nsuccessful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen\nwhen Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another\ngreat effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans,\nwhere patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in\ncheck by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions.\nIf these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have\nto give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large\nforces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could\nrelief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year.\nThe third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This\nwould immediately release a considerable British squadron of battle-\nships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or\nthe Pacific to fight Japan.\nCertain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediter-\nranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by\nair attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic\nburden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general\nconquest of Italy apply equally against a toe and heel operation to\nestablish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political\nquestion for the British and United States Governments. What sort of\nlife after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed\nherself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made\n253\nU.S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\na separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese\nwithout having to fight for them.\nThe second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was\nmuch impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the\nArctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had\nacknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should\nnever forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian Front.\nWe had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be\nin contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and\nplaced us in their debt - a position from which he would like to emerge.\nAs he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the\nRussian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war,\nthus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down\nthe Balkans.\nThe third objective had already been mentioned by the President\nin his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent\nour vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. A11 plans\nshould be judged by this test. We had a large Army, and the Metropol-\nitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most\nexperienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13\nDivisions in that theater. Supposing that HUSKY were completed by the\nend of August, what should these troops do between that time and the\ndate 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first\nbe mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contem-\nplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious\neffect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate\nweight.\nThe objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to BOLERO,\nSLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP. By BOLERO, he meant the administration\narrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American\nforces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem\nof landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches,\nwith the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's de-\nfenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications,\n254\nU. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nall made the task one which must not be underrated, Much, however,\nwould be learned from HUSKY. The question arose whether anything could\nbe done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All\nthe British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to HUSKY,\nand owing to priority having been rightly given to SICKLE, only one\nU. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Never-\ntheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air\nbattle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should\nthis by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear\nthat H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale in-\nvasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible.\nThey certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable\nprospects of success could be made.\nThe fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca,\nField Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for operation\nANAKIM, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The diffi-\nculties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the\nuse of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of\nthe campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power\nto bear. Should, however, ANAKIM be successfully carried out, he was\nadvised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be\nreopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons\na month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of ANAKIM.\nHe attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the\nIndian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could\nbe helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved?\nThe British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and\nguard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed\nthat it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another\nmeans should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India.\nHe thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation\nagainst the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was\nmost anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making\nuse of those advantages which had been so valuable in TORCH. In that\noperation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had\n255\nU. S. SECRET\nBRITISH MOST SECRET\nTHE PRESIDENT stated that he has always been a firm believer in\nattrition as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African\ncampaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had\nsufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing.\nAs a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000\nenemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had\nTunisia been taken at the outset.\nHe pointed out that the United Nations are now out-producing both\nthe Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses\nof airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead.\nTHE PRESIDENT then said that with the large armies and naval\nforces that are available to the United Nations every effort should\nbe made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United\nNations were losing ground when their forces remain idle.\nTHE PRESIDENT expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey\nwas concerned. When the Prime Minister went on his fishing trip after\nthe Casablanca Conferences he, the President, had been surprised by the\ncordial reception that the Prime Minister had received. He felt that\nTurkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been\nbefore. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward\nthe United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the\nuse of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploesti and\nthe Germans' right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey\ncould be brought into the war, there would be the possibility of com-\nbined operations toward the Adrianople line, thus threatening Bulgaria,\nand inducing that country to withdraw from the war. He felt that the\nRussians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations\nwhich would result in breaking the Germans' lines of communication. He\npointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations\nfrom Turkey.\nTHE PRESIDENT then asked \"Where do we go from HUSKY?\" He said\nhe had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy.\nThis might result in attrition for the United Nations and play into\n257"
}